[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 52 (Wednesday, April 6, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1713-S1715]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

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   SENATE RESOLUTION 414--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE 
    ACTIONS, INCLUDING THE REAPPLICATION OF WAIVED NUCLEAR-RELATED 
 SANCTIONS, THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD UNDERTAKE IN THE EVENT OF AN 
      IRANIAN VIOLATION OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION

  Mr. LANKFORD submitted the following resolution; which was referred 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                              S. Res. 414

       Whereas national security is a fundamental and primary 
     responsibility of both Congress and the President;
       Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Barack Obama reached 
     an agreement with Iran known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
     of Action, a political agreement among the United States, 
     France, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of 
     China, the United Kingdom, and Germany (commonly referred to 
     as the ``P5+1 countries'') and Iran that does not carry the 
     force or effect of United States law;
       Whereas President Obama lifted nuclear-related sanctions 
     imposed by the United States with respect to Iran on January 
     16, 2016;
       Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Obama stated, ``If 
     Iran violates the deal, all of these sanctions will snap back 
     into place.'';
       Whereas Congress intends to work with the President to 
     ensure that the President's commitment to snapping back 
     sanctions in response to any violation by Iran of the Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action is fully enforced;
       Whereas Iran has been the beneficiary of financial assets 
     and international engagement while its commitment to 
     fulfilling its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
     of Action has yet to be proven; and
       Whereas, given the historic and dramatic shift in 
     longstanding United States foreign policy represented by the 
     Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the obligations and 
     commitments Iran agreed to as part the Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action must be clarified by the Senate: Now, 
     therefore, be it
       Resolved,

     SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE 
                   JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.

       (a) In General.--It is the sense of the Senate--
       (1) that the United States should take the actions 
     specified in subsection (b) if--
       (A) Iran ever seeks, develops, manufactures, or acquires 
     nuclear weapons;
       (B) Iran ever engages in plutonium reprocessing or 
     plutonium-related research and development;
       (C) Iran violates--
       (i) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
     done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 
     483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation 
     Treaty'' or the ``NPT'');
       (ii) the Agreement between Iran and the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in 
     Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
     Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly 
     referred to as the ``Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement'');
       (iii) its commitment to ratify by October 18, 2023, the 
     Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards 
     Agreement; or
       (iv) the Iranian-ratified Additional Protocol to the 
     Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of 
     the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive Safeguards 
     Agreement;
       (D) Iran installs a new natural uranium core or the 
     original core in the Arak reactor;
       (E) the power of Iran's redesigned heavy water reactor 
     exceeds 20 MWth;
       (F) Iran produces any amount of weapons grade uranium or 
     plutonium;
       (G) Iran pursues construction at the existing unfinished 
     Arak heavy water reactor based on its original design;
       (H) Iran produces or tests natural uranium pellets, fuel 
     pins, or fuel assemblies that are specifically designed for 
     the support of the originally designed Arak heavy water 
     reactor, designated by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     as IR-40;
       (I) Iran does not store all existing natural uranium 
     pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies under the continuous 
     monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency until 
     the modernized Arak reactor becomes operable;
       (J) once the Arak reactor becomes operable, Iran does not 
     take the IR-40 fuel assemblies and natural uranium pellets 
     and convert them to uranyl nitrate or exchange

[[Page S1714]]

     them with an equivalent quantity of natural uranium;
       (K) Iran does not make the necessary technical 
     modifications to the natural uranium fuel production process 
     line that was intended to supply fuel for the IR-40 reactor 
     design, such that it can be used for the fabrication of the 
     fuel reloads for the modernized Arak reactor;
       (L) all spent fuel from the redesigned Arak reactor, 
     regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of the reactor, is 
     not shipped out of Iran;
       (M) Iran operates the Fuel Manufacturing Plant to produce 
     anything other than fuel assemblies for light water reactors 
     or reloads for the modernized Arak reactor;
       (N) Iran does not inform the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency about the inventory and production of the Heavy Water 
     Production Plant or does not allow the International Atomic 
     Energy Agency to monitor the quantities of the heavy water 
     stocks and the amount of heavy water produced, including 
     through visits by the International Atomic Energy Agency, as 
     requested, to the Heavy Water Production Plant;
       (O) Iran does not ship out all spent fuel for all future 
     and present nuclear power and research reactors;
       (P) Iran does not remove and keep stored at Natanz in Hall 
     B of the fuel enrichment plant under continuous monitoring by 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency--
       (i) all excess centrifuge machines, including IR-2m 
     centrifuges (during the 10-year prohibition period under the 
     Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action); and
       (ii) UF6 pipework including sub headers, valves and 
     pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency 
     inverters, and UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of the 
     withdrawal stations, which is currently not in service, 
     including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps (during the 10-
     year prohibition period under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
     Action);
       (Q) the 164-machine IR-2m cascade does not remain stored at 
     Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan under the 
     continuous monitoring of the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency;
       (R) the 164-machine IR-4 cascade does not remain stored at 
     Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan under the 
     continuous monitoring of the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency;
       (S) Iran enriches, obtains, or otherwise stockpiles any 
     uranium, including in oxide form, enriched to greater than 
     3.67 percent;
       (T) all future uranium oxide, scrap oxide, or other 
     material not in fuel plates enriched to between 5 and 20 
     percent is not transferred out of Iran or diluted to a level 
     of 3.67 percent or less within 6 months of production;
       (U) Iran does not abide by its voluntary commitments as 
     expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment 
     research and development plan submitted as part of the 
     initial declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional 
     Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
       (V) Iran engages in production of centrifuges, including 
     centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope separation or any 
     other centrifuge components, which exceeds the enrichment and 
     enrichment research and development requirements outlined in 
     Annex I of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
       (W) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency the use of online enrichment measurement and 
     electronic seals, as well as other International Atomic 
     Energy Agency-approved and certified modern technologies in 
     line with internationally accepted practices of the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency;
       (X) Iran does not facilitate automated collection of 
     International Atomic Energy Agency measurement recordings 
     registered by installed measurement devices and sent to the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency working space at 
     individual nuclear sites;
       (Y) Iran does not make the necessary arrangements to allow 
     for a long-term presence of the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency, including issuing long-term visas, as well as 
     providing proper working space at nuclear sites and, with to 
     the best of its effort, at locations near nuclear sites in 
     Iran for the designated International Atomic Energy Agency 
     inspectors for working and keeping necessary equipment;
       (Z) Iran does not increase the number of designated 
     International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to at least 130 
     by October 16, 2016, which is the date that is 9 months after 
     implementation day, or does not allow the designation of 
     inspectors from countries that have diplomatic relations with 
     Iran;
       (AA) Iran does not apply nuclear export policies and 
     practices in line with the internationally established 
     standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment, and 
     technology;
       (BB) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency access to verify that uranium isotope separation 
     production and research and development activities are 
     consistent with Annex I of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
     Action;
       (CC) Iran engages in--
       (i) designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer 
     models to simulate nuclear explosive devices;
       (ii) designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or 
     using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a 
     nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint 
     Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to 
     monitoring;
       (iii) designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or 
     using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing 
     cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development 
     of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint 
     Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to 
     monitoring; or
       (iv) designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or 
     using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized 
     materials for explosively driven neutron sources;
       (DD) during the 10-year period beginning on implementation 
     day and ending on January 16, 2026--
       (i) Iran operates, for the purpose of enriching uranium, 
     more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges;
       (ii) Iran's enrichment capacity exceeds 5,060 IR-1 
     centrifuge machines in 30 cascades in their current 
     configurations in currently operating units at the Natanz 
     Fuel Enrichment Plant;
       (iii) consistent with Iran's enrichment research and 
     development plan, Iran's enrichment research and development 
     with uranium includes any centrifuges other than IR-4, IR-5, 
     IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges;
       (iv) Iran conducts testing of more than a single IR-4 
     centrifuge machine and IR-4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 
     centrifuge machines;
       (v) Iran tests more than a single IR-5 centrifuge machine;
       (vi) Iran does not recombine the enriched and depleted 
     streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the use of 
     welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that 
     precludes the withdrawal of enriched and depleted uranium 
     materials and verified by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency;
       (vii) research and development with uranium is not strictly 
     limited to IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges;
       (viii) Iran's uranium isotope separation-related research 
     and development or production activities are not exclusively 
     based on gaseous centrifuge technology;
       (ix) Iran engages in nuclear direct-use or nuclear dual-use 
     procurements of commodities without using the procurement 
     channel mandated by the United Nations under United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);
       (x) research and development is carried out in the IR-4, 
     IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 centrifuges in a manner that accumulates 
     enriched uranium, or Iran installs or tests those centrifuges 
     beyond the enrichment and enrichment research and development 
     requirements outlined in Annex I of the Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action;
       (xi) except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (LL), 
     mechanical testing on up to 2 single centrifuges for each 
     type is carried out on any centrifuge other than the IR-2m, 
     IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, or IR-8; or
       (xii) Iran builds or tests any new centrifuge without 
     approval of the Joint Commission;
       (EE) during the 15-year period beginning on implementation 
     day and ending on January 16, 2031--
       (i) Iran conducts uranium enrichment-related activities at 
     Fordow;
       (ii) Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium hexafluoride, or 
     the equivalent in other chemical forms, exceeds 300kg 
     enriched to 3.67 percent;
       (iii) Iran reprocesses spent fuel except for irradiated 
     enriched uranium targets for production of radio-isotopes for 
     medical and peaceful industrial purposes;
       (iv) Iran develops, acquires, or builds facilities capable 
     of separation of plutonium, uranium, or neptunium from spent 
     fuel or from fertile targets, other than for production of 
     radio-isotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes;
       (v) Iran develops, acquires, builds, or operates hot cells 
     (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells, 
     or shielded glove boxes with dimensions not less than 6 cubic 
     meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out 
     in Annex I of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive 
     Safeguards Agreement, unless approved by the Joint Commission 
     established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
       (vi) Iran undertakes destructive post irradiation 
     examination of fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes, and 
     structural materials, unless the P5+1 countries make 
     available their facilities to conduct destructive testing 
     with Iranian specialists, as agreed pursuant to the Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action;
       (vii) Iran engages in producing or acquiring plutonium or 
     uranium metals or their alloys, or conducts research and 
     development on plutonium or uranium (or their alloys) 
     metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or 
     uranium metal;
       (viii) Iran produces, seeks, or acquires separated 
     plutonium, highly enriched uranium, uranium-233, or 
     neptunium-237 (except for use for laboratory standards or in 
     instruments using neptunium-237);
       (ix) Iran installs gas centrifuge machines, or enrichment-
     related infrastructure, whether suitable for uranium 
     enrichment, research and development, or stable isotope 
     enrichment, at any location other than a location exclusively 
     specified under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
       (x) Iran conducts all testing of centrifuges with uranium 
     anywhere other than at the

[[Page S1715]]

     Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant or Iran conducts mechanical 
     testing of centrifuges anywhere other than at the Pilot Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant and the Tehran Research Centre;
       (xi) Iran maintains more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines 
     at one wing of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant;
       (xii) Iran does not limit its stable isotope production 
     activities with gas centrifuges to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment 
     Plant or uses more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for such 
     activities;
       (xiii) Iran exceeds the limitations on its activities at 
     the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant as described in Annex I of 
     the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
       (xiv) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency regular access, including daily as requested by the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency, access to the Fordow Fuel 
     Enrichment Plant;
       (xv) Iran builds or has a heavy water reactor;
       (xvi) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency to implement continuous monitoring, including through 
     containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, to 
     verify that stored centrifuges and infrastructure remain in 
     storage;
       (xvii) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency regular access, including daily access as requested by 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency, to relevant buildings 
     at Natanz, including parts of the fuel enrichment plan and 
     the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
       (xviii) any uranium enrichment activity in Iran, including 
     safeguarded research and development, occurs anywhere but the 
     Natanz enrichment site;
       (xix) Iran engages, including through export of any 
     enrichment or enrichment related equipment and technology, 
     with any other country, or with any foreign entity in 
     enrichment or enrichment related activities, including 
     related research and development activities, without approval 
     by the Joint Commission;
       (xx) the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant does not remain 
     strictly a research facility, Iran conducts enrichment or 
     research and development-related activities, or Iran holds 
     nuclear material at that Plant;
       (xxi) excess heavy water that is beyond Iran's needs for 
     the modernized Arak research reactor or the zero power heavy 
     water reactor, quantities needed for medical research and 
     production of the deuterated solutions, and chemical 
     compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, 
     is not made available for export to the international market 
     based on international prices and delivered to an 
     international buyer;
       (xxii) all enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 
     kg of up to 3.57 percent enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in 
     different chemical forms) is not immediately down-blended to 
     natural uranium level or sold on the international market and 
     delivered to an international buyer;
       (xxiii) Iran does not rely on only light water for its 
     future nuclear power and research reactors;
       (xxiv) Iran conducts enrichment research and development in 
     a manner that accumulates enriched uranium; or
       (xxv) Iran enriches uranium to a level exceeding 3.67 
     percent;
       (FF) during the 25-year period beginning on implementation 
     day and ending on January 16, 2041--
       (i) Iran does not permit the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency to monitor that all uranium ore concentrate produced 
     in Iran or obtained from any other source is transferred to 
     the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan or to any other 
     future uranium conversion facility that Iran might decide to 
     build in Iran within this period; or
       (ii) Iran does not provide the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency with all necessary information so that the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency will be able to verify the 
     production of the uranium ore concentrate and the inventory 
     of uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or obtained from 
     any other source;
       (GG) on or after January 16, 2024, which is the date that 
     is 8 years after implementation day, Iran commences 
     manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges with rotors, or 
     commences manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without 
     rotors at a rate of more than 200 centrifuges per year for 
     each type;
       (HH) on or after January 16, 2026, which is the date that 
     is 10 years after implementation day, Iran commences 
     manufacturing on more than 200 complete centrifuges per year 
     for each type;
       (II) Iran does not present its plan to, and seek approval 
     by, the Joint Commission if Iran seeks to initiate research 
     and development on a uranium metal based fuel for the Tehran 
     Research Reactor in small agreed quantities after January 16, 
     2026, and before January 15, 2031, which are 10 and 15 years 
     after implementation day, respectively; or
       (JJ) during the 8\1/2\ year period beginning on 
     implementation day and ending on July 16, 2024--
       (i) Iran conducts testing on more than a single IR-6 
     centrifuge machine and intermediate cascades for such 
     machines and commences testing on more than 30 centrifuge 
     machines; or
       (ii) Iran conducts testing on more than a single IR-8 
     centrifuge machine and intermediate cascades for such 
     machines or commences testing on more than 30 centrifuge 
     machines; and
       (2) that--
       (A) Iran's uranium enrichment and research and development 
     plans should be made public;
       (B) the reports of the Joint Commission and procurement 
     requests made to the United Nations Security Council and to 
     the Joint Commission, and whether or not such requests were 
     approved, should be made available to the public; and
       (C) countries should verify the end-use of items, 
     materials, equipment, goods, and technologies that require 
     import authorization by the Joint Commission but are not 
     verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
       (b) Actions Specified.--The actions specified in this 
     subsection are the following:
       (1) Seeking immediate reinstitution and application of 
     United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 
     (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), 
     and 2224 (2015).
       (2) Seeking the immediate adoption of a United Nations 
     Security Council resolution that directs all United Nations 
     member states to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, 
     or transfer to Iran of all items listed in subsection (a)(i) 
     of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) in 
     order to prevent Iran from arming itself while its commitment 
     to international law is still in question.
       (3) Working with international partners of the United 
     States to seek the immediate reapplication of the regulations 
     of the Council of the European Union concerning restrictive 
     measures against Iran, as in effect on October 17, 2015.
       (4) The immediate reapplication of the nuclear-related 
     sanctions waived by the United States.
       (5) Seeking the imposition of additional punitive sanctions 
     with respect to Iran.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Highly enriched uranium.--The term ``highly enriched 
     uranium'' means uranium with a 20 percent or higher 
     concentration of the isotope uranium-235.
       (2) Implementation day.--The term ``implementation day'' 
     means January 16, 2016.
       (3) Joint comprehensive plan of action.--The term ``Joint 
     Comprehensive Plan of Action'' means the Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action, agreed to at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran 
     and by the People's Republic of China, France, Germany, the 
     Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United 
     States, with the High Representative of the European Union 
     for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and all implementing 
     materials and agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action.
       (4) P5+1 countries.--The term ``P5+1 countries'' means the 
     United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's 
     Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
       (5) Spent fuel.--The term ``spent fuel'' includes all types 
     of irradiated fuel.

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