[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 97 (Wednesday, June 7, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3323-S3325]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                        ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control 
Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain 
proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, 
the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be 
reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the 
notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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  In keeping with the committee 's intention to see that relevant 
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unaminous consent to 
have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. 
If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is 
available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, room SD-423.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  Defense Security


                                           Cooperation Agency,

                                                    Arlington, VA.
     Hon. Bob Corker,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the reporting requirements 
     of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
     amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 16-84, 
     concerning the Department of the Army's proposed Letter(s) of 
     Offer and Acceptance for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 
     defense articles and services estimated to cost $662 million. 
     After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to 
     issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed 
     sale.
           Sincerely,
                                                       J.W. Rixey,
                                      Vice Admiral, USN, Director.
       Enclosures.


                         Transmittal No. 16-84

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as 
         amended
       (i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
       (ii) Total Estimated Value:
       Major Defense Equipment $482 million.
       Other $180 million.
       Total $662 million.
       (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
     Services under Consideration for Purchase:
       Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
       Twenty-six (26) each AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems to include 
     Solid State Phased Array Radar with KN-4083 Selective 
     Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) enhanced Land/Sea 
     Inertial Navigation System (INS) and automatic leveling 
     system.
       Eight hundred and forty (840), M931 Full Range Training 
     Round, 120mm Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire 
     exercise).
       Two thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM 
     Projectiles with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise).
       Non-MDE includes: Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 
     Systems (SINCGARS) and accessories; Defense Advanced Global 
     Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) equipment and 
     accessories; Miltope laptops and accessories; Medium Tactical 
     Vehicles FMTV M1092 5-ton trucks/chassis with support and 
     accessories; software support; support equipment; classroom 
     simulators; government furnished equipment; technical manuals 
     and publications; essential spares and repair parts; 
     consumables; live fire exercise and ammunition; tools and 
     test equipment; training; transportation; U.S. Government 
     technical support and logistic support; contractor technical 
     support; repair and return support; quality assurance teams; 
     in-country Field Service Representative (FSR) and other 
     associated equipment and services.
       (iv) Military Department: Army (ZAI).
       (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
       (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed 
     to be Paid: None.
       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense 
     Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex 
     Attached.
       (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: June 5, 2017.
       *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control 
     Act.


                          POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--AN/TPO-53(V) Radar Systems and Related Support

       The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested 
     a possible sale of twenty-six (26) AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems 
     to include Solid State Phased Array Radar with KN-4083 
     Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) enhanced 
     Land/Sea Inertial Navigation System (INS) and automatic 
     leveling system; Eight hundred and forty (840), M931, 120mm 
     Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire exercise); Two 
     thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM 
     Projectiles with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise); Single 
     Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and 
     accessories; Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) 
     Receiver (DAGR) equipment and accessories; Miltope laptops 
     and accessories; Medium Tactical Vehicles FMTV M1092 5-ton 
     trucks/chassis with support and accessories; software 
     support; support equipment; classroom simulators; government 
     furnished equipment; technical manuals and publications; 
     essential spares and repair parts; consumables; live fire 
     exercise and ammunition; tools and test equipment; training; 
     transportation; U.S. Government technical support and 
     logistic support; contractor technical support; repair and 
     return support; quality assurance teams; in-country Field 
     Service Representative (FSR) and other associated equipment 
     and services. The total estimated program cost is $662 
     million.
       This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy 
     and national security objectives of the United States by 
     helping to improve the security of an important partner which 
     has been and continues to be a leading contributor of 
     political stability and economic growth in the Middle East.
       Saudi Arabia intends to use these radars to support its 
     border security requirements and modernize its armed forces 
     with a more current capability to locate and counter the 
     source of incoming ballistic artillery, rockets, and mortars. 
     This will contribute to Saudi Arabia's goal to update its 
     military capability while further enhancing greater 
     interoperability among Saudi Arabia, the United States and 
     other allies. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing 
     this equipment into its armed forces.
       The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not 
     alter the basic military balance in the region.
       The Lockheed Martin Corporation, Liverpool, New York, is 
     the principal contractor for the AN/TPQ-53(V) Radars. There 
     are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with 
     this potential sale.
       Implementation of this proposed sale will require U.S. 
     Government or contractor representatives to travel to the 
     Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a period of four (4) months for 
     in-processing/fielding, system checkout and new equipment 
     training, as well as providing the support of two in-country 
     FSRs for two years.
       There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness 
     as a result of the proposed sale.


                         Transmittal No. 16-84

     Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to 
         Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act

                           Annex Item No. vii

       (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
       1. The AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system is a highly mobile radar 
     that automatically detects, classifies, tracks, and locates 
     the point of origin of projectiles fired from mortar, 
     artillery and rocket systems with sufficient accuracy for 
     first round fire for effect. It mitigates close combat radar 
     coverage gaps and replaces the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 
     Firefinder Radars; fully supporting Brigade Combat Teams 
     (BCT), Division Artilleries (DIVARTYs), and Field Artillery 
     (FA) Brigades. Designed to be transported by ship, trucks, 
     train, or aircraft, it is capable of deploying as part of the 
     counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar system of systems to 
     provide a sense and warn capability for fixed and semi-fixed 
     sites. The AN/TPQ-53(V) provides a net ready system with 
     increased range and accuracy throughout a 90 degree search 
     sector (stare mode) as well as 360-degree coverage 
     (rotating).
       a. The Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) hardware 
     design of the AN/TPQ-53(V) is UNCLASSIFIED. Foreign source 
     systems of similar design and capability are available in 
     advanced industrial nations such as Sweden and Israel.
       b. The AN/TPQ-53(V) software gives it an enhanced 
     capability in terms of target detection and classification in 
     an Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) environment. Release of 
     detailed knowledge of the software code or test data could 
     aid an adversary trying to identify ways of countering the 
     detection capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53(V) or improve the 
     performance of their own radar systems. Although the 
     detection, classification technology, and concept used in the 
     AN/TPQ-53(V) has been utilized for more than a decade, the 
     ability to incorporate such technology on a solid state air 
     cooled radar would be a major technological improvement. The 
     software is UNCLASSIFIED. The system is classified SECRET 
     when employed in a theater of operations.
       c. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 
     (SINCGARS) is a tactical radio providing secure jam-resistant 
     voice and data communications of command, control, targeting, 
     and technical information for the AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system. 
     The spread-spectrum frequency hopping Electronic Counter-
     Counter Measures (ECCM) technology resident in the radio is 
     sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While sensitive, the frequency-
     hopping algorithms used to generate the ECCM waveform are 
     unique to the country of ownership and cannot be manipulated 
     by potential adversaries for use or interference with other 
     countries possessing SINCGARS technology. Should a potential 
     adversary come into possession of one of these radios, they 
     would have the potential to intercept operational command, 
     control, and targeting information. This potential problem is 
     mitigated by the fact that the customer can secure 
     information passed over the radio network using a commercial 
     grade security capability equivalent to an AES 256-bit 
     encryption system whose keys are controlled by the customer 
     country.
       d. The Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) 
     Receiver (DAGR) is a handheld GPS location device with map 
     background displaying the user's location. Unlike commercial 
     grade GPS receivers capable of receiving Standard Positioning 
     Signals (SPS) from GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of 
     receiving Precise Positioning Signals (PPS). PPS satellite 
     signals provide significantly more accurate location data 
     than do SPS signals. This capability within DAGR is possible 
     due to the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module 
     (SAASM). The SAASM is an encrypted device permitting both 
     receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of preventing 
     potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display 
     incorrect location information. The SAASM capability within 
     the DAGR is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM 
     capabilities are sensitive due to the system's ability to 
     access

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     restricted PPS GPS satellite signals and to prevent spoofing. 
     While sensitive, the ability of potential adversaries to 
     exploit the system are limited. The SAASM chip goes through a 
     special process of loading encryption signals and unique 
     access codes keyed to the customer country. These processes 
     are strictly controlled by the US Air Force. If the DAGR is 
     compromised, the US Air Force can cut off the device access 
     to PPS signals and the anti-spoofing capability.
       e. The same SAASM capabilities resident in the DAGR are 
     also resident in the AN/TPQ-53(V) KN-4083 Inertial Navigation 
     System (INS). The KN-4083 is a SAASM enhanced INS capability 
     with a 3-axis Monolithic Ring Laser Gyro allowing extremely 
     accurate location as well as 3-axis accelerometer to provide 
     angular information regarding the radar position (i.e. pitch, 
     roll, and azimuth data). While inertial navigation and 
     accelerometer capabilities are well-known, the SAASM 
     capability within the system makes it sensitive but 
     UNCLASSIFIED. As with the DAGR, the US Air Force can cut off 
     access to PPS signals and anti-spoofing capabilities, 
     minimizing impacts should a potential adversary obtain the 
     system.
       2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain 
     knowledge of the specific radar hardware and software 
     elements, the information could be used to identify ways of 
     countering the detection capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53(V) 
     Radar System or improve the performance of their radar 
     systems. Testing and identification of methods to defeat the 
     AN/TPQ-53(V) ECCM capabilities would lead to improvements in 
     the overall effectiveness of an adversary's system and 
     improve their survivability.
       3. A determination has been made that Saudi Arabia can 
     provide substantially the same degree of protection for the 
     technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale 
     is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and 
     national security objectives outlined in the Policy 
     Justification.
       4. All defense articles and services listed in this 
     transmittal have been authorized for release and export to 
     the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

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