    [Congressional Record Volume 164, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 10, 2018)]
    [Senate]
    [Pages S126-S127]
    From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                                      IRAN

      Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss my thoughts on
    recent protests in Iran and the important upcoming decisions by the
    President with respect to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or
    the JCPOA.
      While I am mindful that we have limited visibility into Iran and
    continue to learn more about the circumstances and motivations of the
    recent protests, one thing is clear: A significant portion of the
    Iranian people are not satisfied with their government and are
    increasingly willing to make their dissatisfaction heard. It is
    important that we support their right to peacefully express their views
    and demand that the Iranian Government respond with constructive
    dialogue, rather than force.
      It was notable that Iranian President Ruhani implicitly recognized
    the validity of the protests earlier this week when he reportedly said:

           It would be a misrepresentation and also an insult to
         Iranian people to say they only had economic demands. . . .
         People had economic, political and social demands

      That is according to President Ruhani.
      Acknowledging the need for reform, Ruhani continued:

           We cannot pick a lifestyle and tell two generations after
         us to live like that. It is impossible. The views of the
         young generation about life and the world is different than
         ours.

      Now is the time to support the Iranian people in their quest for a
    government that is more representative and supportive of their
    interests. Unfortunately, some have suggested that our response should
    be to withdraw from the JCPOA, an action that I believe would only
    serve to embolden the hardliners in Iran and leave the United States
    more isolated from our allies. Withdrawing from the JCPOA and
    reimposing nuclear-related sanctions on Iran would immediately change
    the narrative inside of Iran, uniting reformists and hardliners alike
    in their opposition to what they view as a hostile United States.
      While some would argue that the recent protests in Iran are
    symptomatic of what they view as a flawed JCPOA, I would suggest
    otherwise. In reality, the nuclear deal exposed one of the Iranian
    regime's central vulnerabilities--namely, that the regime can no longer
    simply blame sanctions imposed by the United States and the
    international community for its economic woes at home. It is becoming
    clearer to the Iranian people that it is actually the regime's
    corruption, financial mismanagement, funding of malign activities, and
    hegemonic ambitions that are at the root of their government's
    inability to enable job creation and to ensure that necessities like
    food and gasoline remain affordable.
      In the coming days, the President has several important decisions to
    make with respect to the JCPOA. In October, President Trump
    acknowledged that Iran is meeting its commitments under the JCPOA, but
    he chose not to certify that continued sanctions relief is
    ``appropriate and proportionate'' to the actions taken by Iran with
    respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program. By the end of this
    week, President Trump is again required to decide whether to issue such
    a certification. I expect he will again choose not to do so.
      The more consequential decision for the President this week will be
    whether to continue waivers of nuclear-related sanctions, as he is
    required to do under the JCPOA. Choosing not to continue such waivers
    would immediately snap back U.S. nuclear-related sanctions, thereby
    putting the United States in violation of the JCPOA. Let me be clear.
    This would be a unilateral action on behalf of the United States that
    would put us in violation of an international agreement, not just with
    Iran but with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China,
    as well.
      By all accounts, the JCPOA is working as intended, and Iran is
    verifiably meeting its commitments under the deal. It is important to
    remember what the JCPOA was designed to do and what it is now
    achieving. The JCPOA commits Iran to never seeking to develop or
    acquire a nuclear weapon; effectively cuts off all pathways for Iran to
    achieve a nuclear weapon during the period covered by the agreement;
    and increases the time it would take for Iran to acquire enough
    material for one nuclear bomb from 2 to 3 months to at least 1 year.
    When this agreement was signed, they were within months of having that
    capability. It dramatically reduces Iran's stockpile of enriched
    uranium and the number of installed centrifuges. It has prevented Iran
    from producing weapons-grade plutonium and has subjected Iran to robust
    monitoring by the IAEA to verify its compliance.
      Withdrawing from the JCPOA at this point would provide no benefit and
    would actually leave us more isolated and less able to deal with the
    various challenges posed by Iran. The crippling sanctions regime that
    brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place only worked
    because the international community was united in its determination to
    keep Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon. If we withdraw from the
    JCPOA unilaterally--and in the absence of a clear violation of the deal
    by Iran--there is no reason to believe that our partners in the P5+1
    would join us. In fact, French President Macron has said that there is
    ``no alternative'' to the JCPOA and told the U.N. General Assembly that
    ``renouncing it would be a grave error.''
      General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the
    Armed Services Committee last year:

           I believe that the U.S. would incur damage vis-a-vis our
         allies if we unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA. Our allies
         will be less likely to cooperate with us on future military
         action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and
         less likely to cooperate with us on countering other
         destabilizing aspects of Iranian behavior that threaten our
         collective interests.

      Our sanctions may snap back but not those imposed by the rest of the
    world, many of whom have begun building economic ties to Iran since the
    JCPOA was signed. Our international partners would then blame us, not
    Iran, for the failure of the deal.
      Some, including President Trump, have argued that we can and should
    dissolve the JCPOA and renegotiate a better deal. This is a highly
    unrealistic proposal. We were only able to achieve the JCPOA after
    years of sustained multilateral diplomatic efforts and the imposition
    of aggressive international sanctions in concert with our partners. It
    will likely be impossible to replicate those conditions if the United
    States unilaterally withdraws from the JCPOA.
      Contrary to President Trump's belief, threatening to walk away from
    the

    [[Page S127]]

    deal actually weakens our ability to address the JCPOA's perceived
    flaws by alienating our partners. Instead, we should remain committed
    to the JCPOA and lead the international community in imposing
    additional sanctions, where necessary, to change other Iranian
    behaviors--namely, their respect for human rights, ballistic missile
    development efforts, and other malign activities.
      We must also seek to help enable the Iranian people to make their
    choices heard, including by encouraging the adoption of social media
    and other means of communication. We could start by building upon
    general licenses issued by the Obama administration designed to
    encourage the export of communications technology to Iran.
      Secretary Mattis told the Armed Services Committee at his
    confirmation hearing: ``When America gives her word, we have to live up
    to it and work with our allies.''
      If the President decides this week not to continue nuclear-related
    sanctions relief for Iran, he will be effectively choosing to restart
    the Iranian nuclear program, thereby making military conflict with Iran
    more likely.
      Withdrawing from the deal would also be a devastating blow to our
    efforts toward diplomacy with North Korea--and for that matter, any
    future diplomatic efforts to constrain aggressive behavior by our
    adversaries. Why would any nation engage with us in serious dialogue to
    resolve differences if they fear we will later withdraw unilaterally,
    even when the other parties are complying with the agreement?
      Regardless of whether you supported the JCPOA before it was signed,
    the truth is that it has removed the greatest threat we faced from Iran
    while also preserving all other means to address Iran's malign
    activities. Let there be no doubt--Iran continues to be a state sponsor
    of terrorism and an abuser of human rights. Iran continues to
    destabilize the region through its development of ballistic missiles
    and support of proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere.
    If Iran behaves this way without a nuclear weapon, imagine how much
    worse a nuclear-armed Iran would be.

      Fortunately, our nonnuclear sanctions on Iran remain in place and are
    unaffected by the JCPOA. In fact, Congress authorized additional
    sanctions in July to help deal with these issues. The administration
    should work with our international partners and use all tools at its
    disposal, including by ramping up nonnuclear sanctions, where
    necessary, to counter Iran's unacceptable behavior in these other
    areas.
      Abrogating the JCPOA only invites another nuclear crisis like the one
    we are currently facing with North Korea--a concern echoed by General
    Dunford when he appeared before the Armed Services Committee and said:
    ``It makes sense to me that our holding up agreements that we have
    signed, unless there's a material breach, would have impact on others'
    willingness to sign agreements.''
      Many have criticized the JCPOA as a ``flawed deal.'' For example,
    concerns have been raised that certain provisions sunset after a period
    of years, thereby delaying rather than permanently preventing Iran from
    achieving a nuclear weapon. If the concern is that Iran may seek to
    resume nuclear weapons development activities after these sunsets--a
    concern that I share--the appropriate course of action is not to throw
    out the deal but to work with our international partners to ensure that
    necessary restrictions on the JCPOA are appropriately extended or
    supplemented.
      As I noted before, Iran has committed in perpetuity not to develop or
    seek to acquire nuclear weapons. We should not take them at their word;
    we should verify their adherence to this commitment, just as we are
    doing under the JCPOA. If at any point in the future we have evidence
    to suggest Iran is taking steps that would indicate a violation of that
    commitment, we should use that information to rally the P5+1 and other
    international partners to take a unified stand against such efforts.
    Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA would seriously damage our
    ability to exert such leadership in the future.
      Again, according to General Dunford, in the absence of the JCPOA,
    Iran would likely resume its nuclear weapons program and ``a nuclear-
    armed Iran would likely be more aggressive in its actions and more
    dangerous in its consequences.'' General Dunford also told the
    committee that ``the intel community assessment is, in fact, that Iran
    is in compliance right now [with the JCPOA], and therefore, I think we
    should focus on addressing the other challenges: the missile threat
    they pose, the maritime threat they pose, the support of proxies,
    terrorists, and the cyber threat they pose.'' I wholeheartedly agree
    with General Dunford's assessment.
      Our troops in Iraq and Syria are operating in close proximity to
    Iranian-aligned militias, including those who previously targeted
    American troops. Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA could embolden
    these hardline militias and possibly result in Iran giving them a green
    light to begin targeting U.S. forces once more.
      Furthermore, while I have full confidence in our military's ability
    to fight and win wars when necessary, we cannot escape the reality that
    military contingencies to respond to both a nuclear-armed North Korea
    and Iran would result in massive loss of life and national treasure and
    greatly stress our military's capacity and capabilities.
      In conclusion, I will return to where I began. Now is not the time to
    impose a self-inflicted wound upon our foreign policy and standing in
    the world. Unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA would empower
    Iranian hardliners and dramatically undermine the reform-minded
    protests we should be seeking to empower. Worse still, it would leave
    us more isolated in the international community and, by extension, less
    able to address the range of national security challenges posed by
    Iran, North Korea, and our other potential adversaries.
      We must not abdicate the JCPOA or American leadership on these
    issues. Therefore, I urge the President to stay the course with respect
    to the JCPOA, while also rallying the international community to take
    effective actions intended to change other unacceptable behaviors by
    the Iranian regime to suppress dissent at home and sow instability
    abroad. We must not squander this opportunity by making the story about
    the United States rather than the courageous Iranians who at great risk
    to themselves have taken to the streets to demand a better future.
      I yield the floor.
      I suggest the absence of a quorum.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). The clerk will call the roll.
      The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
      Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
    for the quorum call be rescinded.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lee). Without objection, it is so ordered.