[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 79 (Monday, May 8, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2816-S2819]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. President, in addition to the Ministerial of the
Arctic Council, as I mentioned, the eyes of the world are on this--
clearly on the important issue of U.S.-China relations.
We had the recent President Trump and President Xi meeting in Mar-a-
Lago, and this week Madam Fu Ying, who is one of the top Chinese
Foreign Minister officials, is going to be in Washington to meet with a
number of us. It is something I believe this body needs to focus on
more, this important issue of U.S.-China relations.
Our country faces a lot of significant national security challenges
around the world. In my view, however, the most significant long-term,
geostrategic challenge we face is not ISIS, not al-Qaida, not Iran,
Russia, or even North Korea. Those are very serious and immediate
concerns, but the most significant long-term challenge we face as a
country is the rise of China and the threat it poses to the post-World
War II international order, led by the United States.
This has been made clear in a series of writings by the well-known
and respected Harvard professor, Graham Allison, beginning 2 years ago
in 2015. In an article in The Atlantic magazine, he started to write
about what he called the Thucydides Trap. Professor Allison is set to
publish a book this month on the same topic. In the book, he writes
that the defining question of global order for this generation is
whether China and the United States can escape the Thucydides Trap.
I have had the privilege over the last few weeks to review the book,
and I believe it will be a ``must read'' for those who care about the
long-term security and economic interests of the United States.
What is he talking about? What is this issue, the Thucydides Trap?
Why has Professor Allison been so focused on writing about it and
addressing it?
Thucydides is the famed Greek historian. Many actually view him as
the father of all history, who wrote an epic historical work about the
Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. In that 30-year war, which
devastated both of those Greek city states, the rising power, Athens,
challenged the established order of the ruling power, Sparta.
The ``Thucydides Trap'' is the term Professor Allison describes when
he talks about the strategic dilemma and danger that occurs when a
rising power threatens a ruling power in the international system. As
his new book explores, in the last 500 years when this has happened--
because it does happen a lot in history, and he reviews the last 500
years--of the 16 times this has happened in the last 500 years, 12 of
those times ended up having extensive war between the two countries.
That is not good. Those are not great odds. Indeed, in his Atlantic
article just 2 years ago, he concludes by saying that because of the
seismic shifts and friction that is occurring between China and the
United States, war between these two countries is more likely than is
recognized at the moment. That is not good news.
There is some good news on this because it is not just Harvard
professors who are talking about this, such as Professor Allison, who
is talking about the Thucydides Trap; so, too, are the Chinese.
I, with a number of Senators, had the opportunity a few years ago,
when President Xi Jinping visited the Senate, to meet with him. I went
down to the Senate floor to talk about some of the issues, some of the
ways in which we need to think about the long-term challenges with
regard to the United States and China. The article in the Atlantic had
just come out, so I talked about it, the Thucydides Trap, and how we
need to avoid it. Then I literally walked into a meeting with the
President of China and some other U.S. Senators. In his opening
remarks, he talked about the Thucydides Trap and how China and the
United States need to avoid it. So that is the good news. At least on
that issue, we are on the same sheet of paper.
There is other good news, and that is that this body--the U.S.
Senate--in many ways, is the ideal place where we should be discussing,
debating, developing, and, yes, implementing the kind of long-term
strategic policies we need to address as a country and develop with
regard to the rise of China.
In ``The Federalist Papers,'' Madison talks about one of the
important roles of the Senate, with its Members having 6-year terms and
having significant powers in foreign policy, is to be able to ensure
stable and lasting relations between the United States and other
nations. Indeed, perhaps more than any other part of the Federal
Government, this institution--the U.S. Senate--has the opportunity to
act and think and debate and implement policies--strategic policies--
for the long-term interests of our Nation.
Contrary to some conventional wisdom, where we only hear about
American ``short-termism,'' in terms of long-term foreign policy
issues, our country actually has a history of developing long-term
strategic frameworks that address significant challenges to America's
security and economic interests. Just think of the Monroe Doctrine in
the 19th century or George Kennan's strategy of containment in the 20th
century, dealing with the threat posed by the rise of the Soviet Union
and global communism. These were long-term, successful strategies for
the United States in response to significant challenges facing our
Nation, in part developed here in the U.S. Senate and implemented here,
and we can do it with regard to the challenges we are facing now with
China.
So as we work with the executive branch on developing an American
strategy to address the rise of China and to avoid the Thucydides Trap,
how should we be thinking about it? What principles should we be
focused on? Let me suggest four that we should be focused on as a
nation.
First, we must recognize and emphasize that the United States is an
Asia-Pacific power; second, we must strengthen, deepen, and expand our
comprehensive alliances with the Asia-Pacific region; third, we must
engage with, not try to contain, China; and fourth--and perhaps most
importantly--we must renew America's strength, particularly the
economic power and vitality of this great Nation.
[[Page S2817]]
I will turn to each of these principles in a bit more detail. As I
mentioned first, America is an Asia-Pacific power, and we must push
back on narratives or counterstrategies being developed in the region
that talk about Asia for Asians, which are veiled attempts to try to
exclude the United States from this dynamic region in the future, in
the orders being developed in the Asia-Pacific.
Just look at this map. Geographically, we clearly are an Asia-Pacific
nation. A few of us, about a month and a half ago, had the opportunity,
when Prime Minister Abe was visiting, to have breakfast with him, and I
reminded the Prime Minister at the breakfast that not only are they a
key ally of ours in the Asia-Pacific, but for me, as an Alaskan, they
are also a neighbor. Just look at this map. I reminded the Prime
Minister that my hometown of Anchorage is actually closer to Tokyo than
it is to Washington, DC, and having just gotten off the plane from
Anchorage, I can tell you it is a lot closer.
When we think of our forces, whether in Alaska or Guam or Hawaii, we
look at this map, and on U.S. territory, Alaska forces, based in my
great State, are, for the most part, closer to the Korean Peninsula
than forces based in Australia. So, clearly, geographically, we are an
Asia-Pacific country.
Of course, American history has been embedded in the Asia-Pacific for
centuries. During World War II, the United States led the effort to win
the war in the Pacific after the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the
bombing of Alaska, which was bombed, invaded, and occupied by the
forces of Imperial Japan. Many Americans are not familiar with that
history of the war.
It is not just geographic proximity and the battles we fought to win
World War II in the Asia-Pacific, just as important, in terms of our
heritage as an Asia-Pacific nation, are the policies we implemented
after World War II because it is now clear the United States has
underwritten the peace, prosperity, and security of this entire region
through our continued military presence, our alliances, and our
economic engagement and power in the region.
No country has done more than the United States to make the Asia-
Pacific the world's most dynamic and economically vibrant region, and
it has been the policies of our great Nation over 70 years that have
led to that. By the way, no country has benefited more from the
established order that we put forward and established in this region
than China, with the rise of China, in many ways, helped, encouraged,
and moved forward by the peace and prosperity we brought to the region.
Let me provide just one example of how the U.S. military forces in
the region have played the key role in helping keep the relative peace.
Our enduring naval presence has helped to keep the sealanes, where all
of this transportation and commerce and economic growth has occurred,
in the Asia-Pacific. That has been the U.S. Navy, for decades, doing
that. As I mentioned, all nations of the region--ours included--have
benefited from this order, and from our policies, and our commitment
and our sacrifice. All nations--including and particularly true, China
has.
So we must flatly and completely reject policies being developed in
the region or in Washington that forget our geography and our history.
The United States is an Asia-Pacific power. The United States is the
preeminent Asia-Pacific power, but many of America's core national
interests are at stake in the region, and we will be an enduring
presence in this part of the world for decades and centuries to come.
Second, with regard to how to address the rise of China and the
principles we need to think about, we must continue to strengthen,
deepen, and expand our comprehensive set of alliances in the Asia-
Pacific region that have been built over decades. Now, the United
States faces many global challenges, but one of the most critical
strategic advantages that we have as a nation, in terms of security, is
that we are an ally-rich nation and our adversaries and potential
adversaries and competitors are ally-poor. Just think about it. Look at
this map. Look through and think through all of the countries that are
either treaty allies of the United States or wanting to get closer, and
then think of other countries, including China, Russia, North Korea,
Iran--all ally-poor. This is particularly the case in Europe and the
Asia-Pacific. As I mentioned, these alliance systems have been built
over decades by Democratic and Republican administrations, and what we
need to emphasize now is we should not squander them.
It is also the case--and we are seeing and hearing about it literally
almost every day, whether it is countries like Russia or, yes, China
that are constantly looking for opportunities to create schisms and
tensions between the United States and its longstanding allies. We need
to resist that, we need to be aware of that, and we need to focus on
our allies. As Winston Churchill famously said, the only thing worse
than going to war with allies is doing so without them. With regard to
the Asia-Pacific, we have an opportunity to not just deepen existing
alliances with critical countries like Japan and Korea, Australia, New
Zealand, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand, we also have a unique
opportunity to expand our alliances in the region of the Asia-Pacific
with countries like Vietnam and India.
In my first couple of years in the Senate, I have had the opportunity
to travel in the region several times--in fact, every time I go home, I
travel in the region--and meet with many of the leaders in the Asia-
Pacific when they come to Washington or when we are in the region. It
is clear to me there is a deep interest in many countries to strengthen
their economic and security relationships with the United States. This
is driven, in part, by the role we have played over decades as the
force in the region that has kept the peace and promoted prosperity,
but this is also driven by concerns of almost every country in the
region about China's increasingly aggressive actions, particularly in
the South China Sea, where, despite pledges from senior Chinese leaders
not to militarize that part of the world--not to militarize that
critical crossroads of commerce for the entire world--they clearly are
doing it. For a country that in many ways is renowned for taking the
long view--for having the ability to see around the corners of
history--China's actions are having the effect of driving more and more
countries into the American sphere. We should seize this opportunity,
while recognizing that the productive work, the hard work of
maintaining our alliances in the region takes time, takes patience,
perseverance, respect, and consistency.
To be honest, I was a bit concerned--and I gave some speeches last
year about this--that given some of last year's campaign rhetoric, the
Trump administration would not emphasize the importance of our allies
and not undertake the hard but necessary work of deepening and
expanding key strategic relationships, but I think, to the contrary,
they are off to a very good start. The Secretary of Defense, General
Mattis, in his first trip overseas as the new Secretary of Defense,
could have gone anywhere, including NATO, the Middle East, where we
have critical strategic interests, but he chose to go to Japan and
Korea to cement these critical alliances. The Vice President just got
back from a 10-day trip to Japan, to Korea, to Australia, and to
Indonesia, with stops in the States representing the Asia-Pacific,
including my home State of Alaska and Hawaii, along the way.
I had a good discussion with the Vice President recently over dinner.
We talked mostly about this and how focused he and the administration
were on maintaining and deepening our alliances in the region, but
still we can always improve, especially in terms of making sure we are
coordinating closely with all of our allies on critical decisions and
that we keep surprises, especially on sensitive strategic issues, to a
minimum with regard to our allies. In this regard, President Trump's
recent statement that South Korea would have to pay for the THAAD
missile system that we are deploying in South Korea, after the U.S. had
previously stated we would pay, was an unforced error that I hope the
administration will be learning from.
Of course, this body, the U.S. Senate, also has an important role to
play, not only in emphasizing and helping maintain our alliances by
meeting with leaders around the world and working with them but also in
bolstering the capabilities of our partners in the region, economically
and militarily.
[[Page S2818]]
Right now, there are initiatives that are doing just that, coming out
of the Armed Services Committee on which I sit. One is the Asia-Pacific
Stability Initiative, led by Senator McCain, which would do that--
increase our capabilities with our partners in the region to deepen our
alliances.
Our alliances clearly matter. They matter in our long-term strategy
to address the rise of China. But, of course, so does our relationship
with China. That is the third principle I would like to discuss.
We must continue to engage with China, not seek to contain it, as
some have argued. In fact, when we look at the U.S. relationship with
China, ever since Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon in
the early 1970s began having discussions with China's leadership,
America's policy toward China has always been about engaging. It has
never been about containing, as our strategy was with regard to the
Soviet Union.
Of course, it has taken different forms. We had the One China policy,
which we are still focused on, and the Taiwan Relations Act, which was
developed by this body in the U.S. Senate in the late 1970s. We had
recently initiated by President Bush and continued by President Obama
the strategic economic dialogue where senior leaders in the United
States and China met every 6 months. I had the opportunity to
participate in that as an Assistant Secretary of State under Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice.
There are all kinds of different approaches to our engagement. In my
view, the most strategic concept since the One China policy was the
policy developed during the Bush administration by former Deputy
Secretary of State Bob Zoellick, who went on to be the president of the
World Bank. What he called the responsible stakeholder model was very
well-received initially in 2006. He laid it out in a big speech, then
went to China and focused on this.
Essentially, the essence of that strategy was that China has greatly
benefited from the U.S.-led international order, from the U.S.-led
international system; therefore, it is in China's interest to become a
responsible stakeholder in that system, to strengthen the international
system that has so greatly enabled its own economic success.
In the early days of the strategy, when it was launched, there was a
lot of promise. I remember having the opportunity to go to China with
Secretary Paulson when he was leading the strategic economic dialogue
in the Bush administration. We would meet with all the leadership of
China, from the President on down. At that time, every leader in these
meetings used the term ``responsible stakeholder.'' They talked about
it; they talked about this American concept as a framework for our
relationship.
Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to be working out so well now. Chinese
officials no longer talk about being a responsible stakeholder. In
fact, on many military and economic issues, they seem focused on
undermining the US-led international order. Professor Allison's book
mentions this specifically, where he says an increasingly powerful
China is unraveling the American-led order, throwing into question the
peace that generations in the region have taken for granted.
When we look at the long arch of history with regard to China, this
notion that maybe they wouldn't accept this idea of becoming a
responsible stakeholder in our system that we created--that might not
happen. Indeed, this was foretold by one of the wisest men in Asia, Lee
Kuan Yew, who was the father of Singapore. Decade after decade as he
built that country into an economic powerhouse, American leaders--
military leaders, political leaders, Presidents, Democrats,
Republicans--would meet with Lee Kuan Yew to get his advice and wisdom.
I had the opportunity as a young National Security Council staffer to
be invited to a meeting with Lee Kuan Yew when I was in Singapore--one
of the most interesting meetings of my career--with Deputy Secretary
Bob Zoellick and our Ambassador. Lee Kuan Yew talked about Asia and
about America's role for 2 hours.
But in another book about Lee Kuan Yew by Professor Allison, he was
asked about whether China would accept this idea of being a responsible
stakeholder in the American-led international order. His answer was: Of
course not.
Why not? How could they aspire not to be No. 1 in Asia and in time
No. 1 in the world?
When asked about this concept of being a responsible stakeholder in
this system which has benefited them, Lee Kuan Yew was complimentary of
the concept that the Americans were trying to lay out, but he said:
China wants to be China and, as such, not an honorary member of the
West and their international system.
So even though it is clear that the responsible stakeholder framework
is not working with China, we still need to stay engaged at all
levels--senior leaders, economic officials, military leaders. I want to
compliment the President on how he started the relationship with
President Xi Jinping. They seem to be off to a good start.
At the same time, we need to continue to look at different concepts,
different frameworks of how we continue to engage with China. Let me
suggest one idea that I have termed ``true reciprocity.''
As China has rejected the responsible stakeholder model, it is also
clear they are increasingly rejecting the idea of a reciprocal
relationship with the United States across a number of sectors. Let me
give a couple examples.
We look at issues like intellectual property theft. The United States
has been raising this issue for decades. As a matter of fact, I had the
opportunity to sit in a meeting with former President Bush, Condoleezza
Rice, and senior Chinese officials in the Oval Office. We talked about
this issue. The President pounded the table on this issue. The Chinese
committed not to steal our intellectual property. Yet that continues
unabated, now often through cyber attacks.
We look at foreign direct investment, how Chinese companies invest in
Europe and the United States, how they are buying companies such as
advanced robotics, biotech, media, high-tech companies, internet
companies. But if an American company or a Western European company
wanted to do the same in China, we know what the answer would be. It
would be no.
This lack of economic reciprocity extends beyond the trading
relationship. I attended a briefing a few weeks ago in the Senate by
the Asia Society, which is putting out an important strategy document
with regard to China--ideas for the Trump administration, a very
thoughtful policy recommendation piece.
One thing they noted in terms of diplomacy: Right now in Beijing, our
U.S. Ambassador is typically getting only deputy minister-level access,
deputy minister-level meetings, while back here we give much higher
access to ministers to the Secretary of State. This was essentially
confirmed by former President Obama's own Ambassador, former Senator
Max Baucus, who, in a remarkable exit interview about his time as
Ambassador to China--a job he loved--talked about how, in many ways, in
terms of reciprocity, we were too weak, not firm enough, pushed around.
These are his quotes. It was an interview that actually didn't make a
lot of news but was quite remarkable--how we had no strategy to deal
with this, how we needed to draw our own redlines.
As we develop a long-term strategy toward China to avoid the
Thucydides Trap, we need to institute an engagement policy which looks
at true reciprocity. I will be speaking about this more in the coming
weeks, and I am going to be offering legislation with regard to
reciprocity in the economic and trade relationship. But I will say,
diplomatically speaking, this should be a no-brainer. If our Ambassador
in Beijing gets only deputy minister-level access to Chinese officials
in China's capital, then that is what we should provide China's
Ambassador here. It is simple, easy.
The final principle we need to focus on in developing our long-term
strategy to address the rise of China is the imperative to renew
America's strength, particularly the economic power and vitality of the
United States. We have to be strong at home again, and we haven't been.
I have a chart here that says it all. Over the last, really, 10 to 15
years, we have a lost decade of economic growth. We have not been able
to hit 3 percent GDP growth in almost 15 years. Some
[[Page S2819]]
have called this the new normal; this is what we should expect. But in
many ways, when we look at this chart--Republican, Democratic
administrations--the 3-percent line here is not a great number. It is
an OK number. The traditional numbers of economic growth are closer to
4 percent for our country. But literally, in almost 15 years, we
haven't hit it--not once. President Obama was the first President who
never hit 3 percent GDP growth in a year, ever.
This is not a healthy economy, and in many ways people are starting
to question the American dream, the idea that each generation will be
better. We have to get back to a strong economy. I certainly hope the
Trump administration will be focusing on this. I know that many Members
of this body are focused on this issue.
Last quarter we didn't have a good start with the new
administration--0.7 percent GDP growth, less than 1 percent growth.
Economic growth, even more than military might, in many ways is the
coin of the realm in Asia. We must get back to a robust economy.
Many experts at home and abroad say we can't do it. They say our
demographic challenges are too great, but I disagree. If we look at
U.S. history, every time we are dismissed, every time someone talks
about the decline of the great American engine of growth, whether in
the 1930s or in the 1970s or beginning in the 1980s when Japan was
going to overtake us--every time that has happened and the naysayers
are out there, the U.S. economy comes roaring back. It is critical that
we do this now.
We have so many strategic advantages, even relative to China, with
regard to our economy. So many of our challenges, in my view, are self-
inflicted problems that we can solve.
Strong economic growth--at least about 3 percent--will more closely
bind our allies to the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.
Strong economic growth will help us rebuild our military, which has
been drastically cut over the last 8 years. Strong economic growth will
be critical to tackling our challenges at home, such as skyrocketing
deficits and debt levels and crumbling infrastructure. Perhaps, most
importantly, strong economic growth will enable us to view the future,
including the rise of China, with confidence and not fear.
Our great Nation succeeds when we look to the future with
opportunity, not with trepidation. In Professor Allison's upcoming
book, currently titled ``Destined for War: Can America and China Escape
Thucydides's Trap,'' he notes that fear was the driving force that
propelled Athens and Sparta into the Peloponnesian War. ``What made war
inevitable,'' Thucydides tells us, was the rise of Athens and the fear
this instilled in Sparta.
In the 12 of 16 cases he reviews in his book where a rising power
challenged an established power leading to war, fear was a key driving
force that often precipitated war. The more our policies at home can
renew America's strength, vitality, and confidence, the more likely in
my view it is that we will develop clear, long-term foreign policies
that can help us avoid the Thucydides Trap.
I have had the opportunity in my career to view the U.S.-China
relationship over the past two decades from a variety of different
lenses and perspectives. Over 20 years ago, I was deployed as a young
marine infantry officer as part of an amphibious task force to what
later became known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, defending U.S.
interests in the region and those of our ally Taiwan.
Later, I was an NSC staffer and an Assistant Secretary of State under
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and I spent a lot of time in China
working on these issues. I became a State of Alaska official, traveling
for my State as the commissioner of natural resources and energy. I
have traveled to China to pursue the promise of better economic
relations. China is now the No. 1 market for my very export-oriented
State, for Alaska exports. Now, as a U.S. Senator, I am focused on this
issue and cochairing the U.S.-China working group with my good friend
Senator Daines and getting out to the region as often as possible.
I have seen the promise, opportunity, and challenges of the U.S.-
China relationship as it has matured over the last 20 years, and I have
deep respect for China, its history, and all that it has recently
accomplished. I know some of the leaders there and consider them
colleagues.
This body, the Senate, and our country need to do more to focus on
how to make sure that the rise of China is compatible with U.S.
economic and national security interests and, most importantly, with
the interests of the people we represent.
I have laid out some core principles this evening on how we might
begin to develop a coherent, long-term strategy and address the
challenges and opportunities of China's rise. I hope my colleagues--
Democrats and Republicans--will work together over the years on this
incredibly important issue. There is so much at stake and a lot of work
to do by many in the governments, the private sector, and the
military--both in the United States and in China and in the countries
of the region.
The gravitational pull of history might be working against us. There
is a lot riding on how we address this preeminent geostrategic issue.
Let me conclude by reading how Professor Allison, in his book, sums
up the challenge. He states:
The return to prominence of a 5,000-year-old civilization
with 1.4 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a
condition--a chronic condition that will have to be managed
over a generation. Success will require not just a new
slogan, more frequent presidential summits, or additional
meetings of departmental working groups. Managing this
relationship without war will demand sustained attention,
week by week, at the highest levels in both governments. It
will require a depth of mutual understanding not seen since
the Henry Kissinger-Zhou Enlai conversations that
reestablished US-China relations in the 1970s. Most
significant, it will mean more radical changes in attitudes
and actions by leaders and the public alike than anyone yet
has undertaken. To escape Thucydides's Trap, we must be
willing to think the unthinkable--and imagine the
unimaginable. Avoiding Thucydides's Trap in this case will
require nothing less than bending the arc of history.
I yield the floor.
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