[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 45 (Tuesday, March 22, 2016)]
[House]
[Pages H1502-H1505]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PUTIN'S INFLUENCE IN EUROPE
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah
(Mr. Stewart) for 5 minutes.
Mr. STEWART. Mr. Speaker, in the tumult of a Presidential election, a
lot of important and newsworthy events don't get enough attention.
One such event last week was the Czech Republic's release of Ali
Fayyad, a dangerous Hezbollah terrorist who was indicted in 2014 by the
United States for conspiracy to kill officers and employees of the
United States.
The United States had requested Mr. Fayyad's extradition to the
United States, and the Czech courts had approved that extradition
request. But the Czech Minister of Justice, who is aligned with
Vladimir Putin, refused to honor that decision and released this
terrorist.
Fayyad has deep ties with the Russian black market for weapons and
was an adviser to the former President of Ukraine and a close ally of
Vladimir Putin.
It appeared at one point that Mr. Fayyad was exchanged for several
Czech nationals being held hostage in Lebanon, but journalists have
since shown that the hostage situation was a sham staged by his family
and defense team.
[[Page H1503]]
This episode is significant for several reasons. First, Mr. Fayyad's
presence and influence in Central Europe are yet more evidence--as if
we needed more--that Iran, through its proxies like Hezbollah, has
tentacles throughout world.
More importantly, the event demonstrates Vladimir Putin's increasing
influence with an important member of NATO. And it is not just the
Czech Republic.
This is a trend, and it is more concerning. Mr. Putin appears to be
quietly undermining NATO by leveraging his cronies in influential
positions in a number of European nations.
Several months ago I asked the Congressional Research Service to look
into the connections between Putin and high-ranking officials in
Europe, particularly NATO members. The findings are alarming.
The report tracks pro-Russian rhetoric and actions of leaders in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia and Hungary as well as the increasingly
evident ideological link between Europe's far-right parties and the
leadership of Russia.
{time} 1045
Mr. Speaker, though I won't read the entire report at this time, I
will include it in the Record.
I say all this, recognizing that Russia is a much more proximate
threat to our European allies than they are to us. It would be foolish
not to acknowledge that European leaders are in a different position
than we are. The democratic institutions that we take for granted are
still fragile in many of these countries, and Putin knows that.
However, what makes it all the more important is the fact that we, as
the world's superpower, do more than offer simple condemnations of
Putin's actions.
Both the House and the Senate held hearings last year exploring
Russian propaganda efforts. This was a good start, but now we need to
dig deeper to understand all of the levels of Russian pressure,
including agents of Russian influence who occupy high political offices
and own national and regional media outlets.
More than anything, we need the President to get off of the sidelines
and show that he is serious about countering Putin. That could start
with a serious effort to determine who cooperated with Russia in
releasing Mr. Fayyad, and then issue targeted sanctions on those
officials.
Mr. Fayyad is likely to continue plotting to harm the U.S., and his
release isn't a simple oversight that we should ignore.
MEMORANDUM
December 8, 2015.
To: Representative Chris Stewart.
Subject: Pro-Russia Viewpoints Among Selected Leaders in
Central and Eastern Europe.
This memorandum responds to your request for information
about Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe, with a
focus on selected political leaders. It provides additional
information about Russian influence through ties with
European far-right parties. Please contact me if you have
questions or would like additional information.
Introduction
One of the main ways analysts have to gauge Russian
influence in Central and Eastern Europe is by looking at the
reactions of regional political leaders to the conflict in
Ukraine and European Union (EU) debates about Ukraine-related
sanctions against Russia. While some patterns may be
discerned, it is difficult to assess the degree to which
various data points are directly attributable to Russian
influence, as opposed to a variety of other factors and
interests. Economic relationships and energy ties can be
expressed in monetary amounts, but less straightforward is
how to translate such figures into identifiable political and
policy influence. Other aspects of Russian influence can be
even more difficult to quantify. Russian involvement in
political and corporate dealings is not always a transparent
process that is reflected in available open source
information, frequently making for some degree of speculation
when seeking to reach conclusions about the motivations
driving various statements and actions.
Overall, attitudes toward Russia in Central and Eastern
Europe are colored by historical experiences, geographic
proximity, economic ties, and energy dependence. Many
officials and analysts in Central and Eastern Europe relate
that they have not been especially surprised by Russia's
actions in Ukraine and assert that their past efforts to
convey concerns about President Putin's revanchist ambitions
went largely unheeded in the United States and Western
Europe. In light of European history, especially the Soviet
Union's domination of the region during the Communist era,
Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe is not a new
phenomenon brought on in relation to the Ukraine crisis. In
2009, for example, analysts alleged that Czech President
Vaclav Klaus, influenced by Moscow, worked to destabilize the
Czech government and undermine passage of the EU's Lisbon
Treaty.
As the Visegrad Four (V4) group, Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary have attempted to engage in
regional cooperation with one another on a range of issues,
and to form common positions on foreign policy and EU
matters. The countries have struggled to find any group
coherence with regard to Russia and the conflict in Ukraine,
however. Poland's consistent and forceful advocacy of a
robust response to Russia's actions made it something of an
outlier in Central and Eastern Europe. Whether owing to a
desire to preserve energy and economic ties with Russia,
concerns about provoking Russia further, or the perception
that Russia's actions in Ukraine are distant and do not pose
a direct threat to their countries, the governments of the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary have tended to be more
ambiguous and reserved on the topic. Some observers note that
at times the leaders of these countries appear to have
prioritized short-term national economic interests over wider
strategic concerns.
Nevertheless, while many in the V4 countries and elsewhere
in Europe may remain skeptical about the wisdom and utility
of sanctions as an attempt to deter Russia's actions in
Ukraine, the measures have been adopted by the unanimous
agreement of all 28 EU member states. Observers assert that
this consensus was based on a common assessment by the member
state governments that sending a strong message to Russia's
leadership through meaningful sanctions was a political
imperative outweighing economic disruption and discomfort.
Observers further note that action must at times be viewed
separately from rhetoric and political ``doublespeak'' that
may be aimed at a domestic audience.
The Czech Republic
Opinions on Russia and the Ukraine crisis among Czech
political elites are fractured. At one end of the spectrum is
the pro-Kremlin position of Czech President Milos Zeman,
which appears to accept Russia's claims about the conflict
and opposes all sanctions. In June 2014, Zeman stated, ``I
cannot see any reason why to isolate the Russian Federation
from the European Union, why to speak about sanctions,
blockade, and embargo. There is a chance of increasing the
level of our cooperation. . .'' At the other end of the
spectrum is the position of the center-right opposition TOP
09 party, led by former Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg,
which has advocated tougher sanctions and providing military
aid to Ukraine.
In between them is the view characterized by Prime Minister
Bohuslav Sobotka of the center-left Social Democratic Party,
who accepted sanctions but sought exemptions based on
economic interests and called for early removal of the
measures. Following the adoption of wider EU sanctions in
July 2014, Sobotka stated, ``Neither for the European Union,
nor for Russia, is it favorable to get into a drawn-out trade
war and that some new economic and political Iron Curtain
appears on Ukraine's eastern border.'' There is also a
multilateralist view characterized by Foreign Minister
Lubomir Zaoralek, who argued that the Czech Republic should
belong to the EU mainstream and support the sanctions as an
efficient tool.
The Czech foreign and defense ministries ``view Russia as a
country which is destabilising the European security
architecture and . . . making attempts to revise the
international order,'' whereas ``the minister for industry
and trade sees Russia as a key non-EU economic partner for
the Czech Republic, with whom cooperation needs to be
enhanced.'' Prime Minister Sobotka has attempted to balance
these competing viewpoints, but the splits have left the
Czech government without a clear stance on Russia.
Two-thirds of the natural gas consumed in the Czech
Republic comes from Russia, accounting for nearly 15% of the
country's primary energy supply. In the context of sanctions
and Russia's economic slowdown, the Czech economy has been
negatively affected by a substantial decline in Russian
imports of Czech goods and reduced numbers of Russian
tourists visiting the Czech Republic. Russia accounts for
only 4% of Czech exports and 0.3% of foreign investment in
the Czech Republic, however. By contrast, over 80% of Czech
exports go to EU countries, and the Czech economy is tied
most closely to Germany.
President Zeman and Deputy Prime Minister/Finance Minister
Andrej Babis, in particular, have been recently cited by one
prominent commentator as leading politicians who ``frequently
echo or repeat Russian slogans.'' Zeman previously served as
prime minister from 1998-2002 at the head of the Social
Democratic Party, which he left in 2007, before he became the
Czech Republic's first popularly elected president in 2013
(the president was formerly chosen by parliament). The powers
of the Czech presidency are largely ceremonial, and the power
to lead the government falls squarely on the prime minister.
Nevertheless, the president is the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, exerts an influence on foreign policy, and
makes a number of formal appointments to
[[Page H1504]]
the central bank and judiciary. Some analysts assert that
Zeman has sought to push the boundaries of his powers to
influence government policy and legislation.
Although Zeman has also been strongly pro-EU and supported
close security ties with the United States through NATO, his
history of outspoken statements has labeled him as one of the
most pro-Russian leaders in Europe. He has condemned the EU
sanctions against Russia, strongly criticized the Ukrainian
government's approach to the conflict, and termed the
conflict in Ukraine a ``civil war.'' Analysts assert that
such statements have countered and undermined the Czech
government and foreign ministry and threatened to alienate
Czech allies in NATO, including the United States, and its
partners in the EU.
In May 2015, Zeman, who speaks fluent Russian, defied calls
for the diplomatic isolation of Russia by joining Slovak
Prime Minister Fico as one of the few European leaders
attending the 70th anniversary commemoration of the end of
World War II in Moscow. Opposition leaders asserted that the
visit seemed ``choreographed by Kremlin propagandists,'' with
President Putin commenting, ``I want to say that it pleases
us that there are still leaders in Europe who are able to
express their opinion, and who follow an independent
political line.''
While some observers maintain that Zeman is on balance an
outspoken personality who is not afraid to speak his mind,
others point to his close ties with businessmen connected to
Russia as a potential source of influence. Martin Nejedly,
the head of Russian energy company Lukoil's Czech subsidiary,
and Miroslav Slouf, a lobbyist for Lukoil, reportedly
financed much of Zeman's presidential campaign, were part of
his campaign team, and remain close advisers. Zeman has also
previously asserted that he is a ``long-time friend'' of
Vladimir Yakunin, a former KGB agent who was head of Russian
Railways and a close associate and ally of President Putin
until his retirement earlier this year. Yakunin was included
on the list of Russian officials placed under U.S. sanctions
following the annexation of Crimea.
Andrej Babis is reportedly the Czech Republic's second-
richest man, worth an estimated $2.4 billion. Babis, who is
of Slovak origin, founded the ANO party (ANO stands for
Action of Dissatisfied Citizens in Czech, although ``ano''
also means ``yes'' in Czech) in 2011, initially as a personal
political vehicle. Promoting populist, anti-corruption
messages, ANO came in second place in the 2013 Czech
election, and Babis became deputy prime minister and finance
minister in a coalition government led by Prime Minister
Sobotka's Social Democrats. Babis has continued to position
himself and his party as outsiders to the Czech political
establishment, and as a ``movement'' that eludes left-right
characterization rather than a political party (ANO belongs
to the centrist-liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats,
ALDE, in the European Parliament). With recent polls showing
ANO to be the Czech Republic's most popular party and Babis
its most trusted politician, he is considered a leading
possibility for prime minister following the 2017 election.
The intersection between Babis' continued business
interests and his political career has been controversial. In
the early 1990s, while an executive with the state-owned
trading company Petrimex, Babis took over ownership and
control of a newly founded Petrimex subsidiary, Agrofert,
using a still-undisclosed source of foreign financing
channeled through Switzerland. Reportedly aided by the use of
political connections to acquire state-owned enterprises
using state-guaranteed loans that were not always paid back,
Babis grew Agrofert into an agriculture, food, and chemical
giant that is now the Czech Republic's fourth-largest company
and has over 200 subsidiaries of its own. Babis has been
accused of using his government position to benefit his
private business interests, for example in a May 2015
parliamentary vote to continue state subsidies of biofuels, a
policy of strong benefit to Agrofert.
In 2013, Agrofert acquired the MAFRA media group, housing
two of the country's most widely read newspapers, most
popular radio station, and a leading television channel.
Observers assert that these media outlets have subsequently
avoided any criticism of Babis, promoted his activities, and
increased criticism of political opponents. Some analysts
have argued that Babis combination of political, economic,
and media power threatens the stability of the Czech
Republic's democratic institutions. In March 2015, Prime
Minister Sobotka told his party's congress:
``The problem is, however, that Andrej Babis, chairman of
our coalition partner, did not give up his economic and media
influence after he became deputy prime minister and finance
minister. He now concentrates political, economic and media
power whose extent has been unprecedented in this country
since 1989. He is at permanent risk of conflict of
interest.''
Babis' past has also caused controversy. The Czech Republic
maintains a ``lustration law'' passed in 1991 to keep former
high-level communists and secret police collaborators out of
top government posts. Babis has been waging a court battle
with Slovakia's Nation's Memory Institute, which oversees
communist-era secret police files. With Babis' secret police
file having gone missing long ago, the institute presented a
case in 2013 piecing together files it asserted as
circumstantial evidence that Babis was an informant code
named ``Bures.'' In June 2014, a Slovak judge ruled in favor
of removing Babis from the list of secret police
collaborators after two former agents testified in his
defense, finding there was not sufficiently clear documentary
evidence of deliberate collaboration. The institute is
reportedly continuing the investigation, however, after an
appeals court ruled the agents' testimony inadmissible.
Allegations of Babis' ties to communist-era security and
intelligence agencies are additionally fueled by his close
association with Agrofert board chairman Libor Siroky, a
former member of a Czechoslovak secret police unit that had
close ties with the KGB.
Babis has repeatedly criticized the EU sanctions against
Russia, and has been variously quoted stating that NATO
``cannot stay on this idea that Russia is the biggest
problem,'' ``Ukraine is not ready for the European Union and
Ukraine was always under the influence of Russia,'' and, with
regard to responsibility for Crimea and the conflict in
Ukraine, ``What is true or not true, who knows?'' Babis has
asserted that such skepticism is a legitimate part of the
European debate and that he and his party are strongly pro-
NATO and pro-EU, refuting allegations that he is ``pro-
Russian'' or has secretive ties to Russia. Nevertheless, with
Babis considered a possible future prime minister of the
Czech Republic, his oligarchic profile and communist-era
past, combined with his statements on sanctions and the
Ukraine crisis, have caused speculation and concern about
possible Russian connections and influence.
Slovakia
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has been an outspoken
critic of EU sanctions against Russia and has pursued cordial
relations with Moscow during his time in office. Fico has
been prime minister since 2012, and previously from 2006-
2010, at the head of the center-left Direction-Social
Democracy party (SMERSD). Fico (with Czech President Zeman)
was one of only two European leaders to attend events in
Moscow in May 2015 commemorating the 70th anniversary of the
end of World War II, and returned to Moscow in June 2015 with
a government delegation to discuss economic and energy ties.
Analysts and commentators asserted that these visits played
into Russian propaganda by allowing the Kremlin to show it
has partners in Europe who are inclined toward cooperation,
undermining U.S. and European attempts to portray Russia as
diplomatically isolated.
Slovakia is one of the EU countries most exposed
economically to Russia: Slovakia depends on Russia for 98% of
the natural gas it consumes (accounting for over 27% of the
country's primary energy supply), imports oil and nuclear
fuel from Russia, and its state budget relies to a
significant extent on revenue from transit fees associated
with Russian gas (via Ukraine). Slovakia is the main conduit
for Russian gas to Europe. In September 2014, Slovakia began
providing gas supplies to Ukraine, leading Russia to cut gas
flows to Slovakia by a reported 50% the following month. The
Slovak military also remains heavily dependent on Russian
armaments. At the same time, Russia accounts for only 3-4% of
Slovakia's exports, with the vast majority going to other EU
countries.
Fico drew particular attention in June 2014 when he
compared the idea of U.S. and NATO troops being stationed in
Slovakia to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia:
``I cannot imagine that there would be foreign soldiers on
our territory in the form of some bases...Slovakia has its
historical experience with participation of foreign troops.
Let us remember the 1968 invasion. Therefore this topic is
extraordinarily sensitive to us.''
Analysts assert that Slovak attitudes toward Russia are a
complicated mixture of interests and emotions that make it
hard to understand and predict Slovak policy toward Russia.
Some analysts perceive Fico's Russia policy as an attempt to
balance the competing imperatives of relations with NATO and
the EU with Slovakia's energy and economic relationship with
Russia, while attempting to appeal to public opinion,
business interests, and a Russophile wing of his party. For
example, Fico has criticized EU sanctions but not blocked
them, and he strongly criticized Ukrainian measures that have
threatened the flow of gas, but also provided ``reverse
flow'' gas supplies to Ukraine. Moscow opposes the ``reverse
flow'' of gas from Europe back to Ukraine and considers it
illegal.
Overall, national economic interests appear to be paramount
in Fico's approach. Slovakia did not block the expansion of
EU sanctions in July 2014 after securing exemptions for
sectors important to its economy (such as the export of
automobiles to Russia), but Fico has maintained that his
government might ``reject certain sanctions that would hurt
national interests.'' Following the adoption of the wider EU
sanctions and the announcement of Russia's retaliatory
measures, Fico stated, ``Why should we jeopardize the EU
economy that begins to grow? If there is a crisis situation,
it should be solved by other means than meaningless
sanctions. Who profits from the EU economy decreasing,
Russia's economy having trouble, and Ukraine economically on
its knees?''
Hungary
Alongside Hungary's commitment to NATO and a close security
partnership with
[[Page H1505]]
the United States, the government of Prime Minister Viktor
Orban has emphasized that it has other foreign policy
interests, including building closer relations with Russia.
Some analysts assert that the Hungarian government appears to
be the most ``pro-Russian'' government of the NATO and EU
countries. Although Hungary is still a democracy and Russia
is not, ideological similarities between Prime Minister Orban
and President Putin contribute to cordial relations to a
certain extent: both leaders have been organizing their
respective states in contrast to the ``liberal, Western
model,'' with Orban naming Russia (along with Singapore,
China, India, and Turkey) in a July 2014 speech as the type
of state model likely to be successful in the future. In
addition, Putin's doctrine of ``protecting'' ethnic Russian
populations that live outside the borders of Russia closely
evokes the nationalist view in Hungary of ethnic Hungarian
minorities that live outside the borders of the country.
According to some Western observers, Hungary has played an
unhelpful role in the Ukraine crisis by advocating greater
autonomy for a region of western Ukraine inhabited by
approximately 150,000 ethnic Hungarians. Breaking with
European attempts to portray Russia as diplomatically
isolated, Orban hosted Putin in a state visit in February
2015. Orban has been prime minister since 2010, and
previously from 1998-2002, at the head of the conservative
Fidesz party.
Hungary has considerable ties to Russia in the energy
sector. Russia provides over 76% of the natural gas consumed
in Hungary, accounting for one quarter of the country's
primary energy supply, and Hungary was a strong supporter of
Gazprom's now-cancelled South Stream pipeline that would have
crossed Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Slovenia (bypassing
Ukraine) to reach Austria and Italy. Russia also supplies the
fuel for Hungary's Paks nuclear power plant, which provides
about 40% of the country's electricity. Under a controversial
deal reached in early 2014, Russia will loan Hungary =10
billion to finance the construction by Russia's state-
owned Rosatom of two new units at the Paks plant.
Although it joined its EU partners in condemning the
annexation of Crimea as illegal, and signed on to the
multiple rounds of sanctions imposed against Russia by the
EU, Hungary has been among the countries most reluctant to
impose sanctions in response to Russia's actions in the
Ukraine conflict. In an August 2014 interview, just two weeks
after the adoption of expanded sectoral EU sanctions and one
week after the announcement of retaliatory Russian measures
against European food products, Prime Minister Orban called
for a re-think of the EU's sanctions, stating, ``The
sanctions policy pursued by the West, that is, ourselves, a
necessary consequence of which has been what the Russians are
doing, causes more harm to us than to Russia . . . In
politics, this is called shooting oneself in the foot.''
Although Russia is Hungary's largest non-EU trading partner,
with Hungarian exports to Russia represent less than 3% of
Hungary's total exports. The Hungarian economy is tied much
more closely to the German economy.
Russia and European Far-Right Parties
In recent years, there has been an increasingly evident
ideological link between European far-right parties and the
leadership of Russia. Far-right parties in V4 countries that
now take openly pro-Russia positions include: Jobbik in
Hungary; the Slovak National Party (SNS) and People's Party
Our Slovakia (L'SNS); the Czech Workers' Party of Social
Justice (DSSS); Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP)
and Polish Falanga.
Elsewhere in Europe, pro-Russia positions are held by:
France's National Front (FN); Italy's Lega Nord and the New
Force party in Italy; the National Democratic Party of
Germany (NPD); the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO); the
Flemish Interest (VB) party in Belgium; the Order and Justice
(TT) party in Lithuania; Golden Dawn in Greece; the
Nationalist Party of Bulgaria (NPB) and Bulgaria's Ataka
Party; and the British National Party (BNP).
While many of these parties remain well on the fringes of
their countries' political scene, Jobbik, FPO, FN, Golden
Dawn, Lega Nord and TT have had significant electoral
successes in winning seats in national parliaments and the
European Parliament.
Analysts assert that supporting far-right parties serves as
a way for Russia to work against European unity. Among other
elements of far-right ideology (typically including some
combination of extreme nationalism, ``law and order'' and the
preservation of ``traditional'' conservative or family
values, and anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, or anti-Islam
sentiments), most of these parties tend to be anti-
establishment and anti-EU. Some can be characterized as anti-
NATO/U.S. or isolationist, and some focus on problems with
neighboring countries. Jobbik, for example, in addition to
promoting strongly anti-Roma, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and
anti-Western stances, promotes the idea that Slovakia and
Romania are enemies of Hungary due to the ethnic Hungarian
minorities living across the border in those countries.
Although direct evidence of Russian financial support for
far-right parties remains for the most part difficult to
identify, there is a widespread belief that Russia has
covertly funneled money to parties such as the FN and Jobbik.
In November 2014, news outlets reported the discovery that
the FN had received a potentially illegal =9 million loan
from a Russian bank with close ties to President Putin.
Jobbik has also long been under suspicion of receiving
Russian (and Iranian) money, and the party's finances have
been questioned in the Hungarian Parliament and investigated
by the Hungarian government. After publishing an annual
budget of approximately $10,000 per year for 2004-2008,
Jobbik ran a well-financed campaign in the 2009 European
Parliament election and reportedly spent over $100,000 in the
2010 national election, when it won nearly 16% of the vote.
Analysts argued that the sudden increase in funding could not
have been due to domestic contributions. As Jobbik began
running a nationwide party operation, it also abandoned its
previous anti-Russian rhetoric to advocate both good
relations with Russia and Hungary leaving the EU to join
Russia's Eurasian Union. Jobbik now receives a state
allowance allotted to parties in parliament and has an
official budget of over $2.3 million. Suspicions of
additional private financing from abroad persist, however. A
potentially key figure in Jobbik's ties to Moscow is Bela
Kovacs, a Jobbik Member of the European Parliament who played
a central role in the party's rise in 2009 and has been a
vocal supporter of Russia in the European Parliament. In
October 2015, the European Parliament granted a request by
the Hungarian government to lift Kovacs' immunity from arrest
in order to face allegations of spying for Russia.
Russian support for far-right parties is not merely
financial. The Russian government has also been proactive in
offering organizational expertise, political know-how, and
media assistance to parties on Europe's far-right. Russian
support has reportedly included establishing and coordinating
pro-Russian parties, non-governmental civil organizations,
and think tanks, and providing support to friendly media
outlets. Russian diplomacy also offers far-right parties
access to political networks, including by sponsoring forums
and conferences that develop and coordinate national
doctrines and policies and encourage the formation of party
groups or families. To some extent, analysts attribute ties
between a number of European far-right parties and parallels
in the policies of parties in a range of countries to this
type of Russian-sponsored network-building.
____________________