[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 125 (Tuesday, July 25, 2017)]
[House]
[Pages H6241-H6268]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COUNTERING AMERICA'S ADVERSARIES THROUGH SANCTIONS ACT
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and
pass the bill (H.R. 3364) to provide congressional review and to
counter aggression by the Governments of Iran, the Russian Federation,
and North Korea, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 3364
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act''.
[[Page H6242]]
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN
Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Definitions.
Sec. 103. Regional strategy for countering conventional and asymmetric
Iranian threats in the Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 104. Imposition of additional sanctions in response to Iran's
ballistic missile program.
Sec. 105. Imposition of terrorism-related sanctions with respect to the
IRGC.
Sec. 106. Imposition of additional sanctions with respect to persons
responsible for human rights abuses.
Sec. 107. Enforcement of arms embargos.
Sec. 108. Review of applicability of sanctions relating to Iran's
support for terrorism and its ballistic missile program.
Sec. 109. Report on coordination of sanctions between the United States
and the European Union.
Sec. 110. Report on United States citizens detained by Iran.
Sec. 111. Exceptions for national security and humanitarian assistance;
rule of construction.
Sec. 112. Presidential waiver authority.
TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING
Sec. 201. Short title.
Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian
Federation
Sec. 211. Findings.
Sec. 212. Sense of Congress.
Part 1--Congressional Review of Sanctions Imposed With Respect to the
Russian Federation
Sec. 215. Short title.
Sec. 216. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions
imposed with respect to the Russian Federation.
Part 2--Sanctions With Respect to the Russian Federation
Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Codification of sanctions relating to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 223. Modification of implementation of Executive Order 13662.
Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to activities of the
Russian Federation undermining cybersecurity.
Sec. 225. Imposition of sanctions relating to special Russian crude oil
projects.
Sec. 226. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian and other
foreign financial institutions.
Sec. 227. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to significant
corruption in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 228. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to certain
transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious
human rights abusers in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 229. Notifications to Congress under Ukraine Freedom Support Act
of 2014.
Sec. 230. Standards for termination of certain sanctions with respect
to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 231. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons engaging in
transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of
the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to the development of pipelines in the
Russian Federation.
Sec. 233. Sanctions with respect to investment in or facilitation of
privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian
Federation.
Sec. 234. Sanctions with respect to the transfer of arms and related
materiel to Syria.
Sec. 235. Sanctions described.
Sec. 236. Exceptions, waiver, and termination.
Sec. 237. Exception relating to activities of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
Sec. 238. Rule of construction.
Part 3--Reports
Sec. 241. Report on oligarchs and parastatal entities of the Russian
Federation.
Sec. 242. Report on effects of expanding sanctions to include sovereign
debt and derivative products.
Sec. 243. Report on illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation.
Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia
Sec. 251. Findings.
Sec. 252. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 253. Statement of policy.
Sec. 254. Coordinating aid and assistance across Europe and Eurasia.
Sec. 255. Report on media organizations controlled and funded by the
Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 256. Report on Russian Federation influence on elections in Europe
and Eurasia.
Sec. 257. Ukranian energy security.
Sec. 258. Termination.
Sec. 259. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing
Part 1--National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit
Financing
Sec. 261. Development of national strategy.
Sec. 262. Contents of national strategy.
Part 2--Enhancing Antiterrorism Tools of the Department of the Treasury
Sec. 271. Improving antiterror finance monitoring of funds transfers.
Sec. 272. Sense of Congress on international cooperation regarding
terrorist financing intelligence.
Sec. 273. Examining the counter-terror financing role of the Department
of the Treasury in embassies.
Sec. 274. Inclusion of Secretary of the Treasury on the National
Security Council.
Sec. 275. Inclusion of all funds.
Part 3--Definitions
Sec. 281. Definitions.
Subtitle D--Rule of Construction
Sec. 291. Rule of construction.
Sec. 292. Sense of Congress on the strategic importance of Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA
Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Definitions.
Subtitle A--Sanctions to Enforce and Implement United Nations Security
Council Sanctions Against North Korea
Sec. 311. Modification and expansion of requirements for the
designation of persons.
Sec. 312. Prohibition on indirect correspondent accounts.
Sec. 313. Limitations on foreign assistance to noncompliant
governments.
Sec. 314. Amendments to enhance inspection authorities.
Sec. 315. Enforcing compliance with United Nations shipping sanctions
against North Korea.
Sec. 316. Report on cooperation between North Korea and Iran.
Sec. 317. Report on implementation of United Nations Security Council
resolutions by other governments.
Sec. 318. Briefing on measures to deny specialized financial messaging
services to designated North Korean financial
institutions.
Subtitle B--Sanctions With Respect to Human Rights Abuses by the
Government of North Korea
Sec. 321. Sanctions for forced labor and slavery overseas of North
Koreans.
Sec. 322. Modifications to sanctions suspension and waiver authorities.
Sec. 323. Reward for informants.
Sec. 324. Determination on designation of North Korea as a state
sponsor of terrorism.
Subtitle C--General Authorities
Sec. 331. Authority to consolidate reports.
Sec. 332. Rule of construction.
Sec. 333. Regulatory authority.
Sec. 334. Limitation on funds.
TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Countering Iran's
Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017''.
SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act of
international terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in
section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
person that is not a United States person.
(4) Iranian person.--The term ``Iranian person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.
(5) IRGC.--The term ``IRGC'' means Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
(6) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(7) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.
SEC. 103. REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL AND
ASYMMETRIC IRANIAN THREATS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH AFRICA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of the Treasury, and the Director of
[[Page H6243]]
National Intelligence shall jointly develop and submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and leadership a
strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian
activities and threats that directly threaten the United
States and key allies in the Middle East, North Africa, and
beyond.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a)
shall include at a minimum the following:
(1) A summary of the near- and long-term United States
objectives, plans, and means for countering Iran's
destabilizing activities, including identification of
countries that share the objective of countering Iran's
destabilizing activities.
(2) A summary of the capabilities and contributions of
individual countries to shared efforts to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities, and a summary of additional actions
or contributions that each country could take to further
contribute.
(3) An assessment of Iran's conventional force capabilities
and an assessment of Iran's plans to upgrade its conventional
force capabilities, including its acquisition, development,
and deployment of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime offensive and anti-
access or area denial capabilities.
(4) An assessment of Iran's chemical and biological weapons
capabilities and an assessment of Iranian plans to upgrade
its chemical or biological weapons capabilities.
(5) An assessment of Iran's asymmetric activities in the
region, including--
(A) the size, capabilities, and activities of the IRGC,
including the Quds Force;
(B) the size, capabilities, and activities of Iran's cyber
operations;
(C) the types and amount of support, including funding,
lethal and nonlethal contributions, and training, provided to
Hezbollah, Hamas, special groups in Iraq, the regime of
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and other
violent groups across the Middle East; and
(D) the scope and objectives of Iran's information
operations and use of propaganda.
(6) A summary of United States actions, unilaterally and in
cooperation with foreign governments, to counter
destabilizing Iranian activities, including--
(A) interdiction of Iranian lethal arms bound for groups
designated as foreign terrorist organizations under section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);
(B) Iran's interference in international commercial
shipping lanes;
(C) attempts by Iran to undermine or subvert
internationally recognized governments in the Middle East
region; and
(D) Iran's support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in
Syria, including--
(i) financial assistance, military equipment and personnel,
and other support provided to that regime; and
(ii) support and direction to other armed actors that are
not Syrian or Iranian and are acting on behalf of that
regime.
(c) Form of Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership
Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees and leadership'' means--
(1) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO
IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State
should continue to implement Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass
destruction delivery system proliferators and their
supporters).
(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--The President shall impose
the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any
person that the President determines, on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act--
(1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially
contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with
respect to its ballistic missile program, or any other
program in Iran for developing, deploying, or maintaining
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction,
including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer, or use such capabilities;
(2) is a successor entity to a person referred to in
paragraph (1);
(3) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person
referred to in paragraph (1);
(4) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions
that would otherwise be imposed pursuant to paragraph (3);
(5) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4); or
(6) knowingly provides or attempts to provide financial,
material, technological, or other support for, or goods or
services in support of, a person referred to in paragraph
(1), (2), (3), (4) or (5).
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all
property and interests in property of any person subject to
subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State
shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to
subsection (b) that is an alien.
(d) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the
penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
act described in subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Report on Contributions to Iran's Ballistic Missile
Program.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing each person that--
(A) has, during the period specified in paragraph (2),
conducted any activity that has materially contributed to the
activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its
ballistic missile program, or any other program in Iran for
developing, deploying, or maintaining systems capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction, including any efforts
to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,
transfer, or use such capabilities;
(B) is a successor entity to a person referred to in
subparagraph (A);
(C) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person
referred to in subparagraph (A);
(D) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions
that could be imposed as a result of a relationship described
in subparagraph (C);
(E) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D); or
(F) is known or believed to have provided, or attempted to
provide, during the period specified in paragraph (2),
financial, material, technological, or other support for, or
goods or services in support of, any material contribution to
a program described in subparagraph (A) carried out by a
person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).
(2) Period specified.--The period specified in this
paragraph is--
(A) in the case of the first report submitted under
paragraph (1), the period beginning January 1, 2016, and
ending on the date the report is submitted; and
(B) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day
period preceding the submission of the report.
(3) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 105. IMPOSITION OF TERRORISM-RELATED SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE IRGC.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The IRGC is subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive
Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system
proliferators and their supporters), the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), Executive Order 13553 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note; relating to blocking property of certain persons with
respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of
Iran), and Executive Order 13606 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking the property and suspending entry into
the United States of certain persons with respect to grave
human rights abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via
information technology).
(2) The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (in
this section referred to as the ``IRGC-QF'') is the primary
arm of the Government of Iran for executing its policy of
supporting terrorist and insurgent groups. The IRGC-QF
provides material, logistical assistance, training, and
financial support to militants and terrorist operatives
throughout the Middle East and South Asia and was designated
for the imposition of sanctions by the Secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting
transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism) in October 2007 for its support of
terrorism.
(3) The IRGC, not just the IRGC-QF, is responsible for
implementing Iran's international program of destabilizing
activities, support for acts of international terrorism, and
ballistic missile program.
(b) In General.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with
respect to the IRGC and foreign persons that are officials,
agents, or affiliates of the IRGC.
[[Page H6244]]
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign
person pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting
transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism).
SEC. 106. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a list of each person the Secretary
determines, based on credible evidence, on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act--
(1) is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or
other gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights committed against individuals in Iran who seek--
(A) to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of
the Government of Iran; or
(B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally
recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of
religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the
rights to a fair trial and democratic elections; or
(2) acts as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign person in
a matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sanctions Described.--
(1) In general.--The President may, in accordance with the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), block all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person on the list required by
subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
paragraph (1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out paragraph (1) shall be subject to the penalties set
forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
SEC. 107. ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (d), the
President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection
(b) with respect to any person that the President
determines--
(1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially
contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer directly or
indirectly to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of
Iran, of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large
caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack
helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare
parts; or
(2) knowingly provides to Iran any technical training,
financial resources or services, advice, other services or
assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel
described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sanctions Described.--
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all
property and interests in property of any person subject to
subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State
shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to
subsection (a) that is an alien.
(c) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the
penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
act described in subsection (a) of that section.
(d) Exception.--The President is not required to impose
sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person for
engaging in an activity described in that subsection if the
President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that--
(1) permitting the activity is in the national security
interest of the United States;
(2) Iran no longer presents a significant threat to the
national security of the United States and to the allies of
the United States; and
(3) the Government of Iran has ceased providing operational
or financial support for acts of international terrorism and
no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
(e) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section,
the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means a country the
government of which the Secretary of State has determined to
be a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism for purposes of--
(1) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)(1)(A)) (as continued in effect
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.));
(2) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2371(a));
(3) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780(d)); or
(4) any other provision of law.
SEC. 108. REVIEW OF APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO
IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND ITS BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 5 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a
review of all persons on the list of specially designated
nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for
activities relating to Iran--
(1) to assess the conduct of such persons as that conduct
relates to--
(A) any activity that materially contributes to the
activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its
ballistic missile program; or
(B) support by the Government of Iran for acts of
international terrorism; and
(2) to determine the applicability of sanctions with
respect to such persons under--
(A) Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery
system proliferators and their supporters); or
(B) Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons
who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).
(b) Implementation of Sanctions.--If the President
determines under subsection (a) that sanctions under an
Executive order specified in paragraph (2) of that subsection
are applicable with respect to a person, the President
shall--
(1) impose sanctions with respect to that person pursuant
to that Executive order; or
(2) exercise the waiver authority provided under section
112.
SEC. 109. REPORT ON COORDINATION OF SANCTIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that includes the following:
(1) A description of each instance, during the period
specified in subsection (b)--
(A) in which the United States has imposed sanctions with
respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such
weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international
terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in
which the European Union has not imposed corresponding
sanctions; and
(B) in which the European Union has imposed sanctions with
respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such
weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international
terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in
which the United States has not imposed corresponding
sanctions.
(2) An explanation for the reason for each discrepancy
between sanctions imposed by the European Union and sanctions
imposed by the United States described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B) of paragraph (1).
(b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this
subsection is--
(1) in the case of the first report submitted under
subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act and ending on the date the report is
submitted; and
(2) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day
period preceding the submission of the report.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 110. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership a report on United States citizens,
including United States citizens who are also citizens of
other countries, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran
that includes--
(1) information regarding any officials of the Government
of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and
(2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has
taken to secure the swift release of those United States
citizens.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership
Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees and leadership'' means--
(1) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Speaker,
[[Page H6245]]
the majority leader, and the minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 111. EXCEPTIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE; RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) In General.--The following activities shall be exempt
from sanctions under sections 104, 105, 106, and 107:
(1) Any activity subject to the reporting requirements
under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091 et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities
of the United States.
(2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such
admission is necessary to comply with United States
obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations
and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the
Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24,
1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other
applicable international obligations of the United States.
(3) The conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the
sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical
devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Iran, including engaging in a
financial transaction relating to humanitarian assistance or
for humanitarian purposes or transporting goods or services
that are necessary to carry out operations relating to
humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes.
(b) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704) to carry out this Act.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to limit the authority of the President under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.).
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural
commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
(2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that
term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.)).
(3) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the
meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(4) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given
the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
SEC. 112. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.
(a) Case-by-Case Waiver Authority.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case
basis and for a period of not more than 180 days, a
requirement under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108 to
impose or maintain sanctions with respect to a person, and
may waive the continued imposition of such sanctions, not
less than 30 days after the President determines and reports
to the appropriate congressional committees that it is vital
to the national security interests of the United States to
waive such sanctions.
(2) Renewal of waivers.--The President may, on a case-by-
case basis, renew a waiver under paragraph (1) for an
additional period of not more than 180 days if, not later
than 15 days before that waiver expires, the President makes
the determination and submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a report described in paragraph (1).
(3) Successive renewal.--The renewal authority provided
under paragraph (2) may be exercised for additional
successive periods of not more than 180 days if the President
follows the procedures set forth in paragraph (2), and
submits the report described in paragraph (1), for each such
renewal.
(b) Contents of Waiver Reports.--Each report submitted
under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of sanctions
under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108 with respect to a
person, or the renewal of such a waiver, shall include--
(1) a specific and detailed rationale for the determination
that the waiver is vital to the national security interests
of the United States;
(2) a description of the activity that resulted in the
person being subject to sanctions;
(3) an explanation of any efforts made by the United
States, as applicable, to secure the cooperation of the
government with primary jurisdiction over the person or the
location where the activity described in paragraph (2)
occurred in terminating or, as appropriate, penalizing the
activity; and
(4) an assessment of the significance of the activity
described in paragraph (2) in contributing to the ability of
Iran to threaten the interests of the United States or allies
of the United States, develop systems capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction, support acts of international
terrorism, or violate the human rights of any person in Iran.
(c) Effect of Report on Waiver.--If the President submits a
report under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of
sanctions under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108 with
respect to a person, or the renewal of such a waiver, the
President shall not be required to impose or maintain
sanctions under section 104, 105, 106, 107, or 108, as
applicable, with respect to the person described in the
report during the 30-day period referred to in subsection
(a).
TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING
SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Countering Russian
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017''.
Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian
Federation
SEC. 211. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued
Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to
blocking property of certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to
impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining
democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine or
threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama
subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg.
15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons
contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order
13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of
additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine)
to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine.
(2) On December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act
of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et
seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to
impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President
determines to be entities owned or controlled by the
Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the
Russian Federation that manufacture, sell, transfer, or
otherwise provide certain defense articles into Syria.
(3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive
Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the
property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious
cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of
the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and
the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons
determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.
(4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a
Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident
Coordination, which states, ``certain cyber incidents that
have significant impacts on an entity, our national security,
or the broader economy require a unique approach to response
efforts''.
(5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex
to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the
following entities and individuals:
(A) The Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as
Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow,
Russian Federation.
(B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya
Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian
Federation.
(C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd.
Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg,
Russian Federation.
(D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow,
Russian Federation.
(E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the
Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing
Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian
Federation.
(F) Igor Valentinovich Korobov.
(G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov.
(H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.
(I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.
(6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States
intelligence community entitled, ``Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections'' stated,
``Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence
campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential
election.'' The assessment warns that ``Moscow will apply
lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the
U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts
worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election
processes''.
SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the President--
(1) should continue to uphold and seek unity with European
and other key partners on sanctions implemented against the
Russian Federation, which have been effective and
instrumental in countering Russian aggression in Ukraine;
(2) should engage to the fullest extent possible with
partner governments with regard to closing loopholes,
including the allowance of extended prepayment for the
delivery of goods and commodities and other loopholes, in
multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the
Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of
those measures; and
(3) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce
compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the
enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation
in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber
intrusions and attacks, and human rights violators in the
Russian Federation.
[[Page H6246]]
PART 1--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SEC. 215. SHORT TITLE.
This part may be cited as the ``Russia Sanctions Review Act
of 2017''.
SEC. 216. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO
SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership a report that describes the
proposed action and the reasons for that action.
(2) Actions described.--
(A) In general.--An action described in this paragraph is--
(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions
described in subparagraph (B);
(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph
(B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an
action to waive the application of those sanctions with
respect to that person; or
(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United
States' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
(B) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this
subparagraph are--
(i) sanctions provided for under--
(I) this title or any provision of law amended by this
title, including the Executive orders codified under section
222;
(II) the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy,
and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901
et seq.); or
(III) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C.
8921 et seq.); and
(ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the
Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and
New York that the President ordered vacated on December 29,
2016.
(3) Description of type of action.--Each report submitted
under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in
paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the
action--
(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States
foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; or
(B) is intended to significantly alter United States
foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
(4) Inclusion of additional matter.--
(A) In general.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
that relates to an action that is intended to significantly
alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian
Federation shall include a description of--
(i) the significant alteration to United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation;
(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national
security interests of the United States; and
(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions
affected by the action were initially imposed.
(B) Requests from banking and financial services
committees.--The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services
of the House of Representatives may request the submission to
the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and
(iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted
under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not
intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy
with regard to the Russian Federation.
(5) Confidentiality of proprietary information.--
Proprietary information that can be associated with a
particular person with respect to an action described in
paragraph (2) may be included in a report submitted under
paragraph (1) only if the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership provide assurances of
confidentiality, unless such person otherwise consents in
writing to such disclosure.
(6) Rule of construction.--Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) shall not
be construed to require the submission of a report under
paragraph (1) with respect to the routine issuance of a
license that does not significantly alter United States
foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
(b) Period for Review by Congress.--
(1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days
beginning on the date on which the President submits a report
under subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that
is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and
briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully
review the report; and
(B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that
is intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as
appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain
information in order to fully review the report.
(2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under
paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under
subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is
submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in
any calendar year.
(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional
review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
during the period for congressional review provided for under
paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including
any additional period for such review as applicable under the
exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not
take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with
respect to that action is enacted in accordance with
subsection (c).
(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration
of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval
relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes
both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c),
the President may not take that action for a period of 12
calendar days after the date of passage of the joint
resolution of disapproval.
(5) Limitation on actions during congressional
reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint
resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted
under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in
subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in
accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the
joint resolution, the President may not take that action for
a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the
President's veto.
(6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of
disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if
a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report
submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action
described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with
subsection (c), the President may not take that action.
(c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval Defined.--
In this subsection:
(1) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint
resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution of
either House of Congress--
(A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution
approving the President's proposal to take an action relating
to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the
Russian Federation.''; and
(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is
the following: ``Congress approves of the action relating to
the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the
Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report
submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to
________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the
appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with
a short description of the proposed action.
(2) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term ``joint
resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint resolution of
either House of Congress--
(A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution
disapproving the President's proposal to take an action
relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect
to the Russian Federation.''; and
(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is
the following: ``Congress disapproves of the action relating
to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the
Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report
submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to
________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the
appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with
a short description of the proposed action.
(3) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days
provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any
additional period as applicable under the exception provided
in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval may be introduced--
(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader
or the minority leader; and
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority
leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority
leader's designee).
(4) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--If a
committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint
resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has
been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10
calendar days after the date of referral, that committee
shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution.
(5) Consideration in the senate.--
(A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate
shall be--
(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report
under subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to an action that is
not intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation; and
(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the
joint resolution relates to a report under subsection
(a)(3)(B) that relates
[[Page H6247]]
to an action that is intended to significantly alter United
States foreign policy with respect to the Russian Federation.
(B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to which a
joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of
disapproval was referred has not reported the joint
resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral
of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged
from further consideration of the joint resolution and the
joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII
of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any
time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case
may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been
discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution
(even though a previous motion to the same effect has been
disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the
joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint
resolution (and against consideration of the joint
resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not
debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone.
A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed
to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the
decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the
rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure
relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
(E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate
of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all
debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint
resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally
divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and
the minority leader or their designees.
(6) Rules relating to senate and house of
representatives.--
(A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in house.--In the
House of Representatives, the following procedures shall
apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution
of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has
already passed a joint resolution relating to the same
proposed action):
(i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the
appropriate committees.
(ii) If a committee to which a joint resolution has been
referred has not reported the joint resolution within two
calendar days after the date of referral, that committee
shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution.
(iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each
committee to which a joint resolution has been referred
reports the joint resolution to the House or has been
discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in
order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in
the House. All points of order against the motion are waived.
Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has
disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The
previous question shall be considered as ordered on the
motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion
shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by
which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
(iv) The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All
points of order against the joint resolution and against its
consideration are waived. The previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final
passage without intervening motion except two hours of debate
equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint
resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to
reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall
not be in order.
(B) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate.--
(i) If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint
resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval,
the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the
House of Representatives, the following procedures shall
apply:
(I) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a
committee.
(II) With respect to that joint resolution--
(aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no
joint resolution had been received from the House of
Representatives; but
(bb) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution
from the House of Representatives.
(ii) If, following passage of a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate,
the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the
House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be
placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.
(iii) If a joint resolution of approval or a joint
resolution of disapproval is received from the House, and no
companion joint resolution has been introduced in the Senate,
the Senate procedures under this subsection shall apply to
the House joint resolution.
(C) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of
this paragraph shall not apply in the House of
Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.
(7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This
subsection is enacted by Congress--
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such
is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively,
and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is
inconsistent with such rules; and
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and
to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that
House.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership
Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees and leadership'' means--
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and
the minority leader of the House of Representatives.
PART 2--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.
In this part:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
(2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that
term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.)).
(3) International financial institution.--The term
``international financial institution'' has the meaning given
that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
(4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has
actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result.
(5) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.
SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) Codification.--United States sanctions provided for in
Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to
blocking property of certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg.
15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons
contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order
13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of
additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine),
Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to
blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain
transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine),
Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to
blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and
Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking
additional steps to address the national emergency with
respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities),
as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of
this Act, including with respect to all persons sanctioned
under such Executive orders, shall remain in effect except as
provided in subsection (b).
(b) Termination of Certain Sanctions.--Subject to section
216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions
described in subsection (a) that are imposed on a person in
connection with activity conducted by the person if the
President submits to the appropriate congressional committees
a notice that--
(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the
basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable
steps toward stopping the activity; and
(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the
person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.
(c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application under subsection (a) of
sanctions with respect to a person under Executive Order
13694 or 13757 only if the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number
and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that
Government.
[[Page H6248]]
(d) Application of New Ukraine-Related Sanctions.--The
President may waive the initial application under subsection
(a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive
Order 13660, 13661, 13662, or 13685 only if the President
submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement
to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in
Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor
agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.
SEC. 223. MODIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
13662.
(a) Determination That Certain Entities Are Subject to
Sanctions.--The Secretary of the Treasury may determine that
a person meets one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of
Executive Order 13662 if that person is a state-owned entity
operating in the railway or metals and mining sector of the
economy of the Russian Federation.
(b) Modification of Directive 1 With Respect to the
Financial Services Sector of the Russian Federation
Economy.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
modify Directive 1 (as amended), dated September 12, 2014,
issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under
Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive (which
shall be effective beginning on the date that is 60 days
after the date of such modification), to ensure that the
directive prohibits the conduct by United States persons or
persons within the United States of all transactions in,
provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of
longer than 14 days maturity or new equity of persons
determined to be subject to the directive, their property, or
their interests in property.
(c) Modification of Directive 2 With Respect to the Energy
Sector of the Russian Federation Economy.--Not later than 60
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall modify Directive 2 (as
amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any
successor directive (which shall be effective beginning on
the date that is 60 days after the date of such
modification), to ensure that the directive prohibits the
conduct by United States persons or persons within the United
States of all transactions in, provision of financing for,
and other dealings in new debt of longer than 60 days
maturity of persons determined to be subject to the
directive, their property, or their interests in property.
(d) Modification of Directive 4.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
the Treasury shall modify Directive 4, dated September 12,
2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under
Executive Order 13662, or any successor directive (which
shall be effective beginning on the date that is 90 days
after the date of such modification), to ensure that the
directive prohibits the provision, exportation, or
reexportation, directly or indirectly, by United States
persons or persons within the United States, of goods,
services (except for financial services), or technology in
support of exploration or production for new deepwater,
Arctic offshore, or shale projects--
(1) that have the potential to produce oil; and
(2) that involve any person determined to be subject to the
directive or the property or interests in property of such a
person who has a controlling interest or a substantial non-
controlling ownership interest in such a project defined as
not less than a 33 percent interest.
SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING
CYBERSECURITY.
(a) In General.--On and after the date that is 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall--
(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with
respect to any person that the President determines--
(A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining
cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic
institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the
Russian Federation; or
(B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person
described in subparagraph (A);
(2) impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section
235 with respect to any person that the President determines
knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods
or services (except financial services) in support of, an
activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and
(3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section
4(c) of the of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22
U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President
determines knowingly provides financial services in support
of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A).
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
in property of a person determined by the President to be
subject to subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests
in property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person.
(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of visa
or other documentation.--In the case of an alien determined
by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial
of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the
alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of
any visa or other documentation of the alien.
(c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application under subsection (a) of
sanctions with respect to a person only if the President
submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number
and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that
Government.
(d) Significant Activities Undermining Cybersecurity
Defined.--In this section, the term ``significant activities
undermining cybersecurity'' includes--
(1) significant efforts--
(A) to deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an
information and communications technology system or network;
or
(B) to exfiltrate, degrade, corrupt, destroy, or release
information from such a system or network without
authorization for purposes of--
(i) conducting influence operations; or
(ii) causing a significant misappropriation of funds,
economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifications,
or financial information for commercial or competitive
advantage or private financial gain;
(2) significant destructive malware attacks; and
(3) significant denial of service activities.
SEC. 225. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL RUSSIAN
CRUDE OIL PROJECTS.
Section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014
(22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``on and after
the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President may impose'' and inserting ``on and
after the date that is 30 days after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the
President determines that it is not in the national interest
of the United States to do so,''.
SEC. 226. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN AND
OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22
U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall
impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the
national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
(B) by striking ``on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act'' and inserting ``on or after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall
impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the
national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
(B) by striking ``on or after the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting
``on or after the date that is 30 days after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017''.
SEC. 227. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
SIGNIFICANT CORRUPTION IN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and
Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908(a))
is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``is
authorized and encouraged to'' and inserting ``shall''; and
(B) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``President determines is'' and inserting
``President determines is, on or after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017,''; and
(ii) by inserting ``or elsewhere'' after ``in the Russian
Federation'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);
(3) in subsection (c), by striking ``The President'' and
inserting ``except as provided in subsection (d), the
President''; and
(4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application
[[Page H6249]]
of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person
only if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees--
``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement
to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in
Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor
agreements that are agreed to by the Government of
Ukraine.''.
SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS
EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--The Support for the Sovereignty,
Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act
of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``SEC. 10. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS THAT EVADE
SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person
if the President determines that the foreign person
knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of
2017--
``(1) materially violates, attempts to violate, conspires
to violate, or causes a violation of any license, order,
regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to
any covered Executive order, this Act, or the Ukraine Freedom
Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.); or
``(2) facilitates a significant transaction or
transactions, including deceptive or structured transactions,
for or on behalf of--
``(A) any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United
States with respect to the Russian Federation; or
``(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of an
individual described in subparagraph (A).
``(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the exercise of all powers granted to the
President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in
property of a person determined by the President to be
subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in
property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person.
``(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b).
``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection
(b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to
the appropriate congressional committees--
``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;
``(2) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section
in connection with a covered Executive order described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (f)(1), a
certification that the Government of the Russian Federation
is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address
the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk,
Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine,
Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was
agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements
that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine; and
``(3) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section
in connection with a covered Executive order described in
subparagraphs (E) or (F) of subsection (f)(1), a
certification that the Government of the Russian Federation
has made significant efforts to reduce the number and
intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.
``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the
application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to
a person if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees--
``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination;
and
``(2) a notice that--
``(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(B) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.
``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered executive order.--The term `covered Executive
order' means any of the following:
``(A) Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating
to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine).
``(B) Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating
to blocking property of additional persons contributing to
the situation in Ukraine).
``(C) Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating
to blocking property of additional persons contributing to
the situation in Ukraine).
``(D) Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating
to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting
certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of
Ukraine).
``(E) Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating
to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), relating to
the Russian Federation.
``(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to
taking additional steps to address the national emergency
with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled
activities), relating to the Russian Federation.
``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' has the
meaning given such term in section 595.304 of title 31, Code
of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of the
enactment of this section).
``(3) Structured.--The term `structured', with respect to a
transaction, has the meaning given the term `structure' in
paragraph (xx) of section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation
or ruling).
``SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES.
``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person
if the President determines that the foreign person, based on
credible information, on or after the date of the enactment
of this section--
``(1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for
ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission
of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly
occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the
Russian Federation;
``(2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services
to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or
``(3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person
described in paragraph (1).
``(b) Sanctions Described.--
``(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted
to the President by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person determined by the President
to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and
interests in property are in the United States, come within
the United States, or are or come within the possession or
control of a United States person.
``(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of
visa or other documentation.--In the case of an alien
determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a),
denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of,
the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of
any visa or other documentation of the alien.
``(c) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection
(b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to
the appropriate congressional committees--
``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made efforts to reduce serious human rights
abuses in territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled
by that Government.
``(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).
``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the
penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) to the same extent as a person that commits
[[Page H6250]]
an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.
``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the
application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to
a person if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees--
``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination;
and
``(2) a notice--
``(A) that--
``(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or
``(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis
exists for the determination by the President under
subsection (a) with respect to the person.''.
(b) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--
Section 2(2) of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22
U.S.C. 8901(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,'' before ``the Committee
on Foreign Relations''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``the Committee on
Financial Services'' before ``the Committee on Foreign
Affairs''.
SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER UKRAINE FREEDOM
SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.
(a) Sanctions Relating to Defense and Energy Sectors of the
Russian Federation.--Section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support
Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(h) and (i), respectively;
(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
``(g) Notifications and Certifications to Congress.--
``(1) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall notify
the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later
than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a
foreign person under subsection (a) or (b).
``(2) Termination of sanctions with respect to russian
producers, transferors, or brokers of defense articles.--
Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of
2017, the President may terminate the imposition of sanctions
under subsection (a)(2) with respect to a foreign person if
the President submits to the appropriate congressional
committees--
``(A) a notice of and justification for the termination;
and
``(B) a notice that--
``(i) the foreign person is not engaging in the activity
that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that
the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity
subject to sanctions under subsection (a)(2) in the
future.''; and
(3) in subparagraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
(b) Sanctions on Russian and Other Foreign Financial
Institutions.--Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act
of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively;
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
``(e) Notification to Congress on Imposition of
Sanctions.--The President shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days
after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign financial
institution under subsection (a) or (b).''; and
(3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by
striking ``section 4(h)'' and inserting ``section 4(i)''.
SEC. 230. STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Sanctions Relating to Undermining the Peace, Security,
Stability, Sovereignty, or Territorial Integrity of
Ukraine.--Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy,
and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C.
8907) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the
application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to
a person if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a notice that--
``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.
(b) Sanctions Relating to Corruption.--Section 9 of the
Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of
Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the
application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to
a person if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a notice that--
``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.
SEC. 231. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS
ENGAGING IN TRANSACTIONS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE
OR DEFENSE SECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--On and after the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section
235 with respect to a person the President determines
knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a
significant transaction with a person that is part of, or
operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence
sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation,
including the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal
Security Service of the Russian Federation.
(b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive
the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a)
with respect to a person only if the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number
and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that
Government.
(c) Delay of Imposition of Sanctions.--The President may
delay the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with
respect to a person if the President certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees, not less frequently
than every 180 days while the delay is in effect, that the
person is substantially reducing the number of significant
transactions described in subsection (a) in which that person
engages.
(d) Requirement To Issue Guidance.--Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall issue regulations or other guidance to specify the
persons that are part of, or operate for or on behalf of, the
defense and intelligence sectors of the Government of the
Russian Federation.
(e) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (a) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out subsection (a) shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--The President, in coordination with allies
of the United States, may impose 5 or more of the sanctions
described in section 235 with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment
described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or provides to
the Russian Federation, for the construction of Russian
energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology,
information, or support described in subsection (c)--
(1) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or
more; or
(2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair
market value of $5,000,000 or more.
(b) Investment Described.--An investment described in this
subsection is an investment that directly and significantly
contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian
Federation to construct energy export pipelines.
(c) Goods, Services, Technology, Information, or Support
Described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or
support described in this subsection are goods, services,
technology, information, or support that could directly and
significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the
construction, modernization, or repair of energy export
pipelines by the Russian Federation.
SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR
FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED
ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose 5 or more of
the sanctions described in section 235 if the President
determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of
$10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not
less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals
[[Page H6251]]
or exceeds $10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or
facilitates such an investment, if the investment directly
and significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian
Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that
unjustly benefits--
(1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation;
or
(2) close associates or family members of those officials.
(b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive
the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a)
with respect to a person only if the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement
to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in
Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor
agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.
SEC. 234. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS AND
RELATED MATERIEL TO SYRIA.
(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--The President shall impose on a foreign
person the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the
President determines that such foreign person has, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly
exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria
significant financial, material, or technological support
that contributes materially to the ability of the Government
of Syria to--
(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons or related technologies;
(B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile
capabilities;
(C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons;
(D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services,
or defense information (as such terms are defined under the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or
(E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes
of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
(2) Applicability to other foreign persons.--The sanctions
described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any
foreign person that--
(A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in
paragraph (1); or
(B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on
behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed on a
foreign person described in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of
section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to
the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions
in all property and interests in property of the foreign
person if such property and interests in property are in the
United States, come within the United States, or are or come
within the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Aliens ineligible for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Exclusion from the united states.--If the foreign
person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a
visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude
from the United States, the foreign person.
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The issuing consular officer, the
Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or
a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa
or other entry documentation issued to the foreign person
regardless of when issued.
(ii) Effect of revocation.--A revocation under clause (i)
shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel
any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the
possession of the foreign person.
(c) Waiver.--Subject to section 216, the President may
waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with
respect to a person if the President determines that such a
waiver is in the national security interest of the United
States.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Financial, material, or technological support.--The
term ``financial, material, or technological support'' has
the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31,
Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar
regulation or ruling).
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' has the
meaning given such term in section 594.304 of title 31, Code
of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar
regulation or ruling).
(3) Syria.--The term ``Syria'' has the meaning given such
term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or
ruling).
SEC. 235. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.
(a) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed with
respect to a person under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a),
or 233(a) are the following:
(1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned
persons.--The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of
the United States not to give approval to the issuance of any
guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation
in the extension of credit in connection with the export of
any goods or services to the sanctioned person.
(2) Export sanction.--The President may order the United
States Government not to issue any specific license and not
to grant any other specific permission or authority to export
any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under--
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601
et seq.) (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.));
(B) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);
or
(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and
approval of the United States Government as a condition for
the export or reexport of goods or services.
(3) Loans from united states financial institutions.--The
President may prohibit any United States financial
institution from making loans or providing credits to the
sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-
month period unless the person is engaged in activities to
relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities.
(4) Loans from international financial institutions.--The
President may direct the United States executive director to
each international financial institution to use the voice and
vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the
international financial institution that would benefit the
sanctioned person.
(5) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The following
prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if
that person is a financial institution:
(A) Prohibition on designation as primary dealer.--Neither
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the
continuation of any prior designation of, the financial
institution as a primary dealer in United States Government
debt instruments.
(B) Prohibition on service as a repository of government
funds.--The financial institution may not serve as agent of
the United States Government or serve as repository for
United States Government funds.
The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or
(B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes of subsection
(b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be
treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).
(6) Procurement sanction.--The United States Government may
not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(7) Foreign exchange.--The President may, pursuant to such
regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned
person has any interest.
(8) Banking transactions.--The President may, pursuant to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
transfers of credit or payments between financial
institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any
interest of the sanctioned person.
(9) Property transactions.--The President may, pursuant to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
person from--
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring,
withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any
property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and with respect to which the sanctioned person has
any interest;
(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to such property; or
(C) conducting any transaction involving such property.
(10) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned
person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or
guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
United States person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the
sanctioned person.
(11) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may
direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United
States, any alien that the President determines is a
corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a
controlling interest in, the sanctioned person.
(12) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The
President may impose on the principal executive officer or
officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing
similar functions and with similar authorities as such
officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this
subsection.
(b) Sanctioned Person Defined.--In this section, the term
``sanctioned person'' means a person subject to sanctions
under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a).
[[Page H6252]]
SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.
(a) Exceptions.--The provisions of this part and amendments
made by this part shall not apply with respect to the
following:
(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091
et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the
United States.
(2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such
admission is necessary to comply with United States
obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations
and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
and entered into force November 21, 1947, under the
Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24,
1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other
international agreements.
(b) Waiver of Sanctions That Are Imposed.--Subject to
section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect
to a person under this part or the amendments made by this
part, the President may waive the application of those
sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is
in the national security interest of the United States.
(c) Termination.--Subject to section 216, the President may
terminate the application of sanctions under section 224,
231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the
President submits to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and
(2) a notice that--
(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the
basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable
steps toward stopping the activity; and
(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the
person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under this part in the future.
SEC. 237. EXCEPTION RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.
(a) In General.--This Act and the amendments made by this
Act shall not apply with respect to activities of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or the
amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize
the imposition of any sanction or other condition,
limitation, restriction, or prohibition, that directly or
indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Russian
Federation of any product or service, or the procurement of
such product or service by any contractor or subcontractor of
the United States or any other entity, relating to or in
connection with any space launch conducted for--
(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or
(2) any other non-Department of Defense customer.
SEC. 238. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part
shall be construed--
(1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use
of rocket engines for national security purposes under
section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
(Public Law 113-291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note), as
amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1100)
and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2582); or
(2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the
Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to
in such section 1608.
PART 3--REPORTS
SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a detailed report on the following:
(1) Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the
Russian Federation, including the following:
(A) An identification of the most significant senior
foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian
Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian
regime and their net worth.
(B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals
identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir
Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite.
(C) An identification of any indices of corruption with
respect to those individuals.
(D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of
those individuals and their family members (including
spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets,
investments, other business interests, and relevant
beneficial ownership information.
(E) An identification of the non-Russian business
affiliations of those individuals.
(2) Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of
the following:
(A) The emergence of Russian parastatal entities and their
role in the economy of the Russian Federation.
(B) The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of
those entities.
(C) The scope of the non-Russian business affiliations of
those entities.
(3) The exposure of key economic sectors of the United
States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal
entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities,
insurance, and real estate sectors.
(4) The likely effects of imposing debt and equity
restrictions on Russian parastatal entities, as well as the
anticipated effects of adding Russian parastatal entities to
the list of specially designated nationals and blocked
persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of
the Department of the Treasury.
(5) The potential impacts of imposing secondary sanctions
with respect to Russian oligarchs, Russian state-owned
enterprises, and Russian parastatal entities, including
impacts on the entities themselves and on the economy of the
Russian Federation, as well as on the economies of the United
States and allies of the United States.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
(2) Senior foreign political figure.--The term ``senior
foreign political figure'' has the meaning given that term in
section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or
any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report describing in detail the
potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1
(as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office
of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662 (79
Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional
persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any
successor directive, to include sovereign debt and the full
range of derivative products.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
SEC. 243. REPORT ON ILLICIT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each
one-year period thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of the
Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing interagency efforts in the
United States to combat illicit finance relating to the
Russian Federation.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
contain a summary of efforts by the United States to do the
following:
(1) Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit
financial flows linked to the Russian Federation if such
flows affect the United States financial system or those of
major allies of the United States.
(2) Conduct outreach to the private sector, including
information sharing efforts to strengthen compliance efforts
by entities, including financial institutions, to prevent
illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1).
(3) Engage and coordinate with allied international
partners on illicit finance, especially in Europe, to
coordinate efforts to uncover and prosecute the networks
responsible for illicit financial flows described in
paragraph (1), including examples of that engagement and
coordination.
(4) Identify foreign sanctions evaders and loopholes within
the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United
States.
(5) Expand the number of real estate geographic targeting
orders or other regulatory actions, as appropriate, to
degrade illicit financial activity relating to the Russian
Federation in relation to the financial system of the United
States.
(6) Provide support to counter those involved in illicit
finance relating to the Russian Federation across all
appropriate law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and
financial authorities of the Federal Government, including by
imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those
involved.
(7) In the case of the Department of the Treasury and the
Department of Justice, investigate or otherwise develop major
cases, including a description of those cases.
[[Page H6253]]
(c) Briefing.--After submitting a report under this
section, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide
briefings to the appropriate congressional committees with
respect to that report.
(d) Coordination.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
coordinate with the Attorney General, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Secretary of State in preparing each report under
this section.
(e) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
(2) Illicit finance.--The term ``illicit finance'' means
the financing of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or
proliferation, money laundering, or other forms of illicit
financing domestically or internationally, as defined by the
President.
Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia
SEC. 251. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the Russian Federation has sought to
exert influence throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in
the former states of the Soviet Union, by providing resources
to political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups
that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors,
promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise
undermine European unity. The Government of the Russian
Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption
practices as a means toward undermining and buying influence
in European and Eurasian countries.
(2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely
eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language independent media
sector and severely curtails free and independent media
within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russian-
language media organizations that are funded and controlled
by the Government of the Russian Federation and disseminate
information within and outside of the Russian Federation
routinely traffic in anti-Western disinformation, while few
independent, fact-based media sources provide objective
reporting for Russian-speaking audiences inside or outside of
the Russian Federation.
(3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to
violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security
Assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki
August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ``Helsinki Final
Act''), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, of
which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal
annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing
destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.
(4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to
ignore the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement
relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian
Federation troops, free access by humanitarian groups to the
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the
conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.
(5) The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to
comply with the terms of the Minsk Agreement to address the
ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk,
Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine,
Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014.
(6) The Government of the Russian Federation is--
(A) in violation of the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered
into force June 1, 1988 (commonly known as the ``INF
Treaty''); and
(B) failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty on
Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into
force January 1, 2002 (commonly known as the ``Open Skies
Treaty'').
SEC. 252. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the Russian Federation bears
responsibility for the continuing violence in Eastern
Ukraine, including the death on April 24, 2017, of Joseph
Stone, a citizen of the United States working as a monitor
for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;
(2) the President should call on the Government of the
Russian Federation--
(A) to withdraw all of its forces from the territories of
Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova;
(B) to return control of the borders of those territories
to their respective governments; and
(C) to cease all efforts to undermine the popularly elected
governments of those countries;
(3) the Government of the Russian Federation has applied,
and continues to apply, to the countries and peoples of
Georgia and Ukraine, traditional uses of force, intelligence
operations, and influence campaigns, which represent clear
and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;
(4) in response, the countries of Europe and Eurasia should
redouble efforts to build resilience within their
institutions, political systems, and civil societies;
(5) the United States supports the institutions that the
Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine,
including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
European Union;
(6) a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization is critical
to maintaining peace and security in Europe and Eurasia;
(7) the United States should continue to work with the
European Union as a partner against aggression by the
Government of the Russian Federation, coordinating aid
programs, development assistance, and other counter-Russian
efforts;
(8) the United States should encourage the establishment of
a commission for media freedom within the Council of Europe,
modeled on the Venice Commission regarding rule of law
issues, that would be chartered to provide governments with
expert recommendations on maintaining legal and regulatory
regimes supportive of free and independent media and an
informed citizenry able to distinguish between fact-based
reporting, opinion, and disinformation;
(9) in addition to working to strengthen the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the European Union, the United States
should work with the individual countries of Europe and
Eurasia--
(A) to identify vulnerabilities to aggression,
disinformation, corruption, and so-called hybrid warfare by
the Government of the Russian Federation;
(B) to establish strategic and technical plans for
addressing those vulnerabilities;
(C) to ensure that the financial systems of those countries
are not being used to shield illicit financial activity by
officials of the Government of the Russian Federation or
individuals in President Vladimir Putin's inner circle who
have been enriched through corruption;
(D) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption by
Russian actors; and
(E) to work toward full compliance with the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (commonly referred to as
the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'') of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development; and
(10) the President of the United States should use the
authority of the President to impose sanctions under--
(A) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
2012 (title IV of Public Law 112-208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note);
and
(B) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C.
2656 note).
SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
The United States, consistent with the principle of ex
injuria jus non oritur, supports the policy known as the
``Stimson Doctrine'' and thus does not recognize territorial
changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions
and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern
Ukraine, and Transnistria.
SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND
EURASIA.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund
$250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.
(b) Use of Funds.--Amounts in the Countering Russian
Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement,
prioritized in the following order and subject to the
availability of funds, the following goals:
(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and
electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following
countries:
(A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of
State determines--
(i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation;
and
(ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to
aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of
the United States.
(B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement
process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the
European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.
(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and
otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors
general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).
(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability
caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of
Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and
legal education, political transparency and competition, and
compliance with international obligations in the countries
described in paragraph (1).
[[Page H6254]]
(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and
other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence
and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat
corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and
operate freely in all regions in the countries described in
paragraph (1).
(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the
functions specified in section 1287(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law
114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of
recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering
propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments,
in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant
Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
State.
(c) Revision of Activities for Which Amounts May Be Used.--
The Secretary of State may modify the goals described in
subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising
such a goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate
congressional committees of the revision.
(d) Implementation.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, acting
through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe
and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 (22
U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the Freedom for Russia and
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of
1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), and in consultation with the
Administrator for the United States Agency for International
Development, the Director of the Global Engagement Center of
the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the
heads of other relevant Federal agencies, coordinate and
carry out activities to achieve the goals described in
subsection (b).
(2) Method.--Activities to achieve the goals described in
subsection (b) shall be carried out through--
(A) initiatives of the United States Government;
(B) Federal grant programs such as the Information Access
Fund; or
(C) nongovernmental or international organizations, such as
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the
National Endowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust, the
Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague Civil Society Centre,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, the European Endowment
for Democracy, and related organizations.
(3) Report on implementation.--
(A) In general.--Not later than April 1 of each year, the
Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United
States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs
and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in
subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.
(B) Elements.--Each report required by subparagraph (A)
shall include, with respect to each program or activity
described in that subparagraph--
(i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;
(ii) the goal described in subsection (b) to which the
program or activity relates; and
(iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.
(e) Coordination With Global Partners.--
(1) In general.--In order to maximize cost efficiency,
eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals
described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall
ensure coordination with--
(A) the European Union and its institutions;
(B) the governments of countries that are members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and
(C) international organizations and quasi-governmental
funding entities that carry out programs and activities that
seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).
(2) Report by secretary of state.--Not later than April 1
of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
(A) the amount of funding provided to each country referred
to in subsection (b) by--
(i) the European Union or its institutions;
(ii) the government of each country that is a member of the
European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
(iii) international organizations and quasi-governmental
funding entities that carry out programs and activities that
seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b); and
(B) an assessment of whether the funding described in
subparagraph (A) is commensurate with funding provided by the
United States for those goals.
(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to apply to or limit United States foreign
assistance not provided using amounts available in the
Countering Russian Influence Fund.
(g) Ensuring Adequate Staffing for Governance Activities.--
In order to ensure that the United States Government is
properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of
law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and
other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in
subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall establish a
pilot program for Foreign Service officer positions focused
on governance and anticorruption activities in such
countries.
SEC. 255. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED AND FUNDED
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that includes a description of media
organizations that are controlled and funded by the
Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated
entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian
Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based
television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS
IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership a report on funds provided by, or
funds the use of which was directed by, the Government of the
Russian Federation or any Russian person with the intention
of influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any
country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year,
including through direct support to any political party,
candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organization,
or civic organization.
(b) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees and leadership.--
The term ``appropriate congressional committees and
leadership'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the majority and minority
leaders of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and the
minority leader of the House of Representatives.
(2) Russian person.--The term ``Russian person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the
Russian Federation; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian
Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
Government of the Russian Federation.
SEC. 257. UKRANIAN ENERGY SECURITY.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its
sovereign and territorial integrity;
(2) to condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts
by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in
violation of its obligations and international commitments;
(3) to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by
the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of
any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of
military force;
(4) to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from
further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other
independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Caucuses;
(5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory oversight
and operations in Ukraine's energy sector, including the
establishment and empowerment of an independent regulatory
organization;
(6) to encourage and support fair competition, market
liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine's energy sector;
(7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners
in Europe reduce their dependence on Russian energy
resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of
the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce,
intimidate, and influence other countries;
(8) to work with European Union member states and European
Union institutions to promote energy security through
developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that
provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;
(9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given
its detrimental impacts on the European Union's energy
security, gas market development in Central and Eastern
Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and
(10) that the United States Government should prioritize
the export of United States energy resources in order to
create American jobs, help United States allies and partners,
and strengthen United States foreign policy.
(b) Plan To Promote Energy Security in Ukraine.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development and the Secretary of Energy,
[[Page H6255]]
shall work with the Government of Ukraine to develop a plan
to increase energy security in Ukraine, increase the amount
of energy produced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine's reliance
on energy imports from the Russian Federation.
(2) Elements.--The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall
include strategies for market liberalization, effective
regulation and oversight, supply diversification, energy
reliability, and energy efficiency, such as through
supporting--
(A) the promotion of advanced technology and modern
operating practices in Ukraine's oil and gas sector;
(B) modern geophysical and meteorological survey work as
needed followed by international tenders to help attract
qualified investment into exploration and development of
areas with untapped resources in Ukraine;
(C) a broadening of Ukraine's electric power transmission
interconnection with Europe;
(D) the strengthening of Ukraine's capability to maintain
electric power grid stability and reliability;
(E) independent regulatory oversight and operations of
Ukraine's gas market and electricity sector;
(F) the implementation of primary gas law including
pricing, tariff structure, and legal regulatory
implementation;
(G) privatization of government owned energy companies
through credible legal frameworks and a transparent process
compliant with international best practices;
(H) procurement and transport of emergency fuel supplies,
including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;
(I) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning,
crisis response, and public outreach;
(J) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of
fuel supplies;
(K) repair of power generating or power transmission
equipment or facilities; and
(L) improved building energy efficiency and other measures
designed to reduce energy demand in Ukraine.
(3) Reports.--
(A) Implementation of ukraine freedom support act of 2014
provisions.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing
the status of implementing the provisions required under
section 7(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22
U.S.C. 8926(c)), including detailing the plans required under
that section, the level of funding that has been allocated to
and expended for the strategies set forth under that section,
and progress that has been made in implementing the
strategies developed pursuant to that section.
(B) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report detailing the plan
developed under paragraph (1), the level of funding that has
been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth
in paragraph (2), and progress that has been made in
implementing the strategies.
(C) Briefings.--The Secretary of State, or a designee of
the Secretary, shall brief the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 30 days after the submission of
each report under subparagraph (B). In addition, the
Department of State shall make relevant officials available
upon request to brief the appropriate congressional
committees on all available information that relates directly
or indirectly to Ukraine or energy security in Eastern
Europe.
(D) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
paragraph, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(i) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) Supporting Efforts of Countries in Europe and Eurasia
To Decrease Their Dependence on Russian Sources of Energy.--
(1) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(A) The Government of the Russian Federation uses its
strong position in the energy sector as leverage to
manipulate the internal politics and foreign relations of the
countries of Europe and Eurasia.
(B) This influence is based not only on the Russian
Federation's oil and natural gas resources, but also on its
state-owned nuclear power and electricity companies.
(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the United States should assist the efforts of the
countries of Europe and Eurasia to enhance their energy
security through diversification of energy supplies in order
to lessen dependencies on Russian Federation energy resources
and state-owned entities; and
(B) the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation should play key roles
in supporting critical energy projects that contribute to
that goal.
(3) Use of countering russian influence fund to provide
technical assistance.--Amounts in the Countering Russian
Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to
provide technical advice to countries described in subsection
(b)(1) of such section designed to enhance energy security
and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Federation
sources.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Department of State a total of
$30,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to carry out the
strategies set forth in subsection (b)(2) and other
activities under this section related to the promotion of
energy security in Ukraine.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as affecting the responsibilities required and
authorities provided under section 7 of the Ukraine Freedom
Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926).
SEC. 258. TERMINATION.
The provisions of this subtitle shall terminate on the date
that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 259. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.
Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle, the term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing
PART 1--NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILLICIT
FINANCING
SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--The President, acting through the
Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, and the appropriate Federal
banking agencies and Federal functional regulators, develop a
national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism
and related forms of illicit finance.
(b) Transmittal to Congress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive national
strategy developed in accordance with subsection (a).
(2) Updates.--Not later than January 31, 2020, and January
31, 2022, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees updated versions of the national
strategy submitted under paragraph (1).
(c) Separate Presentation of Classified Material.--Any part
of the national strategy that involves information that is
properly classified under criteria established by the
President shall be submitted to Congress separately in a
classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking
member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as
a briefing at an appropriate level of security.
SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.
The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the
following:
(1) Evaluation of existing efforts.--An assessment of the
effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is
currently addressing the highest levels of risk of various
forms of illicit finance, including those identified in the
documents entitled ``2015 National Money Laundering Risk
Assessment'' and ``2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk
Assessment'', published by the Department of the Treasury and
a description of how the strategy is integrated into, and
supports, the broader counter terrorism strategy of the
United States.
(2) Goals, objectives, and priorities.--A comprehensive,
research-based, long-range, quantifiable discussion of goals,
objectives, and priorities for disrupting and preventing
illicit finance activities within and transiting the
financial system of the United States that outlines
priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects
of illicit finance.
(3) Threats.--An identification of the most significant
illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United
States.
(4) Reviews and proposed changes.--Reviews of enforcement
efforts, relevant regulations and relevant provisions of law
and, if appropriate, discussions of proposed changes
determined to be appropriate to ensure that the United States
pursues coordinated and effective efforts at all levels of
government, and with international partners of the United
States, in the fight against illicit finance.
(5) Detection and prosecution initiatives.--A description
of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and
prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure
that--
(A) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data
collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the
efforts described in this section be available in a timely
fashion to--
[[Page H6256]]
(i) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and
(ii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the
International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial
institutions to assist the financial institutions in efforts
to comply with laws aimed at curbing illicit finance; and
(B) appropriate efforts are undertaken to ensure that
Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and
preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly
available data in furtherance of this effort.
(6) The role of the private financial sector in prevention
of illicit finance.--A discussion of ways to enhance
partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal
departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and
detection of illicit finance, including--
(A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at
stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the
effectiveness of such efforts; and
(B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and
to adopt on an industry-wide basis more effective policies.
(7) Enhancement of intergovernmental cooperation.--A
discussion of ways to combat illicit finance by enhancing--
(A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State,
and local officials, including State regulators, State and
local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and
(B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of
countries and with and between multinational institutions
with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the
Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units.
(8) Trend analysis of emerging illicit finance threats.--A
discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance,
including evolving forms of value transfer such as so-called
cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer,
telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any
other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.
(9) Budget priorities.--A multiyear budget plan that
identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully
execute the full range of missions called for in this
section.
(10) Technology enhancements.--An analysis of current and
developing ways to leverage technology to improve the
effectiveness of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism
and other forms of illicit finance, including better
integration of open-source data.
PART 2--ENHANCING ANTITERRORISM TOOLS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
SEC. 271. IMPROVING ANTITERROR FINANCE MONITORING OF FUNDS
TRANSFERS.
(a) Study.--
(1) In general.--To improve the ability of the Department
of the Treasury to better track cross-border fund transfers
and identify potential financing of terrorist or other forms
of illicit finance, the Secretary shall carry out a study to
assess--
(A) the potential efficacy of requiring banking regulators
to establish a pilot program to provide technical assistance
to depository institutions and credit unions that wish to
provide account services to money services businesses serving
individuals in Somalia;
(B) whether such a pilot program could be a model for
improving the ability of United States persons to make
legitimate funds transfers through transparent and easily
monitored channels while preserving strict compliance with
the Bank Secrecy Act (Public Law 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114) and
related controls aimed at stopping money laundering and the
financing of terrorism; and
(C) consistent with current legal requirements regarding
confidential supervisory information, the potential impact of
allowing money services businesses to share certain State
examination information with depository institutions and
credit unions, or whether another appropriate mechanism could
be identified to allow a similar exchange of information to
give the depository institutions and credit unions a better
understanding of whether an individual money services
business is adequately meeting its anti-money laundering and
counter-terror financing obligations to combat money
laundering, the financing of terror, or related illicit
finance.
(2) Public input.--The Secretary should solicit and
consider public input as appropriate in developing the study
required under subsection (a).
(b) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that
contains all findings and determinations made in carrying out
the study required under subsection (a).
SEC. 272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING INTELLIGENCE.
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary, acting
through the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Crimes, should intensify work with foreign partners to help
the foreign partners develop intelligence analytic
capacities, in a financial intelligence unit, finance
ministry, or other appropriate agency, that are--
(1) commensurate to the threats faced by the foreign
partner; and
(2) designed to better integrate intelligence efforts with
the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
regimes of the foreign partner.
SEC. 273. EXAMINING THE COUNTER-TERROR FINANCING ROLE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IN EMBASSIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives a report that contains--
(1) a list of the United States embassies in which a full-
time Department of the Treasury financial attache is
stationed and a description of how the interests of the
Department of the Treasury relating to terrorist financing
and money laundering are addressed (via regional attaches or
otherwise) at United States embassies where no such attaches
are present;
(2) a list of the United States embassies at which the
Department of the Treasury has assigned a technical
assistance advisor from the Office of Technical Assistance of
the Department of the Treasury;
(3) an overview of how Department of the Treasury financial
attaches and technical assistance advisors assist in efforts
to counter illicit finance, to include money laundering,
terrorist financing, and proliferation financing; and
(4) an overview of patterns, trends, or other issues
identified by the Department of the Treasury and whether
resources are sufficient to address these issues.
SEC. 274. INCLUSION OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
(a) In General.--Section 101(c)(1) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(c)(1)) is amended by inserting
``the Secretary of the Treasury,'' before ``and such other
officers''.
(b) Rule of Construction.--The amendment made by subsection
(a) may not be construed to authorize the National Security
Council to have a professional staff level that exceeds the
limitation set forth under section 101(e)(3) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(e)(3)).
SEC. 275. INCLUSION OF ALL FUNDS.
(a) In General.--Section 5326 of title 31, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in the heading of such section, by striking ``coin and
currency'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``subtitle and'' and inserting ``subtitle
or to''; and
(B) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``United States coins
or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the
Secretary may describe in such order)'' and inserting ``funds
(as the Secretary may describe in such order),''; and
(3) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``coins or currency
(or monetary instruments)'' and inserting ``funds''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``coins or currency (or
such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe
in the regulation or order)'' and inserting ``funds (as the
Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for chapter
53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended in the item
relating to section 5326 by striking ``coin and currency''.
PART 3--DEFINITIONS
SEC. 281. DEFINITIONS.
In this subtitle--
(1) the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed
Services, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security,
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
(2) the term ``appropriate Federal banking agencies'' has
the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);
(3) the term ``Bank Secrecy Act'' means--
(A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1829b);
(B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C.
1951 et seq.); and
(C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States
Code;
(4) the term ``Federal functional regulator'' has the
meaning given that term in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809);
(5) the term ``illicit finance'' means the financing of
terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money
laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically
or internationally, as defined by the President;
(6) the term ``money services business'' has the meaning
given the term under section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations;
[[Page H6257]]
(7) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the
Treasury; and
(8) the term ``State'' means each of the several States,
the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of
the United States.
Subtitle D--Rule of Construction
SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title
(other than sections 216 and 236(b)) shall be construed to
limit the authority of the President under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
SEC. 292. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF
ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The principle of collective defense of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is immortalized in
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which members
pledge that ``an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all''.
(2) For almost 7 decades, the principle of collective
defense has effectively served as a strategic deterrent for
the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and provided stability throughout the world, strengthening
the security of the United States and all 28 other member
nations.
(3) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in
New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the Alliance agreed
to invoke Article 5 for the first time, affirming its
commitment to collective defense.
(4) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization have made historic contributions and sacrifices
while combating terrorism in Afghanistan through the
International Security Assistance Force and the Resolute
Support Mission.
(5) The recent attacks in the United Kingdom underscore the
importance of an international alliance to combat hostile
nation states and terrorist groups.
(6) At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, the member countries
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided that all
countries that are members of NATO would spend an amount
equal to 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense
by 2024.
(7) Collective defense unites the 29 members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, each committing to protecting
and supporting one another from external adversaries, which
bolsters the North Atlantic Alliance.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress--
(1) to express the vital importance of Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, the charter of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, as it continues to serve as a critical
deterrent to potential hostile nations and terrorist
organizations;
(2) to remember the first and only invocation of Article 5
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of the
United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001;
(3) to affirm that the United States remains fully
committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will
honor its obligations enshrined in Article 5; and
(4) to condemn any threat to the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, freedom, or democracy of any country that is a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA
SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Korean Interdiction and
Modernization of Sanctions Act''.
SEC. 302. DEFINITIONS.
(a) Amendments to Definitions in the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.--
(1) Applicable executive order.--Section 3(1)(A) of the
North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22
U.S.C. 9202(1)(A)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``or Executive Order 13694'' and inserting
``Executive Order No. 13694''; and
(B) by inserting ``or Executive Order No. 13722 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note; relating to blocking the property of the
Government of North Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea,
and Prohibiting Certain Transactions With Respect to North
Korea),'' before ``to the extent''.
(2) Applicable united nations security council
resolution.--Section 3(2)(A) of the North Korea Sanctions and
Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202(2)(A)) is
amended by striking ``or 2094 (2013)'' and inserting ``2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), or 2321 (2016)''.
(3) Foreign person.--Section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202) is
amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (5) through (14) as
paragraphs (6) through (15), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraph:
``(5) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' means--
``(A) an individual who is not a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the
United States; or
``(B) an entity that is not a United States person.''.
(4) Luxury goods.--Paragraph (9) of section 3 of the North
Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9202), as redesignated by paragraph (3) of this subsection,
is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(C) also includes any items so designated under an
applicable United Nations Security Council resolution.''.
(5) North korean person.--Section 3 of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9202), as amended by paragraph (3) of this subsection, is
further amended--
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (15) as
paragraphs (14) through (16), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following new
paragraph:
``(13) North korean person.--The term `North Korean person'
means--
``(A) a North Korean citizen or national; or
``(B) an entity owned or controlled by the Government of
North Korea or by a North Korean citizen or national.''.
(b) Definitions for Purposes of This Act.--In this title:
(1) Applicable united nations security council resolution;
luxury goods.--The terms ``applicable United Nations Security
Council resolution'' and ``luxury goods'' have the meanings
given those terms, respectively, in section 3 of the North
Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9202), as amended by subsection (a).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees; government of
north korea; united states person.--The terms ``appropriate
congressional committees'', ``Government of North Korea'',
and ``United States person'' have the meanings given those
terms, respectively, in section 3 of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9202).
(3) Foreign person; north korean person.--The terms
``foreign person'' and ``North Korean person'' have the
meanings given those terms, respectively, in paragraph (5)
and paragraph (13) of section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202(5) and
9202(13)), as added by subsection (a).
(4) Prohibited weapons program.--The term ``prohibited
weapons program'' means--
(A) any program related to the development of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery,
including ballistic missiles; and
(B) any program to develop related materials with respect
to a program described in subparagraph (A).
Subtitle A--Sanctions to Enforce and Implement United Nations Security
Council Sanctions Against North Korea
SEC. 311. MODIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DESIGNATION OF PERSONS.
(a) Expansion of Mandatory Designations.--Section 104(a) of
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016
(22 U.S.C. 9214(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (9), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
``or any defense article or defense service (as such terms
are defined in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2794));'';
(2) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (15);
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new
paragraphs:
``(10) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchases or
otherwise acquires from North Korea any significant amounts
of gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, silver, nickel,
zinc, or rare earth minerals;
``(11) knowingly, directly or indirectly, sells or
transfers to North Korea any significant amounts of rocket,
aviation, or jet fuel (except for use by a civilian passenger
aircraft outside North Korea, exclusively for consumption
during its flight to North Korea or its return flight);
``(12) knowingly, directly or indirectly, provides
significant amounts of fuel or supplies, provides bunkering
services, or facilitates a significant transaction or
transactions to operate or maintain, a vessel or aircraft
that is designated under an applicable Executive order or an
applicable United Nations Security Council resolution, or
that is owned or controlled by a person designated under an
applicable Executive order or applicable United Nations
Security Council resolution;
``(13) knowingly, directly or indirectly, insures,
registers, facilitates the registration of, or maintains
insurance or a registration for, a vessel owned or controlled
by the Government of North Korea, except as specifically
approved by the United Nations Security Council;
``(14) knowingly, directly or indirectly, maintains a
correspondent account (as defined in section 201A(d)(1)) with
any North Korean financial institution, except as
specifically approved by the United Nations Security Council;
or''; and
(4) in paragraph (15), as so redesignated, by striking
``(9)'' and inserting ``(14)''.
(b) Expansion of Additional Discretionary Designations.--
(1) In general.--Section 104(b)(1) of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9214(b)(1)) is amended--
[[Page H6258]]
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``pursuant to an
applicable United Nations Security Council resolution;'' and
inserting the following: ``pursuant to--
``(i) an applicable United Nations Security Council
resolution;
``(ii) any regulation promulgated under section 404; or
``(iii) any applicable Executive order;'';
(B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking ``or'' at the
end;
(C) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end
and inserting a semicolon; and
(D) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:
``(D) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or
otherwise acquired from the Government of North Korea
significant quantities of coal, iron, or iron ore, in excess
of the limitations provided in applicable United Nations
Security Council resolutions;
``(E) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or
otherwise acquired significant types or amounts of textiles
from the Government of North Korea;
``(F) knowingly facilitated a significant transfer of funds
or property of the Government of North Korea that materially
contributes to any violation of an applicable United National
Security Council resolution;
``(G) knowingly, directly or indirectly, facilitated a
significant transfer to or from the Government of North Korea
of bulk cash, precious metals, gemstones, or other stores of
value not described under subsection (a)(10);
``(H) knowingly, directly or indirectly, sold, transferred,
or otherwise provided significant amounts of crude oil,
condensates, refined petroleum, other types of petroleum or
petroleum byproducts, liquified natural gas, or other natural
gas resources to the Government of North Korea (except for
heavy fuel oil, gasoline, or diesel fuel for humanitarian use
or as excepted under subsection (a)(11));
``(I) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in,
facilitated, or was responsible for the online commercial
activities of the Government of North Korea, including online
gambling;
``(J) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or
otherwise acquired fishing rights from the Government of
North Korea;
``(K) knowingly, directly or indirectly, purchased or
otherwise acquired significant types or amounts of food or
agricultural products from the Government of North Korea;
``(L) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engaged in,
facilitated, or was responsible for the exportation of
workers from North Korea in a manner intended to generate
significant revenue, directly or indirectly, for use by the
Government of North Korea or by the Workers' Party of Korea;
``(M) knowingly conducted a significant transaction or
transactions in North Korea's transportation, mining, energy,
or financial services industries; or
``(N) except as specifically approved by the United Nations
Security Council, and other than through a correspondent
account as described in subsection (a)(14), knowingly
facilitated the operation of any branch, subsidiary, or
office of a North Korean financial institution.''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to conduct described in subparagraphs (D)
through (N) of section 104(b)(1) of the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, as added by paragraph
(1), engaged in on or after such date of enactment.
(c) Mandatory and Discretionary Asset Blocking.--Section
104(c) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214(c)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``of a designated person'' and inserting
``of a person designated under subsection (a)'';
(2) by striking ``The President'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) Mandatory asset blocking.--The President''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Discretionary asset blocking.--The President may also
exercise such powers, in the same manner and to the same
extent described in paragraph (1), with respect to a person
designated under subsection (b).''.
(d) Designation of Additional Persons.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report including a
determination as to whether reasonable grounds exist, and an
explanation of the reasons for any determination that such
grounds do not exist, to designate, pursuant to section 104
of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of
2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214), as amended by this section, each of
the following:
(A) The Korea Shipowners' Protection and Indemnity
Association, a North Korean insurance company, with respect
to facilitating imports, exports, and reexports of arms and
related materiel to and from North Korea, or for other
activities prohibited by such section 104.
(B) Chinpo Shipping Company (Private) Limited, a Singapore
corporation, with respect to facilitating imports, exports,
and reexports of arms and related materiel to and from North
Korea.
(C) The Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, with respect to the sale of gold to, the receipt of
gold from, or the import or export of gold by the Government
of North Korea.
(D) Kumgang Economic Development Corporation (KKG), with
respect to being an entity controlled by Bureau 39 of the
Workers' Party of the Government of North Korea.
(E) Sam Pa, also known as Xu Jinghua, Xu Songhua, Sa Muxu,
Samo, Sampa, or Sam King, and any entities owned or
controlled by such individual, with respect to transactions
with KKG.
(F) The Chamber of Commerce of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, with respect to the exportation of workers
in violation of section 104(a)(5) or of section 104(b)(1)(M)
of such Act, as amended by subsection (b) of this section.
(2) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) may
contain a classified annex.
SEC. 312. PROHIBITION ON INDIRECT CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS.
(a) In General.--Title II of the North Korea Sanctions and
Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9221 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 201 the following new
section:
``SEC. 201A. PROHIBITION ON INDIRECT CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS.
``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), if
a United States financial institution has or obtains
knowledge that a correspondent account established,
maintained, administered, or managed by that institution for
a foreign financial institution is being used by the foreign
financial institution to provide significant financial
services indirectly to any person, foreign government, or
financial institution designated under section 104, the
United States financial institution shall ensure that such
correspondent account is no longer used to provide such
services.
``(b) Exception.--A United States financial institution is
authorized to process transfers of funds to or from North
Korea, or for the direct or indirect benefit of any person,
foreign government, or financial institution that is
designated under section 104, only if the transfer--
``(1) arises from, and is ordinarily incident and necessary
to give effect to, an underlying transaction that has been
authorized by a specific or general license issued by the
Secretary of the Treasury; and
``(2) does not involve debiting or crediting a North Korean
account.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Correspondent account.--The term `correspondent
account' has the meaning given that term in section 5318A of
title 31, United States Code.
``(2) United states financial institution.--The term
`United States financial institution' means has the meaning
given that term in section 510.310 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of the
enactment of this section.
``(3) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign
financial institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as
in effect on the date of the enactment of this section.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016 is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 201 the following new item:
``Sec. 201A. Prohibition on indirect correspondent accounts.''.
SEC. 313. LIMITATIONS ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO NONCOMPLIANT
GOVERNMENTS.
Section 203 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9223) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Transactions in Lethal
Military Equipment'' and inserting ``Transactions in Defense
Articles or Defense Services'';
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ``that provides lethal
military equipment to the Government of North Korea'' and
inserting ``that provides to or receives from the Government
of North Korea a defense article or defense service, as such
terms are defined in section 47 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2794), if the President determines that a
significant type or amount of such article or service has
been so provided or received''; and
(C) in paragraph (2), by striking ``1 year'' and inserting
``2 years'';
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ``or emergency'' and
inserting ``maternal and child health, disease prevention and
response, or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Report on Arms Trafficking Involving North Korea.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter
for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that
specifically describes the compliance of foreign countries
and other foreign jurisdictions with the requirement to
curtail the trade described in subsection (b)(1).
``(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.''.
SEC. 314. AMENDMENTS TO ENHANCE INSPECTION AUTHORITIES.
Title II of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
[[Page H6259]]
9221 et seq.), as amended by section 102 of this Act, is
further amended by striking section 205 and inserting the
following:
``SEC. 205. ENHANCED INSPECTION AUTHORITIES.
``(a) Report Required.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for
5 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report--
``(A) identifying the operators of foreign sea ports and
airports that knowingly--
``(i) significantly fail to implement or enforce
regulations to inspect ships, aircraft, cargo, or conveyances
in transit to or from North Korea, as required by applicable
United Nations Security Council resolutions;
``(ii) facilitate the transfer, transshipment, or
conveyance of significant types or quantities of cargo,
vessels, or aircraft owned or controlled by persons
designated under applicable United Nations Security Council
resolutions; or
``(iii) facilitate any of the activities described in
section 104(a);
``(B) describing the extent to which the requirements of
applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions to de-
register any vessel owned, controlled, or operated by or on
behalf of the Government of North Korea have been implemented
by other foreign countries;
``(C) describing the compliance of the Islamic Republic of
Iran with the sanctions mandated in applicable United Nations
Security Council resolutions;
``(D) identifying vessels, aircraft, and conveyances owned
or controlled by the Reconnaissance General Bureau of the
Workers' Party of Korea; and
``(E) describing the diplomatic and enforcement efforts by
the President to secure the full implementation of the
applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions, as
described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
``(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
``(b) Specific Findings.--Each report required under
subsection (a) shall include specific findings with respect
to the following ports and airports:
``(1) The ports of Dandong, Dalian, and any other port in
the People's Republic of China that the President deems
appropriate.
``(2) The ports of Abadan, Bandar-e-Abbas, Chabahar,
Bandar-e-Khomeini, Bushehr Port, Asaluyeh Port, Kish, Kharg
Island, Bandar-e-Lenge, and Khorramshahr, and Tehran Imam
Khomeini International Airport, in the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
``(3) The ports of Nakhodka, Vanino, and Vladivostok, in
the Russian Federation.
``(4) The ports of Latakia, Banias, and Tartous, and
Damascus International Airport, in the Syrian Arab Republic.
``(c) Enhanced Security Targeting Requirements.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
Secretary of Homeland Security may, using a layered approach,
require enhanced screening procedures to determine whether
physical inspections are warranted of any cargo bound for or
landed in the United States that--
``(A) has been transported through a sea port or airport
the operator of which has been identified by the President in
accordance with subsection (a)(1) as having repeatedly failed
to comply with applicable United Nations Security Council
resolutions;
``(B) is aboard a vessel or aircraft, or within a
conveyance that has, within the last 365 days, entered the
territory or waters of North Korea, or landed in any of the
sea ports or airports of North Korea; or
``(C) is registered by a country or jurisdiction whose
compliance has been identified by the President as deficient
pursuant to subsection (a)(2).
``(2) Exception for food, medicine, and humanitarian
shipments.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any vessel,
aircraft, or conveyance that has entered the territory or
waters of North Korea, or landed in any of the sea ports or
airports of North Korea, exclusively for the purposes
described in section 208(b)(3)(B), or to import food,
medicine, or supplies into North Korea to meet the
humanitarian needs of the North Korean people.
``(d) Seizure and Forfeiture.--A vessel, aircraft, or
conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities described
in section 104(a) under the jurisdiction of the United States
may be seized and forfeited, or subject to forfeiture,
under--
``(1) chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code; or
``(2) part V of title IV of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C. 1581 et seq.).''.
SEC. 315. ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS SHIPPING
SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA.
(a) In General.--The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33
U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON ENTRY AND OPERATION.
``(a) Prohibition.--
``(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
section, no vessel described in subsection (b) may enter or
operate in the navigable waters of the United States or
transfer cargo in any port or place under the jurisdiction of
the United States.
``(2) Limitations on application.--
``(A) In general.--The prohibition under paragraph (1)
shall not apply with respect to--
``(i) a vessel described in subsection (b)(1), if the
Secretary of State determines that--
``(I) the vessel is owned or operated by or on behalf of a
country the government of which the Secretary of State
determines is closely cooperating with the United States with
respect to implementing the applicable United Nations
Security Council resolutions (as such term is defined in
section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
Act of 2016); or
``(II) it is in the national security interest not to apply
the prohibition to such vessel; or
``(ii) a vessel described in subsection (b)(2), if the
Secretary of State determines that the vessel is no longer
registered as described in that subsection.
``(B) Notice.--Not later than 15 days after making a
determination under subparagraph (A), the Secretary of State
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate written notice of the determination and the basis upon
which the determination was made.
``(C) Publication.--The Secretary of State shall publish a
notice in the Federal Register of each determination made
under subparagraph (A).
``(b) Vessels Described.--A vessel referred to in
subsection (a) is a foreign vessel for which a notice of
arrival is required to be filed under section 4(a)(5), and
that--
``(1) is on the most recent list of vessels published in
Federal Register under subsection (c)(2); or
``(2) more than 180 days after the publication of such
list, is knowingly registered, pursuant to the 1958
Convention on the High Seas entered into force on September
30, 1962, by a government the agents or instrumentalities of
which are maintaining a registration of a vessel that is
included on such list.
``(c) Information and Publication.--The Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall--
``(1) maintain timely information on the registrations of
all foreign vessels over 300 gross tons that are known to
be--
``(A) owned or operated by or on behalf of the Government
of North Korea or a North Korean person;
``(B) owned or operated by or on behalf of any country in
which a sea port is located, the operator of which the
President has identified in the most recent report submitted
under section 205(a)(1)(A) of the North Korea Sanctions and
Policy Enhancement Act of 2016; or
``(C) owned or operated by or on behalf of any country
identified by the President as a country that has not
complied with the applicable United Nations Security Council
resolutions (as such term is defined in section 3 of such
Act); and
``(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this section, and periodically thereafter,
publish in the Federal Register a list of the vessels
described in paragraph (1).
``(d) Notification of Governments.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall notify each
government, the agents or instrumentalities of which are
maintaining a registration of a foreign vessel that is
included on a list published under subsection (c)(2), not
later than 30 days after such publication, that all vessels
registered under such government's authority are subject to
subsection (a).
``(2) Additional notification.--In the case of a government
that continues to maintain a registration for a vessel that
is included on such list after receiving an initial
notification under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall issue
an additional notification to such government not later than
120 days after the publication of a list under subsection
(c)(2).
``(e) Notification of Vessels.--Upon receiving a notice of
arrival under section 4(a)(5) from a vessel described in
subsection (b), the Secretary of the department in which the
Coast Guard is operating shall notify the master of such
vessel that the vessel may not enter or operate in the
navigable waters of the United States or transfer cargo in
any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, unless--
``(1) the Secretary of State has made a determination under
subsection (a)(2); or
``(2) the Secretary of the department in which the Coast
Guard is operating allows provisional entry of the vessel, or
transfer of cargo from the vessel, under subsection (f).
``(f) Provisional Entry or Cargo Transfer.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of this section, the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating may allow
provisional entry of, or transfer of cargo from, a vessel, if
such entry or transfer is necessary for the safety of the
vessel or persons aboard.
``(g) Right of Innocent Passage and Right of Transit
Passage.--This section shall not be construed as authority to
restrict the right of innocent passage or the right of
transit passage as recognized under international law.
``(h) Foreign Vessel Defined.--In this section, the term
`foreign vessel' has the meaning given that term in section
110 of title 46, United States Code.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Special powers.--Section 4(b)(2) of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1223(b)(2)) is amended by
inserting ``or 16'' after ``section 9''.
[[Page H6260]]
(2) Denial of entry.--Section 13(e) of the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1232(e)) is amended by
striking ``section 9'' and inserting ``section 9 or 16''.
SEC. 316. REPORT ON COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5
years, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership a report that
includes--
(1) an assessment of the extent of cooperation (including
through the transfer of goods, services, technology, or
intellectual property) between North Korea and Iran relating
to their respective nuclear, ballistic missile development,
chemical or biological weapons development, or conventional
weapons programs;
(2) the names of any Iranian or North Korean persons that
have knowingly engaged in or directed--
(A) the provision of material support to such programs; or
(B) the exchange of information between North Korea and
Iran with respect to such programs;
(3) the names of any other foreign persons that have
facilitated the activities described in paragraph (1); and
(4) a determination whether any of the activities described
in paragraphs (1) and (2) violate United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership
Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees and leadership'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 317. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5
years, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership a report that
evaluates the degree to which the governments of other
countries have knowingly failed to--
(1) close the representative offices of persons designated
under applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions;
(2) expel any North Korean nationals, including diplomats,
working on behalf of such persons;
(3) prohibit the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or
representative offices of North Korean financial institutions
within the jurisdictions of such governments; or
(4) expel any representatives of North Korean financial
institutions.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership
Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees and leadership'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority leader of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 318. BRIEFING ON MEASURES TO DENY SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL
MESSAGING SERVICES TO DESIGNATED NORTH KOREAN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for
5 years, the President shall provide to the appropriate
congressional committees a briefing that includes the
following information:
(1) A list of each person or foreign government the
President has identified that directly provides specialized
financial messaging services to, or enables or facilitates
direct or indirect access to such messaging services for--
(A) any North Korean financial institution (as such term is
defined in section 3 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9202)) designated under an
applicable United Nations Security Council resolution; or
(B) any other North Korean person, on behalf of such a
North Korean financial institution.
(2) A detailed assessment of the status of efforts by the
Secretary of the Treasury to work with the relevant
authorities in the home jurisdictions of such specialized
financial messaging providers to end such provision or
access.
(b) Form.--The briefing required under subsection (a) may
be classified.
Subtitle B--Sanctions With Respect to Human Rights Abuses by the
Government of North Korea
SEC. 321. SANCTIONS FOR FORCED LABOR AND SLAVERY OVERSEAS OF
NORTH KOREANS.
(a) Sanctions for Trafficking in Persons.--
(1) In general.--Section 302(b) of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9241(b)) is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) a list of foreign persons that knowingly employ North
Korean laborers, as described in section 104(b)(1)(M).''.
(2) Additional determinations; reports.--With respect to
any country identified in section 302(b)(2) of the North
Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9241(b)(2)), as amended by paragraph (1), the report required
under section 302(a) of such Act shall--
(A) include a determination whether each person identified
in section 302(b)(3) of such Act (as amended by paragraph
(1)) who is a national or a citizen of such identified
country meets the criteria for sanctions under--
(i) section 111 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108) (relating to the prevention of
trafficking in persons); or
(ii) section 104(a) or 104(b)(1) of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9214(a)), as amended by section 101 of this Act;
(B) be included in the report required under section 110(b)
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C.
7107(b)) (relating to the annual report on trafficking in
persons); and
(C) be considered in any determination that the government
of such country has made serious and sustained efforts to
eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, as such
term is defined for purposes of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000.
(b) Sanctions on Foreign Persons That Employ North Korean
Labor.--
(1) In general.--Title III of the North Korea Sanctions and
Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9241 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 302 the following new
sections:
``SEC. 302A. REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION APPLICABLE TO GOODS MADE
WITH NORTH KOREAN LABOR.
``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
any significant goods, wares, articles, and merchandise
mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by the
labor of North Korean nationals or citizens shall be deemed
to be prohibited under section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to entry at any of
the ports of the United States.
``(b) Exception.--The prohibition described in subsection
(a) shall not apply if the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise described in
such paragraph were not produced with convict labor, forced
labor, or indentured labor under penal sanctions.
``SEC. 302B. SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PERSONS EMPLOYING NORTH
KOREAN LABOR.
``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (c),
the President shall designate any person identified under
section 302(b)(3) for the imposition of sanctions under
subsection (b).
``(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in paragraph (2) with respect to any person
designated under subsection (a).
``(2) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this
paragraph are sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to
block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests
in property of a person designated under subsection (a), if
such property and interests in property are in the United
States, come within the United States, or are or come within
the possession or control of a United States person.
``(c) Exception.--
``(1) In general.--A person may not be designated under
subsection (a) if the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that the President has received
reliable assurances from such person that--
``(A) the employment of North Korean laborers does not
result in the direct or indirect transfer of convertible
currency, luxury goods, or other stores of value to the
Government of North Korea;
``(B) all wages and benefits are provided directly to the
laborers, and are held, as applicable, in accounts within the
jurisdiction in which they reside in locally denominated
currency; and
``(C) the laborers are subject to working conditions
consistent with international standards.
``(2) Recertification.--Not later than 180 days after the
date on which the President transmits to the appropriate
congressional committees an initial certification under
paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter, the President
shall--
``(A) transmit a recertification stating that the
conditions described in such paragraph continue to be met; or
``(B) if such recertification cannot be transmitted, impose
the sanctions described in subsection (b) beginning on the
date on which the President determines that such
recertification cannot be transmitted.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016 is amended by inserting after the item
[[Page H6261]]
relating to section 302 the following new items:
``Sec. 302A. Rebuttable presumption applicable to goods made with North
Korean labor.
``Sec. 302B. Sanctions on foreign persons employing North Korean
labor.''.
SEC. 322. MODIFICATIONS TO SANCTIONS SUSPENSION AND WAIVER
AUTHORITIES.
(a) Exemptions.--Section 208(a) of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9228(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(1) by inserting ``201A,'' after ``104,''; and
(2) by inserting ``302A, 302B,'' after ``209,''.
(b) Humanitarian Waiver.--Section 208(b) of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9228(b)(1)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``201A,'' after ``104,'' in each place it
appears; and
(2) by inserting ``302A, 302B,'' after ``209(b),'' in each
place it appears.
(c) Waiver.--Section 208(c) of the North Korea Sanctions
and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9228(c)) is
amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(1) by inserting ``201A,'' after ``104,''; and
(2) by inserting ``302A, 302B,'' after ``209(b),''.
SEC. 323. REWARD FOR INFORMANTS.
Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act
of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)), is amended--
(1) in paragraph (9), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (10), by striking the period at the end
and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(11) the identification or location of any person who,
while acting at the direction of or under the control of a
foreign government, aids or abets a violation of section 1030
of title 18, United States Code; or
``(12) the disruption of financial mechanisms of any person
who has engaged in the conduct described in sections 104(a)
or 104(b)(1) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 2914(a) or (b)(1)).''.
SEC. 324. DETERMINATION ON DESIGNATION OF NORTH KOREA AS A
STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.
(a) Determination.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
determination whether North Korea meets the criteria for
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
(2) Form.--The determination required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex, if appropriate.
(b) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--For purposes of
this section, the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means a
country the government of which the Secretary of State has
determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)) (as in effect
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act),
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780), or any other provision of law, is a government that
has repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
Subtitle C--General Authorities
SEC. 331. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.
Any reports required to be submitted to the appropriate
congressional committees under this title or any amendment
made by this title that are subject to deadlines for
submission consisting of similar units of time may be
consolidated into a single report that is submitted to
appropriate congressional committees pursuant to the earlier
of such deadlines. The consolidated reports must contain all
information required under this title or any amendment made
by this title, in addition to all other elements mandated by
previous law.
SEC. 332. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit--
(1) the authority or obligation of the President to apply
the sanctions described in section 104 of the North Korea
Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C.
9214), as amended by section 311 of this Act, with regard to
persons who meet the criteria for designation under such
section, or in any other provision of law; or
(2) the authorities of the President pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.).
SEC. 333. REGULATORY AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--The President shall, not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate
regulations as necessary for the implementation of this title
and the amendments made by this title.
(b) Notification to Congress.--Not fewer than 10 days
before the promulgation of a regulation under subsection (a),
the President shall notify and provide to the appropriate
congressional committees the proposed regulation, specifying
the provisions of this title or the amendments made by this
title that the regulation is implementing.
SEC. 334. LIMITATION ON FUNDS.
No additional funds are authorized to carry out the
requirements of this title or of the amendments made by this
title. Such requirements shall be carried out using amounts
otherwise authorized.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
General Leave
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their
remarks and to include any extraneous material in the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, this bill represents a very broad, bipartisan House-
Senate agreement that the United States must enforce tougher sanctions
against North Korea, against Russia, against Iran.
I thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), the ranking member
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, for his determined and excellent work
on this legislation. This is a very important bill.
These three regimes in different parts of the world are threatening
vital U.S. interests and they are destabilizing their neighbors. It is
well past time that we forcefully respond.
Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has invaded its neighbor, Ukraine,
seizing its territory and destabilizing its government. It poses a
threat to our NATO allies in Europe, as Moscow works to undermine
democratic values with determination and sophistication, as U.S.
intelligence agencies have made clear. This former KGB colonel
attempted to interfere with our own election. Left unchecked, Russia is
sure to continue its aggression.
Putin's forces continue to prop up the murderous Assad regime in
Syria, prolonging a deadly conflict that has driven tens of millions of
people from their homes, while enabling the use of chemical weapons and
other systematic human rights abuses against the people of Syria.
The Russia sanctions in this bill are substantially similar to those
that overwhelmingly passed the other body. They give the administration
important economic leverage, they give it diplomatic leverage by
targeting the things that matter to Vladimir Putin and that matter to
his allies the most, and that is their corrupt efforts to profit from
the country's oil wealth and their ability to sell weapons overseas.
To focus their impact, we clarified several provisions that could
have inadvertently handed Russian companies control of global energy
projects and impacted pipelines that our European allies rely on in an
effort to end their dependence on Russian gas. So this strengthens the
bill.
To ensure these economic sanctions remain in place as long as Putin's
aggression continues, this bill empowers Congress to review and to
disapprove any sanctions relief. This strong oversight is necessary, it
is appropriate. After all, it is Congress that the Constitution
empowers to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
Mr. Speaker, Russia has found a willing partner in Iran. The regime's
Iranian Revolutionary Guard are fighting alongside Russian forces in
Syria. At the same time, Tehran continues to threaten Israel by
providing funding and advanced rockets and missiles to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is its leading terrorist proxy. It continues to hold
Americans hostage, while developing intercontinental ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
To strengthen the U.S. response to the threat from Iran, this bill
includes provisions originally introduced by my counterpart, Senator
Corker, which increase sanctions on those involved in the regime's
human rights abuses and its support for terrorism, as well as its
efforts on the ballistic missile program, which the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard forces control.
Finally, I am proud that this bill includes the text of H.R. 1644,
the Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act, which we
passed in May. We passed it here out of the House by a vote of 419-1.
These provisions, which were strengthened in consultation with the
other body, expand
[[Page H6262]]
sanctions targeting North Korea's nuclear weapons program, but they
also go after those around the world who employ North Korean slave
labor.
This is a human rights abuse. It is one that operates by having a
situation where the indentured workers are fed, but the check, instead
of going to the workers, goes to the regime, and that money then goes
into the nuclear weapons program. It is estimated that this earns
hundreds of millions of dollars for the regime in hard currency.
So with every test, Kim Jong-un's regime comes closer to being able
to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile that is capable of reaching the
U.S. mainland. We simply cannot pass up an opportunity to increase
pressure in response to this threat.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I might
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. I want to, first
of all, thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for all the hard
work that has gone into this legislation so far. I want to especially
thank our chairman, Ed Royce, who has been my partner on this committee
for nearly 5 years. We have passed excellent legislation. The
legislation today just adds to it, and it shows what you can do when
you work in a bipartisan way, so I want to thank the chairman for all
his hard work and all his courtesies.
Mr. Speaker, I support this bill. I certainly plan to vote for it,
but it seems we may be on the floor before we have ironed out all the
differences with the other body. I hope that is not the case.
In particular, there have been issues with the North Korea sanctions.
It was another Royce-Engel bill, which already passed in the House and,
frankly, should have been taken up by the other body on a separate
track; instead, it is now put into this bill. I hope we don't face
further delays when this bill gets back to the other House.
Our job isn't done, obviously, until we get this thing across the
finish line; and we need to do that because this bill is critical to
our national security.
It does far more than just send a message to leaders in Russia, Iran,
and North Korea. It exacts a heavy price for their aggressive and
destabilizing behavior.
Just like the bill we already passed, this legislation would update
and expand our sanctions on North Korea, closing loopholes that have
allowed money to flow to the Kim regime, funding its illegal weapons
program. It would crack down on the trading partners, banks, and
shipping vessels that enable the regime, and go after the regime's most
lucrative enterprises, whether exported goods or the pilfered wages of
North Korean laborers sent abroad to work.
With respect to Iran, this bill would go after so many of the things
Iran's leaders do to drive violence and instability, from Tehran's
ballistic missile program and its support for terrorism to the regime's
abhorrent human rights record and efforts to build up its military. I
have said this again and again, that we need to hold the regime's feet
to the fire on all these issues. This bill does exactly that.
Finally, on Russia, this bill is a strong, direct response to
Vladimir Putin's efforts to undermine American democracy. It imposes
new sanctions on those who want to do business with Putin's cronies or
with Russia's military or intelligence. It strengthens existing
sanctions for Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and armed
intervention in eastern Ukraine. It pushes back against Russia's
cybercrimes, including the hacking of our election to help Donald
Trump--a story which Congress and the special counsel are still trying
to get to the bottom of--as well as Putin's support for the murderous
Assad regime in Syria. And it gives Congress a strong oversight role in
making sure that these Russian sanctions are not lifted prematurely.
This administration has shown over and over that they are willing to
cozy up to Putin, but here is the truth: Russia is not our ally. Putin
wants to harm the United States, splinter our alliances, and undermine
Western democracy. This Congress will not allow him to succeed, so I am
glad to support this bipartisan bill.
I thank the chairman once again. We need to keep working to make sure
this bill gets to the President's desk.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1445
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. McCaul), and I just want to thank him for his
good work to strengthen the bill, as he will discuss, and for his focus
on pipelines that primarily carry oil and gas through Russia that
compete with Russian gas and drives down the price of gas.
Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of increased
sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea. I thank Chairman Royce and
Ranking Member Eliot Engel for their leadership on this issue. I cannot
overstate the importance of sending a strong message to our adversaries
that there will be consequences for their bad behavior.
Back in October of last year, at the height of the Presidential
campaign, I was briefed by our intelligence community. They told me
that Russia engaged in a blatant effort to meddle in our domestic
affairs and, specifically, our democratic process. I was an outspoken
supporter of the need for a strong response then, and I remain so now.
However, in the process of making Russia pay an economic cost for
their bad behavior, we must ensure we are not harming U.S. interests at
home and abroad.
I want to thank Chairman Royce for clarifying that Section 232 of
this bill only applies to Russian energy export pipelines. We should
not be in the business of sanctioning pipelines that help provide
energy independence from Russia. Putin uses this as a tool to provide
political leverage over his neighbors.
So, again, I want to thank Chairman Royce for his leadership in
working with me on this, I think, clarification to the Senate companion
and for his leadership in the House on this important issue.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode
Island (Mr. Cicilline), my colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3364, the
Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions Act. I thank my colleagues,
Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel, for all of their work,
together with the Senate, to reach this important agreement.
This legislation will ensure that Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and
those who seek to help them, will suffer consequences for their bad
behavior. Passage of this legislation is important to hold Iran
accountable for its support for terrorism, human rights violations, and
continued defiance of international treaties, including on ballistic
missiles.
Today we are taking an important step toward holding the Iranian
Government, including the IRGC, and anyone who seeks to support them,
accountable for their bad actions. Anyone who contributes to Iran's
ballistic missile program, supplies it with weapons, or assists the
Iranian Government in their vast human rights abuses will be subject to
sanction.
It is important to note that these sanctions do not violate the JCPOA
and, in my view, strengthen the nuclear deal by showing our allies and
Iran that the United States is serious about continuing to enforce
violations of international law.
I am also pleased to see additional sanctions imposed upon Russia and
North Korea in this legislation. The human suffering that North Korea
has brought upon its own people is unimaginable. Such a depraved leader
as Kim Jong-un getting his hands on nuclear weapons that can be used
against American allies is an outcome that we simply cannot tolerate.
Finally, Russia engaged in an unprecedented attack against our
democracy when it interfered in our 2016 election. This is the
fundamental foundation of our democracy, our election, and we simply
cannot allow any foreign power to interfere in our electoral process.
Given our President's complete unwillingness to hold Russia
accountable for their attack--and let's not mistake it for anything
else; it was an attack on America--it has become necessary for Congress
to assert its role in this area and ensure that Russia will be held
accountable.
So, again, I thank Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, Leader
Pelosi, Whip Hoyer, and members of
[[Page H6263]]
the Senate who worked together to get this bill to the floor. I urge my
colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. I thank him and Eliot Engel for sponsoring this important
bill.
This bill brings together a critical arsenal of stiff and timely
sanctions against Iran, Russia, and North Korea.
The administration was absolutely right in early February to put Iran
on notice regarding its continued testing of ballistic missiles. This
bill underscores that warning by imposing expanded sanctions against
Iran's missile program, demonstrating that the United States will not
sit idly by as Iran augments its ability to militarily blackmail the
United States, Israel, and our allies.
It also, as the world's largest sponsor of terrorism, imposes terror
sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It very
importantly, as well, authorizes the imposition of sanctions on
individuals responsible for Iran's human rights abuses.
The State Department suggests there are as many as 800 political
prisoners in Iran alone. It also reminds us and draws attention to
Iran's despicable practice of arresting American citizens to use them
as bargaining chips.
On Russia, Mr. Speaker, the Putin government's invasion of Ukraine
and annexation of Crimea; indiscriminate bombing in Syria; and
threatening behavior toward our NATO allies, above all, in the Baltics
makes it--important in respects--the worst actor in the global stage
today. Putin's government has passed from threats to aggressive actions
against our friends, allies, and innocent people abroad.
Let's not forget that in 2008--and I was there in Tbilisi as it was
happening--the Russians invaded Georgia and annexed South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.
As to North Korea, a gulag masquerading as a country, we must cut off
all economic lifelines to Kim Jong-un, and punish Pyongyang's clients
and its enablers. A regime that murdered Otto Warmbier and then, of
course, is working on more missiles and the means to deliver them needs
to be taken seriously. This legislation does that with very stiff
sanctions.
I thank, again, Chairman Royce, Eliot Engel, Majority Leader
McCarthy, and Steny Hoyer as the principal sponsors of the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to support H.R. 3364, the Countering
America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, introduced by my good
friend, Chairman Ed Royce. I'm proud to be a co-sponsor. This bill
brings together a critical arsenal of stiff and timely sanctions
trained at some of the gravest national security threats our country
faces today.
The Trump Administration was absolutely right in early February to
put Iran ``on notice'' regarding its continued testing of ballistic
missiles. This bill underscores that warning by imposing expanded
sanctions against Iran's missile program--demonstrating that the United
States will not sit idly by as Iran augments its ability to blackmail
Israel and other allies.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Iran possesses the largest
ballistic missile program in the region and its medium-range ballistic
missiles are already able to strike Israel and our allies and
installations in the Gulf from deep within Iranian territory. Iran's
growing space launch program--a thinly veiled testing scheme for
intercontinental ballistic missiles--is cause for greater alarm still.
Iran is also the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. By
requiring the imposition of terror sanctions on the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, H.R. 3364 treats the IRGC as what it truly
is: Iran's principal means of exporting terrorism around the world,
particularly to Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain.
The U.S. cannot tolerate this brinksmanship and blackmail. Iran
dreams of nothing less than regional hegemony and Israel's
annihilation. There is no room for compromise with such an adversary.
Now is the time to act: Iran is entrenching its influence in Syria and
Iraq and insuring these gains with the credibility of its missile
threat and militant proxies. We must pass this bill to bring maximum
pressure to bear against a mounting threat.
Importantly, this bill also authorizes the imposition of sanctions on
individuals responsible for Iran's horrifying human rights abuses. In
May, the State Department reported to Congress that: ``The Iranian
regime's repression of its own people includes reports of over 800
political prisoners, composed of peaceful civic activists, journalists,
women's rights activists, religious and ethnic minorities, and
opposition political figures.''
This bill would also draw increased attention to Iran's despicable
practice of arresting American citizens to use them as bargaining
chips. On Friday, the Trump Administration rightfully called Iran out
for using these detentions as ``a tool of state policy'' and threatened
``new and serious'' consequences if this practice continues. We must
not forget the lives and families of Robert Levinson, Siamak and Baquer
Namazi, Xiyue Wang, and others that have been torn apart by Iran's
cynical schemes.
Mr. Speaker, regarding Russia, the Putin government's invasion of
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, indiscriminate bombing in Syria, and
threatening behavior toward our NATO allies, above all in the Baltics,
makes it among the worst actors on the global stage today. Putin's
government has passed from threats to aggressive action against our
friends, allies and innocent civilians abroad. And it did so long ago,
when it invaded Georgia in 2008.
I was there, in Tbilisi, several weeks after that invasion began, to
work to secure the exit of two young children, constituents of mine,
trapped behind Russian lines in South Ossetia. I will never forget the
quiet courage of the Georgian people in Tbilisi--not entirely surprised
by Putin's invasion--they were too wise for that--uncertain whether the
Russian army would proceed to Tbilisi, and determined to soldier on in
defense of their country.
And then in 2014 the Russian government annexed Crimea and invaded
eastern Ukraine--each of these incursions was marked by massive human
rights violations, violence toward anyone suspected of being
unsympathetic to the Russian imperialist cause, and created massive
humanitarian crises of displaced persons, which the Russian government
did nothing to relieve.
These acts of aggression underscore the seriousness with which we
must take the Russian government's testing of our limits and our will,
by buzzing our ships and planes, harassing our diplomats, and
intimidating our allies--as it does for example with the Zapad
exercises set to take place in September near the Polish, Lithuanian,
Latvian, and Estonian borders.
We know from experience that the best way to maintain the peace and
keep our country secure is to respond strongly to Russian expansionism
and intimidation attempts--this sanctions bill does just that.
The large number of political assassinations that have scarred
Russian public life since Putin arrived on the scene--the most
notorious but not the only attack on the rights of Russian citizens for
which the Putin government is responsible. These brutal crimes only
underscore the need to respond strongly to Putin's attempts to
intimidate us and our allies.
Congress has responded strongly to Putin's aggressions and crimes
before, for example with the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law and
Accountability Act and the Global Magnitsky legislation, of which I was
the House chief sponsor, taking the lessons of the earlier act and
applied them globally, while in its name further memorializing the
heroic sacrifice of Sergei Magnitsky. The Magnitsky legislation was so
strongly detested by the Putin government that in early 2013, having
cosponsored the original Magnitsky legislation, the Russian government
refused to issue me a visa to visit Russia to work on international
child adoption issues. A State Department official commented to me at
the time that as far he knew, I was the first Congressman denied a visa
since the Brezhnev era.
So, in addition to enacting this new legislation, I want to join
Vladimir Kara-Murza's call that the Magnitsky legislation continue to
be implemented energetically and fully. Kara-Murza is a Russian
democracy activist who twice was nearly killed by sophisticated poisons
while visiting Russia--he testified for me at the Helsinki Commission
after the first poisoning attempt, in October 2015. Many of the Putin
government's murders are motivated by economic crimes and
implementation of the Magnitsky legislation should also include U.S.
government advocacy on behalf of U.S. investors defrauded by Russian
expropriations--the Yukos oil company is the most notorious case of
this.
As to North Korea--a gulag masquerading as a country--we must cut off
all economic lifelines to Kim Jong un and punish Pyongyang's clients
and its enablers. A regime that murders Otto Warmbier does not deserve
respect and should be considered an imminent threat to the US and its
allies because of its nuclear proliferation.
We cannot negotiate our way out of these strategic problems. Carrots
have not worked, we need bigger sticks.
We know sanctions are working. Thae Yong Ho (Thay Young Ho)--North
Korea's former
[[Page H6264]]
deputy ambassador to Britain and the highest ranking defector in twenty
years--said that international sanctions are beginning to squeeze the
regime. He also said that the spread of information from the outside
world is having a real impact. So it shouldn't be a surprise that South
Korea has reported that high-level defections are surging.
This legislation provides crucial tools and I support them
wholeheartedly--as I supported them in May of this year.
The Trump Administration will find that it can use the tools we offer
today to much greater use than did the last White House. With hundreds
of thousands of North Korean laborers abroad--sending as much as $2
billion a year back to the regime in hard currency--we should look at
targeting this expatriate labor and the governments and corporations
that employ them.
Loopholes in our sanctions on North Korea's shipping and financial
sectors must be closed. And when we discover that foreign banks have
helped Kim Jong un skirt sanctions--as those in China have repeatedly
done--we must give those banks and businesses a stark choice: do
business with Kim Jong un or the U.S.
Cut off Kim Jong un's economic lifelines, punish those who keep his
murderous regime afloat, and signal to China and its client state in
North Korea that the era of ``strategic patience'' is finally over.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to strongly support this critical
measure at a perilous moment for our country and the rest of the
planet.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Castro), our colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee and a
member of the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. CASTRO of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member Engel for
yielding.
I also thank Chairman Royce for his leadership on the sanctions
package. The American people have been waiting some time for the
sanctions package to finally pass.
This bill dials up our current sanctions on North Korea, Iran, and
Russia to hold their governments accountable for their destabilizing
actions.
The Russia piece in this package is particularly necessary. Russia
has flagrantly violated international law by invading Ukraine and
interfering in American and European elections. These sanctions are a
clear signal that the United States will hold President Putin and his
close associates accountable for their actions. They are also a
declaration that Congress can and will act, even when President Trump
refuses to do so.
In addition to these sanctions, Congress must continue to investigate
to determine the scope of Russia's attack on America's democracy and
establish which Americans, if any, aided in those efforts.
Again, I thank Ranking Member Engel, Chairman Royce, and everyone in
this Congress who has supported these sanctions.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hensarling), chairman of the Committee on
Financial Services.
Mr. HENSARLING. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and
certainly for his leadership on this very important bill.
I rise in support of the Russia, Iran, and North Korean Sanctions
Act.
Mr. Speaker, I particularly want to highlight the provisions that are
the product of the hard work of the Financial Services Committee's
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Illicit Finance. The inclusion of these
provisions will undoubtedly assist our government's anti-money
laundering and counterterrorist financing efforts.
For instance, this bill includes language directing the President,
acting through the Secretary of the Treasury, to develop and maintain a
national strategy for combating the financing of terrorism and related
forms of illicit financing.
The opportunistic nature of terrorist groups, combined with the
emergence of financial technology, creates new challenges for our law
enforcement community and their efforts to disrupt terror finance.
The national strategy should also seek to enhance partnerships with
the private sector that prevent and detect illicit financing, and
increase efforts to facilitate compliance with our anti-money
laundering and counterterrorist financing laws.
I would like to commend Congressman Ted Budd for introducing the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorists, Underground, and Other
Illicit Financing Act, which is almost entirely incorporated in section
2 of the underlying legislation.
I would also like to recognize Congressman Pearce and Congressman
Pittenger, the chairman and vice chairman of the Terrorism and Illicit
Finance Subcommittee of our committee, whose leadership on these issues
has been instrumental to achieve the legislation that is before us
today.
Mr. Speaker, we know that Thomas Jefferson once famously said: ``The
price of liberty is eternal vigilance.'' And that is indeed true.
Thanks, in no small part, to the hard work of the Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Illicit Finance, the bill before us today ensures that we
remain vigilant to address the evolving threats to our financial
system. I am proud to support it and I encourage all Members to support
it.
Again, I thank Chairman Royce for his leadership today on this bill
and in our committee.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), who was instrumental in putting this bill
forward, who has been with us every step of the way and so invaluable
to this finished product, the distinguished Democratic whip.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member Engel for yielding.
And I thank Mr. Royce for his hard work on this bill.
I have said this before and I will say it again: Mr. Royce, as
chairman, and Mr. Engel, as ranking member, are an example for,
frankly, all of us on how to work together productively in a bipartisan
fashion to reach a result that is good for our country, for our people,
and indeed for international security.
I also want to thank Senators Cardin and Corker for their leadership
and their involvement.
This legislation is the product of very careful and sometimes
difficult negotiations on a bipartisan basis. It is a strong, tough,
and appropriate response to Russia's attempts to meddle in our election
process, its support for violent separatists in Ukraine, its illegal
occupation of Crimea, and, yes, its unhelpful activity in Syria.
It also imposes new sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program,
which threatens the United States, our Gulf allies, and Israel.
Russia's power comes from its ability to coerce other nations by its
energy distribution, in many instances. This bill seeks to make it
harder for Russia to use that type of coercion, and empower other
nations to join us in standing up against Russian aggression. These
sanctions will only be successful, however, if they are truly
bipartisan and if Congress continues to play its important and
necessary oversight role.
Democrats and Republicans are coming together on this bill, Mr.
Speaker, to ensure that the President cannot alter sanctions toward
Russia without congressional review. This is critical at a moment when
our allies are uncertain about where this administration stands with
respect to Russian aggression.
I remain open to additional sanctions on Russia's energy sector at a
later date if the Russian leader and his associates fail to heed the
message of this bill that their business as usual cannot and must not
continue.
Once this bill passes the Senate, as I believe it will, Russia will
know that sanctions levied because of its malevolent acts will be
lifted only with the concurrence, either tacitly or expressly, of the
Congress of the United States. There will be no side deals or turning a
blind eye to its actions.
This legislation, Mr. Speaker, will also make it clear that Russia's
interference in Ukraine comes with consequences, and it puts pressure
on Iran to end its ballistic missile program.
In addition, it deters, hopefully, North Korea from pursuing its
dangerous development of nuclear weapons and vehicles to deliver those
weapons as close as the western part of this country.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and to send it to
the Senate as quickly as possible.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to recognize the good
work of the Democratic whip, Mr. Steny
[[Page H6265]]
Hoyer, and also the Republican leader, Kevin McCarthy, on this
legislation and to thank them.
Mr. HOYER. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROYCE of California. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOYER. Frankly, all four of us--yourself and your leadership, Mr.
Engel, the majority leader, and I--were privileged to work together in
a way that, as I said at the beginning, was constructive and that, I
think, has resulted in a very good product.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions), the chairman of the
Rules Committee, for the purpose of a colloquy.
{time} 1500
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman for yielding
me this time, and I rise to applaud him for the hard work and the
responsible actions that the chairman has taken, not only to ensure
this piece of legislation is prepared, but bettered and ready to go
back to the Senate.
I think we have a forceful sanctions bill that is before the House
today, and one that targets not only Iran and Russia, but also the
North Korean regime.
As you know, the bill that was passed by the Senate risked giving
Russian energy firms a competitive advantage across the globe by
inadvertently denying American companies access to neutral third-party
energy markets where there would simply be a small or de minimis
Russian presence.
The bill before us today prevents Russia from being able to weaponize
these sanctions against U.S. energy firms. I want to thank Chairman
Royce for his hard work on this issue.
I also want to ensure that we have an understanding of the definition
of the word ``controlling'' in section 223(d) of H.R. 3364. For
purposes of clarification and legislative intent, the term
``controlling'' means the power to direct, determine, or resolve
fundamental, operational, and financial decisions of an oil project
through the ownership of a majority of the voting interests of the oil
project.
Mr. Speaker, I would ask the gentleman, the young chairman, if he
agrees with that definition.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SESSIONS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Yes. Yes, that is my understanding.
Mr. SESSIONS. I want to thank the gentleman for not only this
clarification, but making sure that we are most specific in what we are
undertaking.
Mr. Speaker, I would also like to note that the Shah Deniz Pipeline
and the Southern Gas Corridor projects will continue to be able to
bring gas from the Caspian Sea, which is a huge find, to our European
allies, reducing their dependency on Russian energy.
Mr. ROYCE of California. That is my understanding.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman, and I would
thank him for his time on this colloquy.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Sherman), one of my senior colleagues on the
Foreign Affairs Committee, the ranking member of the Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee.
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this bill, which is really a
combination of three bills. First, as to North Korea, it embodies a
bill passed on this floor in May introduced by Chairman Royce, Ranking
Member Engel, Mr. Yoho, and myself from the Asia and the Pacific
Subcommittee. We will expand our sanctions on North Korea's precious
metals, minerals, jet fuel, coal, and across the board, and especially
banking sanctions.
But keep in mind, ultimately, we have got to force China to decide
whether they are going to support North Korea or whether they are going
to have access to American markets. We can't let them have both.
As to Iran, this bill designates the entire Iran Revolutionary Guard
Corps, as the Quds Force has already been designated, as subject to
terrorism sanctions, and provides an arms embargo. Let us remember that
the real face of this regime in Tehran is not their dapper foreign
minister, but rather it is the hundreds of thousands who have died in
Syria as a result of Iranian action.
Speaking of countries that have supported Assad, finally and perhaps
most importantly, this bill provides sanctions against Russia necessary
because of its action in the Ukraine and its interference in our
elections.
We hit Russia in a very important way by dealing with the technology
they would need to explore oil. Unfortunately, even under this very
strong bill, it would take a two-thirds vote for us to block a
sanctions waiver should our resolution be vetoed.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe), chairman of the Foreign Affairs'
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman, and I also thank
the ranking member for their work on this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, I have spoken to our military leaders, and they said
that the biggest threat to the United States is North Korea. Strategic
patience is over. It is time for strategic sanctions. This bill will go
a long way to tighten the screws on little Kim and bring the dictator
to his knees. We can no longer stand by meekly while North Korea
terrorizes the world.
This bill includes my bill that has already passed the House that
calls on the State Department to reassess if North Korea should be on
the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Let us not forget that North
Korea helped supply Syria with chemical weapons. It has given Iran
ballistic missiles and advice on how to develop its own nukes.
North Korea and Iran's evil cooperation is even going on as we speak
today. They are now working together to develop an intercontinental
ballistic missile that can reach American shores.
This bill also puts China in the crosshairs. Chinese banks have
enabled the Korean regime to avoid sanctions and build its illegal
weapons programs. China even provided the vehicle used to launch North
Korea's new ICBM.
China also uses slave labor from North Korea to help North Korea
avoid sanctions already in place. China needs to understand how its
support for Kim will not only endanger the United States and South
Korea, but it also endangers its own security.
Mr. Speaker, by targeting these rogue nations, we show we will not go
away quietly in the darkness of silence.
And that is just the way it is.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Connolly), one of our senior members on the Foreign
Affairs Committee.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the distinguished
ranking member, Mr. Engel.
Mr. Speaker, today, this House comes together on a bipartisan basis
to address sanctions and the rules on the girding sanctions for North
Korea, Iran, and, most importantly perhaps, Russia. Importantly,
because there has been a lot of doubt about whether this Congress would
ever again speak eloquently and forcefully about Russian behavior.
Today, we answer that question. Overwhelmingly, we say Russia's
behavior is unacceptable in many ways, not least of which is the
incursion of sovereign territory of its neighbors, specifically
Georgia, Ukraine, including Crimea.
I vote easily and enthusiastically for the resolution today, but it
must not be construed, because it references the Minsk agreement, that
that means that we don't mean to continue sanctions on the Crimean
invasion. We do.
Mr. Chabot and I, and I know the chairman and the ranking member of
our committee, will continue to be vigilant on that until that illegal
annexation is ended.
Mr. Speaker, I commend the leadership for bringing this resolution to
the floor, and I am proud today to be a Member of this body and
speaking with one voice about Russian behavior and the need for
sanctioning it.
Mr. Speaker, this Congress does not trust the President of the United
States to manage U.S.-Russia relations.
Case in point--the first major legislative accomplishment of the
Republican-led Congress in the Trump era will be a sanctions package
[[Page H6266]]
that limits, in every imaginable way, the president's ability to
appease Putin.
President Trump and his administration have given the American public
little reason to trust them on all things Russia.
The President obstructed justice by firing FBI Director James Comey,
the law enforcement officer tasked with investigating illegal collusion
between the Trump campaign and Russia.
Attorney General Jeff Sessions potentially perjured himself by
failing to disclose secret meetings with the Russian Ambassador.
Donald Trump, Jr. obscured a meeting he had with the Trump campaign's
chairman, the president's son-in-law, and Russian operatives until the
New York Times forced his hand and he had to publish emails that
confirmed his collusion with individuals associated with Russian
intelligence operations.
And now the president is attempting to intimidate his own Attorney
General into prosecuting political opponents and upending the Russia
investigation.
Today, we will pass this sanctions package, the strongest ever, and
send a clear message to President Putin that there are consequences to
invading peaceful neighbors and attacking American democratic
institutions.
I reserve an important objection to the fact that this bill allows a
waiver of Crimea-related sanctions on the condition that the Minsk
agreement is being implemented.
Minsk does not mention Crimea, and therefore its implementation
should have no bearing on the U.S.-led effort to combat the illegal and
forcible annexation of Crimea sovereign Ukrainian territory.
However, I will vote for this bill because it sends a powerful and
unified message to Russia, Iran, and North Korea at time when the
foreign policy emanating from the White House is unsteady and confused.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Lance), a member of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce.
Mr. LANCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this
sanctions bill. The governments of Iran, North Korea, and Russia do not
share American values or interests and are active threats to our
national security. These regimes will see a united message from the
Congress of the United States with an overwhelming vote in favor of
strong sanctions.
Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. North Korea,
the most dangerous and isolated place on Earth, has tested long-range
missiles demonstrating a frightening potential to target our West
Coast. Russia has intolerably involved itself in our Nation's
democratic electoral process. Its invasion of Crimea and actions in
Ukraine are totally unacceptable.
Mr. Speaker, let us act decisively today and put these states on
notice: violate international law by threatening the United States and
thereby face the consequences.
Mr. Speaker, I urge a ``yes'' vote.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Maxine Waters), the ranking member of the Financial
Services Committee.
Ms. MAXINE WATERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank Ranking Member
Engel for his leadership and for yielding me time. I thank Chairman
Royce for his leadership and the way that he has worked with our side
of the aisle.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Russia, Iran, and North Korea
Sanctions Act, legislation that is desperately needed to prevent this
administration from rolling back sanctions tied to Russia's invasion of
Ukraine and interference in our election.
This bill's enhanced sanctions on Russia are important in light of
the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, not to mention the
many ties between the Trump administration and the Kremlin.
In a recent development, the Treasury Department confirmed that
ExxonMobil violated existing Russian sanctions while under the
leadership of Rex Tillerson, who is now Donald Trump's Secretary of
State. Indeed, in 2014, Exxon signed documents related to oil and gas
projects in Russia with Igor Sechin, president of Rosneft, a Russian
state-owned oil giant. Sechin was one of the individuals subject to
sanctions. Exxon was fined a mere $2 million--a slap on the wrist for a
company that earned $7.8 billion in profits in 2016.
Russia is continuing its aggression in Ukraine. It is supporting the
murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. It interfered in the 2016
U.S. election. That is why we must strengthen the sanctions against
Russia, and we must block Rex Tillerson and Donald Trump from waiving
or lifting those sanctions without review.
Before closing, I would also note that the legislation before us also
includes several measures championed by Democrats on the Financial
Services Committee. These provisions will focus the government on
creating a national strategy to combat the financing of terrorism,
enhance Treasury's tools for combating money laundering vulnerabilities
such as the well-known risk in high-end real estate, and help address
the de-risking trend that is driving fund transfers into the shadows.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Budd), a member of the Committee on
Financial Services.
Mr. BUDD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 3364.
In particular, I am proud of the bipartisan language in the bill which
would create a national strategy for combating terrorism and illicit
finance. The financing of terrorism and related forms of illicit
finance present a direct threat to our national security and financial
system.
It is critical for the government to create and maintain a unified
strategy to fight financial crime, both to accommodate new and
developing threats and to help Congress develop legislative and funding
priorities now and in the future.
Additionally, a national strategy should seek to enhance
intergovernmental cooperation, to identify illicit financing trends,
and to encourage Federal agencies to work with the private financial
sector to do the same.
Mr. Speaker, this bill does these things and will go a long way in
making sure we are keeping pace with the ever-changing terror finance
landscape.
I would like to thank Chairman Hensarling for his extraordinary
conservative leadership on the Financial Services Committee and for
helping to include this language in the overall bill.
Additionally, I want to thank the chairman of the Terrorism and
Illicit Finance Subcommittee, Mr. Pearce, and for his support, and for
my colleague, Ms. Sinema, for her work on this as well.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Arizona (Ms. Sinema), my friend on the Financial Services Committee.
Ms. SINEMA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3364. The
authoritarian regimes in Iran, Russia, and North Korea continue to
undermine global peace and security and threaten the safety of the
United States and our allies.
Russia's coordinated efforts to undermine democracies and free and
fair elections around the world is particularly troubling and demand a
strong response.
I thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for their bipartisan
legislation that counters these belligerent regimes and ensures strong
oversight by Congress and the American people.
The safety and security of our communities and our country must come
before partisanship.
I also thank the chair and ranking member for introducing our
bipartisan legislation introduced with Congressman Budd to establish a
whole-of-government strategy to combat the financing of terrorism.
Current U.S. efforts to counter the financing of terrorism lack
sufficient coordination, and the U.S. has no unified national strategy
to guide our counterfinancing efforts. Money is the lifeblood of any
organization. We must establish a comprehensive and effective strategy
to deny money to terrorists. This strategy will enhance detection,
deterrence, and prosecution and ultimately strengthen our broader
national security goals.
Mr. Speaker, I thank the chair and ranking member for advancing this
important bipartisan national security bill, and I urge my colleagues
to vote ``yes.''
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
{time} 1515
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Ryan), my friend on the Appropriations Committee.
Mr. RYAN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman and the
[[Page H6267]]
ranking member for their leadership on this.
This clearly is a big issue pressing the country, and I just wanted
to rise in support of what is happening here today; of taking a firmer
stance on Russia, Iran, and North Korea; trying to stabilize the
peninsula; trying to take care of the funding that is coming out of
Iran to all of these terrorist groups across the country and across the
world.
What is happening with these sanctions here in the targeting of
Russian gas pipelines--their number one export--I think is entirely
appropriate. The Nord Stream 2, which carries gas from Russia through
the Baltics to Germany--and I know Germany isn't happy about it, but
this is something that we have to do.
The point I want to make is that we have to address this issue in a
comprehensive way. We must continue to focus on how we get our gas here
in the United States, our natural gas to Europe, to our allies, so they
are not so dependent on Russia. We have got to have the sanctions, but
we also have got to be shipping liquid natural gas to some of these
allies of ours so they are not so dependent on the Russians, which is
part and parcel of this entire approach.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to
the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), a respected member of
the Energy and Commerce Committee.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise in support of today's sanction legislation, which I am so
happy to find has complied with the Iran nuclear agreement, something I
worked very hard on, as did many here.
Experts, the international community, and even some of President
Trump's own advisers agree that the Iran nuclear agreement is working.
In June, the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran is
within the limits set by this historic deal. There are serious issues
left to be addressed with Iran, especially in regards to human rights
violations and ballistic missiles, which this bill covers.
The Iran deal took Iran's nuclear weapons off the table and allowed
us to deal with these remaining challenges. Withdrawing or violating
the agreement would be an enormous mistake. This bill upholds our
agreement with Iran while also holding Russia and North Korea
accountable for their actions.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. Price).
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise to stress two
critical aspects of this legislation.
First, it would impose tough sanctions on Russia for its serious
international violations, the seizure of Crimea, its violent incursion
into Ukraine, its cyber interference in the 2016 U.S. election. Perhaps
most importantly, in the present context, it would prevent President
Trump from removing or softening existing sanctions without
congressional approval.
Second, the bill addresses Iran's unacceptable behavior in the non-
nuclear realm, such as ballistic missile development, human rights
violations, financing of terrorism, without violating the nuclear deal
with Iran.
The JCPOA celebrated its second anniversary 2 weeks ago. It has given
the international community 24/7 access to Iran's nuclear sites,
provided an enforcement mechanism to ensure that Iran's nuclear-related
activity is solely peaceful, and elongated Iran's breakout time to over
a year. It has made the world a safer place.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the
gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, as the United States
continues to monitor the JCPOA and Iran's behavior, it is important
that Congress continue to refrain from actions that would violate the
deal, threaten the deal, or impose careless sanctions that--under the
guise of being tough on Iran--would make the United States less safe.
This legislation meets that test, and I urge its adoption.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
On Vladimir Putin's orders, Russia attacked American democracy last
year. That makes Russia a threat to this country, just like Iran, just
like North Korea.
When the United States faces a real threat, we have an obligation to
respond. So far, a response to Russia has fallen far short. That ends
with this legislation.
Along with Pyongyang and Tehran, Moscow needs to understand that if
you violate international law, you threaten the security of the United
States and our allies, there will be consequences.
Now, I wish we were going to pass this incentive to the President's
desk today. So after we vote today, leaders in both houses have an
obligation to clear away any remaining issues and get this bill signed
into law as soon as possible.
So long as Russia remains a threat, so long as Iran and North Korea
defy global norms with their destructive agendas, none of us are off
the hook.
I want to also thank the Democratic leader, Ms. Pelosi, for her
advice and counsel on this bill. Let's pass this bill and keep pressing
this bill forward.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, I would like to again thank my colleagues;
the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Engel; our
counterparts, Senators Corker and Cardin; the majority leader, Mr.
McCarthy; the minority whip, Mr. Hoyer; as well as the leadership on
both sides of the aisle in the other body. They deserve credit for
their efforts.
Let me also say it is critically important that we stand shoulder to
shoulder with our European allies encountering Russian aggression. That
is why, in the bipartisan House-Senate negotiations, we secured
important changes to improve transatlantic cooperation. So I am
confident that, under the text of this House bill that we will pass
today, these concerns have been addressed.
Let me also say that every time North Korea tests a ballistic missile
or a nuclear device, it gets closer to having the ability to strike the
U.S. mainland with a nuclear weapon.
For years, the policies of successive administrations have failed to
get North Korea to change.
Why?
Because diplomatic pressure has been applied only in spurts. It has
been lifted prematurely for North Korean promises that have never
materialized.
So we need leverage, and leverage comes from real sustained pressure.
That is why I have authored tough new sanctions to crack down on the
regime, to shut off the regime's access to the hard currency it needs
to fund its nuclear program, and we have included that in this bill.
These sanctions passed in this House in May by a vote of 419-1, and
it is time for the other body to pick them up. By including these North
Korean sanctions in the legislation, we ensure that our colleagues do
so.
We cannot afford any more delay, and that is why I worked with the
other body to make small changes to the North Korean sanctions in this
bill, to ensure swift passage in both Houses. I am confident this bill,
including the North Korean sanctions bill, will soon become law.
Let me say that congressional engagement in foreign affairs is
strongest when we all speak with one voice. I urge my colleagues to
vote in favor of the bill and join us in sending a clear message to
Vladimir Putin, to Kim Jong-un, and to the radical regime in Tehran
that efforts to threaten the United States and to destabilize our
allies will be met with a united American response.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3364 or
the bill entitled ``Russia, Iran, and North Korea Sanctions Act.''
As a senior member of the Committee on Homeland Security and its
Subcommittees on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, and Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security
[[Page H6268]]
Technologies, I am reminded daily that there are actors and nation-
states that threaten the security of our nation.
Within the past year, the United States has experienced a series of
aggressions that threaten not only our nation's security, but also the
very democratic principles that are the foundation upon which our
country was built.
These hostile acts have been orchestrated and perpetrated by our
long-time adversaries--Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Within that short time span, their actions have been so egregious
that it is inexcusable that this administration has failed to respond
to these acts of aggression with strength and resolve.
Mr. Speaker, U.S. intelligence agencies have confirmed that Russian
hackers launched cyberattacks during one of the most sacred processes
in our republic--the U.S. presidential election.
Specifically, we know that Russia was behind the cyber theft of DNC
documents and that Russian hackers intentionally targeted 21 U.S. state
election systems during the 2016 presidential campaign.
This administration refused to acknowledge Russia's tampering in last
year's election until it became impossible to deny what everyone knows
to be true.
Further, Iran's support of groups who actively operate against U.S.
interests is disturbing even in the face of the implementation of the
JCPOA in January 2016.
North Korea is growing increasingly belligerent, launching 17
missiles since the beginning of this year as it attempts to improve its
missile capabilities with each launch.
Although North Korea has launched missiles in the past, never have
they occurred in such a rapid, unpredictable succession.
In a show of bipartisanship, our counterparts in the Senate led the
charge in adopting legislation that would stop Russia, Iran, and North
Korea from operating with such impunity.
On June 15, 2017, the Senate passed an amended version of S. 722, the
``Countering Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017'' that not
only penalizes Iran but also punishes Russia for its interference in
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
The fact that that legislation was passed 98-2 demonstrated
congressional willingness to set clear boundaries for what is and is
not acceptable behavior especially for our adversaries.
The House must act just as decisively by passing H.R. 3364.
H.R. 3364 will work to avert and penalize any threat posed by
adversaries in several ways.
One of the most important provisions of this act is that it will
prevent the Trump Administration from repealing existing Obama-era
Russian sanctions tied to Ukraine and election interference.
H.R. 3364 will also impose new sanctions on Russia while
strengthening other sanctions.
Furthermore, it will require congressional oversight for altering
sanctions related to Russia.
With respect to Iran, H.R. 3364 will mandate new sanctions on those
who support the development of Iran's ballistic missile program.
H.R. 3364 requires the imposition of sanctions on Iran for human
rights violations as well as sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
Finally, H.R. 3364 clamps down on North Korea by updating and
expanding sanctions in direct response to its repeated aggression.
In addition, H.R. 3364 also makes it more difficult for North Korea
to secure the funding for its illegal weapon program.
Mr. Speaker, it is time that this body acts to show that the United
States will not tolerate and will respond to threats to our homeland,
our national security.
That is why I urge all Members to join me in voting for H.R. 3364.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Speaker, today I voted for H.R. 3364, the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Roll no. 413).
This legislation is an important step forward in punishing Russia for
its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and for the country's alleged
interference in the 2016 United States presidential election.
The bill also updates and expands sanctions on North Korea at a time
when the country continues to pursue dangerous weapons programs.
Further, I commend leadership and committee members in the House and
Senate for ensuring that the Iran sanctions portion of this legislation
does not violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached
between Iran, the United States, and five major world powers, including
Russia and China. While the Iranian ballistic missile program is deeply
concerning and must be addressed, undermining the nuclear agreement,
which has forced Iran to remove thousands of centrifuges from service
and halt all uranium enrichment, would be a mistake of tragic
proportions.
The bipartisan support for the bill should be a signal to the
administration to refrain from taking action that would encourage Iran
to change course.
To be sure, Iran has some unsavory hardline people in key positions
of leadership, but these hardliners just suffered a major defeat in the
Iranian elections. President Hassan Rouhani has been a voice of and a
force for moderation--and people voted for him.
We must proceed with the utmost caution and develop a thoughtful
approach to ensure we continue to keep Iran away from the nuclear
threshold, while also countering the regime's nefarious activities.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3364--but with
reservations.
I strongly support the section of this bill that provides a role for
the Congress before any president may waive sanctions or provide relief
from sanctions against Russia. Russia sought to undermine America's
2016 election. It attempted to subvert our democracy. It did so
deliberately, methodically, and ruthlessly, spreading lies and
misinformation and exploiting weaknesses in computer systems and
records to steal private information and release it in sensationalistic
fashion.
These attacks against our democracy were and are totally unacceptable
and must be condemned. I remain bewildered that the current president
of the United States still fails to acknowledge that these actions
happened and that the Russian government, at the very highest level, is
responsible--even though there is a consensus among all U.S. domestic
and international intelligence and law enforcement agencies that this
is the case.
Sanctions imposed by the Obama Administration in response to this
multifaceted operation were lifted by President Trump. This legislation
rectifies that situation by re-imposing those sanctions and ensuring
that they cannot be removed without congressional consultation and
consent.
In addition, Russia continues to threaten its neighbors, especially
Ukraine, for which economic and military sanctions are now in place.
But I am somewhat reluctant in my support for this legislation
because of the provisions included on Iran. Like all my colleagues, I
am worried about Iran's continued testing and development of ballistic
missile technology. It is threatening and provocative to Iran's
neighbors and the region. I also oppose Iran's support for regional
militant and terrorist organizations, and for choosing to side with the
brutal regime of Bashir al-Assad in the Syrian conflict, as did Russia.
I do support, however, Iran's continuing compliance with the terms of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)--or the Iran nuclear
deal. I worry that the sanctions against Iran included in this bill
will be used and manipulated to undermine the JCPOA. I am worried that
we now have a president and an Administration actively seeking to
abrogate this international nuclear agreement. And I strongly oppose
any action that would violate, let alone abandon, the JCPOA.
The Trump Administration--and the White House in particular--seem
hell-bent on putting us on a path that leads to yet another costly war
in the Middle East and to a nuclear-armed Iran. This would be a
calamity of the greatest order, one that would place our friends and
allies in the region in even greater danger than what they now face. We
must not go there.
While I will vote in favor of H.R. 3364, I do so with grave
misgivings about how President Trump will seek to exploit the sanctions
against Iran provided in this bill to violate U.S. obligations under
the JCPOA, which will, in turn, give permission to Iran to develop a
nuclear weapon, and bring us all to the brink of war in the Middle
East.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 3364.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. ROYCE of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and
nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
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