[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 100 (Tuesday, June 13, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3458-S3459]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 234. Mr. PERDUE submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by
him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the appropriate place, insert the following:
SEC. ___. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR
AND BALLISTIC MISSILE COOPERATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Iran developed a close working relationship with North
Korea on many ballistic missile programs, dating back to an
acquisition of Scud missiles from North Korea in the mid-
1980s.
(2) By the mid-1980s North Korea reverse-engineered Scud B
missiles originally received from Egypt, and developed the
500-kilometer range Scud C missile in 1991, and sold both the
Scud B and Scud C, as well as missile production technology,
to Iran.
(3) In 1992, then-Director of the Central Intelligence
Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress, identified Iran as a
recipient of North Korean Scud missiles.
(4) In 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence James
Woolsey provided more detail, stating that North Korea had
sold Iran extended range Scud C missiles and agreed to sell
other forms of missile technology.
(5) Annual threat assessments from the intelligence
community during the 1990s showed that North Korea's ongoing
export of ballistic missiles provided a qualitative increase
in capabilities to countries such as Iran.
(6) The same threat assessments noted that Iran was using
North Korean ballistic missile goods and services to achieve
its goal of self-sufficiency in the production of medium-
range ballistic missiles.
(7) The intelligence community assessed in the 1990s that
Iran's acquisition of missile systems or key missile-related
components could improve Iran's ability to produce an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
(8) Throughout the 2000s, the intelligence community
continued to assess that North Korean cooperation with Iran's
ballistic missile program was ongoing and significant.
(9) In 2007 a failed missile test in Syria caused the death
of Syrian, Iranian, and North Korean experts.
(10) North Korea built the nuclear reactor in Syria that
was bombed in 2007. Syria failed to report the construction
of the reactor to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which was Syria's obligation under its safeguards
agreement with the agency.
(11) Official sources confirm that Iran and North Korea
have engaged in various forms of clandestine nuclear
cooperation.
(12) North Korea and Iran obtained designs and materials
related to uranium enrichment from a clandestine procurement
network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan.
(13) In the early 2000s, North Korea exported, with the
assistance of Abdul Qadeer Khan, uranium hexafluoride (UF6)
gas to Libya, which was intended to be used in Libya's
clandestine nuclear weapons program.
(14) On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth
nuclear weapons test.
(15) On September 9, 2016, North Korea conducted its fifth
nuclear weapons test.
(16) Iranian officials reportedly traveled to North Korea
to witness its three previous nuclear tests in 2006, 2009,
and 2013.
(17) Before North Korea's 2013 test, a senior American
official was quoted as saying ``it's very possible that North
Koreans are testing for two countries''.
(18) In September 2012, Iran and North Korea signed an
agreement for technological and scientific cooperation.
(19) In an April 2015 interview with CNN, then-Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter said that North Korea and Iran ``could
be'' cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon.
(20) On March 11, 2017, Director of National Intelligence
Dan Coats provided written testimony to Congress that stated
that Pyongyang's ``export of ballistic missiles and
associated materials to several countries, including Iran and
Syria, and its assistance to Syria's construction of a
nuclear reactor . . . illustrate its willingness to
proliferate dangerous technologies''.
(21) A 2016 Congressional Research Service report confirmed
that ``ballistic missile technology cooperation between the
two [Iran and North Korea] is significant and meaningful''.
(22) Admiral Bill Gortney, Commander of United States
Northern Command, testified to Congress on April 14, 2016,
that ``Iran's continuing pursuit of long-range missile
capabilities and ballistic missile and space launch programs,
in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions,
remains a serious concern''.
(23) Iran has engaged in nuclear technology cooperation
with North Korea.
(24) It has been suspected for over a decade that Iran and
North Korea are working together on nuclear weapons
development.
(25) Since the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277) repealed requirements for the
intelligence community to provide unclassified annual report
to Congress on the ``Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions'', the number of unclassified reports to Congress
on nuclear-weapons issues decreased considerably.
(26) North Korea's cooperation with Iran on nuclear weapon
development is widely suspected, but has yet to be detailed
by the President to Congress.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea
represent a serious threat to allies of the United States in
the Middle East, Europe, and Asia, members of the Armed
Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United
States;
(2) further cooperation between Iran and North Korea on
nuclear weapons or ballistic missile technology is not in the
security interests of the United States or our allies;
(3) the testing and production by Iran of ballistic
missiles capable of carrying a nuclear device is a clear
violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231
(2015), which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations
Security Council and supported by the international
community; and
(4) Iran is using its space launch program to develop the
capabilities necessary to deploy an intercontinental
ballistic missile that could threaten the United States, and
[[Page S3459]]
the Director of National Intelligence has assessed that Iran
would use ballistic missiles as its ``preferred method of
delivering nuclear weapons''.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, and the heads of other relevant agencies,
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report on nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation between
the Government of Iran and the Government of the Democratic
People's Republic of North Korea, including the identity of
Iranian and North Korean persons that have knowingly engaged
in or directed the provision of material support or the
exchange of information between the Government of Iran and
the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of North
Korea on their respective nuclear programs.
(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
(3) Appropriate committees of congress defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
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