[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 89 (Tuesday, June 7, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3586-S3587]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 4522. Mr. BURR (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, and Ms. Collins) 
submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill S. 
2943, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2017 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and 
for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other 
purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       Strike section 1633 and insert the following:

     SEC. 1633. PROCESS FOR ENDING OF ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE 
                   COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND IS 
                   ALSO DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the ending of the arrangement (commonly referred to as 
     a ``dual-hat arrangement'') under which the Commander of the 
     United States Cyber Command also serves as the Director of 
     the National Security Agency needs to be carefully considered 
     and done through conditions-based criteria; and
       (2) until such arrangement is ended, it is important to 
     ensure such arrangement does not impede the Director's 
     service of national requirements.
       (b) Processes for Ending of Current Arrangement.--The 
     Secretary of Defense may not take action to end the 
     arrangement described in subsection (a) until--
       (1) the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff jointly determine and certify to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress that the end of that arrangement will 
     not pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United 
     States Cyber Command that are unacceptable in the national 
     security interests of the United States; or
       (2) the Director of National Intelligence determines and 
     certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that the 
     continuation of that arrangement poses risks and impedes the 
     appropriate prioritization of national requirements.
       (c) Conditions-based Criteria.--The Secretary of Defense, 
     the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director 
     of National Intelligence shall develop criteria for assessing 
     the military and intelligence necessity and benefit of the 
     arrangement described in subsection (a). The criteria shall 
     be based on measures of the operational dependence of the 
     United States Cyber Command on the National Security Agency 
     and the ability of each organization to accomplish their 
     roles and responsibilities independent of the other. The 
     conditions to be evaluated shall include the following:
       (1) The sufficiency of operational infrastructure.
       (2) The sufficiency of command and control systems and 
     processes for planning, deconflicting, and executing military 
     cyber operations, tools and weapons for achieving required 
     effects.
       (3) Technical intelligence collection and operational 
     preparation of the environment capabilities.
       (4) The ability to train personnel, test capabilities, and 
     rehearse missions.
       (5) The ability to meet national intelligence requirements.
       (6) The ability to correctly and impartially conduct 
     intelligence gain and loss assessments in scenarios with 
     competing requirements.
       (d) Reports.--Not later than 90 days of the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and annually thereafter until a 
     certification is made in accordance with subsection (b)--
       (1) the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff shall submit

[[Page S3587]]

     to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that 
     describes which of the conditions set out under subsection 
     (c) have not been met; and
       (2) the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
     the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the 
     Director's continuing ability to meet national requirements 
     and appropriately conduct intelligence gain and loss 
     assessments in scenarios with competing requirements.
       (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate; and
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
                                 ______