[Congressional Record Volume 162, Number 6 (Monday, January 11, 2016)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10-S11]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, after months of delay, last fall we 
finally were able to see the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
text that corporate lobbyists had access to long before the American 
people and Members of Congress and their staffs did. After examining 
the provisions in this deal, it is clear that far too many of these 
provisions sell out American workers and American jobs.
  In the months leading up to the release of this deal, I warned that 
too often our trade agreements as far back as NAFTA and the Permanent 
Normal Trade Relations with China--not a trade agreement per se, but it 
had the same effect in many ways--the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement, the South Korea Free Trade Agreement--these trade agreements 
amounted to corporate handouts and worker sellouts. I warned our 
negotiators that they needed to do more to ensure that the deal created 
a truly level playing field for American workers and American 
businesses. Unfortunately, that is not what happened, particularly when 
it comes to standing up for the American auto industry.
  We hear often about the supposed opportunities that trade agreements 
will create: opportunities for more jobs, opportunities for small 
business, opportunities for more exports, and for economic growth. But 
when I look at the Trans-Pacific Partnership, I don't see these 
actual--let's call them offensive opportunities--and by ``offensive 
opportunities'' I mean opportunities for American products to break 
into new markets. This is not just playing defense, but playing offense 
so that we can export into these new markets.
  Cheerleaders for this agreement--whether it is the Wall Street 
Journal editorial page, most Republicans in the Senate, or whether it 
is Republican leadership in the House, whether it is corporate CEOs or 
whether it is the White House--say that new markets will be opened for 
American cars, but we have heard these empty promises before.
  Under TPP, many of these new markets will not be opened day one--as 
in the case of Malaysia and Vietnam. They won't be open in day two or 
year one or year two. It will be more than a decade until American 
automakers have full access to these closed markets.
  The TPP will do nothing to level the playing field with our top 
competitor, Japan, or to change Japan's distinction as the most closed 
auto market in the world. We know it has been that in the past. We know 
it is that today. There is nothing in here that would change or open 
Japan's market, to sell into the Japanese auto market.
  Carmakers in Ohio and carmakers across the country will compete with 
huge numbers of Japanese imports. We don't have it today, and under TPP 
we won't have the same opportunity to export to Japan. That is because 
for decades Japan has used barriers other than tariffs to keep their 
markets closed. Tariffs are one way. They charge huge tariffs, causing 
the price of the product that you import--let's say into Japan--to be 
too high for the Japanese to afford, but that is not what Japan does. 
Their tariffs are already at zero, so an agreement on tariffs will do 
nothing to create a level playing field. Japan keeps our products out 
in much more creative ways than tariffs.
  We have seen this in the wake of the Korean Free Trade Agreement. 
Even after our trading partners promised to remove these barriers to 
allow American cars into their market, they often don't. Opening up 
Japan's market didn't work in the 1980s, it didn't work in the 1990s, 
and it didn't seem that it will be any different under the Trans-
Pacific Partnership.
  If there aren't new offensives--offensives in the sense of selling 
into those countries--then I would expect our negotiations at least 
make sure this trade agreement protected American carmakers and workers 
from a flood of cheap foreign competition. I would hope they made sure 
the benefits of the agreement would only go toward its members who have 
been part of the negotiating process and made concessions, but it is 
not. It is not just the TPP countries.
  That is now how I read the text, particularly when it comes to 
something called the rules of origin for autos. These rules of origin 
provide provisions to determine how much of a car is made in the TPP 
region, and TPP rules are weaker than NAFTA's. That means how much of 
the car is actually made in the TPP countries, how much of the car must 
be made in the TPP countries to count as a TPP product.
  That means 62.5 percent of a vehicle must be made in the NAFTA region 
in order for it to qualify for the benefits of the NAFTA agreement. But 
only 45

[[Page S11]]

percent--much less than NAFTA and in some cases even less than that--of 
a car has to be made in the TPP region to qualify for the benefits of 
the agreement. Think about that. Under TPP, less than half a car has to 
be made in TPP countries, which include Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States, to receive the benefits of TPP.
  So what does that mean? That means more than half of the components 
in the car--more than half of the car--can be made in China. So China 
can backdoor much of its supply chain into the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. Then these cars, mostly made in China, will get the 
benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, even though they aren't in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership. As more countries join TPP, that 45-
percent rule will become an even weaker standard, and fewer and fewer 
of our cars will come from the U.S. auto supply chain.
  I never thought I would be able to say this, but this agreement makes 
NAFTA--an agreement I fought hard to defeat 20 years ago--look good. 
TPP's auto rules were written for Japanese automakers to the benefit of 
China and at the expense of American auto jobs.
  TPP will jeopardize the livelihoods of thousands of Americans, 
including up to 600,000 Ohioans, whose jobs depend on the U.S. auto 
supply chain. These aren't just statistics. We are talking about real 
workers in real plants in real companies in real communities, in Ohio 
and across the country, with bills to pay and families to feed.
  They fought hard to bring the American auto industry back to life. 
Their hard work made the auto rescue a success. Last year, 2015, was a 
record year for automakers. We can't pull the rug out from under them 
now with a trade deal that sells out American auto jobs.
  Think of what we have done. In 2010, only--maybe fewer than this--10 
million vehicles were made in the United States. Today that number is 
close to 17 million. Chrysler posted 7 percent gains in sales last 
year. GM and Ford were not far behind with 5 percent. I am proud to say 
the best-selling American vehicle for 34 years running, the Ford-150, 
runs on engines produced in Lima, OH. Five years ago the American 
President, President Obama, did the right thing when he personally 
committed to saving the American auto industry.
  If you ask people in Ohio, in Toledo, in Avon Lake, in Cleveland, in 
Warren, in Lordstown, they know how important the auto rescue was. We 
were losing hundreds of thousands of jobs a month at the beginning of 
President Obama's term. Since the auto rescue, the next year--we have 
seen job growth in this country for 70 months in a row, 70 consecutive 
months of job growth starting with the auto rescue.
  Now I hope the President will do the right thing again and go back to 
the drawing board on the aspects of this trade deal that we know will 
cost American auto jobs.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas

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