[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 97 (Wednesday, June 7, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3323-S3325]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control
Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain
proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification,
the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be
reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the
notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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In keeping with the committee 's intention to see that relevant
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unaminous consent to
have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received.
If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is
available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations
Committee, room SD-423.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Defense Security
Cooperation Agency,
Arlington, VA.
Hon. Bob Corker,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the reporting requirements
of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 16-84,
concerning the Department of the Army's proposed Letter(s) of
Offer and Acceptance for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for
defense articles and services estimated to cost $662 million.
After this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to
issue a news release to notify the public of this proposed
sale.
Sincerely,
J.W. Rixey,
Vice Admiral, USN, Director.
Enclosures.
Transmittal No. 16-84
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment $482 million.
Other $180 million.
Total $662 million.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Twenty-six (26) each AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems to include
Solid State Phased Array Radar with KN-4083 Selective
Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) enhanced Land/Sea
Inertial Navigation System (INS) and automatic leveling
system.
Eight hundred and forty (840), M931 Full Range Training
Round, 120mm Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire
exercise).
Two thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM
Projectiles with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise).
Non-MDE includes: Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio
Systems (SINCGARS) and accessories; Defense Advanced Global
Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) equipment and
accessories; Miltope laptops and accessories; Medium Tactical
Vehicles FMTV M1092 5-ton trucks/chassis with support and
accessories; software support; support equipment; classroom
simulators; government furnished equipment; technical manuals
and publications; essential spares and repair parts;
consumables; live fire exercise and ammunition; tools and
test equipment; training; transportation; U.S. Government
technical support and logistic support; contractor technical
support; repair and return support; quality assurance teams;
in-country Field Service Representative (FSR) and other
associated equipment and services.
(iv) Military Department: Army (ZAI).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Annex
Attached.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: June 5, 2017.
*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control
Act.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--AN/TPO-53(V) Radar Systems and Related Support
The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested
a possible sale of twenty-six (26) AN/TPQ-53(V) Radar Systems
to include Solid State Phased Array Radar with KN-4083
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) enhanced
Land/Sea Inertial Navigation System (INS) and automatic
leveling system; Eight hundred and forty (840), M931, 120mm
Projectiles with M781 fuzes (for live fire exercise); Two
thousand, two hundred and forty (2,240), M107, 155MM
Projectiles with M557 fuzes (for live fire exercise); Single
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and
accessories; Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS)
Receiver (DAGR) equipment and accessories; Miltope laptops
and accessories; Medium Tactical Vehicles FMTV M1092 5-ton
trucks/chassis with support and accessories; software
support; support equipment; classroom simulators; government
furnished equipment; technical manuals and publications;
essential spares and repair parts; consumables; live fire
exercise and ammunition; tools and test equipment; training;
transportation; U.S. Government technical support and
logistic support; contractor technical support; repair and
return support; quality assurance teams; in-country Field
Service Representative (FSR) and other associated equipment
and services. The total estimated program cost is $662
million.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy
and national security objectives of the United States by
helping to improve the security of an important partner which
has been and continues to be a leading contributor of
political stability and economic growth in the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia intends to use these radars to support its
border security requirements and modernize its armed forces
with a more current capability to locate and counter the
source of incoming ballistic artillery, rockets, and mortars.
This will contribute to Saudi Arabia's goal to update its
military capability while further enhancing greater
interoperability among Saudi Arabia, the United States and
other allies. Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing
this equipment into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The Lockheed Martin Corporation, Liverpool, New York, is
the principal contractor for the AN/TPQ-53(V) Radars. There
are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with
this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require U.S.
Government or contractor representatives to travel to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a period of four (4) months for
in-processing/fielding, system checkout and new equipment
training, as well as providing the support of two in-country
FSRs for two years.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of the proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 16-84
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system is a highly mobile radar
that automatically detects, classifies, tracks, and locates
the point of origin of projectiles fired from mortar,
artillery and rocket systems with sufficient accuracy for
first round fire for effect. It mitigates close combat radar
coverage gaps and replaces the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37
Firefinder Radars; fully supporting Brigade Combat Teams
(BCT), Division Artilleries (DIVARTYs), and Field Artillery
(FA) Brigades. Designed to be transported by ship, trucks,
train, or aircraft, it is capable of deploying as part of the
counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar system of systems to
provide a sense and warn capability for fixed and semi-fixed
sites. The AN/TPQ-53(V) provides a net ready system with
increased range and accuracy throughout a 90 degree search
sector (stare mode) as well as 360-degree coverage
(rotating).
a. The Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) hardware
design of the AN/TPQ-53(V) is UNCLASSIFIED. Foreign source
systems of similar design and capability are available in
advanced industrial nations such as Sweden and Israel.
b. The AN/TPQ-53(V) software gives it an enhanced
capability in terms of target detection and classification in
an Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) environment. Release of
detailed knowledge of the software code or test data could
aid an adversary trying to identify ways of countering the
detection capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53(V) or improve the
performance of their own radar systems. Although the
detection, classification technology, and concept used in the
AN/TPQ-53(V) has been utilized for more than a decade, the
ability to incorporate such technology on a solid state air
cooled radar would be a major technological improvement. The
software is UNCLASSIFIED. The system is classified SECRET
when employed in a theater of operations.
c. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
(SINCGARS) is a tactical radio providing secure jam-resistant
voice and data communications of command, control, targeting,
and technical information for the AN/TPQ-53(V) radar system.
The spread-spectrum frequency hopping Electronic Counter-
Counter Measures (ECCM) technology resident in the radio is
sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While sensitive, the frequency-
hopping algorithms used to generate the ECCM waveform are
unique to the country of ownership and cannot be manipulated
by potential adversaries for use or interference with other
countries possessing SINCGARS technology. Should a potential
adversary come into possession of one of these radios, they
would have the potential to intercept operational command,
control, and targeting information. This potential problem is
mitigated by the fact that the customer can secure
information passed over the radio network using a commercial
grade security capability equivalent to an AES 256-bit
encryption system whose keys are controlled by the customer
country.
d. The Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS)
Receiver (DAGR) is a handheld GPS location device with map
background displaying the user's location. Unlike commercial
grade GPS receivers capable of receiving Standard Positioning
Signals (SPS) from GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of
receiving Precise Positioning Signals (PPS). PPS satellite
signals provide significantly more accurate location data
than do SPS signals. This capability within DAGR is possible
due to the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module
(SAASM). The SAASM is an encrypted device permitting both
receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of preventing
potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display
incorrect location information. The SAASM capability within
the DAGR is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM
capabilities are sensitive due to the system's ability to
access
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restricted PPS GPS satellite signals and to prevent spoofing.
While sensitive, the ability of potential adversaries to
exploit the system are limited. The SAASM chip goes through a
special process of loading encryption signals and unique
access codes keyed to the customer country. These processes
are strictly controlled by the US Air Force. If the DAGR is
compromised, the US Air Force can cut off the device access
to PPS signals and the anti-spoofing capability.
e. The same SAASM capabilities resident in the DAGR are
also resident in the AN/TPQ-53(V) KN-4083 Inertial Navigation
System (INS). The KN-4083 is a SAASM enhanced INS capability
with a 3-axis Monolithic Ring Laser Gyro allowing extremely
accurate location as well as 3-axis accelerometer to provide
angular information regarding the radar position (i.e. pitch,
roll, and azimuth data). While inertial navigation and
accelerometer capabilities are well-known, the SAASM
capability within the system makes it sensitive but
UNCLASSIFIED. As with the DAGR, the US Air Force can cut off
access to PPS signals and anti-spoofing capabilities,
minimizing impacts should a potential adversary obtain the
system.
2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain
knowledge of the specific radar hardware and software
elements, the information could be used to identify ways of
countering the detection capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53(V)
Radar System or improve the performance of their radar
systems. Testing and identification of methods to defeat the
AN/TPQ-53(V) ECCM capabilities would lead to improvements in
the overall effectiveness of an adversary's system and
improve their survivability.
3. A determination has been made that Saudi Arabia can
provide substantially the same degree of protection for the
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale
is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives outlined in the Policy
Justification.
4. All defense articles and services listed in this
transmittal have been authorized for release and export to
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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