[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 89 (Tuesday, June 7, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Page S3585]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  SA 4514. Mr. VITTER submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by 
him to the bill S. 2943, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2017 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military 
construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, 
to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for 
other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

       At the end of subtitle D of title XII, add the following:

     SEC. 1227. ASSESSMENT OF INADEQUACIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
                   MONITORING AND VERIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO 
                   IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, and the heads and other relevant 
     officials of agencies with responsibilities under section 
     1078 or 1226, submit to Congress a joint assessment report 
     detailing existing inadequacies in the international 
     monitoring and verification system, including the extent to 
     which such inadequacies relate to the findings and 
     recommendations pertaining to verification shortcomings 
     identified within--
       (1) the September 26, 2006, Government Accountability 
     Office report entitled, ``Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has 
     Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, 
     but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed'';
       (2) the May 16, 2013, Government Accountability Office 
     report entitled, ``IAEA Has Made Progress in Implementing 
     Critical Programs but Continues to Face Challenges'';
       (3) the Defense Science Board Study entitled, ``Task Force 
     on the Assessment of Nuclear Treaty Monitoring and 
     Verification Technologies'';
       (4) the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (in this section referred to as the ``IAEA'') entitled, ``The 
     Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency'' 
     and the IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2010;
       (5) the IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards 
     Agreements and Additional Protocols;
       (6) the IAEA Model Additional Protocol;
       (7) the IAEA February 2015 Director General Report to the 
     Board of Governors; and
       (8) other related reports on Iranian safeguard challenges.
       (b) Recommendations.--The joint assessment report required 
     by subsection (a) shall include recommendations based upon 
     the reports referenced in that subsection, including 
     recommendations to overcome inadequacies or develop an 
     improved monitoring framework and recommendations related to 
     the following matters:
       (1) The nuclear program of Iran.
       (2) Development of a plan for--
       (A) the long-term operation and funding of increased 
     activities of the IAEA and relevant agencies in order to 
     maintain the necessary level of oversight with respect to 
     Iran's nuclear program;
       (B) resolving all issues of past and present concern with 
     the IAEA, including possible military dimensions of Iran's 
     nuclear program; and
       (C) giving IAEA inspectors access to personnel, documents, 
     and facilities involved, at any point, with nuclear or 
     nuclear weapons-related activities of Iran.
       (3) A potential national strategy and implementation plan 
     supported by a planning and assessment team aimed at cutting 
     across agency boundaries or limitations that affect the 
     ability to draw conclusions, with absolute assurance, about 
     whether Iran is developing a clandestine nuclear weapons 
     program.
       (4) The limitations of IAEA actors.
       (5) Challenges in the region that may be too large to 
     anticipate under applicable treaties or agreements or the 
     national technical means monitoring regimes alone.
       (6) Continuation of sanctions with respect to the 
     Government of Iran and Iranian persons and Iran's proxies 
     for--
       (A) ongoing abuses of human rights;
       (B) actions in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in 
     Syria;
       (C) procurement, sale, or transfer of technology, services, 
     or goods that support the development or acquisition of 
     weapons of mass destruction or the means of delivery of those 
     weapons; and
       (D) continuing sponsorship of international terrorism.
       (c) Form of Report.--The joint assessment report required 
     by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
     but may include a classified annex.
       (d) Presidential Certification.--Not later than 60 days 
     after the joint assessment report is submitted under 
     subsection (a), the President shall certify to Congress that 
     the President has reviewed the report, including the 
     recommendations contained therein, and has taken available 
     actions to address existing gaps within the monitoring and 
     verification framework, including identified potential 
     funding needs to address necessary requirements.
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