[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 66 (Thursday, April 28, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2573-S2576]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 AFGHANISTAN ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2015

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 189, S. 1875.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1875) to support enhanced accountability for 
     United States assistance to Afghanistan, and for other 
     purposes.

  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, 
which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with 
an amendment, as follows:
  (The part of the bill intended to be stricken is shown in boldface 
brackets and the part of the bill intended to be inserted is shown in 
italic.)

                                S. 1875

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Afghanistan Accountability 
     Act of 2015''.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

      TITLE I--EFFECTIVE AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

     SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
     the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, and 
     since then the United States Armed Forces and the Afghan 
     National Security Forces have made countless sacrifices in 
     defending Afghanistan against the threat of terrorism and 
     insurgency and by extension the United States and the wider 
     world.
       (2) Since 2001, the United States has worked with a broad 
     coalition of nations that has helped to dramatically improve 
     numerous development indicators within Afghanistan, including 
     a dramatic increase in the number of girls enrolled in 
     primary education from an estimated 5,000 under the Taliban 
     to 2,400,000 girls as of 2010; an increase in the percentage 
     of individuals above the poverty line from 25.4 percent in 
     2002 to 35.8 percent in 2011; an increase in the percentage 
     of individuals who now have access to an improved water 
     source in rural areas from 22 percent in 2001 to 56 percent 
     in 2012; a precipitous decline in maternal mortality from 
     1200/100,000 births in 1995 to 400/100,000 births in 2013; 
     and an expansion of women's rights;
       (3) Numerous research studies have shown that government 
     corruption is a driver of conflict and particularly so in 
     Afghanistan, where it has served as a powerful recruitment 
     tool for the Taliban.
       (4) Since the first democratic transfer of power in the 
     history of Afghanistan in 2014, President Ashraf Ghani and 
     Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah have led a National 
     Unity Government that has identified

[[Page S2574]]

     key security and development challenges in order to make 
     Afghanistan a full and productive member of the community of 
     democratic nations.
       (5) The National Unity Government has renewed specific 
     focus on addressing corruption within the country as a driver 
     of instability, including reopening a fraud case involving 
     high level officials and the Kabul Bank that resulted in the 
     disappearance of an estimated $1,000,000,000.
       (6) In its report ``Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to 
     Reform and Renewed Partnership'', the Government of 
     Afghanistan committed to the international community in 
     London in December 2014, to address the ``main drivers of 
     corruption in Afghanistan,'' including ``collusive 
     procurement practices, weak rule of law and abuse of the 
     legal system, and arbitrary regulations that build in 
     incentives to pay bribes''. Government of Afghanistan 
     commitments included--
       (A) forming an independent anti-corruption commission with 
     time-bound prosecutorial powers;
       (B) implementing recommendations by the Monitoring and 
     Evaluation Committee on a national action plan to reduce 
     corruption;
       (C) requiring all government officials to provide public 
     declarations of their assets;
       (D) meeting all Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
     requirements to further limit and investigate illicit fund 
     flows;
       (E) forming a national procurement board staffed by 
     qualified professionals who will manage all large value 
     contracts using internationally recognized standards and 
     procedures; and
       (F) delineating the roles, responsibilities, and 
     jurisdiction of anti-corruption institutions such as the High 
     Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) and the 
     Attorney General to restrict them to focus on their core 
     function of enforcement instead of oversight.
       (7) The December 2014 Government of Afghanistan report 
     ``Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed 
     Partnership'', expressed a commitment to ``enhancing 
     productivity, growth and revenues'' by--
       (A) developing natural resources through public-private 
     partnerships that bring in rents, taxes, and profits;
       (B) removing obstacles to trade and transit and ending 
     smuggling that diverts revenue away from the treasury;
       (C) negotiating expanded market access in regional and 
     global markets;
       (D) gradually formalizing the informal economy and changing 
     the compact between the state and citizens to one where 
     citizens pay taxes for services they tangibly benefit from; 
     and
       (E) transferring government payments electronically to 
     eliminate losses in transit.
       (8) In 2012, international donors and the Government of 
     Afghanistan agreed to the Tokyo Mutual Accountability 
     Framework (``TMAF'') which committed to provide 
     $4,000,000,000 in economic assistance per year from 2012-2015 
     and sustain assistance at or near the same levels of the past 
     decade through 2017, while the Government of Afghanistan 
     committed to meet benchmarks related to democracy and 
     governance, public finance and revenue generation, and 
     economic development.
       (9) At the end of 2014, under the TMAF, the Government of 
     Afghanistan had fallen short in meeting benchmarks related 
     to: revenue collection, the enhancement of women's rights, 
     corruption and the illicit economy, and the protection of 
     human rights,
       (10) In the Joint Declaration following the London 
     Conference on Afghanistan of December 4, 2014, the 
     international community and the new Government of Afghanistan 
     agreed to refresh the existing TMAF and associated 
     commitments at the 2015 Senior Officials Meeting based on the 
     reform program and priorities as laid out by the Government 
     of Afghanistan.
       (11) Afghanistan faces great difficulties in making 
     progress in countering illegal narcotics and remains the 
     leading global illicit opium poppy producer.
       (12) The illegal narcotics trade results in the transfer of 
     illicit funds and encourages and also requires corrupt 
     financial transactions, and, if minimized, could have 
     beneficial impacts on trade and reduce overall levels of 
     corruption.
       (13) The international community has endorsed Afghanistan's 
     longer-term development following the war and identified the 
     criticality of the ``transformation decade'' from 2015-2024 
     outlined by the Government of Afghanistan and has 
     acknowledged that the Government of Afghanistan will seek 
     continued international assistance in order for it to become 
     a stable, self-sustained partner in the community of 
     democratic countries.
       (14) As development assistance from the United States and 
     broader international community gradually diminishes in the 
     coming years, the accelerated development of the Afghan 
     private sector and governing institutions becomes even more 
     necessary to maintain the gains of the past decade and to 
     enhance our mutual goals of Afghan security and stability.
       (15) While Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have 
     taken over lead combat responsibilities, they continue to 
     operate in close coordination with, and with significant 
     resources from the international community, under the Train, 
     Advise and Assist (TAA) mission of Operation Inherent Resolve 
     and in coordination with ongoing counter-terrorism 
     operations. Development of civilian oversight institutions 
     for the security sector has lagged. Such oversight will be 
     important for ensuring that Afghan security forces are 
     accountable and do not abuse their powers.

     SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE AND 
                   ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the National Unity Government of Afghanistan has made a 
     substantial commitment to reform that should be supported but 
     also subject to heightened scrutiny by the Afghan people and 
     international donors given past failures and persistent 
     challenges in the country;
       (2) Afghanistan is at a critical inflection point, having 
     gone through political and security transitions as the 
     international community draws down its military forces. The 
     international community should work closely with the new 
     government in supporting development priorities for the rest 
     of the transformation decade that translate into producing 
     concrete development results for the Afghan people;
       (3) sustainable accountability and reform of Afghan 
     governing institutions will not come from the international 
     community but from a commitment by the Government of 
     Afghanistan and society reinforced by domestic watchdog 
     groups and internal government accountability monitoring 
     mechanisms;
       (4) the United States Government should deepen its dialogue 
     on anti-corruption efforts with the Government of Afghanistan 
     to develop effective oversight mechanisms to ensure large 
     donor contracts do not contribute to corruption;
       (5) the United States should encourage Afghanistan's 
     participation in the Open Government Partnership, a 
     multilateral initiative in which government and civil society 
     collaborate to promote transparency, fight corruption, and 
     use technologies to strengthen government;
       (6) the United States should urge the Government of 
     Afghanistan to build upon existing anti-money laundering and 
     countering terrorism financing legislation by developing 
     effective regulations and institutions to implement reforms;
       (7) the United States should urge the Government of 
     Afghanistan to broaden personal asset disclosures to include 
     members of the covered officials' immediate families or 
     households and develop effective mechanisms for verifying 
     disclosed information;
       (8) in the event of future egregious cases of corruption in 
     Afghanistan, the President should impose visa bans and asset 
     freezes on those responsible, especially in instances where 
     United States assistance is stolen or misappropriated;
       (9) the United States Government should cooperate with the 
     Government of Afghanistan and with international donors to 
     develop a series of strict accountability benchmarks based on 
     the refreshed Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and the 
     Government of Afghanistan's own ``Realizing Self Reliance'' 
     report commitments that will condition levels of assistance 
     and the amount of on-budget assistance on anti-corruption 
     performance acceptable to donors;
       (10) the United States should support the Afghan Parliament 
     to refine and strengthen the legal framework of anti-
     corruption and anti-money laundering laws to address 
     beneficial ownership, countering bid-rigging and other 
     contracting and procurement fraud, criminal investigations of 
     financial transactions, complementary banks, personal asset 
     or other financial declarations and disclosures as required 
     by law or regulation, efforts to meet FATF requirements, and 
     other areas to further inhibit the illicit flow of money;
       (11) the commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to 
     strengthen its nascent private sector should be supported and 
     sustained using the full array of tools of the United States, 
     including technical and legal assistance;
       (12) United States assistance to the Afghan judicial system 
     and other Afghan legal institutions that enable and empower 
     private sector development by instilling greater investor 
     confidence should be prioritized to ensure the protection of 
     private property, the sanctity of contracts, and effective 
     dispute resolution mechanisms for businesses and investors;
       (13) the United States Government should identify 
     opportunities for the United States to introduce trade 
     facilitation as part of the economic relationship between the 
     two countries;
       (14) the Governments of the United States and Afghanistan 
     should work together to identify more Afghan products and raw 
     materials to be included on the United States Generalized 
     System of Preferences (GSP) treatment list;
       (15) the United States Government should establish a United 
     States-Afghan Tax Commission to help spearhead a rapid and 
     successful conclusion of a new Bilateral Tax Agreement 
     similar to the Agreements with several of Afghanistan's 
     neighbors, including Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, 
     Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, India, and Pakistan;
       (16) the American University of Afghanistan is an emerging 
     pillar in Afghanistan's education system and has provided a 
     unique opportunity for higher education for Afghan youth, 
     especially women; and
       (17) the United States should encourage the Government of 
     Afghanistan to implement with urgency electoral reforms in 
     accordance with the ``Agreement between the

[[Page S2575]]

     Two Campaign Teams Regarding the Structure of the National 
     Unity Government''.

     SEC. 103. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE POLICY FOR AFGHANISTAN.

       It is the policy of the United States--
       (1) to conduct assistance programs that result in highly 
     effective, impact driven development outcomes for the people 
     of Afghanistan while maintaining the highest standards of 
     accountability for United States taxpayers;
       (2) that all United States Government agencies and entities 
     working in Afghanistan coordinate, plan, and regularly review 
     plans in a coherent, well-informed process to develop United 
     States policy and assistance programming;
       (3) to support the development of effective Government of 
     Afghanistan oversight institutions and domestic watchdog 
     civil society organizations;
       (4) subject to significant evident progress made in meeting 
     TMAF accountability and improved governance as it relates to 
     development, to abide by resource commitments made as part of 
     the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework;
       (5) to provide incentivized assistance to Afghanistan's 
     governing institutions based upon verifiable and measurable 
     development outcomes and on-budget assistance based upon 
     demonstrated capacity improvements that are mutually agreed 
     to by the Governments of Afghanistan and the United States;
       (6) to support the development of democratic governing 
     institutions in Afghanistan, promote the development of a 
     growing private sector, and strengthen civil society in 
     Afghanistan;
       (7) to recognize that Afghanistan's sustainable development 
     is grounded in growing the regional economy, and to support 
     the efforts of the Government and people of Afghanistan to 
     build strong regional economic connectivity with the 
     country's [neighbors; and]
       (8) [to support, where appropriate, proven programs that 
     promote private sector job creation in Afghanistan.] 
     neighbors;
       (8) to support, where appropriate, proven programs that 
     promote private sector job creation in Afghanistan; and
       (9) that assistance programs in direct support of Afghan 
     women and girls remain a priority for the United States, 
     including specific efforts to support women and girls 
     education, meaningful engagement in political and 
     reconciliation processes, training and recruitment of Afghan 
     female police and security forces, advancement of women's 
     legal rights, economic development, and efforts to increase 
     the overall health and well-being of Afghan women and girls.

     SEC. 104. EFFECTIVE AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE AND 
                   ACCOUNTABILITY.

       (a) Strategy to Combat Corruption in Afghanistan.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in consultation 
     with the Secretary of Defense and the Government of 
     Afghanistan, shall develop a comprehensive interagency 
     strategy for United States assistance that is sustainable and 
     is not counter-productive to combatting corruption in 
     Afghanistan.
       (2) Elements.--The strategy developed under paragraph (1) 
     should include the following elements:
       (A) Multi-year goals, objectives, and measurable outcomes 
     for targeted activities to strengthen selected Afghan 
     official institutions and nongovernmental organizations to 
     prevent, investigate, deter, and prosecute corruption.
       (B) An operational plan incorporating all United States 
     Government programming to implement the anti-corruption goals 
     and objectives.
       (C) A summary of United States efforts to coordinate with 
     other international donors to ensure that anti-corruption 
     advice or programming provided to the Government of 
     Afghanistan is not contradictory.
       (D) A focus on the development of governmental and 
     nongovernmental Afghan capacity to ensure accountability and 
     combat corruption.
       (E) An evaluation of Afghan civil society anti-corruption 
     capacities that includes their ability to use technology to 
     combat corruption.
       (b) Afghanistan Anti-corruption Fund.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to the availability of funds, the 
     President is authorized to provide technical and financial 
     assistance to official Government of Afghanistan anti-
     corruption and audit institutions and Afghan civil society 
     watchdog groups in support of the anti-corruption priorities 
     identified by the Government of Afghanistan and the United 
     States Government. Subject to careful consideration by the 
     United States Government of the legitimacy, efficacy, and 
     direct impact and influence of such entities and individuals, 
     offices, and organizations that are funded under this 
     subsection could include--
       (A) the Supreme Audit Office;
       (B) the Attorney General;
       (C) the Ministry of Justice;
       (D) Inspectors General within key ministries;
       (E) the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and 
     Evaluation Committee (MEC);
       (F) the major crimes task force, Technical Investigative 
     Unit, and the Sensitive Investigative Unit;
       (G) the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption;
       (H) the Anti-Corruption Tribunal;
       (I) the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center 
     of Afghanistan;
       (J) the proposed procurement board; and
       (K) civil society organizations engaged in oversight, anti-
     corruption advocacy, and support of good governance.
       (c) Promotion of Human Rights, Press Freedom, and Security 
     Sector Accountability.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to the availability of funds, the 
     Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of 
     Defense, should provide support for efforts of the Government 
     of Afghanistan to improve oversight and accountability of the 
     Afghan National Security Forces, including the Afghan 
     National Police, and Afghan local police, and strengthen 
     Afghan civil society and investigative journalists to provide 
     watchdog oversight of these institutions. Subject to due 
     consideration of the legitimacy, efficacy, and direct impact 
     and influence of such entities and individuals, these efforts 
     could include--
       (A) supporting the ANSF to strengthen the capacity, 
     independence, and power of its internal Inspector General to 
     collect and investigate all credible reports of abuse by 
     armed forces;
       (B) supporting the Office of the Attorney General and the 
     Ministries of Defense and Interior to be better capable to 
     investigate and, if appropriate, criminally prosecute police, 
     military, intelligence, and militia personnel, regardless of 
     rank, found responsible for human rights abuses and war 
     crimes;
       (C) considering establishing a special independent 
     mechanism to investigate government officials and security 
     force officers implicated in abuses;
       (D) supporting the Ministry of Interior to establish a 
     centralized register of all detainees held in police and 
     National Directorate of Security custody, and ensure that it 
     is accessible to independent monitors and is updated 
     regularly and in a transparent manner;
       (E) supporting implementation of the Access to Information 
     Law and the 2009 Mass Media Law, particularly provisions of 
     the latter that would disband the Media Violations 
     Investigation Commission and replace it with a Mass Media 
     Commission;
       (F) supporting the Attorney General's Office to undertake 
     prompt, impartial, and thorough investigations into all 
     attacks on journalists and media organizations and bring 
     prosecutions as appropriate; and
       (G) supporting the further establishment of civil society 
     organizations to provide essential ``watchdog'' oversight of 
     the police and armed forces; as well as efforts to strengthen 
     and improve coordination among civil society organizations, 
     such as the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.
       (d) Development of the Afghan Private Sector.--
       (1) Regional economic connectivity fund.--
       (A) Establishment.--There is established a Regional 
     Economic Connectivity Fund from which funds may be made 
     available from existing appropriations to enhance regional 
     economic connectivity between Afghanistan and the countries 
     of South and Central Asia.
       (B) Purpose.--The purpose of the Regional Economic 
     Connectivity Fund is to provide support for efforts to 
     enhance Afghanistan's economic connectivity with its 
     neighbors, thus improving the country's overall economic 
     prospects and diminishing the need for international 
     assistance in the future. The Regional Economic Connectivity 
     Fund may be used to support programs in the following areas:
       (i) Trade and transit fee normalization and electronic 
     payment systems.
       (ii) Capacity and skills development to improve 
     collaboration among countries for border and customs.
       (iii) Women-owned business networking.
       (iv) Developing regional options on transit and customs to 
     facilitate trade.
       (v) Enhancing and implementing confidence building 
     measures.
       (vi) Encouraging regional energy and electricity 
     development and sharing.
       (vii) Market access and business conferences.
       (viii) Intellectual and cultural exchanges to engage in 
     regional problem solving.
       (2) Transfer authority.--In addition to other transfer 
     authorities available to the Department of State, the 
     Department of Defense, the United States Agency for 
     International Development (USAID) or other United States 
     Government agencies or departments, funds that are 
     specifically allocated towards addressing the situation in 
     Afghanistan may be transferred to programs in South and 
     Central Asia that promote regional economic connectivity with 
     substantial and direct benefits to Afghanistan.

     SEC. 105. REPORTS.

       (a) Reporting on Corruption in Afghanistan.--Not later than 
     one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
     annually thereafter through 2024, the Secretary of State 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report listing each individual who the President determines, 
     based on credible evidence--
       (1) is an Government of Afghanistan official, a senior 
     associate, or close relative of such an official, who is 
     responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or 
     otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption, 
     including the expropriation of private or public assets for 
     personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or 
     the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the 
     facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption to 
     foreign jurisdictions; or

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       (2) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided 
     financial, material, or technological support for, or goods 
     or services in support of, an activity described above.
       (b) Report on Civilian-military Assistance Efforts in 
     Afghanistan.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the 
     United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
     committees a report on civilian-military assistance efforts 
     in Afghanistan.
       (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following elements:
       (A) A description of lessons learned from conducting 
     development programming in a conflict zone to include 
     recommendations on how to improve coordination between United 
     States development agencies and the United States Armed 
     Forces.
       (B) An assessment of the ability of the United States 
     Agency for International Development to advance development 
     goals within a conflict environment, operating alongside 
     providers of United States military assistance.
       (C) An assessment of whether funding under the Commander's 
     Emergency Response Program achieved the program's stated 
     goals and whether this program had any long term development 
     impact, including any negative unintended consequences. 

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
committee-reported amendment be withdrawn, the Menendez substitute 
amendment at the desk be agreed to, and the bill, as amended, be read a 
third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 3885) in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I know of no further debate on the measure.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  If not, the bill having been read the third time, the question is, 
Shall it pass?
  The bill (S. 1875), as amended, was passed.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion 
to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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