[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 182 (Tuesday, December 15, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8650-S8653]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
Mr. COONS. Mr. President, today our Nation is distracted by grave
concerns, by threats abroad and at home, by concerns about our economy
and our people. I stand here today to call on us to continue to be
focused on something that is not currently at the top of the news but
on something that is a pressing and ongoing national concern. We need
to be strictly and aggressively enforcing the terms of our nuclear deal
with Iran that we reached with a variety of our other international
partners and that is currently moving forward. We need to push back on
Iran's bad and disruptive behavior, not just in its region but
globally, and give our administration and international agencies the
resources and the nominees confirmed that will allow them to be
successful in enforcing our actions against Iran.
A few short months ago, if you asked anyone what topics would be at
the top of the list of America's foreign policy conversation or the
upcoming Presidential campaign, you would have been hard-pressed to
find anyone who didn't mention the Iran nuclear agreement front and
center. It completely centered the debate in this Chamber and around
the country last summer and fall. What a difference a few months can
make.
This morning many of us are deeply concerned about an alleged bomb
threat in Los Angeles that is causing hundreds of thousands of
schoolchildren to be sent home mid-schoolday. And in response to the
recent and horrific attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, we are focused
on identifying weaknesses in our border security and in finding ways to
protect the American people without compromising our fundamental
values.
We are rightly focused on expanding the U.S.-led coalition to defeat
ISIS and on finding a way to assist our allies in providing safe haven
to some of the millions of refugees fleeing terror and chaos abroad.
Sadly, we are also distracted by a Republican Presidential primary in
which a leading candidate has cast aside the Constitution in favor of
incendiary rhetoric. That is why I rise today to make sure we remain
focused on one of America's most important challenges to the United
States and our key allies, including, centrally, Israel, which is
enforcing the terms of the nuclear deal with Iran.
On September 1, after a long study and real reflection and
significant debate, I ultimately announced my support for the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA, also known as the Iran
nuclear agreement. Just over a week later, the review period ended and
Congress failed to reject the deal, so it moved forward. The agreement
took effect a month and a half later on October 18, known as adoption
day, when Iran agreed to give the International Atomic Energy Agency,
or IAEA, dramatically expanded inspection and verification powers. We
are now 3 months into the JCPOA, and I want to take this opportunity
today to assess areas where the Obama administration and our
international partners have done well over the past 3 months and to
highlight areas where we must do more.
Since adoption day, we have seen some progress and some real setbacks
on implementing the terms of the deal.
First the positives, and there are some. Iran has begun to
reconfigure its plutonium nuclear reactor at Arak so it can no longer
produce materials necessary for a nuclear weapon. The government has
also started to dismantle its enrichment centrifuges and its
infrastructure that would have enabled it to use uranium as a nuclear
weapon in the short term. The IAEA has also continued to make
preparations to monitor and verify the deal and to increase its number
of inspectors on the ground, to deploy modern technologies to monitor
Iran's declared nuclear facilities, and to set up a comprehensive
oversight program of Iran's centrifuge manufacturing facilities and its
entire nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mines, to mills, to enrichment
facilities.
These steps are promising, but by no means do they tell the complete
story of Iran's bad behavior since this deal was reached, nor do these
few positive steps indicate that implementing the terms of this deal
going forward will be anything less than exceptionally difficult. In
fact, not only will enforcement of this deal be incredibly tricky, but
I believe how effectively and aggressively we enforce the JCPOA in
these early months and years will set the table for how we respond when
Iran commits violations later. Whether we respond now when Iran commits
minor violations around the boundaries of the nuclear deal will send a
critical message to our allies and adversaries alike.
I am confident that the actions taken by the United States and our
allies to counter and restrain Iran and the Middle East, especially in
these early months of the deal, will profoundly impact Iran's behavior
going forward.
That brings me to less positive news. When I announced my support for
the JCPOA last September, I made it clear that it was based on a deep
suspicion of Iran, an inherent distrust of their intentions, and a
clear-eyed commitment to aggressively oversee and enforce the terms of
the deal.
My concerns proved justified on October 22 when Iran concluded a
ballistic missile test in clear violation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1929. Those unlawful tests came just days after adoption day
under the JCPOA. Last week, before the U.N. Security Council could
finish their investigations and take any concrete actions, we heard
reports of a second Iranian ballistic missile test on November 21.
I fear the Iranians are taking action after action in this area and
others to
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demonstrate that they are willing to flout international rules,
regulations, and restrictions. And in the absence of our decisive
action, these misdeeds by the Iranians will simply continue and
escalate.
Today, a new report from the IAEA gives further justification to the
distrust shared by supporters and opponents of the nuclear deal. The
IAEA report on the so-called possible military dimensions--or PMD--of
Iran's nuclear program found ``that a range of activities relevant to
the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran
prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities
took place after 2003.'' These activities included computer modeling
that took place as recently as 2009.
The PMD report details just how determined Iran has been to develop
nuclear weapons capability. Iran developed detonators. Iran
experimented with explosives technology. Iran engaged in computer
modeling of a nuclear explosive. Iran even set up organizations
specifically dedicated to nuclear weapons activity. It is not hard to
connect those dots, and the IAEA did. That agency found that Iran
engaged in efforts to demolish, remove, and refurbish facilities
related to testing nuclear weapons components. Its government also
offered misleading explanations of its past nuclear behavior.
It is equally important to note what the IAEA did not find. Iran's
weapons program didn't advance beyond an exploratory stage. The IAEA
found no indication there was a whole undeclared nuclear fuel cycle in
Iran or that Iran held significant amounts of undeclared uranium.
Despite the ambiguous nature of this report, I think the take-away is
clear: Iran's nuclear weapons-related activities and its sustained
determination to hide and obfuscate its behavior reinforce our
justifications for ongoing distrust of the Iranian Government and for
the strict monitoring and verification of the components of the nuclear
deal.
My colleagues and I have access to classified material, meaning we
know more than is publicly known about the extent and direction of the
nuclear weapons program in Iran. But the IAEA report is important
because it establishes a baseline for Iran's program, for our
assessment of their breakout time, and for our knowledge of how far
they have gotten in weaponization. Knowledge of these efforts is
critical to our future enforcement of this deal.
The IAEA report also reaffirms that as implementation of the deal
moves forward, the international community must continue to seek and
consider information about Iran's past nuclear activity. In my view,
the IAEA must maintain its ability to continue reviewing any new
information related to Iran's past nuclear weapons program, and we have
to continue to assertively investigate any new accusations of Iranian
covert activity or malfeasance.
We have to continue to counter Iran's rogue actions--which only serve
to isolate Iran on the world stage--by continuing to enforce sanctions
without exception and be prepared to impose new sanctions if and when
Iran's behavior warrants it. For example, the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, Samantha Power, was right to immediately shine a
spotlight on the recent ballistic missile test I recently cited and to
call for a U.N. Security Council investigation promptly. When that
investigation is completed, the Security Council should act, but if it
doesn't, I hope and expect that the administration is ready to enforce
a series of unilateral American actions, including direct sanctions
against those Iranians responsible for this violation. While these
ballistic missile tests are outside the parameters of the JCPOA, our
response has to be strategic, and we have to make sure Iran knows it
can't continue to simply and blatantly disregard the international
community and the U.N. Security Council.
Since the announcement of the JCPOA, the Treasury Department has
taken steps to target Iran's malign activity in the region. In
November, the Treasury Department designated three Hezbollah
procurement agents and four companies in Lebanon, China, and Hong Kong
for purchasing dual-use technology on behalf of Hezbollah. These
sanctions followed actions in July against three senior Hezbollah
military officials in Syria and Lebanon who were providing military
support to the Syrian regime and an additional Hezbollah procurement
agent who served as the point person for the procurement and
transshipment of weapons and materials for the group and its Syrian
partners for at least 15 years.
These designations also follow Treasury's actions during negotiations
over the JCPOA when the Department utilized multiple authorities and
sanctioned more than 100 Iranians and Iran-linked persons and entities,
including more than 40 under its ongoing terrorism sanction
authorities.
In November, Treasury also participated in the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation
Council Working Group on Iran, through which participants discussed our
joint efforts to counter Iran's support for Hezbollah, for the Assad
regime, and for other militant proxies in the region. That working
group continues to improve information sharing and cooperation to take
joint actions targeting Iran's support for terrorism and its other
destabilizing activities in the region and around the world.
In early December, Saudi Arabia agreed to designate 12 Hezbollah
officials for terrorism, further disrupting their ability to raise and
move funds around the gulf.
Implementing this agreement successfully will demand that we continue
to develop discrete, clear, and public responses to minor Iranian
violations of the agreement. My view on this was shaped in no small
part by advice I got from a dear, long-term friend in New York,
Maurice, who told me about his experience decades ago negotiating a
complex commercial deal with Iran. After 2 years of excruciating and
detailed back-and-forth negotiations, he told me they sat at the table
to sign their agreement and begin their commercial partnership. After
shaking hands across the table, the lead Iranian negotiator said: Now,
my friend, the negotiations begin in earnest.
All of us who have studied Iran's behavior and know the history of
their work to conceal their nuclear weapons program and their work to
destabilize the region know that Iran will cheat on this agreement.
They will litigate the boundaries. They will find ways large and small
to test us.
For example, the nuclear agreement bars Iran from enriching beyond
3.67 percent. How will we respond if, for example, for a month Iran
claims it accidentally enriched to 4 percent? We are unlikely to snap
back the full multilateral sanctions regime because such a move would
have little support in the international community for such a small and
transient infraction and could be perceived as an overreaction. But
inaction is not an option either. In coordination with our allies, we
must develop a menu of responses that allow us to respond quickly and
precisely to minor violations of the deal because there are no real
minor violations of the deal. Otherwise Iran will little by little eat
away at the constraints of this agreement, and our deterrence and
credibility will collapse.
In addition to deploying sanctions more effectively and ratcheting
them up as necessary, the international community must also increase
our efforts to push back against Iran's malign activity in the Middle
East. More specifically, we have to enhance our campaign of
interdicting Iranian weapons shipments and support to its proxies in
Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. Iran sends illicit arms shipments to
terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis who pass
through international waters, and under both domestic and international
law, the United States maintains its authority to disrupt these
shipments. We must use that authority to act and to demonstrate our
will. We must use that authority to work with our partners in the
region and our allies around the world to increase the tempo and scope
of our interdiction efforts. Successful interdiction efforts not only
get deadly weapons out of the hands of terrorists but also deter Iran
and undermine its proxies throughout the Middle East.
We know we can be successful in this aspect of our enforcement
because the administration has already successfully disrupted Iranian
weapons shipments in recent months. Although many of us have been
briefed in a classified setting about encouraging developments in this
area, I think it is important that we have at least one example that we
can share with our colleagues and the world.
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Please take a look at this picture to my left. In September, a raid
off the coast of Yemen seized a large cache of Iranian arms destined
for the Houthi rebels who seek to undermine the legitimate Yemeni
Government. This massive weapons shipment included a whole series of
the component parts of sophisticated TOW missiles, including 56 tube-
launched, optically tracked, wire-guided TOW missiles and the
associated sights, mounts, tubes, battery sets, launcher assemblies,
guidance systems, battery assemblies, and nearly 20 other sophisticated
anti-tank weapons. I commend the administration for these efforts and
for this successful interdiction in international waters, but we cannot
stop there.
Every month while Iran negotiates with the international community
with one hand, with the other hand it has been sending millions of
dollars' worth of weapons to the murderous Assad regime in Syria, to
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and to the Houthis in Yemen. We must not stand by
while Iran continues to spread its terror and destabilize this
region. Nor is it sufficient simply to increase our interdiction
efforts. We must publicize these efforts when successful.
When an American smalltown sheriff pulls off a successful drug bust,
we better believe that sheriff is going to hold a press conference and
put on the table the drugs and guns taken off the streets. Actions like
that send a simple signal to those who engage in the drug trade that
there is a sheriff in town who is actually going after bad actors and
who isn't going to tolerate this destabilizing and illegal activity.
I think the American people and the international community need to
know about Iran's bad behavior and our willingness to take effective
actions to push back. Just as importantly, Iran needs to know that the
international community remains serious about cracking down on its
illegal arms shipments and its promotion of terror.
I am committed and I am willing and ready to help the administration
increase its interdiction efforts in any way I can. A shared commitment
to this from my colleagues--a shared focus on this from my colleagues--
is especially important today when many members of the administration
and the American people are understandably focused elsewhere: on our
Presidential election next year, on the global refugee crisis, and on
recent terrorist attacks and the conflict with ISIS.
These are busy times. As the holidays approach and as Congress nears
a massive budget deal, I see my colleagues and my constituents focusing
less and less on Iran, but we must maintain our focus for the months
and years to come. Given the 24/7 news cycle and the media's incessant
focus on the crisis of the moment, we will be tempted to turn our
attention elsewhere.
Adoption day was not the end of the agreement with Iran. In fact, it
signified just the beginning. And we must think strategically about the
Middle East, which critically includes Iran as the central promoter of
terrorism and source of destabilizing action in the region.
We must redouble our efforts to follow through on the most rigorous
enforcement of the JCPOA or face terrible consequences. We have to
scrutinize Iranian actions ever more closely for signs it is reneging
on its commitments. This JCPOA is set to last in principle for 15 years
but in some terms indefinitely. Congress must not waiver--not for 1
day--in our oversight of the implementation of this agreement.
Whether my colleagues supported or opposed the deal, we should put
our differences about that aside and focus on enforcement. The deal is
designed to deter Iran from evading or cheating on the deal while also
countering Iranian bad activity in the region. That is why I worked
with a group of my colleagues to introduce the Iran Policy Oversight
Act in September. This bill, cosponsored by supporters and opponents of
the JCPOA, helps ensure the United States aggressively enforces the
terms of the nuclear deal. The Iran Policy Oversight Act also provides
support for our friends in the Middle East, most centrally our vital
and steadfast ally, Israel.
I am pleased to hear the administration is working on negotiating a
new 10-year memorandum of understanding for Israel's security, and I am
pleased to hear that its assistance will continue to grow to ensure
Israel maintains its qualitative military edge.
In recent weeks, I have also had the chance to discuss the Iranian
deal and our intention to continue to enforce the sanctions that remain
on the books and to interdict and to push back against Iran's
destabilizing regional activities. When I was in Paris at the global
climate conference, I had the chance to discuss this issue with French
Government officials and business leaders. I will continue these
efforts in early January when I will travel with seven other Senators
to the Middle East and to Europe to discuss our progress implementing
this nuclear deal and the challenges that remain.
I commend President Obama and his administration for engaging with
Congress during the debate over the Iran agreement and in the months
since it took effect, but I urge the administration not to lose focus
and to work with this Congress in the months ahead to ensure strict
enforcement of the agreement.
But we in Congress have our part to do here as well, not the least of
which is making sure the executive branch has capable and effective
officials, which is a crucial part of effective implementation. In
recent months, not only has the Senate not done its job, but this
Chamber's inaction and our apparent focus instead on Presidential
politics means we are increasingly making this Chamber less relevant in
American foreign policy.
The United States has a very qualified and capable leader in the
enforcement of sanctions in Adam Szubin, who oversees the current
imposition and enforcement of sanctions at the Department of Treasury.
Mr. Szubin worked under the Bush administration and under the Obama
administration. He is a dedicated, capable, seasoned career
professional who has been widely complimented on a bipartisan basis by
members of the Banking Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee on
which I serve. He has been nominated to be the new Under Secretary of
Treasury for Terrorism Financing--a position critical to the successful
enforcement of the JCPOA--but his nomination has been on hold for
months for no clear and publicly stated reason.
Adam Szubin's nomination is one of more than two dozen national
security-related nominations, including Tom Shannon, nominated to be
the Under Secretary of Political Affairs at the State Department. Tom
Shannon is a career Foreign Service officer and a determined,
dedicated, nonpartisan professional who also would play a critical role
in working with our allies and ensuring successful enforcement of this
agreement.
Adam Szubin, Tom Shannon, and nearly two dozen other nominees have
been blocked, seemingly for purely partisan reasons in this Senate. I
call on my colleagues to release their holds and to give the
administration the resources and the personnel it needs to do its job
in enforcing this difficult deal.
The Senate's commitment to overseeing and enforcing the terms of this
deal must go beyond simply doing our job and giving the President's
nominees an up-or-down vote. We have to do more. I stand ready to work
with this President and the next one to fully oversee the JCPOA. The
length of this agreement will transcend Presidential terms, and
implementing it should transcend politics as well.
We know Iran will seek every opportunity to push the limits of this
deal in an attempt to test our resolve. We must not let Iran relitigate
the terms of the deal and escape the boundaries of this deal and lay
the groundwork for its future development of a nuclear weapon. We must
deter them by holding them accountable.
When this President or a future President, Republican or Democrat,
successfully enforces this deal, I will be the first one to compliment
them for countering Iran's destabilizing activity in the region. And
when the administration, current or future, isn't actively and
vigorously enforcing this deal and pushing back on Iran, I will be the
first to ask--to demand--that it do more.
The Iranian Government is paying close attention to everything we do,
and I, for one, am determined to make sure that Congress, the
administration, and the American people are doing the same, to
demonstrate to Iran our determination and our will to deter them
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and to closely and vigorously enforce this difficult deal.
Thank you, Mr. President.
With that, I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cassidy). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
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