[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 38 (Wednesday, March 9, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1384-S1385]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ORPHAN DRUGS
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, in light of recognition of Rare Disease
Day, I wish to speak about orphan drug exclusivity and trade promotion
authority.
Congress enacted the bipartisan Orphan Drug Act, ``ODA'', of 1983,
Pub. L. 97-414, to address a longstanding unmet need to develop new
treatments, diagnostics, and cures for rare diseases and disorders. I
am proud to be one of the lead Senate sponsors of the ODA, which was
passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. This act and the Rare
Diseases Act of 2002--which I also championed--created financial
incentives for the research and production of orphan drugs, including 7
years of market exclusivity, tax credits, and research grants, and also
established the Orphan Products Board at FDA and the Office of Rare
Diseases under the National Institutes of Health.
The purpose of these acts was to encourage the development of new
``orphan'' treatments, diagnostics, and cures for the millions of
Americans with rare disease who lacked access to effective medicines
because the existing incentives were insufficient to develop and market
drugs for such small groups of patients.
[[Page S1385]]
The ODA has been enormously successful. Before Congress enacted the
ODA in 1983, the Food and Drug Administration, FDA, approved only 38
drugs in the United States specifically to treat orphan diseases. From
the passage of the ODA in 1983 until May 2010, the FDA approved 353
orphan drugs and granted orphan designations to 2,116 compounds. As of
2010, 200 of the roughly 7,000 officially designated orphan diseases
have become treatable.
Yet, despite the benefits of these policies, the incentives and
access guarantees found in the ODA are not yet part of any free trade
agreement negotiations.
The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act
of 2015, or TPA, contain a number of negotiating objectives for the
administration to follow. For example, the TPA law's negotiating
objectives require that U.S. trade agreements provide a standard of
intellectual property rights protection that is similar to that found
in the United States, which includes providing incentives for
biopharmaceutical innovation that are similar to those in the United
States. The language in the TPA law is necessarily broad, and although
it does not explicitly reference critical incentives for orphan drug
development, I want to make it clear that these incentives, including
the 7-year market exclusivity at the heart of the ODA, are consistent
with the TPA law's requirement that U.S. trade agreements provide a
standard of intellectual property protection that is similar to U.S.
law.
This is especially important because vital incentives for orphan drug
development are lacking in many markets outside the United States,
hindering the development of treatments, diagnostics, and cures for
rare diseases--particularly diseases endemic to those markets. A lack
of incentives for orphan drug development in any one country can have a
very real impact on the likelihood of investment into a research or
cure for a given disease. Particularly in the case of ultra-rare
diseases, those affecting fewer than 1 in 50,000 individuals, there may
only be a handful of patients around the world who would benefit from a
particular treatment or cure, and removing a number of them from the
pool of potential patients may render investments in these therapies
untenable and could drive up costs for rare disease patients in the
United States.
Therefore, I want to make it clear that I believe it is appropriate
for the administration to negotiate ODA incentives and access
guarantees, including the 7-year market exclusivity period, in future
U.S. trade agreements and that the intent of Congress is that TPA's
negotiating objectives are consistent with that goal.
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