[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 114 (Thursday, July 14, 2016)]
[House]
[Pages H4939-H4957]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1015
                    IRAN ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2016

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 819, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 5631) to hold Iran accountable for its state sponsorship 
of terrorism and other threatening activities and for its human rights 
abuses, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 819, the bill 
is considered read.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 5631

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Definitions.

      TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES OWNED BY IRAN'S 
                       REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

Sec. 101. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the IRGC.
Sec. 102. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that 
              support or conduct certain transactions with Iran's 
              Revolutionary Guard Corps or other sanctioned persons.
Sec. 103. IRGC watch list and report.
Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions against Mahan Air.
Sec. 105. Modification and extension of reporting requirements on the 
              use of certain Iranian seaports by foreign vessels and 
              use of foreign airports by sanctioned Iranian air 
              carriers.

               TITLE II--IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS

Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to efforts by Iran to 
              acquire ballistic missile and related technology.
Sec. 202. Expansion of sanctions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 with 
              respect to persons that acquire or develop ballistic 
              missiles.
Sec. 203. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ballistic missile 
              program of Iran.
Sec. 204. Expansion of mandatory sanctions with respect to financial 
              institutions that engage in certain transactions relating 
              to ballistic missile capabilities of Iran.
Sec. 205. Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
              activities with certain sectors of Iran that support the 
              ballistic missile program of Iran.
Sec. 206. Regulations.

      TITLE III--SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

Sec. 301. Special measures with respect to Iran relating to its 
              designation as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering 
              concern.

      TITLE IV--SANCTIONS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

Sec. 401. Expansion of list of persons involved in human rights abuses 
              in Iran.
Sec. 402. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect 
              to, certain Iranian individuals.
Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who conduct 
              transactions with or on behalf of certain Iranian 
              individuals.
Sec. 404. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions 
              that engage in certain transactions on behalf of persons 
              involved in human rights abuses or that export sensitive 
              technology to Iran.
Sec. 405. United States support for the people of Iran.
Sec. 406. United States Special Coordinator on Human Rights and 
              Democracy in Iran.
Sec. 407. Broadcasting to Iran.
Sec. 408. Report on United States citizens detained by Iran.
Sec. 409. Sense of Congress on role of the United Nations in promoting 
              human rights in Iran.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds the following:
       (1) On April 2, 2015, in announcing a framework agreement 
     for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, President Obama 
     stated that ``other American sanctions on Iran for its 
     support of terrorism, its human rights abuses, its ballistic 
     missile program, will continue to be fully enforced''.
       (2) On July 14, 2015, President Obama stated that ``we will 
     maintain our own sanctions related to Iran's support for 
     terrorism, its ballistic missile program, and its human 
     rights violations''.
       (3) On January 16, 2016, President Obama stated that ``We 
     still have sanctions on Iran for its violations of human 
     rights, for its support of terrorism, and for its ballistic 
     missile program. And we will continue to enforce these 
     sanctions, vigorously.''.
       (4) On January 21, 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry 
     admitted that sanctions relief under the Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action would go to terrorist organizations, stating: 
     ``I think that some of it will end up in the hands of the 
     IRGC or other entities, some of which are labeled terrorists 
     . . . You know, to some degree, I'm not going to sit here and 
     tell you that every component of that can be prevented.''.
       (5) Secretary of State John Kerry stated on July 23, 2015, 
     ``We will not violate the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
     (JCPOA)] if we use our authorities to impose sanctions on 
     Iran for terrorism, human rights, missiles, or other 
     nonnuclear reasons. And the JCPOA does not provide Iran any 
     relief from United States sanctions under any of those 
     authorities or other authorities.''.
       (6) Director of National Intelligence James Clapper wrote 
     on February 9, 2016, ``[T]he Islamic Republic of Iran 
     presents an enduring threat to U.S national interests because 
     of its support to regional terrorist and militant groups and 
     the Assad regime, as well as its development of advanced 
     military capabilities. Tehran views itself as leading the 
     `axis of resistance' which includes the Asad regime and sub-
     national groups aligned with Iran, especially Lebanese 
     Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militants . . . Tehran might even 
     use American citizens detained when entering Iranian 
     territories as bargaining pieces to achieve financial or 
     political concessions in line with heir strategic 
     intentions.''.
       (7) Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew stated on July 14, 
     2015, ``We harbor no illusions about the Iranian government's 
     nefarious activities beyond its nuclear program. Make no 
     mistake: we will continue to impose and aggressively enforce 
     sanctions to combat Iran's support for terrorist groups, its 
     fomenting of violence in the region, and its perpetration of 
     human rights abuses.''.

     SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) Iran's ballistic missile program and support for 
     terrorism represents a serious threat to allies of the United 
     States in the Middle East and Europe, members of the Armed 
     Forces deployed in those regions, and ultimately the United 
     States; and
       (2) the United States should impose tough primary and 
     secondary sanctions against any person that directly or 
     indirectly supports the ballistic missile program of Iran, 
     its state sponsorship of terrorism and human rights abuses, 
     as well as against any foreign person or financial 
     institution that engages in transactions or trade that 
     support those efforts.

[[Page H4940]]

  


     SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       It is the policy of the United States--
       (1) to continue to impose pressure on the Government of 
     Iran for its role as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, 
     its ongoing human rights abuses against the citizens of Iran 
     and other peoples, and its unjust detention of United States 
     citizens; and
       (2) to continue to use sanctions as an element of that 
     pressure and to discourage financial institutions and 
     entities from engaging in business and commerce with Iranian 
     entities tied to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and to 
     Iranian officials involved in human rights abuses.

     SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means any corporation, 
     business association, partnership, trust, society, or any 
     other entity.
       (2) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an 
     individual or entity that is not a United States person.
       (3) IRGC.--The term ``IRGC'' means--
       (A) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and any official, 
     agent, or affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
       (B) any person owned or controlled by Iran's Revolutionary 
     Guard Corps.
       (4) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       (A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest by 
     vote or value in the entity;
       (B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the 
     entity; or
       (C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.
       (5) Person.--The term ``person'' means an individual or 
     entity.
       (6) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means--
       (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States 
     or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a 
     foreign branch of such an entity.

      TITLE I--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENTITIES OWNED BY IRAN'S 
                       REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

     SEC. 101. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE IRGC.

       (a) Amendments.--Subtitle A of title III of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8741 
     et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 304 as section 306; and
       (2) by inserting after section 303 the following new 
     sections:

     ``SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S 
                   REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS, ANY OFFICIAL, AGENT, 
                   OR AFFILIATE OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 
                   CORPS, AND ANY PERSON OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY 
                   IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.

       ``(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and 
     as appropriate thereafter, the President shall impose the 
     sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to Iran's 
     Revolutionary Guard Corps, any official, agent, or affiliate 
     of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, and any person owned or 
     controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
       ``(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this 
     subsection are the following:
       ``(1) Sanctions applicable with respect to an organization 
     that is designated by the Secretary of State as a foreign 
     terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
       ``(2) Sanctions applicable with respect to a foreign person 
     pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001; 
     relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions 
     with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support 
     terrorism).

     ``SEC. 305. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this title:
       ``(1) Entity.--The term `entity' means any corporation, 
     business association, partnership, trust, society, or any 
     other entity.
       ``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' means a 
     person that is not a United States person.
       ``(3) Person.--The term `person' means an individual or 
     entity.
       ``(4) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' means--
       ``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United 
     States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, 
     including a foreign branch of such an entity.
       ``(5) Own or control.--The term `own or control' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       ``(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest 
     by vote or value in the entity;
       ``(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the 
     entity; or
       ``(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and 
     inserting the following:

``Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions with respect Iran's Revolutionary 
              Guard Corps, any official, agent, or affiliate of Iran's 
              Revolutionary Guard Corps, and any person owned or 
              controlled by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
``Sec. 305. Definitions.
``Sec. 306. Rule of construction.''.

     SEC. 102. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN 
                   PERSONS THAT SUPPORT OR CONDUCT CERTAIN 
                   TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD 
                   CORPS OR OTHER SANCTIONED PERSONS.

       (a) Identification.--Section 302(a)(1) of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
     8742(a)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, and every 180 days thereafter,'' and inserting 
     ``Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
     the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and every 60 days 
     thereafter,'';
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``, provide 
     significant financial services to, or provide material 
     support to'' after ``transactions with'';
       (3) in subparagraph (C)--
       (A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting ``, 
     provide significant financial services to, or provide 
     material support to'' after ``transactions with'';
       (B) in clause (i), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (C) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (D) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
       ``(iii) a person designated as a foreign terrorist 
     organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) or that has provided 
     support for an act of international terrorism (as defined in 
     section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-
     172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note)); or
       ``(iv) a foreign person whose property and access to 
     property has been blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 
     (September 23, 2001; relating to blocking property and 
     prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to 
     commit, or support terrorism).''.
       (b) Imposition of Sanctions.--Section 302(b) of the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 
     U.S.C. 8742(b)) is amended by striking ``the President--'' 
     and all that follows and inserting ``the President shall, in 
     accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all 
     transactions in property and interests in property with 
     respect to such foreign person if such property and interests 
     in property are in the United States, come within the United 
     States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
     United States person.''.
       (c) Waiver of Imposition of Sanctions.--Section 302(d) of 
     the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 
     (22 U.S.C. 8742(d)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``for a period of not 
     more than 60 days, and may renew that waiver for additional 
     periods of not more than 60 days,'' after ``may waive''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and any 
     waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on 
     December 31, 2018.''.
       (d) Waiver of Identifications and Designations.--Section 
     302(e) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights 
     Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(e)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding'';
       (2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking ``and 
     subject to paragraph (2)'';
       (3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving the 
     margins 2 ems to the right; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and any 
     waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on 
     December 31, 2018.''.
       (e) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996.--Section 302(f) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
     Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8742(f)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``The following provisions'' and inserting 
     the following:
       ``(1) In general.--The following provisions'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (8) as 
     subparagraphs (A) through (H), respectively, and moving the 
     margins 2 ems to the right; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Sunset.--Sections 4(c) and 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions 
     Act of 1996 shall not apply with respect to the imposition 
     under subsection (b) of sanctions relating to activities 
     described in subsection (a)(1), in accordance with the 
     provision of paragraph (1) of this subsection, after December 
     31, 2018.''.

     SEC. 103. IRGC WATCH LIST AND REPORT.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     establish, maintain, and publish in the Federal Register a 
     list (to be known as the ``IRGC Watch List'') of--
       (1) each entity in which the IRGC has an ownership interest 
     of less than 25 percent;
       (2) each entity in which the IRGC does not have an 
     ownership interest if the IRGC maintains a presence on the 
     board of directors of the entity or otherwise influences the

[[Page H4941]]

     actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity; and
       (3) each person that owns or controls an entity described 
     in paragraph (1) or (2).
       (b) Reports Required.--
       (1) Treasury report.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to Congress a report 
     that includes--
       (i) the list required by subsection (a) and, in the case of 
     any report submitted under this subparagraph after the first 
     such report, any changes to the list since the submission of 
     the preceding such report; and
       (ii) an assessment of the role of the IRGC in, and its 
     penetration into, the economy of Iran.
       (B) Form of report.--Each report required by subparagraph 
     (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex if necessary.
       (2) Government accountability office report.--
       (A) In general.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall--
       (i) conduct a review of the list required by subsection 
     (a); and
       (ii) not later than 180 days after each report required by 
     paragraph (1) is submitted to Congress, submit to Congress a 
     report on the review conducted under clause (i).
       (B) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by 
     subparagraph (A)(ii), the Comptroller General shall consult 
     with nongovernmental organizations.

     SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST MAHAN AIR.

       (a) In General.--The President shall impose the sanctions 
     described in subsection (b) with respect to--
       (1) a person that provides, directly or indirectly, goods, 
     services, technology, or financial services, including the 
     sale or provision of aircraft or aircraft parts, fuel, ramp 
     assistance, baggage and cargo handling, catering, refueling, 
     ticketing, check-in services, crew handling, or other 
     services related to flight operations, to or for Mahan Air or 
     its agents or affiliates; or
       (2) any person owned or controlled by, or any person that 
     owns or controls, a person described in paragraph (1).
       (b) Sanctions Described.--
       (1) Blocking of property.--The President shall block, in 
     accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person subject to 
     subsection (a) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       (2) Exclusion from united states.--The Secretary of State 
     shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     shall exclude from the United States, any person subject to 
     subsection (a) that is an alien.
       (c) Compliance With United Nations Headquarters 
     Agreement.--Subsection (b)(2) shall not apply to the head of 
     state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if 
     admission to the United States is necessary to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States.
       (d) Applicability of Additional Sanctions.--A person with 
     respect to which the President imposes sanctions under 
     subsection (a) shall be considered an agent or affiliate of 
     the IRGC for purposes of sections 104 and 104A of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513 and 8513b).
       (e) Additional Measures.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall require each covered 
     person to provide a certification to the President that the 
     person does not conduct transactions with any person that 
     provides, directly or indirectly, goods, services, 
     technology, or financial services, including the sale or 
     provision of aircraft or aircraft parts, fuel, ramp 
     assistance, baggage or cargo handling, catering, refueling, 
     ticketing, check-in services, crew handling, or other 
     services related to flight operations--
       (A) to Mahan Air or its agents or affiliates;
       (B) for aircraft owned or operated by Mahan Air or its 
     agents or affiliates; or
       (C) to a person described in section 105(a).
       (2) Covered person defined.--In this subsection, the term 
     ``covered person'' means--
       (A) an air carrier or foreign air carrier, as those terms 
     are defined in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code; 
     or
       (B) a United States person that exports aircraft or 
     components for aircraft.
       (f) Reports Required.--
       (1) DNI list.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a list of 
     each person described in subsection (e).
       (B) Form of list.--Each list required by subparagraph (A) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex if necessary.
       (2) Report.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to Congress a report that includes--
       (i) a list of countries where aircraft of Mahan Air or its 
     agents or affiliates land;
       (ii) a description of the efforts of the President to 
     encourage countries to prohibit aircraft of Mahan Air or its 
     agents or affiliates from landing in the territory of those 
     countries; and
       (iii) if the President has not imposed sanctions under 
     section 105(a) with respect to any person described in 
     subsection (e), an explanation for why the President has not 
     imposed such sanctions.
       (B) Form of report.--Each report required by subparagraph 
     (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex if necessary.
       (3) Government accountability office report.--
       (A) In general.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall--
       (i) conduct a review of the certifications required by 
     subsection (a), the lists required by paragraph (1), and the 
     reports required by paragraph (2); and
       (ii) not later than 180 days after the submission of each 
     list required by paragraph (1) and each report required by 
     paragraph (2), submit to Congress a report on the review 
     conducted under clause (i).
       (B) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by 
     subparagraph (A)(ii), the Comptroller General shall consult 
     with nongovernmental organizations.

     SEC. 105. MODIFICATION AND EXTENSION OF REPORTING 
                   REQUIREMENTS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN IRANIAN 
                   SEAPORTS BY FOREIGN VESSELS AND USE OF FOREIGN 
                   AIRPORTS BY SANCTIONED IRANIAN AIR CARRIERS.

       (a) In General.--Section 1252(a) of the Iran Freedom and 
     Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8808(a)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
     ``2016'' and inserting ``2019'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (3) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) a description of all efforts the Department of State 
     has made to encourage other countries to prohibit the use of 
     air space and airports by Iranian air carriers described in 
     paragraph (2) during the period specified in subsection 
     (b).''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to reports required to be submitted under 
     section 1252(a) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation 
     Act of 2012 on or after such date of enactment.

               TITLE II--IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS

     SEC. 201. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO EFFORTS BY 
                   IRAN TO ACQUIRE BALLISTIC MISSILE AND RELATED 
                   TECHNOLOGY.

       (a) Certain Persons.--Section 1604(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms 
     Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) is amended by inserting ``, to acquire ballistic 
     missile or related technology,'' after ``nuclear weapons''.
       (b) Foreign Countries.--Section 1605(a) of the Iran-Iraq 
     Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended, in the matter preceding 
     paragraph (1), by inserting ``, to acquire ballistic missile 
     or related technology,'' after ``nuclear weapons''.

     SEC. 202. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 
                   1996 WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS THAT ACQUIRE OR 
                   DEVELOP BALLISTIC MISSILES.

       Section 5(b)(1)(B) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
     (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) in clause (i), by striking ``would likely'' and 
     inserting ``may''; and
       (2) in clause (ii)--
       (A) in subclause (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); and
       (C) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

       ``(II) acquire or develop ballistic missiles and the 
     capability to launch ballistic missiles; or''.

     SEC. 203. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Title II of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
     Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following:

  ``Subtitle C--Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

     ``SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS.

       ``(a) In General.--In this subtitle:
       ``(1) Agricultural commodity.--The term `agricultural 
     commodity' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       ``(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' means the committees 
     specified in section 14(2) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
     (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       ``(3) Correspondent account; payable-through account.--The 
     terms `correspondent account' and `payable-through account' 
     have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 
     31, United States Code.
       ``(4) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign 
     financial institution' has the meaning of that term as 
     determined by the

[[Page H4942]]

     Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to section 104(i) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(i)).
       ``(5) Government.--The term `Government', with respect to a 
     foreign country, includes any agencies or instrumentalities 
     of that Government and any entities controlled by that 
     Government.
       ``(6) Medical device.--The term `medical device' has the 
     meaning given the term `device' in section 201 of the Federal 
     Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       ``(7) Medicine.--The term `medicine' has the meaning given 
     the term `drug' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
     Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       ``(b) Determinations of Significance.--For purposes of this 
     subtitle, in determining if financial transactions or 
     financial services are significant, the President may 
     consider the totality of the facts and circumstances, 
     including factors similar to the factors set forth in section 
     561.404 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any 
     corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

     ``SEC. 232. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS 
                   THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF 
                   IRAN.

       ``(a) Identification of Persons.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and 
     not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report identifying persons that have provided 
     material support to the Government of Iran in the development 
     of the ballistic missile program of Iran.
       ``(2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       ``(A) An identification of persons (disaggregated by 
     Iranian and non-Iranian persons) with respect to which there 
     is credible evidence that such persons have provided material 
     support to the Government of Iran in the development of the 
     ballistic missile program of Iran, including persons that 
     have--
       ``(i) engaged in the direct or indirect provision of 
     material support to such program;
       ``(ii) facilitated, supported, or engaged in activities to 
     further the development of such program;
       ``(iii) transmitted information relating to ballistic 
     missiles to the Government of Iran; or
       ``(iv) otherwise aided such program.
       ``(B) A description of the character and significance of 
     the cooperation of each person identified under subparagraph 
     (A) with the Government of Iran with respect to such program.
       ``(C) An assessment of the cooperation of the Government of 
     the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the Government 
     of Iran with respect to such program.
       ``(3) Classified annex.--Each report required by paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 
     a classified annex.
       ``(b) Blocking of Property.--Not later than 15 days after 
     submitting a report required by subsection (a)(1), the 
     President shall, in accordance with the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block 
     and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
     in property of any person specified in such report that 
     engages in activities described in subsection (a) if such 
     property and interests in property are in the United States, 
     come within the United States, or are or come within the 
     possession or control of a United States person.
       ``(c) Exclusion From United States .--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any 
     alien subject to blocking of property and interests in 
     property under subsection (b).
       ``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the head of 
     state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if 
     admission to the United States is necessary to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States.
       ``(d) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President 
     shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution that the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, 
     conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction 
     for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in 
     property under subsection (b).

     ``SEC. 233. BLOCKING OF PROPERTY OF PERSONS AFFILIATED WITH 
                   CERTAIN IRANIAN ENTITIES.

       ``(a) Blocking of Property.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall, in accordance with 
     the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
     1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person described in 
     paragraph (2) if such property and interests in property are 
     in the United States, come within the United States, or are 
     or come within the possession or control of a United States 
     person.
       ``(2) Persons described.--A person described in this 
     paragraph is--
       ``(A) an entity that is owned or controlled--
       ``(i) by the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid 
     Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, 
     or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group; or
       ``(ii) collectively by a group of individuals that hold an 
     interest in the Aerospace Industries Organization, the Shahid 
     Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, 
     or any agent or affiliate of such organization or group, even 
     if none of those individuals hold a 25 percent or greater 
     interest in the entity; or
       ``(B) a person that owns or controls an entity described in 
     subparagraph (A).
       ``(b) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President 
     shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution that the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, 
     conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction 
     for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in 
     property under subsection (a).
       ``(c) Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and not 
     less frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of 
     the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of--
       ``(A) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries 
     Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid 
     Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such 
     organization or group has an ownership interest of more than 
     0 percent and less than 25 percent;
       ``(B) each entity in which the Aerospace Industries 
     Organization, the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, the Shahid 
     Bakeri Industrial Group, or any agent or affiliate of such 
     organization or group does not have an ownership interest but 
     maintains a presence on the board of directors of the entity 
     or otherwise influences the actions, policies, or personnel 
     decisions of the entity; and
       ``(C) each person that owns or controls an entity described 
     in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       ``(2) Reference.--The list required by paragraph (1) may be 
     referred to as the `Iran Missile Proliferation Watch List'.
       ``(d) Comptroller General Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall--
       ``(A) conduct a review of each list required by subsection 
     (c)(1); and
       ``(B) not later than 180 days after each such list is 
     submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under 
     that subsection, submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on the review conducted under 
     subparagraph (A) that includes a list of persons not included 
     in that list that qualify for inclusion in that list, as 
     determined by the Comptroller General.
       ``(2) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by 
     paragraph (1)(B), the Comptroller General shall consult with 
     nongovernmental organizations.

     ``SEC. 234. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   PERSONS INVOLVED IN BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       ``(a) Certification.--Not later than 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, 
     and not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, 
     the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a certification that each person listed in an 
     annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 
     (2006), 1747 (2007), or 1929 (2010) is not directly or 
     indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the 
     development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or 
     technology, parts, components, or technology information 
     relating to ballistic missiles.
       ``(b) Blocking of Property.--If the President is unable to 
     make a certification under subsection (a) with respect to a 
     person and the person is not currently subject to sanctions 
     with respect to Iran under any other provision of law, the 
     President shall, not later than 15 days after that 
     certification would have been required under that 
     subsection--
       ``(1) in accordance with the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and 
     prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in 
     property of that person if such property and interests in 
     property are in the United States, come within the United 
     States, or are or come within the possession or control of a 
     United States person; and
       ``(2) publish in the Federal Register a report describing 
     the reason why the President was unable to make a 
     certification with respect to that person.
       ``(c) Exclusion From United States .--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall exclude from the United States, any 
     alien subject to blocking of property and interests in 
     property under subsection (b).
       ``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Paragraph (1)

[[Page H4943]]

     shall not apply to the head of state of Iran, or necessary 
     staff of that head of state, if admission to the United 
     States is necessary to permit the United States to comply 
     with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United 
     Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered 
     into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and 
     the United States.
       ``(d) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President 
     shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution that the President determines 
     knowingly, on or after the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, 
     conducts or facilitates a significant financial transaction 
     for a person subject to blocking of property and interests in 
     property under subsection (b).

     ``SEC. 235. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   SECTORS OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC 
                   MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN.

       ``(a) List of Sectors.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and 
     not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of the 
     sectors of the economy of Iran that are directly or 
     indirectly facilitating, supporting, or involved with the 
     development of or transfer to Iran of ballistic missiles or 
     technology, parts, components, or technology information 
     relating to ballistic missiles.
       ``(2) Certain sectors.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a determination as to whether each of the 
     chemical, computer science, construction, electronic, 
     metallurgy, mining, research (including universities and 
     research institutions), and telecommunications sectors of 
     Iran meet the criteria specified in paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Inclusion in initial list.--If the President 
     determines under subparagraph (A) that the sectors of the 
     economy of Iran specified in such subparagraph meet the 
     criteria specified in paragraph (1), that sector shall be 
     included in the initial list submitted and published under 
     that paragraph.
       ``(b) Sanctions With Respect to Specified Sectors of 
     Iran.--
       ``(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall, in 
     accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all 
     transactions in all property and interests in property of any 
     person described in paragraph (4) if such property and 
     interests in property are in the United States, come within 
     the United States, or are or come within the possession or 
     control of a United States person.
       ``(2) Exclusion from united states.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the United 
     States, any alien that is a person described in paragraph 
     (4).
       ``(B) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the head of 
     state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if 
     admission to the United States is necessary to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States.
       ``(3) Facilitation of certain transactions.--Except as 
     provided in this section, the President shall prohibit the 
     opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the 
     maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account 
     or a payable-through account by a foreign financial 
     institution that the President determines knowingly, on or 
     after the date that is 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, conducts or 
     facilitates a significant financial transaction for a person 
     described in paragraph (4).
       ``(4) Persons described.--A person is described in this 
     paragraph if the President determines that the person, on or 
     after the date that is 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016--
       ``(A) operates in a sector of the economy of Iran included 
     in the most recent list published by the President under 
     subsection (a);
       ``(B) knowingly provides significant financial, material, 
     technological, or other support to, or goods or services in 
     support of, any activity or transaction on behalf of or for 
     the benefit of a person described in subparagraph (A); or
       ``(C) is owned or controlled by a person described in 
     subparagraph (A).
       ``(c) Humanitarian Exception.--The President may not impose 
     sanctions under this section with respect to any person for 
     conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of 
     agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices 
     to Iran or for the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
     the people of Iran.

     ``SEC. 236. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS THAT SUPPORT 
                   THE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM OF IRAN IN 
                   CERTAIN SECTORS OF IRAN.

       ``(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and 
     not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and 
     publish in the Federal Register a list of all foreign persons 
     that have, based on credible information, directly or 
     indirectly facilitated, supported, or been involved with the 
     development of ballistic missiles or technology, parts, 
     components, or technology information related to ballistic 
     missiles in the following sectors of the economy of Iran 
     during the period specified in subsection (b):
       ``(1) Chemical.
       ``(2) Computer Science.
       ``(3) Construction.
       ``(4) Electronic.
       ``(5) Metallurgy.
       ``(6) Mining.
       ``(7) Petrochemical.
       ``(8) Research (including universities and research 
     institutions).
       ``(9) Telecommunications.
       ``(10) Any other sector of the economy of Iran identified 
     under section 235(a).
       ``(b) Period Specified.--The period specified in this 
     subsection is--
       ``(1) with respect to the first list submitted under 
     subsection (a), the period beginning on the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016 and ending 
     on the date that is 120 days after such date of enactment; 
     and
       ``(2) with respect to each subsequent list submitted under 
     such subsection, the one year period preceding the submission 
     of the list.
       ``(c) Comptroller General Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--With respect to each list submitted 
     under subsection (a), not later than 120 days after the list 
     is submitted under that subsection, the Comptroller General 
     of the United States shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees--
       ``(A) an assessment of the processes followed by the 
     President in preparing the list;
       ``(B) an assessment of the foreign persons included in the 
     list; and
       ``(C) a list of persons not included in the list that 
     qualify for inclusion in the list, as determined by the 
     Comptroller General.
       ``(2) Consultations.--In preparing the report required by 
     paragraph (1), the Comptroller General shall consult with 
     nongovernmental organizations.
       ``(d) Credible Information Defined.--In this section, the 
     term `credible information' has the meaning given that term 
     in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
     104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

                    ``Subtitle D--General Provisions

     ``SEC. 241. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In this title:
       ``(1) Entity.--The term `entity' means any corporation, 
     business association, partnership, trust, society, or any 
     other entity.
       ``(2) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' means a 
     person that is not a United States person.
       ``(3) Own or control.--The term `own or control' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       ``(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest 
     by vote or value in the entity;
       ``(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the 
     entity; or
       ``(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.
       ``(4) Person.--The term `person' means an individual or 
     entity.
       ``(5) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' means--
       ``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence to the United States; or
       ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United 
     States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, 
     including a foreign branch of such an entity.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224 
     the following:

  ``Subtitle C--Measures Relating to Ballistic Missile Program of Iran

``Sec. 231. Definitions.
``Sec. 232. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons that 
              support the ballistic missile program of Iran.
``Sec. 233. Blocking of property of persons affiliated with certain 
              Iranian entities.
``Sec. 234. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons 
              involved in ballistic missile activities.
``Sec. 235. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain sectors of 
              Iran that support the ballistic missile program of Iran.
``Sec. 236. Identification of foreign persons that support the 
              ballistic missile program of Iran in certain sectors of 
              Iran.

                    ``Subtitle D--General Provisions

``Sec. 241. Definitions.''.

     SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN 
                   TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   CAPABILITIES OF IRAN.

       Section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513) 
     is amended--

[[Page H4944]]

       (1) in subsection (c)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) in clause (i), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and
       (iii) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
       ``(ii) to acquire or develop ballistic missiles and 
     capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic 
     missiles; or''; and
       (B) in subparagraph (E)(ii)--
       (i) in subclause (I), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (ii) by redesignating subclause (II) as subclause (III); 
     and
       (iii) by inserting after subclause (I) the following:

       ``(II) Iran's development of ballistic missiles and 
     capabilities and launch technology relating to ballistic 
     missiles; or''; and

       (2) in subsection (f)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving those 
     subparagraphs, as so redesignated, two ems to the right;
       (B) by striking ``Waiver.--The'' and inserting ``Waiver.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     the''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Exception.--The Secretary of the Treasury may not 
     waive under paragraph (1) the application of a prohibition or 
     condition imposed with respect to an activity described in 
     subparagraph (A)(ii) or (E)(ii)(II) of subsection (c)(2).''.

     SEC. 205. DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
                   COMMISSION OF ACTIVITIES WITH CERTAIN SECTORS 
                   OF IRAN THAT SUPPORT THE BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   PROGRAM OF IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Section 13(r)(1) of the Securities 
     Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(r)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
     a semicolon;
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); 
     and
       (3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:
       ``(D) knowingly engaged in any activity for which sanctions 
     may be imposed under section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012;''.
       (b) Investigations.--Section 13(r)(5)(A) of the Securities 
     Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by striking ``an Executive 
     order specified in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D)'' 
     and inserting ``section 235 of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
     Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, an Executive order specified 
     in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(E)''.
       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 13(r)(5) of the 
     Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended, in the matter 
     preceding subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph 
     (D)(iii)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (E)(iii)''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect with respect to reports required to be 
     filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the 
     date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.

     SEC. 206. REGULATIONS.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the President shall prescribe regulations to carry 
     out this title and the amendments made by this title.

      TITLE III--SANCTIONS RELATING TO IRAN'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

     SEC. 301. SPECIAL MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN RELATING TO 
                   ITS DESIGNATION AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY 
                   MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.

       (a) Prohibition on Direct Use of Correspondent Accounts.--A 
     covered financial institution shall terminate any 
     correspondent account that--
       (1) is established, maintained, administered, or managed in 
     the United States for, or on behalf of, an Iranian banking 
     institution; and
       (2) is not blocked under any Executive Order issued 
     pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
     (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
       (b) Special Due Diligence Measures for Correspondent 
     Accounts.--
       (1) In general.--A covered financial institution shall 
     apply special due diligence measures to correspondent 
     accounts of the financial institution that are reasonably 
     designed to guard against the improper indirect use of such 
     accounts by Iranian banking institutions.
       (2) Requirements.--The special due diligence measures a 
     covered financial institution is required to apply to 
     correspondent accounts under paragraph (1) shall include, at 
     a minimum--
       (A) notifying the holders of such accounts that the covered 
     financial institution knows or has reason to know provide 
     services to Iranian banking institutions, that such holders 
     generally may not provide Iranian banking institutions with 
     access to such accounts; and
       (B) taking reasonable steps to identify any indirect use of 
     such accounts by Iranian banking institutions, to the extent 
     that such indirect use can be determined from transactional 
     records maintained by the covered financial institution in 
     the normal course of business.
       (3) Risk-based approach.--A covered financial institution 
     shall take a risk-based approach when deciding what, if any, 
     other due diligence measures the financial institution should 
     adopt to guard against the improper indirect use of its 
     correspondent accounts by Iranian banking institutions.
       (4) Response to indirect access by iranian banking 
     institutions.--A covered financial institution that obtains 
     credible information that a correspondent account is being 
     used by a foreign bank to provide indirect access to an 
     Iranian banking institution, shall--
       (A) take all appropriate steps to prevent such indirect 
     access, including notifying the holder of the account under 
     paragraph (1)(A); and
       (B) where necessary, terminate the account.
       (c) Recordkeeping and Reporting.--
       (1) In general.--A covered financial institution shall 
     document its compliance with the notice requirement set forth 
     in subsection (b)(2)(A).
       (2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     require a covered financial institution to report any 
     information not otherwise required to be reported by law or 
     regulation.
       (d) Termination.--This section shall terminate on the date 
     that is 30 days after the date on which the President submits 
     to Congress--
       (1) the certification described in section 401(a) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)); and
       (2) a certification that the Financial Action Task Force 
     has lifted its call for countermeasures against Iran and Iran 
     has become a member of a regional body of the Financial 
     Action Task Force.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Correspondent account.--The term ``correspondent 
     account'' has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 
     of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the 
     day before the date of the enactment of this Act).
       (2) Covered financial institution.--The term ``covered 
     financial institution'' has the meaning given that term under 
     paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 1010.605(e) of title 31, 
     Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before 
     the date of the enactment of this Act).
       (3) Foreign bank.--The term ``foreign bank'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 1010.100(u) of title 31, 
     Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the day before 
     the date of the enactment of this Act).
       (4) Iranian banking institution.--The term ``Iranian 
     banking institution'' means--
       (A) any foreign bank chartered by Iran, including--
       (i) any branches, offices, or subsidiaries of such a bank 
     operating in any jurisdiction; and
       (ii) any branch or office within Iran of any foreign bank 
     licensed by Iran;
       (B) the Central Bank of Iran; and
       (C) any foreign bank of which more than 50 percent of the 
     voting stock or analogous interest is owned by two or more 
     foreign banks chartered by Iran.

      TITLE IV--SANCTIONS RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN

     SEC. 401. EXPANSION OF LIST OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN HUMAN 
                   RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Section 105 of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8514) is amended--
       (1) in the section heading, by striking ``certain persons 
     who are responsible for or complicit'' and inserting 
     ``persons involved'';
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Who Are 
     Responsible for or Complicit'' and inserting ``Involved'';
       (B) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a list of persons the President determines have 
     committed or facilitated, directly or indirectly, human 
     rights abuses or other acts of violence, intimidation, or 
     harassment, on behalf of the Government of Iran on or after 
     June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses or acts 
     occurred in Iran.''; and
       (C) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``this Act'' and 
     inserting ``the Iran Accountability Act of 2016''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) Inclusion of Actions That Violate Universal 
     Declaration of Human Rights.--For purposes of subsection 
     (b)(1), the term `human rights abuses' includes actions that 
     violate the rights listed in the United Nations Universal 
     Declaration of Human Rights, adopted at Paris December 10, 
     1948.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 is amended by striking the item relating to 
     section 105 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 105. Imposition of sanctions on persons involved in human rights 
              abuses committed against citizens of Iran or their family 
              members after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran.''.

     SEC. 402. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH 
                   RESPECT TO, CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

       (a) In General.--Section 221 of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8727) is 
     amended to read as follows:

[[Page H4945]]

  


     ``SEC. 221. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 
                   WITH RESPECT TO, CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

       ``(a) Identification of Individuals.--Not later than 90 
     days after the date of the enactment of the Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016, and every 180 days thereafter, 
     the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and publish in the Federal Register a list of all 
     individuals the President determines are described in 
     subsection (b).
       ``(b) Individuals Described.--An individual described in 
     this subsection is--
       ``(1) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
       ``(2) the President of Iran;
       ``(3) a current or former key official, manager, or 
     director of an entity that is owned or controlled after 
     November 14, 1979, by--
       ``(A) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
       ``(B) the Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran;
       ``(C) the President of Iran;
       ``(D) the Office of the President of Iran;
       ``(E) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps;
       ``(F) the Basij-e Motaz'afin;
       ``(G) the Guardian Council;
       ``(H) the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of Iran;
       ``(I) the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran;
       ``(J) the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran;
       ``(K) the Assembly of Experts of Iran;
       ``(L) the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of 
     Iran;
       ``(M) the Ministry of Justice of Iran;
       ``(N) the Ministry of Interior of Iran;
       ``(O) the prison system of Iran;
       ``(P) the judicial system of Iran, including the Islamic 
     Revolutionary Courts; or
       ``(Q) any citizen of Iran included on the list of specially 
     designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the 
     Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the 
     Treasury;
       ``(4) a citizen of Iran indicted in a foreign country for, 
     or otherwise suspected of, participation in a terrorist 
     attack;
       ``(5) a person that ordered, controlled, directed, or was 
     otherwise complicit in the kidnaping or politically motivated 
     detention of a United States citizen, including a United 
     States citizen who is also a citizen of another country; or
       ``(6) a significant foreign political figure associated 
     with an individual described in any of paragraphs (1) through 
     (5) who is not a United States person.
       ``(c) Exclusion From United States.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (f), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, 
     and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the 
     United States, any alien who is on the list required by 
     subsection (a).
       ``(d) Blocking of Property.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (f), the President shall, in accordance with the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property 
     and interests in property of any individual who is on the 
     list required by subsection (a) if such property and 
     interests in property are in the United States, come within 
     the United States, or are or come within the possession or 
     control of a United States person.
       ``(e) Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and 
     every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report that describes 
     the efforts the President has taken during the 90 days 
     preceding the submission of the report to locate and block 
     all property and interests in property of any individual who 
     is on the list required by subsection (a).
       ``(2) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex if necessary.
       ``(f) Exceptions.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President may not include an 
     individual on the list required by subsection (a) if the 
     President determines that, during the 10-year period 
     preceding the determination, the individual has not in any 
     way engaged in, facilitated, or otherwise supported--
       ``(A) human rights abuses;
       ``(B) acts of international terrorism; or
       ``(C) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
       ``(2) Compliance with united nations headquarters 
     agreement.--Subsection (c) shall not apply to the head of 
     state of Iran, or necessary staff of that head of state, if 
     admission to the United States is necessary to permit the 
     United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
     Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success 
     June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, 
     between the United Nations and the United States.
       ``(g) Waiver.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President may waive the application 
     of subsection (c) or (d) with respect to an individual for a 
     period of 180 days, and may renew that waiver for additional 
     periods of 180 days, if the President--
       ``(A) determines that the waiver is vital to the national 
     security of the United States; and
       ``(B) not less than 7 days before the waiver or the renewal 
     of the waiver, as the case may be, takes effect, submits a 
     report to the appropriate congressional committees on the 
     waiver and the reason for the waiver.
       ``(2) Form of report.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
     may include a classified annex if necessary.
       ``(3) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and any 
     waivers issued pursuant to this subsection shall terminate on 
     December 31, 2018.
       ``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Own or control.--The term `own or control' means, 
     with respect to an entity--
       ``(A) to hold more than 25 percent of the equity interest 
     by vote or value in the entity;
       ``(B) to hold any seats on the board of directors of the 
     entity; or
       ``(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or 
     personnel decisions of the entity.
       ``(2) Significant foreign political figure.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `significant foreign political 
     figure' includes a current or former senior political figure, 
     the immediate family of such a figure, and close associates 
     of such a figure.
       ``(B) Additional definitions.--For purposes of subparagraph 
     (A):
       ``(i) Close associate.--The term `close associate', with 
     respect to a senior political figure--

       ``(I) means an individual who is widely and publicly known 
     to maintain an unusually close relationship with the senior 
     political figure; and
       ``(II) includes an individual who is in a position to 
     conduct substantial domestic and international financial 
     transactions on behalf of the senior political figure.

       ``(ii) Immediate family.--The term `immediate family', with 
     respect to a senior foreign political figure, means the 
     parents, siblings, spouse, children, and in-laws of the 
     senior political figure.
       ``(iii) Senior political figure.--The term `senior 
     political figure' means a senior official in the executive, 
     legislative, administrative, military, or judicial branches 
     of the Government of Iran (whether elected or not), a senior 
     official of a major political party in Iran, or a senior 
     executive of an entity owned or controlled by the Government 
     of Iran.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 
     U.S.C. 8701 et seq.) is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 221 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 221. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect 
              to, certain Iranian individuals.''.

     SEC. 403. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO 
                   CONDUCT TRANSACTIONS WITH OR ON BEHALF OF 
                   CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle B of title II of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 
     et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 221 the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 221A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS 
                   WHO CONDUCT TRANSACTIONS WITH OR ON BEHALF OF 
                   CERTAIN IRANIAN INDIVIDUALS.

       ``(a) Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Goods and Services.--The 
     President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described 
     in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 
     104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) with respect to a person that 
     knowingly, on or after the date that is 120 days after the 
     date of the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, 
     sells, supplies, or transfers goods or services to an 
     individual who is on the list required by section 221(a).
       ``(b) Facilitation of Certain Transactions.--The President 
     shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict 
     conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or a payable-through account by any 
     foreign financial institution that has knowingly conducted or 
     facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of 
     an individual who is on the list required by section 221(a).
       ``(c) Application of Certain Provisions of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996.--The following provisions of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note) shall apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions 
     under subsection (a) to the same extent that such provisions 
     apply with respect to the imposition of sanctions under 
     section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996:
       ``(1) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
       ``(2) Section 8.
       ``(3) Section 11.
       ``(4) Section 12.
       ``(5) Section 13(b).
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this Act:
       ``(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through 
     account.--The terms `account', `correspondent account', and 
     `payable-through account' have the meanings given those terms 
     in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
       ``(2) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign 
     financial institution' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 
     U.S.C. 8701 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 221 the following:

``Sec. 221A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who 
              conduct transactions with or on behalf of certain Iranian 
              individuals.''.

[[Page H4946]]

  


     SEC. 404. MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL 
                   INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN 
                   TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE 
                   TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive 
     Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
     (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(F) facilitates a significant transaction or transactions 
     or provides significant financial services for a person that 
     is subject to sanctions under section 105(c), 105A(c), 
     105B(c), or 105C(a);''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to any activity described in subparagraph 
     (F) of section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by 
     subsection (a)(3), initiated on or after the date that is 90 
     days after such date of enactment.
       (c) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendments made 
     by subsection (a).

     SEC. 405. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle B of title IV of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8751 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 416. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.

       ``(a) Policy of the United States.--It is the policy of the 
     United States--
       ``(1) to support the efforts of the people of Iran to 
     promote the establishment of basic freedoms in Iran;
       ``(2) to lay the foundation for the emergence of a freely 
     elected, open, and democratic political system in Iran that 
     is not a threat to its neighbors or to the United States and 
     to work with all citizens of Iran who seek to establish such 
     a political system;
       ``(3) to support the emergence of a government in Iran that 
     does not oppress the people of Iran and does not persecute, 
     intimidate, arrest, imprison, or execute dissidents or 
     minorities;
       ``(4) to advocate on behalf of those in Iran persecuted for 
     their religion or belief;
       ``(5) to assist the people of Iran to produce, access, and 
     share information freely and safely through the Internet and 
     other media; and
       ``(6) to defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to 
     jam or otherwise obstruct international satellite broadcast 
     signals.
       ``(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that--
       ``(1) the United States should support citizens of Iran 
     that actively work to advance political, economic, and social 
     reforms, including freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, 
     freedom of religion, and representative government;
       ``(2) the President should use all available nonviolent 
     means to support citizens of Iran that advocate for 
     pluralistic, prosperous, and participatory societies;
       ``(3) programs of the Department of State to support reform 
     in Iran have not resulted in a more democratic Iran;
       ``(4) the Government of Iran continues to play a pernicious 
     role in the Middle East, undermining democratic consolidation 
     in Iraq, supporting international terrorism through 
     Hezbollah, and aiding the autocratic regime of Bashar al-
     Assad in Syria;
       ``(5) the Secretary of State should make every effort to 
     deliver support directly to people working in Iran to 
     implement programs carried out using assistance provided by 
     the Department of State when possible and all possible means 
     of delivering such assistance should be used; and
       ``(6) oversight, management, and implementation of programs 
     of the Department of State to support reform in Iran should 
     be under the direction of the Special Coordinator on Human 
     Rights and Democracy in Iran established under section 406 of 
     the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, in consultation with the 
     Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and 
     Labor.
       ``(c) Assistance To Support Reform in Iran.--
       ``(1) Assistance authorized.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Secretary of State may provide 
     assistance (including through the award of grants) to 
     individuals and entities working in Iran for the purpose of 
     supporting and promoting the rule of law, good governance, 
     civil society, and economic opportunity in Iran.
       ``(2) Eligibility for assistance.--Assistance authorized 
     under this subsection should be provided only to a person 
     that--
       ``(A) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism 
     and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist 
     organization under section 219 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) at any time during the 4-year 
     period ending on the date of the enactment of the Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016;
       ``(B) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation 
     regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and 
     materiel, and ballistic missiles;
       ``(C) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the 
     adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran;
       ``(D) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including 
     the fundamental equality of women; and
       ``(E) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, 
     freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
       ``(3) Notification requirement.--Not later than 15 days 
     before each obligation of assistance under this subsection, 
     the Secretary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives in accordance 
     with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications 
     under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2394-1).
       ``(4) Termination.--The authority to provide assistance 
     under this subsection shall expire on December 31, 2020.
       ``(d) Reports.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Accountability Act of 2016, and 
     every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall 
     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
     on the implementation of this section that includes the 
     following:
       ``(A) An identification of the actions the President has 
     taken during the 180-day period immediately preceding the 
     submission of the report to advance each of the policies 
     described in subsection (a).
       ``(B) A clear strategy for advancing political, economic, 
     and social reform in Iran that includes benchmarks for 
     success that lead to a set of identified discrete goals and 
     objectives.
       ``(C) A plan to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of 
     the provision of assistance authorized under subsection (c), 
     including measures of effectiveness.
       ``(D) The status of the programming of assistance under 
     subsection (c).
       ``(E) An analysis of any past programming of assistance 
     under subsection (c) and its effectiveness with respect to 
     supporting and promoting the rule of law, good governance, 
     civil society, and economic opportunity in Iran.
       ``(2) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph 
     (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex if necessary.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 415 
     the following:

``Sec. 416. United States support for the people of Iran.''.

     SEC. 406. UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   AND DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.

       (a) Designation.--The President shall designate within the 
     Department of State a Special Coordinator on Human Rights and 
     Democracy in Iran (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Special Coordinator'').
       (b) Consultation and Qualifications.--Before the President 
     designates a Special Coordinator under subsection (a), the 
     Secretary of State shall consult with the chairmen and 
     ranking members of the appropriate congressional committees. 
     The role of Special Coordinator should be filled by an 
     official of the Department of State appointed by and serving 
     at the pleasure of the President in a position not lower than 
     Under Secretary on the day before the date of the enactment 
     of this Act.
       (c) Duties.--The Special Coordinator shall carry out the 
     following duties:
       (1) Coordinate the activities of the United States 
     Government that promote human rights, democracy, political 
     freedom, and religious freedom inside Iran.
       (2) Coordinate the activities of the United States 
     Government that promote human rights, political freedom, and 
     religious freedom for Iranian refugees and asylees living 
     outside Iran.
       (3) Ensure the comprehensive investigation and designation 
     of Iranian human rights abusers in accordance with section 
     105 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514).
       (4) Coordinate the documentation and publicizing of 
     political dissidents and cases of human rights abuse inside 
     Iran.
       (5) Coordinate multilateral efforts to build international 
     support for the promotion of human rights, democracy, 
     political freedom, and religious freedom in Iran, including 
     broadcasting, Internet access, and dissemination of 
     information.
       (6) Encourage the United Nations, multilateral 
     organizations, and human rights nongovernmental organizations 
     to more robustly investigate and report on human rights 
     abuses in Iran.
       (7) Encourage foreign governments to downgrade or sever 
     diplomatic relations with the Government of Iran, enact 
     economic sanctions, and assist Iranian dissidents in response 
     to the continued violations of human rights by the Government 
     of Iran.
       (8) Encourage foreign governments to expel Iran from 
     international fora and organizations with a human rights 
     component, including the United Nations Commission on the 
     Status of Women, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
     and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Children's 
     Fund, and the International Labour Organization.
       (9) Coordinate all programs to promote human rights, 
     democracy, political freedom, and religious freedom inside 
     Iran.

[[Page H4947]]

       (d) Authority.--
       (1) Coordination of activities.--The Special Coordinator 
     shall coordinate all activities related to Iran carried out 
     by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of 
     Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, and the Bureau of 
     Population, Refugees and Migration of the Department of 
     State, the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 
     Freedom, the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-
     Semitism, the United States Commission on International 
     Religious Freedom, the National Endowment for Democracy, and 
     the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
       (2) Coordination of use of funds.--The Special Coordinator 
     shall coordinate and oversee the obligation and expenditure 
     of funds related to human rights, democracy, Internet 
     freedom, and broadcasting activities in Iran, including funds 
     made available for such purposes to the Middle East 
     Partnership Initiative, the United States Commission on 
     International Religious Freedom, the Broader Middle East and 
     North Africa Initiative, the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, 
     and the Near Eastern Regional Democracy Fund.
       (e) Diplomatic Representation.--Subject to the direction of 
     the President and the Secretary of State, the Special 
     Coordinator shall represent the United States in matters and 
     cases relevant to the promotion of human rights, democracy, 
     political freedom, and religious freedom in Iran in--
       (1) contacts with foreign governments, intergovernmental 
     organizations, and specialized agencies of the United 
     Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
     Europe, and other international organizations of which the 
     United States is a member; and
       (2) multilateral conferences and meetings relevant to the 
     promotion of human rights, democracy, political freedom, and 
     religious freedom in Iran.
       (f) Consultations.--The Special Coordinator shall consult 
     with Congress, domestic and international nongovernmental 
     organizations, labor organizations, and multilateral 
     organizations and institutions as the Special Coordinator 
     considers appropriate to fulfill the purposes of this 
     section.
       (g) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 407. BROADCASTING TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the 
     Voice of America services broadcasting to Iran shall--
       (1) provide news and information that is accessible, 
     credible, comprehensive, and accurate;
       (2) emphasize investigative and analytical journalism 
     provided by Iranian or pro-Iranian media outlets; and
       (3) strengthen civil society by promoting democratic 
     processes, respect for human rights, and freedom of the press 
     and expression.
       (b) Programming Surge.--Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and 
     Voice of America programming to Iran shall--
       (1) provide programming content 24 hours a day and 7 days a 
     week to target populations using all available and effective 
     distribution outlets, including at least 12 hours a day of 
     original television and video content, not including live 
     video streaming of breaking news;
       (2) create mobile platforms with an embedded proxy to offer 
     the people of Iran the opportunity to securely listen to 
     programming;
       (3) increase number of staffers based in the region to 
     allow for more direct contact with the people of Iran;
       (4) expand the use, audience, and audience engagement of 
     mobile news and multimedia platforms by the Voice of America 
     and the Radio Farda service of Radio Free Europe/Radio 
     Liberty, including through Internet-based social networking 
     platforms; and
       (5) establish fellowships for Iranian journalists who have 
     fled the country to learn about free, competitive media and 
     be trained in surrogate reporting.

     SEC. 408. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS DETAINED BY IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on United States citizens, including dual 
     citizens, detained by Iran or groups supported by Iran that 
     includes--
       (1) information regarding any officials of the Government 
     of Iran involved in any way in the detentions; and
       (2) a summary of efforts the United States Government has 
     taken to secure the swift release of those United States 
     citizens, including United States citizens who are also 
     citizens of other countries.
       (b) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex if necessary.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     has the meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note).

     SEC. 409. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN 
                   PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United Nations has a significant role to play in 
     promoting and improving human rights in Iran;
       (2) the United States should continue to support the work 
     of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
     human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
       (3) the egregious human rights violations in Iran warrant 
     country-specific attention and continued reporting by the 
     Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran, the Special Rapporteur on torture 
     and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
     punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the 
     Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
     executions, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
     protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
     the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, and 
     the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes, 
     and consequences, of the United Nations.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) 
and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) each will control 30 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.


                             General Leave



 =========================== NOTE =========================== 

  
  July 14, 2016, on page H4947, the following appeared: Engel) 
each will control 30 minutes. GENERAL LEAVE
  
  The online version has been corrected to read: Engel) each will 
control 30 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
California. GENERAL LEAVE


 ========================= END NOTE ========================= 

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to 
include extraneous material on the bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in support of H.R. 5631, the Iran Accountability Act of 2016.
  This week marks the first anniversary of President Obama's agreement 
with Iran. I wish I could say that it has been a win, or the win that 
the proponents had hoped for. But a sober assessment is that both the 
short-term and long-term national security interests of the United 
States have been deeply impacted here. We have suffered as a result of 
this agreement.
  Under the deal, the Obama administration promised that we would be in 
a position to verify all of Iran's commitments under the agreement. 
This just has not been the case. A year later, we have less public 
information about Iran's nuclear activities than we did before the 
pact.
  International inspectors were to have full and unrestricted access to 
any military or suspicious location in Iran. Now, it turns out that the 
deal included an unprecedented arrangement that relies on Iran to 
``self-inspect'' its Parchin military complex.
  The administration insisted that a U.N. Security Council resolution 
would continue to prohibit Iran's ballistic missile development. The 
reality is that it has a loophole big enough for Iran to shoot an 
intercontinental ballistic missile through, and Iran has shot through 
that loophole. Some of those tested missiles that they have shot 
through that loophole are marked ``Israel must be wiped off the 
Earth.'' That is what is in writing in Farsi on the side of them. And 
if anybody should not get the message, it is also written in Hebrew.
  When the Obama administration was strong-arming its allies in the 
other body to save its Iran deal, many promises were made. Central to 
the White House story line was the President's claim that sanctions on 
Iran for terrorism, sanctions for human rights, and sanctions on the 
ballistic missiles, in their words, ``will continue to be fully 
enforced.''
  This, unfortunately, has not happened. Unfortunately, the 
administration's words have not matched its actions. The administration 
has meekly responded to Iran's provocative acts, thanks in part to the 
weak U.N. Security Council language in which we watered down the 
previous language on ballistic missiles. That was agreed to by the 
administration. And just one, only one Iranian, one sole individual, 
has been sanctioned for human rights abuses since negotiations began--
one.
  Indeed, last month, a top Treasury official publicly proclaimed that 
terrorism and missile sanctions would undermine the Iran agreement. 
That is not what this committee was originally told before this 
agreement was voted on. We were told exactly the opposite.
  By now, every Member should know the pattern, and the pattern is 
this. If

[[Page H4948]]

Iran objects, the administration bends over backwards to accommodate. 
Effectively, the Supreme Leader now holds the veto pin over future 
congressional action. This policy of what I call ``walking on egg 
shells'' in deference to Tehran hurts our U.S. national security 
interest.
  And it doesn't have to be this way. The nuclear agreement permits 
sanctions on the Iranian regime for activities such as missile tests, 
terrorism, and human rights abuses. Indeed, that is what the 
administration said they would do after they struck their deal. This 
legislation before the House holds the administration to their promises 
to us.
  Among other provisions, this legislation increases sanctions against 
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. That is what we call the 
IRGC. It expands sanctions against Iran for its ballistic missile 
development, and we should. It stresses the fundamental human rights of 
the Iranian people as key to our national security concerns.
  I would just say Congress has an obligation to look for ways to stem 
the tide of Iranian aggression in the region and to stem the tide of 
its repression of the Persian, of the Iranian people at home.
  I strongly urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
     Hon. Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce, I am writing with respect to H.R. 
     5631, the ``Iran Accountability Act of 2016.'' As a result of 
     your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 5631 that 
     fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways 
     and Means, I agree to waive consideration of this bill so 
     that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
       The Committee on Ways and Means takes this action with the 
     mutual understanding that by forgoing consideration of H.R. 
     5631 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the 
     subject matter contained in this or similar legislation, and 
     the Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as 
     the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may 
     address any remaining issues that fall within our Rule X 
     jurisdiction. The Committee also reserves the right to seek 
     appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any 
     House-Senate conference involving this or similar 
     legislation, and requests your support for such request.
       Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter 
     confirming this understanding, and would ask that a copy of 
     our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration thereof.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Kevin Brady,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
     Hon. Kevin Brady,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged 
     from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving 
     this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
     Hon. Ed Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce: On July 6, 2016, the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence (``the Committee'') received a 
     referral for H.R. 5631, the ``Iran Accountability Act of 
     2016.''
       In order to expedite the House's consideration of this 
     important legislation, the Committee will forego 
     consideration of the measure. This waiver is, however, 
     conditioned on our mutual understanding that it does not 
     diminish or otherwise affect any future jurisdictional claim 
     over the subject matter contained in the bill or any similar 
     legislation.
       Please place a copy of this letter and your response 
     acknowledging the Committee's jurisdictional interest into 
     any committee report on H.R. 5631 and into the Congressional 
     Record during its floor consideration. I would also 
     appreciate your support for the appointment of Committee 
     members to any House-Senate conference on this legislation. 
     Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Devin Nunes,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
     Hon. Devin Nunes,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged 
     from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving 
     this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
     Hon. Jason Chaffetz,
     Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged 
     from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving 
     this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 
           Government Reform,
                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
     Hon. Edward Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write concerning H.R. 5631, the Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016. As you know, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs received an original referral and the 
     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform a secondary 
     referral when the bill was introduced on July 6, 2016. I 
     recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this 
     legislation before the House of Representatives in an 
     expeditious manner, and accordingly, the Committee on 
     Oversight and Government Reform will forego action on the 
     bill.
       The Committee takes this action with our mutual 
     understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 5631 at 
     this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over the subject 
     matter contained in this or similar legislation. Further, I 
     request your support for the appointment of conferees from 
     the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform during any 
     House-Senate conference convened on this or related 
     legislation.
       I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on H.R. 
     5631 be included in the bill report filed by the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, as well as in the Congressional Record 
     during floor consideration, to memorialize our understanding.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Jason Chaffetz,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                                    Washington, DC, July 12, 2016.
     Hon. Ed Royce
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing concerning H.R. 5631, the 
     ``Iran Accountability Act of 2016.''
       As a result of your having consulted with the Committee on 
     Financial Services concerning provisions in the bill that 
     fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to forgo action 
     on the bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House 
     Floor. The Committee on Financial Services takes this action 
     with our mutual understanding that, by foregoing

[[Page H4949]]

     consideration of H.R. 5631 at this time, we do not waive any 
     jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or 
     similar legislation, and that our Committee will be 
     appropriately consulted and involved as this or similar 
     legislation moves forward so that we may address any 
     remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction. 
     Our Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of 
     an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such request.
       Finally, I would appreciate your response to this letter 
     confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 5631 and 
     would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this 
     matter be included in the Congressional Record during 
     consideration of the bill.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Jeb Hensarling,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 2016.
     Hon. Jeb Hensarling
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for consulting with the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 5631, the Iran 
     Accountability Act of 2016, and for agreeing to be discharged 
     from further consideration of that bill.
       I agree that your forgoing further action on this measure 
     does not in any way diminish or alter the jurisdiction of 
     your Committee, or prejudice its jurisdictional prerogatives 
     on this bill or similar legislation in the future. I would 
     support your effort to seek appointment of an appropriate 
     number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving 
     this legislation.
       I will seek to place our letters on H.R. 5631 into the 
     Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. 
     I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation and 
     look forward to continuing to work with your Committee as 
     this measure moves through the legislative process.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in opposition to this measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I just walked here from our hearing room where the 
Foreign Affairs Committee marked up 13 measures. We had a committee 
meeting this morning. Some were written by Republicans, some by 
Democrats. When these bills and resolutions were first introduced, a 
lot of Members had questions and concerns. But the committee went to 
work ironing out differences, and now all 13 pieces of legislation have 
been favorably reported with bipartisan support.
  That is how our committee works. That is how our chairman, Ed Royce, 
runs things. That is why we say that the Foreign Affairs Committee is 
the most bipartisan committee in the entire Congress, and I am proud of 
that as a ranking member.
  I believe, and we believe, that partisanship should end at the 
water's edge. When it comes to fighting for our country, there should 
be no Democrats and Republicans. We should be working together on this. 
Partisanship should end at the water's edge. And that is our best how 
we legislate, especially when it comes to advancing American interests 
and security overseas. So it is rather jarring, Mr. Speaker, to walk 
onto the floor to debate the majority leader's bill--80 pages of new 
sanctions on the Iranian regime, introduced literally in the middle of 
the night last week, rammed through the Rules Committee, brought to the 
floor without any chance to improve it or any input from the Foreign 
Affairs Committee.
  That is a disappointment, Mr. Speaker, because there are plenty of us 
on both sides of the aisle who think we should be doing more to hold 
Iran's leaders accountable for their bad behavior. After all, Iran is 
the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. Iran props up the Assad 
regime, detains Americans on trumped-up charges, and has racked up the 
worst record on human rights you could imagine.
  Congress could speak with a unified voice on these issues, but not 
with the bill we are considering today. I don't like the regime. 
Everyone knows I oppose the deal with Iran. I think if we work 
together, we can move forward on legislation; but not this way, not 
ramming it through the Rules Committee so it doesn't get to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and it gets to the floor where nobody had any kind of 
input whatsoever. That is not how we should be running this house. So 
it is not with the bill we are considering today. My friends on the 
other side know that. This isn't a serious bill. It would force the 
United States to violate our obligations under the nuclear deal.
  Now, I think that is a mistake. As I said before, I opposed the Iran 
nuclear deal, but I was on the losing side of that debate. We shouldn't 
relitigate this issue. We shouldn't have 62 votes again and again to 
try to upend this issue, like we do with the Affordable Care Act. We 
should not relitigate this issue. Our work now should be to hold Iran 
to its obligations and make sure the deal is being fully implemented.
  One of the ways we could do this is to ensure there is a viable 
snapback of sanctions if Iran violates the deal. That is why I have 
been saying we should reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act before it 
expires by the end of the year.
  But here in front of us in this 80-page bill, what is missing?
  A reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act. That shows me that this 
isn't a serious undertaking.
  Regardless of what I think, we know that this bill has zero chance of 
becoming law. It most certainly won't pass the Senate. If it did, the 
White House would veto it. So we can only conclude, Mr. Speaker, that 
this is a political exercise, and that troubles me.
  One of our greatest traditions in American foreign policy is that 
politics and partisanship stop at the water's edge. That principle has 
been especially true in the way Congress has dealt with Iran in recent 
years. That principle has guided our work on the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. Maybe that is why the Foreign Affairs Committee was cut out 
of this process. We have avoided letting foreign policy turn to 
everyday politics. But make no mistake, what we are doing today is 
politics, plain and simple.
  I worry about that precedent. I worry about what it means when Iran 
sees us playing politics with global security, when Iran's leaders see 
us engage in political grandstanding instead of serious policymaking. I 
also worry about what it means for the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Our committee's jurisdiction gives us oversight of diplomacy, 
development, foreign assistance, war powers. Yet, here we are debating 
a major, major sanctions bill that never passed through the doors of 
our committee room. Yesterday, the House voted on another Iran bill 
that completely bypassed our committee as well. The House just approved 
the Defense Authorization Act that includes dozens of provisions that 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Who 
knows how many foreign policy riders will find their way into our 
spending bills this year, all without the Foreign Affairs Committee 
saying a word.
  This is a bad trend, Mr. Speaker. This is not regular order, which 
the Speaker promised us. By the way, I wonder what our friends in the 
Freedom Caucus and Liberty Caucus have to say about the process that 
got this bill to the floor. I wonder what happened to the Speaker's 
commitment to regular order that put the gavel in his hands in the 
first place. I didn't see a lot of concern over regular order as this 
bill was being rushed through the Rules Committee.
  We have a legislative process that cut out the most experienced 
legislators on this issue. We have an important foreign policy concern 
turned into a political football. We have a bill that has no chance of 
becoming law. I am starting to think this has something to do with the 
calendar. Today, when we finish our business, Members will rush to the 
exits. But next week, many of my friends on the other side will descend 
on Cleveland for their convention.
  Now, let me say a bit with tongue and cheek that I sympathize with my 
friends on the other side. Their standard-bearer has some pretty 
unusual ideas about foreign policy. He thinks more countries should get 
nuclear weapons. He wants to withdraw from our alliances. He thinks we 
ought to be neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and start a 
trade war with China. He looks to people like Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-
un, and Saddam Hussein as apparent role models.
  If I were in the majority's shoes, I would want to change the 
conversations, too. But this bill is the way to do it. This bill 
doesn't make the majority appear strong on foreign policy. It only 
makes Congress appear to be divided on

[[Page H4950]]

issues on which we cannot afford division. This bill weakens us as a 
Congress when Congress should be finding ways to make Americans safer.
  I oppose this measure, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I always prefer to work things out with the ranking member. Working 
together, we put three bipartisan bills on the President's desk this 
last week alone. In this Congress, Mr. Engel and I, working together on 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, have seen some 14 bills signed into law. 
So he is right, this isn't the norm.
  Earlier this year, there were intense discussions with the minority 
on legislation to push back on Iran's missile program. I compromised 
more than I wanted, inserting a waiver. We were close, but at the end 
of the day, it became clear that the White House would aggressively 
fight any legislation with the words ``Iran'' written on it.
  For the White House, it is accommodation of Iran at all costs, and 
that includes essentially giving the Supreme Leader the veto pen over 
steps Congress might press the administration to take. So on this, we 
are stuck. Until the Democratic leadership is ready to look past this 
President's legacy, I imagine we will be stuck.
  Lastly, I would note that these pieces of legislation are tightly 
focused on Iran's behavior outside of the nuclear agreement. That is 
the point. Whether one was for the agreement or against the agreement, 
these are outside of the nuclear agreement.

                              {time}  1030

  These bills do not undo or kill the Iran deal but, instead, press 
back on the administration's promises when campaigning for their deal.
  This goes to the issue of what we were told, what was in the talking 
points on the floor of the House, in terms of how this deal would be 
implemented and that it would not impact our ability to stop this 
ballistic missile testing by Iran and these other abuses.
  I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. McCarthy), the 
majority leader.
  Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, today marks the 1-year anniversary of the signing of the 
administration's Iran deal--1 year, and the world has already become a 
more troubled place.
  I personally think the deal sets a dangerous precedent. It 
strengthens the largest state sponsor of terror in the world and gives 
that state sponsor of terror a pathway to nuclear weapons at some point 
in its future.
  I think that all of the arguments to defend this deal can't stand 
against the great weight of reality, including the fact that Iran isn't 
holding up its side of the bargain and is more interested in 
embarrassing American military men and women than in becoming a 
responsible nation.
  I understand a few people disagree. However, there is something we 
have always agreed on from the start. Deal or no deal, good or bad 
deal, we have always agreed to hold Iran accountable for terrorism, for 
its development of ballistic missiles, and for its human rights abuses 
committed against its own people.
  In April alone, President Obama said we have to ``hold Iran to 
account where it is acting in ways that are contrary to rules and 
norms.''
  Secretary Kerry said last year, ``We will never, ever stop standing 
up for the Iranian people's rights.''
  Treasury Secretary Jack Lew also said last year, ``We are going to 
continue to prosecute our unilateral sanctions on things like 
terrorism, on things like regional destabilization and human rights.''
  What about today? Iran has conducted eight ballistic missile tests 
since the deal was signed. The State Department's own Stephen Mull said 
in May, ``There have not been any sanctions imposed for human rights 
grounds since July of last year.'' Iran continues to imprison 
journalists--Americans--and to torture its people.
  In February, the administration's Director of National Intelligence, 
James Clapper, said, ``Iran continues to be the foremost state sponsor 
of terrorism. Iran and Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat 
to U.S. interests and partners worldwide.''
  Those are the facts right there, Mr. Speaker.
  What has the Obama administration done? How has the administration 
held Iran accountable, as they said they would? The administration has 
done nothing.
  And it only gets worse. German intelligence has found that Iran is 
violating its pledges under this nuclear deal. Iran is procuring 
material for nuclear weapons in what is ``by international standards, a 
quantitatively high level.'' Coupled with its missile program, the 
report reads, ``It is safe to expect that Iran will continue its 
intensive procurement activity.''
  Wasn't this deal supposed to stop Iran from developing nuclear 
weapons? Where is the accountability? Where is the administration when 
they so clearly said they would hold them accountable? Where is the 
bipartisanship in the sanctions now?
  Now, I understand on the other side, Mr. Speaker, some will accuse 
Republicans of engaging in a purely partisan exercise and never 
intending to work with our friends on the other side of the aisle.
  Well, you know that is just not true. You know for the last 6 months 
we worked with the other side of the aisle, we worked in a bipartisan 
manner with the chairmen on both sides. But every time we would deal 
with the missiles and the ballistic sanctions against them, the White 
House would thwart any bipartisan effort.
  So why are we here today? It is because, for 6 months, he found every 
reason to say ``no.'' For 6 months, he went back on every word that was 
said about holding them accountable when the facts stood before us.
  Frankly, Mr. Speaker, I don't understand opposition to this bill. We 
are simply holding Iran accountable, which is exactly what the 
administration said they would do.
  We have had tremendous leaders in this country, and we have learned 
the lessons time and again. Ronald Reagan taught us this lesson: that 
peace without freedom is meaningless. Human nature craves that we all 
have peace, but you cannot secure peace without freedom. We have 
watched in history when leaders have failed. Chamberlain, ``peace for 
our time,'' but there was no freedom in that.
  Ronald Reagan had this same dilemma late in his second term, in 
Iceland, when he stood across from Gorbachev, trying to negotiate a 
reduction in nuclear weapons. He was securing almost everything that he 
had asked for, but Gorbachev asked for one last item. He asked that 
America would end their SDI program. Reagan didn't say no. He said, we 
will share it with you so the world can be safe. But Gorbachev said no.
  Reagan had a decision to make. He could have signed that deal, and I 
am sure the elite would have probably given him the Nobel Peace Prize. 
Other Presidents have won them. But he realized there was no freedom in 
that agreement. So he got up, he held the Soviet Union accountable, and 
he walked away.
  Had he not, would the Berlin Wall have collapsed? Had he not, would 
the Soviet Union have collapsed?
  Words have meaning, and words have consequences. The quotes from this 
administration and from around the world were to hold Iran accountable. 
That is what is happening today.
  Mr. Speaker, there are going to be some Members in this Chamber who 
will sit back and say, ``But it didn't happen just the way I wanted it 
to before it came to the floor.''
  I don't want you to look your grandchildren in the eyes and explain 
to them why we don't have freedom in the world. I want you to look your 
grandchildren in the eyes and say you stood up--you stood up for the 
words and what that meant when we were to hold Iran accountable.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode 
Island (Mr. Cicilline), a very respected member of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee.
  Mr. CICILLINE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 5631.
  Nothing is more important to our national security interests in the 
Middle East than continuing to prevent a nuclear Iran while, at the 
same time, effectively containing Iran's influence

[[Page H4951]]

and confronting their destabilizing activities in the region.
  Iran's ongoing ballistic missile program and its continued support 
for terrorism constitute an existential threat to our allies in the 
Middle East, including Israel. In its blatant disregard for human 
rights, we can hear the echoes of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and 
other failed totalitarian regimes that now reside in the dustbin of 
history.
  It is imperative that we do more to exert pressure on the Iranian 
regime to change its behavior, including meaningful sanctions for human 
rights and ballistic missile violations and terrorism. But any steps 
that we take cannot undermine the progress that we have already made 
over the past year to deny Iran a nuclear weapons program.

  The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is working. Since its 
implementation, Iran has dismantled two-thirds of its installed uranium 
enrichment capacity, ended all uranium enrichment activity at its 
Fordow facility, and removed the core of the Arak heavy water reactor 
and rendered its only source of weapons-grade plutonium permanently 
useless.
  Iran is now complying with the most comprehensive transparency and 
monitoring regime ever negotiated in the nuclear age. Israel's Chief of 
the General Staff, Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, has called this 
agreement ``a historic turning point. It is a big change in terms of 
the direction that Iran was headed and in the way we saw things.''
  There is no question that the world is safer today and that our 
allies in the Middle East, especially in Israel, are more secure 
because the JCPOA has denied Iran the opportunity to develop a nuclear 
weapon. We can and should continue to build on this work and confront 
the Iranian regime's behavior without undermining the JCPOA.
  We should impose sanctions for ballistic missiles, for human rights 
violations, and for terrorism, but these sanctions must be carefully 
drawn, must be carefully written to protect the agreement that denies 
Iran a nuclear weapon.
  The bill that we are voting on today does not do this. As a result, 
it won't make us safer. It will, in fact, undermine every single 
achievement we have made over the past year.
  It will impose insurmountable limits on the President's ability to 
work with our allies around the world and to implement effective 
sanctions on Iranian human rights abusers, their ballistic missile 
program, and their support for terrorism. If this bill becomes law, it 
will immediately put Iran back on a path to develop a nuclear weapon.
  I sit on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I have attended dozens 
and dozens of hearings on Iran. I have heard hours and hours of 
testimony from expert witnesses on how we can effect change in Iran. 
But no one asked for our input on this bill. It was introduced by the 
Republican leadership in the dead of night, entirely bypassing the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, and came straight to the floor.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
  Mr. CICILLINE. Let's call this bill for what it is: a cynical 
proposal that is designed to score political points in an election year 
even at the expense of our national security interests.
  Mr. Speaker, we need serious, thoughtful strategies to confront the 
Iranian regime, not partisan politics. The stakes are too high.
  I urge my colleagues to protect this agreement that prevents Iran 
from having a nuclear weapon, to work with us in a bipartisan way, to 
impose sanctions that are carefully drawn with the full participation 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and to reject this bill in its 
current form.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  I would just counter with some observations.
  First, the nuclear deal does not dismantle key aspects of Iran's 
nuclear program. That, in fact, is its fatal flaw.
  At its essence, this agreement traded permanent comprehensive 
sanctions relief for temporary, limited constraints on Iran's nuclear 
program. Under this deal, Iran will keep much of its nuclear 
infrastructure and continue to develop advanced centrifuges, gaining 
the ability to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.
  Due to the deal's fatal flaw--and that is the sunset clause--the 
ayatollah won't even have to cheat to be just steps away from a nuclear 
weapon. All he has to do is wait 10 or 15 years until the deal expires.
  We cannot be sure that Iran is truly living up to its obligations 
under this agreement. I heard the assertion that it was. It is 
certainly not. In its annual report, published last month, the German 
intelligence reports:

       The illegal proliferation-sensitive procurement activities 
     by Iran in Germany, registered by the Federal Office for the 
     Protection of the Constitution, persisted in 2015 at what is, 
     even by international standards, a quantitatively high level. 
     This holds true in particular with regards to items which can 
     be used in the field of nuclear technology.

  If this deal is working, why is Iran secretly violating it? Why is 
Iran buying nuclear technology?

                              {time}  1045

  Now, the point is that these activities we are curtailing aren't 
related to the nuclear deal, and that is the other point I would make.
  Unlike the administration, I am not willing to be able to be held 
hostage to the nuclear deal, doing nothing as Iran develops ICBMs in 
defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
  We realize what is happening here, I hope, is the ayatollah, on a 
weekly basis, leads these chants of ``death to Israel,'' ``death to 
America'' and asserts that it is every military man's responsibility to 
figure out how to mass-produce intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
When he is talking about ``intercontinental,'' that means between 
continents; that means between there and here.
  ``Death to America'' is not a confusing thing that we might be 
misinterpreting. And it is worth noting that, in the last week, it 
surfaced that Iran continued trying to illegally procure nuclear 
equipment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Price).
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition 
to this and the other two bills before the House this week regarding 
Iran, all of which would weaken our national security and our 
international standing, and all of which the President has rightly 
threatened to veto.
  If there is a silver lining in this debate, it is that the majority 
has given us an opportunity to acknowledge the 1-year anniversary of 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which has made the world safer 
by severely constraining Iran's nuclear activities and subjecting them 
to unprecedented international oversight.
  Yet, instead of celebrating this landmark achievement, the majority 
is seeking to undo it. H.R. 5119, H.R. 4992, and H.R. 5631, 
collectively, would deny Iran even the limited access to foreign 
investment and other meaningful incentives that encourage compliance 
with the JCPOA.
  These are just the latest in a series of Republican efforts to 
undermine this historic agreement negotiated with the world's major 
powers. Since the deal was finalized, Republicans have tried again and 
again and again to undermine not just the JCPOA, but also the 
credibility of the President of the United States on the international 
stage.
  It appears the Iran nuclear agreement has become the ObamaCare of 
foreign policy. What I mean is that Republicans proclaim it a failure 
repeatedly, despite its objective success. They call for its immediate 
repeal without offering any viable alternatives, despite the 
potentially disastrous consequences of such action; and they continue 
to clutter the congressional calendar with so-called message votes 
about Iran, instead of addressing the major issues facing our Nation.
  Now, these legislative antics continue even though opponents of the 
JCPOA know full well that strong sanctions on Iran remain in place 
targeting the country's human rights violations, ballistic missile 
development, and support of terrorism.
  The bill before us, H.R. 5631, would impose additional mandatory 
sanctions on Iran for these same violations. There is no one in this 
Chamber about to let Iran off the hook for its egregious human rights 
violations or its

[[Page H4952]]

proliferation of terrorism and ballistic missile technology. And our 
Republican friends know full well that if a violation of the JCPOA were 
to occur, we can put sanctions like these in place immediately.
  So why are we doing this bill now? Must we conclude that our 
colleagues are more interested in unravelling one of President Obama's 
signature accomplishments than they are with the facts of the matter?
  Let's look at the facts: Because of this agreement, an Iranian 
nuclear weapon is not an imminent threat to the United States or our 
allies, including Israel. Because of this agreement, the breakout time 
for Iran to develop enough weapons-grade material for a nuclear weapon 
went from 2 or 3 months to a year or more. The international community 
has 24/7 access to Iran's nuclear sites, and we possess an enforcement 
mechanism to verify Iran's compliance.
  By all objective accounts, Iran has upheld its end of the bargain, 
and it is vital that we uphold ours. This isn't just my opinion. This 
week a bipartisan group of more than 75 national security experts sent 
a letter to the President stating that ``Iran has remained in 
compliance with its commitments'' and ``all pathways to an Iranian 
nuclear weapon have been blocked.''
  I include in the Congressional Record this letter in its entirety.

                                             The Iran Project,

                                      New York, NY, July 12, 2016.
     Letter to the President on the Anniversary of the Nuclear 
         Agreement with Iran.

       Dear Mr. President: On the first anniversary of the Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, Americans 
     should be proud of your leadership in bringing about this 
     landmark diplomatic agreement.
       As a result of the JCPOA all pathways to an Iranian nuclear 
     weapon have been blocked, thereby providing greater security 
     to our friends and partners in the region and to the world. 
     From November 2013, when the interim nuclear agreement was 
     reached, until today, Iran has remained in compliance with 
     its commitments as verified by regular reports of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
       We applaud your Administration's commitment to the rigorous 
     verification of Iran's compliance and remaining in close 
     contact with the U.S. negotiating partners on the JCPOA 
     implementation. This will be essential to ensure their 
     cooperation should action be required to respond to an 
     Iranian violation. As your policies have shown, it will also 
     be essential for the U.S. to continue to assure Israel and 
     the Gulf states of its resolute commitment to their security 
     as our traditional partners in the region. It will be 
     necessary to ensure adequate long-term funding for the IAEA 
     so that it can carry out its inspection and reporting 
     functions as required by the JCPOA.
       Future relations with Iran can improve or get worse and 
     become dangerous for U.S. interests in the region as Iran 
     continues to support the Assad regime and Hezbollah. The U.S. 
     should develop policies that increase the chances of 
     cooperation with Iran, minimize confrontation, and influence 
     Iran's actions in the region. We acknowledge that 
     opportunities will be limited for testing Iran's willingness 
     to work directly with the U.S. due to the political 
     uncertainties in both countries in the coming year, but 
     engagement should be the U.S. government's long-term goal.
       Your diplomatic undertaking with Iran was to seek a safer 
     world and stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To 
     achieve those ambitious goals you engaged in prolonged and 
     intense diplomatic negotiations that enabled you to deal 
     directly with Iran and to test its willingness to work with 
     the U.S. and others in some areas of common purpose. The 
     alternative strategy would be to return to an earlier era of 
     treating Iran as America's principal enemy in the region, 
     thereby: risking the unraveling of the JCPOA; drawing strong 
     opposition from negotiating partners; returning to a period 
     of nuclear danger; missing important opportunities for 
     collaboration in the fight against ISIS and the search for 
     solutions to other regional problems; and risking another 
     armed conflict involving the U.S. in the Middle East.
       We, therefore, encourage your Administration to put in 
     place an institutional structure for conducting relations 
     with Iran in all areas essential to U.S. interests. We 
     suggest several channels that could be set up for your 
     successor:
       A direct diplomatic channel at the deputy level to continue 
     the communications currently being conducted between the 
     Secretary of State and Iranian Foreign Minister. Without such 
     continuity during the transition period, the next 
     Administration will lack the diplomatic means to enlist or 
     pressure Iran in the management of important and urgent 
     issues such as ISIS, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan where the 
     U.S. and Iran have some common but often clashing interests.
       An emergency communications capability with Iran's 
     government to avoid misunderstandings or the escalation of 
     incidents or accidents.
       A regular and direct bilateral channel between the U.S. 
     Treasury and Iranian Central Bank to address all U.S. and 
     Iranian questions about the implementation of sanctions 
     relief commitments under the JCPOA. Treasury and State will 
     need to stay in close harmony in talks with Iran on sanctions 
     relief.
       Iran's leaders appear reluctant now to engage the U.S. 
     beyond the implementation of the JCPOA, and Iran's actions in 
     the region may make engagement difficult for the U.S. But the 
     one lesson learned from your diplomatic efforts with Iran is 
     that persevering patiently in pursuit of careful diplomacy 
     can lead to progress. A variety of channels with Iran will be 
     needed to drive home messages and to improve mutual 
     understanding on our positions on issues of importance to the 
     U.S.--including regional security questions and the treatment 
     of dual nationals--among others.
       You have shown that well-conceived and tough-minded 
     diplomacy can protect U.S. national security interests. Given 
     the stakes, the U.S. will need more, not less, engagement 
     with Iran.
           With respect,
     Amb. (ret.) Morton Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State 
         for Intelligence and Research, Ambassador to Thailand and 
         Turkey
     Graham Allison, Assistant Secretary of Defense
     Les AuCoin, U.S. Representative
     Amb. (ret.) Barbara K. Bodine, Ambassador to Yemen
     David Bonior, U.S. Representative
     BGen Stephen A. Cheney (ret.), U.S. Marine Corps
     Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund
     Amb. (ret.) James F. Collins, Ambassador at Large for the New 
         Independent States and to the Russian Federation
     Leon N. Cooper, Brown University, Nobel Laureate Physics
     Amb. (ret.) Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State 
         for African Affairs
     Amb. (ret.) James B. Cunningham, Ambassador to Israel, 
         Afghanistan, and the United Nations
     Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator, Senate Majority Leader
     Suzanne DiMaggio, Director and Senior Fellow at New America
     Amb. (ret.) James Dobbins, Special Representative for 
         Afghanistan and Pakistan
     Freeman Dyson, Professor of Physics Emeritus, Institute for 
         Advanced Study, Princeton University
     Major General Paul D. Eaton (ret.), U.S. Army, Managing 
         Director Vet Voice Foundation
     Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, the 
         Secretary of State's Special Advisor for Nonproliferation 
         and Arms Control
     Harold A. Feiveson (ret.), Senior Research Scientist, 
         Princeton University
     Richard L. Garwin, Chair of the Arms Control and 
         Nonproliferation Advisory Board
     F. Gregory Gause III, Chairman and Head of the International 
         Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and 
         Public Service, Texas A&M University
     Leslie H. Gelb, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
         Military Affairs, Director of Policy Planning and Arms 
         Control at the Department of Defense
     Amb. (ret.) Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for 
         Political Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for 
         European Affairs, Special Representative for Afghanistan 
         and Pakistan, and Ambassador to Turkey
     Morton H. Halperin, Director of Policy Planning Department of 
         State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning 
         and Arms Control
     Lee H. Hamilton, U.S. Representative, Chairman of the House 
         Foreign Affairs Committee
     Gary Hart, U.S. Senator, Special Envoy to Northern Ireland
     Amb. (ret.) William C. Harrop, Ambassador to Israel, 
         Inspector General of the State Department
     Stephen B. Heintz, President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund
     James Hoge, Former Editor of Foreign Affairs Magazine
     Amb. (ret.) Robert Hunter, National Security Council Director 
         of Middle East Affairs and Ambassador to NATO
     Lt. Gen. (ret.) Arlen D. Jameson, U.S. Air Force, Deputy 
         Commander U.S. Strategic Command
     J. Bennett Johnston, U.S. Senator
     Nancy Landon Kassebaum, U.S. Senator
     LTG. Frank Kearney (ret.), U.S. Army, Deputy Director for 
         Strategic Operational Planning at the National Counter-
         Terrorism Center
     LTG. Claudia J Kennedy (ret.), U.S. Army, Former Deputy Chief 
         of Staff for Intelligence
     Amb. (ret.) Daniel Kurtzer, Ambassador to Israel and Egypt
     Ellen Laipson, Vice Chair of the National Intelligence 
         Council, President Emeritus of Stimson Center
     Carl Levin, U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee 
         on Armed Services
     Mel Levine, U.S. Representative
     Amb. (ret.) John Limbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
         for Iran

[[Page H4953]]

     Amb. (ret.) Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for 
         East Asia and the Pacific Ambassador to China, Director 
         of Policy Planning, Department of State
     Amb. (ret.) William H. Luers, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia 
         and Venezuela
     Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator, Chairman of the Senate 
         Committee on Foreign Relations
     Suzanne Maloney, Policy Planning Department of State, Deputy 
         Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings 
         Institution
     Jessica T. Mathews, Director of the Office of Global Issues, 
         National Security Council
     Gen. (ret.) Merrill McPeak, U.S. Air Force, Chief of Staff
     Amb. (ret.) William G. Miller, Ambassador to Ukraine
     Amb. (ret.) Cameron Munter, Ambassador to Pakistan and Serbia
     Amb. (ret.) Richard W. Murphy, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 
         Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
         Asian Affairs
     Vali Nasr, Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
         Pakistan, Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
         International Studies
     Richard Nephew, Director for Iran at the National Security 
         Council, Deputy Coordinator for Sanctions Policy at the 
         Department of State
     Amb. (ret.) Ronald E. Neumann, Ambassador to Afghanistan, 
         Algeria, and Bahrain
     Gen. (ret.) Lloyd Fig Newton, U.S. Air Force, Commander, Air 
         Education and Training Command
     Joseph Nye, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the 
         National Intelligence Council
     Admiral (ret.) Eric Olson, US. Navy, Commander of U.S. 
         Special Operations Command
     Amb. (ret.) Thomas Pickering, Permanent Representative to the 
         United Nations; Undersecretary of State for Political 
         Affairs; Ambassador to Israel, Russia, India, El 
         Salvador, Nigeria and Jordan
     Paul R. Pillar, National Intelligence Officer for the Near 
         East and South Asia
     Amb. (ret.) Nicholas Platt, Ambassador to Pakistan, 
         Philippines, and Zambia
     Joe R. Reeder, Deputy Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the 
         Panama Canal Commission
     Amb. (ret.) Francis J. Ricciardone, Ambassador to Egypt, 
         Turkey, the Philippines, and Palau
     Burton Richter, Professor Emeritus, Stanford University; 
         Nobel Laureate in Physics
     Barnett R. Rubin, Senior Adviser to the Special 
         Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
     Gary S. Samore, White House Coordinator for Arms Control and 
         Weapons of Mass Destruction, Senior Director for 
         Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the National 
         Security Council
     Gen. Brent Scowcroft (ret.), U.S. National Security Advisor
     Patricia Schroeder, U.S. Representative
     Gary Sick, Director of the Office of Iran and the Persian 
         Gulf of the National Security Council
     Jim Slattery, U.S. Representative
     Mark Udall, U.S. Senator
     Amb. (ret.) Bill vanden Heuvel, Ambassador to the European 
         Office of the United Nations, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to 
         the United Nations
     Frank N. von Hippel, Assistant Director for National 
         Security, White House Office of Science and Technology 
         Policy
     Jane Wales, Special Assistant to the President, Senior 
         Director of the National Security Council, Deputy 
         Assistant Secretary of State
     Amb. (ret.) Edward S. Walker, Jr., Ambassador to Israel, 
         Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates
     James Walsh, Research Associate at Massachusetts Institute of 
         Technology Security Studies Program
     Frank Wilczek, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nobel 
         Laureate in Physics
     Timothy E. Wirth, U.S. Senator
     Amb. (ret.) Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of State for 
         International Security Affairs; Ambassador to India, 
         Egypt, the Philippines, and Zambia.
       The signers of this statement are either former senior 
     officials of the U.S. government or prominent national 
     security leaders who have not held senior government 
     positions. The positions listed after the names of the former 
     government officials are the senior posts held while in 
     government. The positions listed after the names of those who 
     were not from the government are listed with their current 
     position.

  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, this agreement is too 
important and the stakes are too high to treat this issue as just 
another political football. The safety and security of the United 
States, of Israel, and of the region depend on the successful 
implementation and diligent enforcement of the JCPOA.
  Instead of scoring political points, or seeking to deny the President 
a significant achievement, we should be working together in a 
bipartisan fashion to ensure the agreement's success.
  We should be working together to explore ways to enhance coordination 
and cooperation with Israel and the international community to address 
unacceptable Iranian behavior, such as support for Hezbollah and abuse 
of human rights. Yet we find ourselves here, 1 year after the 
agreement's announcement, still dealing with ObamaCare-style 
gamesmanship.
  It is beneath this institution. The world is watching. We may think a 
bill that has no chance of being signed into law doesn't matter; but to 
the leaders of China or Russia or Iran, it sends a signal from our 
country of hesitation and disunity.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this bill and any bills that come 
before us with similar intent and to focus, instead, on ensuring the 
success of the JCPOA and reinforcing the agreement's role in making the 
world a safer place.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Zeldin), a valued member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, it is a little insulting to hear the remarks 
that were just made, as if any objection not toeing the line of this 
President, having objections to this arrangement, is partisan politics.
  The gentleman may have misspoken when he suggested that the Iran 
nuclear deal was signed. I would offer that the Iran nuclear deal 
actually hasn't been signed. The President has acknowledged not only is 
this not a treaty, but Secretary Kerry, when he was before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, said it is not even an executive agreement. 
It is a political commitment, a signed letter from the State Department 
saying that this is an unsigned political commitment. Now, we are 
allowed to have objections to that.
  I would suggest that the best interest of national security is to 
join in support of this bill and putting that over party politics.
  I rise today in support of the Iran Accountability Act introduced by 
House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy.
  I also commend Chairman Ed Royce for all of his incredibly valuable 
leadership, chairing the House Foreign Affairs Committee; and I also 
commend Ranking Member Eliot Engel, who I know is deeply passionate 
about U.S. security and the relationship with and accountability with 
Iran and strengthening our relationship with Israel. I know his heart 
is absolutely in the right place.
  So it is not a difficult position for all the Democratic colleagues 
who voted against the Iran nuclear agreement. I know that that takes an 
incredible amount of courage to stand up to a President of your own 
party. You did it for all the right reasons, putting national security 
over party politics.
  That wasn't partisanship. It was actually a bipartisan vote in this 
House to disapprove of that Iran nuclear deal. Democrats who decided to 
put American security first voted against the Iran nuclear deal, an 
unsigned political commitment.
  Why were the Iranians at the table? Sanctions relief. It is not 
because we asked nicely, not because they want to be good world 
citizens. It is because they wanted the money.
  Then we gave them the money. They got through their election.
  By the way, those who say that the most moderate members were 
elected, that is discounting the fact that the 12,000 most moderate 
members weren't even allowed access to the ballot. There were only the 
hardliners left on the ballot.
  So the Iranians get the money; they get past their elections; and 
here we are today. And you are insulting us in this Chamber by saying 
that any concern that we have, if it doesn't toe the President's party 
line, is partisan politics.
  I don't care who the President is, whether it is Republican or 
Democrat, this one or the next one, the fact is what brought the 
Iranians to the table, the leverage, was the sanctions relief. And the 
sanctions relief that they received is now gone.
  So as they test-fire intercontinental ballistic missiles in violation 
of international law, they unjustly imprison Americans as they commit 
their human rights abuses. Everything that they are doing today, we 
take exception with and we are acting on, and that's why I rise.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

[[Page H4954]]

  

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the 
gentleman from New York.
  Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, everything that we come to this well on this 
day to vote in favor of this legislation and Chairman Royce's 
legislation, three pieces of legislation to hold the Iranians 
accountable, it is the fact that, if we want the Iranians to come back 
to the table, we need to put the leverage back on the table. They are 
not coming back if we ask nicely. They haven't changed who they are. 
They are not good world citizens.
  I am not going to sit here and allow this script of a White House 
taxpayer-funded fiction writer, Ben Rhodes, going to the media to 
spread whatever false lies and narratives to help sell the Iran nuclear 
deal.
  We are here to represent our constituents and the American public. 
This is not about a narrative of a President and his legacy. This is 
about American security and doing what is best and doing what is right 
for our constituents and the American public.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Levin), the ranking member of the Ways and Means 
Committee.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this bill is more than deeply troubling. You 
talk about bipartisanship, and you come forth with a bill that 
completely breaks it down. This issue is too essential to become a 
total tool of partisan jockeying. Our relationship with Israel is too 
vital to become a total political plaything.
  I refer, as my colleague from North Carolina did, to the statement of 
75 national security leaders. I quote:
  ``Dear Mr. President,
  ``On the first anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) with Iran, Americans should be proud of your leadership in 
bringing about this landmark diplomatic agreement.
  ``As a result of the JCPOA all pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon 
have been blocked, thereby providing greater security to our friends 
and partners in the region and to the world. From November 2013, when 
the interim nuclear agreement was reached, until today, Iran has 
remained in compliance with its commitments as verified by regular 
reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency.''
  This letter is signed by 75, including Brent Scowcroft.
  Why don't you totally partisan Republicans, who are approaching a 
convention and a Presidential race, listen to very much-respected 
people within your own party? Instead, you are thumbing your nose like 
this at them and at all of those who endeavor to bring about an 
effective policy regarding nuclear weaponry.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, today is simply unmasked political chicanery.
  This issue deserves better than the majority leader coming here 
without any notice, really, and putting forth a resolution that does 
nothing but harm what used to be a centerpiece of foreign policy: 
bipartisanship when it comes to the Middle East and the security of 
Israel.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Carter).

                              {time}  1100

  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 5631 to hold Iran 
accountable for its state sponsorship of terrorism and for its human 
rights abuses.
  As a Member of Congress, I believe one of our most important duties 
is to ensure that Americans continue to remain secure from other 
countries that wish to harm us.
  Last year, President Obama entered into an agreement with Iran, which 
now allows Iran to advance their nuclear energy program. In turn, the 
President has allowed sanctions against Iran to be removed even though 
entities of the Iranian Government continue to conduct human rights 
violations. In addition, Iran continues to refine their ballistic 
missile program and support terrorism, which represents a serious 
threat to the United States and our allies.
  It should be the clear intent of this body that the continued use of 
economic sanctions against the country of Iran is necessary to ensure 
Iran does not have the resources necessary to harm or even eliminate 
our country or its allies. H.R. 5631 does this. It ensures that the 
policy of this country is to continue to take aggressive action against 
Iran to prevent the development of weapons that could harm our country 
or our allies.
  We must also continue to ensure that it is the policy of this country 
that efforts be taken to prevent human rights violations by any 
country.
  I would like to thank my colleague, Majority Leader McCarthy, for 
bringing this bill to the floor, and I encourage all of my colleagues 
to support this measure.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, may I ask how much time remains on both 
sides?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 13\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New York has 12 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Deutch), a very hardworking and respected member of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, this week we approach the 1-year anniversary of the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, the agreement negotiated 
by the P5+1 countries over Iran's illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
One year later, Iran remains far outside the community of responsible 
countries. Iran continues to sponsor terrorism around the region. It 
funds and supports the murderous Assad regime. It spouts anti-Semitic 
and anti-Israel vitriol. It foments unrest in other countries. It 
denies basic human rights to its citizens, and it unlawfully detains 
American citizens. Iran has still not returned my constituent, Robert 
Levinson, who went missing in Iran in 2007 and is now the longest-held 
American hostage.
  My friends on the other side of the aisle know that, and I commend 
Chairman Royce for his diligence in looking for ways to strengthen our 
sanctions regime and to vigilantly enforce the Iran nuclear deal in 
order to keep the pressure on Iran.
  Iran's subversive actions have not relented despite the agreement. 
Iran has explicitly and repeatedly violated U.N. Security Council 
resolutions by testing its ballistic missile technology, weapons 
capable of delivering nuclear warheads. In addition, recent 
intelligence reports from Germany expose that Iran sought technology 
related to the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons. So there is a lot that needs to be done to keep the pressure 
on Iran.
  For all of these reasons, Congress needs to reauthorize the Iran 
Sanctions Act, the law that actually serves as the foundation for our 
sanctions policy. We have to pass new sanctions to address Iran's 
repeated ballistic missile tests, and we have to crack down on Iran's 
financial support for terrorism. These are items that have always 
enjoyed broad bipartisan support. All of the areas that Iran is doing 
harm throughout the region--support for terrorism, violation of the 
human rights of their people, ballistic missile tests--everything that 
falls outside of the nuclear deal, we should be working together to 
strengthen with this bipartisan support.
  But rushing through legislation that is designed to undermine the 
JCPOA and put the United States in violation of our commitments under 
the JCPOA not only fail to punish Iran's malfeasance--which is our 
goal, and it is the shared goal--but it weakens America's ability to 
lead a global effort against Iran's destabilizing efforts throughout 
the world. We can't do this on our own. We need to work with our 
allies. We need to lead our allies. That is the role that the United 
States has always played.
  Mr. Speaker, I did not support the Iran nuclear agreement, but it is 
in effect, and it must be enforced with vigilance.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Curbelo of Florida). The time of the 
gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the 
gentleman.
  Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend.

[[Page H4955]]

  Mr. Speaker, we have to maintain immense pressure on the Iranian 
regime so long as it violates human rights, supports terrorism, and 
tests ballistic missiles; but failure by the United States to uphold 
the deal will only weaken--I repeat for my colleagues who share my 
commitment to standing up to Iran, it will only weaken--our efforts to 
lead the international community in taking strong action to counter 
Iran's actions both under and outside of the JCPOA.
  These three bills this week that have been rushed to the floor 
without having the opportunity to discuss them, to debate them, and to 
develop broad bipartisan support on them in ways that will not 
jeopardize our role under the JCPOA weaken our ability to lead. That is 
why I oppose them, and that is why I urge my colleagues to oppose them 
as well.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), our Democratic whip.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I regret that I rise to oppose this bill. I 
have historically and repeatedly worked in a bipartisan fashion to 
bring bills to this floor that were supported by both parties as it 
relates to the security of Israel.
  This bill comes to the floor as we take stock of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iran nuclear deal. This bill, 
disappointingly, was written without any input from Democrats or any 
committee or through regular order. By not acting in a bipartisan 
manner, we are missing the opportunity to send an important message to 
Iran of our steadfast resolve in holding it accountable both to their 
commitments under the JCPOA and under applicable U.S. laws and U.N. 
resolutions.
  We need to remember that it was toughness born from bipartisan unity 
that brought Iran to the table in the first place. That, again, is what 
will be required to ensure its full compliance. As much as Iran has 
mostly complied with the letter of the deal, it has pushed the limits 
when it comes to its spirit.
  One of my major concerns about the deal from a year ago remains, and 
it is that the deal is limited in scope only to Iran's nuclear 
activities. It does not cover the other areas in which Iran has proven 
to be a dangerous and threatening actor.

  Mr. Speaker, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which implemented 
the JCPOA, called for Iran to halt its ballistic missile program. 
Instead, Iran has continued to develop and test missiles that could 
carry a nuclear payload. There have also been reports that it is 
attempting to acquire ballistic missile technology in violation of U.N. 
Resolution 2231.
  Iran's sponsorship of global terror has continued unabated, and its 
arms and fighters stream into Syria, exacerbating the instability there 
and threatening regional security. Hamas and Hezbollah continue to 
threaten Israel with Iranian arms and financial support, and Iran's 
leaders continue to call for the end of the Jewish State of Israel.
  That is why, even as Iran has received sanctions relief through the 
JCPOA, it was always understood that we would need and be able to 
increase pressure on Iran with additional sanctions targeting its 
ballistic missile program and other destabilizing actions. We must not 
allow Iran to violate the nuclear deal.
  If Iran does not feel that it is sufficiently benefiting from the 
nuclear deal, frankly, that is because its malign activities and its 
outdated banking system are continuing to deter foreign investment.
  Iran and the world need to understand that it is not America's job to 
fix the problems that Iran has created for itself. That is why, as Iran 
continues to flaunt its obligations and sponsor terrorism around the 
world, its leaders must know with certainty that there will be real 
consequences from the United States and our allies for those actions.
  I am opposing this bill and urging that Democrats and Republicans--
and my friend, Mr. Royce, has done that repeatedly throughout his 
leadership of the Committee on Foreign Affairs--return to our 
successful bipartisan partnership, as we have in the past, to 
reauthorize the Iran Sanctions Act as soon as possible, and then work 
toward enacting sanctions targeting Iran's ballistic missile program.
  Let's come back here with legislation that sends a powerful message 
to Iran that there is no daylight between the parties in Congress when 
it comes to our shared resolve that Iran must abandon its sponsorship 
of terror, end its ballistic missile program, and comply fully with the 
JCPOA. My friends, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and my 
colleagues, our commitment to Israel and international peace and 
security demands no less.
  Let us return to bipartisanship on which Israel has relied and the 
message that we sent was stronger, firmer, and more effective. Let us 
defeat this partisan legislation and return to the bipartisan table.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The goal of the Iran Accountability Act, the goal of this measure we 
are talking about today is not to force the administration to violate 
its flawed Iran deal. The goal here, the goal of this bill is to call 
upon the President to uphold his pledge to remain vigilant and respond 
to Iran's continued support for its ballistic missile program and 
terrorism and its human rights abuses. Okay?
  The sanctions in this bill would force the administration to act 
decisively with respect to the twin threats of Iran's effort to develop 
and acquire ballistic missiles and to support terrorism. It would seek 
to bolster the effect of secondary sanctions that apply outside the 
United States on Iran's development of ballistic missiles in the wake 
of the administration's wholesale retreat from multilateral sanctions 
regarding ballistic missiles.
  If the administration was actually involved in enforcing this, this 
legislation would not be necessary. Last July, Secretary of State John 
Kerry testified that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which 
implemented the deal, contains the exact same language prohibiting Iran 
from developing ballistic weapons as the previous resolution. That 
sounded pretty encouraging to us. Oh, if only it were true. If only it 
had been true.
  The text of the resolution appears to suggest it is quite the 
opposite. In U.N. SCR 2231, Iran is nonbindingly called upon--those are 
the words, ``called upon''--to refrain from developing ballistic 
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. By 
contrast, the original resolution bindingly stated that Iran shall 
not--shall not--develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering 
nuclear warheads.
  Now, here is where we have to focus, my friends. Here is where we 
have to focus. This past spring, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad 
Zarif bragged on this very point, and here are his words. He said that 
he negotiated a loophole. He negotiated a loophole that would enable 
the regime to continue to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. 
That is why we are here debating this today.
  What did he say?
  The new resolution, he claimed--and these are his words--doesn't call 
upon Iran not to test ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear 
warheads. No. It calls upon Iran not to test ballistic missiles that 
were designed to be capable.
  And he adds: ``That word took me about 7 months to negotiate, so 
everybody knew what it meant.''
  As such, Iran could develop a ballistic missile capable of carrying a 
nuclear warhead but then claim it was not designed for that specific 
purpose.

                              {time}  1115

  Later reports indicated that the United States and its European 
allies issued a joint letter. Now, remember, Iran has now fired off 
eight tests. The last test, on the ballistic weapons, on the side of 
them, it said ``Death to Israel'' in Farsi and in Hebrew. And that 
joint letter stated that Iran's recent ballistic missile tests were--
what was the word used by the United States now?--were inconsistent 
with, rather than a violation of, the resolution. So which is it?
  Ultimately, the U.N. fails to impose new sanctions despite Iran's 
continued missile tests. During this entire debate on the floor this 
House, the talking points indicated that Iran would be

[[Page H4956]]

prevented from developing and using and testing these ballistic 
missiles for the next 8 years. Now we find out that, apparently, the 
administration intends to allow this continued buildup of their 
capabilities of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
  Thus, what this legislation seeks to restore is the necessary 
deterrent effect with respect to ballistic missiles and correct the 
administration's debilitating mistakes.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Connolly), a very respected and hardworking member of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend, the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Engel).
  I rise in opposition to H.R. 5631, the so-called Iran Accountability 
Act.
  The majority has decided, on its own, without any bipartisanship, to 
co-opt traditional action on a bipartisan basis to counter Iran by 
fast-tracking sharply partisan legislation that would undermine not 
only the Iran nuclear agreement but fracture the very delicate 
international coalition that allowed us to reverse the nuclear 
development in Iran. I guess that is something that happens when 
amateurs write a bill without any foreign policy background.
  This bill was drafted, as Mr. Hoyer indicated, with no input from the 
minority and was brought to the floor under a closed rule. How can 
anyone, much less our adversary Iran, take this seriously?
  If the majority really cared about countering Iran, it would 
safeguard longstanding bipartisan consensus and bring to the floor a 
clean reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act, which I would support 
and I am sure most people on my side of the aisle.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 15 
seconds.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Instead, the majority is scrambling to pass at the last 
hour of this part of our session, just before a 7-week recess, the bill 
before us today.
  It is a farce. It is a dangerous gambit by the majority to play 
election-year politics at the expense of U.S. bipartisan foreign 
policy.
  I urge rejection of this ill-considered bill.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  You know, the question is not whether Iran is a good player. Iran is 
not a good player. The question is: What should be our response to it? 
It is not a question of whether the Iranian regime is good or bad. Of 
course it is bad. I opposed the Iran deal. The question is: How do we 
react to it?
  Mr. Speaker, we had an opportunity to work on meaningful legislation 
that would have held Iran's feet to the fire and ensured the nuclear 
deal was being fully, fairly implemented. It could have been a 
reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act. It could have been another 
bipartisan approach.
  But, instead, we are going to vote on this bill, which will pass 
mostly on partisan lines, and then skip town for 7 weeks. I think that 
is a shame, because I don't think we have done our job. And there is no 
job more important than protecting America's security.
  Ramming through partisan bills that don't stand a chance of becoming 
law is just irresponsible. It diminishes Congress' role in making 
foreign policy. It certainly diminishes the Foreign Affairs Committee's 
role.
  So I hope when we return from the break we can hit the reset button 
on the way we deal with these issues. I think it is important for us to 
work together in a bipartisan fashion. As I have said so many times on 
this floor, it has been a pleasure working with Chairman Royce on the 
committee in a bipartisan fashion.
  Give the committee a chance to formulate a bill that will hold Iran's 
feet to the fire. It is a terrible regime. It is a bloody regime. We 
are all united on both sides of the aisle in wanting to confront that 
regime. The question is how to do it. You don't do it by ramming 
through a partisan bill. You do it by working in a bipartisan fashion.
  For now, we should reject this bill, go back to the drawing board, 
and work together to confront the Iranian murderous regime. They are a 
regime that we need to confront. Nobody disagrees on that on both sides 
of the aisle. The question is: Should we do it together?
  Let's do it together. The Foreign Affairs Committee has been a 
bipartisan mecca of how Congress should work. Let's go back to that, 
particularly with foreign policy. Let's go back to that.
  So I urge my colleagues to reject the bill. We have good people on 
both sides of the aisle. We all want to see the same thing. Let's put 
our heads together and come up with a consensus and confront Iran. 
Reject the bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The first point I would make, Mr. Speaker, is that, under the 
agreement, Iran has kept much of its nuclear infrastructure. It 
continues to develop advanced centrifuges. It continues to gain the 
ability to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale.
  This means, if we are looking at the long haul on enforcement and 
challenges ahead, that the ayatollah won't even have to cheat to be 
just steps away from a nuclear weapon when the clock runs out.
  In the meantime, tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief is 
now starting to flow to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
  Now, the assurances that we have been given--and these underlying 
concerns, by the way, are why so many Members, including many from the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, opposed the administration's deal with Iran 
in the first place.
  But these long-term problems now of Iran beginning to use that money 
for terrorist activity, for the IRGC, and for support for Hezbollah is 
what is prompting our effort now to try to get some kind of an 
enforcement, not necessarily on the deal itself, but on original 
assurances we had been given by the President.
  For example, when he presented this deal, he claimed that the United 
States would remain vigilant in countering Iran's sponsorship of 
terrorism, its support for proxies who destabilize the Middle East, its 
threats against America's friends and allies, like Israel.
  Some of us supported the nuclear deal with Iran; some of us didn't. 
But, regardless, I don't think any of us thought that Iran should be 
given carte blanche to continue and even escalate its dangerous 
hostility in that region and its hostility to us and our allies and 
hostility to the Iranian people, frankly, which is another issue. That 
is not what the administration told us last year.

  It makes sense to do all we can to check this very dangerous trend in 
Iranian activity. The problem is that the administration refuses to do 
this. This is what drives us to bring the bill to the floor. The 
administration refuses to negotiate, as I said before, on anything with 
the word ``Iran'' in it. So that is why we are here.
  I would ask my colleagues who oppose this measure: We were told, all 
right, we are going to hold them on human rights. How many Iranian 
officials has the administration designated for human rights abuses 
since the negotiations ended? The answer to that is zero. There have 
been no human rights designations in the past year. Talk about walking 
on eggshells.
  Despite the fact that Iran's Minister of Justice and head of the 
judiciary--they are clear human rights violators, but they have not 
been designated, as the number of executions inside Iran go up.
  Iranian regional aggression has increased exponentially since this 
agreement was reached. The administration has been reluctant to act 
decisively on that.
  In March, the CENTCOM Commander, General Joe Votel, testified that 
Iran has become more aggressive in the days since the agreement.
  Similarly, our Director of National Intelligence says Iran--in his 
words, the foremost state sponsor of terrorism--continues to exert its 
influence in regional crises in the Middle East through the 
International Revolutionary Guard Corps, through the Quds Force, its 
terrorist partner Lebanese Hezbollah, and its proxy groups. It also 
provides military and economic aid to its allies in the region. Iran 
and

[[Page H4957]]

Hezbollah remain a continuing terrorist threat to U.S. interests and 
partnerships worldwide.
  Now, if the IRGC ends up with $100 billion--because it is the 
International Revolutionary Guard Corps that, in fact, nationalized 
most of the companies inside Iran. If they get their hands on this 
money and if this terrorist-sponsoring organization continues its 
proliferation, then Hezbollah is going to be the primary beneficiary of 
the sanctions relief.
  We were assured that steps were going to be taken on that point. That 
was supposed to be our end goal, right?
  Secretary Kerry even admitted immediately after the implementation 
day, ``I think that some of it will end up in the hands of the IRGC or 
other entities, some of which are labeled `terrorists.' You know, to 
some degree, I am not going to sit here and tell you that every 
component of that can be prevented.''
  Okay, it can't all be prevented, but surely some of it can. The 
Secretary of State was basically saying that there was nothing the U.S. 
could do to prevent the IRGC and terrorists from benefiting 
exponentially from sanctions relief. No wonder Iran's efforts to 
destabilize the region are picking up steam.
  Consider Iran's smuggling of weapons to militants throughout the 
region. According to the State Department, Iran arms Hezbollah with 
advanced, long-range Iranian manufactured missiles, in violation of the 
U.N. Security Council resolution. We are trying to do something to at 
least say: Stop that.
  Just days after the announcement of the JCPOA, here is what Hezbollah 
leader Hassan Nasrallah asserted that that deal would not stand in the 
way of Iranian support for Hezbollah.
  How right he was, because in June 2016 Nasrallah boasted that all of 
Hezbollah's weapons and rockets came from the Islamic Republic of 
Iran--150,000 rockets pointed at our ally, Israel. And now they say 
they are going to be able to target those with GPS technology. Aren't 
we going to stand in the way of that?
  Similarly, Iran continues to destabilize our partners in the Gulf. 
They already overthrew the Government in Yemen with their support for 
the Shiite Houthis there; particularly, also, in Bahrain, where they 
carry out a low-level insurgency as well.
  I beg to differ with the Secretary of State. There is something we 
can do. We can act on the administration's stated commitment to our 
allies and hold Iran's feet to the fire on this issue.
  The Iran deal should not come at the cost of the domestic security of 
our regional allies. We could have the original deal, and we could 
still enforce what we were told on this floor would be enforced.
  For 8 years, they were not supposed to be proliferating or developing 
ballistic missiles. For 5 years, they were not supposed to be 
transferring to Hezbollah additional weapons capability.
  Now we are turning a blind eye. Now we are walking on eggshells with 
respect to their treatment of their own people, as the human rights 
violations and the executions become worse and as they hold two more 
Americans.
  Frankly, that is why this legislation is before us on the House 
floor. I urge an ``aye'' vote.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1130

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 819, the previous question is ordered on 
the bill.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

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