Congressional Record, Volume 163 Issue 102 (Thursday, June 15, 2017)

[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 102 (Thursday, June 15, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3505-S3528]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

COUNTERING IRAN'S DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES ACT OF 2017

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of S. 722, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 722) to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for
acts of international terrorism, and violations of human
rights, and for other purposes.

Pending:

Corker (for Graham) amendment No. 240, to reaffirm the
strategic importance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty to the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and its contribution to maintaining stability
throughout the world.
Gardner modified amendment No. 250, to provide an exception
for activities of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 11
a.m. will be equally divided between the two leaders or their
designees.

Recognition of the Majority Leader

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.

prayers for the Victims of the Congressional Baseball Practice Shooting

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, this morning, the Senate continues to
send its prayers to all the victims of yesterday's horrific shooting.
We know our House colleagues are all thinking about their colleague,
Majority Whip Scalise. It has been an immensely difficult 24 hours for
all the victims, including Matt Mika, who remains in ICU, Zach Barth,
and, of course, Capitol Police Officers Crystal Griner and David
Bailey. Those officers didn't back down when faced with this threat.
Instead, as the Capitol Police always do, they put themselves in harm's
way to help protect others. Without them, we know so many more would
have been injured.
So we want to continue to express our gratitude to all those who
graciously put their lives on the line to keep the Capitol community
safe. In doing so, we are also reminded of the bravery of our
colleagues on the field yesterday--those who stepped in to help friends
who had been injured as they waited for first responders to arrive. I
think it says something about the character of those people as well.
The events of yesterday were devastating, and we know it will take
time to heal. But for now, the members of the congressional baseball
team have made the decision to go forward with tonight's game, which
will be played for charity. I know we will be thinking about each of
them as they take the field tonight.
Mr. President, the Senate today will take a final vote on the
bipartisan first step to hold Iran and Russia accountable. This follows
overwhelmingly bipartisan action yesterday to approve the Russia
sanctions amendment, an effort that would not have been possible
without the good work of our Foreign Relations Committee chairman,
Senator Corker, and our Banking chair, Senator Crapo, and their ranking
members.
After 8 years of failed foreign policy under the Obama
administration, 8 years of following the Obama administration's
preferred strategy of drawing down both our forces and our commitments,
we must take a stronger stance in deterring Iran and holding its regime
accountable for its actions and addressing Russia's years-long pattern
of provocations.
These sanctions, which are just one of our foreign policy tools, will
only work as part of a broader effort to rebuild our military force
structure and combat readiness in order to send a strong signal to
friend and foe alike. The United States should no longer stand by and
allow threats like these to go unaddressed.
When the administration completes its series of strategic reviews, I
will

[[Page S3506]]

look forward to hearing from the President and his advisers their
recommendations for countering Iran's malign conduct across the Middle
East and their recommendations for countering Russia's persistent
efforts to undermine NATO.
As I said earlier this week, this Iran and Russia sanctions agreement
reflects good bipartisan work. I want to thank Senators on both sides
of the aisle for coming together to codify and strengthen existing
sanctions. Let's come together again now and pass these sanctions later
this morning.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, have you announced the business for the
day?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have laid down the business.
Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DACA

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, today is the fifth anniversary of the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program, known as DACA. DACA
provides temporary legal status to immigrant students who arrived in
the United States as children and infants, if they register with the
government, pay a fee, and pass a criminal background check.
The program is based on the DREAM Act, a piece of legislation I
introduced 16 years ago in 2001. That legislation gave undocumented
students who grew up in this country a chance to earn a path to legal
status and citizenship. These young people have come to be known as
DREAMers. What used to be a word reserved for rock-and-roll groups is
now a word that has become part of our common language to describe an
immigration challenge and opportunity.
These DREAMers came to the United States as children. They are
American in every way except for their legal immigration status. We
have already invested a lot of money in these kids. We educated them.
We made them part of this country, and it makes no sense to squander
their talents by deporting them at this moment in their lives.
In April 2010, I sent a letter to President Obama. Dick Lugar, the
Republican Senator from Indiana, joined me. On a bipartisan basis, we
said to President Obama: Stop deporting these young kids. They did
nothing wrong. Their parents made the decision to come here. Give them
a chance. The President responded. It is now clear the DACA Program he
created by Executive order has been a great success. More than 780,000
DREAMers have come forward and received DACA protection and status that
has allowed them to contribute more fully to this country as students,
as teachers, as nurses, as engineers, as entrepreneurs.
A recent study by the Center for American Progress found that ending
DACA--saying to these 780,000 young people they are no longer part of
America--would cost us. It would cost our economy over $400 billion in
gross domestic product over the next 10 years. These are productive
citizens doing good things for America. I should take that back. They
are not citizens yet. They are productive people doing good things for
America whom I want to make citizens if the DREAM Act becomes law.
I have many differences with President Trump on immigration. For
example, the President's January 25 Executive order makes up to 8
million immigrants priorities for deportation, and seeks to create a
deportation force by tripling the number of immigration agents. This
ignores the reality that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants
are law-abiding individuals who make important economic contributions
to this country, and have deep roots in the United States.
I am grateful, and I say that publicly. I have said it before. I am
grateful President Trump has decided to keep the DACA Program in place.
Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly and the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service Director nominee, Francis Cissna, have promised me
personally and publicly that they will maintain the existing guidelines
for the DACA Program. I appreciate this commitment. I intend to hold
them to it.
Congress also has an obligation to do its job. We ought to do
something we rarely do in the U.S. Senate--pass legislation, fix our
broken immigration system. Think about this: On June 27, 2013--4 years
ago--the Senate, on a bipartisan basis, passed comprehensive
immigration reform by a vote of 68 to 32, better than 2 to 1. I was
glad to be part of the Gang of 8 Democratic and Republican Senators who
worked for months on the bill that passed by this margin. It
strengthened border security, protected American workers, and it
established a tough but fair path to citizenship for 11 million
undocumented people in this country.
Unfortunately, the Republican majority of the House of
Representatives would not debate it, would not consider it, would not
bring it for a vote, and it died in the U.S. House of Representatives.
If they had done their job, their work, it would have passed with a
bipartisan majority. President Obama would have signed it into law. I
might not be standing here today talking about this issue.
Over the years, I have come to the floor of the Senate to tell story
after story about DREAMers, the young immigrant students who grew up in
this country. These stories put a human face on the DACA Program and
the DREAM legislation. They show that immigration makes our country
stronger.
Today, I want to say a word about Gissel Escobedo. This is Gissel.
She came to the United States at the age of 3. Her family emigrated
from Mexico. She grew up in my home State of Illinois, in the town of
Cicero. She was an honors student in high school. She attended their
gifted program. She had a big responsibility personally. From a young
age, she was one of the primary caregivers for her brother who suffers
from severe autism. During the little spare time she had, Gissel was a
volunteer in her community, helping organizations provide care for
children with autism.
As an undocumented student though, Gissel was not eligible for any
Federal assistance to go to college, but as a result of her academic
achievements in high school, she received a private scholarship to
attend the University of Illinois at Chicago. As a college student,
Gissel was a writing tutor and a leader in student organizations for
future teachers. In 2010, she graduated from the University of Illinois
Chicago and the College of Education with a degree in elementary
education. After the graduation ceremony, Gissel received a Dean's
Merit Award. She delivered the graduation speech for her class.
She wanted to start using her degree as an elementary school teacher,
but because she was undocumented, that wasn't possible. Instead, she
continued her education and earned a master's degree at the University
of Illinois. She was accepted into a disability leadership program as a
family advocate.
Then, in 2012, the world changed for the better for Gissel. President
Obama established the DACA Program. She immediately applied for DACA.
Then, in 2013, she completed her master's degree and became an
elementary school teacher. For the last 4 years, Gissel has been a
teacher in the Berwyn South School District. Last year, she was awarded
a certificate of achievement for her leadership as one of two teachers
to implement the first-ever dual-language program in the district.
Gissel sent me a letter. I would like to read part of it as part of
the Record. Here is what she said:

DACA has enabled me to become a meaningful member of
society by opening doors that would have otherwise not been
accessible. DACA recipients, like myself, are more than just
a policy. My hope is that when people listen to our stories,
they will notice the kind of individuals that we are and the
kind of contributions we make--not only to the economy, but
to our society.

I reflect on that paragraph to think about this young woman, the
challenges she has faced within her family, and challenges imposed by
the fact that she was undocumented. She has never lost sight of her
commitment to her family, to her disabled sibling, and to many others
in her community.

[[Page S3507]]

Now she wants to be a teacher. Wouldn't you be proud and honored to
have your child in a classroom with someone with Gissel's master's
degree and values? I certainly would. Gissel and other DREAMers have so
much to give to the United States, but without DACA and without the
DREAM Act, Gissel would be deported back to Mexico--a country she
hasn't lived in since she was 3 years old.
Will America be a stronger country if we send away people like
Gissel, if we deport them and say we don't need them in our future? Of
course not. The answer is clear. Gissel will make America a better
place. Today we celebrate the DACA Program, which has given Gissel and
hundreds of thousands of other DREAMers the chance to finally come out
of the shadows, but we also recognize DACA as a temporary solution.
Ultimately, Congress--and especially the Senate--must step up and
show leadership here; make certain that we address the failings and
weaknesses of our broken immigration system; say to the 780,000
protected by DACA that you stepped forward, paid your fee, submitted
yourself to a background check, and have been given a temporary
opportunity to be part of America. Now it is our job to translate that
into a permanent opportunity for these young people to make America a
better place.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Recognition of the Minority Leader

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.

Thanking Senator Durbin

Mr. SCHUMER. First, I thank my friend and colleague for his
outstanding words on DACA. No one has fought more for the DACA kids
than he has, not just in the last year but over the last decade. The
fact that so many of them are here is, in good part, due to his great
work and effort. Thank you.

Thoughts and Prayers for the Victims of the Congressional Baseball
Practice Shooting

Mr. President, we are still all a bit shaken by the horrors of
yesterday's shooting. It was a senseless act of violence, made even
more chilling by the circumstances at a baseball practice for a
bipartisan charity event. I understand that Representative Scalise is
still in critical condition following surgery last night. When we hear
the word ``critical'' attached to his condition, it sends shivers down
our spines. We hope and pray for a quick and full recovery. I know that
all of his House colleagues are wishing him well right now, and I want
him to know his friends in the Senate do as well.
The same goes for the other four who were injured in the attack,
including two members of our Capitol Police Force. Our thoughts and
prayers go with them as well. We remain grateful for their service and
bravery and for the service and bravery of all of our Capitol police
officers. Their presence at the field yesterday--the presence of those
two Capitol police officers at the field yesterday prevented a bad
situation from getting worse and undoubtedly saved lives. Had the two
brave police officers not acted or if they had not been there, it might
well have been a massacre.
We would all be wise to reflect on the importance of civility in our
Nation's politics this morning. We disagree vehemently at times in
Congress and folks out in the country do, too, but the level of
nastiness, vitriol, and hate that has seeped into our politics must be
excised. Let us all strive at all times--whatever our disagreements--to
respect those who disagree with us, to seek a greater understanding of
them, to walk in their moccasins--as Native Americans have always said.
Let us strive always to conduct our politics with civility.
I was heartened to hear that the congressional baseball game will
still be played this evening. Let it be a symbol that hate and violence
do not cast too long or too great a shadow, that we can and will come
together this evening, and the game will go on. I will be going to the
game with the three congressional leaders as a show of solidarity.
Mr. President, last evening, the Senate showed it can come together.
Last night, we voted, in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion, to
strengthen a package of sanctions against Russia. It was the product of
diligent weeks of bipartisan negotiations. I saw the Senator from
Maryland behind me a few minutes ago. He deserves lots of credit, as do
the Senators from Ohio, Tennessee, and Idaho. The final result is a
very good one for our country because yesterday the U.S. Senate said to
Mr. Putin, in no uncertain terms, that when he violates international
norms and interferes with our election, he will not escape reproach.
Not only did we pass a new round of tough sanctions for Russia's
meddling in our election, we codified existing sanctions into law,
making them harder to lift, and we moved to make the Congress--not the
President--the final arbiter of sanctions relief when necessary. Any
ideas of the President that he can lift sanctions on his own, for any
reason, are dashed by this legislation.
The House of Representatives should take notice that 97 Senators
voted in favor of this package. I hope Leader Ryan will move with the
same haste to pass this package of sanctions through the House. I hope
the President will sign it. The months-long effort to forge bipartisan
consensus on Russia sanctions--an issue that gets to the vital
interests of our country, the wellspring of our democracy--gives me
hope that Democrats and Republicans can come together and work together
on a number of big issues this year.
There are several issues coming before this body soon where we can
come together: another budget--passing another budget; reauthorizing
flood insurance and children's health insurance; raising the debt
ceiling. Each of those issues will, by definition, demand bipartisan
effort.
A lesson that all of us have learned here in the Senate is that
legislation is made better and much more likely to pass when both
parties are involved in crafting it.
I have noticed the media has been questioning all morning why
Congress isn't more bipartisan. We should be. But when the Russia
sanctions agreement passes and the budget deal passes, both major
bipartisan efforts, they are proof that we can get things done
together. If those agreements were given a little more recognition by
the media--the fact that we can at times, at least, work in a
bipartisan way--that would help. For too many of us on both sides of
the aisle, it seems as though when there is divisiveness, it gets far
more attention in the media than when there is comity between the
parties.

Healthcare Legislation

Mr. President, finally, I would suggest to my colleagues that the
most immediate place where we can translate the rhetoric calling for us
to come together into reality is on healthcare. A goal many of us share
on both sides of the aisle is to improve the law, bring costs down for
consumers, stabilize the marketplace, and make it easier for older
Americans to afford the ever-rising out-of-pocket costs of prescription
drugs.
I would conclude by stating that we can make the rhetoric of
bipartisanship not empty by both parties coming together and working
together on healthcare. We have shown thus far in this Congress with
the passage of the budget and Russia sanctions that significant
legislation can best be served by bipartisanship. Opening up the
process and having us all come together on healthcare would be a very
good, concrete reaffirmation of bipartisanship and would translate the
rhetoric--not bad at all--that we have heard here today into reality.
In conclusion, the rhetoric about bipartisanship can be strengthened.
Hopefully healthcare is a place where we can strengthen it, by opening
up the process, having hearings, and having open discussion.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time during the
quorum calls on S. 722 be charged equally to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Strange). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 250, as Modified

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the Senator from

[[Page S3508]]

Alabama is presiding over this very important debate because one of the
most important issues to both of our States, Colorado and Alabama, is
the economy and the economic well-being of our great country. The
amendment that I will be discussing today goes to the very heart of our
opportunities in space, our opportunities in innovation, our
opportunities to ensure that we have the most reliable information as
it relates to weather and to weather events.
It is a great partnership that we have had with the Senator from
Alabama, who has been absolutely critical and instrumental in ensuring
a persistent, reliable space presence. I thank the Senator from
Alabama, Mr. Strange, for his incredible leadership when it comes to
making sure that we are able to reach space, that we are able to
continue our space mission. Whether it is in the defense of this
country or in understanding where the next tornado may strike, I thank
the Senator from Alabama for the leadership that has been provided to
ensure that constant presence and persistence.
Of course, I rise to speak in support of the bipartisan Gardner-
Nelson-Warner et al. amendment, amendment No. 250. Yet, truly, to the
Senate--to my colleagues here--I rise in support of America's role and
leadership in space.
I rise on behalf of the hardworking men and women across this Nation
who make our country's aerospace industry second to none, because, over
the past 70 years, the United States has led the way in space
exploration. From the Apollo missions to the space shuttle to the Orion
program, we are the leaders in exploring the great frontier of space.
That is who this country is. That is who we are--explorers, pioneers.
We were the first to the Moon, and I hope we are the first to Mars, but
we cannot give up that pioneering innovation that has led this country
to greatness.
I will share with colleagues of the Senate a CNBC story from March
that China is building a manned spacecraft that is capable of sending
astronauts to the Moon as well as to near-Earth orbit flight.
Can you imagine the day when the stars and stripes on the lunar
surface stands not alone but stands next to the stars of a flag of
another nation--perhaps China's, perhaps somebody else's?
When it comes to our access to space, this debate is absolutely
critical because without the passage of amendment No. 250, we lose a
tremendous portion of our access to space. We lose it for commercial
applications, and we lose it for civil applications.
In the past few months, this China activity has shown the importance
of U.S. leadership. That is why this bipartisan amendment comes with a
very simple point. It ensures that NASA and our commercial space
industry will continue to be the country's leader in aerospace.
The ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Mark
Warner, of Virginia, is coleading my amendment. The Senator has done a
phenomenal job in leadership on the Intelligence Committee in leading
this amendment.
I see that my colleague from Florida, Senator Nelson, has joined this
debate. He has done a phenomenal job in leading this effort. As the
ranking member of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee, with jurisdiction over NASA, Senator Bill Nelson is the
leading cosponsor of this effort.
They understand how important it is to address this issue for NASA
and other space missions.
I stand here in support of the greater goals of the underlying bill
that we will be amending today. I believe sanctions against our
adversaries are warranted and justified and, indeed, should move
forward. This amendment is not designed to undermine the intent of the
bill, but it seeks to ensure that space exploration may continue as it
is currently planned.
Without this bipartisan amendment, multiple missions on the books
today--that are already planned today--will be delayed or even canceled
and will be subjecting the U.S. taxpayers to significant cost
increases. Without this amendment, missions like the commercial
resupply program, which delivers critical supplies to the International
Space Station, will be jeopardized by the language of the bill as it is
written. American astronauts at the International Space Station, as we
speak, are dependent on those supplies, but we are cutting off the
American lifeline without the adoption of this amendment. Future
missions, like the commercial crew program--a partnership between NASA
and private industry to bring astronauts to the International Space
Station on a U.S.-manufactured spacecraft--will be put at risk without
the adoption of this amendment.
Without this bipartisan amendment, we will continue to rely on
Russian spacecraft to take U.S. astronauts to the International Space
Station. Let me just make that more clear. Without the adoption of this
amendment, NASA and our astronauts will be dependent on Russia for
access to space for even longer. Rejection of this bipartisan amendment
results in further Russian dependence.
I do not believe this was the intent of the language when the bill
was first written. The Gardner-Nelson-Warner-Shelby et al. amendment
creates the certainty that NASA needs and supports to ensure currently
planned NASA and commercial launch missions can continue without
interruption.
NASA contacted my office yesterday and said of amendment No. 250:
``We believe this provides us the flexibility to maintain our
commitments to our national space program.''
It is not just the commercial crew and cargo missions that are going
to be impacted. Several other missions will be subjected to delays--
missions like the Joint Polar Satellite System. This constellation of
satellites will give us the ability to constantly monitor the globe for
significant weather events, such as floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes.
As I stand here today, the three Senators on the floor who are
listening to this important debate--with more on C-SPAN--have been
impacted dramatically by floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes.
In 2013, we had dramatic flooding in Colorado that damaged thousands
and thousands of homes and cost lives. I know the Presiding Officer has
faced the same challenge when it has come to tornadoes and incredibly
tragic weather events. The Senator from Florida has faced hurricanes,
floods, and tornadoes. That is the importance of this amendment--to
understand our weather systems and predictions.
I am proud to say that JPSS is being developed in my home State of
Colorado. The JPSS and other essential programs in which we have
already invested hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions of
dollars already, are now put at risk of significant delays or cost
increases to the taxpayer without the adoption of this amendment.
I am also on the floor to talk about a longer term mission that I
truly believe in and hope to see our Nation achieve, one that goes to
the very heart of our pioneering spirit of who we are as a people. It
is our future manned mission to Mars.
As I have spoken on the floor before, as I child I wanted to be an
astronaut. I was inspired as I watched NASA astronauts explore that
next frontier. I believe that the next destination for human beings to
explore is, indeed, Mars, but without this bipartisan amendment, the
Mars 2020 rover, which will continue to prepare us for that future
manned mission, will be put in doubt. It will be a significant setback
and will make the future goal of getting to Mars seem that much further
away.
This amendment, amendment No. 250, allows these missions to move
forward with certainty and as scheduled. It is a bipartisan effort to
affirm America's leadership in space.
Let's be clear. Last summer we had a debate on this very same issue--
that by 2022 we were going to have an ``America first'' opportunity.
That is the spirit of this amendment--to make sure that we have access
to these vital and critical space missions, access to space, and to
continue to grow economic opportunities for the American people. That
is what this debate is all about.
I yield the floor to my colleague Senator Nelson and then, of course,
will continue with debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I thank Senator Gardner.
Indeed, this is an example of the Senate working together. There is,
simply, a problem in the bill that was passed.

[[Page S3509]]

It is a technical problem, but it goes to the heart of our military-
civilian space program. It goes to the heart of the cooperation that we
have had with Russia that goes back to the Soviet Union days when, in
fact, in 1975, in the middle of the Cold War, a crew from America
rendezvoused and docked with the crew from the Soviet Union. Ever since
that crew, which was led by Lt. Gen. Tom Stafford, of the United
States, and General Alexey Leonov, of the Soviet Union, we have had
cooperation in space, and that program continues today on the
International Space Station.
Before I get into talking about the details of the amendment, as
Senator Gardner has discussed so well already, I hope that the Senate
will treat it as technical in nature because it corrects what was not
intended. Unless corrected, it will be disastrous not only for NASA but
for all of the burgeoning commercial space industry, which we are
bringing back to America. What has happened over the last four decades,
in the meantime, is that a lot of that commercial space industry has
flown the coop to other launchers from other nations. But it is coming
back to America.

prayers for the Victims of the Congressional Baseball Practice Shooting

Mr. President, before I get into the substance, I just want to speak
with regard to the terrible tragedy that occurred yesterday and of my
feelings about this violence that has occurred. I don't know whether it
has occurred because of the excessive rhetoric and the sharpness and
the fact that politics has become a blood sport, but we are so divided.
This is what I want to say. We are Americans first, regardless of
party. In times of threat, we come together. We are all on the same
team.

This Senator has prayed, as I know others have, for the complete
recovery of all of those who were wounded yesterday, two of whom were
apparently grievously wounded. We pray for their full recovery. It was
a heinous attack. Let's come together in bipartisanship.

Amendment No. 250, as Modified

Mr. President, right here is an example of coming together.
Recognizing there is a technical problem, we are coming together to fix
that problem. Let's do this in the spirit of what Americans do. We are
Americans first.
I am obviously here, as I demonstrated in my vote yesterday, for the
Iran sanctions bill, as well as the Russia sanctions amendment, which
we adopted yesterday. Both were bipartisan efforts. I wish to thank our
colleagues, especially the members of the Banking and Foreign Relations
Committees.
This Senator is a cosponsor of the sanctions bill which addresses
Iran's support for terrorism, ballistic missile activity, and human
rights violations--these destabilizing activities--and this bill
strengthens the hand of the United States in countering Iran. These are
destabilizing activities separate and apart from the Iran nuclear
agreement, and to date, the United States has the evidence that they
have complied with the Iran nuclear agreement.
At the same time, we are facing an aggressive Vladimir Putin. The
Russia bill which we debated yesterday and which will come to final
passage shortly strengthens our hand against Putin's Russia. The U.S.
intelligence community has already made clear that Putin attempted to
interfere in our election. Let me tell my colleagues, that didn't stop
with the past election. It is continuing. And we better be ready for it
next year in the 2018 elections because Putin and the GRU have done all
the groundwork. But that is nothing new because he had done it in
elections before in Europe, and he has been doing it in elections right
now, as we saw in France. It boomeranged on him, thank goodness. We
will see an attempt on the upcoming German elections.
The intelligence community has made it very clear--the ranking member
of the Intelligence Committee is here--that Putin and the GRU are
likely to do this again. That is why I say beware. They have laid the
groundwork for next year's elections to try to interfere. Putin's
influence campaign struck at the very core of our democracy and simply
must not be permitted to do it again.
Now is not the time to cozy up to Russia; rather, the United States
must redouble our cyber defenses and our cyber offenses to deter him,
to make him feel enough pain so that he won't do it again. The
sanctions we will adopt today are tough. We need this, but we need
more.
Shortly, we are going to vote on the amendment Senator Gardner has
explained. Interestingly, in all of this angst and conflict with
Russia, we get along with Russia in the civilian and commercial space
program. We have had peaceful cooperation in outer space ever since
what I told my colleagues about; that is, since 1975, in the middle of
the Cold War, the rendezvous and docking and living together in space
for 9 days, a Soviet crew and an American crew. That has been the
central theme of our space program since that time. The shining example
of that now is the cooperation in the International Space Station, the
football field-sized--it is 120 yards long; think one goalpost to
another. People don't have any idea of how big it is on orbit. It
circles the Earth every 90 minutes.
We have been working in space together with many nations but
especially our partner the Russians for over 16 years. So the peaceful
cooperation in space has been good for business. It has been good for
jobs in America. And we are working to grow our share of an over $300
billion global space economy.
That is what this amendment is about. It is about fixing the question
on the purchase of those RD-180 engines, the Russian engine that is
used in the Atlas V, that is used not only for defense launches but for
commercial launches and will be one of the two rockets launching
American astronauts within a year and a half to and from the
International Space Station.
So this amendment is for the benefit of our economy, as well as the
betterment of our civilization.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to thank my friend,
the Senator from Florida, for his comments. There is no one in this
body who is more familiar with and more knowledgeable about our space
programs than is Senator Nelson.
I also want to associate myself with two comments he made. No. 1, as
the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I echo what he said
about the very real, tangible threat the Russians, their spy agencies,
and their agents pose to not just our democratic process but--as the
Senator from Florida has outlined, not only did they attack us in 2016,
they attacked the Dutch, which is why they had to hand-count their
ballots, and they attacked the French, and Facebook took down 30,000
Facebook accounts because of fear of Russian manipulation. They will
attack the Germans.
One of the things that is so concerning to me is that if you add up
the amount of disruption the Russians have caused in Western societies
at large without firing a shot or shooting a missile--and all that for
less than 5 percent of the cost of an aircraft carrier--it is a pretty
good return.
Our country needs to be strong against Russia, and I support the
Russia sanctions, but I also support, as the Senator has indicated, a
really critical part--that we continue our space program. I stand here
to join with Senator Nelson and my good friend, the Senator from
Colorado, Mr. Gardner, in support of this amendment No. 250, which will
allow civilian agencies to continue to launch crucial science, civil,
and commercial space missions and which will continue to support NOAA
and NASA, which depend upon their research.
Without this amendment--and I think this is an amendment that
corrects a mistake in the original bill--billions of dollars and years
of planning that have gone into missions like, as the Senator
mentioned, the International Space Station, commercial cargo, Mars
2020, and the Joint Polar Satellite System, just wouldn't be possible.
In many ways, without this amendment, we could even become more
dependent upon Russian technology.
Again, as the Senator mentioned, I think the overwhelming majority of
this body is very supportive of sanctions against Iran. We are very
supportive, and I appreciate the opportunity to add stronger sanctions
against Russia and sanctions that this

[[Page S3510]]

President cannot arbitrarily withdraw. But we have to make sure that in
this bill we don't do unintentional harm to our space interests--space
interests that I know are in Colorado and Florida and my home State of
Virginia, where we have a flight facility at NASA Wallops, which is
over on our Eastern Shore, where we launch both NASA and commercial
satellites.
We have one of America's leading commercial and military companies,
Orbital ATK, which is headquartered in Virginia and launches the
Antares rocket from Wallops. The fact is, without this amendment,
Orbital ATK would be prevented from buying the Russian RD-181 engines
for its Antares rockets. That will do nothing to help America's space
mission. The fact is, without those engines, Orbital would not be able
to fulfill a $1.2 billion contract for launching from Wallops.
Quite simply, as the Senator indicated and I am repeating, this
amendment is broadly bipartisan. My friend Senator Gardner and I chair
the Cyber Caucus. The amendment is supported by our leading expert in
the Senate on space, Senator Nelson, as well as Senator Shelby and
Senator Bennet and a host of others. I imagine the Presiding Officer is
also a supporter of this. The amendment would simply provide civil and
commercial space parity with the defense industry, for which an
exemption has already been provided. It is in the interests of defense
and civil space to continue the current status quo in order to maintain
a competitive environment until a domestic capability has been
developed.
Let me be clear. I think it is important that over a very short time,
we get away from purchasing Russian rockets, but we need that
transition period, and the transition period the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee laid out on the defense side ought to be extended as
well on the commercial side.
So a ``yes'' vote on amendment No. 250 will support continued access
to space for NASA, as well as for those equally important commercial
space missions. One of the things that I feel is so important about the
commercial space missions is that we have to have that competition,
candidly, with NASA and to push our defense industry if we are going to
bring down space costs. To put a dagger in the heart of our commercial
space industry as it has been slowly evolving would be a grave mistake.
I have taken on this issue on the intelligence side as I have tried
to get smarter on the whole question of our overhead capabilities. The
amount of dollars that we spend and the lack of competitiveness that we
have in terms of some of our more traditional government-purchased
space assets are both a waste of taxpayer dollars, and, candidly, we
have an architecture overhead that is not modern enough to recognize
the threats that Russians, Chinese, and others pose in terms of the
ability to jam our satellites and use laser beams and other things. In
a sense, in many ways, it is almost as if our defense and the
intelligence community, on overhead architecture--nobody ever saw a
James Bond movie. We built these large, bulky platforms in the sky with
the assumption that America would always dominate space. That
dominance--it is unfortunate because our adversary changes, it is
coming to an end, and we need the competition from the commercial
industry, quite honestly, to push the IC and push the defense toward
smaller, more resilient, and more flexible platforms.
While I share the desire of the chairman of the Arms Services
Committee to get us off this Russian hardware, we do need this
transition. I think the amendment that has been put forward by the
Senator from Colorado provides that transition, led by the transition
that was laid out on defense. I believe commercial space needs that
same type of transition.
I hope the amendment will pass. I look forward to our continued
bipartisan support of both NASA and commercial space and obviously our
defense assets and IC assets as well.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Russian sanctions amendment passed by
this body 97 to 2 last year--I take it the Senator from Florida and the
Senator from Virginia were here at the time; it was one person who was
not--was negotiated between Senators of both parties on multiple
committees, including Foreign Relations, Banking, and Armed Services.
It was specifically designed to impose tough sanctions on Russian
defense and intelligence sectors, to impose tough sanctions on the
Russian military industrial complex and intelligence agencies that have
made it possible for Russia to invade Ukraine, annex Crimea, terrorize
Syria, threaten our NATO allies, and attack America's election in 2016.
Have no doubt about what this amendment is, my dear colleagues and
friends. It is a giveaway to the Russian military industrial complex.
There has always been a collection of lawmakers, executives, and
lobbyists who have accepted continuing, even deepening, our Nation's
dependence on Russian rocket engines. That is exactly what will happen
if we allow this amendment to pass, and the door will once again fly
open for taxpayer dollars to be used to subsidize purchases of Russian
rocket engines--purchases which line the pockets of Vladimir Putin's
cronies.
My friends, if you want to vote to buy more Russian rocket engines,
just say it. That is fine. That is fine with me, but to cloak it in
some kind of bipartisan agreement that somehow we are going to have to
continue to buy these Russian rocket engines, after we had an agreement
last year 97 to 2--97 to 2--what does this do? This undoes last year's
97-to-2 agreement. We don't need this amendment to meet America's needs
in space.
As a result of last year's bipartisan agreement and the NDAA, the
Department of Defense is on a path to gradually eliminate dependence on
Russia as quickly as possible while fostering competition among
American companies. NASA needs to do the same. NASA needs to do the
same. NASA needs to do the same.
Sanctions, by definition, require tradeoffs. Sanctions are not free.
Countries that impose sanctions must be willing to pay a cost, too, if
and when a greater principle, a great national security interest, is at
stake.
Let me conclude because I note the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee and the ranking member here. There are costs and tradeoffs
the United States has been asking our European allies to make in the
last few years. We have leaned on France to cancel a sale of naval
vessels to Russia. We have been warning Central and Eastern European
allies against deepening their dependence on Russian energy with
various energy deals and infrastructure projects. We should not be
asking our allies to make these sacrifices unless we are prepared to do
the same.
We will probably pass this amendment. If there is ever a doubt in any
of our constituents' minds about the influence of special interests, it
will be with passage of this amendment--which, by the way, with all due
respect to my friends and colleagues, was the one thing they didn't
want. The one thing they didn't want was an on-the-record vote on this
amendment, which is why I am confident it will lose, but I want every
Member of the U.S. Senate to look in the eyes of the mother whose son
was just killed by a Russian sniper, as I did, down in Mariupol not too
long ago.
I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment. I know how it is going to come
out, but Members of the U.S. Senate will at least be on record. I say
this is not the most courageous chapter in the history of this
institution. I urge a ``no'' vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am not involving myself in this debate.
I just want to say to Senator McCain: You demonstrated yesterday the
best of the U.S. Senate when an issue like this arose, and instead of
blocking a vote, you said you were glad to have a vote. You are
obviously in strong disagreement with the substance of this amendment.
I just want to tell you how much I personally appreciate your
allowing a vote on this, the role you played in all things Russia and
Iran, your forceful nature on these issues, your great leadership, and
the role you have played in getting us today to a vote that isn't
requiring cloture, where you have allowed this amendment to take place.
I

[[Page S3511]]

cannot tell you how much I appreciate that and appreciate the role you
play in this body.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Tennessee and my friend from
Maryland.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona as well
for allowing this vote to move forward, but in his statements, he said
NASA needs to do the same. He repeated it several times.
I would just say that this amendment could actually be titled ``NASA
Needs to Do the Same'' because what we had agreed to last year, when it
comes to defense, is a way forward on the Atlas V rocket, the RD-180.
We agreed to that. I believe it was a unanimous consent agreement. If
there was an objection at that time, then it should have been expressed
when we made this agreement.
Our colleagues across the aisle, for a unanimous consent, it takes
all of us 100 people to agree to a unanimous consent agreement. That
agreement was made on the National Defense Authorization Act. NASA
needs to do the same.
Our colleague, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, Mark
Warner, made the point of parity between civil, commercial, and
defense. That is what this amendment does.
There are a lot of issues that we come to the floor and we talk about
this issue not being rocket science: It is not that difficult. It is
not rocket science. Well, we actually have an issue that is rocket
science. The mission set before American astronauts is jeopardized if
this amendment doesn't pass. The taxpayers of this country face
billions of dollars in costs if this amendment doesn't pass. Reliance
on Russian technology to get to the space station or resupplying
American astronauts will increase if this amendment doesn't pass.
If we want to talk about protecting the people of this country, let's
talk about the victims of floods in Colorado, let's talk about people
who have died in tornadoes because we didn't have the most accurate
ability to forecast where they were coming from, when they were going
to strike, and who would be hit. This amendment will allow these
weather satellites to go into space to protect the men and women of
this country from natural disasters. Again, it brings parity to an
agreement that was decided upon through unanimous consent last year.
I support the underlying legislation, and I support this amendment
and urge my colleagues to support it as well. I thank the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking member of the Foreign
Relations Committee for their leadership on this committee.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I applaud the bipartisan work that my
Senate colleagues have put into legislation to impose sanctions on
Russia. Russia's interference in the 2016 election represents an
assault on our democracy that, until this point, has gone largely
unanswered by the Administration and Congress. Russia has also
conducted cyber attacks on allies and illegally invaded and violated
the sovereignty of Ukraine and Georgia. I know that my colleagues take
this issue very seriously, and I support the bipartisan compromise,
which will maintain existing sanctions on Russia for its cyber and
military intrusions in Ukraine and require additional mandatory
sanctions on Russia's energy sector, those providing arms to Syrian
troops, corrupt Russian oligarchs and their networks, and human rights
abusers. We cannot allow Russia's hostile actions toward Western
democracies to go unchecked. This legislation sends an important
message to Russia and the world that the United States stands strongly
against Russia's anti-democratic actions.
At the same time, the original version of the legislation would have
had unintended consequences for our nation's civil and commercial space
sectors. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, and
commercial space missions are critical to space exploration, weather
data, and sending U.S. astronauts to the International Space Station,
as well as supplying them with cargo and instruments for scientific
research. Under the original legislation, these missions would have
been threatened or prevented from moving forward. In response, Senator
Gardner introduced an amendment that would exempt NASA and commercial
space-related launch activities from the sanctions bill. I was proud to
cosponsor this amendment.
In addition to our defense assets, Virginia is at the epicenter of
the Nation's civil space program and commercial space industry. For
more than 70 years, NASA's Wallops Flight Facility has served as a key
national asset to the U.S. space program, an economic driver for the
Eastern Shore, and an invaluable benefit to the Commonwealth. The Mid-
Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Island serves as a leader in
commercial space, partnering with Virginia-headquartered Orbital ATK to
launch critical cargo to the International Space Station. Finally,
research projects at NASA Langley Research Center and Virginia's superb
academic institutions are developing tomorrow's innovative technologies
and scientific discoveries. As Governor and now Senator, I have
remained a strong supporter of Virginia's booming industry, research,
and launch services. Without Senator Gardner's amendment, some of these
activities in Virginia would cease to exist.
To be clear, I stand in agreement with my Senate colleagues on the
issue of Russian sanctions. I also believe that our space program must
transition to American-made rocket engines and parts, and I know that
U.S. companies are working hard in conjunction with NASA toward that
goal. But we need time for that transition to occur, and this important
amendment would make it possible without hurting our current
capabilities. In addition, while the Department of Defense has been
afforded the opportunity to develop new technologies while maintaining
the status quo, it is only fair that we provide the same chance to
civil and commercial space entities.
For these reasons, I was proud to cosponsor Senator Gardner's
bipartisan amendment to S. 722. I look forward to working with my
colleagues in the future to enhance and expand our Nation's space
program.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator Cardin
and I will speak for a few moments, and then we will have three votes,
one of which will be on the RD-180 issue, one of which will be on the
NATO issue, and then final passage; is that correct? Am I correct in
that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 6 minutes remaining before the first
vote on the Gardner amendment.
Mr. CORKER. Then there will be a series of votes, with no comments
made in advance of those votes; is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I will be very brief, and we will split
our time.
I want to say that, to me, today the U.S. Senate is functioning in
the way our Founders intended for it to function.
It has been my goal, since the beginning of my leadership on the
Foreign Relations Committee, for our committee and for this Senate to
reaffirm its role in foreign policy issues. Today, the U.S. Senate, in
a time of uncertainty around our Nation and uncertainty about some of
our foreign policy issues, is asserting its responsibilities as it
relates to foreign policy for the United States of America. I thank
Senators on both sides of the aisle for the role they have played in
getting us here.
This is a very strong piece of legislation that in many ways has
almost occurred under the radar screen because of the way it has been
done. The fact that we have had no cloture vote, the fact that we are
having amendments, as has been discussed before, and the fact that this
legislation sends a very strong signal to Russia that the nefarious
activities they have been involved in--it does the same with Iran, with
the activities outside of the JCPOA that they have been involved in,
affirming our commitment to NATO, which we will do to article 5, NATO,
in just a few moments.
I thank this body. I thank Leaders McConnell and Schumer for allowing
the environment to exist for us to work

[[Page S3512]]

in the manner we have. I thank our ranking member, Senator Cardin, and
those members--Senator Crapo and Brown and others--who have played such
a significant role. Senator McCain is on the floor, Senator Graham,
Senator Rubio, Senator Menendez, Senator Shaheen--so many members who
have gotten us to this place.
This is a great moment for the U.S. Senate. This is the way the
Senate is supposed to function, and this is the way the Senate is
supposed to exercise its prerogatives as it relates to foreign policy,
a great moment for our body.
Senator Cardin.
Mr. CARDIN. Well, first, to Senator Corker. There is a reason Members
want to serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We had a long
list of Members who wanted to join our committee in this Congress.
Quite frankly, I think the reason they want to join is not only the
challenges we have globally but the fact that this is a committee that
works bipartisanly and respects the views of every single Member, both
Democratic and Republican, on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The bill we have before us reflects that--in the best tradition of
the U.S. Senate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That is
due, in large part, because of the talent, leadership, and commitment
of our chairman. I thank Senator Corker for allowing us to reach this
very important moment in the U.S. Senate, to be able to vote on a bill
that is consequential for America's national security.
I believe this is the first major bill we have had on the floor of
the U.S. Senate, the first bill we have had amendments to, and I concur
in the Senator's observations that our leaders allowed us to let the
process work in the best traditions of the U.S. Senate.
It is difficult for many of us to explain how the Senate operates at
times. It really is difficult, but it is a body which respects the
rights of each Member, and they have certain abilities to slow things
down or bring us to a stop, and the process doesn't work the way it is
supposed to work, but this bill has been handled very quickly on a
major subject because we respected the rights of every single Member of
the U.S. Senate. It doesn't mean we reach total agreement. We didn't,
but we have a bill that accomplishes three very important things:
First, it stands up to the aggression of Russia and Iran. Yes, we
have been talking about this--and I am glad Senator McCain is on the
floor. Senator McCain has been one of the most ardent crusaders to
point out the risk factors of Russia to our national security and that
of our allies.
I started with Senator McCain in January. We sat down, and he
informed me why we had to do certain things and make it very clear and
not have any ambiguity because Russia would run right through that
ambiguity. Thanks to that initial leadership, we have those provisions
in the underlying bill. There will be no ambiguity as to what Congress
is saying in regard to Russia's behavior.
I also acknowledge we have a review process in here. Senator Graham
brought that to our attention very early in the process in January so
Congress can insert itself.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CARDIN. That review process will give Congress the right role to
review executive actions so we are stronger, working together. It also
gives the President a stronger hand in negotiating with Mr. Putin and
Russia because Congress has said: You must accomplish certain
objectives, such as getting Russia's aggression to end in Ukraine or
get Russia to stop supporting war crimes in Syria, to stop interfering
with our democratic election systems. That is what we say, and we are
very clear about that.
Then we take the third step, which I think is very important; that
is, provide the wherewithal of U.S. leadership, working with our
European allies, to protect our democratic institutions.
All of that is included in the bill that we are going to have a
chance to vote on in a few minutes, and I want to thank all who were
involved. I am going to include staff who worked so hard on this.
They were here 24/7 putting this bill together--Damian Murphy, in my
office; Margaret Taylor; and Jessica Lewis, Dana Stroul, Lowell
Schwartz, Sean Bartlett, Chris Barr, John Ryan, Leslie Bull, Danny
Ricchetti, as well as Todd Womack, Rob Strayer, David Kinzler, and Ben
Purser.
They were extraordinary in helping us reach this day.
Mr. CORKER. No question. I thank the Senator for those comments.
Our staffs have been remarkable, and the years of experience and
knowledge they bring to this no doubt allowed us to do something so
substantial in an amount of time, yet do so in a methodical way.
With that, I ask unanimous consent that the votes following the first
vote in this series be 10 minutes in length.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
All time has expired.

Vote on Amendment No. 250, as Modified

The question now occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 250, as
modified, offered by the Senator from Colorado, Mr. Gardner.
Mr. BARRASSO. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant bill clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 94, nays 6, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 145 Leg.]

YEAS--94

Alexander
Baldwin
Barrasso
Bennet
Blunt
Booker
Boozman
Brown
Burr
Cantwell
Capito
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Cassidy
Cochran
Collins
Coons
Corker
Cornyn
Cortez Masto
Cotton
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Donnelly
Duckworth
Durbin
Enzi
Feinstein
Fischer
Flake
Franken
Gardner
Gillibrand
Grassley
Harris
Hassan
Hatch
Heinrich
Heitkamp
Heller
Hirono
Hoeven
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kaine
Kennedy
King
Klobuchar
Lankford
Leahy
Lee
Manchin
Markey
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Merkley
Moran
Murkowski
Murphy
Murray
Nelson
Paul
Perdue
Peters
Portman
Reed
Risch
Roberts
Rounds
Rubio
Sanders
Schatz
Schumer
Scott
Shaheen
Shelby
Stabenow
Strange
Tester
Thune
Tillis
Toomey
Udall
Van Hollen
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wicker
Wyden
Young

NAYS--6

Blumenthal
Ernst
Graham
McCain
Sasse
Sullivan
The amendment (No. 250), as modified, was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

Amendment No. 240

Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 minutes,
evenly split between Senator Corker and me, to speak on the NATO
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I would add that my fellow Ohioan, Senator
Portman, is a cosponsor of this. Special thanks go to Senator Graham--
this is the Graham-Brown NATO amendment--also to Senators McCain,
Rubio, Casey, and Jack Reed and Sheldon Whitehouse from Rhode Island.
This is especially important to the Ukrainian community in my State.
A number of them have been in town the last couple of days. They know
how critical support for our allies is and how important it is that
this amendment sends a clear message that the United States will uphold
our half-century commitment to NATO, combined with a strong signal to
Russia to clean up its act. That is the importance of this amendment. I
ask support from my colleagues.
I yield to Senator Corker.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank all those involved in the message
that is being sent. I support the amendment, and I urge a ``yes'' vote.
Thank you.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on agreeing to
amendment No. 240, offered by the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Corker.
Mr. CORKER. I ask for the yeas and nays.

[[Page S3513]]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 100, nays 0, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 146 Leg.]

YEAS--100

Alexander
Baldwin
Barrasso
Bennet
Blumenthal
Blunt
Booker
Boozman
Brown
Burr
Cantwell
Capito
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Cassidy
Cochran
Collins
Coons
Corker
Cornyn
Cortez Masto
Cotton
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Donnelly
Duckworth
Durbin
Enzi
Ernst
Feinstein
Fischer
Flake
Franken
Gardner
Gillibrand
Graham
Grassley
Harris
Hassan
Hatch
Heinrich
Heitkamp
Heller
Hirono
Hoeven
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kaine
Kennedy
King
Klobuchar
Lankford
Leahy
Lee
Manchin
Markey
McCain
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Merkley
Moran
Murkowski
Murphy
Murray
Nelson
Paul
Perdue
Peters
Portman
Reed
Risch
Roberts
Rounds
Rubio
Sanders
Sasse
Schatz
Schumer
Scott
Shaheen
Shelby
Stabenow
Strange
Sullivan
Tester
Thune
Tillis
Toomey
Udall
Van Hollen
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wicker
Wyden
Young
The amendment (No. 240) was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Fischer). Under the previous order, the
committee-reported substitute, as amended, is agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read
the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the
question is, Shall it pass?
Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 2, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 147 Leg.]

YEAS--98

NAYS--2

Paul
Sanders

The bill (S. 722), as amended, was passed, as follows:

S. 722

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Countering
Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Regional strategy for countering conventional and asymmetric
Iranian threats in the Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 4. Imposition of additional sanctions in response to Iran's
ballistic missile program.
Sec. 5. Imposition of terrorism-related sanctions with respect to the
IRGC.
Sec. 6. Imposition of additional sanctions with respect to persons
responsible for human rights abuses.
Sec. 7. Enforcement of arms embargos.
Sec. 8. Review of applicability of sanctions relating to Iran's support
for terrorism and its ballistic missile program.
Sec. 9. Report on coordination of sanctions between the United States
and the European Union.
Sec. 10. Report on United States citizens detained by Iran.
Sec. 11. Exceptions for national security and humanitarian assistance;
rule of construction.
Sec. 12. Presidential waiver authority.

TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

Sec. 201. Short title.

Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian
Federation

Sec. 211. Findings.
Sec. 212. Sense of Congress.

PART I--Congressional Review of Sanctions Imposed With Respect to the
Russian Federation

Sec. 215. Short title.
Sec. 216. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions
imposed with respect to the Russian Federation.

PART II--Sanctions With Respect to the Russian Federation

Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Codification of sanctions relating to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 223. Modification of implementation of Executive Order 13662.
Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to activities of the
Russian Federation undermining cybersecurity.
Sec. 225. Imposition of sanctions relating to special Russian crude oil
projects.
Sec. 226. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian and other
foreign financial institutions.
Sec. 227. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to significant
corruption in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 228. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to certain
transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious
human rights abusers in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 229. Notifications to Congress under Ukraine Freedom Support Act
of 2014.
Sec. 230. Standards for termination of certain sanctions with respect
to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 231. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons engaging in
transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of
the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to the development of pipelines in the
Russian Federation.
Sec. 233. Sanctions with respect to investment in or facilitation of
privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian
Federation.
Sec. 234. Sanctions with respect to the transfer of arms and related
materiel to Syria.
Sec. 235. Sanctions described.
Sec. 236. Exceptions, waiver, and termination.
Sec. 237. Exception relating to activities of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
Sec. 238. Rule of construction.

PART III--Reports

Sec. 241. Report on oligarchs and parastatal entities of the Russian
Federation.
Sec. 242. Report on effects of expanding sanctions to include sovereign
debt and derivative products.
Sec. 243. Report on illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation.

Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

Sec. 251. Findings.
Sec. 252. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 253. Statement of policy.
Sec. 254. Coordinating aid and assistance across Europe and Eurasia.
Sec. 255. Report on media organizations controlled and funded by the
Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 256. Report on Russian Federation influence on elections in Europe
and Eurasia.
Sec. 257. Ukranian energy security.
Sec. 258. Termination.
Sec. 259. Appropriate congressional committees defined.

Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

PART I--National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit
Financing

Sec. 261. Development of national strategy.
Sec. 262. Contents of national strategy.

PART II--Enhancing Antiterrorism Tools of the Department of the
Treasury

Sec. 271. Improving antiterror finance monitoring of funds transfers.
Sec. 272. Sense of Congress on international cooperation regarding
terrorist financing intelligence.

[[Page S3514]]

Sec. 273. Examining the counter-terror financing role of the Department
of the Treasury in embassies.
Sec. 274. Inclusion of Secretary of the Treasury on the National
Security Council.
Sec. 275. Inclusion of all funds.

PART III--Definitions

Sec. 281. Definitions.

Subtitle D--Rule of Construction

Sec. 291. Rule of construction.
Sec. 292. Sense of Senate on the strategic importance of Article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act of
international terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in
section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a
person that is not a United States person.
(4) Iranian person.--The term ``Iranian person'' means--
(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.
(5) IRGC.--The term ``IRGC'' means Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
(6) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(7) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 3. REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL AND
ASYMMETRIC IRANIAN THREATS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH AFRICA.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of the Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence
shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a strategy for deterring
conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and threats
that directly threaten the United States and key allies in
the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
(b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a)
shall include at a minimum the following:
(1) A summary of the near- and long-term United States
objectives, plans, and means for countering Iran's
destabilizing activities, including identification of
countries that share the objective of countering Iran's
destabilizing activities.
(2) A summary of the capabilities and contributions of
individual countries to shared efforts to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities, and a summary of additional actions
or contributions that each country could take to further
contribute.
(3) An assessment of Iran's conventional force capabilities
and an assessment of Iran's plans to upgrade its conventional
force capabilities, including its acquisition, development,
and deployment of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime offensive and anti-
access or area denial capabilities.
(4) An assessment of Iran's chemical and biological weapons
capabilities and an assessment of Iranian plans to upgrade
its chemical or biological weapons capabilities.
(5) An assessment of Iran's asymmetric activities in the
region, including--
(A) the size, capabilities, and activities of the IRGC,
including the Quds Force;
(B) the size, capabilities, and activities of Iran's cyber
operations;
(C) the types and amount of support, including funding,
lethal and nonlethal contributions, and training, provided to
Hezbollah, Hamas, special groups in Iraq, the regime of
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and other
violent groups across the Middle East; and
(D) the scope and objectives of Iran's information
operations and use of propaganda.
(6) A summary of United States actions, unilaterally and in
cooperation with foreign governments, to counter
destabilizing Iranian activities, including--
(A) interdiction of Iranian lethal arms bound for groups
designated as foreign terrorist organizations under section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);
(B) Iran's interference in international commercial
shipping lanes;
(C) attempts by Iran to undermine or subvert
internationally recognized governments in the Middle East
region; and
(D) Iran's support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in
Syria, including--
(i) financial assistance, military equipment and personnel,
and other support provided to that regime; and
(ii) support and direction to other armed actors that are
not Syrian or Iranian and are acting on behalf of that
regime.
(c) Form of Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.

SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO
IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.

(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State
should continue to implement Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass
destruction delivery system proliferators and their
supporters).
(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--The President shall impose
the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any
person that the President determines, on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act--
(1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially
contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with
respect to its ballistic missile program, or any other
program in Iran for developing, deploying, or maintaining
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction,
including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess,
develop, transport, transfer, or use such capabilities;
(2) is a successor entity to a person referred to in
paragraph (1);
(3) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person
referred to in paragraph (1);
(4) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions
that would otherwise be imposed pursuant to paragraph (3);
(5) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in
paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4); or
(6) knowingly provides or attempts to provide financial,
material, technological, or other support for, or goods or
services in support of, a person referred to in paragraph
(1), (2), (3), (4) or (5).
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all
property and interests in property of any person subject to
subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State
shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to
subsection (b) that is an alien.
(d) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the
penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
act described in subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Report on Contributions to Iran's Ballistic Missile
Program.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing each person that--
(A) has, during the period specified in paragraph (2),
conducted any activity that has materially contributed to the
activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its
ballistic missile program, or any other program in Iran for
developing, deploying, or maintaining systems capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction, including any efforts
to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,
transfer, or use such capabilities;
(B) is a successor entity to a person referred to in
subparagraph (A);
(C) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person
referred to in subparagraph (A);
(D) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions
that could be imposed as a result of a relationship described
in subparagraph (C);
(E) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D); or
(F) is known or believed to have provided, or attempted to
provide, during the period specified in paragraph (2),
financial, material, technological, or other support for, or
goods or services in support of, any material contribution to
a program described in subparagraph (A) carried out by a
person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).
(2) Period specified.--The period specified in this
paragraph is--
(A) in the case of the first report submitted under
paragraph (1), the period beginning January 1, 2016, and
ending on the date the report is submitted; and
(B) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day
period preceding the submission of the report.
(3) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.

[[Page S3515]]

SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF TERRORISM-RELATED SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE IRGC.

(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The IRGC is subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive
Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking
property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system
proliferators and their supporters), the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), Executive Order 13553 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note; relating to blocking property of certain persons with
respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of
Iran), and Executive Order 13606 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking the property and suspending entry into
the United States of certain persons with respect to grave
human rights abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via
information technology).
(2) The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (in
this section referred to as the ``IRGC-QF'') is the primary
arm of the Government of Iran for executing its policy of
supporting terrorist and insurgent groups. The IRGC-QF
provides material, logistical assistance, training, and
financial support to militants and terrorist operatives
throughout the Middle East and South Asia and was designated
for the imposition of sanctions by the Secretary of Treasury
pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note;
relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions
with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support
terrorism) in October 2007 for its support of terrorism.
(3) The IRGC, not just the IRGC-QF, is responsible for
implementing Iran's international program of destabilizing
activities, support for acts of international terrorism, and
ballistic missile program.
(b) In General.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with
respect to the IRGC and foreign persons that are officials,
agents, or affiliates of the IRGC.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign
person pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting
transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism).

SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a list of each person the Secretary
determines, based on credible evidence, on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act--
(1) is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or
other gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights committed against individuals in Iran who seek--
(A) to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of
the Government of Iran; or
(B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally
recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of
religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the
rights to a fair trial and democratic elections; or
(2) acts as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign person in
a matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sanctions Described.--
(1) In general.--The President may, in accordance with the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), block all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person on the list required by
subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
paragraph (1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out paragraph (1) shall be subject to the penalties set
forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.

SEC. 7. ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS.

(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (d), the
President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection
(b) with respect to any person that the President
determines--
(1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially
contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer directly or
indirectly to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of
Iran, of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large
caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack
helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare
parts; or
(2) knowingly provides to Iran any technical training,
financial resources or services, advice, other services or
assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel
described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sanctions Described.--
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in
accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all
property and interests in property of any person subject to
subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State
shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to
subsection (a) that is an alien.
(c) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the
penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
act described in subsection (a) of that section.
(d) Exception.--The President is not required to impose
sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person for
engaging in an activity described in that subsection if the
President certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that--
(1) permitting the activity is in the national security
interest of the United States;
(2) Iran no longer presents a significant threat to the
national security of the United States and to the allies of
the United States; and
(3) the Government of Iran has ceased providing operational
or financial support for acts of international terrorism and
no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
(e) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section,
the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means a country the
government of which the Secretary of State has determined to
be a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism for purposes of--
(1) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)(1)(A)) (as continued in effect
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.));
(2) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2371(a));
(3) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2780(d)); or
(4) any other provision of law.

SEC. 8. REVIEW OF APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO
IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND ITS BALLISTIC
MISSILE PROGRAM.

(a) In General.--Not later than 5 years after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a
review of all persons on the list of specially designated
nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for
activities relating to Iran--
(1) to assess the conduct of such persons as that conduct
relates to--
(A) any activity that materially contributes to the
activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its
ballistic missile program; or
(B) support by the Government of Iran for acts of
international terrorism; and
(2) to determine the applicability of sanctions with
respect to such persons under--
(A) Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery
system proliferators and their supporters); or
(B) Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to
blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons
who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).
(b) Implementation of Sanctions.--If the President
determines under subsection (a) that sanctions under an
Executive Order specified in paragraph (2) of that subsection
are applicable with respect to a person, the President
shall--
(1) impose sanctions with respect to that person pursuant
to that Executive Order; or
(2) exercise the waiver authority provided under section
12.

SEC. 9. REPORT ON COORDINATION OF SANCTIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that includes the following:
(1) A description of each instance, during the period
specified in subsection (b)--
(A) in which the United States has imposed sanctions with
respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such
weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international
terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in
which the European Union has not imposed corresponding
sanctions; and
(B) in which the European Union has imposed sanctions with
respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such
weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international
terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in
which the United States has not imposed corresponding
sanctions.
(2) An explanation for the reason for each discrepancy
between sanctions imposed by the European Union and sanctions
imposed

[[Page S3516]]

by the United States described in subparagraphs (A) and (B)
of paragraph (1).
(b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this
subsection is--
(1) in the case of the first report submitted under
subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act and ending on the date the report is
submitted; and
(2) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day
period preceding the submission of the report.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.

SEC. 10. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on United States citizens, including
United States citizens who are also citizens of other
countries, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran that
includes--
(1) information regarding any officials of the Government
of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and
(2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has
taken to secure the swift release of those United States
citizens.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.

SEC. 11. EXCEPTIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE; RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) In General.--The following activities shall be exempt
from sanctions under sections 4, 5, 6, and 7:
(1) Any activity subject to the reporting requirements
under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3091 et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities
of the United States.
(2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such
admission is necessary to comply with United States
obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations
and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the
Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24,
1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other
applicable international obligations of the United States.
(3) The conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the
sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical
devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Iran, including engaging in a
financial transaction relating to humanitarian assistance or
for humanitarian purposes or transporting goods or services
that are necessary to carry out operations relating to
humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes.
(b) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.--A
requirement or the authority to block and prohibit all
transactions in all property and interests in property under
section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 shall not include the authority to
impose sanctions with respect to the importation of goods.
(c) Implementation.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
the President may exercise all authorities provided under
sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this Act.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act (other than
subsection (b)) shall be construed to limit the authority of
the President under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural
commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
(2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that
term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.)).
(3) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the
meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(4) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given
the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

SEC. 12. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.

(a) Case-by-Case Waiver Authority.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case
basis and for a period of not more than 180 days, a
requirement under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 to impose or
maintain sanctions with respect to a person, and may waive
the continued imposition of such sanctions, not less than 30
days after the President determines and reports to the
appropriate congressional committees that it is vital to the
national security interests of the United States to waive
such sanctions.
(2) Renewal of waivers.--The President may, on a case-by-
case basis, renew a waiver under paragraph (1) for an
additional period of not more than 180 days if, not later
than 15 days before that waiver expires, the President makes
the determination and submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a report described in paragraph (1).
(3) Successive renewal.--The renewal authority provided
under paragraph (2) may be exercised for additional
successive periods of not more than 180 days if the President
follows the procedures set forth in paragraph (2), and
submits the report described in paragraph (1), for each such
renewal.
(b) Contents of Waiver Reports.--Each report submitted
under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of sanctions
under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 with respect to a person, or
the renewal of such a waiver, shall include--
(1) a specific and detailed rationale for the determination
that the waiver is vital to the national security interests
of the United States;
(2) a description of the activity that resulted in the
person being subject to sanctions;
(3) an explanation of any efforts made by the United
States, as applicable, to secure the cooperation of the
government with primary jurisdiction over the person or the
location where the activity described in paragraph (2)
occurred in terminating or, as appropriate, penalizing the
activity; and
(4) an assessment of the significance of the activity
described in paragraph (2) in contributing to the ability of
Iran to threaten the interests of the United States or allies
of the United States, develop systems capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction, support acts of international
terrorism, or violate the human rights of any person in Iran.
(c) Effect of Report on Waiver.--If the President submits a
report under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of
sanctions under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 with respect to a
person, or the renewal of such a waiver, the President shall
not be required to impose or maintain sanctions under section
4, 5, 6, 7, or 8, as applicable, with respect to the person
described in the report during the 30-day period referred to
in subsection (a).

TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Countering Russian
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017''.

Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian
Federation

SEC. 211. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued
Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to
blocking property of certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to
impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining
democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine or
threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and
territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama
subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg.
15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons
contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order
13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of
additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine)
to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine.
(2) On December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act
of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et
seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to
impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President
determines to be entities owned or controlled by the
Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the
Russian Federation that manufacture, sell, transfer, or
otherwise provide certain defense articles into Syria.
(3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive
Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the
property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious
cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of
the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and
the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons
determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.
(4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a
Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident
Coordination, which states, ``certain cyber incidents that
have significant impacts on an entity, our national security,
or the broader economy require a unique approach to response
efforts''.
(5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex
to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the
following entities and individuals:
(A) The Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as
Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow,
Russian Federation.
(B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya
Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian
Federation.
(C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd.
Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg,
Russian Federation.
(D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow,
Russian Federation.
(E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the
Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing
Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian
Federation.
(F) Igor Valentinovich Korobov.
(G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov.
(H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.

[[Page S3517]]

(I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.
(6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States
intelligence community entitled, ``Assessing Russian
Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections'' stated,
``Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence
campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential
election.'' The assessment warns that ``Moscow will apply
lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the
U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts
worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election
processes''.

SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the President--
(1) should engage to the fullest extent possible with
partner governments with regard to closing loopholes,
including the allowance of extended prepayment for the
delivery of goods and commodities and other loopholes, in
multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the
Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of
those measures; and
(2) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce
compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the
enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation
in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber
intrusions and attacks, and human rights violators in the
Russian Federation.

PART I--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 215. SHORT TITLE.

The part may be cited as the ``Russia Sanctions Review Act
of 2017''.

SEC. 216. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO
SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.

(a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership a report that describes the
proposed action and the reasons for that action.
(2) Actions described.--
(A) In general.--An action described in this paragraph is--
(i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions
described in subparagraph (B);
(ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph
(B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an
action to waive the application of those sanctions with
respect to that person; or
(iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United
States' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
(B) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this
subparagraph are--
(i) sanctions provided for under--

(I) this title or any provision of law amended by this
title, including the Executive Orders codified under section
222;
(II) the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy,
and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901
et seq.); or
(III) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C.
8921 et seq.); and

(ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the
Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and
New York that the President ordered vacated on December 29,
2016.
(3) Description of type of action.--Each report submitted
under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in
paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the
action--
(A) is not intended to significantly alter United States
foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; or
(B) is intended to significantly alter United States
foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
(4) Inclusion of additional matter.--
(A) In general.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
that relates to an action that is intended to significantly
alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian
Federation shall include a description of--
(i) the significant alteration to United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation;
(ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national
security interests of the United States; and
(iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions
affected by the action were initially imposed.
(B) Requests from banking and financial services
committees.--The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services
of the House of Representatives may request the submission to
the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and
(iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted
under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not
intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy
with regard to the Russian Federation.
(b) Period for Review by Congress.--
(1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days
beginning on the date on which the President submits a report
under subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that
is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and
briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully
review the report; and
(B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that
is intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as
appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain
information in order to fully review the report.
(2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under
paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under
subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is
submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in
any calendar year.
(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional
review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
during the period for congressional review provided for under
paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including
any additional period for such review as applicable under the
exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not
take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with
respect to that action is enacted in accordance with
subsection (c).
(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration
of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval
relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1)
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes
both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c),
the President may not take that action for a period of 12
calendar days after the date of passage of the joint
resolution of disapproval.
(5) Limitation on actions during congressional
reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint
resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted
under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in
subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in
accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the
joint resolution, the President may not take that action for
a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the
President's veto.
(6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of
disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if
a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report
submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action
described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with
subsection (c), the President may not take that action.
(c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval Defined.--
In this subsection:
(1) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint
resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution of
either House of Congress--
(A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution
approving the President's proposal to take an action relating
to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the
Russian Federation.''; and
(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is
the following: ``Congress approves of the action relating to
the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the
Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report
submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to
________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the
appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with
a short description of the proposed action.
(2) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term ``joint
resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint resolution of
either House of Congress--
(A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution
disapproving the President's proposal to take an action
relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect
to the Russian Federation.''; and
(B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is
the following: ``Congress disapproves of the action relating
to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the
Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report
submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to
________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the
appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with
a short description of the proposed action.
(3) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days
provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any
additional period as applicable under the exception provided
in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval may be introduced--
(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader
or the minority leader; and
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority
leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority
leader's designee).
(4) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--
(A) Reporting and discharge.--If a committee of the House
of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval has been referred

[[Page S3518]]

has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days
after the date of referral, that committee shall be
discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution.
(B) Proceeding to consideration.--Beginning on the third
legislative day after each committee to which a joint
resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has
been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or
has been discharged from further consideration of the joint
resolution, it shall be in order to move to proceed to
consider the joint resolution in the House. All points of
order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not
be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to
proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall
be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption
without intervening motion. The motion shall not be
debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the
motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
(C) Consideration.--The joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval shall be considered as read.
All points of order against the joint resolution and against
its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final
passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate
equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint
resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to
reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall
not be in order.
(5) Consideration in the senate.--
(A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate
shall be--
(i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report
under section 216 A3 that is described as an action that is
not intended to significantly alter United States foreign
policy with regard to the Russian Federation; and
(ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the
joint resolution relates to a report under section 216 A3
that is described as an action that is intended to
significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect
to the Russian Federation.
(B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to which a
joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of
disapproval was referred has not reported the joint
resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral
of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged
from further consideration of the joint resolution and the
joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII
of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any
time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case
may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been
discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution
(even though a previous motion to the same effect has been
disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the
joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint
resolution (and against consideration of the joint
resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not
debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone.
A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed
to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the
decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the
rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure
relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
(E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate
of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all
debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint
resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally
divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and
the minority leader or their designees.
(6) Rules relating to senate and house of
representatives.--
(A) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before
the passage by one House of a joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval of that House, that House
receives an identical joint resolution from the other House,
the following procedures shall apply:
(i) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be
referred to a committee.
(ii) With respect to the joint resolution of the House
receiving the joint resolution from the other House--

(I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no
joint resolution had been received from the other House; but
(II) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution
of the other House.

(B) Treatment of a joint resolution of other house.--If one
House fails to introduce a joint resolution of approval or
joint resolution of disapproval, a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval of the other
House shall be entitled to expedited procedures in that House
under this subsection.
(C) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate.--If,
following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives
an identical joint resolution from the House of
Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the
appropriate Senate calendar.
(D) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of
this paragraph shall not apply in the House of
Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint
resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.
(7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This
subsection is enacted by Congress--
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such
is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively,
but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be
followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution of
approval or joint resolution of disapproval, and supersedes
other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with
such rules; and
(B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and
to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that
House.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership
Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees and leadership'' means--
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and
the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

PART II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

In this part:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
(2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that
term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.)).
(3) International financial institution.--The term
``international financial institution'' has the meaning given
that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
(4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has
actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result.
(5) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.

(a) Codification.--United States sanctions provided for in
Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to
blocking property of certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg.
15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons
contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order
13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of
additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine),
Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to
blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain
transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine),
Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to
blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and
Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking
additional steps to address the national emergency with
respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities),
as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of
this Act, including with respect to all persons sanctioned
under such Executive Orders, shall remain in effect except as
provided in subsection (b).
(b) Termination of Certain Sanctions.--Subject to section
216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions
described in subsection (a) that are imposed on a person in
connection with activity conducted by the person if the
President submits to the appropriate congressional committees
a notice that--
(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the
basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable
steps toward stopping the activity; and
(2) the President has received reliable assurances that the
person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.
(c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application under subsection (a) of
sanctions with respect to a person under Executive

[[Page S3519]]

Order 13694 or 13757 only if the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number
and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that
Government.
(d) Application of New Ukraine-related Sanctions.--The
President may waive the initial application under subsection
(a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive
Order 13660, 13661, 13662, or 13685 only if the President
submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement
to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in
Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor
agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 223. MODIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
13662.

(a) Determination That Certain Entities Are Subject to
Sanctions.--The Secretary of the Treasury may determine that
a person meets one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of
Executive Order 13662 if that person is a state-owned entity
operating in the railway, shipping, or metals and mining
sector of the economy of the Russian Federation.
(b) Modification of Directive 1 With Respect to the
Financial Services Sector of the Russian Federation
Economy.--The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control shall modify Directive 1 (as amended), dated
September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor
directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the conduct
by United States persons or persons within the United States
of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other
dealings in new debt of longer than 14 days maturity or new
equity of persons determined to be subject to the directive,
their property, or their interests in property.
(c) Modification of Directive 2 With Respect to the Energy
Sector of the Russian Federation Economy.--The Director of
the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 2
(as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office
of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any
successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits
the conduct by United States persons or persons within the
United States of all transactions in, provision of financing
for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days
maturity of persons determined to be subject to the
directive, their property, or their interests in property.
(d) Modification of Directive 4.--The Director of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 4,
dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor
directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the
provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or
indirectly, by United States persons or persons within the
United States, of goods, services (except for financial
services), or technology in support of exploration or
production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale
projects--
(1) that have the potential to produce oil;
(2) in which a Russian energy firm is involved; and
(3) that involve any person determined to be subject to the
directive or the property or interests in property of such a
person.

SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING
CYBERSECURITY.

(a) In General.--On and after the date that is 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall--
(1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with
respect to any person that the President determines--
(A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining
cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic
institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the
Russian Federation; or
(B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person
described in subparagraph (A);
(2) impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section
235 with respect to any person that the President determines
knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods
or services (except financial services) in support of, an
activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and
(3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section
4(c) of the of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22
U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President
determines knowingly provides financial services in support
of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A).
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the following:
(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted to
the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests
in property of a person determined by the President to be
subject to subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests
in property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person.
(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of visa
or other documentation.--In the case of an alien determined
by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial
of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the
alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of
any visa or other documentation of the alien.
(c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application under subsection (a) of
sanctions with respect to a person only if the President
submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number
and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that
Government.
(d) Significant Activities Undermining Cybersecurity
Defined.--In this section, the term ``significant activities
undermining cybersecurity'' includes--
(1) significant efforts--
(A) to deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an
information and communications technology system or network;
or
(B) to exfiltrate, degrade, corrupt, destroy, or release
information from such a system or network without
authorization for purposes of--
(i) conducting influence operations; or
(ii) causing a significant misappropriation of funds,
economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifications,
or financial information for commercial or competitive
advantage or private financial gain;
(2) significant destructive malware attacks; and
(3) significant denial of service activities.

SEC. 225. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL RUSSIAN
CRUDE OIL PROJECTS.

Section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014
(22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``on and after
the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President may impose'' and inserting ``on and
after the date that is 30 days after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the
President determines that it is not in the national interest
of the United States to do so,''.

SEC. 226. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN AND
OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22
U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall
impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the
national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
(B) by striking ``on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act'' and inserting ``on or after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017''; and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall
impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the
national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
(B) by striking ``on or after the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting
``on or after the date that is 30 days after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017''.

SEC. 227. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
SIGNIFICANT CORRUPTION IN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.

Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and
Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908(a))
is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``is
authorized and encouraged to'' and inserting ``shall''; and
(B) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``President determines is'' and inserting
``President determines is, on or after the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017,''; and
(ii) by inserting ``or elsewhere'' after ``in the Russian
Federation'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);
(3) in subsection (c), by striking ``The President'' and
inserting ``except as provided in subsection (d), the
President''; and
(4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application

[[Page S3520]]

of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person
only if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees--
``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement
to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in
Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor
agreements that are agreed to by the Government of
Ukraine.''.

SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS
EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--The Support for the Sovereignty,
Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act
of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end the following:

``SEC. 10. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS THAT EVADE
SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.

``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person
if the President determines that the foreign person
knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of
2017--
``(1) materially violates, attempts to violate, conspires
to violate, or causes a violation of any license, order,
regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to
any covered Executive order; or
``(2) facilitates significant deceptive or structured
transactions for or on behalf of--
``(A) any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United
States with respect to the Russian Federation; or
``(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of an
individual described in subparagraph (A).
``(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are the exercise of all powers granted to the
President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and
prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in
property of a person determined by the President to be
subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in
property are in the United States, come within the United
States, or are or come within the possession or control of a
United States person.
``(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b).
``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order issued to
carry out subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties
set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of that section.
``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection
(b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to
the appropriate congressional committees--
``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;
``(2) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section
in connection with a covered Executive order described in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (f)(1), a
certification that the Government of the Russian Federation
is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address
the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk,
Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine,
Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was
agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements
that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine; and
``(3) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section
in connection with a covered Executive order described in
subparagraphs (E) or (F) of subsection (f)(1), a
certification that the Government of the Russian Federation
has made significant efforts to reduce the number and
intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.
``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the
application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to
a person if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees--
``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination;
and
``(2) a notice that--
``(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(B) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.
``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered executive order.--The term `covered Executive
order' means any of the following:
``(A) Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating
to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the
situation in Ukraine).
``(B) Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating
to blocking property of additional persons contributing to
the situation in Ukraine).
``(C) Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating
to blocking property of additional persons contributing to
the situation in Ukraine).
``(D) Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating
to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting
certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of
Ukraine).
``(E) Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating
to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in
significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).
``(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to
taking additional steps to address the national emergency
with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled
activities).
``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' has the
meaning given such term in section 595.304 of title 31, Code
of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of the
enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017).
``(3) Structured.--The term `structured', with respect to a
transaction, has the meaning given the term `structure' in
paragraph (xx) of section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation
or ruling).

``SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES.

``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions
described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person
if the President determines that the foreign person, based on
credible information, on or after the date of the enactment
of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act
of 2017--
``(1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for
ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission
of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly
occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the
Russian Federation;
``(2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services
to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or
``(3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person
described in paragraph (1).
``(b) Sanctions Described.--
``(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted
to the President by the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary
to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of a person determined by the President
to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and
interests in property are in the United States, come within
the United States, or are or come within the possession or
control of a United States person.
``(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of
visa or other documentation.--In the case of an alien
determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a),
denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of,
the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of
any visa or other documentation of the alien.
``(c) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may
waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection
(b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to
the appropriate congressional committees--
``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made efforts to reduce serious human rights
abuses in territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled
by that Government.
``(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and
205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).
``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of
subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued
to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the
penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful
act described in subsection (a) of that section.
``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017,

[[Page S3521]]

the President may terminate the application of sanctions
under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the
President submits to the appropriate congressional
committees--
``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination;
and
``(2) a notice--
``(A) that--
``(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or
``(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis
exists for the determination by the President under
subsection (a) with respect to the person.''.
(b) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--
Section 2(2) of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity,
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22
U.S.C. 8901(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,'' before ``the Committee
on Foreign Relations''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``the Committee on
Financial Services'' before ``the Committee on Foreign
Affairs''.

SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER UKRAINE FREEDOM
SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.

(a) Sanctions Relating to Defense and Energy Sectors of the
Russian Federation.--Section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support
Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections
(h) and (i), respectively;
(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
``(g) Notifications and Certifications to Congress.--
``(1) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall notify
the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later
than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a
foreign person under subsection (a) or (b).
``(2) Termination of sanctions with respect to russian
producers, transferors, or brokers of defense articles.--
Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of
2017, the President may terminate the imposition of sanctions
under subsection (a)(2) with respect to a foreign person if
the President submits to the appropriate congressional
committees--
``(A) a notice of and justification for the termination;
and
``(B) a notice that--
``(i) the foreign person is not engaging in the activity
that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that
the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity
subject to sanctions under subsection (a)(2) in the
future.''; and
(3) in subparagraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
(b) Sanctions on Russian and Other Foreign Financial
Institutions.--Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act
of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections
(f) and (g), respectively;
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
``(e) Notification to Congress on Imposition of
Sanctions.--The President shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days
after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign financial
institution under subsection (a) or (b).''; and
(3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by
striking ``section 4(h)'' and inserting ``section 4(i)''.

SEC. 230. STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Sanctions Relating to Undermining the Peace, Security,
Stability, Sovereignty, or Territorial Integrity of
Ukraine.--Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy,
and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C.
8907) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the
application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to
a person if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a notice that--
``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.
(b) Sanctions Relating to Corruption.--Section 9 of the
Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of
Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia
Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the
application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to
a person if the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a notice that--
``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was
the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant
verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.

SEC. 231. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS
ENGAGING IN TRANSACTIONS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE
OR DEFENSE SECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--On and after the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section
235 with respect to a person the President determines
knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a
significant transaction with a person that is part of, or
operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence
sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation,
including the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal
Security Service of the Russian Federation.
(b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive
the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a)
with respect to a person only if the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number
and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that
Government.

SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--The President may impose 5 or more of the
sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person
if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an
investment described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or
provides to the Russian Federation, for the construction of
Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology,
information, or support described in subsection (c)--
(1) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or
more; or
(2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair
market value of $5,000,000 or more.
(b) Investment Described.--An investment described in this
subsection is an investment that directly and significantly
contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian
Federation to construct energy export pipelines.
(c) Goods, Services, Technology, Information, or Support
Described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or
support described in this subsection are goods, services,
technology, information, or support that could directly and
significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the
construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines by
the Russian Federation.

SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR
FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED
ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--The President shall impose 5 or more of
the sanctions described in section 235 if the President
determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of
$10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not
less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or
exceeds $10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitates
such an investment, if the investment directly and
significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian
Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that
unjustly benefits--
(1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation;
or
(2) close associates or family members of those officials.
(b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive
the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a)
with respect to a person only if the President submits to the
appropriate congressional committees--
(1) a written determination that the waiver--
(A) is in the vital national security interests of the
United States; or
(B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian
Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement
to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in
Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of
Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor
agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

SEC. 234. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS AND
RELATED MATERIEL TO SYRIA.

(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--

[[Page S3522]]

(1) In general.--The President shall impose on a foreign
person the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the
President determines that such foreign person has, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly
exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria
significant financial, material, or technological support
that contributes materially to the ability of the Government
of Syria to--
(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons or related technologies;
(B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile
capabilities;
(C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons;
(D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services,
or defense information (as such terms are defined under the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or
(E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes
of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
(2) Applicability to other foreign persons.--The sanctions
described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any
foreign person that--
(A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in
paragraph (1); or
(B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on
behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed on a
foreign person described in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of
section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to
the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions
in all property and interests in property of the foreign
person if such property and interests in property are in the
United States, come within the United States, or are or come
within the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Aliens ineligible for visas, admission, or parole.--
(A) Exclusion from the united states.--If the foreign
person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a
visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude
from the United States, the foreign person.
(B) Current visas revoked.--
(i) In general.--The issuing consular officer, the
Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or
a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa
or other entry documentation issued to the foreign person
regardless of when issued.
(ii) Effect of revocation.--A revocation under clause (i)
shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel
any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the
possession of the foreign person.
(c) Waiver.--Subject to section 216, the President may
waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with
respect to a person if the President determines that such a
waiver is in the national security interest of the United
States.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Financial, material, or technological support.--The
term ``financial, material, or technological support'' has
the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31,
Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar
regulation or ruling).
(2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' has the
meaning given such term in section 594.304 of title 31, Code
of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar
regulation or ruling).
(3) Syria.--The term ``Syria'' has the meaning given such
term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or
ruling).

SEC. 235. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.

(a) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed with
respect to a person under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a),
or 233(a) are the following:
(1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned
persons.--The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of
the United States not to give approval to the issuance of any
guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation
in the extension of credit in connection with the export of
any goods or services to the sanctioned person.
(2) Export sanction.--The President may order the United
States Government not to issue any specific license and not
to grant any other specific permission or authority to export
any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under--
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601
et seq.) (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.));
(B) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);
or
(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and
approval of the United States Government as a condition for
the export or reexport of goods or services.
(3) Loans from united states financial institutions.--The
President may prohibit any United States financial
institution from making loans or providing credits to the
sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-
month period unless the person is engaged in activities to
relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided
for such activities.
(4) Loans from international financial institutions.--The
President may direct the United States executive director to
each international financial institution to use the voice and
vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the
international financial institution that would benefit the
sanctioned person.
(5) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The following
prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if
that person is a financial institution:
(A) Prohibition on designation as primary dealer.--Neither
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the
continuation of any prior designation of, the financial
institution as a primary dealer in United States Government
debt instruments.
(B) Prohibition on service as a repository of government
funds.--The financial institution may not serve as agent of
the United States Government or serve as repository for
United States Government funds.
The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or
(B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes of subsection
(b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be
treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).
(6) Procurement sanction.--The United States Government may
not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
(7) Foreign exchange.--The President may, pursuant to such
regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned
person has any interest.
(8) Banking transactions.--The President may, pursuant to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
transfers of credit or payments between financial
institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any
interest of the sanctioned person.
(9) Property transactions.--The President may, pursuant to
such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
person from--
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring,
withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any
property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and with respect to which the sanctioned person has
any interest;
(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to such property; or
(C) conducting any transaction involving such property.
(10) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned
person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or
guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
United States person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the
sanctioned person.
(11) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may
direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United
States, any alien that the President determines is a
corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a
controlling interest in, the sanctioned person.
(12) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The
President may impose on the principal executive officer or
officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing
similar functions and with similar authorities as such
officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this
subsection.
(b) Sanctioned Person Defined.--In this section, the term
``sanctioned person'' means a person subject to sanctions
under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a).

SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

(a) Exceptions.--The provisions of this part and amendments
made by this part shall not apply with respect to the
following:
(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091
et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the
United States.
(2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such
admission is necessary to comply with United States
obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations
and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947,
and entered into force November 21, 1947, under the
Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24,
1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other
international agreements.
(b) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.--No
requirement to impose sanctions under this part or an
amendment made by this part shall include the authority to
impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(c) Waiver of Sanctions That Are Imposed.--Subject to
section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect
to a person under this part or the amendments made by this
part, the President may waive the application of those
sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is
in the national security interest of the United States.

[[Page S3523]]

(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216, the President may
terminate the application of sanctions under section 224,
231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the
President submits to the appropriate congressional
committees--
(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and
(2) a notice that--
(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the
basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable
steps toward stopping the activity; and
(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the
person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to
sanctions under this part in the future.

SEC. 237. EXCEPTION RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.

(a) In General.--This Act and the amendments made by this
Act shall not apply with respect to activities of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or the
amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize
the imposition of any sanction or other condition,
limitation, restriction, or prohibition, that directly or
indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Russian
Federation of any product or service, or the procurement of
such product or service by any contractor or subcontractor of
the United States or any other entity, relating to or in
connection with any space launch conducted for--
(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or
(2) any other non-Department of Defense customer.

SEC. 238. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part
shall be construed--
(1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use
of rocket engines for national security purposes under
section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015
(Public Law 113-291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note), as
amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1100)
and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2582); or
(2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the
Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to
in such section 1608.

PART III--REPORTS

SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a detailed report on the following:
(1) Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the
Russian Federation, including the following:
(A) An identification of the most significant senior
foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian
Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian
regime and their net worth.
(B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals
identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir
Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite.
(C) An identification of any indices of corruption with
respect to those individuals.
(D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of
those individuals and their family members (including
spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets,
investments, other business interests, and relevant
beneficial ownership information.
(E) An identification of the non-Russian business
affiliations of those individuals.
(2) Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of
the following:
(A) The emergence of Russian parastatal entities and their
role in the economy of the Russian Federation.
(B) The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of
those entities.
(C) The scope of the non-Russian business affiliations of
those entities.
(3) The exposure of key economic sectors of the United
States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal
entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities,
insurance, and real estate sectors.
(4) The likely effects of imposing debt and equity
restrictions on Russian parastatal entities, as well as the
anticipated effects of adding Russian parastatal entities to
the list of specially designated nationals and blocked
persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of
the Department of the Treasury.
(5) The potential impacts of imposing secondary sanctions
with respect to Russian oligarchs, Russian state-owned
enterprises, and Russian parastatal entities, including
impacts on the entities themselves and on the economy of the
Russian Federation, as well as on the economies of the United
States and allies of the United States.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection
(a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may
contain a classified annex.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
(2) Senior foreign political figure.--The term ``senior
foreign political figure'' has the meaning given that term in
section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or
any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS.

SEC. 243. REPORT ON ILLICIT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each
one-year period thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of the
Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing interagency efforts in the
United States to combat illicit finance relating to the
Russian Federation.
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
contain a summary of efforts by the United States to do the
following:
(1) Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit
financial flows linked to the Russian Federation if such
flows affect the United States financial system or those of
major allies of the United States.
(2) Conduct outreach to the private sector, including
information sharing efforts to strengthen compliance efforts
by entities, including financial institutions, to prevent
illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1).
(3) Engage and coordinate with allied international
partners on illicit finance, especially in Europe, to
coordinate efforts to uncover and prosecute the networks
responsible for illicit financial flows described in
paragraph (1), including examples of that engagement and
coordination.
(4) Identify foreign sanctions evaders and loopholes within
the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United
States.
(5) Expand the number of real estate geographic targeting
orders or other regulatory actions, as appropriate, to
degrade illicit financial activity relating to the Russian
Federation in relation to the financial system of the United
States.
(6) Provide support to counter those involved in illicit
finance relating to the Russian Federation across all
appropriate law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and
financial authorities of the Federal Government, including by
imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those
involved.
(7) In the case of the Department of the Treasury and the
Department of Justice, investigate or otherwise develop major
cases, including a description of those cases.
(c) Briefing.--After submitting a report under this
section, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide
briefings to the appropriate congressional committees with
respect to that report.
(d) Coordination.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall
coordinate with the Attorney General, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Secretary of State in preparing each report under
this section.
(e) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
(f) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives.
(2) Illicit finance.--The term ``illicit finance'' means
the financing of terrorism,

[[Page S3524]]

narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or
other forms of illicit financing domestically or
internationally, as defined by the President.

Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

SEC. 251. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of the Russian Federation has sought to
exert influence throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in
the former states of the Soviet Union, by providing resources
to political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups
that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors,
promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise
undermine European unity. The Government of the Russian
Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption
practices as a means toward undermining and buying influence
in European and Eurasian countries.
(2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely
eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language independent media
sector and severely curtails free and independent media
within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russian-
language media organizations that are funded and controlled
by the Government of the Russian Federation and disseminate
information within and outside of the Russian Federation
routinely traffic in anti-Western disinformation, while few
independent, fact-based media sources provide objective
reporting for Russian-speaking audiences inside or outside of
the Russian Federation.
(3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to
violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security
Assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki
August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ``Helsinki Final
Act''), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, of
which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal
annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing
destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.
(4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to
ignore the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement
relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian
Federation troops, free access by humanitarian groups to the
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the
conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.
(5) The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to
comply with the terms of the Minsk Agreement to address the
ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk,
Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine,
Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol,
which was agreed to on September 5, 2014.
(6) The Government of the Russian Federation is--
(A) in violation of the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered
into force June 1, 1988 (commonly known as the ``INF
Treaty''); and
(B) failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty on
Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into
force January 1, 2002 (commonly known as the ``Open Skies
Treaty'').

SEC. 252. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of the Russian Federation bears
responsibility for the continuing violence in Eastern
Ukraine, including the death on April 24, 2017, of Joseph
Stone, a citizen of the United States working as a monitor
for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;
(2) the President should call on the Government of the
Russian Federation--
(A) to withdraw all of its forces from the territories of
Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova;
(B) to return control of the borders of those territories
to their respective governments; and
(C) to cease all efforts to undermine the popularly elected
governments of those countries;
(3) the Government of the Russian Federation has applied,
and continues to apply, to the countries and peoples of
Georgia and Ukraine, traditional uses of force, intelligence
operations, and influence campaigns, which represent clear
and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;
(4) in response, the countries of Europe and Eurasia should
redouble efforts to build resilience within their
institutions, political systems, and civil societies;
(5) the United States supports the institutions that the
Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine,
including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
European Union;
(6) a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization is critical
to maintaining peace and security in Europe and Eurasia;
(7) the United States should continue to work with the
European Union as a partner against aggression by the
Government of the Russian Federation, coordinating aid
programs, development assistance, and other counter-Russian
efforts;
(8) the United States should encourage the establishment of
a commission for media freedom within the Council of Europe,
modeled on the Venice Commission regarding rule of law
issues, that would be chartered to provide governments with
expert recommendations on maintaining legal and regulatory
regimes supportive of free and independent media and an
informed citizenry able to distinguish between fact-based
reporting, opinion, and disinformation;
(9) in addition to working to strengthen the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the European Union, the United States
should work with the individual countries of Europe and
Eurasia--
(A) to identify vulnerabilities to aggression,
disinformation, corruption, and so-called hybrid warfare by
the Government of the Russian Federation;
(B) to establish strategic and technical plans for
addressing those vulnerabilities;
(C) to ensure that the financial systems of those countries
are not being used to shield illicit financial activity by
officials of the Government of the Russian Federation or
individuals in President Vladimir Putin's inner circle who
have been enriched through corruption;
(D) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption by
Russian actors; and
(E) to work toward full compliance with the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (commonly referred to as
the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'') of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development; and
(10) the President of the United States should use the
authority of the President to impose sanctions under--
(A) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of
2012 (title IV of Public Law 112-208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note);
and
(B) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
(subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C.
2656 note).

SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

The United States, consistent with the principle of ex
injuria jus non oritur, supports the policy known as the
``Stimson Doctrine'' and thus does not recognize territorial
changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions
and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern
Ukraine, and Transnistria.

SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND
EURASIA.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized
to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund
$250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.
(b) Use of Funds.--Amounts in the Countering Russian
Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement,
prioritized in the following order and subject to the
availability of funds, the following goals:
(1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and
electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following
countries:
(A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of
State determines--
(i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation;
and
(ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to
aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of
the United States.
(B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement
process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the
European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.
(2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and
otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors
general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).
(3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability
caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of
Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
(4) To improve participatory legislative processes and
legal education, political transparency and competition, and
compliance with international obligations in the countries
described in paragraph (1).
(5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and
other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence
and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat
corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and
operate freely in all regions in the countries described in
paragraph (1).
(6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the
functions specified in section 1287(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law
114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of
recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering
propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments,
in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant
Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
State.
(c) Revision of Activities for Which Amounts May Be Used.--
The Secretary of State may modify the goals described in
subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising
such a goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate
congressional committees of the revision.
(d) Implementation.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, acting
through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe
and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the
Support for East European Democracy

[[Page S3525]]

(SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the
Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open
Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), and in
consultation with the Administrator for the United States
Agency for International Development, the Director of the
Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board
of Governors, and the heads of other relevant Federal
agencies, coordinate and carry out activities to achieve the
goals described in subsection (b).
(2) Method.--Activities to achieve the goals described in
subsection (b) shall be carried out through--
(A) initiatives of the United States Government;
(B) Federal grant programs such as the Information Access
Fund; or
(C) nongovernmental or international organizations, such as
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the
National Endowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust, the
Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague Civil Society Centre,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, the European Endowment
for Democracy, and related organizations.
(3) Report on implementation.--
(A) In general.--Not later than April 1 of each year, the
Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United
States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs
and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in
subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.
(B) Elements.--Each report required by subparagraph (A)
shall include, with respect to each program or activity
described in that subparagraph--
(i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;
(ii) the goal described in subsection (b) to which the
program or activity relates; and
(iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.
(e) Coordination With Global Partners.--
(1) In general.--In order to maximize cost efficiency,
eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals
described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall
ensure coordination with--
(A) the European Union and its institutions;
(B) the governments of countries that are members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and
(C) international organizations and quasi-governmental
funding entities that carry out programs and activities that
seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).
(2) Report by secretary of state.--Not later than April 1
of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
(A) the amount of funding provided to each country referred
to in subsection (b) by--
(i) the European Union or its institutions;
(ii) the government of each country that is a member of the
European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
(iii) international organizations and quasi-governmental
funding entities that carry out programs and activities that
seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b); and
(B) an assessment of whether the funding described in
subparagraph (A) is commensurate with funding provided by the
United States for those goals.
(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to apply to or limit United States foreign
assistance not provided using amounts available in the
Countering Russian Influence Fund.
(g) Ensuring Adequate Staffing for Governance Activities.--
In order to ensure that the United States Government is
properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of
law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and
other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in
subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall establish a
pilot program for Foreign Service officer positions focused
on governance and anticorruption activities in such
countries.

SEC. 255. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED AND FUNDED
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that includes a description of media
organizations that are controlled and funded by the
Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated
entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian
Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based
television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.
(b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.

SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS
IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.

(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on funds provided by, or funds the use of
which was directed by, the Government of the Russian
Federation or any Russian person with the intention of
influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any
country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year,
including through direct support to any political party,
candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organization,
or civic organization.
(b) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a
classified annex.
(c) Russian Person Defined.--In this section, the term
``Russian person'' means--
(1) an individual who is a citizen or national of the
Russian Federation; or
(2) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian
Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
Government of the Russian Federation.

SEC. 257. UKRANIAN ENERGY SECURITY.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States--
(1) to support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its
sovereign and territorial integrity;
(2) to condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts
by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in
violation of its obligations and international commitments;
(3) to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by
the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of
any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of
military force;
(4) to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from
further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other
independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the
Caucuses;
(5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory oversight
and operations in Ukraine's energy sector, including the
establishment and empowerment of an independent regulatory
organization;
(6) to encourage and support fair competition, market
liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine's energy sector;
(7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners
in Europe reduce their dependence on Russian energy
resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of
the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce,
intimidate, and influence other countries;
(8) to work with European Union member states and European
Union institutions to promote energy security through
developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that
provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;
(9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given
its detrimental impacts on the European Union's energy
security, gas market development in Central and Eastern
Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and
(10) that the United States Government should prioritize
the export of United States energy resources in order to
create American jobs, help United States allies and partners,
and strengthen United States foreign policy.
(b) Plan To Promote Energy Security in Ukraine.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development and the Secretary of Energy, shall
work with the Government of Ukraine to develop a plan to
increase energy security in Ukraine, increase the amount of
energy produced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine's reliance on
energy imports from the Russian Federation.
(2) Elements.--The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall
include strategies for market liberalization, effective
regulation and oversight, supply diversification, energy
reliability, and energy efficiency, such as through
supporting--
(A) the promotion of advanced technology and modern
operating practices in Ukraine's oil and gas sector;
(B) modern geophysical and meteorological survey work as
needed followed by international tenders to help attract
qualified investment into exploration and development of
areas with untapped resources in Ukraine;
(C) a broadening of Ukraine's electric power transmission
interconnection with Europe;
(D) the strengthening of Ukraine's capability to maintain
electric power grid stability and reliability;
(E) independent regulatory oversight and operations of
Ukraine's gas market and electricity sector;
(F) the implementation of primary gas law including
pricing, tariff structure, and legal regulatory
implementation;
(G) privatization of government owned energy companies
through credible legal frameworks and a transparent process
compliant with international best practices;
(H) procurement and transport of emergency fuel supplies,
including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;
(I) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning,
crisis response, and public outreach;
(J) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of
fuel supplies;
(K) repair of power generating or power transmission
equipment or facilities; and
(L) improved building energy efficiency and other measures
designed to reduce energy demand in Ukraine.
(3) Reports.--
(A) Implementation of ukraine freedom support act of 2014
provisions.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment

[[Page S3526]]

of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the
status of implementing the provisions required under section
7(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C.
8926(c)), including detailing the plans required under that
section, the level of funding that has been allocated to and
expended for the strategies set forth under that section, and
progress that has been made in implementing the strategies
developed pursuant to that section.
(B) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report detailing the plan
developed under paragraph (1), the level of funding that has
been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth
in paragraph (2), and progress that has been made in
implementing the strategies.
(C) Briefings.--The Secretary of State, or a designee of
the Secretary, shall brief the appropriate congressional
committees not later than 30 days after the submission of
each report under subparagraph (B). In addition, the
Department of State shall make relevant officials available
upon request to brief the appropriate congressional
committees on all available information that relates directly
or indirectly to Ukraine or energy security in Eastern
Europe.
(D) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
paragraph, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(i) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate; and
(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) Supporting Efforts of Countries in Europe and Eurasia
To Decrease Their Dependence on Russian Sources of Energy.--
(1) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(A) The Government of the Russian Federation uses its
strong position in the energy sector as leverage to
manipulate the internal politics and foreign relations of the
countries of Europe and Eurasia.
(B) This influence is based not only on the Russian
Federation's oil and natural gas resources, but also on its
state-owned nuclear power and electricity companies.
(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the United States should assist the efforts of the
countries of Europe and Eurasia to enhance their energy
security through diversification of energy supplies in order
to lessen dependencies on Russian Federation energy resources
and state-owned entities; and
(B) the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation should play key roles
in supporting critical energy projects that contribute to
that goal.
(3) Use of countering russian influence fund to provide
technical assistance.--Amounts in the Countering Russian
Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to
provide technical advice to countries described in subsection
(b)(1) of such section designed to enhance energy security
and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Federation
sources.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Department of State a total of
$30,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to carry out the
strategies set forth in subsection (b)(2) and other
activities under this section related to the promotion of
energy security in Ukraine.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as affecting the responsibilities required and
authorities provided under section 7 of the Ukraine Freedom
Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926).

SEC. 258. TERMINATION.

The provisions of this subtitle shall terminate on the date
that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 259. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle, the term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on
Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

PART I--NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILLICIT
FINANCING

SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

(a) In General.--The President, acting through the
Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of National Intelligence, and the appropriate
Federal banking agencies and Federal functional regulators,
develop a national strategy for combating the financing of
terrorism and related forms of illicit finance.
(b) Transmittal to Congress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive national
strategy developed in accordance with subsection (a).
(2) Updates.--Not later than January 31, 2020, and January
31, 2022, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees updated versions of the national
strategy submitted under paragraph (1).
(c) Separate Presentation of Classified Material.--Any part
of the national strategy that involves information that is
properly classified under criteria established by the
President shall be submitted to Congress separately in a
classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking
member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as
a briefing at an appropriate level of security.

SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the
following:
(1) Evaluation of existing efforts.--An assessment of the
effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is
currently addressing the highest levels of risk of various
forms of illicit finance, including those identified in the
documents entitled ``2015 National Money Laundering Risk
Assessment'' and ``2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk
Assessment'', published by the Department of the Treasury and
a description of how the strategy is integrated into, and
supports, the broader counter terrorism strategy of the
United States.
(2) Goals, objectives, and priorities.--A comprehensive,
research-based, long-range, quantifiable discussion of goals,
objectives, and priorities for disrupting and preventing
illicit finance activities within and transiting the
financial system of the United States that outlines
priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects
of illicit finance.
(3) Threats.--An identification of the most significant
illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United
States.
(4) Reviews and proposed changes.--Reviews of enforcement
efforts, relevant regulations and relevant provisions of law
and, if appropriate, discussions of proposed changes
determined to be appropriate to ensure that the United States
pursues coordinated and effective efforts at all levels of
government, and with international partners of the United
States, in the fight against illicit finance.
(5) Detection and prosecution initiatives.--A description
of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and
prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure
that--
(A) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data
collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the
efforts described in this section be available in a timely
fashion to--
(i) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and
(ii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the
International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial
institutions to assist the financial institutions in efforts
to comply with laws aimed at curbing illicit finance; and
(B) appropriate efforts are undertaken to ensure that
Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and
preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly
available data in furtherance of this effort.
(6) The role of the private financial sector in prevention
of illicit finance.--A discussion of ways to enhance
partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal
departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and
detection of illicit finance, including--
(A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at
stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the
effectiveness of such efforts; and
(B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and
to adopt on an industry-wide basis more effective policies.
(7) Enhancement of intergovernmental cooperation.--A
discussion of ways to combat illicit finance by enhancing--
(A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State,
and local officials, including State regulators, State and
local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and
(B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of
countries and with and between multinational institutions
with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the
Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units.
(8) Trend analysis of emerging illicit finance threats.--A
discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance,
including evolving forms of value transfer such as so-called
cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer,
telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any
other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.
(9) Budget priorities.--A multiyear budget plan that
identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully
execute the full range of missions called for in this
section.
(10) Technology enhancements.--An analysis of current and
developing ways to leverage technology to improve the
effectiveness

[[Page S3527]]

of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism and other forms
of illicit finance, including better integration of open-
source data.

PART II--ENHANCING ANTITERRORISM TOOLS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY

SEC. 271. IMPROVING ANTITERROR FINANCE MONITORING OF FUNDS
TRANSFERS.

(a) Study.--
(1) In general.--To improve the ability of the Department
of the Treasury to better track cross-border fund transfers
and identify potential financing of terrorist or other forms
of illicit finance, the Secretary shall carry out a study to
assess--
(A) the potential efficacy of requiring banking regulators
to establish a pilot program to provide technical assistance
to depository institutions and credit unions that wish to
provide account services to money services businesses serving
individuals in Somalia;
(B) whether such a pilot program could be a model for
improving the ability of United States persons to make
legitimate funds transfers through transparent and easily
monitored channels while preserving strict compliance with
the Bank Secrecy Act (Public Law 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114) and
related controls aimed at stopping money laundering and the
financing of terrorism; and
(C) consistent with current legal requirements regarding
confidential supervisory information, the potential impact of
allowing money services businesses to share certain State
examination information with depository institutions and
credit unions, or whether another appropriate mechanism could
be identified to allow a similar exchange of information to
give the depository institutions and credit unions a better
understanding of whether an individual money services
business is adequately meeting its anti-money laundering and
counter-terror financing obligations to combat money
laundering, the financing of terror, or related illicit
finance.
(2) Public input.--The Secretary should solicit and
consider public input as appropriate in developing the study
required under subsection (a).
(b) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that
contains all findings and determinations made in carrying out
the study required under subsection (a).

SEC. 272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING INTELLIGENCE.

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary, acting
through the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Crimes, should intensify work with foreign partners to help
the foreign partners develop intelligence analytic
capacities, in a financial intelligence unit, finance
ministry, or other appropriate agency, that are--
(1) commensurate to the threats faced by the foreign
partner; and
(2) designed to better integrate intelligence efforts with
the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
regimes of the foreign partner.

SEC. 273. EXAMINING THE COUNTER-TERROR FINANCING ROLE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IN EMBASSIES.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives a report that contains--
(1) a list of the United States embassies in which a full-
time Department of the Treasury financial attache is
stationed and a description of how the interests of the
Department of the Treasury relating to terrorist financing
and money laundering are addressed (via regional attaches or
otherwise) at United States embassies where no such attaches
are present;
(2) a list of the United States embassies at which the
Department of the Treasury has assigned a technical
assistance advisor from the Office of Technical Assistance of
the Department of the Treasury;
(3) an overview of how Department of the Treasury financial
attaches and technical assistance advisors assist in efforts
to counter illicit finance, to include money laundering,
terrorist financing, and proliferation financing; and
(4) an overview of patterns, trends, or other issues
identified by the Department of the Treasury and whether
resources are sufficient to address these issues.

SEC. 274. INCLUSION OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

(a) In General.--Section 101(c)(1) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(c)(1)) is amended by inserting
``the Secretary of the Treasury,'' before ``and such other
officers''.
(b) Rule of Construction.--The amendment made by subsection
(a) may not be construed to authorize the National Security
Council to have a professional staff level that exceeds the
limitation set forth under section 101(e)(3) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(e)(3)).

SEC. 275. INCLUSION OF ALL FUNDS.

(a) In General.--Section 5326 of title 31, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in the heading of such section, by striking ``coin and
currency'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``subtitle and'' and inserting ``subtitle
or to''; and
(B) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``United States coins
or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the
Secretary may describe in such order)'' and inserting ``funds
(as the Secretary may describe in such order),''; and
(3) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``coins or currency
(or monetary instruments)'' and inserting ``funds''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``coins or currency (or
such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe
in the regulation or order)'' and inserting ``funds (as the
Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for chapter
53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended in the item
relating to section 5326 by striking ``coin and currency''.

PART III--DEFINITIONS

SEC. 281. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle--
(1) the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed
Services, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security,
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
(2) the term ``appropriate Federal banking agencies'' has
the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);
(3) the term ``Bank Secrecy Act'' means--
(A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 1829b);
(B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C.
1951 et seq.); and
(C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States
Code;
(4) the term ``Federal functional regulator'' has the
meaning given that term in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809);
(5) the term ``illicit finance'' means the financing of
terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money
laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically
or internationally, as defined by the President;
(6) the term ``money services business'' has the meaning
given the term under section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of
Federal Regulations;
(7) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the
Treasury; and
(8) the term ``State'' means each of the several States,
the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of
the United States.

Subtitle D--Rule of Construction

SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title
(other than sections 216 and 236(b)) shall be construed to
limit the authority of the President under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

SEC. 292. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF
ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The principle of collective defense of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is immortalized in
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which members
pledge that ``an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all''.
(2) For almost 7 decades, the principle of collective
defense has effectively served as a strategic deterrent for
the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and provided stability throughout the world, strengthening
the security of the United States and all 28 other member
nations.
(3) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in
New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the Alliance agreed
to invoke Article 5 for the first time, affirming its
commitment to collective defense.
(4) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization have made historic contributions and sacrifices
while combating terrorism in Afghanistan through the
International Security Assistance Force and the Resolute
Support Mission.
(5) The recent attacks in the United Kingdom underscore the
importance of an international alliance to combat hostile
nation states and terrorist groups.
(6) At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, the member countries
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided that all
countries that are members of NATO would spend an amount
equal to 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense
by 2024.

[[Page S3528]]

(7) Collective defense unites the 29 members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, each committing to protecting
and supporting one another from external adversaries, which
bolsters the North Atlantic Alliance.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
(1) to express the vital importance of Article 5 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, the charter of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, as it continues to serve as a critical
deterrent to potential hostile nations and terrorist
organizations;
(2) to remember the first and only invocation of Article 5
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of the
United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001;
(3) to affirm that the United States remains fully
committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will
honor its obligations enshrined in Article 5; and
(4) to condemn any threat to the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, freedom, or democracy of any country that is a
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

Amendment No. 255

Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
title amendment at the desk be agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 255) was agreed to, as follows:

Amend the title so as to read:
``An Act to Provide Congressional Review and to Counter
Iranian and Russian Governments' Aggression.''

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