[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 72 (Thursday, April 27, 2017)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2597-S2598]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                           T-45 Goshawk Fleet

  Mr. WICKER. Mr. President, I come to the floor to speak about a 
troubling issue for our Navy, our national defense, and a problem that 
should be of concern to Members of this body. Our Navy pilot training 
installations, including Naval Air Station Meridian in my home State of 
Mississippi, produce some of the finest pilots on the planet. They 
trained on the T-45 Goshawk.
  On Friday, March 31, a significant number of T-45 instructor pilots 
at NAS Meridian, NAS Kingsville in Texas, and NAS Pensacola in Florida 
decided not to fly because of safety concerns. As you can imagine, this 
was an almost unprecedented act and brought considerable attention to a 
problem plaguing the Navy's tactical fighter community: a dramatic and 
sustained increase in so-called physiological episodes, or PE events, 
across the FA-18 Hornet, the EA-18 Growler, and the training jet T-45 
Goshawk fleets.
  Physiological episodes occur when air crew experience diminished 
inflight performance related to loss or contamination of oxygen, 
depressurization in the cockpit, or other factors. There are some 
technical terms I am going to mention to my colleagues. Hypoxic hypoxia 
occurs when pilots are getting insufficient oxygen. A more serious 
phenomenon called histotoxic hypoxia occurs when they are breathing 
contaminated oxygen, and of course depressurization occurs when the 
cabin pressure drops.
  I have been assured that solving this physiological episode problem 
is now naval aviation's No. 1 one safety priority. As chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee's Seapower Subcommittee, I intend to continue 
the committee's oversight on this issue and, if necessary, include 
provisions in the upcoming Defense authorization bill to help. I 
applaud the work of our full committee chairman, Senator McCain, on his 
efforts so far. In fact, Senator McCain knows NAS Meridian very well, 
having served there as an instructor pilot. The airfield named ``McCain 
Field'' is in honor of Senator McCain's grandfather, ADM John McCain.
  The Navy has told Congress and the American people repeatedly that 
its effort to mitigate and solve the problems of these PE events, 
including histotoxic hypoxia, are ``resource unconstrained.'' In other 
words, the Navy has told us that money is no object in solving this 
problem, time is no object, and personnel is no object. As chairman of 
the Seapower Subcommittee, I intend to put that claim to test.
  I would like to update my colleagues on the situation--my factfinding 
trip to Meridian, the state of play, and the plan going forward.
  Beginning around 2010, a significant increase in reported PE events 
occurred, which led to the establishment of a Physiological Episode 
Team to identify root causes, develop mitigation efforts and solutions. 
This team mainly addressed the less serious problem of hypoxic hypoxia, 
but in recent months, there has been an alarming uptick in histotoxic 
hypoxia, a relatively new phenomenon involving contaminated oxygen in 
the cockpit. This has presented new challenges. The Navy has not 
identified a root cause for either type of hypoxia but has taken steps 
to mitigate effects through new maintenance rules, equipment changes 
and redesigns, and by adding data collection tools. However, there is 
currently not adequate mitigation for the more serious type of hypoxia, 
which has led to this halt in training.
  As a search for the root causes continues, data collection is worth 
stressing. These aircraft do not have automatic sensors. In effect, the 
pilot is the sensor. Maximizing data collection on every training 
flight is critical. The collection of more data can help in the 
analytical effort, which will get us closer to finding the root cause. 
After the instructor pilots' boycott--which I stress they had every 
right to do--the Navy issued a safety standdown and stopped all 
training flights for a period of days. This tactical pause allowed the 
Navy to send senior leadership to visit the training installations and 
hear directly from the instructor pilots and students. I respect the 
considered decisions of both of these groups, the instructor pilots who 
continued to fly and the ones who engaged in the boycott.
  After meeting with Pentagon experts on this matter, I then made a 
factfinding trip to NAS Meridian on April 8. I met with VADM Mike 
Shoemaker, the commander of Naval Air Forces. Admiral Shoemaker is the 
air boss who commands operational naval aviation forces. I also met 
with RADM Dell Bull, who is the chief of Naval Air Training, and I met 
with NAS Meridian's excellent installation leadership. Perhaps most 
important, I convened two focus groups: one group of instructor pilots 
who chose to fly and another group who chose not to fly. Both groups 
agree that a serious communication problem existed. The meetings with 
pilots demonstrated that some in the Navy hierarchy did not fully 
appreciate that this histotoxic hypoxia, contaminated oxygen, was a new 
and different phenomenon. In addition, the efforts of the Navy 
leadership were not being communicated effectively to the instructors 
and the students. In other words, the message was not getting down to 
the flight line, and the people on the flight line did not feel the 
message was getting back up to the hierarchy. Many felt their concerns 
were being ignored. The lack of action on the relatively new emergence 
of histotoxic hypoxia in the Goshawk only exacerbated the feeling among 
some that the Navy's actions were not matching its rhetoric.
  Following my visit on April 8, the Navy took the important step of 
establishing a Physiological Episode Team for the T-45 alone. This is 
an important action which should bring more focused attention to the 
Goshawk community. The Navy ended the safety standdown on April 14 and 
resumed flying the next week under restricted conditions, such as 
flying at lower maximum altitudes and pulling fewer Gs. Of course, this 
is not the optimal way of training.
  Then, following a subsequent PE incident in Kingsville and feedback 
from instructor pilots on the mitigation plan, the Navy has chosen to 
restrict training flights even further. This is a problem. The Navy 
tells us the current practice would allow a student to complete only 
about 20 to 25 percent of the curriculum. That is the status today. The 
Navy is already short on pilots, and continuing the status quo could 
further constrict the pilot production pipeline.
  Where do we go from here? The Navy has brought three T-45s that have 
experienced physiological episodes to

[[Page S2598]]

Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, for extensive engineering 
investigation and analysis. They are taking the airplanes apart at Pax 
River. I applaud this action. Initial results of the testing should be 
available next week with more information to follow as the data is 
processed. At the same time, engineers have teamed up with pilots from 
both the test community and the training command, including at least 
one Meridian instructor pilot. They are investigating possible 
mitigations, such as alterations to pilot masks. This will allow our 
instructors and student pilots to get back to what they want to do 
most; that is, to fly and train new pilots to fly.
  In addition, on April 21, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral 
Moran, directed Admiral Scott Swift, commander of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet, to lead a month-long review of the facts, circumstances, and 
processes surrounding the recent episodes and how the Navy has 
addressed them. The Swift review will evaluate the Navy's 
organizational structures and processes and make recommendations for 
additional action.
  These efforts are desperately needed. Still, we have no real 
diagnosis. Still, we have no real solution in the works. Senators 
should know this: As of 3 weeks ago, problems with histotoxic hypoxia 
at our naval training bases have earned the full attention of the top 
leadership in the Navy. These problems also have the full attention and 
oversight of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Seapower 
Subcommittee.
  I look forward to continued interaction with the Navy leadership on 
this very important issue.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.