[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 21 (Thursday, February 4, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Pages S656-S658]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to talk about our 
relations with Iran and the enforcement of the U.S.-Iran--the 
international nuclear deal.
  Let me first start with a few observations to reinforce an important 
point: that Iran is neither our friend nor our ally. Just last 
Wednesday, as the international community marked the 71st anniversary 
of the liberation of Auschwitz as part of UNESCO's Holocaust 
Remembrance Day, when countries from around the world came together in 
solemn remembrance of the Shoah, united in a shared commitment that the 
atrocities of the Holocaust must never happen again, Iran's Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, issued a very different proclamation. It 
came in the form of a video uploaded to his official Web site in which 
the narrator condemns the nations of the world for supporting Israel 
and questions the legitimacy and magnitude of the Holocaust.
  Just a few days later, the Supreme Leader of Iran awarded medals to 
the members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps who detained American 
sailors last month under very dubious circumstances. The Iranian 
Supreme Leader, eager to use this incident for his own propaganda 
purposes, called them Medals of Conquest.
  These two actions are despicable and not the sign of a nation ready 
to rejoin the international community. These actions by Iran's Supreme 
Leader are just the most recent in a series of provocations and 
reminders that the Iranian regime is neither Americas's ally nor 
friend.
  A nation such as Iran that continues to suppress dissent, promotes 
terrorism on its regional neighbors, and blatantly disregards 
international law and norms, is a destabilizing force, a revolutionary 
regime not to be trusted. It is precisely for this reason--because we 
are deeply distrustful of Iran and its intentions--that we have to come 
together to rigorously, aggressively enforce the terms of the nuclear 
deal with Iran and push back on its bad behavior, from its support for 
terrorism, to its human rights abuses, to its illegal ballistic missile 
tests.
  Today I wanted to focus on one of the most vital elements of the 
nuclear deal--the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the 
nuclear deal with Iran, which is the dramatic increase in access and 
surveillance that the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, 
has gained through this agreement.
  After implementation day was reached, one of the significant 
consequences of that milestone is not just that Iran has taken dramatic 
action to push back its own nuclear trajectory but that it has granted 
unprecedented access to the world's nuclear watchdog agency to monitor 
its compliance with the deal. As Congress, the administration, and the 
international community now focus on enforcing the terms of the JCPOA, 
it is worth taking a much deeper look at what exactly makes this IAEA 
access so unprecedented and so important to maintain.
  I recently visited the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna, Austria, 
with a delegation of eight Senators. This agency has a huge amount 
riding on its ability to successfully detect any Iranian cheating under 
this deal. It is no understatement to say that the very credibility of 
the IAEA is on the line as it monitors, inspects, and verifies the 
status of Iran's nuclear program--not just for a week, a month, or a 
year, but for decades into the future. I was pleased and reassured to 
see that they are using some of the very innovative inspection 
techniques developed at America's own National Laboratories. These are 
just a few of the topics I want to touch on in the minutes ahead.
  The nuclear deal reached with Iran required that they provide the 
IAEA with around-the-clock, 24/7 access to monitor Iran's entire 
nuclear fuel cycle. What is a nuclear fuel cycle? It is all the 
different steps required to go from mining the raw ore to actually 
producing highly enriched uranium--from uranium mines, uranium mills, 
centrifuge production workshops, to every known and declared uranium 
enrichment site connected to Iran's nuclear program.
  Simply put, before this agreement--before the JCPOA--Iran could have 
converted its uranium or its plutonium into material useful for a 
nuclear weapon. On implementation day, Iran disabled its Arak reactor. 
They filled the core of that reactor with concrete, shutting off the 
so-called plutonium pathway to a nuclear weapon.
  Today I will focus on the uranium pathway of the commercial nuclear 
fuel cycle, which includes the four

[[Page S657]]

parts I just mentioned--mills, mines, conversion facilities, and 
enrichment facilities. These different components of their entire fuel 
cycle are scattered across the nation of Iran, as you can see in the 
graphic to my right.
  The fuel cycle begins at uranium mines where hundreds of tons of 
dirt, rocks, and ore which contain tiny, trace amounts of uranium--
typically just 0.1 percent--are dug up, blasted into smaller pieces, 
dumped into huge trucks, and then transported to the next stage, 
uranium mills.
  Two mills exist in Iran near Gachin and Saghand. Under the JCPOA, the 
IAEA will maintain continuous access to these mills. In these uranium 
mills, the rocks retrieved from mines are then ground into dust from 
which uranium is extracted. This raw uranium ore concentrate is then 
transported--again, under the supervision of the IAEA--to a uranium 
conversion facility at Isfahan, where it is converted into uranium 
hexafluoride gas, or UF-6.
  The final and most critical step of the fuel cycle takes place at so-
called enrichment facilities where rapidly spinning centrifuges enrich 
uranium hexafluoride to the point where it can be used for research and 
development, industrial purposes, or, if enriched to a very high level 
as fissile material, it can be used for a nuclear weapon.
  Critically, the nuclear deal gives the IAEA access to inspect and 
oversee every one of these stages, not just enrichment facilities, as 
other deals with other countries previously required. If the JCPOA only 
required the Iranians to give nuclear inspectors access to their 
enrichment facilities, Tehran could easily continue to mine, meld, 
convert, and then quite likely enrich uranium undetected elsewhere, 
such as undeclared secret facilities. That is why it is so important 
that mills, mines, and the whole rest of the fuel cycle are subject to 
regular inspections and continuous oversight. Access to the entire fuel 
cycle means that the IAEA--and thus the world--will know if Iran tries 
to move any nuclear material to undeclared covert facilities.
  One of the biggest advances in this new, continuous monitoring 
approach is a whole new series of inspection techniques and 
technologies. It is not enough for nuclear inspectors themselves to be 
able to access every step of the fuel cycle because it is impossible 
for even the best inspectors to be physically present everywhere all of 
the time in a nuclear fuel cycle system as complex as Iran's. That is 
why effective oversight and enforcement demands that the IAEA be able 
to monitor enrichment efforts remotely and constantly. That level of 
monitoring is provided by the continuous real-time monitoring of all of 
Iran's declared nuclear facilities.
  Here is one of the ways that works. The small device to my right here 
is an IAEA monitoring device--known as an online enrichment monitor, or 
an OLEM--which is installed at the Natantz fuel enrichment plant in 
Iran. The pipe labeled ``A'' is a processing pipe that transports 
gaseous uranium hexafluoride gas from cascades of spinning centrifuges. 
These centrifuges are the devices that take the uranium previously 
mined from the ground and then milled to be transformed or enriched 
into uranium possibly useful for either civilian or military purposes.
  Inside the box at the bottom right, this ``B,'' is a gamma ray 
detector which measures the amount of uranium hexafluoride gas flowing 
through the centrifuge at key measurement points. These gamma ray 
detectors send continuous, real-time, 24/7 information to the IAEA so 
it can make sure that Iran's uranium enrichment levels remain at or 
below the agreed-upon 3.67 percent--dramatically lower than the 90 
percent enrichment threshold required for fissile material useable for 
a weapon.
  In addition to these gamma ray detectors, pressure and temperature 
sensors continuously monitor the present quantities of gaseous uranium 
hexafluoride gas. Measurements from these sensors, combined with data 
from the gamma ray detectors, allow the IAEA to effectively monitor all 
uranium enrichment. This monitoring equipment runs autonomously, has 
backup battery power to ensure reliability, and is encased, as you can 
see, in sealed containers that contain tamper-resistant equipment to 
allow the international community to know if Iran tries to alter or 
tamper with the monitoring equipment.
  Before the IAEA developed and implemented these continuous monitoring 
devices, nuclear inspectors had only two options for verifying 
compliance: Send inspectors directly, physically into each facility to 
retrieve physical samples or attempt to measure compliance, even 
remotely, by taking environmental samples. As a stand-alone method, 
these two techniques were unreliable and time-intensive, requiring 
weeks to collect, ship, and analyze samples. Today, instead of waiting 
weeks or months for results, the IAEA now has real-time, around-the-
clock access, so it is aware of exactly what Iran is doing at its 
enrichment facilities.
  These nonstop monitoring devices that were recently developed will 
also be supplemented by traditional sampling and analysis performed in 
person by IAEA inspectors. Continuous monitoring devices are in place 
at all of Iran's uranium enrichment facilities, as well as every known 
site at which Iran mills and converts uranium and manufactures or 
stores centrifuges.

  That represents every single location involved in Iran's fuel cycle--
except uranium mines. That is because real-time monitoring of a mine 
would serve no scientific purpose. Uranium mines consist of thousands 
of tons of raw dirt, rock, and ore. Only a minuscule amount of uranium 
is naturally present, and even that raw uranium is typically present in 
such tiny concentrations--just a fraction of a percent--that they are 
unusable without further processing and enrichment.
  IAEA inspectors have regular access, as I have said, to all known 
uranium mines, and because of the huge amount of activity required to 
process and mine uranium, regular inspectors are more than sufficient 
to uncover and monitor Iran's behavior at mines.
  Throughout Iran's nuclear facilities, the IAEA has also installed 
both still and video cameras. These cameras provide a 90-percent 
increase in the number of images generated per day compared to before 
the nuclear agreement, giving the international community another vital 
window into Iran's activities.
  In addition, gamma ray monitors--as well as all nuclear material, 
centrifuges, and equipment--are all secured with tamper-evident seals 
to protect the integrity of the equipment.
  In our Nation's history of dealing with rogue states seeking a 
nuclear weapons capability--from Saddam Hussein's Iraq to Qadhafi's 
Libya to North Korea--there has never been an inspection protocol that 
allowed the IAEA this level of access to monitor and oversee every 
stage of the nuclear fuel cycle. Under this level of oversight, to 
produce a nuclear weapon, Iran would need to construct an entirely 
separate fuel cycle--a whole supply chain, including mining, milling, 
conversion, and enrichment facilities--completely in secret--an 
exceptionally difficult undertaking.
  But access alone is not enough. For us to be ensured that Iran is not 
developing a nuclear weapon, the IAEA must also have the resources to 
turn that access into effective oversight.
  Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran must declare every nuclear and 
nuclear-related facility that exists within its borders. In response, 
inspectors have three roles: first, to confirm that Iran's site 
declarations are accurate and comprehensive; second, to monitor all 
declared sites to make sure Iran's behavior complies with the terms of 
the deal; and, third, to track material that leaves each facility to 
make sure Iran is not pursuing illicit nuclear activity at undeclared 
sites elsewhere in the country.
  Inspectors have regular, complete access to every segment of the 
nuclear supply chain: conversion, enrichment, mines, mills, fuel 
manufacturing, the reactors themselves, and spent fuel. To reach the 
level of necessary oversight, the IAEA has increased its number of 
inspectors by 120 percent. But I will remind my colleagues that for the 
next 25 years or more, these physical inspections will have to be 
sustained to provide a critical supplement to the continuous monitoring 
technology I referenced before.
  Even so, if the IAEA doesn't have enough capable nuclear scientists 
to effectively monitor, evaluate, and investigate every aspect of 
Iran's nuclear

[[Page S658]]

fuel cycle, the international community will not, for the decades to 
come, be able to effectively enforce the terms of the JCPOA.
  It takes years to train capable nuclear scientists and even longer to 
develop new and better monitoring technologies.
  As the name of the IAEA implies, fully supporting the IAEA requires 
support from each of our international partners. But Congress can and 
should take a step forward by providing reliable, continuous, long-term 
funding for the IAEA so they can increase the number of their fully 
trained and available inspectors. It would send a strong signal to both 
our allies and to Iran that we are serious about holding Iran to the 
terms of the deal not just this year but over the decades to come.
  The IAEA needs the resources to do its job effectively and 
efficiently. Working effectively means the inspections are not only 
uncovering violations or potential violations of the deal but also 
deterring Iran from covert action by knowing with certainty that they 
will be caught. Working efficiently means the IAEA can devote as many 
resources as necessary to searching for undeclared sites and monitoring 
those that are known. To this end, I hope that when the President's 
budget is released next week, it will include a significant increase in 
resources for the IAEA.
  Adequately funding the IAEA is something I will be speaking about in 
greater detail in the weeks to come, but it is also important to note 
that there is a direct correlation between our investments in Federal 
research and development--specifically, in our National Laboratories--
and our effectiveness in keeping Iran's nuclear ambitions and the 
threat of proliferation throughout the rest of the world in check.
  For over 35 years--back to 1980--every single IAEA inspector has been 
trained at least once at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
  The Idaho, Oak Ridge, and Brookhaven National Labs are also part of 
the vital training network for IAEA inspectors. On average, our 
national labs are training 150 IAEA inspectors every year--about one-
fifth of the entire inspection staff--every single year, developing key 
skills to keep us and the world safe, like learning how to make 
accurate, prompt measurements of nuclear material.
  Our National Labs also play a key role in improving existing 
technologies and developing new ones that we can't even imagine today. 
The online enrichment monitors I described earlier, which will allow 
for continuous, real-time oversight of Iran's enrichment activities, 
were originally developed at Oak Ridge National Lab in Tennessee.
  In fact, most of America's 17 National Labs have supported or are 
currently supporting some element of the IAEA safeguards technology, 
both as individual labs and as part of a 10-nation, 20-lab network of 
analytical labs that include Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore, 
Pacific Northwest, and New Brunswick National Labs.
  In conclusion, congressional oversight is essential to the most 
stringent implementation of the nuclear deal with Iran and for our 
national security as a whole. Making investments in our National Labs 
and in Federal research and development today means better trained, 
better equipped nuclear inspectors for the years and the decades to 
come. Adequately funding the IAEA today means the international 
community takes full advantage of the unprecedented access we 
negotiated in this deal.
  Effectively enforcing the JCPOA and pushing back on Iran's bad 
behavior today makes it clear that we intend to hold Iran accountable 
and to lay the groundwork for security for generations to come.
  If we are serious about enforcing the terms of the nuclear deal, we 
need more than access; we need action.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I came to the floor to listen to my friend 
talk about one of the most important issues that we have dealt with in 
this body for many years. There is no one who is more articulate and 
more understanding of the issues that face us in foreign policy than 
the junior Senator from Delaware. So I extend my appreciation to him, 
and I am glad I had the opportunity to come and listen to what he had 
to say. The stuff he talked about is not simple stuff. It took someone 
of his ability to explain so we all understand what he has said, and 
pointing the way forward for peace and security not only in that part 
of the world but the other work he has done on the Foreign Relations 
Committee to promote peace and security around a lot of the world.

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