[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 66 (Thursday, April 28, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2568-S2570]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SA 3885. Mr. McCONNELL (for Mr. Menendez) proposed an amendment to
the bill S. 1875, to support enhanced accountability for United States
assistance to Afghanistan, and for other purposes; as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Afghanistan Accountability
Act of 2015''.
SEC. 2. DEFINED TERM.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional
committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(4) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives;
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(7) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(8) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
TITLE I--EFFECTIVE AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, and
since then the United States Armed Forces and the Afghan
National Security Forces have made countless sacrifices in
defending Afghanistan against the threat of terrorism and
insurgency and by extension the United States and the wider
world.
(2) Since 2001, the United States has worked with a broad
coalition of nations that has helped to dramatically improve
numerous development indicators within Afghanistan,
including--
(A) a dramatic increase in the number of girls enrolled in
primary education from an estimated 5,000 under the Taliban
to 2,400,000 girls as of 2010;
(B) an increase in the percentage of individuals above the
poverty line from 25.4 percent in 2002 to 35.8 percent in
2011;
(C) an increase in the percentage of individuals who now
have access to an improved water source in rural areas from
22 percent in 2001 to 56 percent in 2012;
(D) a precipitous decline in maternal mortality from 1200/
100,000 births in 1995 to 400/100,000 births in 2013; and
(E) an expansion of women's rights.
(3) Numerous research studies have shown that government
corruption is a driver of conflict and particularly so in
Afghanistan, where it has served as a powerful recruitment
tool for the Taliban.
(4) Since the first democratic transfer of power in the
history of Afghanistan in 2014, President Ashraf Ghani and
Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah have led a National
Unity Government that has identified key security and
development challenges in order to make Afghanistan a full
and productive member of the community of democratic nations.
(5) The National Unity Government has renewed specific
focus on addressing corruption within the country as a driver
of instability, including reopening a fraud case involving
high level officials and the Kabul Bank that resulted in the
disappearance of an estimated $1,000,000,000.
(6) In its report ``Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to
Reform and Renewed Partnership'', the Government of
Afghanistan committed to the international community in
London in December 2014, to address the ``main drivers of
corruption in Afghanistan,'' including ``collusive
procurement practices, weak rule of law and abuse of the
legal system, and arbitrary regulations that build in
incentives to pay bribes''. Government of Afghanistan
commitments included--
(A) forming an independent anti-corruption commission with
time-bound prosecutorial powers;
(B) implementing recommendations by the Monitoring and
Evaluation Committee on a national action plan to reduce
corruption;
(C) requiring all government officials to provide public
declarations of their assets;
(D) meeting all Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
requirements to further limit and investigate illicit fund
flows;
(E) forming a national procurement board staffed by
qualified professionals who will manage all large value
contracts using internationally recognized standards and
procedures; and
(F) delineating the roles, responsibilities, and
jurisdiction of anti-corruption institutions such as the High
Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) and the
Attorney General to restrict them to focus on their core
function of enforcement instead of oversight.
(7) The December 2014 Government of Afghanistan report
``Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed
Partnership'', expressed a commitment to ``enhancing
productivity, growth and revenues'' by--
(A) developing natural resources through public-private
partnerships that bring in rents, taxes, and profits;
(B) removing obstacles to trade and transit and ending
smuggling that diverts revenue away from the treasury;
(C) negotiating expanded market access in regional and
global markets;
(D) gradually formalizing the informal economy and changing
the compact between the state and citizens to one where
citizens pay taxes for services they tangibly benefit from;
and
(E) transferring government payments electronically to
eliminate losses in transit.
(8) In 2012, international donors and the Government of
Afghanistan agreed to the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework (``TMAF'') which committed to provide
$4,000,000,000 in economic assistance per year from 2012-2015
and sustain assistance at or near the same levels of the past
decade through 2017, while the Government of Afghanistan
committed to meet benchmarks related to democracy and
governance, public finance and revenue generation, and
economic development.
(9) At the end of 2014, under the TMAF, the Government of
Afghanistan had fallen short in meeting benchmarks related
to: revenue collection, the enhancement of women's rights,
corruption and the illicit economy, and the protection of
human rights.
[[Page S2569]]
(10) In the Joint Declaration following the London
Conference on Afghanistan of December 4, 2014, the
international community and the new Government of Afghanistan
agreed to refresh the existing TMAF and associated
commitments at the 2015 Senior Officials Meeting based on the
reform program and priorities as laid out by the Government
of Afghanistan.
(11) Afghanistan faces great difficulties in making
progress in countering illegal narcotics and remains the
leading global illicit opium poppy producer.
(12) The illegal narcotics trade results in the transfer of
illicit funds and encourages and also requires corrupt
financial transactions, and, if minimized, could have
beneficial impacts on trade and reduce overall levels of
corruption.
(13) The international community has endorsed Afghanistan's
longer-term development following the war and identified the
criticality of the ``transformation decade'' from 2015-2024
outlined by the Government of Afghanistan and has
acknowledged that the Government of Afghanistan will seek
continued international assistance in order for it to become
a stable, self-sustained partner in the community of
democratic countries.
(14) As development assistance from the United States and
broader international community gradually diminishes in the
coming years, the accelerated development of the Afghan
private sector and governing institutions becomes even more
necessary to maintain the gains of the past decade and to
enhance our mutual goals of Afghan security and stability.
(15) While Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have
taken over lead combat responsibilities, they continue to
operate in close coordination with, and with significant
resources from the international community, under the
Resolute Support Mission and in coordination with ongoing
counter-terrorism operations. Development of civilian
oversight institutions for the security sector has lagged.
Such oversight will be important for ensuring that Afghan
security forces are accountable and do not abuse their
powers.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the National Unity Government of Afghanistan has made a
substantial commitment to reform that should be supported but
also subject to heightened scrutiny by the Afghan people and
international donors given past failures and persistent
challenges in the country;
(2) Afghanistan is at a critical inflection point, having
gone through political and security transitions as the
international community draws down its military forces. The
international community should work closely with the new
government in supporting development priorities for the rest
of the transformation decade that translate into producing
concrete development results for the Afghan people;
(3) sustainable accountability and reform of Afghan
governing institutions will not come from the international
community but from a commitment by the Government of
Afghanistan and society reinforced by domestic watchdog
groups and internal government accountability monitoring
mechanisms;
(4) the United States Government should deepen its dialogue
on anti-corruption efforts with the Government of Afghanistan
to develop effective oversight mechanisms to ensure large
donor contracts do not contribute to corruption;
(5) the United States should encourage Afghanistan's
participation in the Open Government Partnership, a
multilateral initiative in which government and civil society
collaborate to promote transparency, fight corruption, and
use technologies to strengthen government;
(6) the United States should urge the Government of
Afghanistan to build upon existing anti-money laundering and
countering terrorism financing legislation by developing
effective regulations and institutions to implement reforms;
(7) the United States should urge the Government of
Afghanistan to broaden personal asset disclosures to include
members of the covered officials' immediate families or
households and develop effective mechanisms for verifying
disclosed information;
(8) in the event of future egregious cases of corruption in
Afghanistan, the President should impose visa bans and asset
freezes on those responsible, especially in instances where
United States assistance is stolen or misappropriated;
(9) the United States Government should cooperate with the
Government of Afghanistan and with international donors to
develop a series of strict accountability benchmarks based on
the refreshed Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and the
Government of Afghanistan's own ``Realizing Self Reliance''
report commitments that will condition levels of assistance
and the amount of on-budget assistance on anti-corruption
performance acceptable to donors;
(10) the United States should support the Afghan Parliament
to refine and strengthen the legal framework of anti-
corruption and anti-money laundering laws to address
beneficial ownership, countering bid-rigging and other
contracting and procurement fraud, criminal investigations of
financial transactions, complementary banks, personal asset
or other financial declarations and disclosures as required
by law or regulation, efforts to meet FATF requirements, and
other areas to further inhibit the illicit flow of money;
(11) the commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to
strengthen its nascent private sector should be supported and
sustained using the full array of tools of the United States,
including technical and legal assistance;
(12) United States assistance to the Afghan judicial system
and other Afghan legal institutions that enable and empower
private sector development by instilling greater investor
confidence should be prioritized to ensure the protection of
private property, the sanctity of contracts, and effective
dispute resolution mechanisms for businesses and investors;
(13) the United States Government should identify
opportunities for the United States to introduce trade
facilitation as part of the economic relationship between the
2 countries;
(14) the Governments of the United States and Afghanistan
should work together to identify more Afghan products and raw
materials to be included on the United States Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) treatment list;
(15) the American University of Afghanistan is an emerging
pillar in Afghanistan's education system and has provided a
unique opportunity for higher education for Afghan youth,
especially women; and
(16) the United States should encourage the Government of
Afghanistan to implement with urgency electoral reforms in
accordance with the ``Agreement between the Two Campaign
Teams Regarding the Structure of the National Unity
Government''.
SEC. 103. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE POLICY FOR AFGHANISTAN.
It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to conduct assistance programs that result in highly
effective, impact driven development outcomes for the people
of Afghanistan while maintaining the highest standards of
accountability for United States taxpayers;
(2) that all United States Government agencies and entities
working in Afghanistan coordinate, plan, and regularly review
plans in a coherent, well-informed process to develop United
States policy and assistance programming;
(3) to support the development of effective Government of
Afghanistan oversight institutions and domestic watchdog
civil society organizations;
(4) subject to significant evident progress made in meeting
TMAF accountability and improved governance as it relates to
development, to abide by resource commitments made as part of
the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework;
(5) to provide incentivized assistance to Afghanistan's
governing institutions based upon verifiable and measurable
development outcomes and on-budget assistance based upon
demonstrated capacity improvements that are mutually agreed
to by the Government of Afghanistan and Government of the
United States;
(6) to support the development of democratic governing
institutions in Afghanistan, promote the development of a
growing private sector, and strengthen civil society in
Afghanistan;
(7) to recognize that Afghanistan's sustainable development
is grounded in growing the regional economy, and to support
the efforts of the Government and people of Afghanistan to
build strong regional economic connectivity with the
country's neighbors;
(8) to support, where appropriate, proven programs that
promote private sector job creation in Afghanistan; and
(9) that assistance programs in direct support of Afghan
women and girls remain a priority for the United States,
including specific efforts to support women and girls
education, meaningful engagement in political and
reconciliation processes, training and recruitment of Afghan
female police and security forces, advancement of women's
legal rights, economic development, and efforts to increase
the overall health and well-being of Afghan women and girls.
SEC. 104. EFFECTIVE AFGHANISTAN ASSISTANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY.
(a) Strategy to Combat Corruption in Afghanistan.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense and the Government of
Afghanistan, shall develop a comprehensive interagency
strategy for United States assistance that is sustainable and
is not counter-productive to combating corruption in
Afghanistan.
(2) Elements.--The strategy developed under paragraph (1)
should include the following elements:
(A) Multi-year goals, objectives, and measurable outcomes
for targeted activities to strengthen selected Afghan
official institutions and nongovernmental organizations to
prevent, investigate, deter, and prosecute corruption.
(B) An operational plan incorporating all United States
Government programming to implement the anti-corruption goals
and objectives.
(C) A summary of United States efforts to coordinate with
other international donors to ensure that anti-corruption
advice or programming provided to the Government of
Afghanistan is not contradictory.
(D) A focus on the development of governmental and
nongovernmental Afghan capacity to ensure accountability and
combat corruption.
(E) An evaluation of Afghan civil society anti-corruption
capacities that includes
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their ability to use technology to combat corruption.
(b) Afghanistan Anti-corruption Fund.--Subject to the
availability of funds, the President is authorized to provide
technical and financial assistance to official Government of
Afghanistan anti-corruption and audit institutions and Afghan
civil society watchdog groups in support of the anti-
corruption priorities identified by the Government of
Afghanistan and the United States Government. Subject to
careful consideration by the United States Government of the
legitimacy, efficacy, and direct impact and influence of such
entities and individuals, offices, and organizations that are
funded under this subsection could include--
(1) the Supreme Audit Office;
(2) the Attorney General;
(3) the Ministry of Justice;
(4) Inspectors General within key ministries;
(5) the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and
Evaluation Committee (MEC);
(6) the major crimes task force, Technical Investigative
Unit, and the Sensitive Investigative Unit;
(7) the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption;
(8) the Anti-Corruption Tribunal;
(9) the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center
of Afghanistan;
(10) the proposed procurement board; and
(11) civil society organizations engaged in oversight,
anti-corruption advocacy, and support of good governance.
(c) Promotion of Human Rights, Press Freedom, and Security
Sector Accountability.--
(1) In general.--Subject to the availability of funds, the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, is authorized to provide support for efforts of the
Government of Afghanistan to improve oversight and
accountability of the Afghan National Security Forces,
including the Afghan National Police, and Afghan local
police, and strengthen Afghan civil society and investigative
journalists to provide watchdog oversight of these
institutions. Subject to due consideration of the legitimacy,
efficacy, and direct impact and influence of such entities
and individuals, these efforts could include--
(A) supporting the ANSF to strengthen the capacity,
independence, and power of its internal Inspector General to
collect and investigate all credible reports of abuse by
armed forces;
(B) supporting the Office of the Attorney General and the
Ministries of Defense and Interior to be better capable to
investigate and, if appropriate, criminally prosecute police,
military, intelligence, and militia personnel, regardless of
rank, found responsible for human rights abuses and war
crimes;
(C) considering establishing a special independent
mechanism to investigate government officials and security
force officers implicated in abuses;
(D) supporting the Ministry of Interior to establish a
centralized register of all detainees held in police and
National Directorate of Security custody, and ensure that it
is accessible to independent monitors and is updated
regularly and in a transparent manner;
(E) supporting implementation of the Access to Information
Law and the 2009 Mass Media Law, particularly provisions of
the latter that would disband the Media Violations
Investigation Commission and replace it with a Mass Media
Commission;
(F) supporting the Attorney General's Office to undertake
prompt, impartial, and thorough investigations into all
attacks on journalists and media organizations and bring
prosecutions as appropriate; and
(G) supporting the further establishment of civil society
organizations to provide essential ``watchdog'' oversight of
the police and armed forces; as well as efforts to strengthen
and improve coordination among civil society organizations,
such as the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.
SEC. 105. REPORTS.
(a) Reporting on Corruption in Afghanistan.--Not later than
1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
annually thereafter through 2024, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report listing each individual who the President determines,
based on credible evidence--
(1) is a Government of Afghanistan official, a senior
associate, or close relative of such an official, who is
responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, controlling, or
otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption,
including the expropriation of private or public assets for
personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or
the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the
facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption to
foreign jurisdictions; or
(2) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided
financial, material, or technological support for, or goods
or services in support of, an activity described above.
(b) Report on Civilian-military Assistance Efforts in
Afghanistan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that describes civilian-military
assistance efforts in Afghanistan.
(2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1)
shall include the following elements:
(A) A description of lessons learned from conducting
development programming in Afghanistan to include
recommendations on how to improve coordination between United
States development agencies and the United States Armed
Forces.
(B) An assessment of the ability of the United States
Agency for International Development to advance development
goals within Afghanistan, operating alongside providers of
United States military assistance.
(C) An assessment of whether funding under the Commander's
Emergency Response Program achieved the program's
counterinsurgency goals, including force protection, and
whether this program had any long term development impact,
including any negative unintended consequences.
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