[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 141 (Tuesday, September 29, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7001-S7002]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
Ms. BALDWIN. Mr. President, I wish to discuss the international
nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, JCPOA. Reached on July 14, 2015, after years of difficult
negotiations among the United States and the other P5+1 countries--
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany--and Iran, the
agreement confronts the Iranian nuclear program, which has long been
the subject of U.S., European Union, and United Nations sanctions.
Throughout these years of international negotiations, and more
recently, during these months of congressional debate, I have been
focused on one goal--ensuring that our dual-track policy of diplomacy
and economic sanctions results in an outcome that verifiably prevents
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran getting the bomb is simply
unacceptable, and blocking that is in our national security interests
and that of our allies, including Israel.
This international agreement impacts the safety and security of
Americans and our allies and is an incredibly serious matter, deserving
careful and considered scrutiny. That includes a thorough and
responsible debate in Congress. That is why I voted for the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, P.L. 114-17, which provided
Congress with a 60-day window to consider the JCPOA prior to its taking
effect. And that window was filled with vigorous debate in the Senate.
Regardless of one's position for or against the international
agreement, one thing is clear: every Senator has had an opportunity to
pass their judgement on whether we are right to choose a path of
international diplomacy to achieve our goal of verifiably preventing
Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In my judgement we are.
For me personally, I felt that it was critical to closely review the
details of the agreement and hear from individuals on all sides of this
debate, including experts and constituents, and listen to their
arguments. I have attended numerous classified briefings with
administration officials, including those with firsthand technical,
scientific, and diplomatic expertise, heard from the Ambassadors of our
P5+1 partners, and benefited from many candid conversations with
Wisconsin constituents. All of these interactions have been invaluable
and have informed my conclusion that rejecting this international
agreement is not in our national security interest. According to the
agreement, before receiving relief from sanctions, Iran must comply
with a number of far-reaching and long-term obligations to limit its
nuclear program, all of which will be verified by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, through an unprecedentedly robust
inspections and monitoring framework. Iran's obligations include
redesigning the Arak reactor to eliminate the plutonium pathway to
nuclear
[[Page S7002]]
weapons; eliminating its current stockpile of highly enriched uranium,
reducing its current stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97 percent,
and capping enrichment at that level for 15 years; reducing the number
of operational centrifuges by two-thirds and severely limiting research
on advanced enrichment technology; converting the underground Fordow
facility to a medical research center; accepting intrusive IAEA
monitoring of Iran's nuclear supply chain and fuel cycle; and
satisfactorily answering IAEA questions into the possible military
dimensions of its prior nuclear program. In exchange for verifiably
meeting these obligations, Iran will receive relief from U.S. and
international nuclear-related sanctions. And importantly, U.S.
sanctions against Iran related to human rights violations, support for
terrorism, and illicit arms shipments remain in effect. Should the
international verification regime catch Iran noncompliant with its
obligations, the agreement includes a provision allowing the United
States to unilaterally reimpose nuclear-related U.N. sanctions.
My judgement on this issue has also been guided by the hard lessons
that should be learned when America chooses to engage in military
action and war in the Middle East. It is easy to conclude that a
rejection of international diplomacy and the JCPOA would shatter the
current international coalition, making key multilateral sanctions
impossible, and would result in Iran restarting its illicit nuclear
activities, leading to inevitable military action. Indeed, I have been
struck by the inability of opponents of the agreement to put forth a
credible alternative that does not involve military action in the
Middle East. In this case, it is simply not feasible for the United
States to go it alone. So I am proud that America led six countries
toward a historic international agreement with Iran that verifiably
prevents it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
While the agreement does represent the best option to prevent Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon, moving forward, Congress and the
administration must work together in a bipartisan manner and in concert
with our allies to ensure that the agreement is implemented
effectively. Implementation is critical because this agreement is not
built on trust of Iran. In fact, the agreement is built on mistrust of
Iranian motives and a clear-eyed view of Iran's past and present
destabilizing activities in the region.
That is why the JCPOA establishes the most intrusive inspections and
monitoring framework in the history of arms control agreements.
Approximately 150 IAEA inspectors, outfitted with the latest training
and technology, much of which originates from the cutting-edge work of
the U.S. Department of Energy's National Labs, will be onsite in Iran
and ready to report any suspicious behavior.
In addition to this stringent monitoring regime, the very real threat
of snapback sanctions will work to incentivize Iranian compliance with
its JCPOA obligations. According to the agreement, in the event of
Iranian cheating, the United States has the ability to unilaterally
reimpose nuclear-related U.N. sanctions as well as add on to U.S.
sanctions against Iran beyond those related to human rights violations,
support for terrorism, and illicit arms shipments that remain in place.
And Iran should make no mistake: I, along with my colleagues in the
Senate, will not hesitate to reapply sanctions should Iran break the
terms of the JCPOA. In short, if Iran cheats, even along the margins,
we will catch them and there will be a heavy price to pay.
I am under no illusions regarding Iran's continuing destabilizing
behavior in the region and its record during the Iraq war, which
includes supporting Shiite militias that killed American
servicemembers. From human rights violations to support for terrorism
and criminal client states such as Assad's Syria to its illicit nuclear
program, Iran is a bad actor. That is why it is absolutely critical
that the JCPOA move forward and block Iran from developing or acquiring
a nuclear weapon, an unthinkable outcome that would make it an even
greater security challenge.
At the same time, I support taking immediate, additional steps to
counter Iran's non-nuclear activities in the region and bolster the
security of our Gulf Cooperation Council partners--who support the
JCPOA--and Israel. From the time of the establishment of the modern
Jewish State in 1948, the United States and Israel have shared a
special bond, grounded in our mutual commitment to democracy, freedom,
respect for the rule of law and the quest for a secure and stable
Middle East. I have spent more time in Israel than in any foreign
country, and my travel and interactions there have greatly informed my
understanding of the security challenges Israel faces.
That is why I have been a longtime supporter of annual U.S. aid to
Israel, which is currently set at $3.1 billion per year, as well as
additional funding for Israeli missile defense systems such as Iron
Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow, all of which are so valuable in
protecting Israeli citizens. I support increasing that level of
assistance and broadening and deepening our two countries'
collaboration in the security and intelligence spheres. The United
States and Israel are currently drafting a new 10-year memorandum of
understanding to govern the nature of U.S. military assistance to
Israel. This is an opportunity to further strengthen our security
relationship with Israel and ensure its qualitative military edge.
In conclusion, the United States cannot afford to walk away from an
international agreement that is based on a robust inspections and
compliance regime and will verifiably prevent Iran from developing or
acquiring a nuclear weapon. While there are legitimately held policy
differences on this highly complex issue, going it alone is not an
effective path forward and not in our national security interest. I
support moving this international agreement forward so we can begin
enforcing it and preventing Iran from developing or acquiring a nuclear
weapon.
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