[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 145 (Monday, September 26, 2016)]
[House]
[Pages H5894-H5905]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2016
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
bill (H.R. 5978) to amend title 14, United States Code, to clarify the
functions of the Chief Acquisition Officer of the Coast Guard, and for
other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 5978
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments Act of 2016''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--COAST GUARD, NAVIGATION, AND SHIPPING
Sec. 101. Coast Guard major acquisition programs.
Sec. 102. Prospective payment of funds necessary to provide medical
care for the Coast Guard.
Sec. 103. Oil spill disbursements auditing and report.
Sec. 104. Deadline for compliance with alternate safety compliance
program.
Sec. 105. Coast Guard pier in Wilmington, North Carolina.
Sec. 106. Backup global positioning system.
Sec. 107. Arctic alternative planning criteria.
TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 201. Vessel ``Apollonia''.
Sec. 202. Reimbursement for non-Federal construction costs of certain
aids to navigation.
Sec. 203. Corrections to provisions enacted by Coast Guard
Authorization Acts.
TITLE I--COAST GUARD, NAVIGATION, AND SHIPPING
SEC. 101. COAST GUARD MAJOR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.
(a) Functions of Chief Acquisition Officer.--Section 56(c)
of title 14, United States Code, is amended by striking
``and'' after the semicolon at the end of paragraph (8),
striking the period at the end of paragraph (9) and inserting
``; and'', and adding at the end the following:
``(10)(A) keeping the Commandant informed of the progress
of major acquisition programs (as that term is defined in
section 581);
``(B) informing the Commandant on a continuing basis of any
developments on such programs that may require new or
revisited trade-offs among cost, schedule, technical
feasibility, and performance, including--
``(i) significant cost growth or schedule slippage; and
``(ii) requirements creep (as that term is defined in
section 2547(c)(1) of title 10); and
``(C) ensuring that the views of the Commandant regarding
such programs on cost, schedule, technical feasibility, and
performance trade-offs are strongly considered by program
managers and program executive officers in all phases of the
acquisition process.''.
(b) Customer Service Mission of Directorate.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 15 of title 14, United States
Code, is amended--
(A) in section 561(b)--
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting
``; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) to meet the needs of customers of major acquisition
programs in the most cost-effective manner practicable.'';
(B) in section 562, by repealing subsection (b) and
redesignating subsections (c) through (g) as subsections (b)
through (e), respectively;
(C) in section 563, by striking ``Not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization
Act of 2010, the Commandant shall commence implementation
of'' and inserting ``The Commandant shall maintain'';
(D) by adding at the end of section 564 the following:
``(c) Acquisition of Unmanned Aerial Systems.--
``(1) In general.--During any fiscal year for which funds
are appropriated for the design or construction of the
Offshore Patrol Cutter, the Commandant--
``(A) may not award a contract for design of an unmanned
aerial system for use by the Coast Guard; and
``(B) may acquire an unmanned aerial system only--
``(i) if such a system has been acquired by, or has been
used by, the Department of Defense or the department in which
the Coast Guard is operating, or a component thereof, before
the date on which the Commandant acquires the system; and
``(ii) through an agreement with such a department or
component, unless the unmanned aerial system can be obtained
at less cost through independent contract action.
[[Page H5895]]
``(2) Limitations on application.--
``(A) Small unmanned aerial systems.--The limitations in
paragraph (1)(B) do not apply to any small unmanned aerial
system that consists of--
``(i) an unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on
takeoff, including all components and equipment on board or
otherwise attached to the aircraft; and
``(ii) associated elements (including communication links
and the components that control such aircraft) that are
required for the safe and efficient operation of such
aircraft.
``(B) Previously funded systems.--The limitations in
paragraph (1) do not apply to the design or acquisition of an
unmanned aerial system for which funds for research,
development, test, and evaluation have been received from the
Department of Defense or the department in which the Coast
Guard is operating.'';
(E) in subchapter II, by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 578. Role of Vice Commandant in major acquisition
programs
``The Vice Commandant--
``(1) shall represent the customer of a major acquisition
program with regard to trade-offs made among cost, schedule,
technical feasibility, and performance with respect to such
program; and
``(2) shall advise the Commandant in decisions regarding
the balancing of resources against priorities, and associated
trade-offs referred to in paragraph (1), on behalf of the
customer of a major acquisition program.
``Sec. 579. Extension of major acquisition program contracts
``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 564(a)(2) of
this title and section 2304 of title 10, and subject to
subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the Secretary may
acquire additional units procured under a Coast Guard major
acquisition program contract, by extension of such contract
without competition, if the Director of the Cost Analysis
Division of the Department of Homeland Security determines
that the costs that would be saved through award of a new
contract in accordance with such sections would not exceed
the costs of such an award.
``(b) Limitation on Number of Additional Units.--The number
of additional units acquired under a contract extension under
this section may not exceed the number of additional units
for which such determination is made.
``(c) Determination of Costs Upon Request.--The Director of
the Cost Analysis Division of the Department of Homeland
Security shall, at the request of the Secretary, determine
for purposes of this section--
``(1) the costs that would be saved through award of a new
major acquisition program contract in accordance with section
564(a)(2) for the acquisition of a number of additional units
specified by the Secretary; and
``(2) the costs of such award, including the costs that
would be incurred due to acquisition schedule delays and
asset design changes associated with such award.
``(d) Number of Extensions.--A contract may be extended
under this section more than once.''; and
(F) in section 581--
(i) by redesignating paragraphs (7) through (10) as
paragraphs (9) through (12), respectively, and by
redesignating paragraphs (3) through (6) as paragraphs (4)
through (7), respectively;
(ii) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Customer of a major acquisition program.--The term
`customer of a major acquisition program' means the operating
field unit of the Coast Guard that will field the system or
systems acquired under a major acquisition program.''; and
(iii) by inserting after paragraph (7), as so redesignated,
the following:
``(8) Major acquisition program.--The term `major
acquisition program' means an ongoing acquisition undertaken
by the Coast Guard with a life-cycle cost estimate greater
than or equal to $300,000,000.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The analysis at the beginning of
such chapter is amended by adding at the end of the items
relating to subchapter II the following:
``578. Role of Vice Commandant in major acquisition programs.
``579. Extension of major acquisition program contracts.''.
(c) Review Required.--
(1) Requirement.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard shall
conduct a review of--
(A) the authorities provided to the Commandant in chapter
15 of title 14, United States Code, and other relevant
statutes and regulations related to Coast Guard acquisitions,
including developing recommendations to ensure that the
Commandant plays an appropriate role in the development of
requirements, acquisition processes, and the associated
budget practices;
(B) implementation of the strategy prepared in accordance
with section 562(b)(2) of title 14, United States Code, as in
effect before the enactment of this Act; and
(C) acquisition policies, directives, and regulations of
the Coast Guard to ensure such policies, directives, and
regulations establish a customer-oriented acquisition system.
(2) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2017, the Commandant
shall submit to the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate a report containing, at a minimum, the following:
(A) The recommendations developed by the Commandant under
paragraph (1) and other results of the review conducted under
such paragraph.
(B) The actions the Commandant is taking, if any, within
the Commandant's existing authority to implement such
recommendations.
(3) Modification of policies, directives, and
regulations.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commandant of the Coast Guard
shall modify the acquisition policies, directives, and
regulations of the Coast Guard as necessary to ensure the
development and implementation of a customer-oriented
acquisition system, pursuant to the review under paragraph
(1)(C).
(d) Analysis of Using Multiyear Contracting.--
(1) In general.--No later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the department in
which the Coast Guard is operating shall submit to the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate an analysis of the use of
multiyear contracting, including procurement authority
provided under section 2306b of title 10, United States Code,
authority similar to that granted to the Navy under section
121(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1648) and section 150
of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Public Law 111-
242; 124 Stat. 3519), and block buy authority to acquire Fast
Response Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, heavy polar
icebreakers, and medium polar icebreakers.
(2) Vessels to be analyzed.--Under paragraph (1) the
Secretary shall analyze--
(A) the acquisition of at least 5 Fast Response Cutters,
beginning with Hull 43;
(B) the acquisition of at least 5 Offshore Patrol Cutters,
beginning with Hull 5;
(C) the acquisition of at least 3 heavy polar icebreakers;
and
(D) the acquisition of at least 3 medium polar icebreakers.
(3) Contents.--The analysis under paragraph (1) shall
include the costs and benefits of using multiyear
contracting, the impact of multiyear contracting on delivery
timelines, and whether the acquisitions examined would meet
the tests for the use of multiyear procurement authorities.
SEC. 102. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT OF FUNDS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE
MEDICAL CARE FOR THE COAST GUARD.
(a) In General.--Chapter 13 of title 14, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 520. Prospective payment of funds necessary to provide
medical care
``(a) Prospective Payment Required.--In lieu of the
reimbursement required under section 1085 of title 10, for
periods when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in
the Navy the Secretary of the department in which the Coast
Guard is operating shall make a prospective payment to the
Secretary of Defense of an amount that represents the
actuarial valuation of treatment or care--
``(1) that the Department of Defense provides to members of
the Coast Guard, former members of the Coast Guard, and
dependents of such members and former members (other than
former members and dependents of former members who are a
Medicare-eligible beneficiary or for whom the payment for
treatment or care is made from the Medicare-Eligible Retiree
Health Care Fund) at facilities under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Defense or a military department; and
``(2) for which a reimbursement would otherwise be made
under such section 1085.
``(b) Amount.--The amount of the prospective payment under
subsection (a) shall be--
``(1) in the case of treatment or care to be provided to
members of the Coast Guard and their dependents, derived from
amounts appropriated for the operating expenses of the Coast
Guard;
``(2) in the case of treatment or care to be provided
former members of the Coast Guard and their dependents,
derived from amounts appropriated for retired pay;
``(3) determined under procedures established by the
Secretary of Defense;
``(4) paid during the fiscal year in which treatment or
care is provided; and
``(5) subject to adjustment or reconciliation as the
Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is
operating when it is not operating as a service in the Navy
and the Secretary of Defense determine appropriate during or
promptly after such fiscal year in cases in which the
prospective payment is determined excessive or insufficient
based on the services actually provided.
``(c) No Prospective Payment When Service in Navy.--No
prospective payment shall be made under this section for any
period during which the Coast Guard operates as a service in
the Navy.
``(d) Relationship to TRICARE.--This section shall not be
construed to require a payment for, or the prospective
payment of an amount that represents the value of, treatment
or care provided under any TRICARE program.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 13 of
title 14, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``520. Prospective payment of funds necessary to provide medical
care.''.
[[Page H5896]]
(c) Repeal.--Section 217 of the Coast Guard Authorization
Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-120), and the item relating to
that section in the table of contents in section 2 of such
Act, are repealed.
SEC. 103. OIL SPILL DISBURSEMENTS AUDITING AND REPORT.
Section 1012 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (33 U.S.C.
2712) is amended--
(1) by repealing subsection (g);
(2) in subsection (l)(1), by striking ``Within one year
after the date of enactment of the Coast Guard Authorization
Act of 2010, and annually thereafter,'' and inserting ``Each
year, on the date on which the President submits to Congress
a budget under section 1105 of title 31, United States
Code,''; and
(3) by amending subsection (l)(2) to read as follows:
``(2) Contents.--The report shall include--
``(A) a list of each disbursement of $500,000 or more from
the Fund in the preceding fiscal year, including
disbursements to Federal agencies;
``(B) a list of each disbursement of $500,000 or more from
the Fund in the fiscal year preceding the preceding fiscal
year that has not been reimbursed by a responsible party; and
``(C) a description of how each use of the Fund described
in subparagraph (A) or (B) meets the requirements of
subsection (a).''.
SEC. 104. DEADLINE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ALTERNATE SAFETY
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM.
Section 4503(d)(1) of title 46, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``After January 1, 2020,'' and all that
follows through ``the Secretary,'' and inserting ``For each
of fishing vessels, fish processing vessels, and fish tender
vessels, after the later of January 1, 2020, or the end of
the 3-year period beginning on the date on which the
Secretary prescribes an alternate safety compliance program
developed in cooperation with the commercial fishing industry
for such a vessel, such a vessel shall comply with the
applicable alternate safety compliance program''.
SEC. 105. COAST GUARD PIER IN WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the department in which
the Coast Guard is operating shall submit to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate by not later than 90 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act a report on--
(1) short-term plans for berthing the USCGC Diligence in
Wilmington, North Carolina, while the Coast Guard pier in
Wilmington is being repaired; and
(2) long-term plans for repairing and maintaining such pier
so that it can be used to berth such vessel and any future
Coast Guard cutter stationed in Wilmington.
(b) Cost Estimates.--The report shall include cost
estimates and timeframes for such short- and long-term plans.
SEC. 106. BACKUP GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``National Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Resilience and
Security Act of 2016''.
(b) In General.--Subtitle VIII of title 46, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``CHAPTER 807--POSITION, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING
``Sec.
``80701. Land-based complementary and backup system.
``Sec. 80701. Land-based complementary and backup system
``(a) In General.--Subject to the availability of
appropriations, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
provide for the establishment, sustainment, and operation of
a reliable land-based enhanced LORAN, or eLORAN, positioning,
navigation, and timing system to provide a complement to and
backup for the Global Positioning System (in this section
referred to as `GPS') to ensure the availability of
uncorrupted and nondegraded positioning, navigation, and
timing signals for military and civilian users in the event
that GPS signals are corrupted, degraded, unreliable, or
otherwise unavailable.
``(b) Requirements.--The system established under
subsection (a) shall--
``(1) be wireless;
``(2) be terrestrial;
``(3) provide wide-area coverage;
``(4) deliver a precise, high-power 100 kilohertz signal;
``(5) be synchronized with coordinated universal time;
``(6) be resilient and extremely difficult to disrupt or
degrade;
``(7) be able to penetrate underground and inside
buildings;
``(8) be capable of ready deployment to remote locations;
``(9) take full advantage of the infrastructure of the
existing, unused Government long-range navigation system
(commonly known as `LORAN');
``(10) incorporate the expertise of the private sector with
respect to development, building, and operation;
``(11) work in concert with and complement any other
similar positioning, navigation, and timing systems;
``(12) be available for use by Federal and non-Federal
government agencies for public purposes at no cost; and
``(13) incorporate such other requirements determined
necessary by the Commandant.
``(c) Request for Proposals.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than three months after the
date of enactment of this section, the Commandant, in
consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, shall
publish a request for proposals to solicit options for--
``(A) eLORAN system architecture; and
``(B) business models for the design, installation,
operation, and maintenance of an eLORAN system in accordance
with this section for a period of no less than 20 years.
``(2) Contracting options.--The request for proposals shall
request options that--
``(A) incorporate the expertise of the private sector; and
``(B) allow for the expeditious installation, daily
operation, and routine maintenance of an eLORAN system
architecture.
``(d) Implementation Date.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this section, the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, in consultation with the Secretary of
Transportation, shall provide to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate a plan to ensure that the system
required under this section is fully operational not later
than 3 years after such date of enactment.''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The analysis for subtitle VIII of
title 46, United States Code, is amended by adding after the
item relating to chapter 805 the following:
``807. Position, Navigation, and Timing....................80701''.....
SEC. 107. ARCTIC ALTERNATIVE PLANNING CRITERIA.
(a) General.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard may approve
alternative planning criteria for an area of lesser
geographic extent than the area covered by the Captain of the
Port Zone that includes the Arctic for purposes of complying
with sections 155.1035(i) and 155.5035(i) of title 33, Code
of Federal Regulations, only if the Commandant--
(1) publishes the proposed alternative planning criteria in
the Federal Register for notice and comment in accordance
with section 553 of title 5, United States Code;
(2) completes a study of the economic impacts on the Arctic
of such criteria; and
(3) submits a report on such study to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate.
(b) Definition.--For the purposes of this section
``Arctic'' has the meaning that term has under section 112 of
the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).
TITLE II--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 201. VESSEL ``APOLLONIA''.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary
of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall
issue a certificate of documentation with a coastwise
endorsement for the vessel Apollonia (United States official
number 1266527).
SEC. 202. REIMBURSEMENT FOR NON-FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF
CERTAIN AIDS TO NAVIGATION.
(a) In General.--Subject to the availability of amounts
specifically provided in advance in subsequent appropriations
Acts and in accordance with this section, the Commandant of
the Coast Guard may reimburse a non-Federal entity for costs
incurred by the entity for a covered project.
(b) Conditions.--The Commandant may not provide
reimbursement under subsection (a) with respect to a covered
project unless--
(1) the need for the project is a result of the completion
of construction with respect to a federally authorized
navigation channel;
(2) the Commandant determines, through an appropriate
navigation safety analysis, that the project is necessary to
ensure safe marine transportation;
(3) the Commandant approves the design of the project to
ensure that it meets all applicable Coast Guard aid to
navigation standards and requirements;
(4) the non-Federal entity agrees to transfer the project
upon completion to the Coast Guard to be operated and
maintained by the Coast Guard as a Federal aid to navigation;
(5) the non-Federal entity carries out the project in
accordance with the same laws and regulations that would
apply to the Coast Guard if the Coast Guard carried out the
project, including obtaining all permits required for the
project under Federal and State law; and
(6) the Commandant determines that the project satisfies
such additional requirements as may be established by the
Commandant.
(c) Limitations.--Reimbursements under subsection (a) may
not exceed the following:
(1) For a single covered project, $5,000,000.
(2) For all covered projects in a single fiscal year,
$5,000,000.
(d) Expiration.--The authority granted under this section
shall expire on the date that is 4 years after the date of
enactment of this section.
(e) Covered Project Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered project'' means a project carried out by a non-
Federal entity to construct and establish an aid to
navigation that facilitates safe and efficient marine
transportation on a federally authorized navigation channel.
SEC. 203. CORRECTIONS TO PROVISIONS ENACTED BY COAST GUARD
AUTHORIZATION ACTS.
(a) Short Title Correction.--The Coast Guard Authorization
Act of 2015 (Public Law
[[Page H5897]]
114-120) is amended by striking ``Coast Guard Authorization
Act of 2015'' each place it appears (including in quoted
material) and inserting ``Coast Guard Authorization Act of
2016''.
(b) Title 46, United States Code.--
(1) Section 7510 of title 46, United States Code, is
amended--
(A) in subsection (c)(1)(D), by striking ``engine'' and
inserting ``engineer''; and
(B) in subsection (c)(9), by inserting a period after
``App''.
(2) Section 4503(f)(2) of title 46, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``, that'' and inserting ``, then''.
(c) Provisions Relating to the Pribilof Islands.--
(1) Short title correction.--Section 521 of the Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-120), as amended by
subsection (a), is further amended by striking ``2015'' and
inserting ``2016''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 105(e)(1) of the
Pribilof Islands Transition Act (16 U.S.C. 1161 note; Public
Law 106-562) is amended by striking ``2015'' and inserting
``2016''.
(3) Technical correction.--Section 522(b)(2) of the Coast
Guard Authorization Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-120), as
amended by subsection (a), is further amended by striking
``subsection (a)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)''.
(d) Title 14, United States Code.--
(1) Redistribution of authorizations of appropriations.--
Section 2702 of title 14, United States Code, is amended--
(A) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``$6,981,036,000'' and
inserting ``$6,986,815,000''; and
(B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``$140,016,000'' and
inserting ``$134,237,000''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The analysis at the beginning of
part III of title 14, United States Code, is amended by
striking the period at the end of the item relating to
chapter 29.
(e) National Academy of Sciences Cost Assessment.--Section
604(a) of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015 (Public
Law 114-120) is amended in the first sentence by striking
``365 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,'' and
inserting ``July 15, 2017,''.
(f) Continuation on Active Duty: Board.--Section 290(a) of
title 14, United States Code, is amended by striking ``five
officers serving in the grade of vice admiral'' and inserting
``5 officers (other than the Commandant) serving in the grade
of admiral or vice admiral''.
(g) Certificate of Documentation.--Section 604(b) of the
Howard Coble Coast Guard and Maritime Authorization Act of
2014 (Public Law 113-281) is amended by inserting ``and
fisheries endorsement'' after ``endorsement''.
(h) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect as if included in the enactment of Public
Law 114-120.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Hunter) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Garamendi) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter).
General Leave
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material on H.R. 5978.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, before we talk about H.R. 5978, I would like to talk
about what is not in this bill, which is probably one of the most
important things that is my duty, Mr. Garamendi's duty, and the Coast
Guard's duty to get done--and that is build a polar icebreaker.
Let me tell you why there is no polar icebreaker in this bill: the
CBO couldn't get their act together in time to score this one way or
another. So, again, this body is held ransom by the Congressional
Budget Office not scoring something one way or another, whether it is
good to go or not.
The reason it is so important that we have more polar icebreakers and
that we included the language that passed the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee last week is this: we do not have 24/7, 365-
day polar icebreaking ability for the Arctic. The Russians have over 40
polar icebreakers. That is over 40, some of which are even nuclear.
China has got more than 20 now. The United States only has one that is
capable of crushing heavy ice, and even that is not available 24/7,
365.
The High Latitude Region Mission Analysis revealed the following
Coast Guard missions--defense readiness; ice operations; marine
environmental protection; and ports, waterways, and coastal security in
the Arctic--were significantly impacted by the gap in this mission
performance. It is these gaps and the knowledge that, when the Polar
Star reaches the end of its extended service life, we will have a
period where the Coast Guard doesn't have a heavy icebreaker at all,
let alone what it has now, which is limited capability in the Arctic.
Progress is being made on the acquisition front. Mr. Garamendi and I
and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee granted the Coast
Guard the capability to do block buys, which is what the Navy has,
where you can purchase more than one vessel at a time, which saves
billions of dollars.
We also gave them the ability to have lead-time materials, which
means they could buy the materials way in advance, which would save
tens of millions of dollars. The Coast Guard now has this ability for
the FRC and the OPC. We want them to have it for the icebreaker as
well, but because of the CBO not scoring this, we weren't able to get
the language in.
Here is the specific language that is missing from H.R. 5978:
``The Commandant of the Coast Guard, subject to the availability of
amounts specifically provided in advance in subsequent appropriations
acts may enter into a contract for the acquisition of no less than
three heavy polar icebreakers; and may enter into a contract for
acquisition of additional polar icebreakers, except that the total
number of icebreakers acquired under this subsection may not exceed
six.''
We are talking about three. Right now we have one.
``Such acquisitions may be made through block buy contracts; may be
incrementally funded; may include combined purchases, also known as
economic order quantity purchases, of materials and components; and
long lead time materials; and may include advance construction
funding.''
This is what the Navy has for every ship that they make. This is one
reason we created a joint program office between the Coast Guard and
the Navy, so that the Navy can push the Coast Guard to do the right
thing.
The Coast Guard, let it be said, at the best, has been dragging their
feet on acquiring these icebreakers. In fact, they have been pushing
back against Congress every inch of the way on this.
In my point of view, this is just like UAVs, or the unmanned aerial
vehicles that we have now, Predators and the like. Congress earmarked
those because the Air Force did not want pilotless airplanes. Then you
would have to get rid of pilots. So the Air Force pushed back day and
night in the late nineties and this Congress earmarked Predator drones.
That is why we have Predator drones.
The military pushed back against Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected
vehicles, also known as MRAP vehicles, which have saved thousands of
lives in Iraq and Afghanistan, also pushed by Congress, not the U.S.
military. In things like this, Congress is able to see things outside
the box, which the Coast Guard cannot in this case.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) has been an
extraordinary leader on trying to address a critical need that the
United States has.
The Arctic Ocean is opening. There is not only a Northwest Passage,
but there is a Northeast Passage. And this year, just a couple of weeks
ago--less than 2 weeks ago--a cruise ship passed through the Northwest
Passage without the aid of an icebreaker.
We absolutely have to have a polar icebreaker. As the chairman said,
we have one icebreaker today, and it is going to go in for overhaul.
When it does, we have no heavy icebreaker either for the North Pole or
the South Pole.
We are in trouble. We have to have this. The U.S. Navy has to have
it. U.S. security has to have it. And certainly for the commerce in the
Arctic, we have to have it. It is a reality. The Arctic Ocean is
opening. Commerce will take place. And it will also need military
availability in that area.
The legislation that is before us today does not have the proper
language in it because of CBO sitting on
[[Page H5898]]
their duff and doodling numbers when we know we need this language.
The Senate appropriations bill has a billion dollars for icebreakers,
but there is no authorization. Unfortunately, because of our rules
here, we had to strip the language out. Later, we hope to put the
language back in, but it is not available today.
We have to have this. We go back meeting after meeting, hearing after
hearing, year after year, 4 or 5 years that we have been working on
this, and then, at the very last moment, CBO can't get its act
together. Well, I am sorry, CBO. We ought to waive the rules and get on
with what we need to do here, which is to provide the authorization.
The language that the chairman has worked out with me and others
would not only provide the authorization, but would do it in such a way
as to give us the very best possible financial deal on the construction
of icebreakers--that is a block buy--and also authorizing, should the
money be available in the future, an additional three lighter
icebreakers beyond the three heavy icebreakers.
Not to say we are going to build it all at once, but the
authorization is in the law. That then allows the Coast Guard to
properly line it up for the very best deal that we can get, maybe one
at a time, maybe two or three over a 5- or 10-year period of time.
Unfortunately, that language had to be stripped out.
So when the chairman started his explanation of this bill, he did so
to call all of our attention to what is not in the bill that should
have been in the bill, but for CBO and the rules that we have that
require us to have CBO's accounting before we move an authorization.
That is where we are today. Unfortunately, it is where we are. So we
are going to move this bill along. We will probably--hopefully--come
back before this session is over in the lameduck session and write this
thing properly. Unfortunately, today we are not there. There is more to
be said about the rest of the bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, now we are going to get back to H.R. 5978, which is a
very good bill in and of itself that, once again, doesn't have the
language that we tried to get in.
H.R. 5978, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments Act
of 2016, is a catch-all bill that addresses a number of different Coast
Guard and maritime transportation issues.
The bill involves improvements to the Coast Guard acquisition
authorities to ensure the acquisition program keeps in mind the needs
of Coast Guard operating units when acquiring assets. This provision
also requires an analysis on the use of multiyear procurement and block
buy authorities related to the purchase of Fast Response Cutters,
Offshore Patrol Cutters, and polar icebreakers, but just a report.
We already know from watching the Navy do business for the last few
decades that block buys save hundreds of millions of dollars.
At the request of the GAO, the bill repeals a GAO report regarding
disbursements from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. The information
that was collected by GAO will be incorporated into an existing Coast
Guard report.
Due to certain recent weather events impacting a Coast Guard pier in
Wilmington, North Carolina, the Coast Guard is required to issue a one-
time report detailing short- and long-term plans to replace and
maintain the pier. Certain fishing industries will be assisted by the
bill, including those that would be affected by a prescribed
Alternative Safety Compliance Program to be issued by the Coast Guard
by January 1, 2017.
If the service does not issue the program by January 1, 2017, which
is hopefully the case, the bill would provide a 3-year window for
industry compliance from the date the Coast Guard issues the program.
It has been a long-term interest for many, including Ranking Member
Garamendi, who has been instrumental--and I would say more instrumental
than myself--in preparing the language included in this legislation
that there be a reliable land-based positioning, navigation, and timing
system to complement, supplement, and back up the Global Positioning
System that we now use, the GPS.
We have all seen what the Chinese can do now in knocking down
satellites. If our GPS goes out, there is no other way for us to
navigate the oceans or to navigate land. The eLoran system does this to
ensure the continuous availability of uncorrupted or non-degraded
signals for military and civilian users. The bill directed the Coast
Guard to establish and maintain such a backup system.
{time} 1915
Aids to navigation are important tools that allow vessels to safely
navigate waterways. The bill would allow the Commandant, subject to
appropriations, to reimburse a non-Federal entity for costs incurred by
that entity to construct and establish an aid to navigation that would
otherwise be constructed by the Coast Guard.
Aids to navigation facilitate safe and efficient maritime
transportation on federally authorized navigation channels. Specific
conditions for reimbursement are outlined. Reimbursements for a single
project are limited to $5 million, and the authority expires 4 years
after the date of enactment of the bill.
There are concerns with the Coast Guard's Western Alaska Captain of
the Port Zone approving alternate planning criteria for areas covering
only a portion of the zone. This action would create two adjacent areas
with different levels of prevention and response preparedness. This
bill requires public notice, an economic study, and a report to
Congress on the study before approval of any criteria not covering the
full Western Alaska zone.
Lastly, the bill makes a variety of technical changes to provisions
in enacted Coast Guard Authorization Acts.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
(Mr. GARAMENDI asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I join Chairman Hunter in strong support
for the legislation and to advance this new policy initiative to
improve the oversight of the Coast Guard and the major acquisition
programs, and also to advance the safety and security of the U.S.
maritime industry.
H.R. 5978, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments
Act, is bipartisan legislation. We have talked about some of the
provisions that are not in the bill. I will try to talk about those
that are in the bill. It deserves the robust support from Members on
both sides of the aisle, and I urge its quick passage, probably as
early as today.
I thank the gentleman, Mr. Hunter, for his unwavering support of the
Coast Guard and the work that we are able to do together with the
members of the committee.
Of great significance, this legislation will address an overlooked
and underappreciated threat to our national and economic security: the
fact that GPS, Global Positioning System, it has been identified for
nearly 20 years as the single point of failure, with serious
implications for our national security and economy.
I know we are not able to use these little machines called cell
phones on the floor, but if we could, they are totally reliant on GPS.
You go down to the ATM, it will not work without GPS. Our systems of
navigation, including such things as positive train control, totally
dependent upon GPS. In fact, Wall Street, totally dependent on GPS. It
is timing, navigation, and positioning. That is GPS.
We have no backup; other countries do. You might ask, why is China,
why is Russia, why are they building a GLAN-based backup to GPS? Well,
they know that if there is trouble, the first thing that is going to
disappear is GPS.
Right now, GPS can be knocked out by somebody driving down the
freeway with their 18-wheeler and using an antiradar device. You might
ask what happened at the Newark airport. That is exactly what happened.
GPS was knocked out by somebody on Interstate 95 with a radar device.
It is a very weak signal, but it is an extraordinarily important
signal. So this bill provides for a backup system which has been
discussed for nearly 20
[[Page H5899]]
years, and we have gone round and round the Bush--I guess that is the
right thing--and the Clinton, in between, without any action.
So this bill would actually push this forward to give us an
opportunity to establish a backup system, which is actually very old
but will be updated with the enhanced LORAN system, dating back to the
1940s, which was the first navigational system that we built in the
United States.
Much of the system is already available; the towers, the locations,
much of that is in place. This would authorize a public-private
partnership to put that in place.
I won't go into it anymore, but it is high time that we get on with
this. The chairman laid out how it is going to be done in his talk and,
hopefully, we can finally get this underway.
There are many, many other pieces that are in this legislation. We
have talked a little bit about the Coast Guard icebreakers. We do have
a study--oh, my goodness, another study. It is the best we could do at
the moment. The chairman and I talked about what we would like to
accomplish with more than that with his actual authorization. The block
buy, we have got to do it, and, hopefully, we will.
There are other things that are in the bill that the chairman has
described. I won't go into them today in any more detail but to say
that, in my written statement, it will be covered.
One more thing, to back up the GPS, I include in the Record about 15
years of studies by Federal Government agencies that all say we have
got to have a backup system, and the eLORAN is the best.
Mr. Chairman, shall we continue on and beat this for a while longer
or shall we say let's pass the bill and get on with it?
I am pleased to rise and join Chairman Hunter in strong support of
this legislation to advance new policy initiatives to improve the
oversight of the Coast Guard's major acquisition programs and to
advance the safety and security of the U.S. maritime industry.
H.R. 5978, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Amendments Act
of 2016, is bipartisan legislation that was developed to address issues
that have arisen since the Congress passed a two-year comprehensive
Coast Guard authorization bill earlier this year.
This legislation is deserving of robust support from members on both
sides of the aisle and I urge its quick passage by the House today so
it can be sent to the other body for its consideration and passage
before the 114th Congress adjourns sine die.
I want to thank Chairman Hunter for his unwavering leadership and for
the cooperative spirit of this excellent staff in working with me and
other Democratic members to address our interests and concerns in this
legislation.
Of greatest significance, this legislation will address an overlooked
need and under-appreciated threat to our national and economic
security--the fact that the Global Positioning System, or GPS, has been
identified as a single point of failure with serious implications for
our national security and economy.
GPS has revolutionized how we live, work, and play. Signals provided
by GPS satellites ensure that literally everything that we routinely
depend on not only runs, but runs with unprecedented reliability and
precision.
We have all benefitted from GPS: whether through the distribution of
power from our electric grid; the coordination of timing signals for
trains and traffic signals; or, to improve the efficiency of maritime
search and rescue missions launched by the Coast Guard.
There is no denying that GPS has been a tremendous technological
asset. But the reality is that GPS signals are relatively weak and
fairly easy to degrade, disrupt or jam. This is not a hypothetical
matter; this threat is real, and it is happening now.
Just last week, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Paul
Zukunft, while speaking at a National Harbor Safety Conference in
Portland, Oregon, cited over 100 instances in which vessels experienced
disruption to their GPS reception.
There is nothing we can do to change the underlying physics of the
GPS signal. We can, however, take necessary and appropriate actions now
to ensure that a reliable land-based back-up system for positioning,
navigation and timing signals is available when needed.
Moreover, if the Russians, the Chinese, the EU, and other nations are
developing land-based GPS back-up systems, the United States should
have its own system as well.
Since 2001 the Federal Government, notably the PNT Executive
Committee, has been evaluating options. The Executive Committee
concluded in December, 2014 that an enhanced LORAN, or eLORAN system,
would be the most cost-effective and reliable back-up for GPS signals.
What this legislation will do is force the Federal Government to
finally take action on its own recommendation.
The Coast Guard, which for decades operated the LORAN-C navigation
system (the predecessor of GPS), would be directed to publish a request
for proposals, complete a plan for the architecture of an eLORAN
system, and get a system built and fully operational within three
years.
Make no mistake, this is a significant undertaking. But the stakes of
doing nothing is a risky roll of the dice we would be well-advised to
avoid. I strongly urge members on both sides to support this important
provision.
I am also very pleased that this legislation continues to move
forward in our efforts to recapitalize the Coast Guard's legacy fleet
of polar class heavy icebreakers.
It is clear that we are witnessing the opening of the Arctic to
maritime commerce, and with it, the creation of a whole new ocean of
operational responsibility for the Coast Guard. In this most
challenging of maritime environments, it is vital that the Service has
the icebreaking capabilities it will need to operate safely and
effectively.
I must express my disappointment that we were unable to retain the
``block buy'' provision that was reported out of the Transportation
Committee.
Nevertheless, the analysis of multi-year procurement and block buy
contracting called for in this legislation would be helpful to have on
hand when the Congress ultimately does appropriate funds for the
construction of these vital new national security assets.
I also want to express my support for other provisions in the bill,
notably language that will ensure commercial fishermen a full three
years to comply with new alternative safety compliance program
requirements from the date the Coast Guard publishes these
requirements.
Additionally, I want to express my support for the provision that
would grant to the Coast Guard authority to reimburse private entities
for their costs to construct a Federal navigation aid. The additional
sideboards that were added have clarified the scope and intent of this
new authority. I want to thank Congressman Blake Farenthold for his
willingness to work to improve this provision.
Mr. Speaker, I again want to express my appreciation to Chairman
Hunter and his staff for their support for the Coast Guard and the U.S.
Maritime industry, and for their collaboration in developing this
legislation.
I also want to thank the Chairman of the full Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, Congressman Bill Shuster, and the Ranking
Member on the full Committee, Congressman Peter DeFazio, for their
leadership and support for the Committee's maritime agenda.
In closing, this legislation is bipartisan and non-controversial. It
deserves the full support of the House.
NSPD-39: U.S. Space-Based Position, Navigation, and Timing Policy,
December 15, 2004
FACT SHEET
The President authorized a new national policy on December
8, 2004 that establishes guidance and implementation actions
for space-based positioning, navigation, and timing programs,
augmentations, and activities for U.S. national and homeland
security, civil, scientific, and commercial purposes. This
policy supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/National
Science and Technology Council-6, U.S. Global Positioning
System Policy, dated March 28, 1996.
I. Scope and Definitions
This policy provides guidance for: (1) development,
acquisition, operation, sustainment, and modernization of the
Global Positioning System and U.S.-developed, owned and/or
operated systems used to augment or otherwise improve the
Global Positioning System and/or other space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing signals; (2) development,
deployment, sustainment, and modernization of capabilities to
protect U.S. and allied access to and use of the Global
Positioning System for national, homeland, and economic
security, and to deny adversaries access to any space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing services; and (3) foreign
access to the Global Positioning System and United States
Government augmentations, and international cooperation with
foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
services, including augmentations.
For purposes of this document:
``Interoperable'' refers to the ability of civil U.S. and
foreign space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
services to be used together to provide better capabilities
at the user level than would be achieved by relying solely on
one service or signal;
``Compatible'' refers to the ability of U.S. and foreign
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services to
be used separately or together without interfering with each
individual service or signal, and without adversely affecting
navigation warfare; and
``Augmentation'' refers to space and/or ground-based
systems that provide users of space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing signals with additional information
[[Page H5900]]
that enables users to obtain enhanced performance when
compared to the un-augmented space-based signals alone. These
improvements include better accuracy, availability,
integrity, and reliability, with independent integrity
monitoring and alerting capabilities for critical
applications.
II. Background
Over the past decade, the Global Positioning System has
grown into a global utility whose multiuse services are
integral to U.S. national security, economic growth,
transportation safety, and homeland security, and are an
essential element of the worldwide economic infrastructure.
In the year 2000, the United States recognized the increasing
importance of the Global Positioning System to civil and
commercial users by discontinuing the deliberate degradation
of accuracy for non-military signals, known as Selective
Availability. Since that time, commercial and civil
applications of the Global Positioning System have continued
to multiply and their importance has increased significantly.
Services dependent on Global Positioning System information
are now an engine for economic growth, enhancing economic
development, and improving safety of life, and the system is
a key component of multiple sectors of U.S. critical
infrastructure.
While the growth in civil and commercial applications
continues, the positioning, navigation, and timing
information provided by the Global Positioning System remains
critical to U.S. national security, and its applications are
integrated into virtually every facet of U.S. military
operations. United States and allied military forces will
continue to rely on the Global Positioning System military
services for positioning, navigation, and timing services.
The continuing growth of services based on the Global
Positioning System presents opportunities, risks, and threats
to U.S. national, homeland, and economic security. The
widespread and growing dependence on the Global Positioning
System of military, civil, and commercial systems and
infrastructures has made many of these systems inherently
vulnerable to an unexpected interruption in positioning,
navigation, and/or timing services. In addition, whether
designed for military capabilities or not, all positioning,
navigation, and timing signals from space and their
augmentations provide inherent capabilities that can be used
by adversaries, including enemy military forces and terrorist
groups. Finally, emerging foreign space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing services could enhance or undermine
the future utility of the Global Positioning System.
The United States must continue to improve and maintain the
Global Positioning System, augmentations, and backup
capabilities to meet growing national, homeland, and economic
security requirements, for civil requirements, and to meet
commercial and scientific demands. In parallel, we must
continue to improve capabilities to deny adversary access to
all space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services,
particularly including services that are openly available and
can be readily used by adversaries and/or terrorists to
threaten the security of the United States. In addition, the
diverse requirements for and multiple applications of space-
based positioning, navigation, and timing services require
stable yet adaptable policies and management mechanisms. The
existing management mechanisms for the Global Positioning
System and its augmentations must be modified to accommodate
a multi-use approach to program planning, resource
allocation, system development, and operations. Therefore,
the United States Government must improve the policy and
management framework governing the Global Positioning System
and its augmentations to support their continued ability to
meet increasing and varied domestic and global requirements.
III. Goals and Objectives
The fundamental goal of this policy is to ensure that the
United States maintains space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services, augmentation, back-up, and service
denial capabilities that: (1) provide uninterrupted
availability of positioning, navigation, and timing services;
(2) meet growing national, homeland, economic security, and
civil requirements, and scientific and commercial demands;
(3) remain the pre-eminent military space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing service; (4) continue to provide civil
services that exceed or are competitive with foreign civil
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services and
augmentation systems; (5) remain essential components of
internationally accepted positioning, navigation, and timing
services; and (6) promote U.S. technological leadership in
applications involving space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services. To achieve this goal, the United States
Government shall:
Provide uninterrupted access to U.S. space-based global,
precise positioning, navigation, and timing services for U.S.
and allied national security systems and capabilities through
the Global Positioning System, without being dependent on
foreign positioning, navigation, and timing services;
Provide on a continuous, worldwide basis civil space-based,
positioning, navigation, and timing services free of direct
user fees for civil, commercial, and scientific uses, and for
homeland security through the Global Positioning System and
its augmentations, and provide open, free access to
information necessary to develop and build equipment to use
these services;
Improve capabilities to deny hostile use of any space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing services, without unduly
disrupting civil and commercial access to civil positioning,
navigation, and timing services outside an area of military
operations, or for homeland security purposes;
Improve the performance of space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing services, including more robust
resistance to interference for, and consistent with, U.S. and
allied national security purposes, homeland security, and
civil, commercial, and scientific users worldwide;
Maintain the Global Positioning System as a component of
multiple sectors of the U.S. Critical Infrastructure,
consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7,
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
Protection, dated December 17, 2003;
Encourage foreign development of positioning, navigation,
and timing services and systems based on the Global
Positioning System. Seek to ensure that foreign space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing systems are interoperable
with the civil services of the Global Positioning System and
its augmentations in order to benefit civil, commercial, and
scientific users worldwide. At a minimum, seek to ensure that
foreign systems are compatible with the Global Positioning
System and its augmentations and address mutual security
concerns with foreign providers to prevent hostile use of
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services; and
Promote the use of U.S. space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing services and capabilities for
applications at the Federal, State, and local level, to the
maximum practical extent.
IV. Management of Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Services
This policy establishes a permanent National Space-Based
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee. The
Executive Committee will be co-chaired by the Deputy
Secretaries of the Department of Defense and the Department
of Transportation or by their designated representatives. Its
members will include representatives at the equivalent level
from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland
Security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, and from other Departments and
Agencies as required. Components of the Executive Office of
the President, including the Office of Management and Budget,
the National Security Council staff, the Homeland Security
Council staff, the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
and the National Economic Council staff, shall participate as
observers to the Executive Committee. The Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission shall be invited to
participate on the Executive Committee as a Liaison. The
Executive Committee shall meet at least twice each year. The
Secretaries of Defense and Transportation shall develop the
procedures by which the Committee shall operate.
The Executive Committee shall make recommendations to its
member Departments and Agencies, and to the President through
the representatives of the Executive Office of the President.
In addition, the Executive Committee will advise and
coordinate with and among the Departments and Agencies
responsible for the strategic decisions regarding policies,
architectures, requirements, and resource allocation for
maintaining and improving U.S. space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing infrastructures, including the Global
Positioning System, its augmentations, security for these
services, and relationships with foreign positioning,
navigation, and timing services. Specifically, the Executive
Committee shall:
Ensure that national security, homeland security, and civil
requirements receive full and appropriate consideration in
the decision-making process and facilitate the integration
and de-confliction of these requirements for space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities, as
required;
Coordinate individual Departments' and Agencies'
positioning, navigation, and timing program plans,
requirements, budgets, and policies, and assess the adequacy
of funding and schedules to meet validated requirements in a
timely manner;
Ensure that the utility of civil services exceeds, or is at
least equivalent to, those routinely provided by foreign
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services;
Promote plans to modernize the U.S. space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing infrastructure,
including: (1) development, deployment, and operation of new
and/or improved national security and public safety services
when required and to the maximum practical extent; and (2)
determining the apportionment of requirements between the
Global Positioning System and its augmentations, including
consideration of user equipment;
Review proposals and provide recommendations to the
Departments and Agencies for international cooperation, as
well as spectrum management and protection issues; and
Establish a space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
Advisory Board. The board shall be comprised of experts from
outside the United States Government, and shall be chartered
as a Federal Advisory Committee.
The Executive Committee shall establish the National Space-
Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Coordination
Office. This
[[Page H5901]]
office shall provide the staff functions for the Executive
Committee. It shall be led by a full-time Director chosen by,
and reporting to the Executive Committee, and shall include a
cadre of full-time staff provided by Departments and
Agencies represented on the Executive Committee. The
Executive Committee shall determine the resources for the
National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
Coordination Office, including funding, location,
staffing, and composition, consistent with the direction
of this policy.
The National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Coordination Office shall serve as the Secretariat for
the Executive Committee and shall perform those functions
delegated by the Executive Committee. Departments and
Agencies shall provide appropriate information to the
National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
Coordination Office to ensure interagency transparency about
positioning, navigation, and timing programs, policies,
budgets, and activities that might affect mutual interests or
interagency dependencies. The Interagency Global Positioning
System Executive Board is hereby disestablished, and the
Executive Committee or the National Space-Based Positioning,
Navigation, and Timing Coordination Office, as appropriate,
shall assume its functions as defined in the Positioning,
Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee Charter,
consistent with the direction provided in this policy.
The Executive Committee shall advise and coordinate the
interdepartmental resource allocation for the Global
Positioning System and it augmentations on an annual basis.
The Secretary of Defense shall have primary responsibility
for providing resources for development, acquisition,
operation, sustainment, and modernization of the Global
Positioning System. The Secretary of Transportation shall
provide resources to the Secretary of Defense for assessment,
development, acquisition, implementation, operation, and
sustainment of additional designated Global Positioning
System civil capabilities beyond the second and third civil
signals already contained in the current Global Positioning
System program Global Positioning System civil signal
performance monitoring, augmentations, and other unique
positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities will be
funded by the agency or agencies requiring those services or
capabilities, including out-year procurement and operations
costs. Any new technical features proposed and funded by the
civil agencies shall not degrade or displace existing or
planned national security functions of the system. If the
Executive Committee recommends that the availability of
Global Positioning System capabilities should be accelerated,
the Executive Committee will make recommendations regarding
the resources required to accelerate those capabilities.
Resource issues will be resolved during the regular budget
process.
The details of the cost sharing between: (1) the Department
of Defense and the Department of Transportation, for the
Global Positioning System; and (2) Departments and Agencies
sponsoring augmentations, and/or unique or accelerated
capabilities, shall be outlined in a Five-Year National
Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan,
consistent with the guidance provided in this policy.
V. Foreign Access to U.S. Space-based Positioning,
Navigation, and Timing Capabilities
Any exports of U.S. positioning, navigation, and timing
capabilities covered by the United States Munitions List or
the Commerce Control List will continue to be licensed
pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or
the Export Administration Regulations, as appropriate, and in
accordance with all existing laws and regulations.
As a general guideline, export of civil or other non-United
States Munitions List space-based positioning, navigation and
timing capabilities that are currently available or are
planned to be available in the global marketplace will
continue to be considered favorably. Exports of sensitive or
advanced positioning, navigation, and timing information,
systems, technologies, and components will be considered on a
case-by-case basis in accordance with existing laws and
regulations, as well as relevant national security and
foreign policy goals and considerations. In support of such
reviews, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and Energy, the
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and the Director of Central Intelligence,
shall modify and maintain the Sensitive Technology List
directed in U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy,
dated April 25, 2003, including those technology items or
areas deemed sensitive for positioning, navigation and timing
applications. The Secretaries of State and Commerce shall use
the list in the evaluation of requests for exports.
VI. Agency Roles and Responsibilities
Departments and Agencies shall allocate the resources
required to fulfill the objectives of this policy. Nothing in
this policy shall diminish the operational and budgetary
authorities of the Departments and Agencies.
The Secretary of Defense shall:
Have responsibility for development, acquisition,
operation, security, and continued modernization of the
Global Positioning System, while facilitating appropriate
civil and homeland security Department and Agency
representation and participation in these activities, and any
decisions that affect civil and homeland security equities;
Develop, acquire, operate, realistically test, evaluate,
and maintain navigation warfare capabilities and other
capabilities required to:
Effectively utilize the Global Positioning System services
in the event of adversary jamming or other interference;
Deny to adversaries position, navigation, and timing
services from the Global Positioning System, its
augmentations, and/or any other space-based position,
navigation, and timing systems without unduly disrupting
civil, commercial, and scientific uses of these services
outside an area of military operations, or for homeland
security purposes; and
Identify, locate and mitigate, in coordination with
Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, any interference on
a global basis that adversely affects use of the Global
Positioning System for military operations;
Ensure the earliest operational availability for modernized
military and navigation warfare capabilities;
Train, equip, test, and exercise U.S. military forces and
national security capabilities in operationally realistic
conditions that include denial of the Global Positioning
System. In cooperation with the Secretaries of Transportation
and Homeland Security, and as appropriate, with the Secretary
of State, develop guidelines that facilitate these activities
and Navigation Warfare training, testing, demonstrations, and
exercises without unduly disrupting or degrading homeland
security and civil services and operations, either
internationally or domestically;
Promote use of Global Positioning System national security
services to allied military forces to facilitate
interoperability between U.S. and allied forces and
capabilities, and to maintain their use as the pre-eminent
military space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
capability;
Consistent with the guidance in Section V of this policy,
make Global Positioning System national security services,
user equipment, information, and technology available for use
by allied military forces; and
Work with allies to monitor access to national security
services and user equipment, in order to limit the potential
for adversaries to use these capabilities against U.S. and
allied military forces;
Maintain the commitment to discontinue the use of the
feature known as Selective Availability designed to degrade
globally the Standard Positioning Service of the Global
Positioning System;
Facilitate access to appropriate levels of national
security services and user equipment at the Federal level to
meet critical requirements for emergency response and other
homeland security purposes, and, on an exceptional basis, for
civil purposes, including state or local emergency response;
Develop improved, dedicated national security positioning,
navigation, and timing capabilities, including but not
limited to more diverse, flexible, and capable signals and
services;
Maintain lead responsibility for negotiating with foreign
defense organizations any cooperation regarding access to or
information about Global Positioning System military
services; and
In cooperation with other Departments and Agencies, assess
the utility and feasibility of hosting secondary payloads on
Global Positioning System satellites, including, but not
limited to those intended to enhance global search and rescue
capabilities for all users. No secondary payload may
adversely affect the performance, schedule, or cost of the
Global Positioning System, its signals or services. Resources
required for the assessment, development, acquisition,
integration, and operation of secondary payloads shall be the
responsibility of the sponsoring agency or agencies.
The Secretary of Transportation shall:
Have lead responsibility for the development of
requirements for civil applications from all United States
Government civil Departments and Agencies;
Ensure, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the performance
monitoring of U.S. civil space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services;
Consistent with the guidance in Section V of this policy,
and in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of State, facilitate: (1) foreign development of
civil positioning, navigation, and timing services and
systems based on the Global Positioning System; and (2)
international participation in the development of civil
applications for U.S. space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services;
Ensure, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, that
space-based positioning, navigation, and timing public safety
services meet or exceed international performance standards,
including but not limited to those used for these services in
aviation and/or maritime applications;
In cooperation with other Departments and Agencies, promote
the use of U.S. civil space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services and capabilities for transportation
safety;
Represent the civil Departments and Agencies in the
development, acquisition, management, and operations of the
Global Positioning System;
[[Page H5902]]
Develop, acquire, operate, and maintain Global Positioning
System space or terrestrial augmentations for civil
transportation applications;
Ensure the earliest operational availability for modernized
civil signals and services on the Global Positioning System
and its augmentations, in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense;
In coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security,
develop, acquire, operate, and maintain backup position,
navigation, and timing capabilities that can support critical
transportation, homeland security, and other critical civil
and commercial infrastructure applications within the United
States, in the event of a disruption of the Global
Positioning System or other space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing services, consistent with Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, dated
December 17, 2003; and
In cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, assess and
assist, as appropriate, in the international acceptance for
using the military positioning, navigation, and timing
services of the Global Positioning System for operations in
civil airspace.
The Secretary of Commerce shall:
Represent U.S. commercial interests with other Departments
and Agencies in the requirements review of the Global
Positioning System and related space-based augmentations;
In coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and
Transportation and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, seek to protect the radio frequency spectrum
used by the Global Positioning System and its augmentations
through appropriate domestic and international spectrum
management and regulatory practices;
In coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and
Transportation, and the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, facilitate cooperation
between the United States Government and U.S. industry as
appropriate to identify mutually acceptable solutions that
will preserve existing and evolving uses of space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing services, while allowing
for the development of other technologies and services that
depend on use of the radio frequency spectrum;
In cooperation with the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, develop and provide to
the Secretary of Transportation requirements for use of the
Global Positioning System and its augmentations to support
civil space systems; and
In cooperation with other Departments and Agencies, promote
the use of U.S. civil space-based positioning, navigation,
and timing services and capabilities for applications at the
Federal, State, and local level, to the maximum practical
extent.
The Secretary of State shall:
In cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of Transportation, and other Departments and Agencies promote
the use of civil aspects of the Global Positioning System and
its augmentation services and standards with foreign
governments and other international organizations;
Take the lead for negotiating with foreign governments and
international organizations regarding civil and, as
appropriate and in coordination with the Secretary of
Defense, military positioning, navigation, and timing
matters, including but not limited to coordinating
interagency review of:
Instructions to U.S. delegations for bilateral and
multilateral consultations relating to the planning,
management, and use of the Global Positioning System and
related augmentation systems; and
International agreements with foreign governments and
international organizations regarding the planning,
operation, management, and/or use of the Global Positioning
System and its augmentations; and
Modify and maintain, in coordination with the Secretaries
of Defense, Commerce, and Energy, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Sensitive
Technology List created by U.S. Commercial Remote Sensing
Space Policy, dated April 25, 2003. In particular, include
sensitive technology items and/or information related to
positioning, navigation, and timing applications.
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:
Identify space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
requirements for homeland security purposes to the Secretary
of Transportation, and coordinate the use of positioning,
navigation, and timing capabilities and backup systems for
homeland security purposes by Federal, State, and local
governments and authorities;
In coordination with the Secretary of Transportation, and
with other Departments and Agencies, promote the use of the
Global Positioning System positioning and timing standards
for use by Federal agencies, and by State and local
authorities responsible for public safety and emergency
response;
In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and in
cooperation with the Secretaries of Transportation and
Commerce, ensure:
Mechanisms are in place to identify, understand, and
disseminate timely information regarding threats associated
with the potential hostile use of space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing services within the United States; and
Procedures are developed, implemented, and routinely
exercised to request assistance from the Secretary of Defense
should it become necessary to deny hostile use of space-based
position, navigation and timing services within the United
States;
In coordination with the Secretaries of Defense,
Transportation, and Commerce, develop and maintain
capabilities, procedures, and techniques, and routinely
exercise civil contingency responses to ensure continuity of
operations in the event that access to the Global Positioning
System is disrupted or denied;
In coordination with the Secretaries of Transportation and
Defense, and in cooperation with other Departments and
Agencies, coordinate the use of existing and planned Federal
capabilities to identify, locate, and attribute any
interference within the United States that adversely affects
use of the Global Positioning System and its augmentations
for homeland security, civil, commercial, and scientific
purposes; and
In coordination with the Secretaries of Transportation and
Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and in
cooperation with other Departments and Agencies: (1) develop
a central repository and database for reports of domestic and
international interference to the civil services of the
Global Positioning System and its augmentations for homeland
security, civil, commercial, and scientific purposes; and (2)
notify promptly the Administrator, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, the
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and other Departments and Agencies in cases of domestic or
international interference with space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing services to enable appropriate
investigation, notification, and/or enforcement action.
The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, in cooperation with the Secretary of
Commerce, shall develop and provide to the Secretary of
Transportation requirements for the use of the Global
Positioning System and its augmentations to support civil
space systems.
The Director of Central Intelligence shall identify,
monitor, and assess the development of foreign threats to the
use of the Global Positioning System positioning, navigation,
and timing architectures and related services; provide
information to assist the Secretary of Defense in development
of countermeasures;
Departments and Agencies detecting interference, or
receiving reports of domestic or international interference
adversely affecting the performance of U.S. space-based
positioning, navigation, and timing services shall provide
timely reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central
Intelligence. Upon notification by the Secretary of Homeland
Security:
The Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with other
Departments and Agencies, and with the Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission shall take appropriate and
legally permissible actions required to mitigate interference
to U.S. space-based positioning, navigation, and timing
services within the United States; and
The Secretary of State shall, as appropriate, notify and/or
coordinate the notification of foreign governments and
international organizations in cases of interference with
U.S. space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services
caused by foreign government or commercial activities.
Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Farenthold).
Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill. There
are a lot of good things in it for the Nation.
As a former computer technician, I know there is nothing worse than a
single point of failure in the network. GPS is a single point of
failure for a lot of things; eLORAN is absolutely must-have.
We can talk about what is not in the bill as well, but I do want to
talk about a section that is specifically important to the district I
represent.
Section 202 grants the authority for the Coast Guard to reimburse
non-Federal entities for the cost of construction to certain aids to
navigation. This authority ensures these types of safety-related
navigation projects can move forward in a timely fashion.
We are all too aware of how slow the government can be, especially
when it comes to funding projects, so we have come up with a way here
where we can work with non-Federal partners to improve the safety of
our navigation system. It doesn't cost the government anything. The
non-Federal partners go ahead and put in the equipment up to Coast
Guard standards with Coast Guard approval and get it done now; and
then, when the Coast Guard gets the money, when the red tape and
government machine moves through its procedure, they can get
reimbursed, while our mariners can enjoin the enhanced safety and our
ports can enjoy
[[Page H5903]]
the enhanced economic activity as a result of being able to, for
instance, traverse channels in low-light conditions.
It is safety. It is good for the economy. In fact, one of the
problems that brought this to my attention was when there was a project
in Corpus Christi, the La Quinta Channel. Somehow, the aids to
navigation never got built, even though this channel has been dredged
and is in use. The pilots say it is unsafe to use in low-light
conditions, and it looks like it could be years before the Coast Guard
gets around to funding it.
Well, the Port of Corpus Christi is willing to pony up the money
today. The Coast Guard says: All right; when we get it, we will give it
back. This piece of legislation allows that to happen. It is good
government, along with lots of other pieces of this legislation,
something we need to pass, and I urge my colleagues to git-r-done.
Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
We need polar icebreakers. This body is going to push; Mr. Garamendi
and I are going to push and push until we have polar icebreakers and we
have at least \1/140\ the capability of Russia. That is a pretty low
bar that we are setting for ourselves, but we are going to set it right
here, right now, in this body. Let's at least have \1/140\ of the
capability or Russia, build those polar icebreakers.
Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support H.R. 5978.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record the following
materials:
Exelis, UrsaNav, the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast
Guard Enter Agreement to Trial Ground-Based Position, Navigation and
Timing Signal
Herndon, VA, May 22, 2015.--Exelis (NYSE: XLS), UrsaNav,
Inc., the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T), and the U.S. Coast Guard
have entered into a cooperative research and development
agreement (CRADA) for testing and demonstration at former
LORAN-C sites. These sites are the legacy ground-based radio
navigation infrastructure of the decommissioned LORAN-C
service that could be retained and upgraded to provide eLORAN
low frequency service.
The team will evaluate eLORAN as a potential complementary
system to the current Global Positioning System (GPS)
currently in wide use throughout the United States. The
capabilities and potential utilization methods of eLORAN will
be explored in depth to identify all strengths, capacities,
and potential vulnerabilities of the technology.
Under the CRADA, Exelis will use the former LORAN-C assets
to put eLORAN signals in space for research, test and
demonstration of the ability of eLORAN to meet precise
positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) requirements of
government and privately-owned critical infrastructure. The
first station Exelis will broadcast from is located in
Wildwood, NJ. The broadcast will provide a usable signal at a
range up to 1000 miles.
``eLORAN is an ideal technology to complement GPS for
critical, resilient and assured PNT,'' said Ed Sayadian, vice
president of Civil & Aerospace Systems for Exelis. ``eLORAN
is a difficult to disrupt technology that offers PNT and wide
area broadcast data capabilities indoors, in underground
locations and other GPS-denied environments.''
``A preponderance of government, academic, and industry
reports have concluded that eLORAN is the best independent,
multi-modal solution to provide assured PNT as a complement
to GPS,'' said Chuck Schue, president and CEO of UrsaNay.
Exelis and UrsaNav have entered into this CRADA because
they believe that low frequency signals, such as eLORAN,
operate independently of GPS signals and can provide
alternative timing, either standalone, or as a component of a
PNT service. Exelis also believes that as a result of its
wealth of experience in its PNT portfolio, that there are
many civil and defense applications that require precise time
and/or position in GPS-denied environments. Examples include
radio frequency interference, both intentional and
unintentional; signal attenuation from heavy forest canopy,
terrain or buildings; and indoor and underground locations.
About UsaNav: UrsaNav, Inc. is a Veteran-Owned and Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business focused on delivering
innovative engineering and information solutions, and
associated professional services to government and commercial
clients worldwide. UrsaNav is the World's leading supplier of
eLORAN technology, equipment, and services with deep
experience in the design, development, and deployment of PNT
systems. For more information, visit our website at
www.ursanay.com.
About Exelis: Exelis is a diversified, top-tier global
aerospace, defense, information and services company that
leverages a greater than 50-year legacy of deep customer
knowledge and technical expertise to deliver affordable,
mission-critical solutions for global customers. Exelis is a
leader in positioning and navigation, sensors, air traffic
management solutions, image processing and distribution,
communications and information systems; and focused on
strategic growth in the areas of critical networks, ISR and
analytics, electronic warfare and composite aerostructures.
Headquartered in McLean, Virginia, Exelis employs
approximately 10,000 people and generated 2014 sales of
approximately $3.3 billion. For more information, visit our
website at www.exelisinc.com.
____
December 8, 2015.
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Congressman DeFazio: Thank you for your August 31,
2015, letter regarding the importance of the Global
Positioning System (GPS) and the need for a complementary
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) capability for the
nation.
We share your concerns regarding the importance of GPS to
our critical infrastructure and security requirements.
Seeking to implement the guidance from National Security
Presidential Directive 39, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
Transportation established an interagency process in 2014 to
assess those information sources that are complementary to
GPS and that could be used to ensure the continuity of PNT
services to critical infrastructure. Through this interagency
process, the National Space-Based PNT Executive Committee
(EXCOM) reviewed several potential solutions and assessed
that an enhanced Loran (eLoran) network could be a viable
nationwide complementary capability for GPS applications in
U.S. critical infrastructure. The EXCOM also assessed that a
timing-focused network could be implemented in the near term
with properly scoped specifications, costs, and cost sharing
arrangements. As you stated, there may be opportunities to
work with private and commercial entities to initiate these
complementary capabilities.
The EXCOM met on September 3, 2015, and agreed to a two-
fold strategy for activities to explore a national
complementary capability to GPS: pursue potential near-term
opportunities to leverage public and private sector
capabilities and resources to support a timing-focused eLoran
network, while also documenting the requirements for a more
comprehensive complementary PNT capability for the nation's
critical infrastructure.
The EXCOM acknowledges the challenges associated with this
undertaking, especially given the fact that no government-
wide set of requirements has been established for such a
complementary capability. However, sufficient data exists
from previous studies to produce initial cost estimates and
basic system specifications to determine the appropriate
scope of the effort. We are building on these data and
estimates to develop a more detailed approach for an initial
timing-focused eLoran capability. This initial timing network
could provide a near-term solution while we continue our
efforts to prescribe a complete set of requirements necessary
to support a full complementary PNT capability for the
nation.
We look forward to working with you as we continue our
efforts to provide a complementary PNT capability for U.S.
critical infrastructure.
We have sent a similar response to each cosigner of your
letter.
Sincerely,
Victor M. Mendez,
Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Co-Chair, National
Executive Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing.
Robert O. Work,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Co-Chair, National Executive
Committee for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing.
____
[From the DHS Science & Technology Press Office, Apr. 20, 2016]
DHS S&T Demonstrates Precision Timing Technology at the New York Stock
Exchange
Washington.--The Department of Homeland security, Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T) announced today the
successful demonstration of the Enhanced Loren (eLoran), a
precision-timing technology for financial transactions at the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
eLoran is a low-frequency, high-power radio navigation
signal that is broadcasted by ground-based transmission
stations, allowing the signal to penetrate through buildings
and provide precision timing indoors and throughout urban
environments.
``Accurate position, navigation, and timing is necessary
for the function and integrity of many critical
infrastructure sectors, such as the electric grid,
communication networks, and financial institutions,'' said
DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Dr. Reginald
Brothers. ``Ensuring the continuous and uninterrupted
availability of critical information ensures our national
security.''
[[Page H5904]]
DHS S&T, U.S. Coast Guard, UrsaNav, Inc., and Harris
Corporation study eLoran through a Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement for applicability to provide timing
information for critical infrastructure applications. The
demonstration at the NYSE was hosted by Juniper Networks on
April 19 and presented to technical representatives from the
financial services, energy, and communication sectors.
We are constantly working with critical infrastructure
partners like the financial sector to help build their
capabilities and resilience to a variety of hazards,
including space weather and other cyber or physical threats
to the system's continuity,'' stated DHS Assistant Secretary
for Infrastructure Protection Caitlin Durkovich.
Precise and synchronized timing of financial transactions
is critical to markets worldwide and is mandated by
regulation in the European Union and is increasingly required
in the United States. Today, precision timing capabilities
are provided primarily by satellite-based Global Positioning
System (GPS). However, GPS's space-based signals are low-
power and susceptible to possible disruptions. GPS signals
are also difficult to receive indoors and in urban canyons.
``During the technology demonstration inside the NYSE
building, we were able to not only provide signals indoors
but also provide timing information to within 30 nanoseconds
of our UTC reference,'' said Sarah Mahmood, S&T program
manager for the eLoran cooperation agreement.
Recognizing the challenges of space-based signals and the
importance of having multiple timing-sources, eLoran is one
technology being considered to provide a complementary timing
solution to existing GPS technology.
____
[From the Atlantic, June 13, 2016]
What Happens If GPS Fails?
(By Dan Glass)
It only took thirteen millionths of a second to cause a
whole lot of problems.
Last January, as the U.S. Air Force was taking one
satellite in the country's constellation of GPS satellites
offline, an incorrect time was accidentally uploaded to
several others, making them out of sync by less time than it
takes for the sound of a gunshot to leave the chamber.
The minute error disrupted GPS-dependent timing equipment
around the world for more than 12 hours. While the problem
went unnoticed by many people thanks to short-term backup
systems, panicked engineers in Europe called equipment makers
to help resolve things before global telecommunications
networks began to fail. In parts of the U.S and Canada,
police, fire, and EMS radio equipment stopped functioning.
BBC digital radio was out for two days in many areas, and the
anomaly was even detected in electrical power grids.
Despite its name, the Global Positioning System is not
about maps; it's about time. Each satellite in the
constellation (24 are needed, plus the U.S. has several
spares) has multiple atomic clocks on board, synchronized
with each other and to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)--the
time standard used across the world--down to the nanosecond.
The satellites continually broadcast their time and position
information down to Earth, where GPS receivers in equipment
from iPhones to automated tractors acquire signals and use
the minuscule differences in their arrival time to determine
an exact position.
While GPS was initially conceived to aid navigation,
globally synchronized time is now a much more critical
function of the system. Telecom networks rely on GPS clocks
to keep cell towers synchronized so calls can be passed
between them. Many electrical power grids use the clocks in
equipment that fine-tunes current flow in overloaded
networks. The finance sector uses GPS-derived timing systems
to timestamp ATM, credit card, and high-speed market
transactions. Computer network synchronization, digital
television and radio, Doppler radar weather reporting,
seismic monitoring, even multi-camera sequencing for film
production--GPS clocks have a hand in all.
But last January's system failure brings up an often-
ignored question: What if all these flying clock radios were
wiped out, and everything on the ground started blinking
12:00? According to Mike Lombardi, a metrologist at the
National Institute for Standards and Technology, ``Nobody
knows exactly what would happen.'' Since so many of these
technologies were designed specifically with GPS in mind, the
unsettling truth, he says, is ``there's no backup.''
This isn't a secret. Concern for the consequences of the
country's reliance on this invisible utility has been growing
among industry and government workers for more than 15 years,
after the Department of Transportation issued a report on the
need for a backup navigation system, in 2001. But while the
means to create one has existed since, a winding bureaucratic
path has kept it from actually being implemented. And that
leaves many of the everyday tools society depends on
vulnerable until one is.
There are plenty of reasons GPS could fail.
Intentional attack is one, as emphasized by a declassified
2012 risk estimate by the Department of Homeland Security.
One of the system's most basic problems is its signals are
weak enough to be easily obstructed. Truckers with cheap
jamming devices designed to elude employer tracking have
unintentionally interfered with airport systems; criminals
thwarting GPS tags on stolen goods in shipping containers
have accidentally shut down port operations. On a grander
scale, North Korea has tormented South Korea with waves of
jamming attacks. (jamming devices are now illegal in the
U.S., but not difficult to obtain illicitly.)
A few steps up from jamming devices in both complexity and
damage are spoofers: systems that get GPS receivers to lock
on to mimicked signal. Spoofers don't trigger equipment
alarms, and deliver altered time and position information to
unaware users. It's been suggested that Iran used this tactic
to lead astray two U.S. Navy patrol boats captured in the
Gulf last January.
A plausible worst-case attack scenario would look something
like this: Spoofers feed erroneous data to electrical
substation equipment in a metro area, which could overheat
power lines and transformers, causing widespread outages.
Meanwhile, multiple hidden jammers could cripple cellphone
service, and also force fire, police, and emergency medicine
departments to revert to old, single-frequency channels.
Supplies in this scenario could only be bought in many places
with cash, which would be limited without ATM service.
According to the DHS report, it could take 30 days or more
before the malicious devices are located and disabled. The
longer it took, the more systems that would be compromised.
As for unintentional threats to GPS, the DHS risk estimate
lists space debris, space weather, defective software, and
good old-fashioned human mistakes, among other things. Of
these threats, space weather is the most potentially
catastrophic, according to Norwegian geophysicist Pal Brekke,
whose country was hardest hit by the January outage.
Eruptions of high energy radiation from the sun (known as
solar flares) and ejections of electrically charged gases
have disabled satellites in the past.
With satellites and the chips inside them getting smaller
as technology progresses, ``one particle from the sun that
penetrates a satellite can ruin things,'' Brekke says. ``It
wouldn't take that large of an event to take out all GPS.''
So far, mitigating the loss of GPS signals has involved two
approaches. One is interoperability with other global
navigation satellite systems like Russia's GLONASS (which
also failed due to a ground control error in 2014) or the
European and Chinese systems, both of which are expected to
be up by 2020. The other is better clocks, says Lombardi, the
NIST metrologist, who's published numerous articles on the
topic. ``The typical cell tower clock has an oscillator
similar to that of a wristwatch,'' he says, ``and can drift
out of tolerance in minutes without a signal.'' How long a
clock can maintain time on its own, called ``holdover,'' also
affects electrical grids, many of which rely on GPS-dependent
devices called synchrophasors used to precisely regulate
current flow, as well as help locate faults in the network. A
lack of such timing technology was the reason it took some
Canadian technicians three months to locate failures after
the infamous blackout of 2003.
Chip-scale atomic clocks the size of a penny are a
promising new technology that can hold time for about a day,
but are currently too expensive to deploy widely. Moreover,
hedging and holdover still aren't backups for when space-
based signals are simply unavailable.
The bulk of a more promising, comprehensive backup system
already exists, right here on the ground. After the sextant
but before GPS, navigators around the world used Long Range
Aids to Navigation, or ``LORAN,'' a terrestrial system of
transmitters and receiving equipment first developed during
WWII. By the mid-1990s, Loran ``tower chains'' provided
coverage for North America, Europe, and other regions in the
Northern Hemisphere. Its use declined in favor of the much
finer accuracy of GPS after it became available for civil use
in 1995, but the U.S. Coast Guard continued working on an
improved system using the existing infrastructure. If
adopted, ``Enhanced'' LORAN, or eLoran, could provide
positioning accuracy comparable to GPS. Broadcast at hundreds
of thousands of watts, the signal is virtually un-jammable,
and unlike GPS, can even be received indoors, underwater, and
in urban or natural canyons. It also turns out that eLoran
can provide a UTC time signal with sub-microsecond time
resolution across a large geographical area.
The technology is available--the Coast Guard demonstrated a
working prototype last year--so why isn't America using it?
John Garamendi, a California congressman, asked this question
at a July 2015 congressional hearing on the Federal
Radionavigation Plan, the nation's primary planning document
for position, navigation, and timing (PNT). ``There are two
kinds of time,'' he opened, ``real time . . . and then
federal time, which seems to be the forever time. The e-Loran
system was identified as a backup 15 years ago, and here we
are, federal time, not yet done.''
Cost doesn't seem to be a problem. A complete alternate PNT
system is estimated at $350 million to $400 million; it costs
$1 billion yearly to maintain GPS. And science and industry
appears to share a consensus that eLoran is the solution.
Even the Air Force Colonel and engineer who created GPS, Brad
Parkinson, had been on record for years saying ``eLoran is
the only cost-effective backup for national needs.''
In a 2004, a presidential directive tasked DHS and DOT with
creating a backup to the GPS system. In 2008, the DHS issued
a press
[[Page H5905]]
release that it was committing to the system and transferred
control from the Coast Guard to its National Protection and
Programs Directorate. But push and pull between DHS and the
Coast Guard appears to have slowed progress.
After this year's satellite error, many European officials
who had previously followed America's reluctance to adopt
eLoran stepped up development. Meanwhile, pressure from
Garamendi, who argued in his address that ``without an eLoran
system in place ASAP, this country is in serious, serious
jeopardy,'' prompted a letter to him from the Deputy
Secretaries of Defense and Transportation informing that the
PNT Executive Committee has agreed that an eLoran-based
timing network ``could provide a near term solution'' (if
private entities bore some of the cost) while they ``continue
[their] efforts to prescribe a complete set of requirements
necessary to support a full complementary PNT capability for
the nation.'' In other words, it seems: federal time.
Why is the sense of urgency among decision-makers so out of
sync? Could some of it be similar to why people delay backing
up our computers even though they've been telling themselves
to for weeks? How do we decide, when presented a risk with
unknown odds, when it's time to sacrifice time and resources
to prevent it?
Now is a critically important time to answer that question,
as the world actually been given odds on another, even more
catastrophic risk than GPS failure: destruction of the
electrical power infrastructure itself. On July 23, 2012, a
billion-ton cloud of electrified gases blasted off the far
side of the sun at over six million miles per hour. According
to professor Daniel Baker at University of Colorado, this
coronal mass ejection (CME) ``was in all respects at least as
strong as the 1859 Carrington Event,'' referring to the
strongest solar storm ever recorded, which set fire to
telegraph stations and caused auroras down to Cuba. As was
widely reported two years ago, if the 2012 CME had occurred
one week later, it would have hit Earth.
Space Katrina would be biblically catastrophic. Power could
be out for years while electrical transformers were repaired,
if the resources are even available to do so. ``Collateral
effects of a longer-term outage would likely include
disruption of the transportation, communication, banking, and
finance systems, and government services; the breakdown of
the distribution of potable water owing to pump failure; and
the loss of perishable foods and medications because of lack
of refrigeration,'' reads a 2008 National Academy of Sciences
report.
In 2014, physicist from San Diego calculated the likelihood
of a Carrington-level event in the next decade. The odds he
came up with were 12 percent.
The predicament of events like this is not that they're
occurring more frequently, but that the rapid development of
technology is opening the tools on which humanity depends to
an increasingly wide variety of rare but potentially
destructive cosmic threats. In the span of a century, we've
transferred much of the weight of modern society to global
infrastructures with wobbly legs. If they collapse, time will
very quickly appear to move backward.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 5978, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________