[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 98 (Thursday, June 8, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3366-S3367]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 226. Mr. VAN HOLLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed
by him to the bill S. 722, to impose sanctions with respect to Iran in
relation to Iran's ballistic missile program, support for acts of
international terrorism, and violations of human rights, and for other
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
At the end of the bill, add the following:
SEC. 13. STRENGTHENING ALLIED CYBERSECURITY.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Strengthening Allied Cybersecurity Act of 2017''.
(b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In January 2017, the Director of National Intelligence
(referred to in this Act as the ``DNI''), in coordination
with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (referred to in this Act as the ``FBI''), and
the National Security Agency, judged with high confidence
that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence
campaign aimed at the 2016 United States presidential
election.
(2) The DNI report stated, ``[The Department of Homeland
Security] assesses that the types of systems Russian actors
targeted or compromised were not involved in vote
tallying.''.
(3) On January 10, 2017, the DNI stated, in testimony
before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
``We can say that we did not see evidence of the Russians
altering vote tallies.''.
(4) On March 20, 2017, FBI Director James Comey stated, in
testimony before the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, ``We also, as a
government, supplied information to all the states so they
could equip themselves to make sure there was no successful
effort to affect the vote and there was none, as we said
earlier.''.
[[Page S3367]]
(5) The DNI, in coordination with the Central Intelligence
Agency, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, judged
that Russia's intelligence services conducted cyber
operations against targets associated with the 2016 United
States presidential election.
(6) The DNI assessed that the Russian Government's campaign
aimed at the United States election featured--
(A) disclosures of data obtained through Russian cyber
operations;
(B) intrusions into United States state and local election
boards; and
(C) overt propaganda.
(7) Russia's use of public disclosures of Russian-collected
data during the United States election was unprecedented.
(8) The DNI, in coordination with the Central Intelligence
Agency, the FBI, and the National Security Agency, assessed
that Russia will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered
campaign aimed at the United States presidential election to
influence future elections worldwide, including against
United States allies and their election processes.
(9) In May 2016, Germany's domestic intelligence agency
assessed that hackers linked to the Russian Government had
targeted Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic
Union party and German state computers.
(10) The head of Germany's foreign intelligence service,
Bruno Kahl, later asserted that Germany had ``evidence that
cyber-attacks are taking place that have no other purpose
than to elicit political uncertainty. The perpetrators are
interested in delegitimizing the democratic process as such,
regardless of who that ends of helping. We have indications
that [the attacks] come from the Russian region.'' In
November 2016, German Chancellor Merkel, said, ``such cyber-
attacks, or hybrid conflicts as they are known in Russian
doctrine, are now part of daily life and we must learn to
cope with them''.
(11) On May 9, 2017, Admiral Michael Rogers, United States
Cyber Command commander and Director of the National Security
Agency, testified before the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate that the United States surveilled Russian hackers
attack French computer systems as the French election
approached. In his testimony, Rogers said, ``We had talked to
our French counterparts prior to the public announcements of
the events that were publicly attributed this past weekend,
and gave them a heads up, `Look we're watching the Russians,
we're seeing them penetrate some of your infrastructure.'.''.
(12) In February 2017, the United Kingdom's Defence
Secretary Fallon stated that--
(A) all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries
must support reform ``to make NATO more agile, resilient, and
better configured to operate in the contemporary environment
including against hybrid and cyber-attacks''; and
(B) ``NATO must defend itself as effectively in the cyber
sphere as it does in the air, on land, and at sea.''.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate federal agencies.--The term ``appropriate
Federal agencies'' means--
(A) the Department of Defense;
(B) the Department of Homeland Security;
(C) the Department of Justice;
(D) the Department of the Treasury;
(E) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
and
(F) the Department of Commerce
(2) Hybrid warfare.--The term ``hybrid warfare'' means a
military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular
warfare, informational warfare, and cyber warfare.
(3) Relevant congressional committees.--The term ``relevant
congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(C) the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;
(D) the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs of the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives;
(E) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
(H) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives;
(I) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(J) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(K) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(L) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
(d) Trans-Atlantic Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of the appropriate Federal
agencies, shall develop, and submit to the relevant
congressional committees, a trans-Atlantic cybersecurity
strategy, with a classified annex, if necessary, that
includes--
(A) a plan of action to guide United States cooperation
with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to
respond to Russia's hybrid warfare against NATO allies;
(B) a plan of action to guide United States cooperation
with European partners, including non-NATO nations, to
counter Russia's cyber efforts to undermine democratic
elections in the United States and Europe;
(C) an assessment of nonmilitary tools and tactics,
including sanctions, indictments, or other actions that the
United States can use, unilaterally or in cooperation with
like-minded nations, to counter Russia's malicious cyber
activity in the United States and Europe; and
(D) a review of resources required by the Department of
State and appropriate Federal agencies to conduct activities
to build cooperation with NATO allies and European partners
on countering Russia's hybrid warfare and disinformation
efforts.
(2) Civil liberties and privacy.--The Secretary of State
shall ensure that the implementation of the strategy
described in paragraph (1) is consistent with United States
standards for civil liberties and privacy protections.
(e) Federal Cybersecurity Liaison to United States
Presidential Campaigns and Major National Political Party
Committees.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall appoint, at the rank of Executive
Assistant Director, a cybersecurity liaison for presidential
campaigns and major national political party committees, who,
at the request of presidential campaigns and major national
political party committees, shall--
(1) regularly share cybersecurity best practices and
protocols with each presidential campaign, the Democratic
National Committee, the Republican National Committee, the
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the National
Republican Senatorial Committee, the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee, and the National Republican Congressional
Committee; and
(2) provide the timely sharing of cybersecurity threats to
such campaigns and committees to prevent or mitigate adverse
effects from such cybersecurity threats.
(f) Reporting Requirement.--The Secretary of State, in
coordination with the heads of the appropriate Federal
agencies, shall submit an annual report to the relevant
congressional committees on the implementation of the trans-
Atlantic cybersecurity cooperation strategy developed under
subsection (d).
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