[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 168 (Monday, November 16, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H8171-H8174]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT

  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and 
pass the bill (H.R. 1073) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to 
secure critical infrastructure against electromagnetic threats, and for 
other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 1073

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Infrastructure 
     Protection Act'' or the ``CIPA''.

     SEC. 2. EMP PLANNING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND 
                   PROTECTION AND PREPAREDNESS.

       (a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
     U.S.C. 121) is amended--
       (1) in section 2 (6 U.S.C. 101), by inserting after 
     paragraph (6) the following:
       ``(6a) EMP.--The term `EMP' means--
       ``(A) an electromagnetic pulse caused by intentional means, 
     including acts of terrorism; and
       ``(B) a geomagnetic disturbance caused by solar storms or 
     other naturally occurring phenomena.'';
       (2) in title V (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.), by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``SEC. 526. NATIONAL PLANNING FRAMEWORKS AND EDUCATION.

       ``The Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, shall, to the 
     extent practicable--
       ``(1) include in national planning frameworks the threat of 
     EMP events; and
       ``(2) conduct outreach to educate owners and operators of 
     critical infrastructure, emergency planners, and emergency 
     response providers at all levels of government of the threat 
     of EMP events.'';
       (3) in title III (6 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), by adding at the 
     end of the following:

     ``SEC. 318. EMP RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

       ``(a) In General.--In furtherance of domestic preparedness 
     and response, the Secretary, acting through the Under 
     Secretary for Science and Technology, and in consultation 
     with other relevant agencies and departments of the Federal 
     Government and relevant owners and operators of critical 
     infrastructure, shall, to the extent practicable, conduct 
     research and development to mitigate the consequences of EMP 
     events.
       ``(b) Scope.--The scope of the research and development 
     under subsection (a) shall include the following:
       ``(1) An objective scientific analysis of the risks to 
     critical infrastructures from a range of EMP events.
       ``(2) Determination of the critical national security 
     assets and vital civic utilities and infrastructures that are 
     at risk from EMP events.
       ``(3) An evaluation of emergency planning and response 
     technologies that would address the findings and 
     recommendations of experts, including those of the Commission 
     to Assess the Threat to the United States from 
     Electromagnetic Pulse Attack.
       ``(4) An analysis of technology options that are available 
     to improve the resiliency of critical infrastructure to EMP.
       ``(5) The restoration and recovery capabilities of critical 
     infrastructure under differing levels of damage and 
     disruption from various EMP events.''; and
       (4) in section 201(d) (6 U.S.C. 121(d)), by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(26)(A) Prepare and submit to the Committee on Homeland 
     Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate--
       ``(i) a recommended strategy to protect and prepare the 
     critical infrastructure of the American homeland against EMP 
     events, including from acts of terrorism; and
       ``(ii) biennial updates on the status of the recommended 
     strategy.
       ``(B) The recommended strategy shall--
       ``(i) be based on findings of the research and development 
     conducted under section 318;
       ``(ii) be developed in consultation with the relevant 
     Federal sector-specific agencies (as defined under Homeland 
     Security Presidential Directive-7) for critical 
     infrastructures;
       ``(iii) be developed in consultation with the relevant 
     sector coordinating councils for critical infrastructures; 
     and
       ``(iv) include a classified annex as needed.
       ``(C) The Secretary may, if appropriate, incorporate the 
     recommended strategy into a broader recommendation developed 
     by the Department to help protect and prepare critical 
     infrastructure from terrorism and other threats if, as 
     incorporated, the strategy complies with subparagraph (B).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendments.--The table of contents in section 
     1(b) of such Act is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end of the items relating to title V 
     the following:

``Sec. 526. National planning frameworks and education.'';
     and
       (2) by adding at the end of the items relating to title III 
     the following:

``Sec. 318. EMP research and development.''.
       (c) Deadline for Recommended Strategy.--The Secretary of 
     Homeland Security shall submit the recommended strategy 
     required under the amendment made by subsection (a)(4) by not 
     later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (d) Report.--The Secretary shall submit a report to 
     Congress by not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act describing the progress made in, and an 
     estimated date by which the Department of Homeland Security 
     will have completed--
       (1) including EMP (as defined in the amendment made by 
     subsection (a)(1)) threats in national planning frameworks;
       (2) research and development described in the amendment 
     made by subsection (a)(3);
       (3) development of the comprehensive plan required under 
     the amendment made by subsection (a)(4); and
       (4) outreach to educate owners and operators of critical 
     infrastructure, emergency planners and emergency response 
     providers at all levels of government regarding the threat of 
     EMP events.

     SEC. 3. NO REGULATORY AUTHORITY.

       Nothing in this Act, including the amendments made by this 
     Act, shall be construed to grant any regulatory authority.

[[Page H8172]]

  


     SEC. 4. NO NEW AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       This Act, including the amendments made by this Act, may be 
     carried out only by using funds appropriated under the 
     authority of other laws.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Georgia (Mr. Carter) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Payne) each 
will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.


                             General Leave

  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under 
consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Georgia?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1073, the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.
  The threats to the Nation's critical infrastructure continue to 
evolve. Threats today come in all forms: physical, cyber, and 
electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, events.
  H.R. 1073 is a commonsense piece of legislation because it would 
ensure that DHS plans and addresses threats to critical infrastructure 
from EMP events. Specifically, this bill would require the Department 
of Homeland Security to include EMP events in national planning 
frameworks. It would also ensure DHS conducts outreach and educates 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure, emergency planners, 
and emergency responders about the threat of EMP events. Finally, this 
legislation requires the Secretary to conduct research and development 
to mitigate the consequences of EMP events.
  I would like to thank my colleague from Arizona (Mr. Franks) for 
authoring this important legislation. I urge all Members to join me in 
supporting this bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1073, the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1073 would require the Department of Homeland 
Security to undertake research, planning, and educational activities to 
mitigate the potential consequences of electromagnetic pulses and 
geomagnetic disturbances on critical infrastructure such as public 
utilities and national security assets. As the Congressional Budget 
Office noted in its analysis, the Department is currently carrying out 
programs similar to those required by the bill.
  Along those lines, I think it is important to identify the elements 
of EMP and GMD preparedness and response activities that are common to 
the existing preparedness and response efforts as set forth in the 
national planning frameworks. These national planning efforts identify 
roles and responsibilities for disaster prevention, protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery activities, and this bill will 
include consideration of EMPs.
  It is also important to distinguish between EMP, or electromagnetic 
pulses, and GMD, or geomagnetic disturbances. There are significant 
differences in the nature of the threats, the science behind their 
impacts, and the range of options for potential solutions.
  EMP weapons are most generally recognized as thermonuclear weapons 
that may be launched on missiles designed to explode in the upper 
atmosphere and produce intense, short-duration, targeted energy that 
can impact a wide range of technologies and industries. An EMP blast 
could disrupt and potentially destroy electronic devices in the 
affected area with consequences extending to critical infrastructures 
that rely on microprocessor-based electronic devices.
  In contrast, geomagnetic fluctuations, or GMDs, result from solar 
weather activity. Severe GMD events may produce varying effects on the 
power system depending on orientation of the solar storm, latitude, 
transmission line characteristics, the geology of an affected area, and 
the design of the power system. The effects of GMD are believed to be 
primarily limited to reliability of the bulk power system, while the 
effects of an EMP could cross multiple infrastructures and 
technologies.
  Given that any EMP is likely to be the result of an international 
attack or warlike activity on the United States or its neighbors, DHS 
may need to partner with the Department of Defense. Going forward, I 
urge Members to be mindful of the broad range of preparedness demands 
on DHS.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks).
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, I am sincerely grateful to all of those who have 
supported the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. I am especially 
grateful to Chairman Pete Sessions for his cosponsorship and his 
committed partnership on this bill, as well as, of course, to Chairman 
McCaul and to the leadership team of this House for allowing this 
legislation to come to the floor.
  Mr. Speaker, I think it is an especially appropriate time for us to 
pause and reflect on the tragedies that have occurred in France and to 
stand in solidarity with those people who are part of the free world 
and do the best they can to fight terrorism and to survive its effects. 
My prayers are with them, and it is ironic that today we are here 
dealing with legislation to try to help mitigate our own 
vulnerabilities to potential attacks that could come in the future.

                              {time}  1645

  Mr. Speaker, electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, can be catalyzed by 
nonnuclear intentional electromagnetic interference, a major solar 
storm, or a high-altitude nuclear blast. EMP is an invisible force of 
ionized particles with the potential to overwhelm and destroy our 
present electrical power grids, which are a vital component of nearly 
every other critical infrastructure we have.
  Reducing America's vulnerability to naturally occurring or weaponized 
electromagnetic pulse is a timely and critical matter of national 
security. During the past several decades, America has spent billions 
of dollars hardening many of our critical defense assets, including our 
nuclear triad and our missile defense components, against natural or 
weaponized electromagnetic pulse.
  However, the Department of Defense relies upon the largely 
unprotected civilian grid for 99 percent of its electricity needs in 
the continental United States, without which it cannot affect its 
mission.
  Twelve years ago, in August of 2003, an electromagnetic pulse knocked 
out a large portion of the electric grid across the eastern United 
States. Fifty million people were affected after 21 power plants shut 
down in just 3 minutes. Office workers streamed into parking lots and 
many commuters were stranded inside their trains.
  In a matter of moments, the things that make up our critical 
infrastructure, from the electric grid to water pumps, to cell phone 
service, to computer systems, were disrupted. Lives suddenly changed 
that day in New York City, Cleveland, Detroit, and all the way into 
Canada. In New York City alone, this short blackout was estimated to 
cost more than a half billion dollars.
  There are at least 11 major government reports now that have all come 
essentially to the same conclusion regarding our vulnerabilities to 
electromagnetic pulse. Some of America's most enlightened national 
security experts, as well as many of our enemies or potential enemies, 
consider a well-executed weaponized electromagnetic pulse against 
America to be a ``kill shot''--let me say that again--a ``kill shot'' 
to America.
  However, our civilian grid remains fundamentally unprotected against 
severe EMP, and for it to remain so is an open invitation to our 
enemies to exploit this dangerous vulnerability.
  Indeed, the National Intelligence University recently translated an 
Iranian military doctrine called ``Passive Defense.'' This doctrine 
stresses that electrical grids are vital to the national existence of 
major powers in the

[[Page H8173]]

world like America. It includes a formula for calculating the value of 
electrical power plants and for prioritizing the targeting of electric 
grid components and other critical infrastructures. Mr. Speaker, this 
Iranian military doctrine referenced the use of nuclear-generated 
electromagnetic pulse as an effective weapon more than 20 times.
  Now that the Islamic Republic of Iran begins to enjoy the bounty of 
their nuclear negotiations, it should be a wake-up call to all of us 
that the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism is contemplating 
the concept of nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulse as an asymmetric 
weapon against America.
  Thankfully, Mr. Speaker, we are here this day to pass the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act, which, if signed into law, will 
represent the first time in history that Congress will be specifically 
addressing this dangerous threat of electromagnetic pulse.
  This legislation will enhance the DHS threat assessments for EMP 
through research and reporting requirements. It will help the United 
States prevent and prepare for such an event by including large-scale 
blackouts into our critical existing national planning scenarios, 
including educational awareness for first responders to protect 
critical infrastructure. Most importantly, it requires a specific plan 
for protecting and recovering the electrical grid and other critical 
infrastructure from a dangerous electromagnetic pulse event.
  Mr. Speaker, finally, there is a moment in the life of nearly every 
problem when it is big enough to be seen by reasonable people and still 
small enough to be addressed. Those of us in this Chamber and across 
America live in a time when there still may be opportunity for the free 
world to address and mitigate the vulnerability that naturally 
occurring or weaponized EMP represents to the mechanisms of our 
civilization. This is our moment.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I want to acknowledge the remarks by the 
gentleman from Arizona in reference to the solidarity in which we stand 
with the French people. As it has been stated now and called, this 
terrorist attack is their 9/11. I just wanted to be on the Record to 
acknowledge the comments of the gentleman from Arizona. We stand with 
the French people in solidarity.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my dear friend from 
Georgia, for the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1073, the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act.
  Over the past decade, our Nation has seen an unprecedented expansion 
in the use of electronics, Mr. Speaker. These electronics have 
transformed our economy, our homes, our families, and, really, the way 
we do business and have become an integral part of our daily lives.
  Unfortunately, this technology is also susceptible to new types of 
potential threats, threats that have been talked about on this floor by 
not only Mr. Franks, but also our friend, Mr. Carter, and others.
  Today electromagnetic pulses, known as EMPs, could dramatically 
disrupt electronic activity and severely damage our electrical grids 
and everything that stands under those grids. Examples of EMP threats 
include those generated from a geomagnetic solar flare, from a 
terrorist short-range missile, cybersecurity attacks, or from a 
physical assault on a utility or a power plant.

  The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act that we are talking about 
today and that we hope to pass is an important first step towards 
protecting our Nation from potential catastrophic nationwide blackouts.
  I would like to recognize Frank Gaffney, the president and founder of 
the Center for Security Policy. Frank has provided the leadership not 
only by meeting with me, but also working with Mr. Franks and hundreds 
of other Members to let us know not only about this important critical 
infrastructure policy need, but also to make sure that we educate and 
spread awareness to not only our constituency, but other Members of 
Congress, regarding the new types of potential threats and occurrences, 
such as an electromagnetic pulse attack, that could dramatically alter 
our way of life.
  I would also like to recognize, as I have previously done, our leader 
in Congress on this issue, my dear friend, Arizona Congressman Trent 
Franks. Mr. Franks and I have spoken about this issue for years. We 
have worked hard with the chairman of Homeland Security, as well as 
leadership in this House, to make sure that we accomplish this 
legislation now.
  Ultimately, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act is simply the 
first step towards getting the U.S. closer to protecting ourselves from 
a potentially catastrophic nationwide blackout. It is simply the first 
step, Mr. Speaker. I know this will begin a national dialogue, a 
dialogue that needs to take place and that has already been begun by 
such leaders as former Speaker Newt Gingrich and former Vice President 
Dick Cheney.
  Mr. Speaker, I applaud the House today for taking up this important 
legislation, ask that my colleagues pay attention to understand this 
bill, and vote for it because support and passage of H.R. 1073, the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, is important to the American 
people and our way of life.
  Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  In closing, I would like to note that H.R. 1073 puts focus on EMP and 
GMD preparedness response in a reasonable manner. It does so in a way 
that does not come at the detriment of preparing for other more likely 
or more potentially lethal events.
  I would also reiterate that there are activities already underway at 
DHS to improve preparedness activities for an EMP event. For example, 
it is my understanding that DHS is looking at including EMP as an annex 
to the Federal Interagency Operational Plans currently in development.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 1073.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I once again urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1073.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak in support of H.R. 
1073, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.
  As a senior member of the House Committee on Homeland Security as 
well as the Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee's 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Investigations, I am well aware of 
the importance of our nation's critical infrastructure and for this 
reason I support H.R. 1073.
  The bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding the 
definition of ``EMP'' to mean: (1) an electromagnetic pulse caused by 
intentional means, including acts of terrorism; and (2) a geomagnetic 
disturbance caused by solar storms or other naturally occurring 
phenomena.
  Directs DHS to: (1) include in national planning frameworks the 
threat of EMP events; and (2) conduct outreach to educate owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure, emergency planners, and emergency 
response providers of the threat of EMP events.
  The bill also directs DHS to conduct research and development to 
mitigate the consequences of EMP events, including: an objective 
scientific analysis of the risks to critical infrastructures from a 
range of EMP events; determination of the critical national security 
assets and vital civic utilities and infrastructures that are at risk 
from EMP events; an evaluation of emergency planning and response 
technologies that would address the findings and recommendations of 
experts, including those of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the 
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack; an analysis of 
available technology options to improve the resiliency of critical 
infrastructure to EMP; and the restoration and recovery capabilities of 
critical infrastructure under differing levels of damage and disruption 
from various EMP events.
  DHS will make recommendations to Congress on a strategy to protect 
and prepare the critical infrastructure of the nation against EMP 
events, and provide biennial updates on the status of developing a 
defense against EMP strategy.
  Electricity and the national electric grid are of vital importance to 
our national and domestic security interest.
  There were 3 strategic imperatives that dives the Federal approach to 
strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience: refine and 
clarify functional relationships across

[[Page H8174]]

the Federal Government to advance the national unity of effort to 
strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience; enable 
effective information exchange by identifying baseline data and systems 
requirements for the Federal Government; and implement an integration 
and analysis function to inform planning and operations decisions 
regarding critical infrastructure.
  Effective security for our nation's critical infrastructure requires 
a national unity of effort based upon strategic guidance from the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.
  I introduced H.R. 85, Terrorism Prevention and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act, which directs the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and 
state, local, and territorial to take proactive steps to address All 
Hazards that would impact: national security; economic stability; 
public health and safety; and or any combination of these.
  The Jackson Lee bill, just as H.R. 1703 is intended to do, would 
reduce vulnerabilities associated with potential terrorist attacks that 
target critical infrastructure by supporting a coordinated partnership 
among federal agencies; critical infrastructure owners and operators 
and local, state, and tribal authorities.
  Last, Friday's terrible attacks in Paris only illustrates the 
inhumanity of those who are America's enemies--the enemies of all of 
those who cherish freedom.
  I join my colleagues in the House in offering my deepest sympathies 
to the people of Paris especially to the families of those killed.
  Our commitment to our national security should and must extend to the 
security needs of our allies in the struggle against violence and 
terrorism--France.
  I ask my colleagues to join me in voting for H.R. 1703.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Carter) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 1073, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the 
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________