[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 133 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E1285]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]





             APPROVAL OF JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                        HON. PETER J. VISCLOSKY

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 10, 2015

  Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Speaker, as the Ranking Member on the Defense 
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, I am acutely aware 
of the harmful influence the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies 
have on the security situation in the Greater Middle East. Simply put, 
Iran pursues policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals 
throughout the Middle East, often by enflaming sectarian tensions that 
are exploited by violent extremist elements in the region.
   However, despite my clear and deep mistrust of Iran, I firmly 
support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This hard-
fought multilateral agreement will severely limit Iran's nuclear 
ambitions, establish a verifiable and robust inspection regime, allow 
for the timely reinstatement of sanctions for violations of this 
agreement, and in no way limit U.S. military options. If fully 
implemented and rigorously enforced, the JCPOA will result in the 
removal of a source of risk and uncertainty within the region for the 
foreseeable future. I believe this will substantially increase the 
security for our nation and all of our regional allies.
   Under the JCPOA, Iran's access to nuclear material will be 
significantly curtailed from what we know exists today. Specifically, 
Iran will not produce or acquire either highly enriched uranium or 
weapons-grade plutonium for at least 15 years, and they will reduce 
their stockpile of low enriched uranium by 98 percent, from 12,000 
kilograms to 300 kilograms. Additionally, two-thirds of Iran's 
centrifuges will be removed from nuclear facilities, to be secured and 
constantly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
Also important to note is the commitment Iran has made under the 
agreement to not pursue certain research and development programs 
directly linked to the development of a nuclear weapon. All told, these 
restrictions significantly increase the amount of time Iran would need 
to produce enough fissile material for a weapon and to build a nuclear 
device.
   The agreement provides for the establishment of a verifiable and 
robust inspection system, including constant monitoring of Iran's known 
nuclear facilities throughout the entire chain of development, from the 
uranium mines to its centrifuges. Access to the supply chain makes it 
improbable that Iran could establish a covert nuclear program without 
detection. Further, the JCPOA ensures continuous monitoring of Iran's 
declared nuclear facilities and IAEA inspectors can request access to 
any location they suspect is involved with nuclear activities, 
including military sites. In anticipation of difficulties with access, 
the JCPOA contains a dispute resolution mechanism should Iran deny the 
IAEA access to any site. While the time allowed for the dispute 
resolution process has been criticized as too lengthy, I am certain any 
suspicious site will receive the full attention of U.S. observation 
assets during that period. Additionally, nuclear inspection experts 
express the utmost confidence that IAEA environmental sampling would 
detect the presence of any nuclear material.
   In order to receive new sanctions relief, Iran must satisfy IAEA 
demands about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, 
dismantle the vast majority of its uranium capability, and remove the 
core from the Arak reactor. To receive full relief from the remaining 
sanctions, Iran must continue meeting commitments for the years agreed 
to in the JCPOA. If the terms of the agreement are not met at any time, 
the JCPOA provides for the ability to re-impose both unilateral and 
multilateral nuclear-related sanctions. And notably, the agreement 
allows the U.S. and its European allies to re-impose United Nations 
sanctions over the objections of any member of the Security Council, 
including China or Russia.
   Further, the JCPOA only applies to nuclear-related sanctions. The 
United States will maintain several strong sanctions authorities due to 
Iran's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and for its abysmal 
record on human rights. For example, U.S. sanctions will continue to 
apply to several top-level officials in Iran's security apparatus, to 
the transfer of weapons of mass destruction technologies, missile 
technologies, and conventional weapons.
   Finally, the agreement in no way constrains the U.S. military 
options at our disposal, as has been repeatedly pointed out by General 
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony 
before Congress.
   I cannot argue that the JCPOA is perfect, and I share the 
frustration expressed by its opponents with its limited scope. In 
particular, I would have preferred if the agreement kept the 
constraints on Iran's nuclear program for longer periods of time, 
further reduced the number of operational centrifuges, did not allow 
for the future elimination of sanctions on conventional arms and 
ballistic missiles, contained restrictions on Iran's use of the 
sanctions relief, and addressed the detention of American citizens in 
Iran. However, in any negotiation, especially one with many sovereign 
nations, each having their own economic and security considerations, 
some compromise is necessary. Critically, I believe the agreement 
reached accomplishes the goal of preventing Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon.
   I fundamentally disagree with those supporters of the deal who have 
stated that ``war'' will be the immediate result if the agreement is 
rejected, and find that opponents of the deal have only presented 
alternatives that are best described as delusional. Rather, I concur 
with the sentiments of my esteemed friend, and former Senator, Richard 
Lugar, who recently wrote that Congressional rejection of the Iran deal 
would, ``kill the last chance for Washington to reach a verifiable 
Iranian commitment not to build a nuclear weapon,'' and, ``destroy the 
effective coalition that brought Iran to the negotiating table.'' We 
cannot reasonably expect foreign nations, even our closest allies, to 
continue making costly sacrifices at our demand if the U.S. 
unilaterally withdraws from its commitment to the JCPOA. And I can say 
with some confidence that China and Russia will have no hesitation to 
resume trade with Iran if the agreement were rejected. Iran negotiated 
because of crippling sanctions and a unified international community, 
neither of which will exist should Congress reject this agreement.
   The ultimate success or failure of the JCPOA will be determined by 
time and verification based on Iranian behavior. However, it is vital 
for the duration of the agreement that the U.S. leads the international 
community to maintain focus on Iran's compliance and ensure that Iran 
does not undermine regional stability through other pathways, negating 
the security gains from this agreement. To accomplish this, we must 
remain steadfast in our commitments to all of our regional partners, 
including Israel, and help improve their capacity to counter Iran and 
mitigate the effects of their malign activity. Additionally, we must 
keep combining diplomacy, economic pressure, and the resolve to keep 
military options on the table.
   Assuming the agreement is affirmed, I ask all to constructively work 
to improve the security situation in the Middle East rather than using 
all their energy to undermine the agreement. We cannot rely on force of 
arms alone to bring lasting stability to any region of our world. And I 
hope that the exhaustive multilateral negotiations that led to the 
JCPOA will serve as a template for future U.S. and international 
engagement on other outstanding issues that have led to instability and 
violence in the region.

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