[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 102 (Thursday, June 15, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3505-S3528]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         COUNTERING IRAN'S DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES ACT OF 2017

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of S. 722, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 722) to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in 
     relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for 
     acts of international terrorism, and violations of human 
     rights, and for other purposes.

  Pending:

       Corker (for Graham) amendment No. 240, to reaffirm the 
     strategic importance of Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty to the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization and its contribution to maintaining stability 
     throughout the world.
       Gardner modified amendment No. 250, to provide an exception 
     for activities of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 11 
a.m. will be equally divided between the two leaders or their 
designees.


                   Recognition of the Majority Leader

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.


prayers for the Victims of the Congressional Baseball Practice Shooting

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, this morning, the Senate continues to 
send its prayers to all the victims of yesterday's horrific shooting. 
We know our House colleagues are all thinking about their colleague, 
Majority Whip Scalise. It has been an immensely difficult 24 hours for 
all the victims, including Matt Mika, who remains in ICU, Zach Barth, 
and, of course, Capitol Police Officers Crystal Griner and David 
Bailey. Those officers didn't back down when faced with this threat. 
Instead, as the Capitol Police always do, they put themselves in harm's 
way to help protect others. Without them, we know so many more would 
have been injured.
  So we want to continue to express our gratitude to all those who 
graciously put their lives on the line to keep the Capitol community 
safe. In doing so, we are also reminded of the bravery of our 
colleagues on the field yesterday--those who stepped in to help friends 
who had been injured as they waited for first responders to arrive. I 
think it says something about the character of those people as well.
  The events of yesterday were devastating, and we know it will take 
time to heal. But for now, the members of the congressional baseball 
team have made the decision to go forward with tonight's game, which 
will be played for charity. I know we will be thinking about each of 
them as they take the field tonight.
  Mr. President, the Senate today will take a final vote on the 
bipartisan first step to hold Iran and Russia accountable. This follows 
overwhelmingly bipartisan action yesterday to approve the Russia 
sanctions amendment, an effort that would not have been possible 
without the good work of our Foreign Relations Committee chairman, 
Senator Corker, and our Banking chair, Senator Crapo, and their ranking 
members.
  After 8 years of failed foreign policy under the Obama 
administration, 8 years of following the Obama administration's 
preferred strategy of drawing down both our forces and our commitments, 
we must take a stronger stance in deterring Iran and holding its regime 
accountable for its actions and addressing Russia's years-long pattern 
of provocations.
  These sanctions, which are just one of our foreign policy tools, will 
only work as part of a broader effort to rebuild our military force 
structure and combat readiness in order to send a strong signal to 
friend and foe alike. The United States should no longer stand by and 
allow threats like these to go unaddressed.
  When the administration completes its series of strategic reviews, I 
will

[[Page S3506]]

look forward to hearing from the President and his advisers their 
recommendations for countering Iran's malign conduct across the Middle 
East and their recommendations for countering Russia's persistent 
efforts to undermine NATO.
  As I said earlier this week, this Iran and Russia sanctions agreement 
reflects good bipartisan work. I want to thank Senators on both sides 
of the aisle for coming together to codify and strengthen existing 
sanctions. Let's come together again now and pass these sanctions later 
this morning.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, have you announced the business for the 
day?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have laid down the business.
  Mr. DURBIN. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                                  DACA

  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, today is the fifth anniversary of the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program, known as DACA. DACA 
provides temporary legal status to immigrant students who arrived in 
the United States as children and infants, if they register with the 
government, pay a fee, and pass a criminal background check.
  The program is based on the DREAM Act, a piece of legislation I 
introduced 16 years ago in 2001. That legislation gave undocumented 
students who grew up in this country a chance to earn a path to legal 
status and citizenship. These young people have come to be known as 
DREAMers. What used to be a word reserved for rock-and-roll groups is 
now a word that has become part of our common language to describe an 
immigration challenge and opportunity.
  These DREAMers came to the United States as children. They are 
American in every way except for their legal immigration status. We 
have already invested a lot of money in these kids. We educated them. 
We made them part of this country, and it makes no sense to squander 
their talents by deporting them at this moment in their lives.
  In April 2010, I sent a letter to President Obama. Dick Lugar, the 
Republican Senator from Indiana, joined me. On a bipartisan basis, we 
said to President Obama: Stop deporting these young kids. They did 
nothing wrong. Their parents made the decision to come here. Give them 
a chance. The President responded. It is now clear the DACA Program he 
created by Executive order has been a great success. More than 780,000 
DREAMers have come forward and received DACA protection and status that 
has allowed them to contribute more fully to this country as students, 
as teachers, as nurses, as engineers, as entrepreneurs.
  A recent study by the Center for American Progress found that ending 
DACA--saying to these 780,000 young people they are no longer part of 
America--would cost us. It would cost our economy over $400 billion in 
gross domestic product over the next 10 years. These are productive 
citizens doing good things for America. I should take that back. They 
are not citizens yet. They are productive people doing good things for 
America whom I want to make citizens if the DREAM Act becomes law.
  I have many differences with President Trump on immigration. For 
example, the President's January 25 Executive order makes up to 8 
million immigrants priorities for deportation, and seeks to create a 
deportation force by tripling the number of immigration agents. This 
ignores the reality that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants 
are law-abiding individuals who make important economic contributions 
to this country, and have deep roots in the United States.
  I am grateful, and I say that publicly. I have said it before. I am 
grateful President Trump has decided to keep the DACA Program in place. 
Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly and the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service Director nominee, Francis Cissna, have promised me 
personally and publicly that they will maintain the existing guidelines 
for the DACA Program. I appreciate this commitment. I intend to hold 
them to it.
  Congress also has an obligation to do its job. We ought to do 
something we rarely do in the U.S. Senate--pass legislation, fix our 
broken immigration system. Think about this: On June 27, 2013--4 years 
ago--the Senate, on a bipartisan basis, passed comprehensive 
immigration reform by a vote of 68 to 32, better than 2 to 1. I was 
glad to be part of the Gang of 8 Democratic and Republican Senators who 
worked for months on the bill that passed by this margin. It 
strengthened border security, protected American workers, and it 
established a tough but fair path to citizenship for 11 million 
undocumented people in this country.
  Unfortunately, the Republican majority of the House of 
Representatives would not debate it, would not consider it, would not 
bring it for a vote, and it died in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
If they had done their job, their work, it would have passed with a 
bipartisan majority. President Obama would have signed it into law. I 
might not be standing here today talking about this issue.
  Over the years, I have come to the floor of the Senate to tell story 
after story about DREAMers, the young immigrant students who grew up in 
this country. These stories put a human face on the DACA Program and 
the DREAM legislation. They show that immigration makes our country 
stronger.
  Today, I want to say a word about Gissel Escobedo. This is Gissel. 
She came to the United States at the age of 3. Her family emigrated 
from Mexico. She grew up in my home State of Illinois, in the town of 
Cicero. She was an honors student in high school. She attended their 
gifted program. She had a big responsibility personally. From a young 
age, she was one of the primary caregivers for her brother who suffers 
from severe autism. During the little spare time she had, Gissel was a 
volunteer in her community, helping organizations provide care for 
children with autism.
  As an undocumented student though, Gissel was not eligible for any 
Federal assistance to go to college, but as a result of her academic 
achievements in high school, she received a private scholarship to 
attend the University of Illinois at Chicago. As a college student, 
Gissel was a writing tutor and a leader in student organizations for 
future teachers. In 2010, she graduated from the University of Illinois 
Chicago and the College of Education with a degree in elementary 
education. After the graduation ceremony, Gissel received a Dean's 
Merit Award. She delivered the graduation speech for her class.
  She wanted to start using her degree as an elementary school teacher, 
but because she was undocumented, that wasn't possible. Instead, she 
continued her education and earned a master's degree at the University 
of Illinois. She was accepted into a disability leadership program as a 
family advocate.
  Then, in 2012, the world changed for the better for Gissel. President 
Obama established the DACA Program. She immediately applied for DACA. 
Then, in 2013, she completed her master's degree and became an 
elementary school teacher. For the last 4 years, Gissel has been a 
teacher in the Berwyn South School District. Last year, she was awarded 
a certificate of achievement for her leadership as one of two teachers 
to implement the first-ever dual-language program in the district.
  Gissel sent me a letter. I would like to read part of it as part of 
the Record. Here is what she said:

       DACA has enabled me to become a meaningful member of 
     society by opening doors that would have otherwise not been 
     accessible. DACA recipients, like myself, are more than just 
     a policy. My hope is that when people listen to our stories, 
     they will notice the kind of individuals that we are and the 
     kind of contributions we make--not only to the economy, but 
     to our society.

  I reflect on that paragraph to think about this young woman, the 
challenges she has faced within her family, and challenges imposed by 
the fact that she was undocumented. She has never lost sight of her 
commitment to her family, to her disabled sibling, and to many others 
in her community.

[[Page S3507]]

  Now she wants to be a teacher. Wouldn't you be proud and honored to 
have your child in a classroom with someone with Gissel's master's 
degree and values? I certainly would. Gissel and other DREAMers have so 
much to give to the United States, but without DACA and without the 
DREAM Act, Gissel would be deported back to Mexico--a country she 
hasn't lived in since she was 3 years old.
  Will America be a stronger country if we send away people like 
Gissel, if we deport them and say we don't need them in our future? Of 
course not. The answer is clear. Gissel will make America a better 
place. Today we celebrate the DACA Program, which has given Gissel and 
hundreds of thousands of other DREAMers the chance to finally come out 
of the shadows, but we also recognize DACA as a temporary solution.
  Ultimately, Congress--and especially the Senate--must step up and 
show leadership here; make certain that we address the failings and 
weaknesses of our broken immigration system; say to the 780,000 
protected by DACA that you stepped forward, paid your fee, submitted 
yourself to a background check, and have been given a temporary 
opportunity to be part of America. Now it is our job to translate that 
into a permanent opportunity for these young people to make America a 
better place.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.


                   Recognition of the Minority Leader

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.


                        Thanking Senator Durbin

  Mr. SCHUMER. First, I thank my friend and colleague for his 
outstanding words on DACA. No one has fought more for the DACA kids 
than he has, not just in the last year but over the last decade. The 
fact that so many of them are here is, in good part, due to his great 
work and effort. Thank you.


  Thoughts and Prayers for the Victims of the Congressional Baseball 
                           Practice Shooting

  Mr. President, we are still all a bit shaken by the horrors of 
yesterday's shooting. It was a senseless act of violence, made even 
more chilling by the circumstances at a baseball practice for a 
bipartisan charity event. I understand that Representative Scalise is 
still in critical condition following surgery last night. When we hear 
the word ``critical'' attached to his condition, it sends shivers down 
our spines. We hope and pray for a quick and full recovery. I know that 
all of his House colleagues are wishing him well right now, and I want 
him to know his friends in the Senate do as well.
  The same goes for the other four who were injured in the attack, 
including two members of our Capitol Police Force. Our thoughts and 
prayers go with them as well. We remain grateful for their service and 
bravery and for the service and bravery of all of our Capitol police 
officers. Their presence at the field yesterday--the presence of those 
two Capitol police officers at the field yesterday prevented a bad 
situation from getting worse and undoubtedly saved lives. Had the two 
brave police officers not acted or if they had not been there, it might 
well have been a massacre.
  We would all be wise to reflect on the importance of civility in our 
Nation's politics this morning. We disagree vehemently at times in 
Congress and folks out in the country do, too, but the level of 
nastiness, vitriol, and hate that has seeped into our politics must be 
excised. Let us all strive at all times--whatever our disagreements--to 
respect those who disagree with us, to seek a greater understanding of 
them, to walk in their moccasins--as Native Americans have always said. 
Let us strive always to conduct our politics with civility.
  I was heartened to hear that the congressional baseball game will 
still be played this evening. Let it be a symbol that hate and violence 
do not cast too long or too great a shadow, that we can and will come 
together this evening, and the game will go on. I will be going to the 
game with the three congressional leaders as a show of solidarity.
  Mr. President, last evening, the Senate showed it can come together. 
Last night, we voted, in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion, to 
strengthen a package of sanctions against Russia. It was the product of 
diligent weeks of bipartisan negotiations. I saw the Senator from 
Maryland behind me a few minutes ago. He deserves lots of credit, as do 
the Senators from Ohio, Tennessee, and Idaho. The final result is a 
very good one for our country because yesterday the U.S. Senate said to 
Mr. Putin, in no uncertain terms, that when he violates international 
norms and interferes with our election, he will not escape reproach.
  Not only did we pass a new round of tough sanctions for Russia's 
meddling in our election, we codified existing sanctions into law, 
making them harder to lift, and we moved to make the Congress--not the 
President--the final arbiter of sanctions relief when necessary. Any 
ideas of the President that he can lift sanctions on his own, for any 
reason, are dashed by this legislation.
  The House of Representatives should take notice that 97 Senators 
voted in favor of this package. I hope Leader Ryan will move with the 
same haste to pass this package of sanctions through the House. I hope 
the President will sign it. The months-long effort to forge bipartisan 
consensus on Russia sanctions--an issue that gets to the vital 
interests of our country, the wellspring of our democracy--gives me 
hope that Democrats and Republicans can come together and work together 
on a number of big issues this year.
  There are several issues coming before this body soon where we can 
come together: another budget--passing another budget; reauthorizing 
flood insurance and children's health insurance; raising the debt 
ceiling. Each of those issues will, by definition, demand bipartisan 
effort.
  A lesson that all of us have learned here in the Senate is that 
legislation is made better and much more likely to pass when both 
parties are involved in crafting it.
  I have noticed the media has been questioning all morning why 
Congress isn't more bipartisan. We should be. But when the Russia 
sanctions agreement passes and the budget deal passes, both major 
bipartisan efforts, they are proof that we can get things done 
together. If those agreements were given a little more recognition by 
the media--the fact that we can at times, at least, work in a 
bipartisan way--that would help. For too many of us on both sides of 
the aisle, it seems as though when there is divisiveness, it gets far 
more attention in the media than when there is comity between the 
parties.


                         Healthcare Legislation

  Mr. President, finally, I would suggest to my colleagues that the 
most immediate place where we can translate the rhetoric calling for us 
to come together into reality is on healthcare. A goal many of us share 
on both sides of the aisle is to improve the law, bring costs down for 
consumers, stabilize the marketplace, and make it easier for older 
Americans to afford the ever-rising out-of-pocket costs of prescription 
drugs.
  I would conclude by stating that we can make the rhetoric of 
bipartisanship not empty by both parties coming together and working 
together on healthcare. We have shown thus far in this Congress with 
the passage of the budget and Russia sanctions that significant 
legislation can best be served by bipartisanship. Opening up the 
process and having us all come together on healthcare would be a very 
good, concrete reaffirmation of bipartisanship and would translate the 
rhetoric--not bad at all--that we have heard here today into reality.
  In conclusion, the rhetoric about bipartisanship can be strengthened. 
Hopefully healthcare is a place where we can strengthen it, by opening 
up the process, having hearings, and having open discussion.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time during the 
quorum calls on S. 722 be charged equally to both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Strange). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                     Amendment No. 250, as Modified

  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the Senator from

[[Page S3508]]

Alabama is presiding over this very important debate because one of the 
most important issues to both of our States, Colorado and Alabama, is 
the economy and the economic well-being of our great country. The 
amendment that I will be discussing today goes to the very heart of our 
opportunities in space, our opportunities in innovation, our 
opportunities to ensure that we have the most reliable information as 
it relates to weather and to weather events.
  It is a great partnership that we have had with the Senator from 
Alabama, who has been absolutely critical and instrumental in ensuring 
a persistent, reliable space presence. I thank the Senator from 
Alabama, Mr. Strange, for his incredible leadership when it comes to 
making sure that we are able to reach space, that we are able to 
continue our space mission. Whether it is in the defense of this 
country or in understanding where the next tornado may strike, I thank 
the Senator from Alabama for the leadership that has been provided to 
ensure that constant presence and persistence.
  Of course, I rise to speak in support of the bipartisan Gardner-
Nelson-Warner et al. amendment, amendment No. 250. Yet, truly, to the 
Senate--to my colleagues here--I rise in support of America's role and 
leadership in space.
  I rise on behalf of the hardworking men and women across this Nation 
who make our country's aerospace industry second to none, because, over 
the past 70 years, the United States has led the way in space 
exploration. From the Apollo missions to the space shuttle to the Orion 
program, we are the leaders in exploring the great frontier of space. 
That is who this country is. That is who we are--explorers, pioneers. 
We were the first to the Moon, and I hope we are the first to Mars, but 
we cannot give up that pioneering innovation that has led this country 
to greatness.
  I will share with colleagues of the Senate a CNBC story from March 
that China is building a manned spacecraft that is capable of sending 
astronauts to the Moon as well as to near-Earth orbit flight.
  Can you imagine the day when the stars and stripes on the lunar 
surface stands not alone but stands next to the stars of a flag of 
another nation--perhaps China's, perhaps somebody else's?
  When it comes to our access to space, this debate is absolutely 
critical because without the passage of amendment No. 250, we lose a 
tremendous portion of our access to space. We lose it for commercial 
applications, and we lose it for civil applications.
  In the past few months, this China activity has shown the importance 
of U.S. leadership. That is why this bipartisan amendment comes with a 
very simple point. It ensures that NASA and our commercial space 
industry will continue to be the country's leader in aerospace.
  The ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Mark 
Warner, of Virginia, is coleading my amendment. The Senator has done a 
phenomenal job in leadership on the Intelligence Committee in leading 
this amendment.
  I see that my colleague from Florida, Senator Nelson, has joined this 
debate. He has done a phenomenal job in leading this effort. As the 
ranking member of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee, with jurisdiction over NASA, Senator Bill Nelson is the 
leading cosponsor of this effort.
  They understand how important it is to address this issue for NASA 
and other space missions.
  I stand here in support of the greater goals of the underlying bill 
that we will be amending today. I believe sanctions against our 
adversaries are warranted and justified and, indeed, should move 
forward. This amendment is not designed to undermine the intent of the 
bill, but it seeks to ensure that space exploration may continue as it 
is currently planned.
  Without this bipartisan amendment, multiple missions on the books 
today--that are already planned today--will be delayed or even canceled 
and will be subjecting the U.S. taxpayers to significant cost 
increases. Without this amendment, missions like the commercial 
resupply program, which delivers critical supplies to the International 
Space Station, will be jeopardized by the language of the bill as it is 
written. American astronauts at the International Space Station, as we 
speak, are dependent on those supplies, but we are cutting off the 
American lifeline without the adoption of this amendment. Future 
missions, like the commercial crew program--a partnership between NASA 
and private industry to bring astronauts to the International Space 
Station on a U.S.-manufactured spacecraft--will be put at risk without 
the adoption of this amendment.
  Without this bipartisan amendment, we will continue to rely on 
Russian spacecraft to take U.S. astronauts to the International Space 
Station. Let me just make that more clear. Without the adoption of this 
amendment, NASA and our astronauts will be dependent on Russia for 
access to space for even longer. Rejection of this bipartisan amendment 
results in further Russian dependence.
  I do not believe this was the intent of the language when the bill 
was first written. The Gardner-Nelson-Warner-Shelby et al. amendment 
creates the certainty that NASA needs and supports to ensure currently 
planned NASA and commercial launch missions can continue without 
interruption.
  NASA contacted my office yesterday and said of amendment No. 250: 
``We believe this provides us the flexibility to maintain our 
commitments to our national space program.''
  It is not just the commercial crew and cargo missions that are going 
to be impacted. Several other missions will be subjected to delays--
missions like the Joint Polar Satellite System. This constellation of 
satellites will give us the ability to constantly monitor the globe for 
significant weather events, such as floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes. 
As I stand here today, the three Senators on the floor who are 
listening to this important debate--with more on C-SPAN--have been 
impacted dramatically by floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes.
  In 2013, we had dramatic flooding in Colorado that damaged thousands 
and thousands of homes and cost lives. I know the Presiding Officer has 
faced the same challenge when it has come to tornadoes and incredibly 
tragic weather events. The Senator from Florida has faced hurricanes, 
floods, and tornadoes. That is the importance of this amendment--to 
understand our weather systems and predictions.
  I am proud to say that JPSS is being developed in my home State of 
Colorado. The JPSS and other essential programs in which we have 
already invested hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions of 
dollars already, are now put at risk of significant delays or cost 
increases to the taxpayer without the adoption of this amendment.
  I am also on the floor to talk about a longer term mission that I 
truly believe in and hope to see our Nation achieve, one that goes to 
the very heart of our pioneering spirit of who we are as a people. It 
is our future manned mission to Mars.
  As I have spoken on the floor before, as I child I wanted to be an 
astronaut. I was inspired as I watched NASA astronauts explore that 
next frontier. I believe that the next destination for human beings to 
explore is, indeed, Mars, but without this bipartisan amendment, the 
Mars 2020 rover, which will continue to prepare us for that future 
manned mission, will be put in doubt. It will be a significant setback 
and will make the future goal of getting to Mars seem that much further 
away.
  This amendment, amendment No. 250, allows these missions to move 
forward with certainty and as scheduled. It is a bipartisan effort to 
affirm America's leadership in space.
  Let's be clear. Last summer we had a debate on this very same issue--
that by 2022 we were going to have an ``America first'' opportunity. 
That is the spirit of this amendment--to make sure that we have access 
to these vital and critical space missions, access to space, and to 
continue to grow economic opportunities for the American people. That 
is what this debate is all about.
  I yield the floor to my colleague Senator Nelson and then, of course, 
will continue with debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I thank Senator Gardner.
  Indeed, this is an example of the Senate working together. There is, 
simply, a problem in the bill that was passed.

[[Page S3509]]

It is a technical problem, but it goes to the heart of our military-
civilian space program. It goes to the heart of the cooperation that we 
have had with Russia that goes back to the Soviet Union days when, in 
fact, in 1975, in the middle of the Cold War, a crew from America 
rendezvoused and docked with the crew from the Soviet Union. Ever since 
that crew, which was led by Lt. Gen. Tom Stafford, of the United 
States, and General Alexey Leonov, of the Soviet Union, we have had 
cooperation in space, and that program continues today on the 
International Space Station.
  Before I get into talking about the details of the amendment, as 
Senator Gardner has discussed so well already, I hope that the Senate 
will treat it as technical in nature because it corrects what was not 
intended. Unless corrected, it will be disastrous not only for NASA but 
for all of the burgeoning commercial space industry, which we are 
bringing back to America. What has happened over the last four decades, 
in the meantime, is that a lot of that commercial space industry has 
flown the coop to other launchers from other nations. But it is coming 
back to America.


prayers for the Victims of the Congressional Baseball Practice Shooting

  Mr. President, before I get into the substance, I just want to speak 
with regard to the terrible tragedy that occurred yesterday and of my 
feelings about this violence that has occurred. I don't know whether it 
has occurred because of the excessive rhetoric and the sharpness and 
the fact that politics has become a blood sport, but we are so divided.
  This is what I want to say. We are Americans first, regardless of 
party. In times of threat, we come together. We are all on the same 
team.

  This Senator has prayed, as I know others have, for the complete 
recovery of all of those who were wounded yesterday, two of whom were 
apparently grievously wounded. We pray for their full recovery. It was 
a heinous attack. Let's come together in bipartisanship.


                     Amendment No. 250, as Modified

  Mr. President, right here is an example of coming together. 
Recognizing there is a technical problem, we are coming together to fix 
that problem. Let's do this in the spirit of what Americans do. We are 
Americans first.
  I am obviously here, as I demonstrated in my vote yesterday, for the 
Iran sanctions bill, as well as the Russia sanctions amendment, which 
we adopted yesterday. Both were bipartisan efforts. I wish to thank our 
colleagues, especially the members of the Banking and Foreign Relations 
Committees.
  This Senator is a cosponsor of the sanctions bill which addresses 
Iran's support for terrorism, ballistic missile activity, and human 
rights violations--these destabilizing activities--and this bill 
strengthens the hand of the United States in countering Iran. These are 
destabilizing activities separate and apart from the Iran nuclear 
agreement, and to date, the United States has the evidence that they 
have complied with the Iran nuclear agreement.
  At the same time, we are facing an aggressive Vladimir Putin. The 
Russia bill which we debated yesterday and which will come to final 
passage shortly strengthens our hand against Putin's Russia. The U.S. 
intelligence community has already made clear that Putin attempted to 
interfere in our election. Let me tell my colleagues, that didn't stop 
with the past election. It is continuing. And we better be ready for it 
next year in the 2018 elections because Putin and the GRU have done all 
the groundwork. But that is nothing new because he had done it in 
elections before in Europe, and he has been doing it in elections right 
now, as we saw in France. It boomeranged on him, thank goodness. We 
will see an attempt on the upcoming German elections.
  The intelligence community has made it very clear--the ranking member 
of the Intelligence Committee is here--that Putin and the GRU are 
likely to do this again. That is why I say beware. They have laid the 
groundwork for next year's elections to try to interfere. Putin's 
influence campaign struck at the very core of our democracy and simply 
must not be permitted to do it again.
  Now is not the time to cozy up to Russia; rather, the United States 
must redouble our cyber defenses and our cyber offenses to deter him, 
to make him feel enough pain so that he won't do it again. The 
sanctions we will adopt today are tough. We need this, but we need 
more.
  Shortly, we are going to vote on the amendment Senator Gardner has 
explained. Interestingly, in all of this angst and conflict with 
Russia, we get along with Russia in the civilian and commercial space 
program. We have had peaceful cooperation in outer space ever since 
what I told my colleagues about; that is, since 1975, in the middle of 
the Cold War, the rendezvous and docking and living together in space 
for 9 days, a Soviet crew and an American crew. That has been the 
central theme of our space program since that time. The shining example 
of that now is the cooperation in the International Space Station, the 
football field-sized--it is 120 yards long; think one goalpost to 
another. People don't have any idea of how big it is on orbit. It 
circles the Earth every 90 minutes.
  We have been working in space together with many nations but 
especially our partner the Russians for over 16 years. So the peaceful 
cooperation in space has been good for business. It has been good for 
jobs in America. And we are working to grow our share of an over $300 
billion global space economy.
  That is what this amendment is about. It is about fixing the question 
on the purchase of those RD-180 engines, the Russian engine that is 
used in the Atlas V, that is used not only for defense launches but for 
commercial launches and will be one of the two rockets launching 
American astronauts within a year and a half to and from the 
International Space Station.
  So this amendment is for the benefit of our economy, as well as the 
betterment of our civilization.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to thank my friend, 
the Senator from Florida, for his comments. There is no one in this 
body who is more familiar with and more knowledgeable about our space 
programs than is Senator Nelson.
  I also want to associate myself with two comments he made. No. 1, as 
the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I echo what he said 
about the very real, tangible threat the Russians, their spy agencies, 
and their agents pose to not just our democratic process but--as the 
Senator from Florida has outlined, not only did they attack us in 2016, 
they attacked the Dutch, which is why they had to hand-count their 
ballots, and they attacked the French, and Facebook took down 30,000 
Facebook accounts because of fear of Russian manipulation. They will 
attack the Germans.
  One of the things that is so concerning to me is that if you add up 
the amount of disruption the Russians have caused in Western societies 
at large without firing a shot or shooting a missile--and all that for 
less than 5 percent of the cost of an aircraft carrier--it is a pretty 
good return.
  Our country needs to be strong against Russia, and I support the 
Russia sanctions, but I also support, as the Senator has indicated, a 
really critical part--that we continue our space program. I stand here 
to join with Senator Nelson and my good friend, the Senator from 
Colorado, Mr. Gardner, in support of this amendment No. 250, which will 
allow civilian agencies to continue to launch crucial science, civil, 
and commercial space missions and which will continue to support NOAA 
and NASA, which depend upon their research.
  Without this amendment--and I think this is an amendment that 
corrects a mistake in the original bill--billions of dollars and years 
of planning that have gone into missions like, as the Senator 
mentioned, the International Space Station, commercial cargo, Mars 
2020, and the Joint Polar Satellite System, just wouldn't be possible. 
In many ways, without this amendment, we could even become more 
dependent upon Russian technology.
  Again, as the Senator mentioned, I think the overwhelming majority of 
this body is very supportive of sanctions against Iran. We are very 
supportive, and I appreciate the opportunity to add stronger sanctions 
against Russia and sanctions that this

[[Page S3510]]

President cannot arbitrarily withdraw. But we have to make sure that in 
this bill we don't do unintentional harm to our space interests--space 
interests that I know are in Colorado and Florida and my home State of 
Virginia, where we have a flight facility at NASA Wallops, which is 
over on our Eastern Shore, where we launch both NASA and commercial 
satellites.
  We have one of America's leading commercial and military companies, 
Orbital ATK, which is headquartered in Virginia and launches the 
Antares rocket from Wallops. The fact is, without this amendment, 
Orbital ATK would be prevented from buying the Russian RD-181 engines 
for its Antares rockets. That will do nothing to help America's space 
mission. The fact is, without those engines, Orbital would not be able 
to fulfill a $1.2 billion contract for launching from Wallops.
  Quite simply, as the Senator indicated and I am repeating, this 
amendment is broadly bipartisan. My friend Senator Gardner and I chair 
the Cyber Caucus. The amendment is supported by our leading expert in 
the Senate on space, Senator Nelson, as well as Senator Shelby and 
Senator Bennet and a host of others. I imagine the Presiding Officer is 
also a supporter of this. The amendment would simply provide civil and 
commercial space parity with the defense industry, for which an 
exemption has already been provided. It is in the interests of defense 
and civil space to continue the current status quo in order to maintain 
a competitive environment until a domestic capability has been 
developed.
  Let me be clear. I think it is important that over a very short time, 
we get away from purchasing Russian rockets, but we need that 
transition period, and the transition period the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee laid out on the defense side ought to be extended as 
well on the commercial side.
  So a ``yes'' vote on amendment No. 250 will support continued access 
to space for NASA, as well as for those equally important commercial 
space missions. One of the things that I feel is so important about the 
commercial space missions is that we have to have that competition, 
candidly, with NASA and to push our defense industry if we are going to 
bring down space costs. To put a dagger in the heart of our commercial 
space industry as it has been slowly evolving would be a grave mistake.
  I have taken on this issue on the intelligence side as I have tried 
to get smarter on the whole question of our overhead capabilities. The 
amount of dollars that we spend and the lack of competitiveness that we 
have in terms of some of our more traditional government-purchased 
space assets are both a waste of taxpayer dollars, and, candidly, we 
have an architecture overhead that is not modern enough to recognize 
the threats that Russians, Chinese, and others pose in terms of the 
ability to jam our satellites and use laser beams and other things. In 
a sense, in many ways, it is almost as if our defense and the 
intelligence community, on overhead architecture--nobody ever saw a 
James Bond movie. We built these large, bulky platforms in the sky with 
the assumption that America would always dominate space. That 
dominance--it is unfortunate because our adversary changes, it is 
coming to an end, and we need the competition from the commercial 
industry, quite honestly, to push the IC and push the defense toward 
smaller, more resilient, and more flexible platforms.
  While I share the desire of the chairman of the Arms Services 
Committee to get us off this Russian hardware, we do need this 
transition. I think the amendment that has been put forward by the 
Senator from Colorado provides that transition, led by the transition 
that was laid out on defense. I believe commercial space needs that 
same type of transition.
  I hope the amendment will pass. I look forward to our continued 
bipartisan support of both NASA and commercial space and obviously our 
defense assets and IC assets as well.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Russian sanctions amendment passed by 
this body 97 to 2 last year--I take it the Senator from Florida and the 
Senator from Virginia were here at the time; it was one person who was 
not--was negotiated between Senators of both parties on multiple 
committees, including Foreign Relations, Banking, and Armed Services. 
It was specifically designed to impose tough sanctions on Russian 
defense and intelligence sectors, to impose tough sanctions on the 
Russian military industrial complex and intelligence agencies that have 
made it possible for Russia to invade Ukraine, annex Crimea, terrorize 
Syria, threaten our NATO allies, and attack America's election in 2016. 
Have no doubt about what this amendment is, my dear colleagues and 
friends. It is a giveaway to the Russian military industrial complex.
  There has always been a collection of lawmakers, executives, and 
lobbyists who have accepted continuing, even deepening, our Nation's 
dependence on Russian rocket engines. That is exactly what will happen 
if we allow this amendment to pass, and the door will once again fly 
open for taxpayer dollars to be used to subsidize purchases of Russian 
rocket engines--purchases which line the pockets of Vladimir Putin's 
cronies.
  My friends, if you want to vote to buy more Russian rocket engines, 
just say it. That is fine. That is fine with me, but to cloak it in 
some kind of bipartisan agreement that somehow we are going to have to 
continue to buy these Russian rocket engines, after we had an agreement 
last year 97 to 2--97 to 2--what does this do? This undoes last year's 
97-to-2 agreement. We don't need this amendment to meet America's needs 
in space.
  As a result of last year's bipartisan agreement and the NDAA, the 
Department of Defense is on a path to gradually eliminate dependence on 
Russia as quickly as possible while fostering competition among 
American companies. NASA needs to do the same. NASA needs to do the 
same. NASA needs to do the same.
  Sanctions, by definition, require tradeoffs. Sanctions are not free. 
Countries that impose sanctions must be willing to pay a cost, too, if 
and when a greater principle, a great national security interest, is at 
stake.
  Let me conclude because I note the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee and the ranking member here. There are costs and tradeoffs 
the United States has been asking our European allies to make in the 
last few years. We have leaned on France to cancel a sale of naval 
vessels to Russia. We have been warning Central and Eastern European 
allies against deepening their dependence on Russian energy with 
various energy deals and infrastructure projects. We should not be 
asking our allies to make these sacrifices unless we are prepared to do 
the same.
  We will probably pass this amendment. If there is ever a doubt in any 
of our constituents' minds about the influence of special interests, it 
will be with passage of this amendment--which, by the way, with all due 
respect to my friends and colleagues, was the one thing they didn't 
want. The one thing they didn't want was an on-the-record vote on this 
amendment, which is why I am confident it will lose, but I want every 
Member of the U.S. Senate to look in the eyes of the mother whose son 
was just killed by a Russian sniper, as I did, down in Mariupol not too 
long ago.
  I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment. I know how it is going to come 
out, but Members of the U.S. Senate will at least be on record. I say 
this is not the most courageous chapter in the history of this 
institution. I urge a ``no'' vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am not involving myself in this debate.
  I just want to say to Senator McCain: You demonstrated yesterday the 
best of the U.S. Senate when an issue like this arose, and instead of 
blocking a vote, you said you were glad to have a vote. You are 
obviously in strong disagreement with the substance of this amendment.
  I just want to tell you how much I personally appreciate your 
allowing a vote on this, the role you played in all things Russia and 
Iran, your forceful nature on these issues, your great leadership, and 
the role you have played in getting us today to a vote that isn't 
requiring cloture, where you have allowed this amendment to take place. 
I

[[Page S3511]]

cannot tell you how much I appreciate that and appreciate the role you 
play in this body.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Tennessee and my friend from 
Maryland.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona as well 
for allowing this vote to move forward, but in his statements, he said 
NASA needs to do the same. He repeated it several times.
  I would just say that this amendment could actually be titled ``NASA 
Needs to Do the Same'' because what we had agreed to last year, when it 
comes to defense, is a way forward on the Atlas V rocket, the RD-180. 
We agreed to that. I believe it was a unanimous consent agreement. If 
there was an objection at that time, then it should have been expressed 
when we made this agreement.
  Our colleagues across the aisle, for a unanimous consent, it takes 
all of us 100 people to agree to a unanimous consent agreement. That 
agreement was made on the National Defense Authorization Act. NASA 
needs to do the same.
  Our colleague, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, Mark 
Warner, made the point of parity between civil, commercial, and 
defense. That is what this amendment does.
  There are a lot of issues that we come to the floor and we talk about 
this issue not being rocket science: It is not that difficult. It is 
not rocket science. Well, we actually have an issue that is rocket 
science. The mission set before American astronauts is jeopardized if 
this amendment doesn't pass. The taxpayers of this country face 
billions of dollars in costs if this amendment doesn't pass. Reliance 
on Russian technology to get to the space station or resupplying 
American astronauts will increase if this amendment doesn't pass.
  If we want to talk about protecting the people of this country, let's 
talk about the victims of floods in Colorado, let's talk about people 
who have died in tornadoes because we didn't have the most accurate 
ability to forecast where they were coming from, when they were going 
to strike, and who would be hit. This amendment will allow these 
weather satellites to go into space to protect the men and women of 
this country from natural disasters. Again, it brings parity to an 
agreement that was decided upon through unanimous consent last year.
  I support the underlying legislation, and I support this amendment 
and urge my colleagues to support it as well. I thank the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee for their leadership on this committee.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I applaud the bipartisan work that my 
Senate colleagues have put into legislation to impose sanctions on 
Russia. Russia's interference in the 2016 election represents an 
assault on our democracy that, until this point, has gone largely 
unanswered by the Administration and Congress. Russia has also 
conducted cyber attacks on allies and illegally invaded and violated 
the sovereignty of Ukraine and Georgia. I know that my colleagues take 
this issue very seriously, and I support the bipartisan compromise, 
which will maintain existing sanctions on Russia for its cyber and 
military intrusions in Ukraine and require additional mandatory 
sanctions on Russia's energy sector, those providing arms to Syrian 
troops, corrupt Russian oligarchs and their networks, and human rights 
abusers. We cannot allow Russia's hostile actions toward Western 
democracies to go unchecked. This legislation sends an important 
message to Russia and the world that the United States stands strongly 
against Russia's anti-democratic actions.
  At the same time, the original version of the legislation would have 
had unintended consequences for our nation's civil and commercial space 
sectors. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, and 
commercial space missions are critical to space exploration, weather 
data, and sending U.S. astronauts to the International Space Station, 
as well as supplying them with cargo and instruments for scientific 
research. Under the original legislation, these missions would have 
been threatened or prevented from moving forward. In response, Senator 
Gardner introduced an amendment that would exempt NASA and commercial 
space-related launch activities from the sanctions bill. I was proud to 
cosponsor this amendment.
  In addition to our defense assets, Virginia is at the epicenter of 
the Nation's civil space program and commercial space industry. For 
more than 70 years, NASA's Wallops Flight Facility has served as a key 
national asset to the U.S. space program, an economic driver for the 
Eastern Shore, and an invaluable benefit to the Commonwealth. The Mid-
Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Island serves as a leader in 
commercial space, partnering with Virginia-headquartered Orbital ATK to 
launch critical cargo to the International Space Station. Finally, 
research projects at NASA Langley Research Center and Virginia's superb 
academic institutions are developing tomorrow's innovative technologies 
and scientific discoveries. As Governor and now Senator, I have 
remained a strong supporter of Virginia's booming industry, research, 
and launch services. Without Senator Gardner's amendment, some of these 
activities in Virginia would cease to exist.
  To be clear, I stand in agreement with my Senate colleagues on the 
issue of Russian sanctions. I also believe that our space program must 
transition to American-made rocket engines and parts, and I know that 
U.S. companies are working hard in conjunction with NASA toward that 
goal. But we need time for that transition to occur, and this important 
amendment would make it possible without hurting our current 
capabilities. In addition, while the Department of Defense has been 
afforded the opportunity to develop new technologies while maintaining 
the status quo, it is only fair that we provide the same chance to 
civil and commercial space entities.
  For these reasons, I was proud to cosponsor Senator Gardner's 
bipartisan amendment to S. 722. I look forward to working with my 
colleagues in the future to enhance and expand our Nation's space 
program.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator Cardin 
and I will speak for a few moments, and then we will have three votes, 
one of which will be on the RD-180 issue, one of which will be on the 
NATO issue, and then final passage; is that correct? Am I correct in 
that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 6 minutes remaining before the first 
vote on the Gardner amendment.
  Mr. CORKER. Then there will be a series of votes, with no comments 
made in advance of those votes; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I will be very brief, and we will split 
our time.
  I want to say that, to me, today the U.S. Senate is functioning in 
the way our Founders intended for it to function.
  It has been my goal, since the beginning of my leadership on the 
Foreign Relations Committee, for our committee and for this Senate to 
reaffirm its role in foreign policy issues. Today, the U.S. Senate, in 
a time of uncertainty around our Nation and uncertainty about some of 
our foreign policy issues, is asserting its responsibilities as it 
relates to foreign policy for the United States of America. I thank 
Senators on both sides of the aisle for the role they have played in 
getting us here.
  This is a very strong piece of legislation that in many ways has 
almost occurred under the radar screen because of the way it has been 
done. The fact that we have had no cloture vote, the fact that we are 
having amendments, as has been discussed before, and the fact that this 
legislation sends a very strong signal to Russia that the nefarious 
activities they have been involved in--it does the same with Iran, with 
the activities outside of the JCPOA that they have been involved in, 
affirming our commitment to NATO, which we will do to article 5, NATO, 
in just a few moments.
  I thank this body. I thank Leaders McConnell and Schumer for allowing 
the environment to exist for us to work

[[Page S3512]]

in the manner we have. I thank our ranking member, Senator Cardin, and 
those members--Senator Crapo and Brown and others--who have played such 
a significant role. Senator McCain is on the floor, Senator Graham, 
Senator Rubio, Senator Menendez, Senator Shaheen--so many members who 
have gotten us to this place.
  This is a great moment for the U.S. Senate. This is the way the 
Senate is supposed to function, and this is the way the Senate is 
supposed to exercise its prerogatives as it relates to foreign policy, 
a great moment for our body.
  Senator Cardin.
  Mr. CARDIN. Well, first, to Senator Corker. There is a reason Members 
want to serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We had a long 
list of Members who wanted to join our committee in this Congress. 
Quite frankly, I think the reason they want to join is not only the 
challenges we have globally but the fact that this is a committee that 
works bipartisanly and respects the views of every single Member, both 
Democratic and Republican, on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  The bill we have before us reflects that--in the best tradition of 
the U.S. Senate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That is 
due, in large part, because of the talent, leadership, and commitment 
of our chairman. I thank Senator Corker for allowing us to reach this 
very important moment in the U.S. Senate, to be able to vote on a bill 
that is consequential for America's national security.
  I believe this is the first major bill we have had on the floor of 
the U.S. Senate, the first bill we have had amendments to, and I concur 
in the Senator's observations that our leaders allowed us to let the 
process work in the best traditions of the U.S. Senate.
  It is difficult for many of us to explain how the Senate operates at 
times. It really is difficult, but it is a body which respects the 
rights of each Member, and they have certain abilities to slow things 
down or bring us to a stop, and the process doesn't work the way it is 
supposed to work, but this bill has been handled very quickly on a 
major subject because we respected the rights of every single Member of 
the U.S. Senate. It doesn't mean we reach total agreement. We didn't, 
but we have a bill that accomplishes three very important things:
  First, it stands up to the aggression of Russia and Iran. Yes, we 
have been talking about this--and I am glad Senator McCain is on the 
floor. Senator McCain has been one of the most ardent crusaders to 
point out the risk factors of Russia to our national security and that 
of our allies.
  I started with Senator McCain in January. We sat down, and he 
informed me why we had to do certain things and make it very clear and 
not have any ambiguity because Russia would run right through that 
ambiguity. Thanks to that initial leadership, we have those provisions 
in the underlying bill. There will be no ambiguity as to what Congress 
is saying in regard to Russia's behavior.
  I also acknowledge we have a review process in here. Senator Graham 
brought that to our attention very early in the process in January so 
Congress can insert itself.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CARDIN. That review process will give Congress the right role to 
review executive actions so we are stronger, working together. It also 
gives the President a stronger hand in negotiating with Mr. Putin and 
Russia because Congress has said: You must accomplish certain 
objectives, such as getting Russia's aggression to end in Ukraine or 
get Russia to stop supporting war crimes in Syria, to stop interfering 
with our democratic election systems. That is what we say, and we are 
very clear about that.
  Then we take the third step, which I think is very important; that 
is, provide the wherewithal of U.S. leadership, working with our 
European allies, to protect our democratic institutions.
  All of that is included in the bill that we are going to have a 
chance to vote on in a few minutes, and I want to thank all who were 
involved. I am going to include staff who worked so hard on this.
  They were here 24/7 putting this bill together--Damian Murphy, in my 
office; Margaret Taylor; and Jessica Lewis, Dana Stroul, Lowell 
Schwartz, Sean Bartlett, Chris Barr, John Ryan, Leslie Bull, Danny 
Ricchetti, as well as Todd Womack, Rob Strayer, David Kinzler, and Ben 
Purser.
  They were extraordinary in helping us reach this day.
  Mr. CORKER. No question. I thank the Senator for those comments.
  Our staffs have been remarkable, and the years of experience and 
knowledge they bring to this no doubt allowed us to do something so 
substantial in an amount of time, yet do so in a methodical way.
  With that, I ask unanimous consent that the votes following the first 
vote in this series be 10 minutes in length.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  All time has expired.


                 Vote on Amendment No. 250, as Modified

  The question now occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 250, as 
modified, offered by the Senator from Colorado, Mr. Gardner.
  Mr. BARRASSO. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant bill clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 94, nays 6, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 145 Leg.]

                                YEAS--94

     Alexander
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blunt
     Booker
     Boozman
     Brown
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cassidy
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cortez Masto
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Donnelly
     Duckworth
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fischer
     Flake
     Franken
     Gardner
     Gillibrand
     Grassley
     Harris
     Hassan
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     Kennedy
     King
     Klobuchar
     Lankford
     Leahy
     Lee
     Manchin
     Markey
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Paul
     Perdue
     Peters
     Portman
     Reed
     Risch
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Rubio
     Sanders
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Scott
     Shaheen
     Shelby
     Stabenow
     Strange
     Tester
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Udall
     Van Hollen
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden
     Young

                                NAYS--6

     Blumenthal
     Ernst
     Graham
     McCain
     Sasse
     Sullivan
  The amendment (No. 250), as modified, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.


                           Amendment No. 240

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 minutes, 
evenly split between Senator Corker and me, to speak on the NATO 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I would add that my fellow Ohioan, Senator 
Portman, is a cosponsor of this. Special thanks go to Senator Graham--
this is the Graham-Brown NATO amendment--also to Senators McCain, 
Rubio, Casey, and Jack Reed and Sheldon Whitehouse from Rhode Island.
  This is especially important to the Ukrainian community in my State. 
A number of them have been in town the last couple of days. They know 
how critical support for our allies is and how important it is that 
this amendment sends a clear message that the United States will uphold 
our half-century commitment to NATO, combined with a strong signal to 
Russia to clean up its act. That is the importance of this amendment. I 
ask support from my colleagues.
  I yield to Senator Corker.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank all those involved in the message 
that is being sent. I support the amendment, and I urge a ``yes'' vote. 
Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on agreeing to 
amendment No. 240, offered by the Senator from Tennessee, Mr. Corker.
  Mr. CORKER. I ask for the yeas and nays.

[[Page S3513]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 100, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 146 Leg.]

                               YEAS--100

     Alexander
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Boozman
     Brown
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cassidy
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cortez Masto
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Donnelly
     Duckworth
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Feinstein
     Fischer
     Flake
     Franken
     Gardner
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Grassley
     Harris
     Hassan
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     Kennedy
     King
     Klobuchar
     Lankford
     Leahy
     Lee
     Manchin
     Markey
     McCain
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Paul
     Perdue
     Peters
     Portman
     Reed
     Risch
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Rubio
     Sanders
     Sasse
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Scott
     Shaheen
     Shelby
     Stabenow
     Strange
     Sullivan
     Tester
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Udall
     Van Hollen
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden
     Young
  The amendment (No. 240) was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Fischer). Under the previous order, the 
committee-reported substitute, as amended, is agreed to.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the 
question is, Shall it pass?
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 2, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 147 Leg.]

                                YEAS--98

     Alexander
     Baldwin
     Barrasso
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Boozman
     Brown
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Capito
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cassidy
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cortez Masto
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Donnelly
     Duckworth
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Feinstein
     Fischer
     Flake
     Franken
     Gardner
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Grassley
     Harris
     Hassan
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kaine
     Kennedy
     King
     Klobuchar
     Lankford
     Leahy
     Lee
     Manchin
     Markey
     McCain
     McCaskill
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Perdue
     Peters
     Portman
     Reed
     Risch
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Rubio
     Sasse
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Scott
     Shaheen
     Shelby
     Stabenow
     Strange
     Sullivan
     Tester
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Udall
     Van Hollen
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden
     Young

                                NAYS--2

     Paul
     Sanders
       
  The bill (S. 722), as amended, was passed, as follows:

                                 S. 722

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Countering 
     Iran's Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Regional strategy for countering conventional and asymmetric 
              Iranian threats in the Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 4. Imposition of additional sanctions in response to Iran's 
              ballistic missile program.
Sec. 5. Imposition of terrorism-related sanctions with respect to the 
              IRGC.
Sec. 6. Imposition of additional sanctions with respect to persons 
              responsible for human rights abuses.
Sec. 7. Enforcement of arms embargos.
Sec. 8. Review of applicability of sanctions relating to Iran's support 
              for terrorism and its ballistic missile program.
Sec. 9. Report on coordination of sanctions between the United States 
              and the European Union.
Sec. 10. Report on United States citizens detained by Iran.
Sec. 11. Exceptions for national security and humanitarian assistance; 
              rule of construction.
Sec. 12. Presidential waiver authority.

    TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND 
               COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

Sec. 201. Short title.

 Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian 
                               Federation

Sec. 211. Findings.
Sec. 212. Sense of Congress.

 PART I--Congressional Review of Sanctions Imposed With Respect to the 
                           Russian Federation

Sec. 215. Short title.
Sec. 216. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions 
              imposed with respect to the Russian Federation.

       PART II--Sanctions With Respect to the Russian Federation

Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Codification of sanctions relating to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 223. Modification of implementation of Executive Order 13662.
Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to activities of the 
              Russian Federation undermining cybersecurity.
Sec. 225. Imposition of sanctions relating to special Russian crude oil 
              projects.
Sec. 226. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian and other 
              foreign financial institutions.
Sec. 227. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to significant 
              corruption in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 228. Mandatory imposition of sanctions with respect to certain 
              transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious 
              human rights abusers in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 229. Notifications to Congress under Ukraine Freedom Support Act 
              of 2014.
Sec. 230. Standards for termination of certain sanctions with respect 
              to the Russian Federation.
Sec. 231. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons engaging in 
              transactions with the intelligence or defense sectors of 
              the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to the development of pipelines in the 
              Russian Federation.
Sec. 233. Sanctions with respect to investment in or facilitation of 
              privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian 
              Federation.
Sec. 234. Sanctions with respect to the transfer of arms and related 
              materiel to Syria.
Sec. 235. Sanctions described.
Sec. 236. Exceptions, waiver, and termination.
Sec. 237. Exception relating to activities of the National Aeronautics 
              and Space Administration.
Sec. 238. Rule of construction.

                           PART III--Reports

Sec. 241. Report on oligarchs and parastatal entities of the Russian 
              Federation.
Sec. 242. Report on effects of expanding sanctions to include sovereign 
              debt and derivative products.
Sec. 243. Report on illicit finance relating to the Russian Federation.

     Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

Sec. 251. Findings.
Sec. 252. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 253. Statement of policy.
Sec. 254. Coordinating aid and assistance across Europe and Eurasia.
Sec. 255. Report on media organizations controlled and funded by the 
              Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 256. Report on Russian Federation influence on elections in Europe 
              and Eurasia.
Sec. 257. Ukranian energy security.
Sec. 258. Termination.
Sec. 259. Appropriate congressional committees defined.

         Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

  PART I--National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit 
                               Financing

Sec. 261. Development of national strategy.
Sec. 262. Contents of national strategy.

    PART II--Enhancing Antiterrorism Tools of the Department of the 
                                Treasury

Sec. 271. Improving antiterror finance monitoring of funds transfers.
Sec. 272. Sense of Congress on international cooperation regarding 
              terrorist financing intelligence.

[[Page S3514]]

Sec. 273. Examining the counter-terror financing role of the Department 
              of the Treasury in embassies.
Sec. 274. Inclusion of Secretary of the Treasury on the National 
              Security Council.
Sec. 275. Inclusion of all funds.

                         PART III--Definitions

Sec. 281. Definitions.

                    Subtitle D--Rule of Construction

Sec. 291. Rule of construction.
Sec. 292. Sense of Senate on the strategic importance of Article 5 of 
              the North Atlantic Treaty.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act of 
     international terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
     172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a 
     person that is not a United States person.
       (4) Iranian person.--The term ``Iranian person'' means--
       (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of Iran; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise 
     subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran.
       (5) IRGC.--The term ``IRGC'' means Iran's Islamic 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps.
       (6) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       (7) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.

     SEC. 3. REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING CONVENTIONAL AND 
                   ASYMMETRIC IRANIAN THREATS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
                   AND NORTH AFRICA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
     of the Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall jointly develop and submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a strategy for deterring 
     conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and threats 
     that directly threaten the United States and key allies in 
     the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
       (b) Elements.--The strategy required by subsection (a) 
     shall include at a minimum the following:
       (1) A summary of the near- and long-term United States 
     objectives, plans, and means for countering Iran's 
     destabilizing activities, including identification of 
     countries that share the objective of countering Iran's 
     destabilizing activities.
       (2) A summary of the capabilities and contributions of 
     individual countries to shared efforts to counter Iran's 
     destabilizing activities, and a summary of additional actions 
     or contributions that each country could take to further 
     contribute.
       (3) An assessment of Iran's conventional force capabilities 
     and an assessment of Iran's plans to upgrade its conventional 
     force capabilities, including its acquisition, development, 
     and deployment of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, 
     unmanned aerial vehicles, and maritime offensive and anti-
     access or area denial capabilities.
       (4) An assessment of Iran's chemical and biological weapons 
     capabilities and an assessment of Iranian plans to upgrade 
     its chemical or biological weapons capabilities.
       (5) An assessment of Iran's asymmetric activities in the 
     region, including--
       (A) the size, capabilities, and activities of the IRGC, 
     including the Quds Force;
       (B) the size, capabilities, and activities of Iran's cyber 
     operations;
       (C) the types and amount of support, including funding, 
     lethal and nonlethal contributions, and training, provided to 
     Hezbollah, Hamas, special groups in Iraq, the regime of 
     Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and other 
     violent groups across the Middle East; and
       (D) the scope and objectives of Iran's information 
     operations and use of propaganda.
       (6) A summary of United States actions, unilaterally and in 
     cooperation with foreign governments, to counter 
     destabilizing Iranian activities, including--
       (A) interdiction of Iranian lethal arms bound for groups 
     designated as foreign terrorist organizations under section 
     219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189);
       (B) Iran's interference in international commercial 
     shipping lanes;
       (C) attempts by Iran to undermine or subvert 
     internationally recognized governments in the Middle East 
     region; and
       (D) Iran's support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in 
     Syria, including--
       (i) financial assistance, military equipment and personnel, 
     and other support provided to that regime; and
       (ii) support and direction to other armed actors that are 
     not Syrian or Iranian and are acting on behalf of that 
     regime.
       (c) Form of Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 4. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO 
                   IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State 
     should continue to implement Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass 
     destruction delivery system proliferators and their 
     supporters).
       (b) Imposition of Sanctions.--The President shall impose 
     the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any 
     person that the President determines, on or after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act--
       (1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially 
     contributes to the activities of the Government of Iran with 
     respect to its ballistic missile program, or any other 
     program in Iran for developing, deploying, or maintaining 
     systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, 
     including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, 
     develop, transport, transfer, or use such capabilities;
       (2) is a successor entity to a person referred to in 
     paragraph (1);
       (3) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person 
     referred to in paragraph (1);
       (4) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions 
     that would otherwise be imposed pursuant to paragraph (3);
       (5) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in 
     paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4); or
       (6) knowingly provides or attempts to provide financial, 
     material, technological, or other support for, or goods or 
     services in support of, a person referred to in paragraph 
     (1), (2), (3), (4) or (5).
       (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in 
     accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person subject to 
     subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State 
     shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to 
     subsection (b) that is an alien.
       (d) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (c)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued 
     to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the 
     penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful 
     act described in subsection (a) of that section.
       (e) Report on Contributions to Iran's Ballistic Missile 
     Program.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report describing each person that--
       (A) has, during the period specified in paragraph (2), 
     conducted any activity that has materially contributed to the 
     activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its 
     ballistic missile program, or any other program in Iran for 
     developing, deploying, or maintaining systems capable of 
     delivering weapons of mass destruction, including any efforts 
     to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, 
     transfer, or use such capabilities;
       (B) is a successor entity to a person referred to in 
     subparagraph (A);
       (C) owns or controls or is owned or controlled by a person 
     referred to in subparagraph (A);
       (D) forms an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions 
     that could be imposed as a result of a relationship described 
     in subparagraph (C);
       (E) is acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D); or
       (F) is known or believed to have provided, or attempted to 
     provide, during the period specified in paragraph (2), 
     financial, material, technological, or other support for, or 
     goods or services in support of, any material contribution to 
     a program described in subparagraph (A) carried out by a 
     person described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).
       (2) Period specified.--The period specified in this 
     paragraph is--
       (A) in the case of the first report submitted under 
     paragraph (1), the period beginning January 1, 2016, and 
     ending on the date the report is submitted; and
       (B) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day 
     period preceding the submission of the report.
       (3) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

[[Page S3515]]

  


     SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF TERRORISM-RELATED SANCTIONS WITH 
                   RESPECT TO THE IRGC.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The IRGC is subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive 
     Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking 
     property of weapons of mass destruction delivery system 
     proliferators and their supporters), the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), Executive Order 13553 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note; relating to blocking property of certain persons with 
     respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of 
     Iran), and Executive Order 13606 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
     relating to blocking the property and suspending entry into 
     the United States of certain persons with respect to grave 
     human rights abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via 
     information technology).
       (2) The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (in 
     this section referred to as the ``IRGC-QF'') is the primary 
     arm of the Government of Iran for executing its policy of 
     supporting terrorist and insurgent groups. The IRGC-QF 
     provides material, logistical assistance, training, and 
     financial support to militants and terrorist operatives 
     throughout the Middle East and South Asia and was designated 
     for the imposition of sanctions by the Secretary of Treasury 
     pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
     relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions 
     with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support 
     terrorism) in October 2007 for its support of terrorism.
       (3) The IRGC, not just the IRGC-QF, is responsible for 
     implementing Iran's international program of destabilizing 
     activities, support for acts of international terrorism, and 
     ballistic missile program.
       (b) In General.--Beginning on the date that is 90 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with 
     respect to the IRGC and foreign persons that are officials, 
     agents, or affiliates of the IRGC.
       (c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign 
     person pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note; relating to blocking property and prohibiting 
     transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or 
     support terrorism).

     SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a list of each person the Secretary 
     determines, based on credible evidence, on or after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act--
       (1) is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or 
     other gross violations of internationally recognized human 
     rights committed against individuals in Iran who seek--
       (A) to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of 
     the Government of Iran; or
       (B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally 
     recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of 
     religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the 
     rights to a fair trial and democratic elections; or
       (2) acts as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign person in 
     a matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--
       (1) In general.--The President may, in accordance with the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.), block all transactions in all property and 
     interests in property of a person on the list required by 
     subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     paragraph (1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to 
     carry out paragraph (1) shall be subject to the penalties set 
     forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) 
     to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in subsection (a) of that section.

     SEC. 7. ENFORCEMENT OF ARMS EMBARGOS.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (d), the 
     President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection 
     (b) with respect to any person that the President 
     determines--
       (1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially 
     contributes to the supply, sale, or transfer directly or 
     indirectly to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of 
     Iran, of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large 
     caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack 
     helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, as 
     defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of 
     Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare 
     parts; or
       (2) knowingly provides to Iran any technical training, 
     financial resources or services, advice, other services or 
     assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, 
     manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel 
     described in paragraph (1).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in 
     accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person subject to 
     subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State 
     shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to 
     subsection (a) that is an alien.
       (c) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued 
     to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the 
     penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful 
     act described in subsection (a) of that section.
       (d) Exception.--The President is not required to impose 
     sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person for 
     engaging in an activity described in that subsection if the 
     President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that--
       (1) permitting the activity is in the national security 
     interest of the United States;
       (2) Iran no longer presents a significant threat to the 
     national security of the United States and to the allies of 
     the United States; and
       (3) the Government of Iran has ceased providing operational 
     or financial support for acts of international terrorism and 
     no longer satisfies the requirements for designation as a 
     state sponsor of terrorism.
       (e) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means a country the 
     government of which the Secretary of State has determined to 
     be a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts 
     of international terrorism for purposes of--
       (1) section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
     1979 (50 U.S.C. 4605(j)(1)(A)) (as continued in effect 
     pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.));
       (2) section 620A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2371(a));
       (3) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2780(d)); or
       (4) any other provision of law.

     SEC. 8. REVIEW OF APPLICABILITY OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO 
                   IRAN'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND ITS BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 5 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall conduct a 
     review of all persons on the list of specially designated 
     nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of 
     Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for 
     activities relating to Iran--
       (1) to assess the conduct of such persons as that conduct 
     relates to--
       (A) any activity that materially contributes to the 
     activities of the Government of Iran with respect to its 
     ballistic missile program; or
       (B) support by the Government of Iran for acts of 
     international terrorism; and
       (2) to determine the applicability of sanctions with 
     respect to such persons under--
       (A) Executive Order 13382 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     blocking property of weapons of mass destruction delivery 
     system proliferators and their supporters); or
       (B) Executive Order 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 
     blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons 
     who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism).
       (b) Implementation of Sanctions.--If the President 
     determines under subsection (a) that sanctions under an 
     Executive Order specified in paragraph (2) of that subsection 
     are applicable with respect to a person, the President 
     shall--
       (1) impose sanctions with respect to that person pursuant 
     to that Executive Order; or
       (2) exercise the waiver authority provided under section 
     12.

     SEC. 9. REPORT ON COORDINATION OF SANCTIONS BETWEEN THE 
                   UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that includes the following:
       (1) A description of each instance, during the period 
     specified in subsection (b)--
       (A) in which the United States has imposed sanctions with 
     respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such 
     weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international 
     terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in 
     which the European Union has not imposed corresponding 
     sanctions; and
       (B) in which the European Union has imposed sanctions with 
     respect to a person for activity related to the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems for such 
     weapons to or by Iran, support for acts of international 
     terrorism by Iran, or human rights abuses in Iran, but in 
     which the United States has not imposed corresponding 
     sanctions.
       (2) An explanation for the reason for each discrepancy 
     between sanctions imposed by the European Union and sanctions 
     imposed

[[Page S3516]]

     by the United States described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
     of paragraph (1).
       (b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this 
     subsection is--
       (1) in the case of the first report submitted under 
     subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and ending on the date the report is 
     submitted; and
       (2) in the case of a subsequent such report, the 180-day 
     period preceding the submission of the report.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 10. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on United States citizens, including 
     United States citizens who are also citizens of other 
     countries, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran that 
     includes--
       (1) information regarding any officials of the Government 
     of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and
       (2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has 
     taken to secure the swift release of those United States 
     citizens.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 11. EXCEPTIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN 
                   ASSISTANCE; RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       (a) In General.--The following activities shall be exempt 
     from sanctions under sections 4, 5, 6, and 7:
       (1) Any activity subject to the reporting requirements 
     under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3091 et seq.), or to any authorized intelligence activities 
     of the United States.
       (2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such 
     admission is necessary to comply with United States 
     obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations 
     and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters 
     of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 
     and entered into force November 21, 1947, or under the 
     Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 
     1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other 
     applicable international obligations of the United States.
       (3) The conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the 
     sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical 
     devices to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian 
     assistance to the people of Iran, including engaging in a 
     financial transaction relating to humanitarian assistance or 
     for humanitarian purposes or transporting goods or services 
     that are necessary to carry out operations relating to 
     humanitarian assistance or humanitarian purposes.
       (b) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.--A 
     requirement or the authority to block and prohibit all 
     transactions in all property and interests in property under 
     section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 shall not include the authority to 
     impose sanctions with respect to the importation of goods.
       (c) Implementation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     the President may exercise all authorities provided under 
     sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this Act.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act (other than 
     subsection (b)) shall be construed to limit the authority of 
     the President under the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural 
     commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       (2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)).
       (3) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the 
     meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the 
     Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       (4) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given 
     the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, 
     and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

     SEC. 12. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY.

       (a) Case-by-Case Waiver Authority.--
       (1) In general.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case 
     basis and for a period of not more than 180 days, a 
     requirement under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 to impose or 
     maintain sanctions with respect to a person, and may waive 
     the continued imposition of such sanctions, not less than 30 
     days after the President determines and reports to the 
     appropriate congressional committees that it is vital to the 
     national security interests of the United States to waive 
     such sanctions.
       (2) Renewal of waivers.--The President may, on a case-by-
     case basis, renew a waiver under paragraph (1) for an 
     additional period of not more than 180 days if, not later 
     than 15 days before that waiver expires, the President makes 
     the determination and submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report described in paragraph (1).
       (3) Successive renewal.--The renewal authority provided 
     under paragraph (2) may be exercised for additional 
     successive periods of not more than 180 days if the President 
     follows the procedures set forth in paragraph (2), and 
     submits the report described in paragraph (1), for each such 
     renewal.
       (b) Contents of Waiver Reports.--Each report submitted 
     under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of sanctions 
     under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 with respect to a person, or 
     the renewal of such a waiver, shall include--
       (1) a specific and detailed rationale for the determination 
     that the waiver is vital to the national security interests 
     of the United States;
       (2) a description of the activity that resulted in the 
     person being subject to sanctions;
       (3) an explanation of any efforts made by the United 
     States, as applicable, to secure the cooperation of the 
     government with primary jurisdiction over the person or the 
     location where the activity described in paragraph (2) 
     occurred in terminating or, as appropriate, penalizing the 
     activity; and
       (4) an assessment of the significance of the activity 
     described in paragraph (2) in contributing to the ability of 
     Iran to threaten the interests of the United States or allies 
     of the United States, develop systems capable of delivering 
     weapons of mass destruction, support acts of international 
     terrorism, or violate the human rights of any person in Iran.
       (c) Effect of Report on Waiver.--If the President submits a 
     report under subsection (a) in connection with a waiver of 
     sanctions under section 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 with respect to a 
     person, or the renewal of such a waiver, the President shall 
     not be required to impose or maintain sanctions under section 
     4, 5, 6, 7, or 8, as applicable, with respect to the person 
     described in the report during the 30-day period referred to 
     in subsection (a).

    TITLE II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND 
               COMBATING TERRORISM AND ILLICIT FINANCING

     SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Countering Russian 
     Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017''.

 Subtitle A--Sanctions and Other Measures With Respect to the Russian 
                               Federation

     SEC. 211. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued 
     Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to 
     blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to 
     impose sanctions on those determined to be undermining 
     democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine or 
     threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and 
     territorial integrity of Ukraine. President Obama 
     subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 
     15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons 
     contributing to the situation in Ukraine) and Executive Order 
     13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of 
     additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine) 
     to expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine.
       (2) On December 18, 2014, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 
     of 2014 was enacted (Public Law 113-272; 22 U.S.C. 8921 et 
     seq.), which includes provisions directing the President to 
     impose sanctions on foreign persons that the President 
     determines to be entities owned or controlled by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation or nationals of the 
     Russian Federation that manufacture, sell, transfer, or 
     otherwise provide certain defense articles into Syria.
       (3) On April 1, 2015, President Obama issued Executive 
     Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to blocking the 
     property of certain persons engaging in significant malicious 
     cyber-enabled activities), which authorizes the Secretary of 
     the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and 
     the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on persons 
     determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking.
       (4) On July 26, 2016, President Obama approved a 
     Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident 
     Coordination, which states, ``certain cyber incidents that 
     have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, 
     or the broader economy require a unique approach to response 
     efforts''.
       (5) On December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex 
     to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on the 
     following entities and individuals:
       (A) The Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as 
     Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow, 
     Russian Federation.
       (B) The Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya 
     Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian 
     Federation.
       (C) The Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd. 
     Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg, 
     Russian Federation.
       (D) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, 
     Russian Federation.
       (E) The autonomous noncommercial organization known as the 
     Professional Association of Designers of Data Processing 
     Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) in Moscow, Russian 
     Federation.
       (F) Igor Valentinovich Korobov.
       (G) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov.
       (H) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov.

[[Page S3517]]

       (I) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev.
       (6) On January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States 
     intelligence community entitled, ``Assessing Russian 
     Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections'' stated, 
     ``Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence 
     campaign in 2016 aimed at the United States presidential 
     election.'' The assessment warns that ``Moscow will apply 
     lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the 
     U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts 
     worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election 
     processes''.

     SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President--
       (1) should engage to the fullest extent possible with 
     partner governments with regard to closing loopholes, 
     including the allowance of extended prepayment for the 
     delivery of goods and commodities and other loopholes, in 
     multilateral and unilateral restrictive measures against the 
     Russian Federation, with the aim of maximizing alignment of 
     those measures; and
       (2) should increase efforts to vigorously enforce 
     compliance with sanctions in place as of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act with respect to the Russian Federation 
     in response to the crisis in eastern Ukraine, cyber 
     intrusions and attacks, and human rights violators in the 
     Russian Federation.

 PART I--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE 
                           RUSSIAN FEDERATION

     SEC. 215. SHORT TITLE.

       The part may be cited as the ``Russia Sanctions Review Act 
     of 2017''.

     SEC. 216. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATING TO 
                   SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Submission to Congress of Proposed Action.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership a report that describes the 
     proposed action and the reasons for that action.
       (2) Actions described.--
       (A) In general.--An action described in this paragraph is--
       (i) an action to terminate the application of any sanctions 
     described in subparagraph (B);
       (ii) with respect to sanctions described in subparagraph 
     (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an 
     action to waive the application of those sanctions with 
     respect to that person; or
       (iii) a licensing action that significantly alters United 
     States' foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
       (B) Sanctions described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subparagraph are--
       (i) sanctions provided for under--

       (I) this title or any provision of law amended by this 
     title, including the Executive Orders codified under section 
     222;
       (II) the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, 
     and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 
     et seq.); or
       (III) the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
     8921 et seq.); and

       (ii) the prohibition on access to the properties of the 
     Government of the Russian Federation located in Maryland and 
     New York that the President ordered vacated on December 29, 
     2016.
       (3) Description of type of action.--Each report submitted 
     under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in 
     paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the 
     action--
       (A) is not intended to significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation; or
       (B) is intended to significantly alter United States 
     foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.
       (4) Inclusion of additional matter.--
       (A) In general.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     that relates to an action that is intended to significantly 
     alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian 
     Federation shall include a description of--
       (i) the significant alteration to United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation;
       (ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions 
     affected by the action were initially imposed.
       (B) Requests from banking and financial services 
     committees.--The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services 
     of the House of Representatives may request the submission to 
     the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and 
     (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted 
     under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not 
     intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy 
     with regard to the Russian Federation.
       (b) Period for Review by Congress.--
       (1) In general.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
     beginning on the date on which the President submits a report 
     under subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that 
     is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee 
     on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
     Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and 
     briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully 
     review the report; and
       (B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that 
     is intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation, the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as 
     appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain 
     information in order to fully review the report.
       (2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under 
     paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under 
     subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is 
     submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in 
     any calendar year.
       (3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional 
     review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     during the period for congressional review provided for under 
     paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
     proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including 
     any additional period for such review as applicable under the 
     exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not 
     take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with 
     respect to that action is enacted in accordance with 
     subsection (c).
       (4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration 
     of a joint resolution of disapproval.--Notwithstanding any 
     other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval 
     relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
     proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes 
     both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), 
     the President may not take that action for a period of 12 
     calendar days after the date of passage of the joint 
     resolution of disapproval.
       (5) Limitation on actions during congressional 
     reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint 
     resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted 
     under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in 
     subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in 
     accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the 
     joint resolution, the President may not take that action for 
     a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the 
     President's veto.
       (6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of 
     disapproval.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if 
     a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report 
     submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action 
     described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with 
     subsection (c), the President may not take that action.
       (c) Joint Resolutions of Disapproval or Approval Defined.--
     In this subsection:
       (1) Joint resolution of approval.--The term ``joint 
     resolution of approval'' means only a joint resolution of 
     either House of Congress--
       (A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution 
     approving the President's proposal to take an action relating 
     to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the 
     Russian Federation.''; and
       (B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     the following: ``Congress approves of the action relating to 
     the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the 
     Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report 
     submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to 
     ________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the 
     appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with 
     a short description of the proposed action.
       (2) Joint resolution of disapproval.--The term ``joint 
     resolution of disapproval'' means only a joint resolution of 
     either House of Congress--
       (A) the title of which is as follows: ``A joint resolution 
     disapproving the President's proposal to take an action 
     relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect 
     to the Russian Federation.''; and
       (B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     the following: ``Congress disapproves of the action relating 
     to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the 
     Russian Federation proposed by the President in the report 
     submitted to Congress under section 216(a)(1) of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017 on _______ relating to 
     ________.'', with the first blank space being filled with the 
     appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with 
     a short description of the proposed action.
       (3) Introduction.--During the period of 30 calendar days 
     provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any 
     additional period as applicable under the exception provided 
     in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval may be introduced--
       (A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader 
     or the minority leader; and
       (B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority 
     leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the minority 
     leader's designee).
       (4) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--
       (A) Reporting and discharge.--If a committee of the House 
     of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or 
     joint resolution of disapproval has been referred

[[Page S3518]]

     has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days 
     after the date of referral, that committee shall be 
     discharged from further consideration of the joint 
     resolution.
       (B) Proceeding to consideration.--Beginning on the third 
     legislative day after each committee to which a joint 
     resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has 
     been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or 
     has been discharged from further consideration of the joint 
     resolution, it shall be in order to move to proceed to 
     consider the joint resolution in the House. All points of 
     order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not 
     be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to 
     proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall 
     be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption 
     without intervening motion. The motion shall not be 
     debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the 
     motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
       (C) Consideration.--The joint resolution of approval or 
     joint resolution of disapproval shall be considered as read. 
     All points of order against the joint resolution and against 
     its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be 
     considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final 
     passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate 
     equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint 
     resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to 
     reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall 
     not be in order.
       (5) Consideration in the senate.--
       (A) Committee referral.--A joint resolution of approval or 
     joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate 
     shall be--
       (i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs if the joint resolution relates to a report 
     under section 216 A3 that is described as an action that is 
     not intended to significantly alter United States foreign 
     policy with regard to the Russian Federation; and
       (ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations if the 
     joint resolution relates to a report under section 216 A3 
     that is described as an action that is intended to 
     significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect 
     to the Russian Federation.
       (B) Reporting and discharge.--If the committee to which a 
     joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of 
     disapproval was referred has not reported the joint 
     resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral 
     of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged 
     from further consideration of the joint resolution and the 
     joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       (C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule XXII 
     of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any 
     time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case 
     may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been 
     discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution 
     (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been 
     disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the 
     joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint 
     resolution (and against consideration of the joint 
     resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not 
     debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. 
     A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed 
     to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
       (D) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the 
     decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the 
     rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure 
     relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
       (E) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate 
     of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of 
     approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all 
     debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint 
     resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally 
     divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and 
     the minority leader or their designees.
       (6) Rules relating to senate and house of 
     representatives.--
       (A) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before 
     the passage by one House of a joint resolution of approval or 
     joint resolution of disapproval of that House, that House 
     receives an identical joint resolution from the other House, 
     the following procedures shall apply:
       (i) The joint resolution of the other House shall not be 
     referred to a committee.
       (ii) With respect to the joint resolution of the House 
     receiving the joint resolution from the other House--

       (I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no 
     joint resolution had been received from the other House; but
       (II) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution 
     of the other House.

       (B) Treatment of a joint resolution of other house.--If one 
     House fails to introduce a joint resolution of approval or 
     joint resolution of disapproval, a joint resolution of 
     approval or joint resolution of disapproval of the other 
     House shall be entitled to expedited procedures in that House 
     under this subsection.
       (C) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate.--If, 
     following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives 
     an identical joint resolution from the House of 
     Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the 
     appropriate Senate calendar.
       (D) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of 
     this paragraph shall not apply in the House of 
     Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint 
     resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.
       (7) Rules of house of representatives and senate.--This 
     subsection is enacted by Congress--
       (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
     and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such 
     is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, 
     but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be 
     followed in that House in the case of a joint resolution of 
     approval or joint resolution of disapproval, and supersedes 
     other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
     such rules; and
       (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
     procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.
       (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees and Leadership 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the majority and 
     minority leaders of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and 
     the minority leader of the House of Representatives.

       PART II--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

     SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

       In this part:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (2) Good.--The term ``good'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. 4618) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)).
       (3) International financial institution.--The term 
     ``international financial institution'' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 1701(c) of the International Financial 
     Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)).
       (4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to 
     conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has 
     actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the 
     circumstance, or the result.
       (5) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
     entity.
       (6) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.

     SEC. 222. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) Codification.--United States sanctions provided for in 
     Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to 
     blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 
     15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons 
     contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 
     13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of 
     additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), 
     Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to 
     blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain 
     transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine), 
     Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to 
     blocking the property of certain persons engaging in 
     significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), and 
     Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to taking 
     additional steps to address the national emergency with 
     respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), 
     as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, including with respect to all persons sanctioned 
     under such Executive Orders, shall remain in effect except as 
     provided in subsection (b).
       (b) Termination of Certain Sanctions.--Subject to section 
     216, the President may terminate the application of sanctions 
     described in subsection (a) that are imposed on a person in 
     connection with activity conducted by the person if the 
     President submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
     a notice that--
       (1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the 
     basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable 
     steps toward stopping the activity; and
       (2) the President has received reliable assurances that the 
     person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions described in subsection (a) in the future.
       (c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application under subsection (a) of 
     sanctions with respect to a person under Executive

[[Page S3519]]

     Order 13694 or 13757 only if the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number 
     and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that 
     Government.
       (d) Application of New Ukraine-related Sanctions.--The 
     President may waive the initial application under subsection 
     (a) of sanctions with respect to a person under Executive 
     Order 13660, 13661, 13662, or 13685 only if the President 
     submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement 
     to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in 
     Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of 
     Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor 
     agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

     SEC. 223. MODIFICATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 
                   13662.

       (a) Determination That Certain Entities Are Subject to 
     Sanctions.--The Secretary of the Treasury may determine that 
     a person meets one or more of the criteria in section 1(a) of 
     Executive Order 13662 if that person is a state-owned entity 
     operating in the railway, shipping, or metals and mining 
     sector of the economy of the Russian Federation.
       (b) Modification of Directive 1 With Respect to the 
     Financial Services Sector of the Russian Federation 
     Economy.--The Director of the Office of Foreign Assets 
     Control shall modify Directive 1 (as amended), dated 
     September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets 
     Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor 
     directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the conduct 
     by United States persons or persons within the United States 
     of all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other 
     dealings in new debt of longer than 14 days maturity or new 
     equity of persons determined to be subject to the directive, 
     their property, or their interests in property.
       (c) Modification of Directive 2 With Respect to the Energy 
     Sector of the Russian Federation Economy.--The Director of 
     the Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 2 
     (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office 
     of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any 
     successor directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits 
     the conduct by United States persons or persons within the 
     United States of all transactions in, provision of financing 
     for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days 
     maturity of persons determined to be subject to the 
     directive, their property, or their interests in property.
       (d) Modification of Directive 4.--The Director of the 
     Office of Foreign Assets Control shall modify Directive 4, 
     dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office of Foreign 
     Assets Control under Executive Order 13662, or any successor 
     directive, to ensure that the directive prohibits the 
     provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or 
     indirectly, by United States persons or persons within the 
     United States, of goods, services (except for financial 
     services), or technology in support of exploration or 
     production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale 
     projects--
       (1) that have the potential to produce oil;
       (2) in which a Russian energy firm is involved; and
       (3) that involve any person determined to be subject to the 
     directive or the property or interests in property of such a 
     person.

     SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES 
                   OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDERMINING 
                   CYBERSECURITY.

       (a) In General.--On and after the date that is 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall--
       (1) impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with 
     respect to any person that the President determines--
       (A) knowingly engages in significant activities undermining 
     cybersecurity against any person, including a democratic 
     institution, or government on behalf of the Government of the 
     Russian Federation; or
       (B) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act 
     for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a person 
     described in subparagraph (A);
       (2) impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 
     235 with respect to any person that the President determines 
     knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides 
     financial, material, or technological support for, or goods 
     or services (except financial services) in support of, an 
     activity described in paragraph (1)(A); and
       (3) impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 
     4(c) of the of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 
     U.S.C. 8923(c)) with respect to any person that the President 
     determines knowingly provides financial services in support 
     of an activity described in paragraph (1)(A).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted to 
     the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block 
     and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
     in property of a person determined by the President to be 
     subject to subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests 
     in property are in the United States, come within the United 
     States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
     United States person.
       (2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of visa 
     or other documentation.--In the case of an alien determined 
     by the President to be subject to subsection (a)(1), denial 
     of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the 
     alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of 
     any visa or other documentation of the alien.
       (c) Application of New Cyber Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application under subsection (a) of 
     sanctions with respect to a person only if the President 
     submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number 
     and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that 
     Government.
       (d) Significant Activities Undermining Cybersecurity 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``significant activities 
     undermining cybersecurity'' includes--
       (1) significant efforts--
       (A) to deny access to or degrade, disrupt, or destroy an 
     information and communications technology system or network; 
     or
       (B) to exfiltrate, degrade, corrupt, destroy, or release 
     information from such a system or network without 
     authorization for purposes of--
       (i) conducting influence operations; or
       (ii) causing a significant misappropriation of funds, 
     economic resources, trade secrets, personal identifications, 
     or financial information for commercial or competitive 
     advantage or private financial gain;
       (2) significant destructive malware attacks; and
       (3) significant denial of service activities.

     SEC. 225. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO SPECIAL RUSSIAN 
                   CRUDE OIL PROJECTS.

       Section 4(b)(1) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 
     (22 U.S.C. 8923(b)(1)) is amended by striking ``on and after 
     the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President may impose'' and inserting ``on and 
     after the date that is 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017, the President shall impose, unless the 
     President determines that it is not in the national interest 
     of the United States to do so,''.

     SEC. 226. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO RUSSIAN AND 
                   OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 
     U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall 
     impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the 
     national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
       (B) by striking ``on or after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act'' and inserting ``on or after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by striking ``may impose'' and inserting ``shall 
     impose, unless the President determines that it is not in the 
     national interest of the United States to do so,''; and
       (B) by striking ``on or after the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting 
     ``on or after the date that is 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017''.

     SEC. 227. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   SIGNIFICANT CORRUPTION IN THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       Section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and 
     Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908(a)) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``is 
     authorized and encouraged to'' and inserting ``shall''; and
       (B) in paragraph (1)--
       (i) by striking ``President determines is'' and inserting 
     ``President determines is, on or after the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017,''; and
       (ii) by inserting ``or elsewhere'' after ``in the Russian 
     Federation'';
       (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);
       (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``The President'' and 
     inserting ``except as provided in subsection (d), the 
     President''; and
       (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application

[[Page S3520]]

     of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person 
     only if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       ``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
       ``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       ``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
       ``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement 
     to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in 
     Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of 
     Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor 
     agreements that are agreed to by the Government of 
     Ukraine.''.

     SEC. 228. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN SANCTIONS 
                   EVADERS AND SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSERS IN THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--The Support for the Sovereignty, 
     Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act 
     of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8901 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:

     ``SEC. 10. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS THAT EVADE 
                   SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       ``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person 
     if the President determines that the foreign person 
     knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the 
     Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 
     2017--
       ``(1) materially violates, attempts to violate, conspires 
     to violate, or causes a violation of any license, order, 
     regulation, or prohibition contained in or issued pursuant to 
     any covered Executive order; or
       ``(2) facilitates significant deceptive or structured 
     transactions for or on behalf of--
       ``(A) any person subject to sanctions imposed by the United 
     States with respect to the Russian Federation; or
       ``(B) any child, spouse, parent, or sibling of an 
     individual described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the exercise of all powers granted to the 
     President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and 
     prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in 
     property of a person determined by the President to be 
     subject to subsection (a) if such property and interests in 
     property are in the United States, come within the United 
     States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
     United States person.
       ``(c) Implementation; Penalties.--
       ``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 
     205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b).
       ``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (b) or any regulation, license, or order issued to 
     carry out subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties 
     set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) 
     to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act 
     described in subsection (a) of that section.
       ``(d) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection 
     (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to 
     the appropriate congressional committees--
       ``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
       ``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       ``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act;
       ``(2) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section 
     in connection with a covered Executive order described in 
     subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of subsection (f)(1), a 
     certification that the Government of the Russian Federation 
     is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address 
     the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, 
     Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, 
     Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was 
     agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements 
     that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine; and
       ``(3) in the case of sanctions imposed under this section 
     in connection with a covered Executive order described in 
     subparagraphs (E) or (F) of subsection (f)(1), a 
     certification that the Government of the Russian Federation 
     has made significant efforts to reduce the number and 
     intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that Government.
       ``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the 
     application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a person if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       ``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; 
     and
       ``(2) a notice that--
       ``(A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(B) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.
       ``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered executive order.--The term `covered Executive 
     order' means any of the following:
       ``(A) Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating 
     to blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 
     situation in Ukraine).
       ``(B) Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating 
     to blocking property of additional persons contributing to 
     the situation in Ukraine).
       ``(C) Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; relating 
     to blocking property of additional persons contributing to 
     the situation in Ukraine).
       ``(D) Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating 
     to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting 
     certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of 
     Ukraine).
       ``(E) Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating 
     to blocking the property of certain persons engaging in 
     significant malicious cyber-enabled activities).
       ``(F) Executive Order 13757 (82 Fed. Reg. 1; relating to 
     taking additional steps to address the national emergency 
     with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled 
     activities).
       ``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 595.304 of title 31, Code 
     of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of the 
     enactment of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and 
     Eurasia Act of 2017).
       ``(3) Structured.--The term `structured', with respect to a 
     transaction, has the meaning given the term `structure' in 
     paragraph (xx) of section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of 
     Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation 
     or ruling).

     ``SEC. 11. MANDATORY IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN 
                   RIGHTS ABUSES.

       ``(a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person 
     if the President determines that the foreign person, based on 
     credible information, on or after the date of the enactment 
     of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act 
     of 2017--
       ``(1) is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for 
     ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission 
     of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly 
     occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the 
     Russian Federation;
       ``(2) materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, 
     material, or technological support for, or goods or services 
     to, a foreign person described in paragraph (1); or
       ``(3) is owned or controlled by, or acts or purports to act 
     for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a foreign person 
     described in paragraph (1).
       ``(b) Sanctions Described.--
       ``(1) Asset blocking.--The exercise of all powers granted 
     to the President by the International Emergency Economic 
     Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary 
     to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and 
     interests in property of a person determined by the President 
     to be subject to subsection (a) if such property and 
     interests in property are in the United States, come within 
     the United States, or are or come within the possession or 
     control of a United States person.
       ``(2) Exclusion from the united states and revocation of 
     visa or other documentation.--In the case of an alien 
     determined by the President to be subject to subsection (a), 
     denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, 
     the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) 
     of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), of 
     any visa or other documentation of the alien.
       ``(c) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may 
     waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection 
     (b) with respect to a person only if the President submits to 
     the appropriate congressional committees--
       ``(1) a written determination that the waiver--
       ``(A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       ``(B) will further the enforcement of this Act; and
       ``(2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made efforts to reduce serious human rights 
     abuses in territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled 
     by that Government.
       ``(d) Implementation; Penalties.--
       ``(1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 
     205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out subsection (b)(1).
       ``(2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
     violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of 
     subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued 
     to carry out subsection (b)(1) shall be subject to the 
     penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 
     of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful 
     act described in subsection (a) of that section.
       ``(e) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017,

[[Page S3521]]

     the President may terminate the application of sanctions 
     under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the 
     President submits to the appropriate congressional 
     committees--
       ``(1) a notice of and justification for the termination; 
     and
       ``(2) a notice--
       ``(A) that--
       ``(i) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future; or
       ``(B) that the President determines that insufficient basis 
     exists for the determination by the President under 
     subsection (a) with respect to the person.''.
       (b) Definition of Appropriate Congressional Committees.--
     Section 2(2) of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, 
     Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 
     U.S.C. 8901(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,'' before ``the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``the Committee on 
     Financial Services'' before ``the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs''.

     SEC. 229. NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS UNDER UKRAINE FREEDOM 
                   SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.

       (a) Sanctions Relating to Defense and Energy Sectors of the 
     Russian Federation.--Section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support 
     Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (g) and (h) as subsections 
     (h) and (i), respectively;
       (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
       ``(g) Notifications and Certifications to Congress.--
       ``(1) Imposition of sanctions.--The President shall notify 
     the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later 
     than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a 
     foreign person under subsection (a) or (b).
       ``(2) Termination of sanctions with respect to russian 
     producers, transferors, or brokers of defense articles.--
     Subject to section 216 of the Russia Sanctions Review Act of 
     2017, the President may terminate the imposition of sanctions 
     under subsection (a)(2) with respect to a foreign person if 
     the President submits to the appropriate congressional 
     committees--
       ``(A) a notice of and justification for the termination; 
     and
       ``(B) a notice that--
       ``(i) the foreign person is not engaging in the activity 
     that was the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the foreign person will not knowingly engage in activity 
     subject to sanctions under subsection (a)(2) in the 
     future.''; and
       (3) in subparagraph (B)(ii) of subsection (a)(3), by 
     striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
       (b) Sanctions on Russian and Other Foreign Financial 
     Institutions.--Section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 
     of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as subsections 
     (f) and (g), respectively;
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Notification to Congress on Imposition of 
     Sanctions.--The President shall notify the appropriate 
     congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days 
     after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign financial 
     institution under subsection (a) or (b).''; and
       (3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1), by 
     striking ``section 4(h)'' and inserting ``section 4(i)''.

     SEC. 230. STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS WITH 
                   RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) Sanctions Relating to Undermining the Peace, Security, 
     Stability, Sovereignty, or Territorial Integrity of 
     Ukraine.--Section 8 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, 
     and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
     8907) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the 
     application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a person if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a notice that--
       ``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.
       (b) Sanctions Relating to Corruption.--Section 9 of the 
     Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of 
     Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Termination.--Subject to section 216 of the Russia 
     Sanctions Review Act of 2017, the President may terminate the 
     application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to 
     a person if the President submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a notice that--
       ``(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was 
     the basis for the sanctions or has taken significant 
     verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and
       ``(2) the President has received reliable assurances that 
     the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under subsection (a) in the future.''.

     SEC. 231. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS 
                   ENGAGING IN TRANSACTIONS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   OR DEFENSE SECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--On and after the date that is 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in section 
     235 with respect to a person the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after such date of enactment, engages in a 
     significant transaction with a person that is part of, or 
     operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence 
     sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation, 
     including the Main Intelligence Agency of the General Staff 
     of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or the Federal 
     Security Service of the Russian Federation.
       (b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive 
     the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) 
     with respect to a person only if the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation has made significant efforts to reduce the number 
     and intensity of cyber intrusions conducted by that 
     Government.

     SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
                   PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--The President may impose 5 or more of the 
     sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person 
     if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an 
     investment described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or 
     provides to the Russian Federation, for the construction of 
     Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, 
     information, or support described in subsection (c)--
       (1) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or 
     more; or
       (2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair 
     market value of $5,000,000 or more.
       (b) Investment Described.--An investment described in this 
     subsection is an investment that directly and significantly 
     contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian 
     Federation to construct energy export pipelines.
       (c) Goods, Services, Technology, Information, or Support 
     Described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or 
     support described in this subsection are goods, services, 
     technology, information, or support that could directly and 
     significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the 
     construction, modernization, or repair of energy pipelines by 
     the Russian Federation.

     SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR 
                   FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED 
                   ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose 5 or more of 
     the sanctions described in section 235 if the President 
     determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of 
     $10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not 
     less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or 
     exceeds $10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitates 
     such an investment, if the investment directly and 
     significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian 
     Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that 
     unjustly benefits--
       (1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; 
     or
       (2) close associates or family members of those officials.
       (b) Application of New Sanctions.--The President may waive 
     the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) 
     with respect to a person only if the President submits to the 
     appropriate congressional committees--
       (1) a written determination that the waiver--
       (A) is in the vital national security interests of the 
     United States; or
       (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and
       (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian 
     Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement 
     to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in 
     Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of 
     Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor 
     agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

     SEC. 234. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSFER OF ARMS AND 
                   RELATED MATERIEL TO SYRIA.

       (a) Imposition of Sanctions.--

[[Page S3522]]

       (1) In general.--The President shall impose on a foreign 
     person the sanctions described in subsection (b) if the 
     President determines that such foreign person has, on or 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly 
     exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Syria 
     significant financial, material, or technological support 
     that contributes materially to the ability of the Government 
     of Syria to--
       (A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 
     weapons or related technologies;
       (B) acquire or develop ballistic or cruise missile 
     capabilities;
       (C) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of 
     advanced conventional weapons;
       (D) acquire significant defense articles, defense services, 
     or defense information (as such terms are defined under the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)); or
       (E) acquire items designated by the President for purposes 
     of the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of 
     the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
       (2) Applicability to other foreign persons.--The sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) shall also be imposed on any 
     foreign person that--
       (A) is a successor entity to a foreign person described in 
     paragraph (1); or
       (B) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on 
     behalf of, a foreign person described in paragraph (1).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed on a 
     foreign person described in subsection (a) are the following:
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all 
     powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of 
     section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to 
     the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions 
     in all property and interests in property of the foreign 
     person if such property and interests in property are in the 
     United States, come within the United States, or are or come 
     within the possession or control of a United States person.
       (2) Aliens ineligible for visas, admission, or parole.--
       (A) Exclusion from the united states.--If the foreign 
     person is an individual, the Secretary of State shall deny a 
     visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude 
     from the United States, the foreign person.
       (B) Current visas revoked.--
       (i) In general.--The issuing consular officer, the 
     Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or 
     a designee of one of such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa 
     or other entry documentation issued to the foreign person 
     regardless of when issued.
       (ii) Effect of revocation.--A revocation under clause (i) 
     shall take effect immediately and shall automatically cancel 
     any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the 
     possession of the foreign person.
       (c) Waiver.--Subject to section 216, the President may 
     waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with 
     respect to a person if the President determines that such a 
     waiver is in the national security interest of the United 
     States.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Financial, material, or technological support.--The 
     term ``financial, material, or technological support'' has 
     the meaning given such term in section 542.304 of title 31, 
     Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar 
     regulation or ruling).
       (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 594.304 of title 31, Code 
     of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar 
     regulation or ruling).
       (3) Syria.--The term ``Syria'' has the meaning given such 
     term in section 542.316 of title 31, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or 
     ruling).

     SEC. 235. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.

       (a) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed with 
     respect to a person under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), 
     or 233(a) are the following:
       (1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned 
     persons.--The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of 
     the United States not to give approval to the issuance of any 
     guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation 
     in the extension of credit in connection with the export of 
     any goods or services to the sanctioned person.
       (2) Export sanction.--The President may order the United 
     States Government not to issue any specific license and not 
     to grant any other specific permission or authority to export 
     any goods or technology to the sanctioned person under--
       (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601 
     et seq.) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.));
       (B) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
       (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); 
     or
       (D) any other statute that requires the prior review and 
     approval of the United States Government as a condition for 
     the export or reexport of goods or services.
       (3) Loans from united states financial institutions.--The 
     President may prohibit any United States financial 
     institution from making loans or providing credits to the 
     sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-
     month period unless the person is engaged in activities to 
     relieve human suffering and the loans or credits are provided 
     for such activities.
       (4) Loans from international financial institutions.--The 
     President may direct the United States executive director to 
     each international financial institution to use the voice and 
     vote of the United States to oppose any loan from the 
     international financial institution that would benefit the 
     sanctioned person.
       (5) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The following 
     prohibitions may be imposed against the sanctioned person if 
     that person is a financial institution:
       (A) Prohibition on designation as primary dealer.--Neither 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the 
     Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the 
     continuation of any prior designation of, the financial 
     institution as a primary dealer in United States Government 
     debt instruments.
       (B) Prohibition on service as a repository of government 
     funds.--The financial institution may not serve as agent of 
     the United States Government or serve as repository for 
     United States Government funds.
     The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or 
     (B) shall be treated as 1 sanction for purposes of subsection 
     (b), and the imposition of both such sanctions shall be 
     treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of subsection (b).
       (6) Procurement sanction.--The United States Government may 
     not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement 
     of, any goods or services from the sanctioned person.
       (7) Foreign exchange.--The President may, pursuant to such 
     regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned 
     person has any interest.
       (8) Banking transactions.--The President may, pursuant to 
     such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     transfers of credit or payments between financial 
     institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, 
     to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to 
     the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any 
     interest of the sanctioned person.
       (9) Property transactions.--The President may, pursuant to 
     such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     person from--
       (A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, 
     withdrawing, transporting, importing, or exporting any 
     property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
     States and with respect to which the sanctioned person has 
     any interest;
       (B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege 
     with respect to such property; or
       (C) conducting any transaction involving such property.
       (10) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned 
     person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or 
     guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any 
     United States person from investing in or purchasing 
     significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the 
     sanctioned person.
       (11) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may 
     direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United 
     States, any alien that the President determines is a 
     corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a 
     controlling interest in, the sanctioned person.
       (12) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The 
     President may impose on the principal executive officer or 
     officers of the sanctioned person, or on persons performing 
     similar functions and with similar authorities as such 
     officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this 
     subsection.
       (b) Sanctioned Person Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``sanctioned person'' means a person subject to sanctions 
     under section 224(a)(2), 231(b), 232(a), or 233(a).

     SEC. 236. EXCEPTIONS, WAIVER, AND TERMINATION.

       (a) Exceptions.--The provisions of this part and amendments 
     made by this part shall not apply with respect to the 
     following:
       (1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under 
     title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 
     et seq.), or any authorized intelligence activities of the 
     United States.
       (2) The admission of an alien to the United States if such 
     admission is necessary to comply with United States 
     obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations 
     and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters 
     of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 
     and entered into force November 21, 1947, under the 
     Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 
     1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967, or under other 
     international agreements.
       (b) Exception Relating to Importation of Goods.--No 
     requirement to impose sanctions under this part or an 
     amendment made by this part shall include the authority to 
     impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
       (c) Waiver of Sanctions That Are Imposed.--Subject to 
     section 216, if the President imposes sanctions with respect 
     to a person under this part or the amendments made by this 
     part, the President may waive the application of those 
     sanctions if the President determines that such a waiver is 
     in the national security interest of the United States.

[[Page S3523]]

       (d) Termination.--Subject to section 216, the President may 
     terminate the application of sanctions under section 224, 
     231, 232, 233, or 234 with respect to a person if the 
     President submits to the appropriate congressional 
     committees--
       (1) a notice of and justification for the termination; and
       (2) a notice that--
       (A) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the 
     basis for the sanctions or has taken significant verifiable 
     steps toward stopping the activity; and
       (B) the President has received reliable assurances that the 
     person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to 
     sanctions under this part in the future.

     SEC. 237. EXCEPTION RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL 
                   AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.

       (a) In General.--This Act and the amendments made by this 
     Act shall not apply with respect to activities of the 
     National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or the 
     amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize 
     the imposition of any sanction or other condition, 
     limitation, restriction, or prohibition, that directly or 
     indirectly impedes the supply by any entity of the Russian 
     Federation of any product or service, or the procurement of 
     such product or service by any contractor or subcontractor of 
     the United States or any other entity, relating to or in 
     connection with any space launch conducted for--
       (1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; or
       (2) any other non-Department of Defense customer.

     SEC. 238. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this part or the amendments made by this part 
     shall be construed--
       (1) to supersede the limitations or exceptions on the use 
     of rocket engines for national security purposes under 
     section 1608 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 
     (Public Law 113-291; 128 Stat. 3626; 10 U.S.C. 2271 note), as 
     amended by section 1607 of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1100) 
     and section 1602 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2582); or
       (2) to prohibit a contractor or subcontractor of the 
     Department of Defense from acquiring components referred to 
     in such section 1608.

                           PART III--REPORTS

     SEC. 241. REPORT ON OLIGARCHS AND PARASTATAL ENTITIES OF THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a detailed report on the following:
       (1) Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in the 
     Russian Federation, including the following:
       (A) An identification of the most significant senior 
     foreign political figures and oligarchs in the Russian 
     Federation, as determined by their closeness to the Russian 
     regime and their net worth.
       (B) An assessment of the relationship between individuals 
     identified under subparagraph (A) and President Vladimir 
     Putin or other members of the Russian ruling elite.
       (C) An identification of any indices of corruption with 
     respect to those individuals.
       (D) The estimated net worth and known sources of income of 
     those individuals and their family members (including 
     spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including assets, 
     investments, other business interests, and relevant 
     beneficial ownership information.
       (E) An identification of the non-Russian business 
     affiliations of those individuals.
       (2) Russian parastatal entities, including an assessment of 
     the following:
       (A) The emergence of Russian parastatal entities and their 
     role in the economy of the Russian Federation.
       (B) The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of 
     those entities.
       (C) The scope of the non-Russian business affiliations of 
     those entities.
       (3) The exposure of key economic sectors of the United 
     States to Russian politically exposed persons and parastatal 
     entities, including, at a minimum, the banking, securities, 
     insurance, and real estate sectors.
       (4) The likely effects of imposing debt and equity 
     restrictions on Russian parastatal entities, as well as the 
     anticipated effects of adding Russian parastatal entities to 
     the list of specially designated nationals and blocked 
     persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of 
     the Department of the Treasury.
       (5) The potential impacts of imposing secondary sanctions 
     with respect to Russian oligarchs, Russian state-owned 
     enterprises, and Russian parastatal entities, including 
     impacts on the entities themselves and on the economy of the 
     Russian Federation, as well as on the economies of the United 
     States and allies of the United States.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (2) Senior foreign political figure.--The term ``senior 
     foreign political figure'' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

     SEC. 242. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS TO INCLUDE 
                   SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report describing in detail the 
     potential effects of expanding sanctions under Directive 1 
     (as amended), dated September 12, 2014, issued by the Office 
     of Foreign Assets Control under Executive Order 13662 (79 
     Fed. Reg. 16169; relating to blocking property of additional 
     persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), or any 
     successor directive, to include sovereign debt and the full 
     range of derivative products.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may 
     contain a classified annex.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 243. REPORT ON ILLICIT FINANCE RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN 
                   FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and not later than the end of each 
     one-year period thereafter until 2021, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report describing interagency efforts in the 
     United States to combat illicit finance relating to the 
     Russian Federation.
       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     contain a summary of efforts by the United States to do the 
     following:
       (1) Identify, investigate, map, and disrupt illicit 
     financial flows linked to the Russian Federation if such 
     flows affect the United States financial system or those of 
     major allies of the United States.
       (2) Conduct outreach to the private sector, including 
     information sharing efforts to strengthen compliance efforts 
     by entities, including financial institutions, to prevent 
     illicit financial flows described in paragraph (1).
       (3) Engage and coordinate with allied international 
     partners on illicit finance, especially in Europe, to 
     coordinate efforts to uncover and prosecute the networks 
     responsible for illicit financial flows described in 
     paragraph (1), including examples of that engagement and 
     coordination.
       (4) Identify foreign sanctions evaders and loopholes within 
     the sanctions regimes of foreign partners of the United 
     States.
       (5) Expand the number of real estate geographic targeting 
     orders or other regulatory actions, as appropriate, to 
     degrade illicit financial activity relating to the Russian 
     Federation in relation to the financial system of the United 
     States.
       (6) Provide support to counter those involved in illicit 
     finance relating to the Russian Federation across all 
     appropriate law enforcement, intelligence, regulatory, and 
     financial authorities of the Federal Government, including by 
     imposing sanctions with respect to or prosecuting those 
     involved.
       (7) In the case of the Department of the Treasury and the 
     Department of Justice, investigate or otherwise develop major 
     cases, including a description of those cases.
       (c) Briefing.--After submitting a report under this 
     section, the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide 
     briefings to the appropriate congressional committees with 
     respect to that report.
       (d) Coordination.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     coordinate with the Attorney General, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     and the Secretary of State in preparing each report under 
     this section.
       (e) Form.--Each report submitted under this section shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (2) Illicit finance.--The term ``illicit finance'' means 
     the financing of terrorism,

[[Page S3524]]

     narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money laundering, or 
     other forms of illicit financing domestically or 
     internationally, as defined by the President.

     Subtitle B--Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia

     SEC. 251. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of the Russian Federation has sought to 
     exert influence throughout Europe and Eurasia, including in 
     the former states of the Soviet Union, by providing resources 
     to political parties, think tanks, and civil society groups 
     that sow distrust in democratic institutions and actors, 
     promote xenophobic and illiberal views, and otherwise 
     undermine European unity. The Government of the Russian 
     Federation has also engaged in well-documented corruption 
     practices as a means toward undermining and buying influence 
     in European and Eurasian countries.
       (2) The Government of the Russian Federation has largely 
     eliminated a once-vibrant Russian-language independent media 
     sector and severely curtails free and independent media 
     within the borders of the Russian Federation. Russian-
     language media organizations that are funded and controlled 
     by the Government of the Russian Federation and disseminate 
     information within and outside of the Russian Federation 
     routinely traffic in anti-Western disinformation, while few 
     independent, fact-based media sources provide objective 
     reporting for Russian-speaking audiences inside or outside of 
     the Russian Federation.
       (3) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to 
     violate its commitments under the Memorandum on Security 
     Assurances in connection with Ukraine's Accession to the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
     Budapest December 5, 1994, and the Conference on Security and 
     Co-operation in Europe Final Act, concluded at Helsinki 
     August 1, 1975 (commonly referred to as the ``Helsinki Final 
     Act''), which laid the ground-work for the establishment of 
     the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, of 
     which the Russian Federation is a member, by its illegal 
     annexation of Crimea in 2014, its illegal occupation of South 
     Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008, and its ongoing 
     destabilizing activities in eastern Ukraine.
       (4) The Government of the Russian Federation continues to 
     ignore the terms of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement 
     relating to Georgia, which requires the withdrawal of Russian 
     Federation troops, free access by humanitarian groups to the 
     regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and monitoring of the 
     conflict areas by the European Union Monitoring Mission.
       (5) The Government of the Russian Federation is failing to 
     comply with the terms of the Minsk Agreement to address the 
     ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, 
     Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, 
     Russia, France, and Germany, as well as the Minsk Protocol, 
     which was agreed to on September 5, 2014.
       (6) The Government of the Russian Federation is--
       (A) in violation of the Treaty between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
     Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered 
     into force June 1, 1988 (commonly known as the ``INF 
     Treaty''); and
       (B) failing to meet its obligations under the Treaty on 
     Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into 
     force January 1, 2002 (commonly known as the ``Open Skies 
     Treaty'').

     SEC. 252. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Government of the Russian Federation bears 
     responsibility for the continuing violence in Eastern 
     Ukraine, including the death on April 24, 2017, of Joseph 
     Stone, a citizen of the United States working as a monitor 
     for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe;
       (2) the President should call on the Government of the 
     Russian Federation--
       (A) to withdraw all of its forces from the territories of 
     Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova;
       (B) to return control of the borders of those territories 
     to their respective governments; and
       (C) to cease all efforts to undermine the popularly elected 
     governments of those countries;
       (3) the Government of the Russian Federation has applied, 
     and continues to apply, to the countries and peoples of 
     Georgia and Ukraine, traditional uses of force, intelligence 
     operations, and influence campaigns, which represent clear 
     and present threats to the countries of Europe and Eurasia;
       (4) in response, the countries of Europe and Eurasia should 
     redouble efforts to build resilience within their 
     institutions, political systems, and civil societies;
       (5) the United States supports the institutions that the 
     Government of the Russian Federation seeks to undermine, 
     including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
     European Union;
       (6) a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization is critical 
     to maintaining peace and security in Europe and Eurasia;
       (7) the United States should continue to work with the 
     European Union as a partner against aggression by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation, coordinating aid 
     programs, development assistance, and other counter-Russian 
     efforts;
       (8) the United States should encourage the establishment of 
     a commission for media freedom within the Council of Europe, 
     modeled on the Venice Commission regarding rule of law 
     issues, that would be chartered to provide governments with 
     expert recommendations on maintaining legal and regulatory 
     regimes supportive of free and independent media and an 
     informed citizenry able to distinguish between fact-based 
     reporting, opinion, and disinformation;
       (9) in addition to working to strengthen the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization and the European Union, the United States 
     should work with the individual countries of Europe and 
     Eurasia--
       (A) to identify vulnerabilities to aggression, 
     disinformation, corruption, and so-called hybrid warfare by 
     the Government of the Russian Federation;
       (B) to establish strategic and technical plans for 
     addressing those vulnerabilities;
       (C) to ensure that the financial systems of those countries 
     are not being used to shield illicit financial activity by 
     officials of the Government of the Russian Federation or 
     individuals in President Vladimir Putin's inner circle who 
     have been enriched through corruption;
       (D) to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption by 
     Russian actors; and
       (E) to work toward full compliance with the Convention on 
     Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
     International Business Transactions (commonly referred to as 
     the ``Anti-Bribery Convention'') of the Organization for 
     Economic Co-operation and Development; and
       (10) the President of the United States should use the 
     authority of the President to impose sanctions under--
       (A) the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 
     2012 (title IV of Public Law 112-208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note); 
     and
       (B) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
     (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 
     2656 note).

     SEC. 253. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       The United States, consistent with the principle of ex 
     injuria jus non oritur, supports the policy known as the 
     ``Stimson Doctrine'' and thus does not recognize territorial 
     changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions 
     and occupations of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Eastern 
     Ukraine, and Transnistria.

     SEC. 254. COORDINATING AID AND ASSISTANCE ACROSS EUROPE AND 
                   EURASIA.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Countering Russian Influence Fund 
     $250,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.
       (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts in the Countering Russian 
     Influence Fund shall be used to effectively implement, 
     prioritized in the following order and subject to the 
     availability of funds, the following goals:
       (1) To assist in protecting critical infrastructure and 
     electoral mechanisms from cyberattacks in the following 
     countries:
       (A) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization or the European Union that the Secretary of 
     State determines--
       (i) are vulnerable to influence by the Russian Federation; 
     and
       (ii) lack the economic capability to effectively respond to 
     aggression by the Russian Federation without the support of 
     the United States.
       (B) Countries that are participating in the enlargement 
     process of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the 
     European Union, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Kosovo, Serbia, and Ukraine.
       (2) To combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and 
     otherwise strengthen independent judiciaries and prosecutors 
     general offices in the countries described in paragraph (1).
       (3) To respond to the humanitarian crises and instability 
     caused or aggravated by the invasions and occupations of 
     Georgia and Ukraine by the Russian Federation.
       (4) To improve participatory legislative processes and 
     legal education, political transparency and competition, and 
     compliance with international obligations in the countries 
     described in paragraph (1).
       (5) To build the capacity of civil society, media, and 
     other nongovernmental organizations countering the influence 
     and propaganda of the Russian Federation to combat 
     corruption, prioritize access to truthful information, and 
     operate freely in all regions in the countries described in 
     paragraph (1).
       (6) To assist the Secretary of State in executing the 
     functions specified in section 1287(b) of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 
     114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) for the purposes of 
     recognizing, understanding, exposing, and countering 
     propaganda and disinformation efforts by foreign governments, 
     in coordination with the relevant regional Assistant 
     Secretary or Assistant Secretaries of the Department of 
     State.
       (c) Revision of Activities for Which Amounts May Be Used.--
     The Secretary of State may modify the goals described in 
     subsection (b) if, not later than 15 days before revising 
     such a goal, the Secretary notifies the appropriate 
     congressional committees of the revision.
       (d) Implementation.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, acting 
     through the Coordinator of United States Assistance to Europe 
     and Eurasia (authorized pursuant to section 601 of the 
     Support for East European Democracy

[[Page S3525]]

     (SEED) Act of 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5461) and section 102 of the 
     Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open 
     Markets Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5812)), and in 
     consultation with the Administrator for the United States 
     Agency for International Development, the Director of the 
     Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, the 
     Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board 
     of Governors, and the heads of other relevant Federal 
     agencies, coordinate and carry out activities to achieve the 
     goals described in subsection (b).
       (2) Method.--Activities to achieve the goals described in 
     subsection (b) shall be carried out through--
       (A) initiatives of the United States Government;
       (B) Federal grant programs such as the Information Access 
     Fund; or
       (C) nongovernmental or international organizations, such as 
     the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 
     National Endowment for Democracy, the Black Sea Trust, the 
     Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Prague Civil Society Centre, 
     the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic 
     Communications Centre of Excellence, the European Endowment 
     for Democracy, and related organizations.
       (3) Report on implementation.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than April 1 of each year, the 
     Secretary of State, acting through the Coordinator of United 
     States Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on the programs 
     and activities carried out to achieve the goals described in 
     subsection (b) during the preceding fiscal year.
       (B) Elements.--Each report required by subparagraph (A) 
     shall include, with respect to each program or activity 
     described in that subparagraph--
       (i) the amount of funding for the program or activity;
       (ii) the goal described in subsection (b) to which the 
     program or activity relates; and
       (iii) an assessment of whether or not the goal was met.
       (e) Coordination With Global Partners.--
       (1) In general.--In order to maximize cost efficiency, 
     eliminate duplication, and speed the achievement of the goals 
     described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall 
     ensure coordination with--
       (A) the European Union and its institutions;
       (B) the governments of countries that are members of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union; and
       (C) international organizations and quasi-governmental 
     funding entities that carry out programs and activities that 
     seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b).
       (2) Report by secretary of state.--Not later than April 1 
     of each year, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
       (A) the amount of funding provided to each country referred 
     to in subsection (b) by--
       (i) the European Union or its institutions;
       (ii) the government of each country that is a member of the 
     European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and
       (iii) international organizations and quasi-governmental 
     funding entities that carry out programs and activities that 
     seek to accomplish the goals described in subsection (b); and
       (B) an assessment of whether the funding described in 
     subparagraph (A) is commensurate with funding provided by the 
     United States for those goals.
       (f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to apply to or limit United States foreign 
     assistance not provided using amounts available in the 
     Countering Russian Influence Fund.
       (g) Ensuring Adequate Staffing for Governance Activities.--
     In order to ensure that the United States Government is 
     properly focused on combating corruption, improving rule of 
     law, and building the capacity of civil society, media, and 
     other nongovernmental organizations in countries described in 
     subsection (b)(1), the Secretary of State shall establish a 
     pilot program for Foreign Service officer positions focused 
     on governance and anticorruption activities in such 
     countries.

     SEC. 255. REPORT ON MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS CONTROLLED AND FUNDED 
                   BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report that includes a description of media 
     organizations that are controlled and funded by the 
     Government of the Russian Federation, and any affiliated 
     entities, whether operating within or outside the Russian 
     Federation, including broadcast and satellite-based 
     television, radio, Internet, and print media organizations.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 256. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS 
                   IN EUROPE AND EURASIA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on funds provided by, or funds the use of 
     which was directed by, the Government of the Russian 
     Federation or any Russian person with the intention of 
     influencing the outcome of any election or campaign in any 
     country in Europe or Eurasia during the preceding year, 
     including through direct support to any political party, 
     candidate, lobbying campaign, nongovernmental organization, 
     or civic organization.
       (b) Form of Report.--Each report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Russian Person Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``Russian person'' means--
       (1) an individual who is a citizen or national of the 
     Russian Federation; or
       (2) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian 
     Federation or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the 
     Government of the Russian Federation.

     SEC. 257. UKRANIAN ENERGY SECURITY.

       (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States--
       (1) to support the Government of Ukraine in restoring its 
     sovereign and territorial integrity;
       (2) to condemn and oppose all of the destabilizing efforts 
     by the Government of the Russian Federation in Ukraine in 
     violation of its obligations and international commitments;
       (3) to never recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by 
     the Government of the Russian Federation or the separation of 
     any portion of Ukrainian territory through the use of 
     military force;
       (4) to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from 
     further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other 
     independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
     Caucuses;
       (5) to assist in promoting reform in regulatory oversight 
     and operations in Ukraine's energy sector, including the 
     establishment and empowerment of an independent regulatory 
     organization;
       (6) to encourage and support fair competition, market 
     liberalization, and reliability in Ukraine's energy sector;
       (7) to help Ukraine and United States allies and partners 
     in Europe reduce their dependence on Russian energy 
     resources, especially natural gas, which the Government of 
     the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce, 
     intimidate, and influence other countries;
       (8) to work with European Union member states and European 
     Union institutions to promote energy security through 
     developing diversified and liberalized energy markets that 
     provide diversified sources, suppliers, and routes;
       (9) to continue to oppose the NordStream 2 pipeline given 
     its detrimental impacts on the European Union's energy 
     security, gas market development in Central and Eastern 
     Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine; and
       (10) that the United States Government should prioritize 
     the export of United States energy resources in order to 
     create American jobs, help United States allies and partners, 
     and strengthen United States foreign policy.
       (b) Plan To Promote Energy Security in Ukraine.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
     with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
     International Development and the Secretary of Energy, shall 
     work with the Government of Ukraine to develop a plan to 
     increase energy security in Ukraine, increase the amount of 
     energy produced in Ukraine, and reduce Ukraine's reliance on 
     energy imports from the Russian Federation.
       (2) Elements.--The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall 
     include strategies for market liberalization, effective 
     regulation and oversight, supply diversification, energy 
     reliability, and energy efficiency, such as through 
     supporting--
       (A) the promotion of advanced technology and modern 
     operating practices in Ukraine's oil and gas sector;
       (B) modern geophysical and meteorological survey work as 
     needed followed by international tenders to help attract 
     qualified investment into exploration and development of 
     areas with untapped resources in Ukraine;
       (C) a broadening of Ukraine's electric power transmission 
     interconnection with Europe;
       (D) the strengthening of Ukraine's capability to maintain 
     electric power grid stability and reliability;
       (E) independent regulatory oversight and operations of 
     Ukraine's gas market and electricity sector;
       (F) the implementation of primary gas law including 
     pricing, tariff structure, and legal regulatory 
     implementation;
       (G) privatization of government owned energy companies 
     through credible legal frameworks and a transparent process 
     compliant with international best practices;
       (H) procurement and transport of emergency fuel supplies, 
     including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;
       (I) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning, 
     crisis response, and public outreach;
       (J) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of 
     fuel supplies;
       (K) repair of power generating or power transmission 
     equipment or facilities; and
       (L) improved building energy efficiency and other measures 
     designed to reduce energy demand in Ukraine.
       (3) Reports.--
       (A) Implementation of ukraine freedom support act of 2014 
     provisions.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment

[[Page S3526]]

     of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the 
     status of implementing the provisions required under section 
     7(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
     8926(c)), including detailing the plans required under that 
     section, the level of funding that has been allocated to and 
     expended for the strategies set forth under that section, and 
     progress that has been made in implementing the strategies 
     developed pursuant to that section.
       (B) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report detailing the plan 
     developed under paragraph (1), the level of funding that has 
     been allocated to and expended for the strategies set forth 
     in paragraph (2), and progress that has been made in 
     implementing the strategies.
       (C) Briefings.--The Secretary of State, or a designee of 
     the Secretary, shall brief the appropriate congressional 
     committees not later than 30 days after the submission of 
     each report under subparagraph (B). In addition, the 
     Department of State shall make relevant officials available 
     upon request to brief the appropriate congressional 
     committees on all available information that relates directly 
     or indirectly to Ukraine or energy security in Eastern 
     Europe.
       (D) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
     paragraph, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (i) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
       (c) Supporting Efforts of Countries in Europe and Eurasia 
     To Decrease Their Dependence on Russian Sources of Energy.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (A) The Government of the Russian Federation uses its 
     strong position in the energy sector as leverage to 
     manipulate the internal politics and foreign relations of the 
     countries of Europe and Eurasia.
       (B) This influence is based not only on the Russian 
     Federation's oil and natural gas resources, but also on its 
     state-owned nuclear power and electricity companies.
       (2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (A) the United States should assist the efforts of the 
     countries of Europe and Eurasia to enhance their energy 
     security through diversification of energy supplies in order 
     to lessen dependencies on Russian Federation energy resources 
     and state-owned entities; and
       (B) the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the 
     Overseas Private Investment Corporation should play key roles 
     in supporting critical energy projects that contribute to 
     that goal.
       (3) Use of countering russian influence fund to provide 
     technical assistance.--Amounts in the Countering Russian 
     Influence Fund pursuant to section 254 shall be used to 
     provide technical advice to countries described in subsection 
     (b)(1) of such section designed to enhance energy security 
     and lessen dependence on energy from Russian Federation 
     sources.
       (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Department of State a total of 
     $30,000,000 for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 to carry out the 
     strategies set forth in subsection (b)(2) and other 
     activities under this section related to the promotion of 
     energy security in Ukraine.
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed as affecting the responsibilities required and 
     authorities provided under section 7 of the Ukraine Freedom 
     Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8926).

     SEC. 258. TERMINATION.

       The provisions of this subtitle shall terminate on the date 
     that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 259. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

       Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle, the term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

         Subtitle C--Combating Terrorism and Illicit Financing

  PART I--NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORIST AND OTHER ILLICIT 
                               FINANCING

     SEC. 261. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

       (a) In General.--The President, acting through the 
     Secretary, shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, 
     the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     the Director of National Intelligence, and the appropriate 
     Federal banking agencies and Federal functional regulators, 
     develop a national strategy for combating the financing of 
     terrorism and related forms of illicit finance.
       (b) Transmittal to Congress.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive national 
     strategy developed in accordance with subsection (a).
       (2) Updates.--Not later than January 31, 2020, and January 
     31, 2022, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees updated versions of the national 
     strategy submitted under paragraph (1).
       (c) Separate Presentation of Classified Material.--Any part 
     of the national strategy that involves information that is 
     properly classified under criteria established by the 
     President shall be submitted to Congress separately in a 
     classified annex and, if requested by the chairman or ranking 
     member of one of the appropriate congressional committees, as 
     a briefing at an appropriate level of security.

     SEC. 262. CONTENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY.

       The strategy described in section 261 shall contain the 
     following:
       (1) Evaluation of existing efforts.--An assessment of the 
     effectiveness of and ways in which the United States is 
     currently addressing the highest levels of risk of various 
     forms of illicit finance, including those identified in the 
     documents entitled ``2015 National Money Laundering Risk 
     Assessment'' and ``2015 National Terrorist Financing Risk 
     Assessment'', published by the Department of the Treasury and 
     a description of how the strategy is integrated into, and 
     supports, the broader counter terrorism strategy of the 
     United States.
       (2) Goals, objectives, and priorities.--A comprehensive, 
     research-based, long-range, quantifiable discussion of goals, 
     objectives, and priorities for disrupting and preventing 
     illicit finance activities within and transiting the 
     financial system of the United States that outlines 
     priorities to reduce the incidence, dollar value, and effects 
     of illicit finance.
       (3) Threats.--An identification of the most significant 
     illicit finance threats to the financial system of the United 
     States.
       (4) Reviews and proposed changes.--Reviews of enforcement 
     efforts, relevant regulations and relevant provisions of law 
     and, if appropriate, discussions of proposed changes 
     determined to be appropriate to ensure that the United States 
     pursues coordinated and effective efforts at all levels of 
     government, and with international partners of the United 
     States, in the fight against illicit finance.
       (5) Detection and prosecution initiatives.--A description 
     of efforts to improve, as necessary, detection and 
     prosecution of illicit finance, including efforts to ensure 
     that--
       (A) subject to legal restrictions, all appropriate data 
     collected by the Federal Government that is relevant to the 
     efforts described in this section be available in a timely 
     fashion to--
       (i) all appropriate Federal departments and agencies; and
       (ii) as appropriate and consistent with section 314 of the 
     International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-
     Terrorism Act of 2001 (31 U.S.C. 5311 note), to financial 
     institutions to assist the financial institutions in efforts 
     to comply with laws aimed at curbing illicit finance; and
       (B) appropriate efforts are undertaken to ensure that 
     Federal departments and agencies charged with reducing and 
     preventing illicit finance make thorough use of publicly 
     available data in furtherance of this effort.
       (6) The role of the private financial sector in prevention 
     of illicit finance.--A discussion of ways to enhance 
     partnerships between the private financial sector and Federal 
     departments and agencies with regard to the prevention and 
     detection of illicit finance, including--
       (A) efforts to facilitate compliance with laws aimed at 
     stopping such illicit finance while maintaining the 
     effectiveness of such efforts; and
       (B) providing guidance to strengthen internal controls and 
     to adopt on an industry-wide basis more effective policies.
       (7) Enhancement of intergovernmental cooperation.--A 
     discussion of ways to combat illicit finance by enhancing--
       (A) cooperative efforts between and among Federal, State, 
     and local officials, including State regulators, State and 
     local prosecutors, and other law enforcement officials; and
       (B) cooperative efforts with and between governments of 
     countries and with and between multinational institutions 
     with expertise in fighting illicit finance, including the 
     Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group of Financial 
     Intelligence Units.
       (8) Trend analysis of emerging illicit finance threats.--A 
     discussion of and data regarding trends in illicit finance, 
     including evolving forms of value transfer such as so-called 
     cryptocurrencies, other methods that are computer, 
     telecommunications, or Internet-based, cyber crime, or any 
     other threats that the Secretary may choose to identify.
       (9) Budget priorities.--A multiyear budget plan that 
     identifies sufficient resources needed to successfully 
     execute the full range of missions called for in this 
     section.
       (10) Technology enhancements.--An analysis of current and 
     developing ways to leverage technology to improve the 
     effectiveness

[[Page S3527]]

     of efforts to stop the financing of terrorism and other forms 
     of illicit finance, including better integration of open-
     source data.

    PART II--ENHANCING ANTITERRORISM TOOLS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                                TREASURY

     SEC. 271. IMPROVING ANTITERROR FINANCE MONITORING OF FUNDS 
                   TRANSFERS.

       (a) Study.--
       (1) In general.--To improve the ability of the Department 
     of the Treasury to better track cross-border fund transfers 
     and identify potential financing of terrorist or other forms 
     of illicit finance, the Secretary shall carry out a study to 
     assess--
       (A) the potential efficacy of requiring banking regulators 
     to establish a pilot program to provide technical assistance 
     to depository institutions and credit unions that wish to 
     provide account services to money services businesses serving 
     individuals in Somalia;
       (B) whether such a pilot program could be a model for 
     improving the ability of United States persons to make 
     legitimate funds transfers through transparent and easily 
     monitored channels while preserving strict compliance with 
     the Bank Secrecy Act (Public Law 91-508; 84 Stat. 1114) and 
     related controls aimed at stopping money laundering and the 
     financing of terrorism; and
       (C) consistent with current legal requirements regarding 
     confidential supervisory information, the potential impact of 
     allowing money services businesses to share certain State 
     examination information with depository institutions and 
     credit unions, or whether another appropriate mechanism could 
     be identified to allow a similar exchange of information to 
     give the depository institutions and credit unions a better 
     understanding of whether an individual money services 
     business is adequately meeting its anti-money laundering and 
     counter-terror financing obligations to combat money 
     laundering, the financing of terror, or related illicit 
     finance.
       (2) Public input.--The Secretary should solicit and 
     consider public input as appropriate in developing the study 
     required under subsection (a).
       (b) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that 
     contains all findings and determinations made in carrying out 
     the study required under subsection (a).

     SEC. 272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
                   REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING INTELLIGENCE.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary, acting 
     through the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
     Crimes, should intensify work with foreign partners to help 
     the foreign partners develop intelligence analytic 
     capacities, in a financial intelligence unit, finance 
     ministry, or other appropriate agency, that are--
       (1) commensurate to the threats faced by the foreign 
     partner; and
       (2) designed to better integrate intelligence efforts with 
     the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
     regimes of the foreign partner.

     SEC. 273. EXAMINING THE COUNTER-TERROR FINANCING ROLE OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY IN EMBASSIES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
     the House of Representatives a report that contains--
       (1) a list of the United States embassies in which a full-
     time Department of the Treasury financial attache is 
     stationed and a description of how the interests of the 
     Department of the Treasury relating to terrorist financing 
     and money laundering are addressed (via regional attaches or 
     otherwise) at United States embassies where no such attaches 
     are present;
       (2) a list of the United States embassies at which the 
     Department of the Treasury has assigned a technical 
     assistance advisor from the Office of Technical Assistance of 
     the Department of the Treasury;
       (3) an overview of how Department of the Treasury financial 
     attaches and technical assistance advisors assist in efforts 
     to counter illicit finance, to include money laundering, 
     terrorist financing, and proliferation financing; and
       (4) an overview of patterns, trends, or other issues 
     identified by the Department of the Treasury and whether 
     resources are sufficient to address these issues.

     SEC. 274. INCLUSION OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

       (a) In General.--Section 101(c)(1) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(c)(1)) is amended by inserting 
     ``the Secretary of the Treasury,'' before ``and such other 
     officers''.
       (b) Rule of Construction.--The amendment made by subsection 
     (a) may not be construed to authorize the National Security 
     Council to have a professional staff level that exceeds the 
     limitation set forth under section 101(e)(3) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021(e)(3)).

     SEC. 275. INCLUSION OF ALL FUNDS.

       (a) In General.--Section 5326 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in the heading of such section, by striking ``coin and 
     currency'';
       (2) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``subtitle and'' and inserting ``subtitle 
     or to''; and
       (B) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``United States coins 
     or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the 
     Secretary may describe in such order)'' and inserting ``funds 
     (as the Secretary may describe in such order),''; and
       (3) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``coins or currency 
     (or monetary instruments)'' and inserting ``funds''; and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``coins or currency (or 
     such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may describe 
     in the regulation or order)'' and inserting ``funds (as the 
     Secretary may describe in the regulation or order)''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for chapter 
     53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended in the item 
     relating to section 5326 by striking ``coin and currency''.

                         PART III--DEFINITIONS

     SEC. 281. DEFINITIONS.

       In this subtitle--
       (1) the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Armed 
     Services, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland 
     Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
     Committee on the Judiciary, Committee on Homeland Security, 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (2) the term ``appropriate Federal banking agencies'' has 
     the meaning given the term in section 3 of the Federal 
     Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813);
       (3) the term ``Bank Secrecy Act'' means--
       (A) section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
     U.S.C. 1829b);
       (B) chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 
     1951 et seq.); and
       (C) subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States 
     Code;
       (4) the term ``Federal functional regulator'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 509 of the Gramm-Leach-
     Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6809);
       (5) the term ``illicit finance'' means the financing of 
     terrorism, narcotics trafficking, or proliferation, money 
     laundering, or other forms of illicit financing domestically 
     or internationally, as defined by the President;
       (6) the term ``money services business'' has the meaning 
     given the term under section 1010.100 of title 31, Code of 
     Federal Regulations;
       (7) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of the 
     Treasury; and
       (8) the term ``State'' means each of the several States, 
     the District of Columbia, and each territory or possession of 
     the United States.

                    Subtitle D--Rule of Construction

     SEC. 291. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this title or the amendments made by this title 
     (other than sections 216 and 236(b)) shall be construed to 
     limit the authority of the President under the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

     SEC. 292. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF 
                   ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) The principle of collective defense of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is immortalized in 
     Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which members 
     pledge that ``an armed attack against one or more of them in 
     Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
     them all''.
       (2) For almost 7 decades, the principle of collective 
     defense has effectively served as a strategic deterrent for 
     the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     and provided stability throughout the world, strengthening 
     the security of the United States and all 28 other member 
     nations.
       (3) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in 
     New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the Alliance agreed 
     to invoke Article 5 for the first time, affirming its 
     commitment to collective defense.
       (4) Countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization have made historic contributions and sacrifices 
     while combating terrorism in Afghanistan through the 
     International Security Assistance Force and the Resolute 
     Support Mission.
       (5) The recent attacks in the United Kingdom underscore the 
     importance of an international alliance to combat hostile 
     nation states and terrorist groups.
       (6) At the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, the member countries 
     of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided that all 
     countries that are members of NATO would spend an amount 
     equal to 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense 
     by 2024.

[[Page S3528]]

       (7) Collective defense unites the 29 members of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization, each committing to protecting 
     and supporting one another from external adversaries, which 
     bolsters the North Atlantic Alliance.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
       (1) to express the vital importance of Article 5 of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty, the charter of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization, as it continues to serve as a critical 
     deterrent to potential hostile nations and terrorist 
     organizations;
       (2) to remember the first and only invocation of Article 5 
     by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of the 
     United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
     2001;
       (3) to affirm that the United States remains fully 
     committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will 
     honor its obligations enshrined in Article 5; and
       (4) to condemn any threat to the sovereignty, territorial 
     integrity, freedom, or democracy of any country that is a 
     member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                           Amendment No. 255

  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
title amendment at the desk be agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 255) was agreed to, as follows:

       Amend the title so as to read:
       ``An Act to Provide Congressional Review and to Counter 
     Iranian and Russian Governments' Aggression.''

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