Congressional Record, Volume 163 Issue 42 (Friday, March 10, 2017)

[Congressional Record Volume 163, Number 42 (Friday, March 10, 2017)]
[House]
[Pages H2025-H2041]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

LAWSUIT ABUSE REDUCTION ACT OF 2017

General Leave

Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 720.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Virginia?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 180 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 720.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. Jenkins) to
preside over the Committee of the Whole.

{time} 0915

In the Committee of the Whole

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 720) to amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
improve attorney accountability, and for other purposes, with Mr.
Jenkins of West Virginia in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
H.R. 720, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, would restore mandatory
sanctions for frivolous lawsuits filed in Federal court.
Many Americans may not realize it, but today, under what is called
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no
requirement that those who file frivolous lawsuits pay for the
unjustified legal costs they impose on their victims, even when those
victims prove to a judge the lawsuit was without any basis in law or
fact.
As a result, the current rule 11 goes largely unenforced because the
victims of frivolous lawsuits have little incentive to pursue
additional litigation to have the case declared frivolous when there is
no guarantee of compensation at the end of the day.
H.R. 720 would finally provide light at the end of the tunnel for the
victims of frivolous lawsuits by requiring sanctions against the filers
of frivolous lawsuits, sanctions which include paying back victims for
the full cost of their reasonable expenses incurred as a direct result
of the rule 11 violation, including attorneys' fees.
The bill also strikes the current provisions in rule 11 that allow
lawyers to avoid sanctions for making frivolous claims and demands by
simply withdrawing them within 21 days. This change eliminates the
``free pass'' lawyers now have to file frivolous lawsuits in Federal
court.
The current lack of mandatory sanctions leads to the regular filing
of lawsuits that are baseless. So many frivolous pleadings currently go
under the radar because the lack of mandatory sanctions for frivolous
filings forces victims of frivolous lawsuits to roll over and settle
the case, because doing that is less expensive than litigating the case
to a victory in court.
Correspondence written by someone filing a frivolous lawsuit, which
became public, concisely illustrates how the current lack of mandatory
sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuits leads to legal extortion. That
correspondence to the victim of a frivolous lawsuit states: ``I really
don't care what the law allows you to do. It's a more practical issue.
Do you want to send your attorney a check every month indefinitely as I
continue to pursue this?''
Under the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, those who file frivolous
lawsuits would no longer be able to get off scot-free and, therefore,
they couldn't get away with those sorts of extortionary threats any
longer.
The victims of lawsuit abuse are not just those who are actually
sued. Rather, we all suffer under a system in which innocent Americans
everywhere live under the constant fear of a potentially bankrupting
frivolous lawsuit.
As the former chairman of The Home Depot company has written: ``An
unpredictable legal system casts a shadow over every plan and
investment. It is devastating for startups. The cost of even one ill-
timed abusive lawsuit can bankrupt a growing company and cost hundreds
of thousands of jobs.''
The prevalence of frivolous lawsuits in America is reflected in the
absurd warning labels companies must place on their products to limit
their exposure to frivolous claims. A 5-inch brass fishing lure with
three hooks is labeled ``Harmful if swallowed.'' A household iron
contains the warning ``Never iron clothes while they are being worn.''
A piece of ovenware warns, ``Ovenware will get hot when used in oven.''
And here are just a couple of examples of frivolous lawsuits brought
in Federal court, where judges failed to award compensation to the
victims:

[[Page H2026]]

A man sued a television network for $2.5 million because he said a
show it aired raised his blood pressure. When the network publicized
his frivolous lawsuit, he demanded the court make them stop. Although
the court found the case frivolous, not only did it not compensate the
victim, it granted the man who filed the frivolous lawsuit an exemption
from even paying the ordinary court filing fees.
In another case, lawyers filed a case against a parent, claiming the
parent's discipline of their child violated the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment by the
government, not private citizens. One of the lawyers even admitted
signing the complaint without reading it.
The court found the case frivolous, but awarded the victim only about
a quarter of its legal costs because rule 11 currently doesn't require
that a victim's legal costs be paid in full. The Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act would change that.

I thank the former chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Lamar Smith,
for introducing this simple, commonsense legislation that would do so
much to prevent lawsuit abuse and restore Americans' confidence in the
legal system. I urge my colleagues to support it today.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 720, the so-called Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act.
This bill amends rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
ways that will chill the advancement of civil rights claims and
increase exponentially the volume and costs of litigation in the
Federal courts.
These concerns are not hypothetical. H.R. 720 restores the deeply
flawed version of rule 11 in effect from 1983 to 1993 in two ways: by
requiring mandatory sanctions for even unintentional violations rather
than leaving the imposition of sanctions to the court's discretion, as
is currently the case; and secondly, by eliminating the current rule's
21-day safe harbor provision, which allows the defending party to
correct or withdraw allegedly offending submissions.
Simply put, H.R. 720 will have a disastrous impact on the
administration of justice in numerous ways. To begin with, the bill
will chill legitimate civil rights litigation, which, to me, of course,
is very important.
Civil rights cases often raise novel legal arguments, which made such
cases particularly susceptible to sanction motions under the 1983 rule.
For example, a Federal Judicial Center study found that the incidence
of rule 11 motions under the 1983 rule was ``higher in civil rights
cases than in some other types of cases.''
Another study showed that, while civil rights cases comprised about
11 percent of the cases filed, more than 22 percent of the cases in
which sanctions had been imposed were, in fact, civil rights cases.
Under the 1983 rule, civil rights cases were clearly disadvantaged.
Yet, H.R. 720 would reserve this problematic regime.
Although the bill's rule of construction is a welcome acknowledgment
of the problem, it does nothing to prevent defendants from using rule
11 as a weapon to discourage civil rights plaintiffs. Even a landmark
case like Brown v. Board of Education might not have been pursued had
H.R. 720's changes to rule 11 been in effect at that time, because the
legal arguments in the case were novel and not based on then-existing
law.
In addition, H.R. 720 will substantially increase the amount, cost,
and intensity of civil litigation and create more grounds for
unnecessary delay and harassment in the courtroom itself.
By making sanctions mandatory and having no safe harbor, the 1983
rule spawned a cottage industry of rule 11 litigation. Each party had a
financial incentive to tie up the other in rule 11 proceedings.
We heard testimony on a previous version of this bill that almost
one-third of all Federal lawsuits during the decade that the 1983 rule
was in effect were burdened by such satellite litigation, where the
parties tried the underlying case and then put each side's counsel on
trial.
Finally, H.R. 720 strips the judiciary of its discretion and
independence. H.R. 720 overrides judicial independence by removing the
discretion that rule 11 currently gives judges in determining whether
to impose sanctions and what type of sanctions would be most
appropriate. It also circumvents the painstakingly thorough Rules
Enabling Act process that Congress established more than 80 years ago.
For all of these reasons, I urge my colleagues to join us in opposing
this highly problematic legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, known as LARA, is just
over one-page long, but it would prevent the filing of thousands of
frivolous lawsuits in Federal courts. These absurd lawsuits cost many
innocent families their savings and often ruin their reputations.
Frivolous lawsuits have been filed against a weather channel for
failing to accurately predict storms, against television shows people
claimed were too scary, against a university that awarded a low grade,
and against a high school that dropped a member from the track team.
Lawyers who bring these cases have everything to gain and nothing to
lose under current rules, which allow plaintiffs' lawyers to file
frivolous suits without any penalty. Meanwhile, defendants are often
faced with years of litigation and substantial attorneys' fees.
Prior to 1993, it was mandatory for judges to impose sanctions, such
as orders to pay for the other side's legal expenses, when lawyers
filed frivolous lawsuits. Then, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, an
obscure branch of the courts, made penalties optional. This needs to be
reversed by Congress.
LARA requires lawyers who file frivolous lawsuits to pay attorneys'
fees and court costs of innocent defendants. This will serve as a
disincentive to file junk lawsuits.
Further, LARA specifically requires that no changes ``shall be
construed to bar or impede the assertion or development of new claims,
defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including
civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States.''
So civil rights law would not be affected in any way by LARA, and
that might go a long way to reassuring the ranking member's concerns
about its impact on civil rights.
Opponents argue that reinstating mandatory sanctions for frivolous
lawsuits impedes judicial discretion, but this is false. Under LARA,
judges retain the discretion to determine whether or not a claim is
frivolous. If a judge determines that a claim is frivolous, then they
must award sanctions. This ensures that victims of frivolous lawsuits
obtain compensation. But the decision to determine whether a claim is
frivolous or not remains with the judge.
The American people are looking for solutions to obvious lawsuit
abuse. LARA restores accountability to our legal system by reinstating
sanctions for attorneys who are found by a judge to have filed
frivolous lawsuits. Though it will not stop all lawsuit abuse, LARA
encourages attorneys to think twice before making an innocent party's
life miserable.

{time} 0930

These attorneys engage in legalized extortion and try to force
individuals to settle out of court instead of paying huge legal costs.
There is currently no disincentive to deter attorneys from filing
frivolous claims. By requiring attorneys who file junk lawsuits to pay
the court costs of those they sue, such lawsuits will be discouraged.
I thank Chairman Goodlatte, the chairman of the Committee on the
Judiciary, for bringing this much-needed legislation to the House
floor. I ask my colleagues who oppose frivolous lawsuits and who want
to protect innocent Americans from false charges to support the Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler),

[[Page H2027]]

the senior member of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 720, the
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act. This bill is supposedly aimed at
preventing frivolous litigation, but it would, in fact, generate a
whole new set of litigation, further clogging our overburdened Federal
courts.
Under rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may
impose sanctions on a party that files a frivolous case or motion. A
party subject to a rule 11 violation has a 21-day safe harbor period to
withdraw or correct its filing, and sanctions are purely discretionary.
This rule serves a vital role in maintaining the integrity of our legal
system without creating a chilling effect on presenting novel claims.
Judges, when they see frivolous suits, can sanction them and do.
This bill, however, would restore a failed version of rule 11 that
was enacted by the Judicial Conference in 1983, but which was repealed
10 years later because it led to disastrous results. Under this bill,
sanctions would be mandatory whenever a court rules that rule 11 has
been violated. The safe harbor period, when filings can be withdrawn or
corrected, would be eliminated.
We do not have to speculate about what would happen as a result of
this bill because we have a decade of experience that shows us how
catastrophic it would be and was. Under the 1983 rule, which this bill
would restore, rule 11 battles became a routine part of civil
litigation, affecting one-third of all cases. Rather than serving as a
disincentive, the old rule 11 actually made the system even more
litigious.
In the decade following the 1983 amendments, there were almost 7,000
reported rule 11 cases, becoming part of approximately one-third of all
Federal civil lawsuits. Civil cases effectively became two cases, one
on the merits and the other on a set of dueling rule 11 allegations by
both parties. The drain on the courts and the parties' resources caused
the Judicial Conference to revisit the rule and adopt the changes that
this bill would now have us undo.
More troubling was the 1983 rule's impact on civil rights cases,
which are often based on novel claims that require significant
discovery to establish. A 1991 Federal Judicial Center study found that
whereas civil rights cases made up 11.4 percent of Federal cases filed,
they constituted 22.7 percent of the cases in which sanctions were
imposed. If we return to the old rule, we could see a chilling effect
in which untested, but no less valid, civil rights claims are never
brought for fear of sanctions.
The courts have ample authority to sanction conduct that undermines
the integrity of our legal system. But this legislation is not just a
solution in search of a problem. By taking us back to a time when rule
11 actually promoted routine, costly, and unnecessary litigation, this
bill is a cure worse than the disease.
Given that we already know this bill will be a failure, one wonders
how it would survive its own rule 11 motion if Congress had such a
thing. The courts, having tried it for 10 years with disastrous
results, rightly rejected this approach 20 years ago, and we should
reject it again. I urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume
to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), a senior member of the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act. I want to commend my colleague from Texas (Mr.
Smith) for his leadership on this important bill. Mr. Smith, of course,
who is now the chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, was, for a number of years, the chairman of the Committee
on the Judiciary, and he has a long reputation, much experience in
trying to find ways to make the legal system work better for more
people all across the country, and this is part of that, because there
is a huge cost associated with the abusive lawsuits that have been
filed for many years in this country.
Businesses are a popular target for frivolous lawsuits that lack any
legal or factual basis. These lawsuits can easily result in hundreds of
thousands of dollars in legal fees and discovery costs. Small
businesses oftentimes don't have the financial resources to obtain a
dismissal or sometimes even good legal counsel, and, therefore, their
only option, in many cases, is to settle the case. In fact, many
businesses and other entities put aside--insurance companies do this as
well--a nuisance value of many of these cases because they realize so
many cases are basically filed for not really legitimate reasons, but
because there is a cash payout at the end of this, and some who are
able to will actually put that in their budget. But these expenses
don't just cost small businesses time and productivity. Too often they
force small businesses into bankruptcy, and that means real people lose
their jobs. This happens thousands and thousands and thousands of times
all across this country.
Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the House Committee on Small Business, I
cannot emphasize enough that we absolutely cannot afford to lose any
more small businesses in this country and the associated jobs that go
with them.
By ensuring that there are penalties for lawyers filing frivolous
lawsuits, H.R. 720 will deter abusive litigation practices that pose a
real threat to the stability of many small businesses all across this
country. After all, small businesses are the backbone of the economy.
About 70 percent of the new jobs created in the American economy
nowadays are created by small-business folks, so we should do
everything we can to make sure that they are successful and able to
hire more and more Americans so that we can get this economy moving
again.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 720. I again thank Mr. Smith for
putting forth this very wise and thoughtful legislation which I think
will go a long way toward improving the legal system that we have in
this country.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the
distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member of the
Committee on the Judiciary for his distinguished service and my good
friend from Texas for his managing of this bill on which we have a
vigorous and active disagreement, but realize that the role of the
Committee on the Judiciary is to enhance justice for all Americans, no
matter what size business, what ethnicity, racial background, what
issue they bring, whether they bring a commercial issue or whether they
are for criminal justice.
That is why I rise to oppose this legislation, for it is important
that we monitor, promote, coddle, and respect justice. I oppose the
legislation that aims to restore a long-discredited version of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in effect from 1983 to 1993. I use as a
premise of my argument a letter from the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, in
particular written by two distinguished Federal judges from Arizona,
the chair of the Committee on Rules and the chair of the Advisory
Committee on Rules, both Federal district court judges. But more
importantly, my luck was to meet with a series of judges in the past
week, Federal judges, Republican appointees and some Democratic
appointees, and there was a vocal outcry of the outrage of this
legislation, asking and begging that this legislation not be put in
place.
Let me give you a description from the Federal courts, recognizing:
``We of course share the desire of the sponsors of LARA to improve the
civil justice system''--and that is the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act--
``in our Federal courts, including the desire to reduce frivolous
filings. But LARA creates a cure worse than the problem it is meant to
solve.''
``Moreover, as we are both Federal trial judges, our perspective is
informed by our ongoing daily experience with the practical operation
of the rules.''
I, too, am concerned about small businesses. That is why we need to
proceed as we are proceeding. It gives thoughtful judges the ability to
protect those entities. The facts do not, according to the letter,
support any assumption that mandatory sanctions deter frivolous
filings.
``A decade of experience with the 1983 mandatory sanctions
provision,'' they go on to say, ``demonstrated that it failed to
provide meaningful relief from

[[Page H2028]]

the litigation behavior it was meant to address, and instead generated
wasteful satellite litigation that had little to do with the merits of
cases.''
What good is that for the small litigant? What good will they have
when they might be subject to satellite litigation? And so, Mr.
Chairman, why would we want to return to the failed, discredited
sanction regime rightly abandoned in 1993? H.R. 720 would require
courts to impose monetary sanctions for any rule 11 violation,
eliminating the safe harbor provision that currently allows attorneys
to correct or withdraw a filing before rule 11 proceedings commence.
That is justice: I made a mistake, I want to withdraw it. I am suing a
small business, I have a different perspective. I know the facts, let
me withdraw it.
The cost-shifting provision was eliminated by the courts because it
encouraged satellite litigation, and many cases required parallel
proceedings. Here is the worst of it: Suppose we were back in 1954.
Would Brown v. Board of Education be a frivolous lawsuit subject to
sanctions, a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that
declared State laws establishing separate public schools for Black and
White students unconstitutional? What about Griswold in 1965? It would
also be judged as a frivolous lawsuit.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentlewoman.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, Griswold was a landmark case in which
the Supreme Court ruled that we had a right to privacy. Or what about
the famous case that was made into a movie, Loving v. Virginia? I think
for almost 25 years this mixed-marriage couple could not live in their
own State. A lawsuit would have been considered frivolous. Loving was a
landmark case which decided Virginia's antimiscegenation statute was
unconstitutional.
New York Times Co. v. United States in 1971, the question was on the
constitutional freedom of the press. It reinforced the First Amendment.
Mr. Chairman, it is impossible to go back to the old days. I ask my
colleagues to support the Jackson Lee amendment, to come up and to
oppose the underlying bill in the name of justice for all.
Mr. Chairman, I include in the Record a list of seven notable cases
the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act may have barred from a courtroom.

seven notable cases the ``lawsuit abuse reduction act'' may have barred
from a courtroom

Contrary to proponents' claims, LARA does not deter
frivolous lawsuits. Rather it deters meritorious cases by
imposing a one-size-fits-all mandate for federal judges.
Mandatory sanctions inevitably chill meritorious claims
particularly in cases of first impression or involving new
legal theories, including cases to protect civil rights, the
right to privacy, the environment, collective bargaining and
the First Amendment. Our system of justice is a moving body
of law, and novel legal theories have the ability to shift
public policy and law.
Below are seven notable cases that LARA may have prevented
because the cases presented what--at the time they were
presented to the court--would have been considered novel
legal theories:
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954):
Brown was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court that declared state laws establishing separate public
schools for black and white students unconstitutional. The
decision overturned the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896
which allowed state-sponsored segregation. The Court's
unanimous decision stated that ``separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.'' As a result, de jure
racial segregation was ruled a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. This ruling paved the way for
integration and the civil rights movement.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Griswold was
a landmark case in which the Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution protected a right to privacy. The case involved
a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court invalidated the law on
the grounds that it violated the ``right to marital
privacy.''
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): In Lawrence, the
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether adult
consensual sexual activity is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law. The
Court found that the petitioners were free as adults to
engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their
liberty under the Due Process Clause. The decision
decriminalized the Texas law that made it illegal for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct.
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S.
497 (2007): In this case, twelve states and several cities of
the United States brought suit against the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to force the federal
agency to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
as pollutants. The Supreme Court found that Massachusetts,
due to its ``stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign
interests'' as a state, had standing to sue the EPA over
potential damage caused to its territory by global warming.
The Court rejected the EPA's argument that the Clean Air Act
was not meant to refer to carbon emissions in the section
giving the EPA authority to regulate ``air pollution
agent[s].''
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967): Loving was a
landmark civil rights case in which the United States Supreme
Court, by a 9-0 vote, declared Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statute, the ``Racial Integrity Act of 1924,''
unconstitutional, thereby ending all race-based legal
restrictions on marriage in the United States.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971):
This case considered whether the New York Times and
Washington Post newspapers could publish the then-classified
Pentagon Papers without risk of government censure. The
question before the Court was whether the constitutional
freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was
subordinate to a claimed need of the executive branch of
government to maintain the secrecy of information. The
Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected the
right of the New York Times to print the materials.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(The Snail Darter Case): In TVA, the Supreme Court affirmed a
court of appeals' judgment, which agreed with the Secretary
of Interior that operation of the federal Tellico Dam would
eradicate an endangered species. The Court held that a prima
facie violation of Sec. 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. Sec. 1536, occurred, and ruled that an injunction
requested by respondents should have been issued.

Mr. Chair, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 720, the ``Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act of 2017,'' because it is both unnecessary and
counterproductive.
I oppose this legislation that aims to restore a long-discredited
version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in effect from 1983 to
1993.
The current Rule 11 allows federal courts, in their discretion, to
impose sanctions for frivolous filings and it encourages litigants to
resolve such issues without court intervention.
As written, H.R. 720 would change the sanctions for a violation of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to a cost-shifting sanction payable
to the opposing party, an antiquated version of the Rule in effect from
1983 until 1993.
Why, Mr. Chair would we return to the failed and discredited sanction
regime rightly abandoned in 1993?
H.R. 720 would require courts to impose monetary sanctions for any
Rule 11 violation, eliminating the safe harbor provision that currently
allows attorneys to correct or withdraw a filing before Rule 11
proceedings commence.
That cost-shifting provision was eliminated by the courts because it
encouraged satellite litigation; many cases required parallel
proceedings--one on the merits of the lawsuit and one on the Rule 11
motion.
The 1983 rule had a particularly negative disproportionate impact on
plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs in civil rights cases, because
plaintiffs in such cases often raise novel legal arguments, leaving
them vulnerable to a Rule 11 motion by a defendant.
Reinstating this mandatory fee shifting rule, as H.R. 720 does, will
again have a chilling effect on plaintiffs' claims, especially
individual plaintiffs taking on large corporate interests.
Sanctions were more often imposed against plaintiffs than defendants
and more often imposed against plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases,
primarily in civil rights and certain kinds of discrimination cases.
A leading study on this issue showed that although civil rights cases
made up 11.4% of federal cases filed, 22.7% of the cases in which
sanctions had been imposed were civil rights cases.
The imposition of mandatory fees and costs ultimately shifts the
purpose of the Rule from deterrence to compensation, encouraging
parties to always file Rule 11 motions in the hopes of gaining
additional compensation.
Both the Judicial Conference of the United States and the U.S.
Supreme Court support preservation of the current version of Rule 11(c)
and restoring the true balance between punishing unwarranted conduct
and deterring unnecessary litigation.
Given the highly problematic experience under the 1983 rule, which
sparked extensive and costly litigation, the rule burdened already
strained federal court system, adversely affecting cases of all types,
including civil litigation among businesses.
Congress should be looking for ways to decrease, not increase
wasteful burdens on

[[Page H2029]]

courts, and should avoid rule changes that have a discriminatory impact
on civil rights, employment, environmental, and consumer cases.
For these reasons and more, I oppose this bill.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, the Judicial Conference, by its own admission, objects
to any amendments to the Federal rules it doesn't propose itself, but
Congress has the constitutional authority and responsibility to
establish and amend the Federal rules. It also has the duty to address
problems with the judicial system that fall within its enumerated
powers. Reducing frivolous lawsuits and ensuring that those who face
meritless filings are able to receive compensation for losses caused by
frivolous claims is a significant improvement to our justice system.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I would ask my colleagues, does a bill that
grants the victims of corporate fraud the right to damages create
satellite litigation? Of course it doesn't. What it does is create a
means of guaranteed compensation for a wrong suffered. This bill does
just that. It creates a means of guaranteed compensation for a wrong
suffered; namely, the wrong of a frivolous lawsuit.
It is the job of judges to apply the law. It is the job of Members of
Congress to write the law. We are the people's representatives, and all
of us have constituents who have been the victims of frivolous
lawsuits. We are responsible for the lack of any redress today for the
victims of frivolous lawsuits, and we aim to remedy that today by
passing this bill on behalf of the constituents who sent us here. If
you deny that the victims of frivolous lawsuits are real victims, then
vote against this bill, but if you think the victims of frivolous
lawsuits should be entitled to compensation, just like anyone else who
proves their legal claims in court, you should support this bill.
Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

{time} 0945

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 4 minutes to
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Johnson).
Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for
yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 720, the Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act of 2017--which is misnamed, just as all of the other
bills that we have considered this week that are trying to crush the
ability of plaintiffs, people who have been injured, due to the
negligence or intentional acts of others--legislation designed to keep
plaintiffs out of court and protect wrongdoing corporations.
This bill is misnamed the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act. I would
propose that we take out the word ``abuse'' and just leave it as it
really is, which is the Lawsuit Reduction Act of 2017. That is what
this legislation is designed to do, is to stop litigation in its
tracks.
We have been debating the merits of a bill that the Judicial
Conference itself does not find useful, especially considering the fact
that they have already been through so-called lawsuit abuse reduction
reform in the past. The Judicial Conference, of course, is the group of
judges that helps to formulate policy for the judiciary, and they are
the ones who know. We should consult with them. Of course, we have, as
the legislative branch, the ability to legislate in those areas; but it
doesn't make much sense for us to override or to ignore the views of
the Judicial Conference when it comes to their own business.
That is what this legislation does. It doesn't lend itself to the
support of the Judicial Conference, which is important, especially
since they have already been through lawsuit abuse reduction reform
efforts that were put into place by this body, the same ones that we
are considering today. They didn't work then; they don't work today.
H.R. 720 ignores the discretion of well-versed judges to impose
sanctions against attorneys engaging in unnecessary litigation. Because
there have been critiques that the pleading standards in rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give parties a license to bring a
multiplicity of frivolous lawsuits, rule 11 is meant to act like a
check.
Under rule 11, judges can sanction attorneys when they deem it is
appropriate to curb unmeritorious lawsuits, and they use it. There is
no question about that. Parties are being sanctioned every day under
rule 11.
H.R. 720 now requires that judges impose mandatory sanctions with
monetary compensation and deprive litigants of the opportunity to cure
a defective lawsuit. The problem with this approach is that it makes
the cost of litigation skyrocket as litigants are required to pay for
attorneys' fees and other filing fees.
In addition, it creates a vicious cycle of litigation where parties
engage in many trials over penalties to be paid as a result of rule 11
sanction motions rather than getting to the actual merits of the case.
This approach was tried 20 years ago. It didn't work then, and there is
no compelling reason to think that it is going to work today.
I ask my colleagues to oppose H.R. 720, just as I ask them to oppose
these other attacks on the ability of plaintiffs to bring cases in
court against wrongdoing corporate defendants, many of them
multinationals.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, a few minutes ago, a judicial poll was mentioned. But I
would point out to all of my colleagues that only one survey was done
that consisted mostly of judges who had experience under both the
stronger rule with mandatory sanctions. That poll showed overwhelming
support for mandatory sanctions. When judges who had experience under
both the stronger and weaker versions of rule 11 were polled, they
overwhelmingly supported mandatory sanctions for frivolous lawsuits.
The survey of 751 Federal judges found that an overwhelming majority
of Federal judges believed, based on their experience under both a
weaker and stronger rule 11, that a stronger rule 11 did not impede
development of the law: 95 percent; the benefits of the rule outweighed
any additional requirement of judicial time: 72 percent; the stronger
version of rule 11 had a positive effect on litigation in the Federal
courts: 81 percent; and the rule should be retained in its then current
form: 80 percent. Incredible.
A 2005 survey was also mentioned. In that survey, only 278 judges
responded, as opposed to the 751 who responded to the survey done in
1990. Over half of the judges who responded to the 2005 survey had no
experience under the stronger rule 11 because they were appointed to
the bench after 1992. So that 2005 survey tells us very little about
how judges comparatively view the stronger versus the weaker rule 11.
I would also point out that in the 1990 survey, roughly twice as many
responded as in the 2005 survey.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
These constitute my closing observations on this measure.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 720 would turn back the clock to a time when rule
11 discouraged civil rights cases, restricted judicial discretion, and
engendered vast amounts of time-consuming and costly so-called
satellite litigation.
Not surprisingly, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the
principal policymaking body for the judicial branch charged with
proposing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the
careful, deliberate process specified in the Rules Enabling Act,
opposes this measure, noting that it creates a cure worse than the
problem it is meant to solve.
Likewise, the American Bar Association opposes this legislation, as
do numerous consumer and environmental groups, including: Public
Citizen, the Alliance for Justice, the Center for Justice and
Democracy, the Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union,
Earthjustice, the National Association of Consumer Advocates, and six
other major organizations.

Finally, last Congress, the Obama administration, strongly opposed a
substantively identical measure, noting that the bill was ``both
unnecessary and counterproductive,'' and that it ``actually increases
litigation.''
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues in this body to reject this flawed
bill.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

[[Page H2030]]

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Let me first point out that this bill is being key voted by the
United States Chamber of Commerce. It has been endorsed by the National
Federation of Independent Business, and also endorsed by the Physicians
Insurance Association of America.
Mr. Chairman, let me remind Members what the base bill--which is just
a page long--actually does. It makes it mandatory for the victims of
frivolous lawsuits filed in Federal Court to be compensated for the
harm done to them by the filers of frivolous lawsuits. The bill doesn't
change the existing standards for determining what is or is not a
frivolous lawsuit. So under the bill, mandatory sanctions would only be
awarded to victims of frivolous lawsuits when those lawsuits have no
basis in law or fact.
The victims of frivolous lawsuits are real victims. They have to
shell out thousands of dollars, endure sleepless nights, and spend time
away from their family, work, and customers, just to respond to
frivolous pleadings. Few would ever claim that judges should have the
discretion to deny damage awards to victims of legal wrongs proved in
court.
So why should judges have the discretion to deny damage awards to
victims of frivolous lawsuits who prove in court that the case brought
against them was, indeed, frivolous?
A vote against LARA, including a vote for the motion to recommit, is
a denial of the fact that victims of frivolous lawsuits are real
victims. But they are real victims, and they deserve to be guaranteed
compensation when they prove in court that the claims against them are
frivolous. This bill would do just that, and for these reasons, I urge
my colleagues to support it.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Hultgren). All time for general debate has
expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule. The bill shall be considered as read.
The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 720

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act
of 2017''.

SEC. 2. ATTORNEY ACCOUNTABILITY.

(a) Sanctions Under Rule 11.--Rule 11(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may'' and inserting
``shall'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Rule 5'' and all that
follows through ``motion.'' and inserting ``Rule 5.''; and
(3) in paragraph (4), by striking ``situated'' and all that
follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting
``situated, and to compensate the parties that were injured
by such conduct. Subject to the limitations in paragraph (5),
the sanction shall consist of an order to pay to the party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred as a
direct result of the violation, including reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs. The court may also impose
additional appropriate sanctions, such as striking the
pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-
monetary nature, or, if warranted for effective deterrence,
an order directing payment of a penalty into the court.''.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or an
amendment made by this Act shall be construed to bar or
impede the assertion or development of new claims, defenses,
or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including
civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United
States.

The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to the bill shall be in order except
those printed in part A of House Report 115-29. Each such amendment may
be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable
for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and
shall not be subject to a demand for division of the question.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Soto

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in part A of House Report 115-29.
Mr. SOTO: Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 3, strike line 11 and all that follows through line
13, and insert the following:
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by inserting after ``be presented to the court if'' the
following: ``discovery has not been completed and if'' ; and
(B) by striking ``within 21 days'' and inserting ``within
14 days''; and

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 180, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Soto) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. SOTO. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would reinstate the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure rule 11(c)(2) safe harbor provision, which
allows parties to avoid penalties, by withdrawing or correcting the
claims within 14 days from when the alleged violation of rule 11(b)
becomes known, anytime up until the end of the discovery period.
This bill would force attorneys to assess their case blindly as it
stands. Every attorney knows to assess their case based upon an
objective set of facts regarding the situation.
A good attorney would never overpromise a cause of action, but this
bill prevents even a fair assessment of a case. A full and accurate
analysis of the merits of the case must be done on day one, because
this bill requires mandatory sanctions with no grace period. We have
tried this already, and it did not work.
This bill will eliminate rule 11(c)(2)'s safe harbor provision, which
currently allows the target of a rule 11 motion for sanctions to
withdraw or correct the paper claim, defense, contention, or denial
that is the subject of the motion for sanctions within 21 days after
service.
Between 1938 and 1983, there were only 19 rule 11 filings. In 1983,
rule 11 was changed to the standard being proposed by this bill. In the
10 years without this safe harbor provision, nearly 7,000 motions for
sanctions were made. A 1989 study showed that roughly one-third of all
Federal civil lawsuits involved rule 11 satellite litigation, and
approximately one-fourth of all those cases on the docket involved rule
11 actions that did not result in sanctions. Thus, attorneys had a dual
job: one to try the case, and the other to try the opposing counsel.
We can't go back to a failed system. The amount of sanction
litigation that clogged the system was so extensive that in 1993, a
mere 10 years after this failed legal experiment began, a safe harbor
provision was established to unclog the system, and it worked. Since
then, the amount of rule 11 sanction satellite litigation has come
down, and the courts are now better able to focus on the case at hand.
In committee, Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island, recommended the
reimplementation of the 21-day safe harbor provision.

{time} 1000

Instead of following this commonsense proposal, the committee
rejected it by an 18-4 vote. I believe such an important provision
needs to be revisited, but with a compromise. That is why I drafted
this amendment that offers a 14-day safe harbor provision; and as a
measure to protect further abuse, my safe harbor amendment is only
available prior to the completion of discovery, yet another attempt to
have a compromise here.
The intent for this discovery provision is that an attorney, during
discovery, may realize a flaw in their case. Such a revelation should
allow an attorney to correct or withdraw their claim without having the
fear of having mandatory automatic sanctions imposed on them. Instead,
this bill, as written, immediately places sanctions on the mistaken
lawyer. This is well-intentioned, but it does not acknowledge the
realities of litigation or the legal process.
In the real world, clients can easily misrepresent a situation to
their counsel, and the truth won't be known until discovery. This bill
will have a stifling effect on the legal community and will lead to
denied justice because attorneys will not be willing to take a case
unless it is a guaranteed win.
We should take the lessons learned from the 1983 experiment and
preserve the safe harbor provision to protect well-intended plaintiffs'
attorneys and not stack the deck against those who seek justice.
Mr. Chair, I urge support for my amendment, and I reserve the balance
of my time.

[[Page H2031]]

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to
the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment which
allows lawyers who file frivolous claims to escape any sanction.
It is essential that LARA reverse the 1993 amendments to rule 11. The
current rule allows those who file frivolous lawsuits to avoid
sanctions by withdrawing claims within 21 days after a motion for
sanctions has been filed. This loophole, which LARA closes, gives
unscrupulous lawyers an unlimited number of free passes to file
frivolous pleadings with impunity.
Justice Scalia correctly predicted that such amendments would, in
fact, encourage frivolous lawsuits. Opposing the 1993 amendments in
which the 21-day rule was instated, Justice Scalia wrote:

In my view, those who file frivolous suits in pleadings
should have no safe harbor. The rules should be solicitous of
the abused and not of the abuser. Under the revised rule,
parties will be able to file thoughtless, reckless, and
harassing pleadings, secure in the knowledge that they have
nothing to lose: if objection is raised, they can retreat
without penalty.

LARA would eliminate the free pass lawyers use to file frivolous
lawsuits. This amendment would eliminate that free pass that is so
costly to innocent Americans.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. SOTO. Mr. Chair, there is a sanction in place. You have to remove
your claim or your assertion that is in question, and there is the cost
of time that any attorney has to put in. But at the end of the day, we
have already been down this road and it has failed. Now all we are
going to see is more litigation again without the requisite increase in
funding to our Federal courts.
And so what we are going to see is anybody who sued--whether you are
a plaintiff suing or defendant--is going to now have far more complex,
dual-track litigation, and that is going to increase costs on
businesses and on individuals who are facing litigation in our Federal
courts. I believe we need to keep the lessons learned from the past,
and I urge Members to adopt my amendment.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Soto).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SOTO. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2
printed in part A of House Report 115-29.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 3, beginning on line 19, strike ``shall consist of an
order to pay'' and all that follows through ``reasonable
expenses incurred'' on line 20, and insert ``may consist of
an order to pay the reasonable expenses incurred by the party
or parties''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 180, the gentlewoman
from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me again emphasize our mutual
commitment to justice and why I think the underlying bill skews justice
and tips the scale of justice on Lady Justice.
I again refer you to the sitting experts, and that is the Judicial
Conference of the United States, comprised of Federal judges all across
America. I can't help but recite this sentence that strikes me as one
as strong as possible to have been cited in a letter.
Their referral to LARA, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, in this one
sentence, recognizing the concern about frivolous lawsuits or filings,
they say:

But LARA creates a curse worse than the problem it is meant
to solve.

I think that that one sentence says it all. We are not here solving a
problem. We are here creating a problem.
I am particularly struck by the comments regarding small businesses.
My amendment improves H.R. 720 by preserving the current law and
practice of courts awarding attorneys' fees when justice requires.
As written, H.R. 720 would change the sanctions for violation of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to a cost-shifting sanction,
payable to the opposing party, an antiquated version of the rule in
effect from 1983 until 1993. That cost-shifting provision was
eliminated by the courts because it encouraged satellite litigation.
The Jackson Lee amendment would preserve the sanctions currently
available under rule 11, which provide the correct balance in punishing
unwarranted conduct--this is under the present status of rule 11--
without encouraging unnecessary litigation.
Specifically, my amendment will strike a provision of the legislation
that mandates the award of reasonable attorney fees and costs. Instead,
it restores judicial discretion to award such fees and costs when
warranted.
Take small business A, who is mad at big bank XYZ. They mishandled my
account, and they filed a lawsuit. Unfortunately, the bookkeeper--not
accountant--bookkeeper that the small business used really made the
mistake, but the judge, recognizing the small business had good
intentions, would not have to mandatorily force them to be sanctioned
and to pay attorneys' fees but might then have discretion. That is how
you help small business A.
I ask my colleagues to support the reasonable Jackson Lee amendment.
Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to explain the Jackson Lee
Amendment to H.R. 720.
My amendment improves H.R. 720 by preserving the current law and
practice of courts awarding attorney fees when justice so requires.
As written, H.R. 720 would change the sanctions for a violation of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 11 to a cost-shifting sanction
payable to the opposing party, an antiquated version of the Rule in
effect from 1983 until 1993.
That cost-shifting provision was eliminated by the courts because it
encouraged satellite litigation.
The Jackson Lee Amendment would preserve the sanctions currently
available under Rule 11, which provide the correct balance in punishing
unwarranted conduct, without encouraging unnecessary litigation.
Specifically, my amendment will strike a provision of the legislation
that mandates the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and
instead restores judicial discretion to award such fees and costs when
warranted.
The Jackson Lee Amendment preserves the balance found in the current
version of Rule 11, which gives the court discretion to determine an
appropriate sanction.
H.R. 720 seeks a return to the failed and discredited sanction regime
rightly abandoned in 1993.
By eliminating the mandatory fee-shifting provision, the 1993 Rule
discouraged satellite litigation and encouraged parties to move forward
with the merits of the case.
Under the prior Rule 11, during the 1983-1993 time, mandatory fee-
shifting was used to discourage plaintiffs from bringing meritorious
claims using novel legal theories in civil rights and employment rights
cases.
Reinstating this mandatory fee shifting rule, as H.R. 720 does, will
again have a chilling effect on plaintiffs claims, especially
individual plaintiffs taking on large corporate interests.
The Jackson Lee Amendment would preserve the current version of Rule
11(c) and restore the true balance between punishing unwarranted
conduct and deterring unnecessary litigation.
The old rule disproportionately affected plaintiffs, especially
plaintiffs in civil rights cases.
Sanctions were more often imposed against plaintiffs than defendants
and more often imposed against plaintiffs in certain kinds of cases,
primarily in civil rights and certain kinds of discrimination cases.
A leading study on this issue showed that although civil rights cases
made up 11.4% of federal cases filed, 22.7% of the cases in which
sanctions had been imposed were civil rights cases.
The imposition of mandatory fees and costs shifts the purpose of the
Rule from deterrence to compensation, encouraging parties to always
file Rule 11 motions in the hopes of gaining additional compensation.

[[Page H2032]]

For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the
Jackson Lee Amendment.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States,
Washington, DC, April 13, 2015.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: We write to present the views of the
Judicial Conference Rules Committees on H.R. 758, the Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act of 2015.
As the current chairs of the Judicial Conference's
Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure (the
``Standing Committee'') and the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the ``Advisory
Committee''), we oppose H.R. 758, which seeks to reduce
lawsuit abuse by amending Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The bill would reinstate a mandatory
sanctions provision of Rule 11 adopted in 1983 and removed as
counterproductive in 1993. The bill would also eliminate a
provision adopted in 1993 that allows a party to withdraw
challenged pleadings. Our concerns mirror the views expressed
by the Judicial Conference in 2004 and 2005, and by the
Standing Committee and Advisory Committee in 2011 and 2013,
in response to similar legislation, and reflect our ongoing
daily experience with the practical operation of the rules.
We share the desire of the sponsors of H.R. 758 to improve
the civil justice system in our federal courts, including the
desire to reduce frivolous filings. But legislation that
would restore the 1983 version of Rule 11 would create a cure
worse than the problem it is meant to solve. Such legislation
also contravenes the longstanding Judicial Conference policy
opposing direct amendment of the federal rules by legislation
rather than through the deliberative process Congress
established in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
Sec. Sec. 2071-2077.
A decade of experience with the 1983 mandatory sanctions
provision demonstrated that it failed to provide meaningful
relief from the litigation behavior it was meant to address,
and instead generated wasteful satellite litigation that had
little to do with the merits of cases. The 1983 version of
Rule 11 required sanctions for every violation of the rule,
and quickly became a tool of abuse. Aggressive filings of
Rule 11 sanctions motions required expenditure of tremendous
resources on Rule 11 battles having nothing to do with the
merits of the case and everything to do with strategic
gamesmanship. Many Rule 11 motions in turn triggered counter-
motions seeking Rule 11 sanctions as a penalty for filing of
the original Rule 11 motion.
The 1993 changes to Rule 11 followed years of examination
and were made on the Judicial Conference's strong
recommendation, with the Supreme Court's approval, and
effective only following a period of congressional review.
The 1993 amendments were designed to remedy the major
problems with the rule, strike a fair balance between
competing interests, and allow parties and courts to focus on
the merits of the underlying cases. Since 1993, the rule has
included a safe harbor, providing a party 21 days within
which to withdraw a particular claim or defense before
sanctions can be imposed. If the party fails to withdraw an
allegedly frivolous claim or defense within that time, a
court may impose sanctions, including assessing reasonable
attorney fees. Under the 1993 amendments, sanctioning of
discovery-related abuse remains available under Rules 26 and
37, which provide for sanctions that include awards of
reasonable attorney fees.
Minimizing frivolous filings is vital. The current rules
give judges tools to deal with frivolous pleadings, including
the imposition of sanctions where warranted. Rule 12(b)(6)
authorizes courts to dismiss pleadings that fail to state a
claim. Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code
authorizes sanctions against lawyers for ``unreasonably and
vexatiously'' multiplying the proceedings in any case. Other
tools to address frivolous filings include 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1915(e), which requires courts to dismiss cases brought
in forma pauperis that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to
state a claim, and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915A, which requires
courts to dismiss prisoner complaints against governmental
entities, officers, or employees that are frivolous,
malicious, or fail to state a claim.
Some may ask, why not give courts another tool to deter
frivolous filings by reinstating the 1983 version of Rule 11?
The answer is that the very process Congress established to
consider rule proposals exposed the 1983 version of Rule 11
as superficially appealing, but replete with unintended
consequences, chiefly an explosion of satellite litigation.
Congress designed the Rules Enabling Act process in 1934, and
reformed it in 1988, to produce the best rules possible
through broad public participation and review by the bench,
the bar, and the academy. The Enabling Act charges the
judiciary with the task of neutral, independent, and thorough
analysis of the rules and their operation. The Rules
Committees undertake extensive study of the rules, including
empirical research, so that they can propose rules that will
best serve the American justice system while avoiding
unintended consequences. Experience has shown that this
process works well. Direct amendment of Rule 11 will not only
circumvent the effective Rules Enabling Act process Congress
implemented, but as the careful study of Rule 11 undertaken
by the Rules Committees over many years demonstrates, direct
amendment of Rule 11 as envisioned by H.R. 758 would work
against the laudable purpose of improving the administration
of justice.
Before proposing the 1993 amendments, the Advisory
Committee reviewed several empirical studies of the 1983
version of Rule 11, including studies conducted by the
Federal Judicial Center in 1985 and 1988, a Third Circuit
Task Force report on Rule 11 in 1989, and a New York State
Bar Committee report in 1987. In 1990, the Advisory Committee
issued a call for general comments on the rule. The response
was substantial and clearly called for a change. The Advisory
Committee concluded that Rule 11's cost-shifting provision
created an incentive for too many unnecessary Rule 11
motions. Amendments to Rule 11 were drafted by the Advisory
Committee and approved by the Standing Committee and Judicial
Conference. The Supreme Court approved the amendments and
transmitted them to Congress in May 1993 after extensive
scrutiny and debate by the bench, bar, and public in
accordance with the Rules Enabling Act process.
The amended rule has produced a marked decline in Rule 11
satellite litigation without any noticeable increase in
frivolous filings. In June 1995, the Federal Judicial Center
conducted a survey of 1,130 lawyers and 148 judges on the
effects of the 1993 amendments. The Center found general
satisfaction with the amended rule, and that a majority of
the responding judges and lawyers did not favor a return to
mandatory sanctions when the rule is violated.
In 2005, the Federal Judicial Center surveyed federal trial
judges to get a clearer picture of how the revised Rule 11
was operating. A copy of the study is enclosed. The study
showed that judges on the front lines--those who must contend
with frivolous litigation and apply Rule II--strongly believe
that the current rule works well. The study's findings
include the following highlights:
More than 80 percent of the 278 district judges surveyed
indicated that ``Rule 11 is needed and it is just right as it
now stands'';
87 percent prefer the existing Rule 11 to the 1983 version
or the version proposed by legislation (e.g., H.R. 4571 (the
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004) or H.R. 420 (the Lawsuit
Abuse Reduction Act of 2005));
85 percent strongly or moderately support Rule 11's safe
harbor provisions;
91 percent oppose the proposed requirement that sanctions
be imposed for every Rule 11 violation;
84 percent disagree with the proposition that an award of
attorney fees should be mandatory for every Rule 11
violation;
85 percent believe that the amount of groundless civil
litigation has not grown since the promulgation of the 1993
rule (for judges commissioned before 1992) or since their
first year as a federal district judge (for judges
commissioned after January 1, 1992); and
72 percent believe that addressing sanctions for discovery
abuse in Rules 26(g) and 37 is better than in Rule 11.
The findings of the Federal Judicial Center underscore the
judiciary's united opposition to legislation amending Rule
11. Lawyers share this view. The American Bar Association has
opposed H.R. 758. Indeed, of the 200 lawyers, litigants,
judges, and academics who participated in the 2010 conference
at Duke University Law School convened by the Advisory
Committee to search for ways to address the problems of costs
and delay in civil litigation, nobody proposed a return to
the 1983 version of Rule 11.
Thank you for considering the views of the Standing
Committee and Advisory Committee. We look forward to
continuing to work with you to ensure that our civil justice
system fulfills its vital role. If you or your staff have any
questions, please contact Rebecca Womeldorf, Secretary to the
Standing Committee.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey S. Sutton,
United States Circuit Judge Sixth Circuit,Chair, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
David G. Campbell,
United States District Judge District of Arizona, Chair,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to
the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment which would
strike the provision for penalties for frivolous lawsuits and, thus,
defeat the purpose of the bill.
Today, there is no guarantee that a victim of a frivolous lawsuit
will be compensated, even when a court finds that the lawsuit is
frivolous. This legislation gives the victims of frivolous lawsuits the
ability to receive compensation from those who abuse the legal system.
The underlying bill enables innocent Americans to protect

[[Page H2033]]

themselves and their families from absolutely absurd lawsuits, which
can cost them their reputations and their livelihoods.
Mr. Chair, I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, reading again from the Judicial
Conference letter, it says: The facts do not support any assumption
that mandatory sanctions under H.R. 720--that is what the bill is
about--deter frivolous filings. All it does, after a decade of
experience, is that it demonstrates that it failed to provide
meaningful relief from the litigation behavior it was supposed to
address.
What it will do is it will punish the small business. By eliminating
the mandatory fee-shifting provision, the 1993 rule discouraged
satellite litigation. Reinstating this mandatory fee-shifting rule, as
H.R. 720 does, will again have a chilling effect.
The Jackson Lee amendment would give the courts discretion to protect
against the mom-and-pop business from having to pay because they
mistakenly thought big bank XYZ did them in, and it really was a
mistake on their part.
Sanctions are more often imposed against plaintiffs than defendants,
more often imposed against plaintiffs in certain kind of cases,
primarily civil rights and certain kinds of discrimination cases.
The Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka might have been perceived
to be outrageous--how dare you try to strike down the separate but
equal--and yet it has had an amazing impact and a case of moment in
history.
Or the Loving v. Virginia, when two individuals who loved each other
still were kept out of Virginia because they were of different races,
it was absurd to file that lawsuit at that time. Yet, if they had not,
or if these kinds of penalties were in place, they might be suffering
mandatory sanctions and kept out of the courthouse.
A leading study on this issue showed that, although civil rights
cases make up 11.4 percent, 22.7 percent of the cases in which
sanctions have been imposed are civil rights cases.
Mr. Chair, I ask my colleagues to support the Jackson Lee amendment.
In order to foster justice, support the Jackson Lee amendment, which
restores to the courts judicial discretion on penalties and sanctions,
if you will, and listen to the Judicial Conference: this is a curse
worse than the problem.
Mr. Chair, I urge support of the Jackson Lee amendment, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, let me just summarize this bill in
one sentence, and that is that no reputable attorney is going to have
any concerns with this legislation.
Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Conyers

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in part A of House Report 115-29.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that my amendment be brought forward
at this time.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Add, at the end of the bill, the following:

SEC. 3. PROTECTING ACTIONS PERTAINING TO CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIMS OR CIVIL RIGHTS.

Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by this Act,
shall be construed to apply to actions alleging any violation
of a right protected by the Constitution or any civil right
protected by law.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 180, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned that H.R. 720 may have
a serious, deleterious impact on the ability of individuals to protect
their civil and constitutional rights in Federal court. This is a point
that has been emphasized on this side ever since we have started
examining, more carefully, H.R. 720. Accordingly, my amendment would
simply exempt these types of cases from the bill.
Based on a decade of experience with the 1983 version of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, we know that the civil rights cases were, in
fact, disproportionately impacted because they often raised novel
arguments.
For example, a 1991 Federal Judicial Center study found that the
incidence of rule 11 motions was ``higher in civil rights cases than in
some other types of cases.'' Another study shows that, while civil
rights cases comprised only 11 percent of the Federal cases filed, more
than 22 percent of the cases in which sanctions had been imposed were,
in fact, civil rights cases.
The bill contains a rule of construction intended to clarify that
``it not be construed to bar the assertion of new claims or defenses or
remedies, including those arising under civil rights laws or the
Constitution.''
The inclusion of this language is an acknowledgment of the
disproportionate impact that the 1983 rule had on civil rights cases,
and we should applaud--and I am sure we do--its intent.
Nevertheless, I fear this rule of construction, by itself, will not
prevent defendants from using rule 11 as a weapon to dissuade civil
rights plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.

{time} 1015

My amendment makes an explicit exception for civil rights and
constitutional actions. As a result, litigants will be clearly aware of
its existence and will not be able to force opposing parties into
satellite litigation when the case is brought under a civil rights law.
This amendment is necessary to avoid even the possibility of a
chilling effect that the revisions made by the bill to rule 11 could
have on those advocating for civil rights and constitutional law
protections. As the late Robert Carter, a former United States judge
for the Southern District of New York, who earlier in his career
represented one of the plaintiffs in the Brown v. Board of Education
case, said of the 1983 version of rule 11:
``I have no doubt that the Supreme Court's opportunity to pronounce
separate schools inherently unequal in Brown v. Board of Education
would have been delayed for a decade had my colleagues and I been
required, upon pain of potential sanctions, to plead our legal theory
explicitly from the start.''
For that reason alone, I urge the adoption of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to
the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, let me say, first of all, that the
ranking member of the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Conyers), has been a champion of civil rights all of his life. I
recognize and respect that.
For that reason, I would like to try to reassure him that the base
bill already says, as I mentioned in my opening statement:
``Nothing in this Act or an amendment made by this Act shall be
construed to bar or impede the assertion or development of new claims,
defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including
civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States.''
This provision clearly preserves the right to assert claims under the
civil rights laws or the Constitution. I don't know how this language
could be more clear.
This amendment would allow frivolous claims to be brought under civil
rights laws without any of the penalties required in the base bill. If
this amendment were adopted, the bill would invite the filing of
frivolous civil rights claims without any penalty whatsoever.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment, which regrettably
would expose innocent Americans to abusive and frivolous lawsuits.

[[Page H2034]]

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I support Representative Conyers'
amendment.
I include in the Record in support of our amendment a Judicial
Conference letter dated April 13, 2015, and letters from a number of
organizations, including the Alliance for Justice and the American
Association for Justice.
I also include in the Record a letter from the American Bar
Association, who begins their message:
``On behalf of the American Bar Association, ABA, and its over
400,000 members, I am writing to urge you to vote against H.R. 720, the
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act . . . which is scheduled for a floor vote
this week.''

Re Groups Strongly Oppose Attacks on Civil Justice.

Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Hon. John Conyers, Jr.,
Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers: On
February 2, the House Committee on the Judiciary is scheduled
to mark up several bills that collectively would make it more
difficult for Americans to enforce their legal rights, and
would place unreasonable burdens on the federal judiciary and
federal enforcement officials. The undersigned organizations
strongly oppose these bills as harmful and unnecessary.

H.R. 720: THE LAWSUIT ABUSE REDUCTION ACT (LARA)

LARA would make major, substantive changes to Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, bypassing both the
Judicial Conference of the United States and the U.S. Supreme
Court in the process. Rule 11 provides judges with authority
to sanction attorneys for filing frivolous claims and
defenses. It provides judges with discretion to decide, on a
case-by-case basis, if sanctions are appropriate. LARA would
remove this judicial discretion, mandating sanctions. LARA
would reinstate a rule put into effect in 1983 that was so
unworkable it was rescinded in 1993 after many problems and
nearly universal criticism. Among those problems were: the
rule had a chilling effect on the filing of meritorious civil
rights, employment, environmental, and consumer cases; the
rule was overused in civil rights cases as sanctions were
sought and imposed against civil rights plaintiffs more than
against any other litigants in civil court; and the rule
burdened the already strained federal court system with
satellite litigation over compliance with the rule. These
burdens adversely affected cases of all types, including
business-to-business civil litigation. Congress should be
looking for ways to decrease, not increase, wasteful burdens
on the courts, and should avoid rules changes that have a
discriminatory impact on civil rights, employment,
environmental, and consumer cases.

H.R. 725: THE INNOCENT PARTY PROTECTION ACT

This bill would upend long established law in the area of
federal court jurisdiction, specifically addressing the
supposed overuse of ``fraudulent joinder'' to defeat complete
diversity jurisdiction in a case. It was previously known as
the ``Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act.'' However, this bill
is not about fraud. It is a corporate forum-shopping bill
that would allow corporations to move cases properly brought
in state courts into federal courts. Corporate defendants
support this bill because they prefer to litigate in federal
court, which usually results in less diverse jurors, more
expensive proceedings, longer wait times for trials, and
stricter limits on discovery. For plaintiffs, who are
supposed to be able to choose their forums, this legislation
would result in additional time, expense, and inconvenience
for the plaintiff and witnesses. Moreover, there is no
evidence that federal courts are not already properly
handling allegations of so-called ``fraudulent joinder''
after removal under current laws. The bill would result in
needless micromanagement of federal courts and a waste of
judicial resources. While it purports to fix a non-existent
problem, it creates problems itself.

H.R. 732: STOP SETTLEMENT SLUSH FUNDS ACT

Under existing laws, settlement terms that result from
federal enforcement actions can sometimes include payments to
third parties to advance programs that assist with recovery,
benefits, and relief for communities harmed by lawbreakers,
to the extent such payments further the objectives of the
enforcement action. This bill would cut off any payments to
third parties other than individualized restitution and other
forms of direct payment for ``actual harm.'' That restriction
would handcuff federal enforcement officials by limiting
their ability to negotiate appropriate relief for real harms
caused to the public by illegal conduct that is the subject
of federal enforcement actions. This bill would be a gift to
lawbreakers at the expense of families and communities
suffering from injuries that cannot be addressed by direct
restitution.
We urge you to oppose each of these bills. For more
information, please contact Joanne Doroshow at the Center for
Justice & Democracy or Susan Harley at Public Citizen's
Congress Watch.
Very sincerely,
Alliance for Justice, American Association for Justice,
Americans for Financial Reform, Asbestos Disease Awareness
Organization, Brazilian Worker Center, California Kids IAQ,
Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Justice &
Democracy, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Coal
River Mountain Watch, Comite Civico, Committee to Support the
Antitrust Laws, Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety.
Daily Kos, DMV EJ Coalition Earthjustice, East Yard
Communities for Environmental Justice, Environmental Working
Group, Farmworker Association of Florida, Homeowners Against
Deficient Dwellings, IDARE LLC, Impact Fund, Louisiana Bucket
Brigade, M&M Occupational Health and Safety Services,
Martinez Environmental Group, National Association of
Consumer Advocates, National Center for Law and Economic
Justice, National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low
income clients).
National Consumers League, National Employment Lawyers
Association, Natural Resources Defense Council, New Haven
Legal Assistance Association, Ohio Citizen Action, Ohio
Valley Environmental Coalition, Oregon Environmental Council,
Progressive Congress Action Fund, Protect All Children's
Environment, Public Citizen, Public Justice Center, Public
Law Center, RootsAction.org, Southern Appalachia Mountain
Stewards, Texas Watch, The Workers' Rights Center, U.S. PIRG,
Western New Council on Occupational Safety and Health,
WisCOSH, Inc., Workplace Fairness, Worksafe.
____

American Bar Association,

Washington, DC, March 7, 2017.

ABA Urges You To Oppose Passage of H.R. 720, the Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act

Dear Representative: On behalf of the American Bar
Association (ABA) and its over 400,000 members, I am writing
to urge you to vote against H.R. 720, the Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act of 2015, which is scheduled for a floor vote
this week.
Even though this legislation may seem straightforward and
appealing on initial review, a thorough examination of the
concerns the bill is designed to address provides compelling
evidence that, rather than reducing frivolous lawsuits, H.R.
720 will encourage civil litigation abuse and increase court
costs and delays.
H.R. 720 seeks to amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure by rolling back critical improvements made to
the Rule in 1993. The legislation would reinstate a mandatory
sanction provision that was adopted in 1983 and eliminated a
decade later after experience revealed its unintended,
adverse consequences. It also would eliminate the ``safe
harbor'' provision, added in 1993, which has helped reduce
frivolous lawsuits by allowing parties to withdraw claims
within 21 days after a motion for sanctions is served.
The ABA urges you to oppose enactment of H.R. 720 for three
main reasons. First, the legislation was drafted in an
empirical and historical vacuum without the input of the
judicial branch. Second, there is no demonstrated evidence
that the existing Rule 11 is inadequate and needs to be
amended. And third, by ignoring the lessons learned from ten
years of experience under the 1983 mandatory version of Rule
11, Congress incurs the substantial risk that the proposed
changes will harm litigants by encouraging additional
litigation and increasing court costs and delays.

I. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES SHOULD BE VETTED THROUGH THE RULES
ENABLING ACT PROCESS

The Rules Enabling Act was established by Congress to
assure that amendment of the Federal Rules occurs only after
a comprehensive and balanced review of the problem and
proposed solution is undertaken by the Judicial Conference of
the United States, the policy-making arm of the federal
judiciary, in consultation with lawyers, scholars,
individuals, and organizations devoted to improving the
administration of justice. Prior to submission to Congress, a
proposed amendment undergoes extensive review and public
comment, a process that often takes over two years and offers
Members assurance the proposed amendment is necessary and
wise.
In stark contrast, H.R. 720 proposes to amend the Federal
Rules over the objections of the Judicial Conference and
despite compelling evidence that it will adversely affect the
administration of justice.

II. THERE IS NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT RULE 11 IS INADEQUATE AND NEEDS
TO BE AMENDED

Proponents state that the legislation is needed to stem the
growth in frivolous lawsuits that, according to the written
statement of the National Federation of Independent Business,
has ``created a legal climate that hinders economic growth
and hurts job creation.''
There simply is no proof that problems created by frivolous
lawsuits have increased since 1993 or that the current Rule
11 is ineffective in deterring frivolous filings. In fact, it
is more likely that problems have abated since 1993 because
Rule 11's safe harbors provision provides an incentive to
withdraw frivolous filings at the outset of litigation.

[[Page H2035]]

In addition, according to Professor Danielle Kie Hart and
other researchers, after the current version of Rule 11 went
into effect, there was an increased incidence of sanctions'
being imposed under other sanction rules and laws, including
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927, as well as pursuant to the court's
inherent power. Judges have numerous tools at their disposal
to impose sanctions and prevent frivolous lawsuits from going
forward.

III. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL RISK THAT H.R. 758 WOULD IMPEDE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY ENCOURAGING ADDITIONAL LITIGATION AND
INCREASING COURT COSTS AND DELAYS

Most importantly, there is no evidence that the proposed
changes to Rule 11 would deter the filing of non-meritorious
lawsuits. In fact, as stated earlier, past experience
strongly suggests that the proposed changes would encourage
new litigation over sanction motions, thereby increasing, not
reducing, court costs and delays. This is a costly and
completely avoidable outcome.

IV. CONCLUSION

The 1983 version of Rule 11 was ill-conceived and created
significant unintended adverse consequences that harmed
litigants and impeded the administration of justice. We urge
you to avoid making the same mistake and to oppose passage of
H.R. 720.
If you have any questions concerning the ABA's position on
this bill, please feel free to contact me or Denise Cardman,
Deputy Director of the Governmental Affairs Office.
Sincerely,
Thomas M. Susman.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Jeffries

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in part A of House Report 115-29.
Mr. JEFFRIES. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Add, at the end of the bill, the following:

SEC. 3. PROTECTING ACTIONS PERTAINING TO WHISTLEBLOWERS.

Nothing in this Act, or the amendments made by this Act,
shall be construed to apply to actions brought by an
individual, or individuals, under Federal whistleblower laws,
Federal anti-retaliation laws, or any Federal laws which
protect reporting government misconduct or malfeasance.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 180, the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Jeffries) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. JEFFRIES. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished colleagues in
government and the lead Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee for
their continued leadership.
My amendment would amend from the underlying bill all actions where
whistleblowers allege misconduct or malfeasance in connection with the
Federal Government. A whistleblower is defined as one who reveals
wrongdoing within an organization in the hope of stopping it.
Our country has long recognized the importance of affording legal
protections to whistleblowers. Under the protection and umbrella of
these laws, whistleblowers have helped expose corruption, government
waste, fraud, unconstitutional practices, and abuses of the public
trust. They have risked, in many cases, their livelihoods to do what is
right for this country and defend our democracy.
It should not be our objective to create barriers that will stop
people in good faith from coming forward by subjecting them or their
representatives to mandatory sanctions, but that is exactly what this
bill is designed to do.
This amendment will ensure that whistleblowers are still protected
under current law when they bring an action through our judicial
system. The need for this amendment is clear now more than ever.
Donald Trump and his team appear, at times, to be paranoid about the
information that comes out of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. If the 45th
President of the United States chooses to run the White House and the
government in the same way that he ran many of his businesses, their
fear may be well-founded. He does not have a great track record.
Donald Trump has been sued by the Department of Justice for violating
Federal antidiscrimination laws, refusing to rent apartments to people
based on their race. I note that that lawsuit in the early 1970s was
brought by the Nixon Justice Department.
He was forced to shut down Trump University, an apparent scam that he
used to rip off students, swindling them out of tens of thousands of
dollars. And he has repeatedly failed to pay his workers and
contractors for their services--hardworking Americans.
He created a fake charity, the Trump Foundation, which apparently has
been used to pay for a portrait of himself and pay off fines and bills.
He has declared bankruptcy four times in his career after losing
billions of dollars.
Now, as President, this is the first time that Donald Trump has had
to act in the best interest of someone other than himself or his
family.
His Cabinet, however, consists of the superwealthy, many of whom are
unfamiliar with the programs that their departments oversee and who are
inexperienced in handling billions and billions of taxpayer dollars.
Many others seem more concerned about helping out interests that are
corporate in nature, not the people's interests.
In the words of the legendary Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis:
``Sunlight is the best of disinfectants, electric light the most
efficient policeman.''
Putting whistleblower protections at risk puts our democracy at risk,
and for that reason, I urge adoption of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. Members are reminded to refrain from engaging in
personalities toward the President.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to
the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the Chair pointing out
that it is improper to impugn the integrity or damage the reputation of
the President of the United States or others. I thank the Chair for
pointing that out.
Mr. Chairman, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act makes three important
changes to rule 11 to limit lawsuit abuse by imposing sanctions for
bringing frivolous lawsuits. These changes apply to all cases brought
in Federal district courts.
However, this amendment would change that. If this amendment is
adopted, the changes to rule 11 made by LARA would not apply to
lawsuits brought in relation to whistleblower claims. There is no
reason to make this or other exceptions.
The changes made by the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act should apply
uniformly throughout the Federal courts. Because this amendment
excludes certain cases from the bill's coverage and thereby allows
frivolous lawsuits to be filed without any of the penalties required by
the bill, I oppose the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. JEFFRIES. Mr. Chairman, I would add that, in a democracy, the
ability to use the Article III Federal court system is incredibly
important as it relates to the chance for individual citizens who
recognize that wrongdoing is taking place to do something about it and
save taxpayers from the waste, fraud, and abuse that so many in this
Chamber appear to often be concerned about.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, proponents of this amendment want to allow lawsuits
with no basis in law or fact to proceed without penalty if the lawsuit
relates to whistleblowers. Think about that. The proponents of this
amendment support lawsuits that apparently have no basis in law or
fact, and they want those frivolous lawsuits to proceed without
penalty.

[[Page H2036]]

Let me remind Members what the base bill--which is just one page
long--actually does. It makes it mandatory for the victims of frivolous
lawsuits filed in Federal court to be compensated for the harm done to
them by the filers of frivolous lawsuits. The bill doesn't change the
existing standards for determining what is or is not a frivolous
lawsuit. So under the bill, mandatory sanctions would only be awarded
to victims of frivolous lawsuits when those lawsuits, as determined by
the judge, have no basis in law or fact, including cases related to
whistleblowers that have no basis in law or fact.
This amendment would allow legally frivolous whistleblower cases to
go without penalty and leave their victims uncompensated, so I urge all
of my colleagues to oppose it.
Once again, I don't know how any reputable attorney would have any
concerns with this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Jeffries).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. JEFFRIES. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York
will be postponed.

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings
will now resume on those amendments printed in part A of House Report
115-29 on which further proceedings were postponed, in the following
order:
Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Soto of Florida.
Amendment No. 2 by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas.
Amendment No. 3 by Mr. Conyers of Michigan.
Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Jeffries of New York.
The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the minimum time for any
electronic vote after the first vote in this series.

Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Soto

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Soto) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 181,
noes 225, not voting 23, as follows:

[Roll No. 153]

AYES--181

Adams
Aguilar
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Capuano
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Correa
Courtney
Crist
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Curbelo (FL)
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Demings
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Espaillat
Esty
Evans
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hanabusa
Hastings
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Krishnamoorthi
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham, M.
Lujan, Ben Ray
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rosen
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Russell
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth

NOES--225

Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Barr
Barton
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Cheney
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Conaway
Cook
Costa
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Culberson
Davidson
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donovan
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Dunn
Emmer
Farenthold
Faso
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garrett
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Griffith
Grothman
Guthrie
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kustoff (TN)
Labrador
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
LoBiondo
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Massie
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Nunes
Olson
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rooney, Thomas J.
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
Rutherford
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin

NOT VOTING--23

Banks (IN)
Barletta
Bishop (UT)
Boyle, Brendan F.
Buck
Carter (GA)
Comstock
Davis (CA)
DeSaulnier
Duffy
Jones
Kuster (NH)
Langevin
Lynch
Moore
O'Halleran
Palazzo
Richmond
Rush
Sinema
Titus
Walz
Waters, Maxine

{time} 1049

Messrs. BOST, LUETKEMEYER, BUDD, and BISHOP of Michigan changed their
vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chair, on rollcall No. 153, I was unavoidably
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``Aye.''
Stated against:
Mrs. COMSTOCK. Mr. Chair, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been
present, I would have voted ``Nay'' on rollcall No. 153.
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Chair, I was unavoidably detained. Had I
been present, I would have voted ``Nay'' on rollcall No. 153.

Amendment No. 2 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Texas
(Ms. Jackson Lee) on which further proceedings were postponed and on
which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.

[[Page H2037]]

The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185,
noes 225, not voting 19, as follows:

[Roll No. 154]

AYES--185

Adams
Aguilar
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Capuano
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Correa
Courtney
Crist
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Curbelo (FL)
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Espaillat
Esty
Evans
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hanabusa
Hastings
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Krishnamoorthi
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham, M.
Lujan, Ben Ray
Lynch
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Halleran
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rosen
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Russell
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth

NOES--225

Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Banks (IN)
Barr
Barton
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Cheney
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costa
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Culberson
Davidson
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donovan
Duffy
Duncan (TN)
Dunn
Emmer
Farenthold
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallagher
Garrett
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Grothman
Guthrie
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kustoff (TN)
Labrador
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
LoBiondo
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Massie
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rooney, Thomas J.
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
Rutherford
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin

NOT VOTING--19

Amash
Barletta
Boyle, Brendan F.
Buck
Castro (TX)
Davis (CA)
Duncan (SC)
Faso
Gaetz
Jones
Kuster (NH)
McClintock
Moore
Richmond
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sinema
Titus

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.

{time} 1053

So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. Mr. Chair, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been
present, I would have voted ``yea'' on rollcall No. 154.
Stated against:
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chair, had I been present, I would have voted ``nay''
on rollcall No. 154.

Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Conyers

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Conyers) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 190,
noes 227, not voting 12, as follows:

[Roll No. 155]

AYES--190

Adams
Aguilar
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Capuano
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Crist
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Curbelo (FL)
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Espaillat
Esty
Evans
Fitzpatrick
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffith
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hanabusa
Hastings
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Krishnamoorthi
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham, M.
Lujan, Ben Ray
Lynch
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Halleran
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rosen
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Russell
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth

NOES--227

[[Page H2038]]

Faso
Ferguson
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garrett
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Grothman
Guthrie
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kustoff (TN)
Labrador
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
LoBiondo
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Massie
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rooney, Thomas J.
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
Rutherford
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin

NOT VOTING--12

Barletta
Boyle, Brendan F.
Castro (TX)
Davis (CA)
Johnson (OH)
Jones
Kuster (NH)
McClintock
Richmond
Rush
Sinema
Titus

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.

{time} 1058

So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Jeffries

The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Jeffries) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

Recorded Vote

[Roll No. 156]

AYES--189

Adams
Aguilar
Barragan
Bass
Beatty
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Blunt Rochester
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Brown (MD)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Capuano
Carbajal
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Correa
Costa
Courtney
Crist
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Curbelo (FL)
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Demings
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Espaillat
Esty
Evans
Fitzpatrick
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hanabusa
Hastings
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Krishnamoorthi
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham, M.
Lujan, Ben Ray
Lynch
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Halleran
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rosen
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth

NOES--229

Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Banks (IN)
Barr
Barton
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Cheney
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Culberson
Davidson
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donovan
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Dunn
Emmer
Farenthold
Faso
Ferguson
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garrett
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Griffith
Grothman
Guthrie
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kustoff (TN)
Labrador
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Massie
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rooney, Thomas J.
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
Russell
Rutherford
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin

NOT VOTING--11

Barletta
Boyle, Brendan F.
Davis (CA)
Johnson (GA)
Jones
Kuster (NH)
Richmond
Rush
Sinema
Titus
Yoho

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR (during the vote). There is 1 minute remaining.

{time} 1102

Mr. DOGGETT changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Mr. YOHO. Mr. Chair, I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present,
I would have voted ``Nay'' on rollcall No. 156.
The Acting CHAIR. There being no further amendments, under the rule,
the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Womack) having assumed the chair, Mr. Hultgren, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 720) to
amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to improve
attorney accountability, and for other purposes, and, pursuant to House
Resolution 180, he reported the bill back to the House.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

[[Page H2039]]

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.

Motion to Recommit

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
Ms. LOFGREN. I am opposed in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:

Ms. Lofgren moves to recommit the bill H.R. 720 to the
Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report the
same back to the House forthwith with the following
amendment:
Add, at the end of the bill, the following:

SEC. 3. PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
INTERFERENCE.

Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act may
be construed to apply to a civil action that implicates the
foreign emoluments clause of the United States Constitution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, this is the final amendment to the bill,
which will not kill the bill or send it back to committee. If adopted,
the bill will immediately proceed to final passage, as amended.
As has been amply discussed, the mandatory sanctions and fees in this
bill would have a chilling effect on cutting-edge litigation. One type
of cutting-edge litigation to suffer would be citizen lawsuits seeking
enforcement of the foreign Emoluments Clause. The amendment proposed in
this motion would exempt civil actions that implicate foreign
emoluments.
Article I, section 9, clause 8 of the Constitution says: ``No person
holding any office of profit or trust . . . shall, without the consent
of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of
any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.''
Why did the Founding Fathers write this? Concern that foreign
governments might try to control America. They wanted to make sure that
nothing--no gifts, no payments, no advantages of any kind--could be
received by officers of the United States, including the President,
unless Congress approved it. They wanted to make sure that loyalty was
completely to America, not divided by obligations to foreign powers. So
receipt of emoluments is a serious breach of the requirements of the
Constitution unless Congress approves the payment.
Congress has not voted to approve payments by foreign governments to
our President. Some Americans are considering legal action to protect
America from a Presidential violation of the Emoluments Clause.
President Trump took the symbolic step of resigning from his
businesses, but he still gets the income. Letting his family run his
businesses doesn't solve the emoluments violations.
Here are some of the potential problems:
In February, China gave provisional approval for 31 new trademarks
for The Trump Organization, which have been sought for a decade, to no
avail, until he won the election. This is a benefit the Chinese
Government gave to the President's business.
At Trump Tower in New York, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China's large tenant, the United Arab Emirates, leases space, and the
Saudi mission to the U.N. makes payments. Money from these foreign
countries goes to the President.
The President is part owner of a New York building carrying a $950
million loan, partially held by the Bank of China. He literally owes
the government of China.
The Embassy of Kuwait held its 600-guest National Day celebration at
Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C., last month, proceeds to Trump.
The President has deals in Turkey. When he announced the Muslim ban,
Turkey's President called for President Trump's name to be removed from
Trump Towers Istanbul. His company is currently involved in major
licensing deals for that property.
Shortly after the election, the President met with former U.K.
Independent Party leader Nigel Farage, to get help to get the view from
his golf resorts in Scotland resolved. Both golf resorts he owns there
are promoted by Scotland's official tourism agency.
Foreign government-owned broadcasts in several countries air the
President's television program ``The Apprentice,'' resulting in
royalties and other payments from these governments.
There may be many more business violations to the Emoluments Clause
that are unknown due to the President's refusal to disclose his tax
returns.
Congress could move to approve these questionable payments and
benefits under Article 1, section 9 to solve the constitutional
violation, although, in my view, that would not resolve concerns about
divided loyalties.
But Congress has done nothing--neither enforce the clause nor
authorize the payments. That is why patriotic citizens are returning to
the third branch of government to defend the Constitution and the
country.
America has never faced this situation before, and any litigation
will, of course, be breaking new ground and, therefore, be more
susceptible to the mandatory rule 11 fees required by the bill.
Citizens who seek a President free from foreign influence by bringing
actions in court should not be penalized with the mandatory fees
required by this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to vote for this motion to
recommit, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I will be brief.
Proponents of the motion to recommit want to allow lawsuits with no
basis in law or fact to proceed without penalty in the area covered by
their motion. Let that sink in for a moment--and just a brief moment.
The proponents of the motion to recommit support certain lawsuits
that apparently have no basis in law or fact. Otherwise, they have no
relevance to this bill. If they are relevant motions, they won't have
to worry about it. They want those frivolous lawsuits to proceed
without penalty.
Every time a judge decides a company made a defective product that
ended up hurting people, damages are awarded. When a lawyer makes up a
lawsuit that has no basis in law or fact, that lawsuit is a defective
product. The victims harmed by that defective product should be
compensated just like everyone else.
Oppose this motion to recommit, pass the base bill, and let's show
America where we stand on frivolous lawsuits and on the compensation
rightfully owed to the victims of frivolous lawsuits.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passage.
This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 186,
noes 232, not voting 11, as follows:

[Roll No. 157]

AYES--186

[[Page H2040]]

Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Gonzalez (TX)
Gottheimer
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hanabusa
Hastings
Heck
Higgins (NY)
Himes
Hoyer
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jayapal
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Khanna
Kihuen
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Krishnamoorthi
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lawson (FL)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham, M.
Lujan, Ben Ray
Lynch
Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Halleran
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Rosen
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth

NOES--232

Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Banks (IN)
Barr
Barton
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Cheney
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Culberson
Curbelo (FL)
Davidson
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donovan
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Dunn
Emmer
Farenthold
Faso
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garrett
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Griffith
Grothman
Guthrie
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Kustoff (TN)
Labrador
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
LoBiondo
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Massie
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Pittenger
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rooney, Thomas J.
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
Russell
Rutherford
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin

NOT VOTING--11

Barletta
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (TX)
Davis (CA)
Jones
Kuster (NH)
Richmond
Rush
Sinema
Titus
Walden

Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes
remaining.

{time} 1118

So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 157, I was
unavoidably detained to cast my vote in time. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``No.''

personal explanation

Ms. KUSTER of New Hampshire. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained.
Had I been present, I would have voted ``Yea'' on rollcall No. 153,
``Yea'' on rollcall No. 154, ``Yea'' on rollcall No. 155, ``Yea'' on
rollcall No. 156, and ``Yea'' on rollcall No. 157.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.

Recorded Vote

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 230,
noes 188, not voting 11, as follows:

[Roll No. 158]

AYES--230

Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Arrington
Babin
Bacon
Banks (IN)
Barr
Barton
Bergman
Biggs
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Budd
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Cheney
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comer
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costa
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Cuellar
Culberson
Davidson
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Donovan
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Dunn
Emmer
Farenthold
Faso
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Flores
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gaetz
Gallagher
Garrett
Gibbs
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Grothman
Guthrie
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Higgins (LA)
Hill
Holding
Hollingsworth
Hudson
Huizenga
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (LA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Joyce (OH)
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger
Knight
Labrador
LaHood
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
Lewis (MN)
LoBiondo
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Marshall
Massie
Mast
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mitchell
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Murphy (PA)
Newhouse
Noem
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Peterson
Pittenger
Poliquin
Posey
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney, Francis
Rooney, Thomas J.
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce (CA)
Rutherford
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smucker
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Taylor
Tenney
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Zeldin

NOES--188

[[Page H2041]]

Maloney, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McCollum
McEachin
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Halleran
O'Rourke
Pallone
Panetta
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Pingree
Pocan
Poe (TX)
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Raskin
Rice (NY)
Rosen
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Russell
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Soto
Speier
Suozzi
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth

NOT VOTING--11

Barletta
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (TX)
Davis (CA)
Jones
Lawrence
Richmond
Rush
Sinema
Titus
Walden

{time} 1129

Ms. ROSEN changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. MARCHANT changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 158, I was
unavoidably detained to cast my vote in time. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``Yes.''

Personal Explanation

Ms. KUSTER of New Hampshire. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, March 10, 2017,
I missed the following rollcall votes to H.R. 720: number 153 the Soto
Amendment, number 154 the Jackson-Lee amendment, number 155 the Conyers
amendment, number 156 the Jeffries amendment, number 157 on the
Democratic motion to recommit and number 158 on final passage. Had I
voted, I would have voted ``Aye'' on rollcall vote 153, ``Aye on
rollcall vote 154, ``Aye'' on rollcall vote 155, ``Aye'' on rollcall
vote 156, ``Aye'' on rollcall vote 157 the Democratic motion to
recommit, and ``Nay'' on rollcall vote 158 on final passage of H.R.
720.

____________________