[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 105 (Tuesday, June 20, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3631-S3633]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                       Coup Attempt in Montenegro

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, last week, the Senate voted 97 to 2 to 
strengthen sanctions against Vladimir Putin's Russia for its attack on 
America's 2016 election and its other aggressive and illegal behavior. 
I hope the other body will take swift action to send this legislation 
to the President's desk.
  We need strong Russia sanctions now because it has been 8 months 
since the U.S. intelligence community said publicly that the Russian 
Government directed this attack on our democracy. Yet, in the last 8 
months, the Russian Government has hardly paid any price for its 
aggression. Thus, Vladimir Putin has been learning all over again that 
aggression pays. He learned that in Georgia in 2008. He learned that in 
Ukraine in 2014. He has learned that in Syria since 2015. So Vladimir 
Putin remains on the offense. This year, Russia attempted to interfere 
in France's election. We have already seen attempts to influence German 
public opinion ahead of elections in September. And there is every 
expectation that Russia will do the same thing in the Czech Republic, 
Italy, and elsewhere in future elections.
  But perhaps the most disturbing indication of how far Vladimir Putin 
is willing to go to advance his dark and dangerous view of the world is 
what happened in October 2016 in the small Balkan country of 
Montenegro, when Russian intelligence operatives, in league with Serbia 
nationalists and others, attempted to overthrow the democratically 
elected Government of Montenegro and murder its Prime Minister on the 
country's election day. Why would Vladimir Putin go this far? To answer 
this, one must understand why Russia was so interested in the outcome 
of Montenegro's election.
  Russia opposes the spread of democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law across Europe, which is advanced by the European Union and 
protected by the NATO alliance. To Russia's great frustration, 
Montenegro's Government had committed the country to a Euro-Atlantic 
future and pursued membership in both the EU and NATO.
  Indeed, NATO's invitation to Montenegro to join the NATO alliance in 
December 2015 was considered particularly insulting and threatening by 
Moscow. After all, Montenegro had once been part of Russia's 
traditional Slavic ally, Serbia. Montenegro has long been a favorite 
destination for Russian tourists. Russian politicians and oligarchs are 
reported to own as much as 40 percent of the real estate in that 
country. A few years ago, when it feared losing its naval base in Syria 
due to the civil war, Russia reportedly sought a naval base in 
Montenegro but was rejected. Now, if Montenegro joined NATO, the entire 
Adriatic Sea would fall completely within NATO's borders.
  Montenegro's accession into NATO would also send a signal that NATO 
membership was a real possibility for other nations of the Western 
Balkans--Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and, according to 
some optimistic voices in the region, perhaps even Serbia.

  That is why Montenegro's October 16 election was no ordinary one. In 
Russia's eyes, it was a last chance to stop Montenegro from joining 
NATO, to thwart Montenegro's pursuit of a Euro-Atlantic future, and to 
reassert Russian influence in southeastern Europe. That is why there 
was little doubt that Russia would exert heavy pressure on Montenegro 
ahead of the election. Russia had already been accused of fomenting 
anti-government demonstrations and funding opposition parties. Yet few 
would have guessed how far Russia was willing to go. But now we know.
  This April, as part of my visit to seven countries in southeastern 
Europe to reaffirm America's commitment to the region, I visited 
Montenegro and was briefed by Montenegrin officials on

[[Page S3632]]

the status of the investigation into the coup attempt. On April 14, 
Montenegro's special prosecutor filed indictments against 2 Russians 
and 12 other people for their roles in the coup attempt. This past 
weekend, a Montenegrin court accepted the indictments. As a result, the 
evidence before the court is now public.
  I believe it is critically important that my colleagues and the 
American people are aware of the allegations made in these indictments. 
Pieced together, they reveal another blatant attack on democracy by the 
Russian Government--an attempt to smash a small, brave country that had 
the nerve to defy its will. And it is another unmistakable warning that 
Vladimir Putin will do whatever it takes to achieve his ambition to 
restore the Russian Empire.
  According to the indictments, the coup planning got off to a slow 
start in March 2016. That was when opposition leaders in Montenegro 
allegedly sent an emissary known as Nino to Belgrade to meet with 
Slavko Nikic. In the first meeting at Slavko's office, Nino said that 
he had been doing business for years in Russia, and he claimed that he 
was in contact with powerful men in Russia. He claimed that one of the 
men with him was a Russian FSB agent in charge of special tasks. Nino 
tried to enlist Slavko and his men to lead a plot to destabilize 
Montenegro, and Slavko indicated he was able and willing to 
participate. Later, Nino and Slavko met on the Pupin Bridge in 
Belgrade, this time with the supposed FSB agent in tow. The Russian 
told Slavko it would be good if he traveled to Moscow.
  After these encounters in Belgrade, Nino enlisted the help of 
Bratislav Dikic, the former chief of Serbia's special police and 
someone we will meet later in this story, to use his contacts to check 
into Slavko's reliability. He didn't pass the test, and this original 
version of the coup plot was abandoned.
  It was at this point that the two Russians, Eduard Shishmakov and 
Vladimir Popov, stepped in to take control of the plans for 
destabilization operations in Montenegro. Both of these men are 
believed to be members of the Russian military agency, the GRU.
  Shishmakov in particular already had a colorful past. In 2014, 
Shishmakov had been serving as deputy military attache in Russia's 
Embassy in Warsaw, Poland. After a scandal involving a Russian spy 
network within the Polish Government, the Polish Government identified 
Shishmakov as a GRU agent, declared him persona non grata, and ejected 
him from Poland.
  Having taken over the Montenegrin operation, Shishmakov moved quickly 
to contact Sasa Sindjelic. The two had first met in Russia back in 
2014, when they discussed their opposition to the EU and NATO. 
Shishmakov even offered to help support Sindjelic's organization, the 
Serbian Wolves, which promotes Pan-Slavism and close relations between 
Russians and Serbs and opposes NATO and the Government of Montenegro.
  The two met again in Moscow in 2015. This time, Shishmakov had 
Sindjelic submitted to a polygraph test that lasted for hours. After 
the test went well, he sent Sindjelic home with $5,000 and a promise to 
contact him if something urgent came up. That was in the spring of 
2016. Shishmakov wrote that Montenegro's Prime Minister, Milo 
Djukanovic, and his government must be removed immediately and that the 
people of Montenegro must rebel in order for this to happen.
  Then in September 2016, Shishmakov told Sindjelic to urgently come to 
Moscow. Shishmakov even sent $800 to Sindjelic to buy his ticket. It 
was no trouble for Shishmakov to send the money--after all, he sent it 
from a Western Union conveniently located on the same street as GRU 
headquarters in Moscow. Once in Moscow, Shishmakov and Sindjelic 
discussed the planning and operation of the plot to overthrow the 
Montenegrin Government, install the opposition in power, and abandon 
all plans for Montenegro to enter NATO. Shishmakov said opposition 
leaders from Montenegro had already visited Moscow a number of times 
and were in agreement with the plan.
  In total, Sindjelic received more than $200,000 to support the 
operation. He used those funds to pay personnel, acquire police 
uniforms and equipment, and purchase weapons, including rifles, gas 
masks, bulletproof vests, electrical tranquilizers, and a drone with a 
camera. He was also provided encrypted phones to enable secure 
communications between the coup plotters and GRU agents.
  Sindjelic and Shishmakov stayed in close touch as preparations 
continued ahead of the October elections. The plan was this:
  On election day, the Montenegrin opposition was planning large 
protests in front of the Parliament, expecting to draw nearly 5,000 
people. Sindjelic and his coconspirators, including Bratislav Dikic, 
the former commander of the Serbian special police, would recruit as 
many Serbian nationalists as they could to travel from Serbia to 
Montenegro to join the demonstrations. They were hoping 500 would join 
the protests and be ready to act when called upon.
  As the protests were underway, a group of 50 armed men recruited by 
Shishmakov and wearing police uniforms provided by Sindjelic would 
ambush and kill the members of Montenegro's Special Anti-Terrorist Unit 
to prevent them from interfering with the coup. The armed men, still 
wearing their police uniforms, would then proceed to the Parliament 
building, where they would begin shooting at members of the police 
defending the Parliament building. They hoped to create the impression 
that some members of the police were changing sides and joining the 
protesters against the government. As the coup plotters saw it, this 
was poetic justice--reminiscent of how former Serbian President and 
convicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic had fallen from power.
  Led by the coup plotters and the Serbian nationalists, who would wear 
blue ribbons to be recognizable to one another, the protesters would 
then storm the Parliament building and declare victory for the 
opposition. Within 48 hours, the new government would be formed and 
arrests would be made across the capital, including Prime Minister 
Djukanovic. If the Prime Minister could not be captured, he would be 
killed.
  The coup plotters obviously wanted to create chaos, and it appears 
they may have had someone in mind to blame for the violence. Ahead of 
the election, the Montenegrin opposition hired a U.S. company to 
provide services, including countersurveillance and planning to extract 
personnel from the Montenegrin capital, around the time of the 
election. It is still unclear, the precise nature of this outreach to 
the U.S. company by the Montenegrin opposition or what services the 
company may have ended up providing, if any. Now, this is speculation, 
but if I know the Russians, American security personnel--some likely to 
have military or intelligence background--on the ground during the coup 
in the Montenegrin capital would have made excellent patsies for 
stories on Sputnik and Russia Today.
  Fortunately--one might even say luckily--the plan never got off the 
ground. Four days before election day, one of the coup plotters got 
cold feet and informed the Montenegrin authorities. On election day, 
Montenegrin police arrested 20 Serbian citizens, including the on-the-
ground leader of the nationalist protesters, Bratislav Dikic, the 
former commander of the Serbian special police. News of the arrests 
sparked fear among others involved in the plot, many of whom retreated 
to Serbia.
  Furious that the plot had been disrupted, Shishmakov, the Russian GRU 
agent, grasped at straws for new ways of bringing down the Montenegrin 
Government. He ordered Sindjelic to procure an assassin to kill the 
Prime Minister. Sindjelic did not carry out that order and later turned 
himself into police, fearing he would be next for assassination by the 
GRU.

  Shishmakov also ordered a false flag attack on the opposition party 
headquarters to create the appearance of an attack by the government. 
He even hoped to entice one of the political parties that was part of 
the Prime Minister's coalition to leave the government with a bribe 
using Russian money funneled through Chechnya. Again, fortunately none 
of this worked.
  Montenegrin police made several arrests in the aftermath of this 
failed coup attempt, but those arrests did not

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include the alleged GRU agents, Mr. Shishmakov and Mr. Popov. They were 
in Belgrade, Serbia's capital. Presumably, Montenegrin authorities 
hoped the Serbian Government would consider expediting the pair to 
Montenegro as the government had done with some of the lower level coup 
plotters, but that did not happen, and the two Russian agents returned 
to Moscow.
  I know that sounded a little complicated. Every American should be 
disturbed by what happened in Montenegro. We should admire the courage 
of the country's leaders who resisted Russian pressure and persevered 
to bring Montenegro into the NATO alliance, which finally took place 
officially 2 weeks ago.
  If there is one thing we should take away from this heinous plot, it 
is that we cannot treat Russia's interference in America's election in 
2016 as an isolated incident. We have to stop looking at this through 
the warped lens of politics and see this attack on our democracy for 
what it is--just one phase of Vladimir Putin's long-term campaign to 
weaken the United States, to destabilize Europe, to break the NATO 
alliance, to undermine confidence in Western values, and to erode any 
and all resistance to his dark and dangerous view of the world.
  That is why Putin attacked our 2016 election. That is why Putin 
attempted to overthrow the Government of Montenegro. That is why he 
tried to influence the election in France and will try the same in 
Germany and elsewhere throughout Europe. That is why it probably will 
not be long before Putin attempts some punitive actions in Montenegro 
to show other countries in the Western Balkans what happens when you 
try to defy Russia.
  That is why it will not be long before Putin takes interest in 
another American election. The victim may be a Republican. It may be a 
Democrat. To Putin, it will not matter as long as he succeeds in 
dividing us from one another, weakening our resolve, undermining 
confidence in ourselves, and eroding our belief in our own values.
  I urge my colleagues again that we must take our own side in this 
fight, not as Republicans, not as Democrats but as Americans. It is 
time to respond to Russia's attack on American democracy and that of 
our European allies with strength, with resolve, with common purpose, 
and with action.
  I would like to finally add we will be holding a hearing in the Armed 
Services Committee on this whole situation that took place in 
Montenegro.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, before the Senator from Arizona leaves the 
floor, he and I are very much in syncopation on the question of what he 
has just eloquently addressed about the Russian attempts to interfere 
in other countries as well as in our country with regard to the 
elections.
  I just wanted to pose a question to the Senator. Is the Senator 
aware, as he obviously is--but it is my rhetorical question--that the 
Russians have already intervened in the elections of other countries 
and indeed tried and it boomeranged against them against France and are 
probably in the midst of trying to interfere with the German election?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, every indication, I would say to my friend 
from Florida, a most valued member of the Armed Services Committee, 
they will continue to try to interfere in any election they possibly 
can. They are spending large amounts of money. They have certainly, to 
some degree, undermined confidence between countries in the NATO 
alliance, and that, coupled with the degree of uncertainty here in 
Washington, has probably put as great a strain on the NATO alliance as 
you have seen since its very beginning. I thank my colleague from 
Florida.
  Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, one further question. Has the Senator 
been--well, he obviously is aware, and he has obviously been briefed--
but can he help convey the gravity of the situation of Russia's 
interference in the upcoming elections in 2018 and 2020, where not only 
is it a question of whether they would change the vote count by getting 
in and hacking, but they could change the registration records so that 
a voter could show up to vote on election day and suddenly the 
registrar says: But you are not registered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would just say to my colleague from 
Florida that when you look at their early attempts versus their latest 
attempts, they learn with every experience. It is a lot easier--as my 
colleague from Florida knows, it is a lot easier to play offense than 
defense.
  We are going to have a hearing on this whole Montenegrin thing, and I 
know the Senator from Florida will play a very significant role. Every 
time we turn around, we have a new revelation of some of the activities 
that have been carried out, not just by Russian hackers but by Chinese, 
by Iranian, even by single individuals. This is probably the national 
security challenge that may not be the greatest, but I would say we are 
the least prepared for.
  Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, this Senator certainly looks forward to 
that hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee. I thank the 
chairman for his leadership in constantly bringing up and reminding the 
American people of the threat that is coming through cyber attacks into 
this Nation and others.