[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 146 (Tuesday, October 6, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H6811-H6813]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AIRPORT ACCESS CONTROL SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2015
Mr. KATKO. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 3102) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to reform
programs of the Transportation Security Administration, streamline
transportation security regulations, and for other purposes, as
amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 3102
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Airport Access Control
Security Improvement Act of 2015''.
SEC. 2. AVIATION SECURITY.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title XVI of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``SEC. 1602. RISK-BASED SCREENING OF EMPLOYEES AT AIRPORTS.
``(a) Screening Model.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall
establish a risk-based, intelligence-driven model for the
screening of employees at airports based on level of access
and employment positions at domestic airports. Such screening
model shall--
``(A) ensure that only those individuals authorized to have
access to the secure areas of a domestic airport are
permitted such access;
``(B) ensure that an individual is immediately denied entry
to a secure area when such individual's access authorization
for such secure area is withdrawn; and
``(C) provide a means to differentiate between individuals
authorized to have access to an entire secure area and
individuals authorized access to only a particular portion of
a secure area.
``(2) Factors.--The Administrator shall consider the
following factors when establishing the screening model
described in paragraph (1):
``(A) Whether and how often employees at airports require
employment-related access to Secure Identification Display
Areas, Airport Operations Areas, or secure areas.
``(B) The ability of each airport operator to reduce
employee entry and exit points to a mutually agreed upon
minimum number of such entry and exit points necessary to
maintain airport operations.
``(C) In consultation with airport operators, the ability
of the Administration to create a randomization plan for
screening at the defined operational minimum entry and exit
points at airports which maximizes the deterrent effect of
screening efforts.
``(b) Disqualifying Offenses.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, the Administrator, in
consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, labor organizations representing aviation,
ground, and cabin crew workers, and the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, shall conduct an aviation security risk-
based review of the disqualifying criminal offenses codified
in sections 1542.209 and 1544.229 of title 49, Code of
Federal Regulations, to determine the appropriateness of such
offenses as a basis for denying to an employee a credential
that allows unescorted access to Secure Identification
Display Areas of airports. Such review shall consider the
following:
``(A) The adequacy of codified disqualifying offenses to
address the current aviation security threat environment,
particularly the terrorism insider threat.
``(B) If such codified disqualifying offenses should be
tailored to address the current aviation security threat
environment, particularly the terrorism insider threat, by
excluding or including other offenses.
``(C) The potential security benefits, drawbacks, and
challenges associated with identifying patterns of
misdemeanors or of other non-disqualifying offenses that
could jeopardize aviation security.
``(D) The feasibility of integrating similar departmental
eligibility requirements for access to Secure Identification
Display Areas of airports.
``(E) If the ten year look-back period for disqualifying
offenses is appropriate, in light of the current aviation
security threat environment, particularly the terrorism
insider threat.
``(2) Waiver.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall
provide an adequate redress process for an employee who is
subject to an adverse employment decision, including removal
or suspension of such employee, due to a disqualifying
offense referred to in paragraph (1), that is consistent with
the appeals and waiver process established for applicants for
commercial motor vehicle hazardous materials endorsements and
transportation workers at ports under section 70105(c) of
title 46, United States Code.
``(3) Notice.--Any changes to the Secure Identification
Display area badge program,
[[Page H6812]]
such as changes considered pursuant to subparagraphs (B),
(C), (D), and (E) of paragraph (1) shall be subject to notice
of proposed rulemaking.
``(4) Briefing to congress.--Upon completion of the
aviation security risk-based review required under paragraph
(1), the Administrator shall brief the Committee on Homeland
Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the
results of such review.
``(c) Credentialing.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this section, the Administrator, in
consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee,
shall review the auditing procedures for all airport-issued
identification media. Such review shall determine the
following:
``(1) The efficacy of the auditing program requirements at
domestic airports to ensure the integrity, accountability,
and control of airport-issued identification media.
``(2) The feasibility of including biometrics standards for
all airport-issued identification media used for identity
verification and badge verification.
``(3) The feasibility of integrating other departmental
programs' eligibility requirements for access to secure areas
of airports.
``(d) Vetting.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, the Administrator shall--
``(A) establish a program to allow airport badging offices
to utilize the employment eligibility confirmation system
established under section 404 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C.
1324a note; commonly referred to as `E-Verify') to determine
the eligibility to work in the United States of all
applicants seeking access to secure areas of airports;
``(B) establish a process to transmit applicants' biometric
fingerprint data to the Office of Biometric Identity
Management's (OBIM's) Automated Biometrics Identification
System (IDENT) for vetting; and
``(C) conduct a data quality assessment to ensure that
credential application data elements received by the
Administration are complete and match the data submitted by
the airport operators.
``(2) Briefing to congress.--Upon completion of the
responsibilities specified in paragraph (1), the
Administrator shall brief the Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the
results of such completion.
``(e) Reporting of Violations.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this section, the
Administrator shall establish a nationwide program for the
anonymous reporting of violations of airport security.
``(f) Centralized Database.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this section, the Administrator,
in consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, shall--
``(1) establish a national database of employees who have
had either their airport or aircraft operator-issued badge
revoked for failure to comply with aviation security
requirements;
``(2) determine the appropriate reporting mechanisms for
airports and airlines to submit data regarding employees
described in paragraph (1) and to access the database
established pursuant to such paragraph; and
``(3) establish a process that allows individuals whose
names were mistakenly entered into such database to have
their names removed and have their credentialing restored.
``(g) Updated Review.--Not later than April 8, 2016, the
Administrator, in consultation with the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, shall conduct an updated and thorough
review of airport access controls.
``(h) Employee Screening Study.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this section, the Administrator, in
consultation with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee,
shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the
Comptroller General of the United States a cost and
feasibility study of a statistically significant number of
Category I, II, and X airports, that ensures that all
employee entry and exit points that lead to secure areas of
such airports are comprised of the following:
``(A) A secure door utilizing card and pin entry or
biometric technology.
``(B) Surveillance video recording, capable of storing
video data for at least 30 days.
``(C) Advanced screening technologies, including at least
one of the following:
``(i) Magnetometer (walk-through or hand-held).
``(ii) Explosives detection canines.
``(iii) Explosives trace detection swabbing.
``(iv) Advanced imaging technology.
``(v) X-ray bag screening technology.
``(2) Contents.--The study required under paragraph (1)
shall include information related to the employee screening
costs of those airports which have already implemented
practices of screening one-hundred percent of employees
entering secure areas of airports, including the following:
``(A) Costs associated with establishing an operational
minimum number of employee entry and exit points.
``(B) A comparison of costs associated with implementing
the requirements specified in paragraph (1), based on whether
such implementation was carried out by the Administration or
airports.
``(3) Comptroller general assessment.--
``(A) In general.--Upon completion of the study required
under paragraph (1), the Comptroller General of the United
States shall review such study to assess the quality and
reliability of such study.
``(B) Assessment.--Not later than 60 days after the receipt
of the study required under paragraph (1), the Comptroller
General of the United States shall report to the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate on the results of the review required under
subparagraph (A).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 is amended by inserting after
the item relating to section 1601 the following new item:
``Sec. 1602. Risk-based screening of employees at airports.''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Katko) and the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Richmond) each
will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
{time} 1715
General Leave
Mr. KATKO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and
to include extraneous material on the bill under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from New York?
There was no objection.
Mr. KATKO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
H.R. 3102 is a critically important, bipartisan piece of legislation,
which serves as a culmination of months of intense oversight on the
issue of airport access controls and the insider threat to aviation
security.
The gaps in airport employee access control made headlines after an
investigation revealed that aviation employees were trafficking weapons
and ammunitions between Atlanta and New York. More than 170 guns were
trafficked in such a manner.
Furthermore, a recent inspector general report found that TSA failed
to identify 73 aviation workers with possible links to terrorism.
Lastly, at airports such as Dallas/Fort Worth, Los Angeles
International, and Oakland, many major drug-trafficking rings have been
uncovered involving employees using their insider ability to access the
airports.
It is the responsibility of this committee to act to prevent similar
stories from continuing to emerge.
Specifically, H.R. 3102 requires TSA to consult with Federal and
private sector partners to review existing employee screening protocols
and work comprehensively to improve the effectiveness of controls at
airports across the United States.
Moreover, the bill improves standards of vetting for the credentials
granted to individuals with access to secure areas of airports and
takes a robust approach to bolstering the oversight of the access given
to these employees.
H.R. 3102 codifies a number of recommendations put forward by the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which examined the issue of
airport access controls earlier this year at our urging.
This legislation reflects rigorous oversight, including a number of
hearings, site visits, and briefings from Homeland Security, TSA, the
FBI, and aviation stakeholders.
Furthermore, I am very proud of the cooperation among our private
sector stakeholders, Federal partners, and the labor community that has
helped to bring this bill to the floor today.
Throughout this legislation's development, we have worked tirelessly
with the same end goal in mind: to enhance the security of our Nation's
airports and mitigate threats to aviation workers and the traveling
public.
The insider threat to aviation is real, and it is critical that we
evolve our security standards and best practices to stay abreast of
changing threats to transportation.
I wish to thank Ranking Member Rice and Ranking Member Thompson
[[Page H6813]]
for their hard work and attention to this issue, as we have focused
heavily on these problems in a bipartisan manner.
I also wish the thank the chairman of the full committee, Mr. McCaul,
for his support on the committee's oversight efforts and for seeing
this bill through the committee.
Together--together--we can fix these problems and assure the American
public that their aviation system is secure and adaptive to changing
threats.
I urge all Members to join me in supporting this bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RICHMOND. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise to speak in support of H.R. 3102.
Last year we learned that airport employees used their access to the
secure areas of airports to bypass screening to smuggle weapons and
drugs onto commercial flights.
In response, then-Acting Administrator Melvin Carraway requested that
TSA's stakeholder advisory committee, the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, take on the challenge of evaluating airport access controls
and come up with approaches to address security vulnerabilities.
In April, the ASAC issued a thoughtful report with 28 recommendations
designated to mitigate threats and risks associated with airport access
controls.
Congress approved legislation in December 2014 to codify ASAC in law
in the hopes that it would result in better aviation security
policymaking at TSA.
We envisioned a process in which various stakeholders throughout the
aviation community were able to come together and address security
issues affecting the industry. In this instance, the process worked as
envisioned, and TSA is making sure and steady progress towards
addressing many of the recommendations.
I believe that, by advancing this bill today, we will send a message
to TSA and aviation stakeholders that we have a strong interest in
raising the bar when it comes to securing our Nation's airports.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, I simply reiterate that the committee
remains interested in raising the level of security within our Nation's
airports. As such, we will continue to track TSA's efforts at
bolstering access controls and addressing the ASAC's recommendations.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KATKO. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, the issues addressed in H.R. 3102 are a pressing concern
to the security of our Nation's airports. It is critical that we send
this bill to the Senate today. Congress cannot stand idly by and grant
tacit approval to lax security standards for employees when we have the
authority and responsibility to spur action and keep the traveling
public safe from harm.
I want to thank Mr. Richmond for his bipartisan comments. That truly
is the nature of what we have done today, is act in a bipartisan manner
to attack a problem.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Homeland
Security Committee, I rise to speak on H.R. 3102, the ``Airport Access
Control Security Improvement Act of 2015,'' which amends the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 to reform programs of the Transportation Security
Administration, and streamline transportation security regulations.
The objective of the bill is to establish a risk-based, intelligence-
driven model for the screening of employees at airports based on level
of access and employment positions at domestic airports.
The model is intended to ensure that only those individuals
authorized to have access to secure areas of a domestic airport are
permitted such access.
The model must be able to differentiate between individuals
authorized to have access to an entire secure area and those who are
not permitted access.
The Director of the FBI and Director of the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee are directed to review the disqualifying criminal
offenses in the Code of Federal Regulations to determine the adequacy
for an individual to have continued access to Secure Identification
Display Areas of airports.
The review based on the current language of the bill would consider
whether the list of disqualifying offenses should be amended to include
other offenses.
As House Judiciary Committee's Ranking Member on the Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism and Investigation, I am concerned that the bill
contains this language.
At a time when we are discussing the rights of non-violent offenders
to have an opportunity, if their conduct and records dictate to be able
to fully reintegration into society, that there may be other efforts to
make this process more difficult without a serious review of why such
measures should be taken and for whom should they be applied?
I would offer to work with my fellow members on the House Committee
on Homeland Security to consider carefully the reasons for any
expansion on this list, especially if the expansion only involves the
Department of Homeland Security.
There are similar concerns regarding language in the bill that may
extend the period of time that may be considered between a particular
situation and the life a person is currently leading.
Considering behavior of a teenager when considering the conduct of a
35 year-old adult, the weight of the consideration should be on the
life of the adult and the seriousness of the offense.
Any new model that may be developed that would impact the
employability of current persons who hold access credentials and future
employees should be further reviewed by the full committee prior to
becoming policy.
The bill's goals are important--the House should consider every
aspect of airport security to improve aviation safety.
I will continue to work in my capacity on both the House Committee on
Homeland Security and the House Committee on the Judiciary to improve
aviation security.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Katko) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 3102, as amended.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the
rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
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