[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 151 (Tuesday, September 19, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5826-S5827]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                             FISA and CFIUS

  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, as the subway attack in London last week 
proves all too well, when terrorism goes underground, it doesn't 
disappear. Every day there are individuals operating in the world's 
shadows in places like the Parsons Green station in Fulham. They mean 
to do our allies and us great harm, and they are not going away.
  As President Trump said last week, in this era in which attacks like 
that in London are the new normal, we have to be proactive. We can't 
take our security for granted. We can't naively assume that when it 
comes to threats like that and others even bigger, our country is out 
of the woods. One way to be proactive and to keep our country safe is 
to reauthorize section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.
  Earlier this month, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Director of 
National Intelligence Dan Coats sent a letter to congressional 
leadership calling for this reauthorization. It is easy to see why. 
Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allows the 
intelligence community to collect vital information about international 
terrorists, cyber actors, and other important foreign intelligence 
targets. Information collected under one particular section--section 
702--produces particularly important foreign intelligence that helps 
prevent terrorist attacks and malign state actors as well. It does so 
by focusing on non-U.S. persons, which is important, because, as it is 
called, it is foreign intelligence surveillance. It focuses on non-U.S. 
persons located outside of the United States who are foreign 
intelligence targets.
  But that is not all. Just as importantly, section 702 also includes a 
comprehensive oversight regime to make sure the privacy of U.S. persons 
is protected under the Constitution. That is done by not only oversight 
here in the Senate and in the House through the intelligence committees 
but also by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which monitors 
compliance with the law.
  There has been some criticism of this provision, but I must say that 
the overwhelming support for the section 702 reauthorization is quite 
remarkable in this polarized environment in which we live. Even the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board gave the program a ringing 
endorsement.
  But the criticism that has been made is actually based on very few 
actual facts and often reflects a misunderstanding, both of the purpose 
of FISA and the controls that constrain government action. Just to be 
clear, section 702 does not allow intelligence personnel to evade the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It may not be used to 
intentionally target a citizen of the United States. That citizen could 
be in New York or New Delhi. It simply doesn't matter. He or she is off 
limits.

[[Page S5827]]

  Section 702 also does not allow for bulk collection or the unlimited 
dissemination of intelligence that is obtained. Rather, the 
government's capabilities are specifically circumscribed.
  Finally, section 702 does not ignore the possibility that 
intelligence personnel will inadvertently obtain information about U.S. 
persons, but that statute requires intricate procedures to minimize 
this type of incidental collection to make sure that American citizens 
are not swept up in foreign intelligence surveillance targets.
  Because of these safeguards, section 702 achieves a careful balance, 
preserving privacy and civil liberties while giving our intelligence 
personnel the flashlights they need to find terrorists and other 
adversaries operating in the dark.
  This careful balance is why scholars at the U.S. Naval Academy, 
commenting on section 702, summarized that ``there is simply no good 
case for not reauthorizing when it comes up for renewal.''
  I say to my colleagues that the time for renewal is fast approaching. 
That is why today I join the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence in recommending the speedy enactment of 
legislation reauthorizing title VII before it sunsets later this year.
  Section 702 is only one piece of our dense security puzzle. It 
complements many other pieces of legislation that were designed to 
handle our incredibly diverse array of threats, and I just want to 
mention one other.
  We need to strengthen the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States, also known as CFIUS. Yesterday we passed the National 
Defense Authorization Act which contains an important CFIUS provision. 
I would like to thank the senior Senator from Arizona, the chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee, as well as the ranking member, the senior 
Senator from Rhode Island, for including it in the National Defense 
Authorization Act, which we approved yesterday.
  This provision is critically important, as it could help strengthen 
the process by which we screen investment by foreign companies to 
ensure that our military superiority and our technological edge is not 
whittled away by foreign governments that might use our technology 
against us or to undermine our industrial base here in the United 
States.
  As my colleagues know, many national security threats don't make the 
headlines. Some of them emerge gradually. They develop quietly when 
countries like China begin acquiring American technology in every way 
possible, knowledgeable of our laws, and with a conscious strategy to 
try to evade and circumvent those protections in order to grab our 
technological edge and undermine our industrial base.
  It has been reported that the Chinese Government has already made 
investments in robotics and artificial intelligence, pouring some $30 
billion into early-stage U.S. technologies over a 6-year period.
  When the Chinese are able to get their hands on our cutting-edge 
technology, just imagine the boost for their long-term military 
capabilities.
  But here is the problem. CFIUS needs to be modernized and brought up 
to date in order to plug these holes that currently exist in the 
protective regime. Secretary Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, said 
that CFIUS ``needs to be updated to deal with today's situation.'' I 
agree.
  My provision included in the NDAA would begin that process. It 
requires the Secretary to find and propose ways to make the current 
CFIUS process work more effectively. The NDAA also sets the stage for 
more comprehensive reform that I will be discussing in the coming days 
and weeks.
  I want to thank the senior Senator from Idaho, the chairman of the 
Banking Committee, for taking this important issue up in the Senate 
Banking Committee just this last Thursday. As chairman, his leadership 
on the committee has been indispensable, and CFIUS reform is just the 
latest example.
  The bipartisan legislation I am spearheading is called the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act. It will modernize the CFIUS 
process to prepare our country to meet the 21st century threats, and I 
plan to introduce it soon.
  This bill would ensure, first, that the government scrutinizes 
closely those nations that are the biggest threats to our national 
security; second, that CFIUS obtains more authority to look at 
investment deals that, as of today, don't fall under its purview, just 
as certain joint ventures based overseas and minority-position 
investments in companies do not currently fall within its purview; and, 
third, it would give CFIUS the means to assess rapidly developing 
technologies our export control regime has not yet figured out how to 
handle.
  Colleagues, I hope you will join me in supporting this important 
reform package, and I look forward to further debate on this topic.
  I yield the floor.