[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 168 (Monday, November 16, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H8171-H8174]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and
pass the bill (H.R. 1073) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to
secure critical infrastructure against electromagnetic threats, and for
other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 1073
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act'' or the ``CIPA''.
SEC. 2. EMP PLANNING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
PROTECTION AND PREPAREDNESS.
(a) In General.--The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 121) is amended--
(1) in section 2 (6 U.S.C. 101), by inserting after
paragraph (6) the following:
``(6a) EMP.--The term `EMP' means--
``(A) an electromagnetic pulse caused by intentional means,
including acts of terrorism; and
``(B) a geomagnetic disturbance caused by solar storms or
other naturally occurring phenomena.'';
(2) in title V (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.), by adding at the end
the following:
``SEC. 526. NATIONAL PLANNING FRAMEWORKS AND EDUCATION.
``The Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, shall, to the
extent practicable--
``(1) include in national planning frameworks the threat of
EMP events; and
``(2) conduct outreach to educate owners and operators of
critical infrastructure, emergency planners, and emergency
response providers at all levels of government of the threat
of EMP events.'';
(3) in title III (6 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), by adding at the
end of the following:
``SEC. 318. EMP RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.
``(a) In General.--In furtherance of domestic preparedness
and response, the Secretary, acting through the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology, and in consultation
with other relevant agencies and departments of the Federal
Government and relevant owners and operators of critical
infrastructure, shall, to the extent practicable, conduct
research and development to mitigate the consequences of EMP
events.
``(b) Scope.--The scope of the research and development
under subsection (a) shall include the following:
``(1) An objective scientific analysis of the risks to
critical infrastructures from a range of EMP events.
``(2) Determination of the critical national security
assets and vital civic utilities and infrastructures that are
at risk from EMP events.
``(3) An evaluation of emergency planning and response
technologies that would address the findings and
recommendations of experts, including those of the Commission
to Assess the Threat to the United States from
Electromagnetic Pulse Attack.
``(4) An analysis of technology options that are available
to improve the resiliency of critical infrastructure to EMP.
``(5) The restoration and recovery capabilities of critical
infrastructure under differing levels of damage and
disruption from various EMP events.''; and
(4) in section 201(d) (6 U.S.C. 121(d)), by adding at the
end the following:
``(26)(A) Prepare and submit to the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate--
``(i) a recommended strategy to protect and prepare the
critical infrastructure of the American homeland against EMP
events, including from acts of terrorism; and
``(ii) biennial updates on the status of the recommended
strategy.
``(B) The recommended strategy shall--
``(i) be based on findings of the research and development
conducted under section 318;
``(ii) be developed in consultation with the relevant
Federal sector-specific agencies (as defined under Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7) for critical
infrastructures;
``(iii) be developed in consultation with the relevant
sector coordinating councils for critical infrastructures;
and
``(iv) include a classified annex as needed.
``(C) The Secretary may, if appropriate, incorporate the
recommended strategy into a broader recommendation developed
by the Department to help protect and prepare critical
infrastructure from terrorism and other threats if, as
incorporated, the strategy complies with subparagraph (B).''.
(b) Clerical Amendments.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended--
(1) by adding at the end of the items relating to title V
the following:
``Sec. 526. National planning frameworks and education.'';
and
(2) by adding at the end of the items relating to title III
the following:
``Sec. 318. EMP research and development.''.
(c) Deadline for Recommended Strategy.--The Secretary of
Homeland Security shall submit the recommended strategy
required under the amendment made by subsection (a)(4) by not
later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(d) Report.--The Secretary shall submit a report to
Congress by not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act describing the progress made in, and an
estimated date by which the Department of Homeland Security
will have completed--
(1) including EMP (as defined in the amendment made by
subsection (a)(1)) threats in national planning frameworks;
(2) research and development described in the amendment
made by subsection (a)(3);
(3) development of the comprehensive plan required under
the amendment made by subsection (a)(4); and
(4) outreach to educate owners and operators of critical
infrastructure, emergency planners and emergency response
providers at all levels of government regarding the threat of
EMP events.
SEC. 3. NO REGULATORY AUTHORITY.
Nothing in this Act, including the amendments made by this
Act, shall be construed to grant any regulatory authority.
[[Page H8172]]
SEC. 4. NO NEW AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
This Act, including the amendments made by this Act, may be
carried out only by using funds appropriated under the
authority of other laws.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Carter) and the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Payne) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
General Leave
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on the bill under
consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Georgia?
There was no objection.
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1073, the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.
The threats to the Nation's critical infrastructure continue to
evolve. Threats today come in all forms: physical, cyber, and
electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, events.
H.R. 1073 is a commonsense piece of legislation because it would
ensure that DHS plans and addresses threats to critical infrastructure
from EMP events. Specifically, this bill would require the Department
of Homeland Security to include EMP events in national planning
frameworks. It would also ensure DHS conducts outreach and educates
owners and operators of critical infrastructure, emergency planners,
and emergency responders about the threat of EMP events. Finally, this
legislation requires the Secretary to conduct research and development
to mitigate the consequences of EMP events.
I would like to thank my colleague from Arizona (Mr. Franks) for
authoring this important legislation. I urge all Members to join me in
supporting this bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1073, the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act.
Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1073 would require the Department of Homeland
Security to undertake research, planning, and educational activities to
mitigate the potential consequences of electromagnetic pulses and
geomagnetic disturbances on critical infrastructure such as public
utilities and national security assets. As the Congressional Budget
Office noted in its analysis, the Department is currently carrying out
programs similar to those required by the bill.
Along those lines, I think it is important to identify the elements
of EMP and GMD preparedness and response activities that are common to
the existing preparedness and response efforts as set forth in the
national planning frameworks. These national planning efforts identify
roles and responsibilities for disaster prevention, protection,
mitigation, response, and recovery activities, and this bill will
include consideration of EMPs.
It is also important to distinguish between EMP, or electromagnetic
pulses, and GMD, or geomagnetic disturbances. There are significant
differences in the nature of the threats, the science behind their
impacts, and the range of options for potential solutions.
EMP weapons are most generally recognized as thermonuclear weapons
that may be launched on missiles designed to explode in the upper
atmosphere and produce intense, short-duration, targeted energy that
can impact a wide range of technologies and industries. An EMP blast
could disrupt and potentially destroy electronic devices in the
affected area with consequences extending to critical infrastructures
that rely on microprocessor-based electronic devices.
In contrast, geomagnetic fluctuations, or GMDs, result from solar
weather activity. Severe GMD events may produce varying effects on the
power system depending on orientation of the solar storm, latitude,
transmission line characteristics, the geology of an affected area, and
the design of the power system. The effects of GMD are believed to be
primarily limited to reliability of the bulk power system, while the
effects of an EMP could cross multiple infrastructures and
technologies.
Given that any EMP is likely to be the result of an international
attack or warlike activity on the United States or its neighbors, DHS
may need to partner with the Department of Defense. Going forward, I
urge Members to be mindful of the broad range of preparedness demands
on DHS.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks).
Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, I am sincerely grateful to all of those who have
supported the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. I am especially
grateful to Chairman Pete Sessions for his cosponsorship and his
committed partnership on this bill, as well as, of course, to Chairman
McCaul and to the leadership team of this House for allowing this
legislation to come to the floor.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is an especially appropriate time for us to
pause and reflect on the tragedies that have occurred in France and to
stand in solidarity with those people who are part of the free world
and do the best they can to fight terrorism and to survive its effects.
My prayers are with them, and it is ironic that today we are here
dealing with legislation to try to help mitigate our own
vulnerabilities to potential attacks that could come in the future.
{time} 1645
Mr. Speaker, electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, can be catalyzed by
nonnuclear intentional electromagnetic interference, a major solar
storm, or a high-altitude nuclear blast. EMP is an invisible force of
ionized particles with the potential to overwhelm and destroy our
present electrical power grids, which are a vital component of nearly
every other critical infrastructure we have.
Reducing America's vulnerability to naturally occurring or weaponized
electromagnetic pulse is a timely and critical matter of national
security. During the past several decades, America has spent billions
of dollars hardening many of our critical defense assets, including our
nuclear triad and our missile defense components, against natural or
weaponized electromagnetic pulse.
However, the Department of Defense relies upon the largely
unprotected civilian grid for 99 percent of its electricity needs in
the continental United States, without which it cannot affect its
mission.
Twelve years ago, in August of 2003, an electromagnetic pulse knocked
out a large portion of the electric grid across the eastern United
States. Fifty million people were affected after 21 power plants shut
down in just 3 minutes. Office workers streamed into parking lots and
many commuters were stranded inside their trains.
In a matter of moments, the things that make up our critical
infrastructure, from the electric grid to water pumps, to cell phone
service, to computer systems, were disrupted. Lives suddenly changed
that day in New York City, Cleveland, Detroit, and all the way into
Canada. In New York City alone, this short blackout was estimated to
cost more than a half billion dollars.
There are at least 11 major government reports now that have all come
essentially to the same conclusion regarding our vulnerabilities to
electromagnetic pulse. Some of America's most enlightened national
security experts, as well as many of our enemies or potential enemies,
consider a well-executed weaponized electromagnetic pulse against
America to be a ``kill shot''--let me say that again--a ``kill shot''
to America.
However, our civilian grid remains fundamentally unprotected against
severe EMP, and for it to remain so is an open invitation to our
enemies to exploit this dangerous vulnerability.
Indeed, the National Intelligence University recently translated an
Iranian military doctrine called ``Passive Defense.'' This doctrine
stresses that electrical grids are vital to the national existence of
major powers in the
[[Page H8173]]
world like America. It includes a formula for calculating the value of
electrical power plants and for prioritizing the targeting of electric
grid components and other critical infrastructures. Mr. Speaker, this
Iranian military doctrine referenced the use of nuclear-generated
electromagnetic pulse as an effective weapon more than 20 times.
Now that the Islamic Republic of Iran begins to enjoy the bounty of
their nuclear negotiations, it should be a wake-up call to all of us
that the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism is contemplating
the concept of nuclear-generated electromagnetic pulse as an asymmetric
weapon against America.
Thankfully, Mr. Speaker, we are here this day to pass the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act, which, if signed into law, will
represent the first time in history that Congress will be specifically
addressing this dangerous threat of electromagnetic pulse.
This legislation will enhance the DHS threat assessments for EMP
through research and reporting requirements. It will help the United
States prevent and prepare for such an event by including large-scale
blackouts into our critical existing national planning scenarios,
including educational awareness for first responders to protect
critical infrastructure. Most importantly, it requires a specific plan
for protecting and recovering the electrical grid and other critical
infrastructure from a dangerous electromagnetic pulse event.
Mr. Speaker, finally, there is a moment in the life of nearly every
problem when it is big enough to be seen by reasonable people and still
small enough to be addressed. Those of us in this Chamber and across
America live in a time when there still may be opportunity for the free
world to address and mitigate the vulnerability that naturally
occurring or weaponized EMP represents to the mechanisms of our
civilization. This is our moment.
Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I want to acknowledge the remarks by the
gentleman from Arizona in reference to the solidarity in which we stand
with the French people. As it has been stated now and called, this
terrorist attack is their 9/11. I just wanted to be on the Record to
acknowledge the comments of the gentleman from Arizona. We stand with
the French people in solidarity.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, my dear friend from
Georgia, for the time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1073, the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act.
Over the past decade, our Nation has seen an unprecedented expansion
in the use of electronics, Mr. Speaker. These electronics have
transformed our economy, our homes, our families, and, really, the way
we do business and have become an integral part of our daily lives.
Unfortunately, this technology is also susceptible to new types of
potential threats, threats that have been talked about on this floor by
not only Mr. Franks, but also our friend, Mr. Carter, and others.
Today electromagnetic pulses, known as EMPs, could dramatically
disrupt electronic activity and severely damage our electrical grids
and everything that stands under those grids. Examples of EMP threats
include those generated from a geomagnetic solar flare, from a
terrorist short-range missile, cybersecurity attacks, or from a
physical assault on a utility or a power plant.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act that we are talking about
today and that we hope to pass is an important first step towards
protecting our Nation from potential catastrophic nationwide blackouts.
I would like to recognize Frank Gaffney, the president and founder of
the Center for Security Policy. Frank has provided the leadership not
only by meeting with me, but also working with Mr. Franks and hundreds
of other Members to let us know not only about this important critical
infrastructure policy need, but also to make sure that we educate and
spread awareness to not only our constituency, but other Members of
Congress, regarding the new types of potential threats and occurrences,
such as an electromagnetic pulse attack, that could dramatically alter
our way of life.
I would also like to recognize, as I have previously done, our leader
in Congress on this issue, my dear friend, Arizona Congressman Trent
Franks. Mr. Franks and I have spoken about this issue for years. We
have worked hard with the chairman of Homeland Security, as well as
leadership in this House, to make sure that we accomplish this
legislation now.
Ultimately, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act is simply the
first step towards getting the U.S. closer to protecting ourselves from
a potentially catastrophic nationwide blackout. It is simply the first
step, Mr. Speaker. I know this will begin a national dialogue, a
dialogue that needs to take place and that has already been begun by
such leaders as former Speaker Newt Gingrich and former Vice President
Dick Cheney.
Mr. Speaker, I applaud the House today for taking up this important
legislation, ask that my colleagues pay attention to understand this
bill, and vote for it because support and passage of H.R. 1073, the
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, is important to the American
people and our way of life.
Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
In closing, I would like to note that H.R. 1073 puts focus on EMP and
GMD preparedness response in a reasonable manner. It does so in a way
that does not come at the detriment of preparing for other more likely
or more potentially lethal events.
I would also reiterate that there are activities already underway at
DHS to improve preparedness activities for an EMP event. For example,
it is my understanding that DHS is looking at including EMP as an annex
to the Federal Interagency Operational Plans currently in development.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of H.R. 1073.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CARTER of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I once again urge my colleagues to support H.R. 1073.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak in support of H.R.
1073, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.
As a senior member of the House Committee on Homeland Security as
well as the Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Investigations, I am well aware of
the importance of our nation's critical infrastructure and for this
reason I support H.R. 1073.
The bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding the
definition of ``EMP'' to mean: (1) an electromagnetic pulse caused by
intentional means, including acts of terrorism; and (2) a geomagnetic
disturbance caused by solar storms or other naturally occurring
phenomena.
Directs DHS to: (1) include in national planning frameworks the
threat of EMP events; and (2) conduct outreach to educate owners and
operators of critical infrastructure, emergency planners, and emergency
response providers of the threat of EMP events.
The bill also directs DHS to conduct research and development to
mitigate the consequences of EMP events, including: an objective
scientific analysis of the risks to critical infrastructures from a
range of EMP events; determination of the critical national security
assets and vital civic utilities and infrastructures that are at risk
from EMP events; an evaluation of emergency planning and response
technologies that would address the findings and recommendations of
experts, including those of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack; an analysis of
available technology options to improve the resiliency of critical
infrastructure to EMP; and the restoration and recovery capabilities of
critical infrastructure under differing levels of damage and disruption
from various EMP events.
DHS will make recommendations to Congress on a strategy to protect
and prepare the critical infrastructure of the nation against EMP
events, and provide biennial updates on the status of developing a
defense against EMP strategy.
Electricity and the national electric grid are of vital importance to
our national and domestic security interest.
There were 3 strategic imperatives that dives the Federal approach to
strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience: refine and
clarify functional relationships across
[[Page H8174]]
the Federal Government to advance the national unity of effort to
strengthen critical infrastructure security and resilience; enable
effective information exchange by identifying baseline data and systems
requirements for the Federal Government; and implement an integration
and analysis function to inform planning and operations decisions
regarding critical infrastructure.
Effective security for our nation's critical infrastructure requires
a national unity of effort based upon strategic guidance from the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
I introduced H.R. 85, Terrorism Prevention and Critical
Infrastructure Protection Act, which directs the Secretary of Homeland
Security to work with critical infrastructure owners and operators and
state, local, and territorial to take proactive steps to address All
Hazards that would impact: national security; economic stability;
public health and safety; and or any combination of these.
The Jackson Lee bill, just as H.R. 1703 is intended to do, would
reduce vulnerabilities associated with potential terrorist attacks that
target critical infrastructure by supporting a coordinated partnership
among federal agencies; critical infrastructure owners and operators
and local, state, and tribal authorities.
Last, Friday's terrible attacks in Paris only illustrates the
inhumanity of those who are America's enemies--the enemies of all of
those who cherish freedom.
I join my colleagues in the House in offering my deepest sympathies
to the people of Paris especially to the families of those killed.
Our commitment to our national security should and must extend to the
security needs of our allies in the struggle against violence and
terrorism--France.
I ask my colleagues to join me in voting for H.R. 1703.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Carter) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 1073, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________