[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 165 (Thursday, November 17, 2016)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1504-E1505]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      IRAN SANCTIONS EXTENSION ACT

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                        HON. SHEILA JACKSON LEE

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, November 15, 2016

  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of extending the 
option of sanctions against Iran by passage of H.R. 6297, the Iran 
Sanctions Extension Act, which reauthorizes the Iran Sanctions Act of 
1996 for 10 years.
  As a Senior Member of the Homeland Security Committee, and Ranking 
Member of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 
Homeland Security, and Investigations, I am very much aware of what is 
at stake in the work done by President Obama to ensure that Iran does 
not have the breakout capacity to build a nuclear weapon.
  Events over this Congress make it clear that Congress should be even 
more vigilant in providing for the protection of the United States.
  Congress should be mindful of the:
  United States' leadership in the effort to forge an enforceable and 
verifiable nuclear agreement with Iran; and
  Deadliness of chemical weapons when they were used during the Syrian 
conflict against unarmed men, women, and children.
  H.R. 6297, allows Congress the option to impose sanctions, but does 
renew the imposition of sanctions.
  As Congress continues to review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), which resulted in the significant reduction in Iran's 
capabilities to develop a nuclear weapon, we must continue the peaceful 
and verifiable efforts to cut off Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon.
  President Obama and current and former Secretary of State John Kerry 
and Hillary Clinton were successful in the pursuit of global sanctions 
and gained the cooperation of the world, including Russia and China, 
which was critical in bringing the Iranians to the negotiation table on 
their nuclear arms program.
  We should retain in our arsenal the option to impose sanctions so 
that if necessary the United States can act quickly to coordinate a 
global response to any threat posed by Iran's verified breach of the 
JCPOA.
  Declaring sanctions for the sake of declaring sanctions against Iran 
should never be the objective, nor should we forget that the 
effectiveness of sanctions are their global nature.
  Under President Obama's brilliant leadership the United States had 
the stature around the globe to impose sanctions, and the diplomatic 
ties to gain global cooperation to expand participation in Iranian 
sanctions because we could make the case that Iran's nuclear program 
posed an international threat to peace and stability.
  The United States is the world's foremost authority on radiological 
weapons grade material detection and source identification.
  The Department of Homeland Security is leading the effort through its 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to create a Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture, which should be aggressively supported with 
sufficient funding by Congress.
  Recognizing the threat posed by nuclear and other radioactive 
materials, DNDO was created by National Security Presidential Directive 
(NSPD)-43 and Homeland Security

[[Page E1505]]

Presidential Directive (HSPD)-3.4 and subsequently codified by Title V 
of the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act (Pub. L. 
No. 109-347), which amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
  A key area that the United States has focused its capabilities and 
resources is blocking the enrichment of radioactive materials for 
weapons use; and the detection of radioactive materials that would pose 
a threat to public safety and health.
  There are several material facts that must be understood about 
weapons grade radioactive material--each nation's process for refining 
nuclear material for use in a weapon is unique.
  Radioactive material has a unique spectrum range and composition that 
is akin to signatures that cannot be confused with other sources of 
radioactive material both natural and manmade.
  The first essential fact is that having samples and data from Iranian 
facilities where materials in Iran were produced established the 
radiological signatures for materials that could have only come from 
those facilities or from processes that follow the methods used by the 
Iranian nuclear physicists who developed their program.
  The United States has those samples and the data needed to identify 
material from Iranian efforts to purify radiological materials.
  The second essential fact is that radiological material leaves 
evidence of its presence long after it may have been removed from an 
area.
  The physical evidence of centrifuges; storage facilities or weapons 
themselves are not the only evidence that may convict Iran of violation 
of the agreement; it can also be the unique Iranian radiation trail 
left behind during any attempt to refine or purify radiological 
material for use in a weapon or the transfer of even small quantities 
of material that is generated or sourced by the Iranians.
  The third essential fact is that if the Iranians need special 
centrifuges to refine radiological material to a point that it may be 
used for a weapon.
  H.R. 6297 assures that any attempt by the Iranians to cheat by 
refining more radiological material than is allowed will be detected 
and Congress would be prepared to impose a sanctions regime.
  Another significant signal of Iranian violation would be the unique 
signature of the sound made by centrifuges that are used to purify 
radiological material.
  The sound of these massive centrifuges will be detectable many miles 
away from where they are operated--and the United States has the 
resources in place in cooperation with allies around the world to 
detect if enrichment activity is occurring.
  Operating more centrifuges than is allowed by the agreement would be 
a actionable sign that Iran is seeking to purify more radioactive 
material than is allowed by the agreement.
  This is important to the timeline in calculating the time to 
breakout--having enough enriched material to use in a weapon.
  The final essential fact is that the United States has satellite 
surveillance and ground surveillance capability to detect in great 
detail activity on the ground.
  The United States used these resources to identify nuclear arms 
activity that informed the administration of the severity of the issue 
and used that evidence to galvanize international support for one of 
the most successful embargoes in human history.
  For these reasons, I will join my colleagues in supporting passage of 
this bipartisan effort to extend by 10 years the period that sanctions 
may be applied to Iran.
  I urge you to join me in support of this bill and the excellent work 
of the Obama Administration in making the world much safer from nuclear 
threats.

                          ____________________