[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 130 (Thursday, September 10, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6544-S6596]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      HIRE MORE HEROES ACT OF 2015

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of H.J. Res. 61, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A joint resolution (H.J. Res. 61) amending the Internal 
     Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt employees with health coverage 
     under TRICARE or the Veterans Administration from being taken 
     into account for purposes of determining the employers to 
     which the employer mandate applies under the Patient 
     Protection and Affordable Care Act.

  Pending:

       McConnell amendment No. 2640, of a perfecting nature.
       McConnell amendment No. 2641 (to amendment No. 2640), to 
     change the enactment date.
       McConnell amendment No. 2642 (to amendment No. 2641), of a 
     perfecting nature.
       McConnell amendment No. 2643 (to the language proposed to 
     be stricken by amendment No. 2640), to change the enactment 
     date.
       McConnell amendment No. 2644 (to amendment No. 2643), of a 
     perfecting nature.
       McConnell motion to commit the joint resolution to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, with instructions, McConnell 
     amendment No. 2645, to change the enactment date.
       McConnell amendment No. 2646 (to (the instructions) 
     amendment No. 2645), of a perfecting nature.
       McConnell amendment No. 2647 (to amendment No. 2646), of a 
     perfecting nature.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the time until 3:45 
p.m. will be equally divided between the two leaders or their 
designees.
  The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I understand we are moving back to the 
incredibly important debate on Iran. I will come back and address that 
a little bit later.


  Remembering Alison Parker and Adam Ward and Paying Tribute to Vicki 
                                Gardner

  Mr. President, it is with a heavy heart that I rise today to pay 
tribute to the victims of another horrific act of gun violence.
  On August 26, a gunman opened fire during a live television interview 
at Smith Mountain Lake in Virginia. By now, I think everyone in this 
Chamber and all across the country saw that event on live television. 
The gunfire killed WDBJ News 7 reporter Alison Parker, News 7 
photographer Adam Ward, and the shooting severely wounded Vicki 
Gardner, a local chamber of commerce official who was being 
interviewed. I know my colleague Senator Kaine has already spoken on 
this, but I speak for everyone in the Commonwealth when I say our 
hearts go out to the Parker family and the Ward family. We are all 
pleased to hear that Vicki Gardner was released from the hospital on 
Monday, and she is on the road to recovery.
  So Smith Mountain Lake in Virginia is now added to the all-too-
familiar, heartbreaking litany--Charleston, Aurora, Sandy Hook, Tucson, 
and Virginia Tech. It became clear in the days following the 26th that 
Alison Parker and Adam Ward represented the best of their community. 
The outpouring of love and support for them and their families was 
remarkable. I had a number of conversations with Alison's father Andy, 
whom I knew from local government, and I will be meeting with him later 
today. Vicki Gardner, who was released from the hospital, will soon, 
hopefully, be getting back to her job at the chamber of commerce.
  We feel--particularly those of us in Virginia--as if we knew Alison, 
Adam, and Vicki because the crime committed against them was so 
horrible and the details were reported so widely.
  How many more parents must lose their children to gun violence? How 
many more anxious families must maintain a lonely vigil at the hospital 
before all of us here in Congress move on commonsense gun legislation?
  More than 30,000 people are killed by firearms in this country every 
year. The last time Congress meaningfully engaged in a debate about gun 
reform was more than 2 years ago, after Sandy Hook. Even after the 
horrific loss of 20 children and 6 adults in Newtown at Sandy Hook, the 
Senate was still unable to pass responsible, commonsense

[[Page S6545]]

reforms, such as closing the gun show loophole. Since Sandy Hook, there 
have been at least 136 school shootings in America. That is an average 
of one every week.
  Probably like most of us, there are a lot of meetings we take in the 
Senate that kind of blur before our eyes. I will never forget the 
meeting with the Newtown families after that tragedy. I would have 
thought and would have expected with their grief that these families 
would have come in and asked for a whole array of legislative 
solutions, but they didn't. The families I met with came in and simply 
had one very reasonable, commonsense request of Congress: universal 
background checks to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and those 
with serious mental illness. Let me acknowledge that won't prevent 
every shooting. It is not a magical fix for violent, disturbed people 
who are determined to do harm, but it is a start at tackling the 
epidemic of gun violence.
  I am a supporter of the Second Amendment--for many years I had an 
``A'' rating from the NRA--but I believe background checks do not 
infringe on the Second Amendment. As a matter of fact, gun owners 
understand this. In fact, a greater proportion of gun owners support 
requiring background checks for all gun sales than do non-gun owners. 
In a recent survey, 85 percent of gun owners and 83 percent of non-gun 
owners--so gun owners more than non-gun owners--supported requiring 
background checks for all gun sales.
  Reasonable people can disagree about what additional steps might need 
to be taken, but the facts are not up for debate. Background checks do 
work, and they keep guns out of the hands of those who shouldn't have 
them.
  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Brady law has 
blocked almost 2.4 million gun purchases since its enactment in 1994. 
Almost 200,000 purchases were blocked in the most recent year in which 
we have records. But, as we know, background checks aren't performed on 
every purchase. In fact, a significant number of transfers are done 
with no check whatsoever to determine whether a prospective buyer can 
legally possess a gun.
  There is no reason why we shouldn't have a comprehensive background 
check system on all firearms sales. The Senate came close to making 
progress on this in the weeks following Sandy Hook. I want to 
particularly cite two colleagues, Senator Manchin and Senator Toomey, 
who both have strong records of support for the Second Amendment, who 
introduced and fought for bipartisan legislation that would have 
expanded background checks for many private gun sales, while still 
allowing families to appropriately transfer firearms within their 
family. However, this responsible and commonsense proposal fell short.
  The cycle of tragedy followed by outrage followed by inaction has 
become all too familiar. These tragic events are not isolated in any 
one part of the country--Charleston, Aurora, Tucson, Roanoke. Each of 
them breaks our hearts. We should not and cannot simply acknowledge and 
accept them as the status quo. We must not be content, and we must 
recognize that Congress, those of us in this body, have an ability to 
act. Thoughts and prayers for victims are not enough; we need to take 
responsible action. We can debate and should debate how far reform 
measures should go, but at the very least, we should look at a way to 
renew a push for more meaningful background checks. We must do more to 
make sure criminals and those who are dangerously mentally ill cannot 
purchase guns. We must work together to make sure local and State 
governments have the resources and place an appropriate priority on 
inputting the correct data into the national background check system.
  As recently as the end of June, Senators Toomey and Manchin indicated 
they were considering ways to renew their efforts at meaningful 
background checks. I want to state clearly today that they will have my 
full support in this effort. I call on my colleagues to work with us to 
get legislation expanding meaningful background checks to the floor of 
the Senate before the end of this year. I can think of no better way to 
honor the lives of Alison Parker and Adam Ward and the thousands of 
other American families touched by gun violence.

  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rounds). The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I intend to support the resolution of 
disapproval of the comprehensive plan of action negotiated by the Obama 
administration with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The agreement falls 
woefully short of the international goal to improve global security by 
stopping Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions.
  The American people and Congress were promised an inspections regime 
providing anywhere, anytime access to facilities where tests were 
conducted. Instead, Iran can delay access to facilities for up to 24 
days. This is inconsistent with the Obama administration's claims that 
no part of this agreement is based on trusting Iran at its word. A 
credible agreement would include stronger verification measures to 
ensure that the Iranians play by the rules, particularly given that 
government's well-documented efforts to conceal its nuclear activities 
and ambitions.
  We are also concerned about the consequence of lifting the economic 
sanctions that forced Iran to the negotiating table. This agreement is 
an issue of long-term significance. Our country and our allies will be 
forced to deal with the repercussions of a strengthened Iran for the 
foreseeable future. This agreement is a bad deal for us and our allies, 
and I will not support it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I have been a Member of this body for 
nearly four decades. During that time, I have had the honor of 
participating in numerous debates that shaped the course of our future, 
but I can think of none more important than the one in which we are now 
engaged.
  The Iranian regime is one of our most dangerous foes. It has declared 
the United States to be the ``Great Satan.'' It has repeatedly claimed 
its intent to ``wipe Israel off the map.'' It has perpetrated violence 
against American servicemen and civilians alike. It has sewn conflict 
across the most volatile region of the world. And it has repressed its 
people by some of the most ghastly methods imaginable.
  Indeed, we should remember throughout this debate that our quarrel is 
not with the Iranian people. The Iranian people are our friends. We 
should remember throughout our plight and their desire for a 
cooperative relationship with the United States and the rest of the 
world. Instead, it is the dictatorial and fanatical regime that seeks 
to build and even use nuclear weapons, to destabilize the entire 
region, and to kill Americans and Israelis. Given the threat posed by 
this rogue regime, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability is absolutely critical. It is a goal shared across party 
lines as well as among many of our friends and allies abroad.
  All of us here prefer to prevent Iran from acquiring this capability 
by diplomatic means if possible rather than by armed conflict. In light 
of this shared desire to resolve the Iranian threat without a war, I 
examined the Obama administration's proposed agreement hopeful, if 
skeptical, that I could support the agreement. Nevertheless, the duty 
incumbent upon us as Senators is not to accept or reject this deal 
based upon knee-jerk reactions or blind partisan loyalty but rather to 
determine our stances based on thorough examination and reasoned 
judgment.
  Regrettably, after much study, I have concluded that this is a 
catastrophically bad deal that I must strongly oppose.
  Now, at the outset, I should note that the media is reporting that 
President Obama has gathered the votes to support his Iran deal. In 
reality, he has done no such thing. Were this a treaty, it would fall 
well short of the two-thirds requirement. It won't--and it can't--even 
muster a majority in either the House or Senate. There is nothing 
bipartisan about support for this deal. Only the opposition is 
bipartisan, and only the opposition is a majority. The deal lacks the 
most important kind of support--that of the American people. A strong 
majority of Americans oppose this deal, and they are right to do so.
  Far from blocking the Iranian regime's path to nuclear weapons 
capability, this agreement actually secures

[[Page S6546]]

what Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies, calls a ``patient pathway'' to nuclear weapons 
capability.
  Consider the timeline. From day one, the Iranian regime will be 
allowed to enrich uranium using thousands of centrifuges and to conduct 
nuclear research and development. After 8 years, the regime will be 
allowed to begin building hundreds of new advanced centrifuges annually 
and will be allowed to expand its ballistic missile program.
  After 15 years, it will be permitted to use advanced centrifuges to 
enrich uranium on an industrial scale, to stockpile significant 
quantities of enriched uranium, and to build heavy water reactors, 
according to the State Department's own fact sheet. After only 10 
years, Iran's breakout time to rush for a nuclear weapon drops ``almost 
down to zero,'' as President Obama himself admitted.
  In the words of former Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate, 
this deal ``stalls, [then] enables, and then validates an Iranian 
nuclear program.'' All that the Iranian regime has to do is abide by 
the terms of the agreement to achieve threshold nuclear status--with an 
expanded infrastructure for the production of nuclear materials and a 
visible means of delivering a nuclear weapon to targets as far away as 
the United States.
  Moreover, the deal's means of verifying the Iranian regime's 
compliance with these temporary limits on its nuclear programs are, 
frankly, pathetic. Our only peaceful means of recourse under the deal, 
the so-called snapback mechanism, involves an incredibly cumbersome 
process.
  It allows the Iranian regime to delay international inspections for 
up to 24 days without recourse, a critical gap that experts such as 
former International Atomic Energy Agency Deputy Director General for 
Safeguards Olli Heinonen and former National Nuclear Security 
Administration Deputy Administrator for Defense William Tobey assert 
could allow Iran to hide evidence of illicit nuclear activities.
  Other parties' intransigence could also drag out the snapback 
mechanism more than 2 months before reimposing U.N. sanctions, 
approximately the same length of time as Iran's current breakout 
timetable, according to President Obama.
  Furthermore, the deal only makes the snapback mechanism available for 
instances of ``significant nonperformance,'' leaving no mechanism to 
respond to the kind of incremental cheating that has characterized the 
Iranian nuclear program thus far.
  Perhaps most troubling, it remains unclear whether weapons inspectors 
will even have access to all Iranian nuclear facilities in the first 
place. Senior officials of the Iranian regime have repeatedly claimed 
that the deal does not allow access to military sites. The agreement's 
language appears to have been left deliberately vague on this point, 
hardly an encouraging development.
  Moreover, press accounts of an IAEA side deal with Iran indicate that 
the international watchdog has already agreed to rely on the Iranian 
regime to conduct its own inspections at the Parchin weapons testing 
site, providing the IAEA with only photographs, videos, and 
environmental samples. Former IAEA Deputy Director General Heinonen may 
have put it best when he observed:

       If the reporting is accurate, these procedures appear to be 
     departing significantly from well-established and proven 
     safeguards practices. At a broader level, if verification 
     standards have been diluted for Parchin or elsewhere and 
     limits imposed, the ramification is significant as it will 
     affect the IAEA's ability to draw definitive conclusions with 
     the requisite level of assurances and without undue hampering 
     of the verification process.

  Regarding these troubling reports, I have a number of outstanding 
questions and concerns that have only been amplified by the Obama 
administration's steadfast refusal to share the text of the agreement 
with Congress. This intransigence amounts to an evasion of the spirit 
and possibly the text of the bipartisan Iran Nuclear Agreement Review 
Act, a development that rightfully sows doubt and concern about what 
else the Obama administration might be hiding.
  In light of these incredible concessions to the Iranian regime, I am 
also deeply troubled by the great benefit the Iranian regime stands to 
enjoy from this deal. To use the succinct words of one scholar, 
``President Obama is agreeing to dismantle the sanctions regime 
permanently. In return, Tehran is agreeing to slow the development of 
its nuclear program temporarily.''
  The current sanctions regime has imposed heavy costs on the Iranian 
economy. Oil exports have dropped by 60 percent. The inflation rate has 
risen to 40 percent. And foreign companies, deterred by harsh 
penalties, have avoided investing in Iran, thereby isolating Iran from 
the global economy. Along with the threat of military action, these 
sanctions played a critical role in bringing the Iranian regime to the 
negotiating table, and we should thus be very careful before 
sacrificing this leverage.
  In exchange for these minimal, temporary concessions, the Iranian 
regime stands to reap enormous rewards in sanctions relief. According 
to figures cited by President Obama, the Iranian regime will regain 
control of more than $150 billion currently frozen in the world's 
financial institutions. Sanctions relief will also allow an influx of 
international businesses into Iran, bringing about greater revenue for 
the regime.
  Where should we expect this money to be spent? Will it go to the 
long-suffering Iranian people who are the victims of this regime, a 
people who have long contributed to the advancement of civilization and 
the good of mankind, a people whose true spirit has been continually 
repressed for almost 40 years, a people who have paid a high price 
because of the radical fundamentalism of their leaders, and a people 
who look to us for strength in the defense of our ideals, not 
capitulation to this heinous regime?

  Unfortunately, we cannot expect such an outcome. If history is any 
guide, we should expect the Iranian regime to use sanctions relief to 
pursue its dangerous aims, including: to support its terrorist proxies 
that represent a dire threat to the stability of the whole region, such 
as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the 
murderous Assad regime in Syria; to encourage the ``swarming of 
[foreign] businesses to Iran,'' which the Iranian foreign minister 
believes will make it ``impossible to reconstruct'' broad international 
sanctions; to take advantage of the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo 
after 5 years to purchase sophisticated weapons systems such as the 
Russian S-300 air defense system, which would make American or Israeli 
military action against the Iranian nuclear program even more difficult 
than it already would be; and to shore up the political and financial 
standing of the most radical elements of the Iranian regime, reducing 
the likelihood of internal reform and a more constructive Iranian 
foreign policy.
  If the Iranian regime suddenly becomes flush with cash, what 
incentive will it have to change priorities 15 years from now?
  Doesn't this deal reward what the Obama administration called ``bad 
behavior'' in one of the most astonishing understatements that I have 
ever heard?
  And in the words of one expert, ``when in the course of human history 
did getting $100 billion [or $150 billion] at the stroke of a pen ever 
convince anyone that they have been wrong all along?''
  For a deal built on the unfounded hope that the Iranian regime would 
change its ways, I see very little reason to expect success. And for an 
agreement that would supposedly reinforce the position of the Iranian 
moderates and bring relief to the Iranian people, I see only the 
prospect of strengthening the hand of the hard-liners and of sanctions 
relief diverted for more violent misadventures, rather than for the 
benefit of the Iranian people.
  Reflecting on this spectacularly bad deal, I can only conclude that 
Obama administration officials proved to be weak negotiators because of 
an absolute desperation for a deal--almost any deal. These massive 
concessions to the Iranian regime for so little in return were produced 
by this administration's knee-jerk aversion to the prospect of using 
military force, a preoccupation demonstrated by the constant rhetoric 
that we hear from the White House that the only alternative to this 
deal is war.

[[Page S6547]]

  That claim is patently false. We can and should go back to the 
negotiating table. While reassembling the sanctions coalition that this 
agreement throws away will not be easy and may not even be fully 
possible, a nation as strong as ours still has plenty of tools at our 
disposal. Our unparalleled economic and military might give us 
significant leverage to get a better deal, and we should not be misled 
by overly simplistic rhetoric to conclude otherwise.
  War is never a happy matter to contemplate, especially from a 
position of responsibility such as in the Senate. In this body, we are 
saddled all too often with the sorts of decisions in which real 
people's lives hang in the balance: those of our friends and neighbors; 
our fellow countrymen; our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines; and 
even those in faraway distant places who look to America as a guardian 
of freedom and peace, what Abraham Lincoln called the last, best hope 
of Earth.
  None of us relish the prospect of war, especially in an age in which 
our weapons have a power almost too terrible to contemplate. In 
particular, neither I nor any of my colleagues seek a war with Iran; as 
I stated before, the Iranian people are not our enemies. They are our 
friends. No people have paid a higher price for the regime's record of 
terrorism, mass murder, corruption, and duplicity than the Iranians. 
The prospect of inflicting collateral damage on our long-suffering 
friends further counsels against any course of action that leads to 
war.
  It is not a cavalier attitude about war that leads me to oppose this 
deal; it is my unwavering judgment that this deal makes war much more 
likely that leads me to oppose it.
  Let there be no doubt. A deal that paves rather than precludes Iran's 
path to a nuclear weapons capability makes war more likely. A deal that 
makes the Iranian regime more confident of its ability to protect its 
nuclear program from international pressure and military action makes 
war more likely. A deal that funnels tens of billions of dollars to 
terrorists bent on destabilizing the Middle East makes war more likely. 
A deal that provokes a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region on 
the globe makes war more likely. A deal that surrounds Israel not only 
with a nuclear Iran but also eventually with numerous other regimes 
with nuclear weapons capability and a genocidal attitude toward the 
Jewish State makes war more likely. And a deal that puts the Iranian 
regime and its terrorist allies one turn of a screwdriver away from a 
nuclear weapon and a means of delivering it anywhere across the world 
makes war more likely.
  War may come, but it is not inevitable. As Members of ``the world's 
greatest deliberative body,'' it is our duty to discern the wisest 
course of action that preserves the security of the United States and 
our allies--that reduces the risk of war but does not let the strong 
desire for peace we all share cloud our judgment about how we best 
preserve that peace.
  In this solemn debate, it is my hope that the voice of reason will 
have the power to change minds and overcome the pressures of our 
politics that have the power to lead us astray. I am encouraged in my 
hope by the fact that almost every Member to come out in support of 
this deal has noted its significant flaws. The opposition to it has 
been unambiguous, strong, and bipartisan, and it constitutes a strong 
majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. I want to 
pay tribute to four of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who 
have bucked significant political pressure to vote their consciences 
against this bad deal.
  We still have a chance to change course. All that is required is the 
bravery and good judgment to lead our Nation and the world to an 
agreement that can actually preserve the long-term peace. I urge all of 
my colleagues to join me in opposing this disastrous deal and in 
supporting a better way forward.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, first, I thank our honored President pro 
tempore for his outstanding comments.
  But while my distinguished friend from Illinois is on the floor, I 
thought I would walk through a unanimous consent request, if that is 
OK. I think it has been cleared with him.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be further 
divided as follows: from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. would be Republican time, 
from 11 a.m. to 12 p.m. would be Democratic time, from 12 p.m. to 1 
p.m. would be Republican time, from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. would be 
Democratic time, from 2 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. would be Republican time, 
from 2:30 p.m. to 3 p.m. would be Democratic time, from 3 p.m. to 3:45 
p.m. it be equally divided between the leaders or their designees, and 
that Senator Menendez be given 15 minutes of the Republican time and 15 
minutes of the Democrat time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. DURBIN. If I might ask the Senator from Tennessee to clarify, 
would the last part of his request relate to the period between 3 p.m. 
and 3:45 p.m.?
  Mr. CORKER. Yes, that is correct.
  Mr. DURBIN. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Thank you.
  Mr. President, so our side knows what will occur between now and the 
end of our time, the next 15 minutes will be for Senator Graham, then 
10 minutes to Senator Barrasso, and then 10 minutes to Senator Flake.
  With that, I yield the floor to one of the best national security 
voices in the United States of America, Senator Graham of South 
Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I just want to make sure people understand 
what we are trying to do here this morning. Our Democratic colleagues 
are filibustering an attempt to have a debate and an up-or-down vote on 
the most consequential foreign policy decision in modern history. That 
is what you are doing.
  Senator Corker, in good faith, got us here in a bipartisan manner. 
And Senator Reid has come out of nowhere to change what was the common 
understanding of how we would proceed--get 60 votes, a simple majority, 
and let the President act as he wishes.
  But, no, we couldn't do that. They are more worried about protecting 
Barack Obama from having to veto this than they are about having a 
debate on the floor of the Senate.
  Now, let me tell you a little about who you are dealing with here, 
folks. If I hear one more comment from my Democratic friends about how 
much they love Israel--with friends like this, you don't need an enemy. 
This is who you are dealing with. This was yesterday:

       Iran's supreme leader predicted Wednesday that Israel would 
     not exist in 25 years, and ruled out any new negotiations 
     with the ``Satan,'' the United States, beyond the recently 
     completed nuclear accord.
       In remarks published Wednesday on his personal website--

  At least the Ayatollah has gotten into modern times--

     and in posts on Twitter, the supreme leader--

  Do you know why they call him the Supreme Leader? Because he is--

     Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, responded to what he said were claims 
     that Israel would be safe for that period. . . .

  Where did those claims come from? It came from this administration, 
my colleagues on the other side. You are telling the world that this is 
the best deal for Israel. Guess what. Nobody in Israel who is in the 
current government agrees with you. It is just not Bibi. Everybody who 
is in the current coalition government understands this is not a good 
deal for Israel.
  Why don't you listen to them? You want it to be a good deal for 
Israel. Well, it is not, and your wanting it doesn't change it.
  So let's finish what he said.

       [The Ayatollah] responded to what he said were claims that 
     Israel would be safe for that period under the nuclear 
     agreement reached in July.
       ``After nuclear negotiations, the Zionist regime said that 
     they will not be worried about Iran in the next 25 years.''

  I repeat.

       ``After nuclear negotiations, the Zionist regime said that 
     they will not be worried about Iran in the next 25 years.''

  Israel didn't say that. People over here said that.
  The Ayatollah wrote:

       ``I am telling you, first, you will not be around in 25 
     years' time, and God willing, there will be no Zionist regime 
     in 25 years. Second, during this period, the spirit of

[[Page S6548]]

     fighting, heroism and jihad will keep you worried every 
     moment.''

  Clearly, somebody who is on the course of change, somebody we should 
give $100 billion to, create a pathway to a nuclear bomb in 15 years 
and let him buy more weapons in 5 years and build an intercontinental 
ballistic missile in 8 years--clearly, this is the man who has changed 
course and you have empowered him.
  At least--at least--Chamberlain can say Hitler lied. At least 
Chamberlain can say: I negotiated with the Fuhrer. He told me to my 
face: If you give me this, I am done.
  Well, we all know Chamberlain was a chump, and Hitler actually meant 
what he said when he wrote a book.
  The question is, Does this man mean what he says when he tweets 
yesterday that the ink is not dry on the deal?
  The one thing you can say about the old Ayatollah--who is crazy, who 
is a religious Nazi--is that at least he is honest. He doesn't want you 
to be confused as you vote as to what he wants to do to your friend 
Israel. See, he doesn't want you to misstate what this deal means to 
him. You obviously are writing him off. You obviously believe he 
doesn't mean it.
  I guess he has a polling problem in Iran. He has to get his numbers 
up. He needs to say these things--because he doesn't mean it. But he 
has to keep his people happy because they like hearing this stuff. All 
I can tell you is his people tried to rise up against him in 2009, and 
our President sat on the sidelines and didn't do a damn thing. The 
biggest moment for change in Iran came in 2009, when young people and 
women took to the streets demanding a fair election that was stolen 
from them by the Ayatollah, and his response was to beat them, shoot 
them, put them in jail and torture them. This is the guy you are going 
to give $100 billion to, a clear pathway to a bomb. He doesn't even 
have to cheat to get there and buy more weapons to attack us.

  At least Chamberlain lied. This man is telling you what he is going 
to do as of yesterday, and between these times that negotiations have 
started until now, has he shown us a little leg about what will change? 
During the negotiations he has toppled four Arab capitals. During the 
negotiations he has supported the Houthis in Yemen, who destroyed a 
pro-American government, and we have lost eyes and ears on Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula--a Sunni extremist group that attacked Paris and 
will attack us.
  During the negotiations they have done anything but be moderate. I 
cannot believe that you don't believe him. I cannot believe you made 
the biggest miscalculation in modern history by empowering a religious 
fanatic with the ability to attack our Nation, destroy our friends in 
Israel, and keep the Mideast on fire for 15 years. What are you all 
thinking over there?
  All I can say is that on the last 9/11, 3,000 of us died because they 
couldn't get weapons to kill 3 million of us. If you let this deal go 
forward, before too long the most radical regime on the planet will 
have the most lethal weapons available to mankind. They will share that 
technology with terrorists and they will come here. Why do they need an 
ICBM, folks? What are they going to do with it? They are not going to 
send people to space. What are you thinking? What are you all thinking 
over there? You are taking the most radical regime on the planet, a 
theocracy--this is not a democracy. The moderates were shot down in the 
streets. They were begging: Are you with us or are you with him, 
President Obama?
  President Obama is absolutely the poorest champion of freedom and the 
weakest opponent of evil in history. Evil is flourishing on his watch. 
President Obama said you would have to be crazy not to support this 
deal. Let's walk through whether we should follow his advice about 
radical Islam.
  This is the President who was told to leave troops in Iraq to make 
sure our gains would be maintained, and he pulled everybody out because 
he wanted to get to zero. He turned down every commander's advice to 
get to zero because he made a campaign promise. This is the President 
who was told by his entire national security team 3 years ago to 
establish a no-fly zone and help the Free Syrian Army because Assad was 
on the ropes, at a time when it would have mattered, when there was a 
Free Syrian Army to help and Assad was about to fall. Obama said: No 
thanks. This is the President who drew a redline against Assad, after 
he backed off, and said: If you use chemical weapons and you cross that 
redline, there will be a price.
  Here are the facts. Assad is going to be in power and Obama is going 
to be gone. The last man standing is going to be Assad. So all I can 
tell you is this is the man who said: Don't worry about ISIL. They are 
the JV team. I killed bin Laden; Al Qaeda is decimated.
  At what point in time do you realize President Obama has no idea what 
he is talking about? At what point in time is it obvious to anybody in 
the world who is paying attention that when it comes to radical Islam 
he has no clue?
  So this is the guy we are going to send in to negotiate with a 
radical ayatollah--a guy who, in the eyes of the world, is a complete 
weak defender of freedom and a very poor adversary of evil. If that is 
not enough, the Iranians are rubbing this in John Kerry and Barack 
Obama's face by tweeting this out hours before you vote on this deal.
  Just to remind you that no matter what you say on this floor about 
Israel, nothing has changed in his mind about Israel. When you claim 
Israel is safe, he is telling you: No, they are not. But you are not 
listening because you don't think he really means it. Well, I can tell 
you right now, you better be right. How about this idea. When it comes 
to the Ayatollah, assume the worst, not the best.
  To our friends in Russia, John Kerry said one of the big benefits of 
this deal is that we will bring Russia in and Iran will be a better 
partner in the Mideast, and we will have a major breakthrough where 
Iran begins to help us with problems like Syria. Well, here is Russia's 
response, before you vote. They are sending Russian troops--maybe 
fighter planes--into Syria to prop up Assad before you vote. They are 
taking everything John Kerry said about what would happen if you do 
this deal and rubbing it in his face.
  Tell me how you fix Syria with Assad in power? What the Russians are 
doing is ensuring he will stay in power longer, and the longer he stays 
in power, the more refugees the world will have to deal with and the 
more Hell on Earth will occur in Syria.
  The Syrian people want two things; they want to destroy ISIL and they 
want Assad gone because he has destroyed their families. So Secretary 
Kerry, how well is this working, with this new engagement of Iran and 
Russia. Things are really changing. Look at the tweet yesterday. What 
are you going to tell the American people this means? Interpret the 
Ayatollah for me. This is just all talk? He has to say these things? He 
doesn't get elected. He doesn't have to worry about the next election. 
He says these things because he believes them. He is a religious 
fanatic, compelled by his version of Islam to destroy everything in his 
religion that he doesn't agree with--to destroy the one and only Jewish 
State and attack democracies such as ours, and you are giving him more 
to do that with. This is, over time, a death sentence for Israel, if it 
is not changed.
  If I had $100 billion to negotiate with, for God's sake, could I get 
four people out of jail? I could get people out of jail here with $100 
billion. Who is negotiating with Iran? This idea we are going to 
separate all of their bad behavior from their nuclear program was the 
biggest miscalculation in modern foreign policy history.
  To suggest we don't need to look at Iran as a whole unit; that we are 
going to ignore the fact that they have four hostages, U.S. personnel 
held in sham trials, a Washington Post reporter; that they are the 
largest State sponsor of terrorism; that they destabilize the region; 
that they have driven our friends out of Yemen; that they are 
supporting Hezbollah, a mortal enemy of Israel; and that they have 
taken over the Lebanese Government--we are not going to worry about all 
that? What do you think they are going to do with the $100 billion? Do 
you really think they are going to build roads and bridges?
  The best indication of the next 15 years is the last 35. When you 
separated their nuclear ambitions from their destructive behavior, 
giving them access to more weapons and $100 billion, you made a huge 
mistake because you are damning the Mideast to holy hell for the next 
15 years, and you are

[[Page S6549]]

giving the largest state sponsor of terrorism more money and more 
weapons to attack us--and you couldn't get four people out of jail.
  The only reason they are not dancing in Iran is the Ayatollah just 
doesn't believe in dancing. I have friends over there whom I respect 
and admire. I have no idea what you are thinking. I have no idea why 
you believe the Ayatollah doesn't mean what he says, given the way he 
has behaved. If they would shoot their own children down in the streets 
to keep power, what do you think they will do to ours? And the only 
reason 3,000 people died on 9/11 is because they couldn't get the 
weapons to kill 3 million of us, and they are on course to do it now.
  I have never been more disappointed in the body than I am today, a 
body known to be the most deliberative body in democracy in the history 
of the world. Yet you will not let us have a vote. You will not let us 
have a debate.
  Please stop saying this deal makes Israel safer. That is cruel. Your 
response to this deal is to give them more weapons because you know 
they are not safer. I find it a bit odd that in response to this deal 
we are selling the Arabs every kind of weapon known to man and we are 
promising Israel every kind of weapon we have. If you truly thought 
this was such a good deal, why do you have to arm everybody who is in 
the crosshairs of the Ayatollah?
  When they write the history of these times, they are going to look 
back and say that President Obama was a weak opponent of evil and a 
poor champion of freedom. They are going to look and say that the 
United States Senate refused to debate the most consequential foreign 
policy agreement in modern times, and the people in Israel are going to 
wonder where did America go.
  Has it ever crossed your mind that everybody in Israel who is in 
power, who is running the government today, objects to this agreement?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Senator Corker, thank you for trying to have the debate 
we need. To my Democratic friends: You own this. You own every ``i'' 
and every ``t'' and every bullet, and you own everything that is to 
follow and it is going to be holy hell.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I am so proud of my colleague from South 
Carolina for the remarkable speech he just gave to this Senate about 
his concerns about this President's deal with Iran--the President's 
nuclear deal with Iran. That is what the Senate is debating right now--
a deal President Obama negotiated with Iran and whether that deal 
should stand or fall.
  This agreement could affect American foreign policy in the Middle 
East and beyond for this generation as well as the next. It will affect 
America's relationship with our allies as well as with our enemies. 
Other countries are wondering whether America will accept a flawed 
agreement that gives Iran almost everything it has asked for or will 
we, as the United States of America, stand strong against outlaw 
nations with nuclear ambitions and dreams.
  As Senators prepare to vote on this legislation we should ask: Does 
this agreement do enough to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program? Does 
this agreement do enough to protect the security of the American people 
and our friends around the world? I believe the answer is no. It would 
be irresponsible to support such a weak, such a naive, and such a 
dangerous deal.
  The original goal of ending Iran's nuclear weapons program was a good 
one, and I wish the President had actually stuck with that goal. I wish 
the President had done a better job of negotiating with the Iranians. 
He did not. During the negotiations this administration was far too 
willing to make concessions, concessions that put our own national 
security at risk.
  We were in a very strong position during these negotiations from the 
start, and the Obama administration squandered the advantage. The 
President badly wanted to strike a deal with Iran, and that is the 
problem because President Obama has shown once again that if you want a 
deal badly enough, you will end up with a bad deal. The President fell 
in love with this deal, even though it is deeply flawed. And deeply 
flawed is a description our Democratic colleagues continue to make 
about this deal. The President cannot see the flaws that our colleagues 
on the Senate floor can see because I believe the President is blinded 
by deal euphoria. He is in love with the deal.
  The agreement President Obama has negotiated will legitimize Iran's 
nuclear program. It will accept Iran as a nuclear threshold state. To 
me, this is inexcusable. It is not the deal the President should have 
signed. It is not the deal the President could have signed. It is not 
the deal President Obama promised he would sign.
  President Obama once said that Iran didn't need advanced centrifuges 
in order to have a limited, peaceful nuclear program, but under this 
agreement his administration did negotiate that Iran will not eliminate 
a single centrifuge. It will continue to research more advanced 
centrifuges, and it can even start building them.
  So how did it happen? How did this happen? On the day the agreement 
was announced, the President of Iran bragged--bragged--about how he had 
gotten the Obama administration to surrender on this point. ``To 
surrender,'' that is the language I am hearing around the State of 
Wyoming and certainly the language we are hearing from Iran: The 
President surrendered.
  At the beginning, the President said Iran would only need 100 
centrifuges. Then the number went to 1,000, then 4,000, then eventually 
allowed more than 6,000. When it mattered most, the Obama 
administration wanted a deal so badly that it was willing to concede on 
point after point after point. This proves if you want a deal bad 
enough, you will get a bad deal--and that is what we have here today.
  The same thing happened with ballistic missiles. GEN Martin Dempsey, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States 
military, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Under no 
circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic 
missile capabilities and arms trafficking.'' Under no circumstances.
  Defense Secretary Ash Carter also testified at the same hearing. Now, 
this hearing, of course, was only 6 days before the final deal was 
announced by the President. Secretary of Defense said, ``We want them 
to continue to be isolated as a military and limited in terms of the 
kinds of equipment and materials they are able to get.'' That was 6 
days before the final deal was announced.
  So what happened? What did the President of the United States 
surrender on? With this agreement, Iran will have access to ballistic 
missile technology in as little as 8 years, even though the Secretary 
of Defense said no; even though the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff said, ``Under no circumstances.'' That is when Russia and other 
countries are going to be able to start selling this deadly technology 
to Iran--and I believe that Iran will use it.
  Now, this was a last-minute demand that Iran made, and it should have 
been easy for President Obama to reject it, but he did not. He 
surrendered. The President was so desperate to get a deal that he gave 
in once again. It is always the same story with the Obama 
administration: If you want a deal bad enough, you are going to get a 
bad deal--and they have. When the Obama administration is negotiating 
with countries that need a deal much more than we do, the President of 
the United States surrenders.
  This administration has no red lines when it comes to negotiating. 
They will give away anything to get a deal. There have been too many 
concessions for anyone to be comfortable with this agreement. There are 
too many red flags. President Obama cannot see the defects that are 
obvious in this plan. He refuses to see what is so clear to the 
American people.
  After this agreement, Iran will be a nuclear threshold state, and a 
military and an industrial power. It will have the money to support 
terrorists around the world--more money than it has had in the past. It 
will have the freedom to pursue its nuclear ambitions.
  Even some Democrats who have said they support this deal are doing so 
with great reservations. They say they know it is not a good deal, but 
they say: It is the only option we have. Well,

[[Page S6550]]

that is not a good enough reason for me to accept all of the risks and 
all of the concessions that the Obama administration allowed in this 
agreement.
  The President says: The choice is the Iran nuclear deal or war. He 
has said it time and time again. It is fear mongering. It is not true. 
There is an alternative. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said 
so.
  General Dempsey was asked about that at a hearing of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. In answer to the question: Is it this or war, the 
general said, ``I can tell you that we have a range of options, and I 
always present them''--present them to the President. ``We have a range 
of options.'' It is not just a choice between this deal or war. It is a 
choice between accepting a bad deal or rejecting it. If the only choice 
is to take this deal or leave it, then we must leave it.
  The Obama administration doesn't want us to have a vote here in the 
Senate. The Obama administration knows it signed a bad deal, and it 
wants the whole thing to disappear from the front pages before it 
causes them any more embarrassment.
  So instead of having a full and honest debate on the floor of the 
Senate, the President and the Senate Democrat leader are trying to hide 
behind a filibuster. That is not how the Senate should handle this 
important resolution to disapprove the Iran deal. Every Member of the 
Senate should be willing to cast a vote up or down on this Iran deal. 
We should stand up, we should represent the people of our State and 
this Nation, and we should cast our votes.
  The Obama administration has made its arguments, and it has failed to 
make its case. The President has not shown that America will be better 
off with this deal, and I believe we would be better off without it.
  We have heard the administration's excuses. We have heard all of the 
ways the final deal fell short of their promises. America can't afford 
to let Iran have the nuclear program that this agreement will allow it 
to obtain. We should vote to disapprove the Iran deal. The President 
should drop his veto threat. The President should send his people back 
to the negotiating table because this deal poses too great a threat to 
America's national security for us to do anything else.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. FLAKE. Mr. President, as we continue the debate on one of the 
most important foreign policy matters this body has addressed in some 
time, I would be remiss if I didn't mention how honored I am to be a 
part of it.
  It is not unusual for the Congress to engage in debate over matters 
like spending bills, bills to authorize various Federal agencies, 
executive branch and judicial nominations, or other business that we 
routinely attend to around here. But it is only on occasion that this 
body gets to have the opportunity to weigh in on some of the more 
pressing foreign policy matters. When it does, the legislation it 
considers often has lasting consequences for the United States and for 
the rest of the world.
  Take, for example, the Taiwan Relations Act. Passed by both chambers 
in 1979 in response to the normalization of relations between the 
United States and China, this piece of legislation remains the 
cornerstone of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship to this day.
  Likewise, this body has considered a number of arms limitation 
treaties over the decades between the United States and Russia. The 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, was approved by this body in 
1992 by a vote of 93 to 6. START II was approved in 1996 by a vote of 
87 to 4. Most recently, the New START treaty with Russia was approved 
in 2010 by a vote of 71 to 26.
  These bills address subject matter that was highly controversial. I 
am sure there was a fair amount of disagreement between Democrats and 
Republicans, and between the Congress and the White House. But in 
instances likely too numerous to count, Senate deliberation ended with 
a bipartisan vote that set the U.S. foreign policy into place for 
years, even decades, and signaled that America was speaking to the rest 
of the world with one voice.
  I deeply regret the JCPOA will not build on this history. 
Unfortunately, the administration elected to negotiate this deal as an 
executive agreement rather than a treaty. That was the administration's 
call. It does mean, however, that the administration did not need to 
negotiate the JCPOA, mindful that it would need the support of 67 
Senators. It also means the Senate does not have the opportunity to 
offer so-called RUDs--reservations, understandings, and declarations--
that can accompany treaties and clarify its interpretation of the 
agreement.
  To be sure, there are several troubling aspects of this agreement 
that could have been improved if the Senate had the opportunity to 
consider the JCPOA as a treaty. For example, the text of the agreement 
clearly states that any reimposition of the sanctions specified in 
Annex II would be viewed by Iran as a violation of the agreement and 
would likely prompt Iran to cease abiding by its obligations under the 
agreement. The sanctions in Annex II include all the influential 
sanctions, such as those on Iran's Central Bank. These have had a 
profound effect on Iran's economy.
  In hearings and briefings by the administration, I have asked whether 
the United States could reimpose these powerful sanctions at some point 
later down the line for other, nonnuclear-related behavior by the 
Iranian government to penalize Iran for regional activities or for 
committing acts of terrorism. This regime, as we know, has made 
achieving regional hegemony its calling card since its inception in 
1979. Now, this administration has assured me that these sanctions 
would be available in the future, but, unfortunately, that simply does 
not square with the text of the agreement.
  The question of reimposition of sanctions raises a further question 
of how this agreement might bind the hands of future Congresses and 
future administrations. As I previously mentioned, though the JCPOA has 
already been adopted by the United Nations, it will never be the 
supreme law of the land in the United States because it is not a 
treaty. A treaty that has been agreed to by at least 67 Senators gives 
the treaty the critical imprimatur that insulates it from political 
winds for the lifespan of the treaty. The JCPOA will benefit from no 
such imprimatur.
  What if, for example, a future Congress or President wishes to 
reimpose sanctions against Iran or take some other action that might 
legitimately cause Iran to accuse us of violating the JCPOA? A future 
Congress or President could be put in the position of either having to 
preserve an agreement that neither had a hand in negotiating nor taking 
action that would result in Iran walking away from its nuclear 
obligations. It would be beneficial for U.S. foreign policy to steer 
clear of those lose-lose propositions.
  The current administration has already expressed reluctance to push 
back against Iran's interpretation of the agreement even before it has 
been implemented. I have serious concerns that if there is reluctance 
to push back on Iran now, there will be even more reluctance to push 
back on Iran's regional behavior once the deal is in place. This gives 
Iran more leverage than it currently has moving forward, and that could 
have disastrous consequences on the Middle East. These are issues that 
could have been addressed in a positive manner by the Senate if the 
agreement had been submitted as a treaty.
  Now, when this agreement was announced, I said I would take every 
opportunity to learn more about it, so I attended every hearing held by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I commend Chairman Corker and 
Ranking Member Cardin for holding these hearings and going about this 
in such a deliberative and serious manner. I attended every classified 
congressional briefing and several other briefings, and had discussions 
with numerous experts and administration officials.
  After these discussions, these hearings, these briefings, I believe 
it is a much closer call on this agreement than most want to admit. 
There are positive aspects on the nuclear side. Unfortunately, I think 
this deal suffers from significant shortcomings.
  Hoping that Iran's nuclear ambitions might change after a 15-year 
sabbatical might be a bet worth making. Believing that Iran's regional 
behavior will change tomorrow while giving up tools to deter or modify 
such behavior is not a bet worth taking.

[[Page S6551]]

  It is for these reasons that I reluctantly oppose the JCPOA.
  I do hope that we can make up for this unfortunately partisan vote by 
working together, and with the President, to pass a regional security 
framework agreement that will not only reassure Israel and our allies 
in the region, but solidify this agreement throughout the duration of 
the JCPOA.
  The United States is strongest when we speak with one voice on 
foreign policy matters.


                      Border Jobs for Veterans Act

  Mr. President, yesterday, we were able to pass on a bipartisan 
basis--in fact, unanimously--a bipartisan bill to help put veterans 
back to work as Customs and Border Protection officers at understaffed 
U.S. ports of entry.
  Earlier this week, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson 
confirmed that the agency has not yet filled 1,200 of the 2,000 new CBP 
officer positions created by Congress in 2014 to improve security and 
reduce trade-stifling commercial traffic in ports. Secretary Johnson 
has attributed these shortfalls to delays associated with applicant 
background investigations. So we were able to pass legislation to force 
the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security to work 
together with this legislation. Now they will do so, and hopefully it 
will improve the condition of trade and the backlogs we have on the 
border.

  I applaud my colleagues for making this happen--cosponsors John 
McCain, Chuck Schumer, Richard Burr, Tammy Baldwin, Richard Blumenthal, 
Dianne Feinstein, and others. Thank you for passing this legislation. 
It will improve the situation on the Arizona-Mexico border.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I know the time has ended. I know that 
Senator Daines wants to speak very briefly. Senator Durbin is allowing 
that as long as we give back some time at a later moment. If we might 
have 3 minutes.
  Mr. DAINES. I wish to thank the Senator. I appreciate that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Capito). The Senator from Montana.
  Mr. DAINES. Madam President, if Iran's ultimate goal is to obtain a 
nuclear weapon, the deal reached by the Obama administration sets Iran 
on course to do so. From the time this deal is agreed to, Iran has 10 
years to fill their coffers with tens of billions of dollars from newly 
unsanctioned oil sales and pursue the research and development of 
nuclear capabilities. As the world's leader of state-sponsored 
terrorism, it will only be a matter of time before Iran achieves its 
ultimate goal, and that is obtaining a nuclear weapon. These are 
bipartisan concerns.
  This deal will not prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and 
the American people deserve a better deal. This deal is stacked against 
transparency and accountability. It provides up to a 24-day delay 
before Iran is forced to comply with inspections of nuclear sites on 
their military bases. This is a long way from ``anywhere, anytime'' the 
American people were promised. Can you imagine if the EPA or the FDA 
came knocking on a Montana farmer or business owner's door, and they 
said: Well, you can't come and inspect right now, but come back in 24 
days. That is what we have set up right now with the Iranian Government 
through this deal.
  Through this deal, the American people are being asked to enter into 
a binding trust agreement with the world's leading state sponsor of 
terror. In fact, just yesterday I looked at my Twitter feed, and the 
Supreme Leader of Iran--he is called the Supreme Leader for a reason--
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: ``I say that you [Israelis] will not see 
the coming 25 years and, God willing, there will not be something named 
the Zionist regime in [the] next 25 years.'' And then he went on to 
reiterate in calling America the Great Satan. This is whom the United 
States is making this bad nuclear deal with. It is not a mistake to 
push for tougher sanctions.
  The American people deserve a better option. Two nights ago, I had a 
tele-townhall meeting, calling into 100,000 Montana households. 
Overwhelmingly, by 3 to 1, Montanans opposed this deal.
  As we close, let me say this: As I step back and look at the numbers 
today, if we look at the Senate, it looks as if about 69 Senators are 
opposed to this deal. There are 42 supporting it. Those 58 who oppose 
it are bipartisan. The House numbers are similar in ratios.
  The point is this: There is bipartisan opposition to this deal, both 
Democrats and Republicans joining together. The only support is 
partisan. It is a mistake to not push for a better deal that can be 
supported by more than one segment of one political party.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, so that those who are following this 
debate understand where we are, this morning the Democratic leader, 
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, for the second time offered to the 
Republican side the following: that we will bring this critically 
important, historic measure before the U.S. Senate for an up-or-down 
vote--a clean up-or-down vote--at a margin of 60 votes.
  Sixty votes is the margin that is used for every major and, I might 
add, controversial measure before the Senate. So what we are asking is 
not out of line. In fact, the Republican side had supported the notion 
of a 60-vote margin until they didn't have 60 votes. Now they are 
calling for some other approach.
  So here is what we face. This afternoon at about 3:45 p.m., we will 
have a rollcall vote. It will be on the procedural question of whether 
we end debate on one aspect of this issue. It is known as a cloture 
vote. We will see how it turns out. But we have made a good-faith offer 
twice to the Republicans to finish this important debate and to bring 
this to a 60-vote close.
  Every single Member of the Senate on both sides of the aisle has 
announced publicly in advance where they stand on the issue. No one is 
trying to avoid this tough vote, and it is a challenging vote. Everyone 
has faced it squarely and honestly, and that is where we should go. 
Senator McConnell, on the Republican side, objected to this. We will 
face a procedural vote at 3:45 p.m.
  What is troubling is that we are in disarray now in the Congress. 
This statute that brings us to the floor of the U.S. Senate, the 
resolution of disapproval on the Iran agreement, passed the Senate with 
a vote of 98 to 1--a strong bipartisan agreement that this is how we 
would approach it. This is what Senator McConnell is working off of, 
the basic statute that brings us together. But look what is happening 
across the Rotunda. Yesterday the House of Representatives 
disassembled. When they were supposed to move forward procedurally to 
the same vote we are facing, they fell apart. There was a Republican 
caucus, and it was in disarray. Now they are proposing not the 
underlying statute which we are considering but three brandnew, 
different approaches to this. This is no way to run a Congress. It is 
no way to address a serious foreign policy issue, one of the more 
serious issues of our time.
  My colleagues are here to speak. I am going to yield the floor to 
them. I have spoken from time to time, but I will say this: Understand 
what we are trying to achieve here. We are not putting a seal of 
approval on Iran and their conduct and their activity. That will never 
happen. Instead, what we are saying is we have one goal in mind, shared 
by many nations around the world: to stop Iran from developing a 
nuclear weapon. That is the goal. I believe this agreement comes as 
close to achieving that as we can hope for at this moment.
  I wish it were stronger and better, but in the course of negotiation, 
we don't always get everything we want. But think of what happened 
here. We met in Switzerland at the table with five other nations--
China, Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. The European 
Union, I might add, joined the United States in this effort to 
negotiate this agreement and walked away. All nations involved in the 
negotiations said this is a good agreement and should move forward. In 
addition to that, we have had support from the Security Council of the 
United Nations. Over 100 countries have endorsed this.
  Yet it has been categorically rejected by the Republicans in both the 
House and the Senate. The first evidence of their rejection was March 9 
of this year while the negotiations were underway. Forty-seven 
Republican Senators sent a letter to the Supreme Leader in Iran,

[[Page S6552]]

the Ayatollah, saying to him basically: Don't waste your time 
negotiating with the United States of America. That has never happened 
in the history of the United States--never. I asked the historians to 
check it. Never have we had Members of Congress sending a letter in the 
midst of negotiations telling the other side: Don't pay attention to 
our President; don't pay any attention to our Nation. It never happened 
before. So 47 of them made it clear even before the agreement was 
reached that they were rejecting it. That doesn't show good faith. That 
doesn't show an effort to try to be objective and honest about this.
  Here we stand today with the first procedural vote this afternoon. 
There are two things we want to achieve with this vote and with this 
agreement: No. 1, stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. We do 
that by shutting down their production facilities, by closing down 
their centrifuges, and by sending in scores of international 
inspectors, who will be roaming through Iran during the entire pendency 
of this agreement, looking for violations that could trigger the 
sanctions being returned. No. 2, our goal is to bring peace and 
stability as best we can when it comes to the nuclear issue in the 
Middle East, particularly in support of our friend and ally, the nation 
of Israel. I think the President's good-faith effort here reaches that 
goal.
  I support this, and I will be voting on the procedural side this 
afternoon to support the President's Iran agreement.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, my dear friend and colleague and I 
disagree, but I very much respect the way he has conducted himself 
throughout this entire debate.
  Every several years or so, a legislator is called upon to cast a 
momentous vote in which the stakes are high, and both sides of the 
issue feel very strongly about their views. Such is the case with the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. It demands reasoned and 
serious debate.
  Over the years, I have learned that the best way to treat big 
decisions is to study the issue carefully, hear the full explanation of 
those for and against, and then, without regard to pressure, politics, 
or party, make a decision based on the merits. That is what I did with 
the Iran deal. I carefully studied the JCPOA, read and reread the 
agreement and its annexes, questioned dozens of proponents and 
opponents, and sought answers to questions that went beyond the text of 
the agreement. After deep study and considerable soul-searching, I 
announced that I would oppose the agreement and vote yes on the motion 
of disapproval.
  While we have come to different conclusions, I want to give 
tremendous credit to President Obama for his work on this issue. The 
President, Secretary Kerry, and their team spent painstaking months and 
years pushing Iran to come to an agreement and, years before, 
assembling the international sanctions regime that brought Iran to the 
table in the first place. It was the President's farsightedness that 
led our Nation to accelerate development of the Massive Ordnance 
Penetrator, the MOP, the best military deterrent and antidote to a 
nuclear Iran. Regardless of how one feels about the agreement, all 
fairminded Americans should acknowledge the President's strong 
achievements in combating and containing Iran.
  I also have a great deal of respect for the careful thought and 
deliberation my colleagues went through before making their final 
decisions. While I came to a different conclusion than many in my own 
caucus, I recognize for them that this is a vote of conscience, just as 
it is for me.
  I wish to recount my reasoning here on the floor before a vote is 
taken. I examined this deal in three parts: nuclear restrictions on 
Iran in the first 10 years, nuclear restrictions on Iran after 10 
years, and nonnuclear components and consequences of a deal. In each 
case, I didn't ask what is the ideal agreement. We are not in that 
world. I asked, are we better off with the agreement that we have 
before us or without it?
  In the fist 10 years of the deal, there are serious weaknesses in the 
agreement. First, inspections are not ``anywhere, anytime.'' The 
potential delay of as many as 24 days before we can inspect undeclared, 
suspicious sites is troubling. It is true that declared sites will be 
monitored. That is one of the positives of this deal. But if Iran is 
going to cheat, it will not be at a declared site with the eyes of the 
world watching, it will be at a nondesignated site. If Iran is trying 
to cheat, it will certainly delay the inspection process as long as 
possible.
  Even more troubling is the fact that the United States cannot demand 
inspections unilaterally. We require a majority of the eight-member 
joint commission. Assuming that China, Russia, and Iran will not 
cooperate, inspections would require the votes of all three European 
members of the P5+1 as well as the EU representative. It is a 
reasonable fear that once the Europeans become entangled in lucrative 
economic relations with Iran, they may not want to rock the boat by 
voting to allow inspections.
  Additionally, the snapback provisions in the agreement seem 
cumbersome and difficult to use. While the United States could 
unilaterally cause snapback of all sanctions, there will be instances 
where it is more appropriate to snap back some but not all of the 
sanctions. A partial snapback of multilateral sanctions could be 
difficult to obtain because the United States would require the 
cooperation of other nations.

  If the U.S. insists on snapback of all provisions, which it can do 
unilaterally, the Europeans, Russians or Chinese might feel it is too 
severe a punishment and might not comply.
  Those who argue for the agreement say it is better to have an 
imperfect deal than nothing. When you consider only this portion of the 
deal, it is indeed better to have inspections and sanctions snapback 
than nothing, but even for this part of the agreement, the weaknesses 
with both of those processes make this argument less compelling.
  Second, we must evaluate how this deal would restrict Iran's nuclear 
development after 10 years. In my view, if Iran's true intent is to get 
a nuclear weapon, under this agreement it simply must exercise 
patience. After 10 years, it can be very close to achieving that goal. 
Iran would be stronger financially, better able to advance a robust 
nuclear program. Unlike its current unsanctioned pursuit of a nuclear 
weapon, Iran's nuclear program would be codified in an agreement signed 
by the United States and other nations.
  Finally, we must consider the nonnuclear elements of the agreement. 
This aspect of the deal gives me the most pause. For years Iran has 
used military force and terrorism to expand its influence in the Middle 
East by actively supporting military or terrorist actions in Israel, 
Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza.
  Under this agreement, Iran would receive at least $50 billion in the 
future and would undoubtedly use some of that money to create even more 
trouble in the Middle East and perhaps beyond. The hardliners could use 
these funds to pursue an ICBM as soon as sanctions are lifted and then 
augment their ICBM capabilities in 8 years after the ban on importing 
ballistic weaponry is lifted. Restrictions should have been put in 
place limiting how Iran could use its new resources.
  Using the proponents' overall standard, not whether the agreement is 
ideal or whether it is better to have it or not have it, it seems to 
me, when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement, within 10 
years we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes 
to nuclear aspects after 10 years and nonnuclear aspects, we would be 
better off without it.
  Ultimately, in my view, whether one opposes or supports the 
resolution of disapproval depends on how one thinks Iran will behave 
under this agreement--whether contact with the West and a decrease in 
economic and political isolation will soften Iran's hardline positions 
or whether the current autocratic regime views this deal as a way to 
get relief from onerous sanctions while still retaining their designs 
on nuclear arms and regional hegemony.
  No one has a crystal ball. No one can tell with certainty which way 
Iran will go. It is true, Iran has a large number of people who want 
their government to decrease its isolation from the world and focus on 
economic advancement at

[[Page S6553]]

home, but this desire has been evident for 35 years. Yet Iranian 
leaders have held a tight and undiminished grip on Iran with little 
threat.
  Who is to say that this same dictatorship will not prevail for 
another 10, 20 or 30 years? To me, the very real risk that Iran will 
not moderate and will instead use the agreement to pursue its nefarious 
goals is too great; therefore, I will vote to disapprove the agreement, 
not because I believe war is a viable or desirable option, nor to 
challenge the path of diplomacy, it is because it is far too likely 
that Iran will not change, and under this agreement it will be able to 
achieve its dual goals of eliminating sanctions while ultimately 
retaining nuclear and nonnuclear power. It is better to keep U.S. 
sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce the secondary sanctions on 
other nations, and pursue the hard, trident path of diplomacy once 
more, difficult as it may be.
  For all of these reasons, I believe the vote to disapprove is the 
right one.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I yield 20 minutes to the Senator from 
Delaware.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. CARPER. Madam President, I thank the Democratic whip for yielding 
time to me and for his extraordinary leadership on this issue and tell 
him how proud I am of him and my other colleagues, no matter where we 
come down on this issue.
  I have a little bit of a different approach to the serious matter 
that is before us. During the first week or two of the August recess, I 
did something that I suspect none of my colleagues did; I actually read 
the Iran deal and a lot of the materials that relate to the agreement. 
After putting it down, my mind wandered back to another time and place 
where there was an intense effort to end years of hostility and 
mistrust in the Middle East.
  As Governor of Delaware and chairman of the National Governors 
Association, I led a trade delegation in 1999 of business leaders, 
government officials, and citizens mostly from Delaware, many of them 
Jewish, and we went to Israel in the summer of 1999. We went looking to 
strengthen economic and cultural relations between Delaware and Israel.
  Briefed by U.S. Department of State officials before departing on our 
mission, I also went looking for an opportunity to encourage Israeli 
and Palestinian leaders to seize the day and change the leadership in 
Israel in order to try and negotiate the two-state solution that always 
seemed just out of reach.
  Those opportunities came sooner than I ever expected. Shortly after 
we landed there, we were whisked off in Israel to a sprawling outdoor 
Fourth of July celebration that was hosted by the U.S. Ambassador to 
Israel. Among the guests there that day were former General Ehud Barak, 
who was about to become Prime Minister of the country, and Bibi 
Netanyahu, the man he defeated. The other guests included the widow and 
daughter of the late Yitzhak Rabin, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres, 
former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, General Ariel Sharon, and a 
remarkable assemblage of who's who in Israel.
  I spoke briefly that day with Ehud Barak and at length with him 
several days in his office after he had officially assumed his new 
duties as Prime Minister. The second conversation focused on the 
negotiations which lay ahead with Yasser Arafat, shepherded by the 
Clinton administration, to try to reach a land-for-peace deal once and 
for all with the Palestinians.
  Ironically, a few days later, our delegation was invited to Ramallah 
to join Arafat and members of his leadership team for an extended 
lunch. Over that meal, I sat with Arafat and I shared with him the new 
Prime Minister's earnest desire to complete the work begun by former 
Prime Minister Rabin before his assassination. I urged Arafat to set 
aside generations of conflict and distrust in an effort to find common 
ground with the Israelis that would ultimately provide greater security 
for Israel and better relations with its neighbors in return for 
Palestinian statehood. The conversation seemed to go well. A few days 
later back in the States, I shared as much with the Clinton 
administration.
  The negotiations that ensued over the course of the next year 
ultimately presented Arafat with the best land-for-peace proposal the 
Palestinians would ever receive. In the end, they turned it down. 
Dennis Ross, who played a key role in the negotiations for the 
administration, would later tell me that ``Arafat simply could not take 
yes for an answer.''
  Sixteen years have passed since then. Another transformative 
opportunity has presented itself, and this time to America and to our 
five negotiating partners--the British, the French, the Germans, the 
Russians, and the Chinese as well as the people of Iran. We have a 
chance to ensure that the Iranian hopes of developing a nuclear weapon 
are put on the shelf for years--maybe forever.
  The Iranians have a chance to bring to an end the crippling economic 
sanctions that the coalition we lead has imposed on Iran for years, and 
the Iranians have another opportunity; that is, to shed their status as 
a pariah among the nations of this world and assume a position worthy 
of their history and their culture.
  Over the past 2 years, I have had countless meetings with people from 
Delaware and beyond our borders who fall on both sides of this issue. 
Some are vehemently opposed to any deal with Iran and others believe we 
absolutely must have a deal in order to avoid a war.
  I came to support this agreement only after considering all of these 
points of view, reviewing the text of the deal again and again, 
hundreds of additional pages of supporting documents, and taking in 
dozens of briefings from experts on Iran and nuclear proliferation.
  Two years of negotiations have produced an agreement that Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu and most of our Republican colleagues 
denounced almost as soon as the ink was dry on it and well before they 
ever read it. They said America should reject the deal and negotiate a 
better one. Well, to that I think you say: Good luck.
  Last month, along with a number of my colleagues, I met here in 
Washington with ambassadors and representatives of the five nations 
that were our negotiating partners. To a person they argued--
persuasively I thought--that this is a deal we should not reject. In 
effect, they urged us to learn from Arafat's mistake and this time take 
yes for an answer.
  They are not the only ones who believe we should support this deal. 
There are dozens of former Israeli national security and military 
officials, including retired Israeli Navy Admiral Ami Ayalon. He is 
pictured here. He was effectively the CNO of the Israeli Navy--the 
person in charge of the Navy in the last decade. I am an old Navy guy. 
I am a retired Navy captain. I spent 23 years in the Navy. I was 
interested in what he had to say when he came to my State.
  Here is what he said, among other things: ``The Iran deal is the best 
possible alternative from Israel's point of view given the other 
available alternatives.''
  Now, look, he is one significant Israeli leader who believes this is 
the right thing for Israel. As it turns out, there are dozens, and 
actually scores, of former Israeli military leaders and intelligence 
leaders who agree with him--not all but a lot, and we should listen to 
their voices. I have certainly listened to him.
  To those who think there are dangerous people in Iran who want this 
deal so they can exploit it, I remind them that the Revolutionary Guard 
is vehemently opposed to this deal. A lot of people I have talked to in 
Delaware in recent weeks think that, well, the Revolutionary Guard, the 
bad guys and hardliners in Iran, if you will, are for it. As it turns 
out, they are not for it. It is quite the opposite.
  Here is a photograph of Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander 
of Iran's Revolutionary Guard. He said: ``We'll never accept it.'' That 
is not exactly a voice of endorsement for this agreement. I think this 
is all the more reason we should vigorously enforce this agreement 
through the intrusive inspections regime it mandates for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to make for years to come, in order 
to ensure that the Iranians comply with every element required of them 
by this deal.
  This deal blocks four pathways to a bomb. I will mention what they 
are:

[[Page S6554]]

first of all, the uranium facility in Natanz, blocked; the uranium 
facility at Fordow, blocked; weapons-grade plutonium, blocked; covert 
attempts to make a bomb, blocked; intrusive and uncomfortable 
inspections; sanctions relief only after Iran meets its obligations. If 
they cheat, the harsh economic sanctions snap back. Who can snap them 
back like that? We can, the United States, and any of our negotiating 
partners as well. We don't need their concurrence. We can do it alone.
  Iran currently has 10,000 kilograms of enriched uranium and nearly 
20,000 centrifuges, that puts them 2 or 3 months away with a nuclear 
bomb. Without a deal, it stays that way. With a deal, however, that 
enriched uranium stockpile must shrink to 300 kilograms and Iran must 
cut their number of centrifuges by two-thirds. And the ones they end up 
with are not the advanced centrifuges, they are actually the most 
elementary centrifuges. That change blocks their pathway to a bomb, 
keeping them at least 1 year away for the next 15 years or maybe 
longer.
  Our negotiating partners also made the following critical points 
repeatedly. If at the end of the day the agreement is implemented and 
the Iranians violate its provisions later on, we will know it. We will 
know it by virtue of our own intelligence, the intelligence of our 
partner nations, and the intelligence of the Israelis as well. If it 
becomes apparent that the Iranians have cheated, any of the six of our 
nations can mandate the reimposition of an international economic 
sanctions regime against Iran, the same crippling sanctions that 
brought them to the table 2 years ago and to this hard-fought agreement 
today.
  Madam President, 35 years ago, the United States imposed sanctions 
against Iran that were largely unilateral. It was just us. Then we 
began ratcheting it up over time.

  Unilateral sanctions by the United States were clearly a nuisance to 
Iran, but they did not bring Iran to the table. Only sustained, 
multilateral sanctions, joined in by our five negotiating partners and 
others around the world, succeeded in bringing Iran to the table in a 
mood to talk. In fact, under the agreement that has been negotiated, if 
necessary, they could be set up by the United States in their entirety 
at our request--our request--if we are convinced the Iranians are 
cheating. This agreement guarantees that if they are ever needed again, 
any of the six of us could pull the trigger and reimpose them. 
Conversely, if the United States rejects this agreement, we not only 
lose the ability to know that the Iranians are pursuing the development 
of a nuclear weapons capability, we will also lose the support of the 
rest of the world in reimposing sanctions in the event that a future 
government in Iran elects to pursue a nuclear weapons program. I don't 
know about my colleagues, but that makes no sense to me--no sense. It 
also makes no sense to our negotiating partners.
  Almost every American who was alive on 9/11, which we will 
commemorate tomorrow, remembers the horrifying images of that tragedy. 
To make matters worse, we had to endure the spectacle throughout the 
day and night of tens of thousands of Arabs across the world taking to 
the streets to celebrate the death of thousands of Americans. Lost 
among those images, however, was a remarkably different gathering that 
took place in another nation. It took place in, of all places, Tehran, 
the capital of Iran. There that night, thousands of Iranians came 
together in a candlelight vigil in solidarity with the United States. 
Most Americans have no idea that ever happened. I have never forgotten 
it.
  A half-dozen years later in New York City, I would meet an Iranian 
leader named Javad Zarif, living there with his family. He was the 
Iranian ambassador to the U.N. We didn't have relations with them and 
we still don't. But the Iranians have for some time had an ambassador 
there to the U.N. and he lives in New York City.
  Zarif was educated, it turns out, at San Francisco State University 
and the University of Denver. I remember thinking when I met him that 
he spoke flawless English--better than I--and he knew more about 
Americans than most Americans. I think his kids were educated here as 
well.
  Impressed, later on, after I came back to Washington, DC, I spoke to 
him and I said: Why don't you come to Washington and meet some of our 
colleagues to give them a chance to get to know you and to have a 
dialogue.
  He said: The George W. Bush administration won't let me come. They 
won't let me leave New York City.
  So I said: Well, that is easy to fix, and I met with the Bush 
administration. Well, it wasn't easy to fix, and they wouldn't relax 
their travel ban.
  So I later would ask Zarif in a conversation we had--this is when 
Ahmadinejad was the President of Iran, saying the holocaust was a 
figment of the imagination and the leaders of Israel should be blown 
off the face of the Earth. I said to Zarif: How do you get along with 
your President Ahmadinejad, and his response was: Not good.
  He said: Ahmadinejad doesn't trust me. I am not going to be here much 
longer.
  And he was right. The next time I reached out to him, he was gone. He 
was gone, seemingly without a trace. I found out years later he had 
been recalled to Iran and had returned to private life writing, 
lecturing, and largely staying out of sight.
  As Ahmadinejad's second and final term began to wind down, a campaign 
to determine who would replace him ensued. A reformer named Rohani put 
his hat in the ring. Most people had never heard of him, at least not 
here. And most people in Iran said he would never have a chance to even 
get elected or run. Well, he got to run, and not only did he get to 
run, he won more votes than the other five candidates combined. In the 
end, he did serve.
  Later on, the question was what kind of cabinet would he put together 
to surround himself as the leader of Iran. And what he did--we were 
watching to see who would be minister of this or that over there. So 
when Rohani submitted the names of the Iranian parliament, his 
submission for Foreign Minister was my friend, Zarif. You could have 
knocked me over with a feather. I never saw it coming, never imagined 
it would come. The man who had gone on to lead the Iranians in 
negotiations with our five negotiating partners over the past 2 years 
is a man I have known for a half a dozen years or more.
  Our negotiating team has been led superbly by Secretary of State John 
Kerry. By his side, however, for much of the past year has been a less 
well-known Cabinet Secretary, our Energy Secretary Ernie Moniz, who 
would end up playing a key role among all of the members of a very 
talented and dedicated team.
  Dr. Moniz has never sought elected office. I first met him almost a 
decade ago at MIT where he was a leader and a professor in physics. He 
was regarded as one of the world's experts on all things nuclear. He 
testified one day at a field hearing I held at MIT focusing on spent 
fuel rods from nuclear plants. Later, I came back and people said: What 
is he like? And I said: This guy Moniz is a genius. And by God he is.
  It turns out he is not just a genius; he leads a bunch of these 
national labs where people who are just as smart as he is know all 
kinds of information, including all things nuclear--more so than any 
other country in the world. As it turns out, they were harnessed to 
help us in this negotiation--the national labs--led by Ernie Moniz.
  As it turned out, ironically, among the graduate students at MIT 
during Dr. Moniz's distinguished career, there was a young Iranian 
named Akbar Salehi. Later Salehi would return to his country and, as 
fate would have it, ultimately become Dr. Moniz's Iranian counterpart 
in the negotiations with the U.S.-led team. As it turns out, Salehi's 
thesis adviser at MIT was one of Ernie Moniz's closest friends at MIT, 
and thus was created maybe not a bond, but a connection, and a shared 
trust that went back to both Ernie Moniz, a former professor at MIT, 
and a former graduate student, Salehi at MIT.
  It didn't take long for Secretary Moniz to make a profound impression 
during the negotiations. Shortly after he joined the team earlier this 
year, he gave the Iranians what several members of the U.S. team would 
later describe to me as a tutorial in all things nuclear, making it 
clear that the Iranians had ``more than met their match.'' Adding Ernie 
Moniz to our team was I think a stroke of genius, not only bringing him 
here, but the national labs as well. In the countless

[[Page S6555]]

meetings he has participated in with House and Senate Members, he has 
bolstered the credibility, probably as much as anybody, of the 
agreement--and the confidence of many in it--in ways that almost no 
other American could do.
  Much has been made of whether we can trust the Iranians to do what 
they have committed to do. John Kerry, Ernie Moniz, and the other 
members of our team have made clear that the agreement they and our 
five partners from the other nations have hammered out with Iran is not 
based on trust. Let me say that again: It is not based on trust. It is 
based, as we have already heard on this floor, on mistrust. We realize 
that some future Iranian regime may well ponder whether to violate the 
agreement and launch another pilot program to develop another 
nonpeaceful nuclear capability. If they actually attempt to do that, 
the key questions are these: Will we know it? Are the consequences for 
Iran severe enough to deter them from going forward with it? I am 
convinced the answer to both those questions is yes.
  Today, Iran has much more than the hardline Revolutionary Guard whose 
influence has begun to wane. Iran today is a nation of 78 million 
people. Their average age is 25. Most of them were not alive in 1979 
during the Iranian revolution. They don't remember the brutal Shah we 
propped up for years and allowed to come to our country when his regime 
fell. This new generation of Iranians is ready to take yes for an 
answer. I think we should too. This is a good deal for America and our 
allies, and that certainly includes Israel, one of our closest allies. 
I think it beats the likely alternative that there could well be war 
with Iran, hands down.
  I will close with this brief conversation. About a year and a half 
ago I was up in New York in a house that Senator Durbin had actually 
visited with me, as well as a couple of others where Zarif used to 
live. We had the opportunity to talk about the upcoming negotiations. I 
said: Zarif, you and Iran have a choice. You can have a strong, vibrant 
economy for your country again, or you can have a nuclear weapons 
program. You cannot have both. And we are not going to accept a nuclear 
weapons program.
  We have the ability to know if they cheat. If they cheat, we have the 
ability to put right back in place these same crippling economic 
sanctions. If that doesn't do the job, we have other alternatives at 
our disposal. Nothing is off the table.
  Sometimes around here we talk about voting our fears or voting our 
hopes. I am prepared to vote my hopes, for our Nation and the Iranians 
as well. Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I wish to thank my colleague, the 
Senator from Delaware. That was a very thoughtful presentation. The 
Senator from Delaware has a personal interest in and has made a 
personal commitment to this issue. I thank him for his insight.
  I now yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. PETERS. Madam President, earlier this week I announced that I 
will reluctantly support the Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action and 
oppose the resolution of disapproval, despite some very serious 
reservations.
  I did not reach this position easily or quickly. Although there are 
many positive aspects to this deal, this agreement also has flaws that 
I believe need to be addressed in the months and years ahead.
  The congressional review period has served a very useful purpose. My 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle have raised very important points 
about this deal as we were briefed by experts and administration 
negotiators. I commend Senators Cardin and Corker for their bipartisan 
efforts to establish this review and for affirming Congress's role in 
shaping our Nation's foreign policy.
  After this debate is over, it is my hope that moving forward the 
Senate will forge bipartisan consensus and act with unity of purpose. 
We must work together and take action against Iran if they fail to live 
up to their obligations under this agreement, and we must work on 
legislation and multinational and lateral efforts to combat Iran's 
sponsorship of terrorist activities, arms smuggling, and hegemonic 
ambitions.
  We need to look no further than the humanitarian crisis emanating 
from Syria to see the havoc and chaos that Iran and its proxies are 
wreaking on an already troubled region.
  We need to provide robust oversight and work together to stem the 
proliferation of nuclear material, especially from nascent nuclear 
states and from Iran in particular. Nearly 20 countries produce safe 
nuclear power without domestic enrichment. America's longstanding 
policy is that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty does not provide 
the right to enrich uranium.
  While in the short term this agreement helps reduce Iran's capacity 
to enrich and eliminates the vast majority of their Iranian stockpile, 
I am concerned that in the long term other nations will view this 
agreement as a precedent that will lead to increased proliferation of 
nuclear enrichment and the potential for other nations to emerge as 
threshold nuclear states.
  Just a few years ago, the United States signed and ratified a 123 
Agreement with the United Arab Emirates that would help them build 
nuclear power capabilities while explicitly preventing them from 
enriching uranium on their soil.
  The United States must take a leadership role in setting a threshold 
of acceptable levels of enrichment of uranium for the safe production 
of nuclear energy. As more nations look to meet growing energy needs 
while minimizing carbon output, a comprehensive policy to ensure only 
safe levels of uranium enrichment with strong international safeguards 
is critical to global security.
  No nation faces a more severe threat than Iran's nuclear ambitions 
than the State of Israel. For decades, the Iranian regime has made it 
their mandate to eliminate the Jewish State. We must be united in 
ensuring that this never happens. We must always be ready to act to 
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and smuggling arms to its 
proxies in the region.
  As the Middle East falls deeper into chaos, our alliance with Israel, 
a nation that shares so many of our values, has never been more 
important. America must reaffirm our longstanding commitment to 
Israel's security by renewing our memorandum of understanding, 
providing Israel with defense capabilities in order to cement its 
qualitative military edge in the region, and bolstering Israel's 
ability to initiate deterrence against Iran.
  The JCPOA is not the end of our multilateral efforts against Iran and 
its illicit behavior. America must work with our allies to initiate 
multilateral sanctions against Iran for its terrorist activities, 
especially its funding of Hezbollah and Hamas.
  We also need to set clear understandings of how Iran will be 
sanctioned for minor violations of this agreement that will not 
initiate the snapback of full sanctions. We must continue working in a 
coordinated fashion to ensure unity in purpose against Iran's nuclear 
ambitions, terrorist activities, and efforts to destabilize the region. 
We must also continue pressing for the release of all U.S. hostages 
currently imprisoned in Iran, including Amir Hekmati. Congress must 
address these issues.
  In 2009 Congress debated whether to pursue sanctions or diplomacy 
with Iran first, with military force always being the last resort but a 
necessary final deterrent. I was proud to cosponsor the effort to pass 
sanctions in 2009 and help pass additional sanctions in the years 
since. As a new Member of the Senate, I joined a group of bipartisan 
Senators ready to pass additional sanctions against Iran as they 
continued to drag out negotiations. Iran needed to know that the 
patience of the United States was not limitless.
  The JCPOA is a product of complex negotiations and painstaking 
compromises. But let's be clear. Either rejecting or accepting this 
deal comes with a set of distinct risks. However, those who oppose this 
deal have been accused of supporting war over diplomacy, and those who 
support this deal have been likewise portrayed as supporting 
containment and capitulation. Foreign policy is rarely so simple, and 
it is certainly not so simple in this case.

[[Page S6556]]

  As leaders of this great Nation, we owe it to our citizens and the 
men and women in uniform to never let ourselves become so fractured by 
partisan politics on issues of such importance to national security. I 
look forward to working with Senators on both sides of the aisle to 
protect the interests of our allies and the safety and security of this 
great Nation and to ensure that the United States of America remains 
both united in our goals and indivisible in our purpose.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. KING. Madam President, I want to talk about this arrangement and 
agreement with Iran and cover several points and what I think are 
important realities that have not been emphasized in this debate, but 
first I would like to address the issue of the 60-vote margin.
  First, I think it should be on the record that the minority leader 
offered to the majority leader a unanimous consent agreement that there 
would be no filibuster on the motion to proceed and there would be a 
60-vote threshold required for final passage of the bill. As I 
understand it, that offer was rejected. That means the only alternative 
is to go the technical rule of the filibuster in order to require a 60-
vote margin.
  It is absolutely clear from the legislative record of the Corker-
Cardin bill that everyone involved in that discussion, including the 
Senator from Tennessee, understood that a 60-vote margin would be 
required in the passage of this legislation. There is no question about 
it. There are quotes in the Record. Everyone understood that from the 
beginning of the consideration of the Corker-Cardin bill.
  Finally, every major issue that has come before this bill since I 
have been here has required 60 votes, whether it was immigration or 
background checks or extension of unemployment benefits or the minimum 
wage. All of those have required a 60-vote threshold. That has been the 
standard in this body. We could debate whether that should or should 
not be the standard, but it is, it has been, and this is not a time to 
decide we are going to arbitrarily abandon that.
  I must say I am sort of amazed to hear people discussing this as if 
this is some kind of new imposition of a rule, and it reminds me of 
``Casablanca": I am shocked--shocked--to understand that there might be 
a 60-vote requirement on this piece of legislation.
  That has been the standard for this body certainly for as long as I 
have been here and for some time longer. As I say, we can discuss 
whether that should be the standard, but that is what it is, and no one 
should be surprised that is the way we are proceeding here today.
  OK. Let's talk about the agreement--five quick realities.
  No. 1, Iran is a nuclear threshold state today. There is a lot of 
argument. I sat through the long debate yesterday afternoon about what 
happens in 2030, what happens in 15 years, and would Iran be somehow a 
legitimized nuclear threshold state. They are a nuclear threshold state 
today. The risk to the world is imminent. It is not in 15 years; it is 
today. That is why this agreement is so important--because basically it 
freezes and rolls back Iran's nuclear capabilities for at least the 
next 15 years and probably longer.
  The No. 2 reality: Iran is a rogue nation. It foments terrorism 
around the world. It is a state sponsor of terrorism. Everyone knows 
that. Under this agreement, as has been pointed out, because of the 
nature of the negotiations, which were ``roll back your nuclear program 
in exchange for relief from the sanctions,'' they will indeed receive 
relief from the sanctions, and that will give them additional funds for 
their economy and possibly for their nefarious purposes. But I would 
submit that the only thing worse than a rogue Iran is a rogue Iran 
armed with nuclear weapons. That is the essence of this deal. It 
prevents their opportunity to gain nuclear weapons, to create 
sufficient fissile material. It rolls back what they already have.
  I should point out that they became a nuclear threshold state during 
the imposition of various sanctions regimes. So it is clear that 
sanctions in and of themselves are never going to prevent their 
achievement of becoming a nuclear weapons state.
  No. 3, this is a multilateral agreement. All the discussion around 
here acts as if it is the United States and Iran, Obama and the 
Ayatollah. It indeed involves the world's major powers. It involves 
Great Britain, France, Germany, China, Russia, and other countries that 
have helped to enforce those sanctions and make them effective. If we 
walk away from this deal, we are doing so alone.
  We had an extraordinary meeting before the recess with Ambassadors 
from the P5+1 countries. They made it clear that they had accepted this 
agreement and that if we rejected it, their willingness to go back to 
the table, reimpose the sanctions, reinforce the sanctions--I believe 
one of the Ambassadors used the term ``far-fetched''--it is not going 
to happen.
  The sanctions are going to erode starting now, no matter what we do 
in this Congress. I can't figure out any way that a weaker sanctions 
regime--which is inevitable because other countries involved in the 
sanctions have already started to make moves toward doing business with 
Iran--I don't see how a weaker sanctions regime is ever going to bring 
Iran back to the table to get a better deal.
  Reality No. 4: This agreement is flawed. It is not the agreement I 
would prefer. There are elements that I think could be improved. I wish 
the 15 years was 20 or 30 years. I wish the 24 days was 12 days or 8 
days or 1 day. But this is the agreement that is before us. And the 
analysis could not be strictly of the agreement itself and within its 
four corners, but compared to what? That is really the basic question 
here--not whether this a good deal or a bad deal. The question is, How 
does this deal, no matter what its flaws, compare with the alternatives 
that are out there? In all of the drama and all of the argument and all 
of the speeches and rallies that we have heard, no one has yet come up 
with a credible alternative. I have not yet heard a credible 
alternative. The only thing I hear is this: We will reimpose sanctions 
and bring them back to the table and get a better deal. It is going to 
be very hard to reimpose those sanctions without the support of our 
international partners. If we enter into the deal and Iran cheats, then 
we can bring the international partners back with us, but to do so--to 
try to think that we could do so now is just unrealistic. I wish there 
were a better alternative. I also wish I could play tight end for the 
New England Patriots, but it is not going to happen. It is simply not 
realistic. There is no credible alternative.
  Finally, we have to talk about what happens after the deal. Congress 
has a responsibility. The administration has a responsibility. We 
cannot trust Iran. Everyone knows that. No one argues that.
  There has been a lot of discussion about the IAEA. I serve on the 
Intelligence Committee. We had a briefing just yesterday morning with 
the heads of our intelligence agencies. It is not just the IAEA that is 
going to be watching this agreement, it is the world's intelligence 
community, and we have significant capability to know if they are 
cheating over and above and in addition to anything the IAEA brings to 
the table. This is not trust; this is verification based upon the 
IAEA's worldwide experience but also based upon the considerable 
intelligence assets of the United States and other countries that are 
supporting us in this effort.
  Finally, there are risks. I understand that. There are risks on both 
sides. There are severe risks. This is not an easy call. It is one of 
the hardest decisions I have ever had to make. But if you analyze the 
alternatives and weigh the risks, I believe the risks of not going 
forward with this agreement are significantly greater than the risks of 
giving diplomacy a chance going forward with this agreement, which can 
be verified. If there is cheating, it can be caught, No. 1, and 
punished, No. 2, and if the agreement doesn't work, we have the same 
options we have today.
  This is a difficult decision. It is one that has weighed on this body 
and on this country. But I think this is a tremendous opportunity for 
us to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran and secure at least that part of a 
peaceful Middle East and more secure world.

[[Page S6557]]

  Thank you, Madam President.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, let me thank my colleague from Maine for 
his thoughtful presentation.
  I would like to ask how much time remains.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven minutes.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I am going to yield to the Senator from 
Ohio. I hope 7 minutes is adequate. If it is not, I would ask unanimous 
consent to extend that and offer time to the other side or whatever is 
necessary.
  I yield to the Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN. I thank you, Madam President, and I thank the assistant 
Democratic leader.
  Madam President, I rise in support of the international agreement 
designed to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. No one in 
this body trusts Iran. No one in this body disputes that Iran is the 
leading state sponsor of terrorism, that it denies Israel's right to 
exist, and that it destabilizes the Middle East and violates the human 
rights of its people. That is why we need to prevent a nuclear-armed 
Iran, which would pose an exponentially greater danger to the security 
of the United States, to our longtime important ally Israel, and to the 
entire world. This is the only viable option.
  As Senator King said, no one has answered the question of what 
happens if we reject this agreement. Well, of the hundreds of calls I 
have made and the dozens of briefings and discussions I have had with 
people on both sides of the agreement--from Israeli officials, to 
American security people, to activists, engaged citizens on both sides 
of this--nobody has answered the question: What do we do if this 
agreement is killed in the Congress? What would follow? What is the 
alternative?
  I am incredibly proud of the diligent work my Democratic colleagues 
have done over the last 6 weeks in researching, examining, and 
questioning this deal. There was no knee-jerk reaction on our side 
where people all went the same way almost immediately when the 
agreement came out. People on the Democratic side of the aisle listened 
to experts, and they listened to stakeholders. We came to thoughtful, 
informed decisions.
  I made my decision after serious study of the agreement's contents, 
after listening to Ohioans on all sides of this, after consulting with 
nuclear experts, such as the Energy Secretary and Nobel Prize-winning 
physicist Secretary Moniz. I attended hours of briefings from the 
President, from the Energy Secretary, from Treasury Secretary Lew, from 
Secretary of State Kerry, and other administration officials. I 
consulted U.S. intelligence officials, outside arms control experts, 
and met for over an hour with Israel's Ambassador to the United 
States. I met with all five of the Ambassadors of the P5+1 countries; 
those who have been long-time allies of ours from France, England, and 
Germany; those from China, and from Russia, who are allies on this 
issue, if not a number of others. All--every one of them individually, 
collectively, warned that the United States--it would be the United 
States which would be isolated internationally if Congress rejects this 
agreement.

  Many of my colleagues talk about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its 
human rights abuses, and its pursuit of ballistic missiles. These are 
legitimate concerns, but they are not the focus of this agreement. Of 
course we would love to solve those issues. Sanctions on those issues 
will remain in place, but that was not the focus of this nuclear 
agreement.
  Let's be clear. When I hear opponents say that Iran 10, 15 years from 
now would be a threshold nuclear state--maybe they will, maybe they 
will not. That is certainly debatable. It is not debatable that Iran is 
a nuclear threshold state right now. They are 2 to 3 months away from 
being able to produce enough fissile material for a bomb. That is a 
fact. They are 2 to 3 months away from being able to produce enough 
fissile material for a nuclear weapon.
  The agreement provides for comprehensive restrictions today--
beginning when Congress allows this agreement to move forward, to block 
Iran's pathway to a bomb. They include reducing Iran's installed 
centrifuges by two-thirds for at least 10 years, cutting its stockpile 
of enriched uranium by 98 percent for 15 years, reconfiguring its 
plutonium reactor to render it inoperable and deny Iran a source of 
weapons-grade plutonium.
  To verify Iran's compliance, the deal requires 24/7 access to all 
declared nuclear sites. The United Nations inspectors will say that of 
the 120 country inspections they have done, this is the most 
comprehensive and the most intrusive. The deal provides time-certain 
access to all suspicious sites in Iran. It provides for a permanent 
prohibition on Iran acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon. It 
provides a permanent ban on nuclear weapons research and a permanent 
inspection regime for their nuclear program.
  If Iran violates the deal, the agreement gives the United States 
extraordinary power to snap back both U.S. and international sanctions 
without fear of veto by other nations. The President made clear that if 
10 or 15 or 20 years from now Iran tries to build a bomb, this 
agreement ensures the United States will have better tools to target 
it. Americans fundamentally don't want another war in the Middle East. 
Americans strongly prefer a diplomatic solution, which this agreement 
is all about, that ensures that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon.
  At the beginning of my remarks, I spoke about the serious way, with 
great gravitas, that Democratic after Democratic Senator--the serious 
way we pursued coming to a decision on this. Let me contrast for a 
moment on this, one of the most significant national security issues 
Congress will face in a generation. I have been in the House and Senate 
for 20 years now. This will be one of the two most important decisions 
I have made on foreign policy. The first was my vote against the war in 
Iraq. It was clearly the right vote, even though at the time there was 
public support for it.
  We know that the information we were presented was not exactly right 
in the end, even though there was huge support in Congress and a lot of 
public support for going into war with Iraq. I thought about that a 
lot. I made a decision that I thought the Iraq war would be disastrous 
for our country. That decision clearly was right. It was not so 
partisan back then, although we had a President that certainly pushed 
us and a Vice President, especially, that pushed us into that war.
  But this agreement should not be subject to the kind of reflexive 
partisan attacks we have seen in recent months. Just a few months ago, 
47 of my Republican colleagues signed a letter signaling their 
opposition to the emerging deal--not just that, they signed a letter to 
the Ayatollah--to the leader of the enemy, Iran--suggesting that the 
deal was not quite on the up-and-up because of the President of the 
United States. They signed a letter that was teaching the Ayatollah, if 
you will, some American civic lessons. Imagine, if Democrats in the 
Senate in the early 1980s had written a letter to President Gorbachev 
saying: Don't negotiate with Ronald Reagan. Imagine if we had done 
that.
  I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Fischer). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Imagine if that had happened. So we start off with 47 
Republicans writing to the Ayatollah, saying, fundamentally: Don't 
negotiate with President Obama. We have seen now not a single one of my 
colleagues is in support of this agreement, even though Secretary 
Powell supports it, even though former Senator Lugar, who was as 
respected as anybody in this country as a former Republican Senator, 
supports it. It is not just disappointing that not a single one of my 
Republican colleagues supports this, but the first day the agreement 
came out, I heard talk radio saying: Read the agreement. Read the bill. 
The first day this agreement came out, 19 Republicans--on that first 
day--came out in opposition to this agreement. There is no way they 
could have read it. I know how complicated this agreement is. I have 
read it. I assume that every one of my Democratic colleagues, in an 
arduous, focused, difficult, persistent way, studied this issue. Then I 
see what happened on the other side of the aisle

[[Page S6558]]

when it was--as Timothy Crouse said the press does in the ``Boys on the 
Bus--`` if one of them flies off the telephone wire, they all fly off 
the telephone wire.
  That is what happened. I was just so disappointed. Senator Corker is 
here, one of the people who did not sign that letter and one of the 
people who thought about this issue. But what I saw in the contrast of 
the way we looked at this, it was pretty disturbing.
  I will conclude. My time is running out. This agreement will matter 
for our country. It is clearly in our national interests. I think there 
has been no good answer offered on what happens if we walk away. That 
is why I ask my colleagues to vote no on the next vote coming in front 
of us.
  Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Madam President, I want to thank the Senator for his 
comments. Just so we know how we are organized on this side for the 
next hour--and I think we are about evened up on the time, maybe 3 
minutes more needs to come our way but roughly even. For the next 30 
minutes, we have Senator Coats, one of our outstanding foreign policy, 
national security Senators, who served as an ambassador; 15 minutes for 
Senator Grassley; and 15 minutes for Senator Roberts.
  I thank you so much for being here and your incredibly responsible 
way of facing this issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I thank my colleague Senator Corker for 
his diligent efforts, as it consumed literally hundreds, if not 
thousands, of hours as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in helping guide us through this very important, very 
difficult process.
  I was on this floor earlier saying this is an issue that rises above 
partisan politics. This is something that each of us as a Senator has 
to weigh carefully. I don't know how many hours and how much time I 
have spent reading through, parsing through, trying to analyze and 
understand this agreement, its side annexes and everything connected 
with it. I would like to now say to my colleagues, perhaps with an 
appeal that they at least, at the very least, set aside: The deal is 
done. You lost. Therefore, we are not even going to allow a vote on 
this matter.
  This is one of the most historic, consequential measures that anyone 
in this Chamber will ever be confronted with. I know for me it is one 
of the most historic because of the consequences that may occur if we 
don't get this right. It is important that we debate this, have ample 
time to go through every bit of this, and have each Member weigh 
carefully what we hear from each other and what we come to understand 
on the basis of our own personal examination. I hope that will be the 
case. To deny us the opportunity to even let our yes be yes or our no 
be no before the public I think would be a tragic mistake.
  I would like to go back a little bit and talk about my history with 
all of this. When I returned from my ambassadorship to Germany and 
actually had to deal with this as one of many different issues--because 
even back then there was great concern among both the United States and 
the German Government over Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons 
capability. I engaged in a number of discussions and diplomatic efforts 
there in working with our allied country Germany on this issue. But 
when I did come back, I suppose partly because of my engagement there, 
I was asked by the Bipartisan Policy Center that had just been formed 
to chair a task force on this very issue, the Iranian pursuit of 
nuclear weapons.
  We obviously wanted this to be bipartisan, so I recruited my fellow 
Senate colleague Chuck Robb, then a retired Senator from Virginia. 
Together we cochaired that effort. Later we were joined by retired 4-
star General and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of Europe Chuck Wall. 
We put together a who's who of experts on the Middle East and experts 
on nuclear capabilities. We had renowned experts from across the 
spectrum come and present to us.
  All of that resulted in three major reports titled: ``Meeting the 
Challenge, U.S. Policy Towards Iranian Nuclear Development''; the 
second one, ``Meeting the Challenge, Time is Running Out''; the third, 
``Meeting the Challenge When Time Runs Out.''
  There is a treasure trove of information here about how Iran has 
violated U.N. treaty resolutions, violated the nonproliferation treaty 
agreement. We have talked about the consequences of all of this and 
made recommendations to the administration, whatever administration 
that would be. As it turns out, these recommendations went both to a 
Republican administration under President George W. Bush and to the 
Obama administration under our current President.
  Clearly, we have outlined--and in the interest of time I will not be 
able to go back through all of this. But let me just state a couple of 
the conclusions here relative to all of this. Absent necessary 
leverage, we believe it unlikely that Supreme Leader Khamenei will 
reciprocate President Obama's conciliatory gestures in a meaningful 
way.
  First of all, we endorsed diplomacy to its ultimate, but we 
recognized that diplomacy has its limits. You can sit at a table and 
not come to agreement for decades. We had been trying diplomatic 
efforts with Iran and they were not succeeding. So then we talked about 
the necessity of having sanctions, ever-ratcheting, tightening 
sanctions, to bring Iran to the table. Included in that was the threat 
of the use of force if all else failed.
  None on that committee were warmongers. We wanted to do everything 
possible to prevent conflict in this in solving this problem. So we 
laid out a long framework. Perhaps if this continues into next week, I 
will be able to go through some of this framework, but the key on this 
is stated here somewhere. The key to this was that you had to have a 
combination of tough diplomacy, which we had years of, and we were 
going to continue that, backed up by ever-ratcheting sanctions, to show 
Iran that there was a price to pay for not coming to agreement, and 
then backed up ultimately by the threat of force if we could not secure 
an agreement, which would reach the goal.
  The goal was to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapon capability, 
knowing the destabilization that would take place in the Middle East, 
the historic impact this would have, and consequences this would have 
if we allowed that to happen.
  Let me move on to what I believe are major problems with this deal. 
We know Iran's misbehavior, its violation of six U.N. treaties that it 
agreed to, its violation of the nonproliferation treaty, its support 
for terrorism. It is a bad actor, perhaps the world's worst bad actor, 
engaging in weaponization that killed American troops. We are dealing 
with a rogue nation here.
  I don't know how my colleagues react to this, but when they cut a 
deal with the United States, they are cheering on the streets of 
Tehran. And the Supreme Leader came out yesterday and basically said: 
Well, don't worry, Israel won't be around in the next 25 years. They 
will be wiped off the map. We have already said ``Death to Israel'' and 
also ``Death to the Great Satan, the United States.'' This is the party 
that we just negotiated an agreement with.
  Now, if we had negotiated an agreement that achieved our goals, I 
would say good for us. Finally, the sanctions worked. We came up with a 
good agreement. But I have read through this document and parsed over 
every word, tried to find every meaning. I serve on the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, and earlier I served on the Armed Services 
Committee. I have had more than a decade of experience in this.
  I spent almost the entire weekend carefully reading this, hoping that 
we had achieved, if not all, at least some of the most important goals 
we had.
  But to my dismay, we ended up not achieving any of those goals. The 
goal was to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons capability that 
could break out and totally destabilize the Middle East. What we have 
come up with is an agreement that puts them on a path to do exactly 
that, justified now by this agreement, justified by the Security 
Council at the U.N.
  I said there were two major things that needed to be talked about 
before we talk about some of the specifics: First is the false claim 
that we must choose between accepting this failed agreement or war, and 
the second is

[[Page S6559]]

that the agreement prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons 
capability.
  This is the sales pitch from the White House. This is the sales pitch 
that is being made to the American people, and neither of these is 
true.
  It has to be a desperate administration that has chosen to force this 
agreement on us by arguing that it is a choice between this deal and 
war. I am disgusted by the administration's sales strategy for this 
agreement and those who are led down the path of belief that the only 
option here is war, and therefore, no matter what we gave away, this 
deal is better than the alternative.
  This false choice is among the most infamous, cynical, and blatantly 
false manipulations the Obama administration has used to distort this 
important debate, and they ought to be ashamed of themselves for using 
this tactic.
  In fact, the false argument masks a far more valid argument that this 
deal makes future war far more likely, not less. By abandoning the tool 
of economic sanctions, in giving away a strong, principled negotiating 
position, the administration's desperate tactic is reducing our options 
when Iran does go nuclear, as we have put them on the path to do.
  President Obama and Secretary Kerry have repeatedly said over the 
past year: No deal is better than a bad deal. They never argued that 
any deal is better than no deal, yet that is what they ended up 
conceding.
  We had the strength of the six most powerful countries in the world--
the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia--
sitting at one side of the negotiating table. On the other side of the 
negotiating table was Iran, crippled by sanctions and oil falling into 
the range of $40 a barrel, costing more to extract and sell than they 
could get back. They were desperate to achieve some kind of relief from 
these sanctions.
  We had the negotiating leverage. We gave away that leverage in these 
negotiations, desperate to conclude any deal whatsoever so that we 
could avoid making some difficult decisions down the line in terms of 
what we had said we must do.
  Four Presidents--including this President, two Democrats, two 
Republicans--said it is unacceptable for Iran to achieve nuclear 
capability. We gave that away just to get them at the table. Just to 
get them at the table, we took off the use of any force, any leverage 
or additional sanctions or continuing sanctions in order to get to the 
table--not negotiating to get what we needed, but just to get to the 
table.
  The administration has accepted, in my opinion, a deeply flawed deal 
and then set it in motion with a U.N. Security Council resolution on 
the next day, well before Congress could even respond to it.
  Thank goodness Senator Corker and Senator Cardin were able to 
convince their colleagues on a 98-to-1 vote to give Congress the right 
to have a say in this issue. Had that not happened, the President, by 
not declaring this a treaty, by declaring this simply an executive 
agreement, the President would have locked this thing in even before we 
had a chance to read it, before the American people even had a chance 
to know what it was except for what the President told them it was or 
the Secretary of State told them that it was.
  So we are having this debate thanks to these two men, these two 
leaders--one a Republican and one a Democrat--who had the courage to 
stand up to this President and say: No, the American people deserve to 
have a say.
  And, boy, what a say it is. I don't know about others. My mail is 
running 10 to 1 against this. Maybe I am talking to the wrong people, I 
don't know, but the more they learn about this agreement, the more they 
say: Are you crazy? We gave up that? For what? What did we get back?
  I want to go over some of that, trying to move through this because I 
know time is of the essence here, but this idea that war is the only 
alternative--and then the sales pitch that I have heard so many of my 
colleagues and others who support the deal say: You know, I am for this 
because this prevents Iran from having a nuclear bomb. It is just the 
opposite. It gives Iran the pathway to have a nuclear bomb. This has a 
sunset clause in it, and it releases all the sanctions. It has a sunset 
clause that says after 15 years they can do whatever they want to do. 
We cannot reimpose sanctions. What kind of a deal is that? But the 
false narrative that this will not allow that--the agreement, even the 
annexes say we have to help Iran achieve nuclear research, nuclear 
research that can help them move toward this.
  I looked at the annex and said: Surely, I am reading this wrong. We 
are committed to help them? And if other nations, say Israel, want to 
take action against this because they think they are going to be 
extinguished from the face of the Earth--as the Iranians have told them 
that is going to happen--if they want to take action, we actually are 
required to convince the Israelis not to do that. We side with the 
Iranians.
  I mean, you can't write this script. This is beyond comprehension. So 
those two false narratives alone ought to be reason to say: Wait a 
minute. Let's not go forward with this deal. Surely we can find a way 
to negotiate a better deal for us.
  Our Bipartisan Policy Center committee--I want to read from this 
because we looked into this very question, and this was the conclusion: 
Even if Iran were to honor all of its obligations and fully comply with 
all the restrictions in the agreement--JCPOA--the deal would not 
prevent a nuclear Iran indefinitely. Starting in year 13, Iran will be 
able to break out, produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon 
in about 10 weeks, down from 1 year. In year 16 Iran would obtain 
nuclear weapons capabilities in a breakout time of less than 3 weeks.
  That was the conclusion--not of Republicans--that was the conclusion 
of a bipartisan group of experts, chaired by a Republican and a 
Democratic former Senator at the time.
  And what we have said actually has come true. The sunset clause 
should, by itself, be enough to persuade, hopefully, a majority of us 
to reject this deal. This doesn't make sense.
  If President Bush in 2001 had presented to the American people this 
same deal with Iran and secured the votes to pass this deal, today Iran 
would be having breakout--unrestricted breakout, assisted by the 
agreement. And we are going to call that a diplomatic victory?
  Fifteen years is going to go by very fast. They are going to have 
breakout capability much earlier than that and could easily--if you 
read the agreement--easily declare that we have breached the agreement, 
they are pulling back, and therefore they are going forward. And they 
will have well over $100 billion to achieve that effort. They will have 
sanctions relief--total sanctions relief. They will be able to export 
all of the oil that they want, and Iran wins.
  There are some particular problems with this, and they have been 
listed by people on the right, Charles Krauthammer, and on the left or 
at least in the middle, David Brooks. The New York Times is not exactly 
a Republican rag, and David Brooks is not necessarily far rightwing. 
They are basically saying: Every single major goal that we had going 
into this agreement has been given away in a desperate attempt to 
achieve any agreement so that we don't have to deal with this. What we 
have to deal with can be pushed down the road.
  So on that basis I went through the agreement and looked at some of 
these areas. I would like to identify for the record those that we had 
the leverage to achieve--a goal, a stated goal by the administration 
and by others negotiating to achieve--and we caved on every one of 
them.
  First, verification inspections. Most people understand that anytime, 
anywhere means anytime, anywhere. Actually, now it means--well, a 
minimum of 24 days if Iran agrees with us initially that we should go 
through this convoluted process where Iran helps make the decisions. It 
is like giving Tom Brady and the Patriots the right to determine 
whether or not the footballs were deflated. I am from Indiana, it is 
the Colts, and they whipped us in the Super Bowl. I am probably biased 
in that statement.
  On the other hand, just to simplify it for people, if you have an 
adversary that you don't trust and you want to have an ability to find 
out if whether or not what they do and say is true, you don't say: Go 
ahead, check it yourself, then tell me what you think, and

[[Page S6560]]

we will take that for an answer. So, talk about caving anytime, 
anywhere on inspections.
  The administration also argued this principle of short notice. 
Secretary Kerry, when asked this at one of our meetings here, basically 
said: No, we never pursued such a goal; and, indeed, we never heard of 
it.
  I, along with every one of us here was relieved when the 
administration announced--I don't know if it was Secretary Kerry or one 
of his team supporters--announced inspections anytime, anywhere, and 
everybody said: Oh, OK, at least we have that.
  Now we learn no American can be part of the inspection team. Now we 
learn that a U.N. independent agency will do inspections, and now we 
have learned that military and former weapon manufacturing and research 
facilities are off limits, and we are not even allowed to inspect them.
  So anywhere, anytime has become a farce. How can you possibly--that 
in and of itself would be reason not to vote for this agreement. How go 
do you go home and say to people: Anytime, anywhere is a scrubbed 
version of 24 hours a day at a minimum as long as Iran agrees.
  It doesn't take somebody with a Ph.D. or a law degree--or even a 
Senator or a Congressman who has delved into these issues--for people 
to say, are you nuts? Who would sign a deal like that?
  Uranium enrichment--we caved there. Then talk about one of the key 
weaknesses is the agreement that the centrifuges are to be disconnected 
and only stored feet from their original position. They can be 
reintroduced into the enrichment system when the earlier expiration 
dates of the deal occur, whenever the Iranians choose to move quickly 
toward nuclear capability.
  This involves some highly technical stuff, but the bottom line is 
almost all aspects of these enrichment details in dispute are in 
dispute by experts who understand the technical application of all of 
this, and they are not persuaded by the misleading leadership coming 
out of the administration--once again another cave.
  Fordow. What is Fordow? Fordow is a facility at which some nuclear 
technology pursuit was being undertaken, and we wanted to be able to 
shut that down.
  But the Iranians said: No, no, I don't think so.
  So we said: OK, let's cave on that; let's move onto something else.
  The same applied to military dimensions and undisclosed military 
facilities. So Secretary Kerry is faced again with Iranian 
intransigence and explained his new position now. He no longer was 
fixated on the past: That was something that we talked about months 
ago. I am not fixated on that anymore. So scratch that one off. Don't 
worry. Keep Fordow. Keep Fordow open, no problem. What is next?

  Sanctions relief. This agreement does not generally relieve sanctions 
pressure as originally intended. Rather it abandons the sanctions 
regime entirely all at once. Indeed, the multilateral sanctions are now 
already gone. European nations and others are flocking into Tehran to 
sign long-term agreements that will never be subject to sanctions if 
they are snapped back. We lost again. So the re-imposition of 
sanctions, if we find out something is wrong here, is a farce. It is 
not implementable.
  I talked about snap-back here, so I am going to move forward from 
that. This is one I mentioned before, but I still can't comprehend it.
  The deal obligates the P5+1--that is the six of us, the six nations 
that were negotiating--to actually help Iran build up its nuclear 
infrastructure during the 15 years before they achieve a 3-week 
breakout. So we are actually helping them construct their nuclear 
infrastructure, which then can easily be converted to breaking out for 
a nuclear weapon. And in return for altering their timetable for 
nuclear industrial development, the Iranians secured not just 
international acceptance of that activity but actual assistance in 
pursuing it.
  That is incredible. We are actually helping Iran get to the bomb? As 
we hear from some of our colleagues and others who support this 
agreement, they say: I am voting for this because this prevents Iran 
from getting the bomb. Read the agreement. It is not easy to read. It 
is not fun to read. But it is alarming to read.
  I was in the Senate during the 1990s and the negotiations with North 
Korea, and actually, Wendy Sherman, the principal negotiator along with 
Senator Kerry of this agreement, was the principal negotiator in the 
North Korea agreement. I remember being told on this floor through the 
President of the United States, then President Clinton and his 
Secretary of State and others: Don't worry; we have total verification 
procedures in place. If they cheat on us, we are going to know it. And 
when we know it, we are going to stop it. Well, here it is 2015, and 
North Korea has somewhere between 20 and 40 nuclear weapons sitting on 
top of ballistic missiles, and we didn't know it.
  That made me a skeptic going into this thing because it is like deja 
vu here. We are being told the same thing: Don't worry; we will know if 
they cheat. We will be able to do something to stop them.
  This is the assurance that this is a good deal. So that is a hard 
sale for me. It is a no sale for me. I didn't end up voting for that 
because I had some real suspicions about whether that would take place. 
But that actually ought to be a lesson for all of us here--that 
something that is promised by the President of the United States and 
his Secretary of State and his negotiating team won't necessarily come 
true and be the case. So the promises that have been made about what 
this agreement is and what it isn't and what we will be able to do I 
measure by what didn't work out really well in North Korea, and yet the 
same negotiator that negotiated that helped negotiate on this.
  I don't know if my colleague from Tennessee is standing because I am 
running long on this, but I have a lot more I would like to say. I am 
going to try to move to a couple of last things here.
  Some prominent people have been noted here as favoring the deal. 
Well, I think Henry Kissinger is someone who probably has some 
experience, at the age of 90-some years and a lifetime in diplomacy. I 
don't have to give his credentials. And George Shultz also has some 
credibility on this. So if you want to listen to one side on this, you 
ought to listen to the other. These individuals have said:

       Previous thinking on nuclear strategy assumed the existence 
     of stable state actors. . . . How will these doctrines 
     translate into a region where sponsorship of nonstate proxies 
     is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on 
     behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?

  Sadly, their views have been largely ignored and not mentioned by 
anybody else. So if they are going to mention their guys, we are going 
to mention our guys.
  Look, the last thing I want to say here before I conclude is there 
hasn't been much discussion about the consequences for Israel, our 
democratic ally in the region, which I think should be a core issue. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu was here and spoke to a joint assembly of 
Congress. He received standing ovations for standing tall and standing 
hard and saying the very future existence of my nation is at risk here. 
He made the point that a bad deal is not better than no deal, that a 
bad deal could be worse than no deal, and that there are ways around 
this.
  We cannot ignore the major risk that Iran will follow through with 
their often-repeated threats of obliterating the State of Israel--a 
threat that was just repeated by the Supreme Leader yesterday.
  I ask unanimous consent for 1 additional minute to conclude.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COATS. I thank my colleagues.
  In conclusion, with this agreement, we have paid too much and gained 
too little. The risks are not adequately acknowledged and not 
effectively addressed. I cannot support this agreement. I cannot 
approve the misguided desperation that led to it.
  I cannot understand those who claim this is a great victory for 
diplomacy nor those who turn a blind eye to its obvious failings 
because of the appeal of party discipline nor those who have fallen 
prey to the Obama administration's manipulation of the deal with the 
U.N. prior to Congress having any say in this.

[[Page S6561]]

  When I read about the gloating, the boastful joy in Iran--in Tehran, 
their capital--that all their needs were met and none of their redlines 
were crossed, I despaired. I despaired because this misadventure has 
been a failure of vision, a failure of will, and a historic failure of 
leadership. I fear these failures will lead to great suffering.
  We have seen this before. Peace at any price is not peace. Peace at 
any price sometimes leads to tragic consequences. In the last century 
we saw the loss of tens of millions of lives because the goal was to 
seek peace at any price. We cannot make that mistake again.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. CORKER. Again, Madam President, I thank my colleague very much 
for his passionate comments and his concern from day one about this 
agreement.
  I think we ran over a little bit. I know Senator Brown of Ohio ran 
over. If I can ask how much time remains on our side, I think we maybe 
go to 1:04 p.m., at least, or something like that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-eight minutes for the majority.
  Mr. CORKER. So I know you all each asked for 15. If we could make it, 
instead, 14 each, so it is equally divided, Senator Roberts will enjoy 
that. This will be equally divided between our distinguished Senator 
Grassley and Senator Roberts, and I thank them for letting me intervene 
and thank them both for being here.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, this is a critically important debate 
on a nuclear deal that is going to have long-lasting impacts on our 
national security and the security of our friends and our allies. This 
debate is happening because 98 Senators expressed the desire to have a 
say on this agreement. This process will allow the American people to 
speak through their elected representatives, and I can say the American 
people overwhelmingly oppose this agreement. New public opinion polls 
released in just the last few days indicate that Americans in general 
are opposed to this deal by a margin of 2 to 1. Only 21 percent support 
it.
  I participated in meetings with constituents in 25 of Iowa's 99 
counties during the August work period. The message I received was 
overwhelmingly in opposition to this agreement. That is the same 
message I am hearing from Iowans who have written or called since the 
deal was announced in July.
  After many weeks of studying the terms of the Iranian deal, also 
hearing from experts and attending classified briefings, and engaging 
in dialogue with my constituents, my initial skepticism has been 
confirmed. I have come to the conclusion this agreement presented to us 
is a bad deal that will not increase our national security or the 
security of our friends and allies and should be rejected.
  The United States began the negotiations from a position of very real 
strength. The international sanctions were obviously hurting Iran, and 
Iran wanted out from under those sanctions. The sanctions regime that 
Congress put in place over the objections of President Obama drove Iran 
to the negotiating table.
  The administration, leading up to the negotiations and throughout the 
entire process, outlined the conditions for a good deal. President 
Obama and Secretary Kerry both made important statements about the 
goals of the negotiations. The goal was, of course, to dismantle Iran's 
nuclear program. Secretary Kerry himself said in the fall of 2013 that 
Iran has ``no right to enrich,'' and that a good deal with Iran would 
``help Iran dismantle its nuclear program.''
  Despite all these assurances that negotiations would include 
``anytime, anywhere'' inspections, the deal falls real short. President 
Obama negotiated away from these positions over the course of these 
negotiations.
  This agreement accepts and legitimizes Iran as a nuclear threshold 
state. Iran will not dismantle many important parts of its uranium 
enrichment infrastructure, contrary to past U.S. policies that Iran not 
be allowed to enrich.
  Iran also is permitted to continue a vast research and development 
program. Many of the significant limitations expire after 10 short 
years, leaving Iran an internationally legitimate nuclear program.
  Iran could fully abide by this deal and be a nuclear threshold state, 
contrary to what we were promised by this administration and the 
initial goals that were announced by the President.
  Now, with respect to inspections, international inspectors will not 
have anytime, anywhere access. They will have what is termed ``managed 
access.'' In fact, the deal provides Iran with a 24-day process to 
further delay--we know what will happen--and hide prohibited 
activities. Iran has a track record of cheating, otherwise I couldn't 
say those things. They have cheated on past agreements. This deal 
allows Iran to stonewall the inspectors for up to 24 days.
  The agreement also includes side agreements between Iran and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency that we can't review. Even the 
administration has not seen them. And people in this country expect us 
to read before we vote.
  Of course, we can read the agreement, but we can't read side 
agreements that the law requires be given to the Congress to read under 
this special law. So we are going to be voting on things which we 
haven't seen and which the law says we should see.
  The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which passed the Senate 98 to 
1, requires the administration to provide to Congress access to all 
``annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing 
material, documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings 
and any related agreements'' as part of our agreement with the 
President. It seems in this case we are being asked to put our faith in 
the Iranian regime to not cheat, contrary to what we know about them.
  Iran has not provided details on the past military dimensions of its 
nuclear program even though the U.S. position was, very simply, that 
Iran had to come clean about that history before any sanctions relief. 
It is critical, for a robust verification regime to work, that the 
International Atomic Energy Agency have a full accounting of Iran's 
past efforts and stockpiles. Yet it appears that Iran will be allowed 
to supervise itself by conducting its own inspections and collect 
samples from its secretive military facility in Parchin, where much of 
the military dimensions of its nuclear program had been carried out.
  I also oppose the last-minute decision to lift the embargo on 
conventional arms and ballistic missiles. GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in July that ``we should under no circumstances 
relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and 
arms trafficking.''
  They didn't listen to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So 
under this agreement, after just 5 years the conventional arms embargo 
will be lifted. After just 8 years the ballistic missile embargo will 
be lifted. Iran has long sought the technology to develop 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, which would be a direct threat to 
the United States and our allies. And Iran's past arms trafficking to 
the Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations has long 
threatened the State of Israel and other Middle Eastern allies as well, 
and it of course threatens stability--very much so--in the region.
  Once Iran has complied with the initial restraints on its nuclear 
program, many sanctions will be lifted. This will release somewhere 
around $100 billion of frozen Iranian assets. The lifting of sanctions 
and release of these funds will only exacerbate Iran's support for 
terror and tradition of terror, with Iran having access to tens of 
billions of frozen assets to bolster its conventional military and 
further support global terrorism.
  Even Obama administration officials have said that Iran is likely to 
use some of the funds to purchase weapons and fund terrorism that would 
threaten Americans and Israelis. Now, isn't that something--this 
administration negotiating an agreement where it is assumed that we are 
going to give them further resources to support efforts to kill 
Americans and Western Europeans.
  The concept of ``snapping back'' these sanctions is another issue 
that has been discussed. These sanctions also appear less effective on 
the issue of snapping back than originally claimed. The complicated 
process to reimpose sanctions is unlikely to work

[[Page S6562]]

even if Iran fails to comply with the agreement. Iran views snapback 
sanctions as grounds to walk away from the agreement, so any effort to 
reimpose sanctions will be regarded by all parties as to whether or not 
to dissolve the agreement and impose sanctions.
  I support a robust diplomatic effort that will prevent Iran from 
developing a nuclear weapons capability, but I also strongly disagree 
with proponents of this agreement who argue that the only alternative 
to this deal is war. That, of course, is a false choice and 
intellectually dishonest.
  Iran came to the negotiation table because it desperately sought 
sanctions relief. If this deal were rejected, we could impose even 
tougher sanctions, allowing our diplomats to negotiate a better deal 
that would more adequately safeguard our Nation's security interests 
and that of our allies. A better deal would not legitimize Iran as a 
nuclear threshold state, it would not trade massive sanctions relief 
for limited temporary constraints, and it would not provide concessions 
that will trigger a regional nuclear arms race.
  If we reject this deal, we could push for an international agreement 
that would truly dismantle Iran's nuclear program and verifiably 
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
  A better deal would not ignore Iran's past bad behavior. Iran has for 
many years been the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iran has an 
egregious record of human rights violations and the persecution of 
religious minorities. It continues to imprison U.S. citizens. At least 
500 U.S. military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan are directly linked to 
Iran and its support for anti-American militants.
  This agreement will free up tens of billions of dollars in frozen 
Iranian assets without addressing any of these issues. We know Iran 
will use some of that money to support terrorist activities throughout 
the Middle East, and those are extended into the United States and 
Western Europe. Iran provides support for the brutal Assad regime in 
Syria, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and provides weapons, funding, and 
support to Hamas and Hezbollah.
  This deal appears to be the result of desperation on our side for a 
deal--any deal--and the Iranians knew that and took advantage of our 
weakness.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I will put the remainder in the Record.
  Mr. CORKER. Madam President, he may conclude.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. This deal is a result of President Obama's philosophy 
of leading from behind. As a result of this philosophy, we now have 
enemies who don't fear us and friends and allies who don't follow us 
because they question our credibility and they question our leadership. 
We have a more dangerous world because of it.
  President Obama himself said that it is better to have no deal than a 
bad deal. This deal has far too many shortcomings and will fail to make 
America and our allies safer. It will not prevent Iran from developing 
nuclear weapons, while providing a windfall that will allow them to 
ramp up their bad behavior.
  Obviously I oppose this deal, and I hope we can send a signal to the 
administration and Iran that we need a deal that improves our national 
security and the security of our friends and allies in the region and 
responds to the common sense of the American people who, through the 
polls, have shown they know this to be a bad deal.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Madam President, we all come here to make a difference, 
and we have on the floor two Senators who have done just that--Senator 
Corker and his counterpart on the Democrat side, Senator Cardin, who is 
a good friend of mine. Both are good friends of mine. History will note 
in salutary terms what both of them have contributed in regard to 
leadership, perseverance, and trying to make a bad situation much 
better. I thank them for that.
  I rise today concerned, disheartened, and fearful about the vote--or, 
to be more accurate, not even having a vote--regarding the issue before 
us that affects our national security and that of others worldwide.
  We have before us the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an 
Executive agreement whose original goal was to prevent Iran from 
becoming a nuclear-armed state. In keeping with our constitutional 
responsibility and Senate tradition, what we should have before us is a 
treaty, but we do not. Were the Senate taking up a treaty, we could be 
having debate on rational, commonsense, and effective amendments that 
would protect our country and reduce the flames of turmoil in the 
Middle East and in Europe, but we are not. We are voting on a 
resolution of disapproval, and we may well end up voting not to vote at 
all--a probability I find inexplicable and outrageous. In the Senate's 
226-year history, it has taken up almost 1,900 treaties and only 
rejected 22, many of which have dealt with subjects of much less 
consequence.
  I deeply regret that the administration would not even consider the 
Senate allowing a vote on this crucial foreign policy and national 
security issue as a treaty. During debate on the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act in April, I voted in favor of Senator Johnson's amendment to 
do just that. We had the opportunity. The Senate failed to seize it.
  I believe this agreement to be deeply flawed, and our failure to 
truly debate and fix what is in it represents an abrogation of our 
responsibilities--this in the face of an agreement or a ``deal'' that 
is already adversely affecting the daily lives and well-being of 
individuals all around the world. Refugees throughout the Middle East 
recognize the United States is yielding both power and persuasion to 
Iran, and they are fleeing for their lives.
  As if failure to consider this agreement is not enough, now consider 
the fact that there are those in this distinguished body who will try 
to block cloture and in doing so prevent even a simple yes-or-no vote 
on the resolution. Talk about an upside down, ``Alice in Wonderland'' 
exercise.
  The Senate has already voted 98 to 2 to have a vote, and yet we stand 
here today ready to abrogate that vote.
  So, my colleagues, what are we doing? We are simply debating a flawed 
agreement submitted to us by the President. We are not amending or 
voting on the agreement at all; we are just debating. The path which we 
take today--a detour into a box canyon, achieving nothing--has been 
forced upon us by the very same people who made the Senate swallow the 
nuclear option.
  Where on Earth has the Senate gone? Well, the President has been 
breaking arms and political legs, urging my colleagues to use Senate 
procedure and deny Senators the right to vote. It is pretty simple: The 
President doesn't want the Senate to vote no on what he considers his 
foreign policy legacy.
  However, on occasion, the Senate has put partisanship aside and 
debated issues of deep conviction and diverging opinions. This should 
be one of those times, but it is not. We should find a path forward 
that enables bipartisan accord as a legislative body. That path always 
starts when respect trumps partisanship. I regret that is not today, 
not this week, not this issue, not this President.
  Given the fact that we are where we are, I think it is imperative 
that we fully understand how Iran interprets this agreement. The shoe 
is on the Iranian foot, and judging by the statements of their leaders, 
they believe it fits just fine.
  We have heard in detail from Secretary Kerry. We have heard from and 
been lectured by the President. But Members should also know what 
Iranian President Hasan Ruhani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei told the 
Iranian people after the agreement was finalized. The difference is 
both pertinent and remarkable. Speaking before his constituency in 
Tehran, President Ruhani perfectly articulated where the United States 
began these so-called negotiations and where the United States made 
enormous concessions. According to him, we did not negotiate at all, we 
conceded.
  It is a paradox of enormous irony that in order to know the truth 
about this agreement--highly praised by this administration and well-
received by a determined minority in this Senate--to learn the 
unfortunate truth about who negotiated and who conceded, we have

[[Page S6563]]

to read and understand the remarks of President Ruhani of Iran to get 
the full picture.
  President Ruhani stated that in the beginning, the United States 
capped the number of centrifuges to 100. Today, Iran is allowed over 
6,000. Where original restriction and oversight were set for 20 years, 
today it is 8. With regard to research and development, the United 
States abandoned any limits on developing systems for enriching 
uranium. Instead, Iran is free to develop centrifuges to the highest 
level they desire--the IR-8. The administration placed a redline on 
heavy water production at the Iraq facility. Today the reactor will 
continue operating and produce heavy water.
  We said sanctions would be lifted incrementally. Today they are 
virtually nonexistent. Soon Iran will receive a windfall of 
approximately $100 to $150 billion for whatever use it wishes--read, 
terrorism; read, anti-missile defense systems. Of greatest importance, 
what happened to the inspections regime? This administration said 
anytime, anywhere, but Iran walked away holding the key to who, how, 
and when inspectors will get in.
  It is not so much what we in the United States know or believe. It 
is, rather, what Iran believes, in the words of their President and 
Supreme Leader. Their remarks not only put into absolute focus what the 
Iranian Government understands as their responsibility in regard to 
this agreement, but it also puts into perspective which side demanded 
and which side conceded.
  The administration will argue President Ruhani's statements are but a 
show for the Iranian public; that Iran wants to claim they can become a 
stable influence in the Middle East. Sure, tell that to Israel. But the 
question remains, are we voting on an agreement or are we voting on 
concessions? According to President Ruhani, it is the latter.
  Perhaps the proud boasting of President Ruhani is one thing, but the 
vows of the Ayatollah are quite another. His speech--punctuated by 
cheers of ``Death to America,'' ``Death to Israel''--vowed that 
regardless of the deals' approval, Iran would never stop supporting 
their friends in Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq or Lebanon; the exact 
places Iran had been found backing terrorist organizations, which led 
to its listing as a State sponsor of terrorism by the State Department. 
But I have just listed the concessions and vows that Iran's leaders 
have made public. What about the ones that will never be revealed--the 
agreed-upon arrangements between Iran and the United Nations' 
International Atomic Energy Agency.
  Today all Senators should be gravely concerned about these 
negotiations and agreements. Do we have access? No. Do we have 
information? No. Do we have transparency? No. Do we know what processes 
will be allowed? No. Well, actually we do.
  Under the agreement's dispute resolution mechanisms, this agreement 
sets up a tortured path that does not just involve the much publicized 
24-day waiting period. After 24 days, any dispute would be referred to 
a joint commission where there will be a 15-day waiting period. Then 
the dispute would be referred to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs with 
another 15-day day waiting period. Finally, the dispute would end up 
before an advisory board with--you guessed it--another 15-day waiting 
period. All of this, of course, can be delayed if the parties agree on 
an extension for further discussion, which they will.
  Instead of resolution, we have an unending series of switchbacks to 
get to the top of a mountain which in fact we will never see. ``The 
definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and 
expecting different results.'' We have tried IAEA inspections with Iran 
before, and they failed miserably. It seems nothing short of insane to 
say that we can trust Iran today.
  This deal does more than give Iran the power to self-regulate, 
filibuster, and avoid inspections. It gives Iran the ability to remain 
unaccountable and rogue. This debate is not just about what the 
administration, this body or the American public thinks of an agreement 
with Iran, this is also very much about what the Iranians think we have 
and will accept.
  I worry that we are looking at this so-called agreement through rose-
colored glasses, based on hope and the misguided idea that any deal is 
better than no deal because the alternative is war. Why do I say 
``rose-colored glasses''? It is because civilized nations do that--
nations such as America. We naturally want to believe that disaster and 
chaos will not happen but unfortunately they do.
  Now, 14 years ago tomorrow, while heading into work I heard the news 
of the World Trade Center being attacked. My heart fell and my stomach 
churned because as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee at 
that time, I had been repeating over and over again that the oceans no 
longer protected us and the nature of warfare was dramatically 
changing.
  At the time of the attacks, coming up on 395, I could see black smoke 
billowing from the Pentagon. I knew the Capitol would be next. If it 
were not for the heroes of flight 93 who made the declaration ``let's 
roll'' a national rolling cry, my instincts would have been right and 
the Capitol would have been hit. The probability is I would not be 
making these remarks today had that happened.
  Madam President, my colleagues, everybody watching, close your eyes. 
Imagine the terrible ramifications had that plane hit the Capitol. 
Where we sit today would have been rubble. Imagine that happening 
tomorrow.
  Throughout our history, periods of peace, stability, and prosperity 
have unfortunately been the aberration, not the norm. As a result, we 
have learned the hard way, as Americans who made the ultimate sacrifice 
in so many conflicts throughout our history. Around the world, we have 
witnessed man's inhumanity to man: the Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, and 
now with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and their savage caliphate 
threatening almost indiscriminately against all those who do not 
subscribe to their Sharia law, and especially to our best ally in the 
region, the State of Israel.
  My colleagues, despite our best efforts, our hope, our optimism, and 
the siren song, ``It can't happen,'' I would only remind you that 
history tells us that it has happened, and it will happen again unless 
we have the courage to take off the rose-colored glasses and come to 
the realization with regard to the consequences of what we are doing 
or, more aptly put, not doing and whom we are dealing with. Today we 
are dealing with a State sponsor of terrorism and they will continue. 
Iran will become a nuclear-armed state.
  As we mark the 14th anniversary of the horrific terrorist attacks and 
loss of over 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001, I want to make it 
clear that I do not trust Iran, and I will never support concessions 
which will allow them to become a nuclear-armed state.
  It is my hope to vote yes on the resolution of disapproval. As my 
good friend and colleague Senator Cornyn emphasized yesterday: Every 
Senator here should have----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sasse). The majority's time has expired.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 30 seconds.
  Mr. CORKER. I agree.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Every Senator should have the opportunity to vote on 
this issue, given the irony that Iran's leadership has given that power 
and privilege to its own Parliament. At least give me and others the 
privilege today, as a Senator, to cast the most important vote of my 35 
years in public service.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. I understand we have 60 minutes under Democratic control. 
I would ask unanimous consent that up to 7 minutes be available to 
Senator Merkley, up to 7 minutes to Senator Manchin, up to 6 minutes to 
Senator Donnelly, up to 18 minutes to Senator Franken, and up to 5 
minutes to Senator Hirono, and up to 10 minutes to Senator Markey.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, the United Sates, our citizens, our 
President, and I believe every single Member of Congress stand united 
in our commitment to block Iran from securing a nuclear weapon. The 
question we

[[Page S6564]]

are debating is the pathway that is best for ensuring that outcome. Is 
the international agreement negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 
nations the best strategy for blocking Iran's potential pursuit of a 
nuclear weapon or is there some other route that yields better 
probability, better outcome? That is the issue we are considering.
  Over the last month, I have explored the strengths of every argument 
and counterargument. I have met with policy experts, intelligence 
analysts, advocates, and the Ambassadors of our partner nations. I have 
sought and received the counsel of Oregonians on both sides of this 
issue. Taking all of this into account, this deal is the best available 
strategy for blocking Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
  The plan's strength is that for 15 years it creates an effective 
framework for blocking Iran's three pathways to securing a nuclear 
weapon: the uranium path, the plutonium path, and the covert path. It 
blocks the uranium path by requiring Iran to dismantle two-thirds of 
its centrifuges; more importantly, to reduce its stockpile of enriched 
uranium by 97 percent; and to limit enrichment of uranium to 3.67 
percent--far below the 90 percent required for a nuclear weapon.
  It blocks Iran's plutonium pathway by requiring Iran to pull the core 
of its Arak reactor and to fill it with concrete, to build any 
replacement reactor with a design that will not produce weapons-grade 
plutonium, and to forgo the reprocessing of spent fuel which is 
essential to the plutonium path. The agreement also blocks a covert 
path to a bomb by imposing extensive inspections and monitoring. This 
includes providing onsite inspections anywhere a violation is 
suspected. Unprecedented procedures have been put in place to guarantee 
that Iran cannot indefinitely stall these inspections, including 
setting a maximum number of days for access and number of days that is 
guaranteed to ensure that we can, with confidence, detect any work with 
radioactive materials. The result--attested to by 75 nonproliferation 
experts and diplomats in a recent letter--is that it is ``very likely 
that any future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a 
clandestine program, would be detected promptly.''
  As many have pointed out on the floor today, the agreement is not 
without shortcomings. It has not sustained the current U.N. ban on 
Iran's importation of conventional arms. Iran could acquire 
conventional arms up to 5 years and missile technology after 8 years.
  It does not dictate how Iran can spend the dollars it reclaims from 
cash assets that are frozen. It does not permanently maintain bright 
lines on Iran's nuclear research or nuclear energy program, lifting the 
300-kilogram stockpile limit and 3.77 percent enrichment limit after 15 
years. These exclusions are trouble.
  It is possible, perhaps probable, that Iran will use some of that 
additional cash and access to conventional arms to increase its support 
for terrorist groups. It is possible that Iran will use a nuclear 
research program and a nuclear energy program as the foundation for a 
future nuclear weapons program. That is a substantial concern.
  For this reason, many have come to this floor and argued the United 
States, instead of implementing this agreement, should withdraw from it 
and negotiate a better deal. The prospects for that possibility, 
however, are slim.
  Our P5+1 partners--and I have met with all of their Ambassadors to 
explore this issue--have committed the good faith of their governments 
behind this agreement. They believe this is the best path, the best 
opportunity to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. They plan to 
honor the deal they have signed on to with or without the United States 
as long as Iran does as well. Iran has every reason to honor this 
agreement, even if the United States rejects it because agreement 
fulfills Iran's goal of lifting the international sanctions and it sets 
the stage for valuable trade and investment partnerships.
  If Iran were to follow this course, it would gain many benefits while 
leaving the United States at odds with the balance of our partners, 
undermining, in a dramatic international fashion, American influence 
with strategic and security consequences throughout a large spectrum. 
On the other hand, if Iran exits this agreement and responds to its 
rejection by the United States, our country then is the one that stands 
in the pathway of a potential diplomatic solution to this incredibly 
important international security issue. It will be the United States 
blocking a plan with high confidence of stopping Iran from acquiring a 
nuclear bomb. Furthermore, the international support for economic 
sanctions would fray, giving Iran some of the economic relief it is 
seeking without the burden of intrusive inspections.
  In short, this course would shatter diplomacy, impact and diminish 
American leadership, and shred our economic leverage, increasing 
reliance on one leftover tool--military options--while at the same time 
dramatically diminishing our confidence in the actual state of Iran's 
nuclear program. Less information, more reliance, and less confidence 
would be a dangerous combination.
  The most effective strategy for blocking Iran's access to a nuclear 
bomb is to utilize this agreement and maximize American participation 
to hold Iran strictly accountable, not through the first 15 years but 
through the next decades that follow, where Iran is still completely 
constrained by its commitment to never develop a nuclear weapon.
  After 15 years, Iran will be subject to the deal's requirement that 
it will never ``seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.'' And 
Iran will continue to be subject to ongoing intensive monitoring and 
verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA.
  We, the United States, can greatly strengthen this framework. The 
United States should use a massive intelligence program to back up the 
plan in the first 15 years and strengthen the IAEA's monitoring after 
the first 15 years. The United States should lead the international 
community in defining the boundary that constitutes the difference 
between a nuclear research program and a nuclear energy program versus 
a nuclear weapons program. Those bright lines that are diminished are 
replaced with a commitment that has to be defined, and it is through 
participation and agreement that the United States can ensure that the 
international community sustains a clear line and enforces that clear 
line.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. MERKLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 30 more 
seconds.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MERKLEY. In conclusion, no foreign policy choice comes with 
guarantees. The future, whether we approve or reject this deal, is 
unknowable and carries risks. But this agreement, with its verification 
and full U.S. participation, offers the best prospect for stopping Iran 
from acquiring a nuclear weapon at any point here forward, and for that 
reason I will support it.
  I thank the Presiding Officer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. MANCHIN. Mr. President, when I go home to my beautiful State of 
West Virginia, I have always said that if I can't explain it, I can't 
vote for it.
  When this process began, I was supportive of the diplomatic efforts 
led by Secretaries Kerry and Moniz. I have always believed that to 
truly be a superpower, you must engage in superdiplomacy. Whenever I am 
able, I will choose diplomacy over war because the stakes are so high 
for West Virginia and our entire country.
  In our State of West Virginia, we have one of the highest rates of 
military service in the Nation, participation-wise. But as I struggled 
with this decision, I could not ignore the fact that Iran, the country 
that will benefit most from the sanctions being lifted, refuses to 
change its 36-year history of sponsoring terrorism.
  For me, this deal had to be about more than preventing Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon for the next 10 to 15 years. For me, this 
deal had to address Iran's terrorist actions. Without doing so, it 
would reward Iran's 36 years of deplorable behavior and do nothing to 
prevent its destructive activities.
  In fact, even during the negotiating process that we have been 
watching unfold, it has continued to hold four American hostages, 
support terrorism

[[Page S6565]]

around the world, breed anti-American sentiment, and acquire arms from 
Russia. The continued actions by Iran and its recent activities with 
Russia have proven to me that when we catch Iran violating the 
agreement--and I believe we will--I have grave doubts that we will have 
unified committed partners willing to prevent Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon.
  I also cannot, in good conscience, agree to Iran receiving up to $100 
billion in funds that everyone knows will be used--at least in some 
part--to continue funding terrorism and further destabilize the Middle 
East. Lifting sanctions without ensuring that Iran's sponsorship of 
terrorism is neutralized is dangerous to regional and American 
security.
  The administration has accepted what I consider to be a false 
choice--that this is only about nuclear weapons and not terrorism. 
However, the fact of the matter is that we are concerned about Iran 
having a bomb because, in large part, it is the world's largest state 
sponsor of terror. Asking us to set aside the terrorist question is 
irresponsible and misses the point.
  Over the last 36 years, Iran has carried out thousands of acts of 
terror that have killed thousands of innocent lives, and not just in 
the Middle East but around the world. They have defied international 
sanctions and treaties, continued to call for an attempt to violently 
destroy the State of Israel, bombed diplomatic buildings, and murdered 
innocent civilians. On top of it all, Iran is directly responsible for 
the deaths of hundreds of U.S. soldiers. This regime has shown no signs 
that its deplorable behavior will change, and the deal does nothing to 
guarantee that behavior change.
  The deal places real constraints on Iran's nuclear program for the 
next 10 to 15 years. After that term, Iran will be able to produce 
enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in a very short period of 
time. While I hope its behavior will change in that span, I cannot 
gamble our security and that of our allies on the hope that Iran will 
conduct itself differently than it has for the last 36 years. It is 
because of that belief and a month of thoughtful consideration that I 
must cast a vote against this deal.
  I do not believe that supporting this deal will prevent Iran from 
eventually acquiring a nuclear weapon or from continuing to be a 
leading sponsor of terrorism against Americans and our allies around 
the world. To those who are upset by my deliberations, I will simply 
say that the decision to pursue diplomacy is every bit as consequential 
as the decision to pursue war, and in many cases--possibly even this 
one--the choice to abandon the first path leads inevitably to the 
second. I, like most Americans and West Virginians, have already seen 
too much American sacrifice in the Middle East to push us down the path 
towards war. However, I don't believe a vote against this deal forces 
us to abandon the diplomatic path. We must continue to pursue peace but 
on terms that promise a lasting peace for the United States and our 
allies.
  I met with and spoke to every national security expert I could. I 
attended every secured briefing that was made available to me. I spoke 
with representatives of every Middle Eastern country, and most 
importantly, I listened to the good citizens of West Virginia. I thank 
all of my constituents who reached out to my office and to the many 
advisers who took their time to help me reach this decision.
  I will continue to listen to my constituents, and I will support a 
path towards peace and diplomacy over war and aggression. But make no 
mistake about it. I will vote to use all of our military might to 
protect our homeland whenever it is threatened, defend our allies 
whenever they are put in harm's way, and to prevent Iran from acquiring 
a nuclear weapon.
  To be a superpower I believe you must possess superdiplomatic skills, 
and I believe we can use these skills to negotiate a better deal. We 
need a deal that citizens of West Virginia, our country, and the world 
know will make us safer.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. President, as Indiana's Senator, my top priority 
and most fundamental responsibility is to ensure the security of the 
people of Indiana and our Nation, as well as the security of our 
friends and allies, including Israel and the Gulf States. It is through 
the lens of these solemn obligations that I have carefully reviewed and 
evaluated the proposed nuclear agreement.
  In making this decision, I bring to bear not only my responsibilities 
as a Senator but as the ranking member of the Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, overseeing our Nation's own nuclear 
arsenal and global nonproliferation efforts, and my convictions as a 
strong supporter of Israel and my concerns as a Hoosier who has 
attended the funerals of too many young men and women lost protecting 
our Nation in this conflict-ridden region.
  After exhaustive assessment and careful thought, I determined that 
despite my questions about Iran's intentions, the most responsible 
course of action is to give this agreement the opportunity to succeed. 
It is not the agreement I would have written, but it is the one we have 
to make a decision on, and I believe the alternative is much more 
dangerous to our country and to Israel.
  While reasonable people can disagree on the substance of the 
agreement, we can all agree that a nuclear-armed Iran poses an 
unacceptable threat to global security and the Iranian leadership 
should not and cannot be trusted. The question then becomes this: How 
can we most effectively eliminate Iran's nuclear threat?
  This agreement rolls back Iran's nuclear capabilities, shrinks its 
program, and gives us unprecedented access with the most intrusive 
inspections and verification regime ever put into place. Iran must get 
rid of 98 percent of their stockpiled uranium, more than two-thirds of 
their centrifuges, and the existing core of their heavy water plutonium 
reactor.
  These measures not only give us the opportunity to restrain Iran's 
nuclear capabilities but also, according to our military leadership, 
improve the effectiveness of our military option should that one day 
become necessary. Without this agreement, we risk the worst of both 
worlds. The united front we have formed with the international 
community against Iran's nuclear program would break apart, the 
agreement would dissolve, sanctions relief would flow into Iran from 
those countries that are no longer willing to hold the line, and Iran 
is left with tens of thousands of centrifuges capable of producing 
highly enriched uranium, a heavy water reactor capable of producing 
weapons-grade plutonium, and a breakout time of just 2 to 3 months.
  While I support this agreement, I also recognize that the only true 
guarantee that Iran will never become a nuclear-armed state is the 
steadfast resolve of the United States and our allies to do whatever is 
necessary to stop them and to put in place the policies to make that 
happen. With or without this deal, the day may come when we are left 
with no alternative but to take military action to prevent Iran from 
crossing a nuclear threshold. The burden and danger would, as always, 
be on the shoulders of our servicemembers, who put their lives on the 
line for our country.
  Indiana is home to the Nation's fourth largest National Guard 
contingent, with more than 14,000 Hoosiers standing ready to serve 
their communities and our country. These men and women and the 
thousands of Hoosiers who serve in the Reserves and on Active Duty 
across the country and around the world have been called to serve time 
and time again. They have done so with honor and distinction. They make 
up the greatest fighting force the world has ever seen, and I have 
every confidence in their ability to meet any challenge put before 
them.
  If the day does come that I am faced with a vote on whether to 
authorize military action against Iran, I owe it to our Armed Forces 
and to the people of Indiana to have tried all other options to stop 
Iran before we consider putting our servicemembers into harm's way.
  We stand ready to take military action if needed, but we owe it to 
the young men and women who protect our country on the frontlines--from 
Terre Haute, Angola, Evansville, and Indianapolis--to at least try to 
find a peaceful solution. They should be able to expect at least that 
much from us here in

[[Page S6566]]

the Senate, and if that solution does not succeed, they stand ready.
  While I share the concerns expressed by the agreement's critics about 
what may happen 10 years or 15 years or 20 years from now, I cannot in 
good conscience take action that would shift the potential risks of 
2026 and 2031 to 2016.
  I believe this agreement is, as my predecessor and friend, former 
U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, recently said, ``our best chance to stop an 
Iranian bomb without another war in the Middle East.'' I owe Senator 
Lugar and my other fellow Hoosier, former Congressman Lee Hamilton, a 
great debt of gratitude for their input and expertise throughout this 
process.
  This deal will not resolve every problem we have were Iran. It must 
be part of a comprehensive strategy to counter the broader threat Iran 
poses through their support for terrorists and other proxies across 
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere.
  I remain committed to working with my colleagues and friends on both 
sides of the aisle to confront these challenges with a clear, decisive 
strategy in the Middle East.
  I thank the Presiding Officer.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. FRANKEN. Mr. President, I rise today to express strong support 
for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the diplomatic agreement 
that the United States and our international partners reached with Iran 
in July. I urge my colleagues to support the agreement and to reject 
the resolution of disapproval.
  This is not a decision I came to lightly. Since the agreement was 
announced, I have consulted with nuclear and sanctions experts inside 
and outside the government, Obama administration officials, including 
Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, 
Ambassadors from the other countries who negotiated alongside of us, 
our intelligence communities, advocates for Israel on both sides of the 
issue, my constituents in Minnesota, and, of course, with my colleagues 
in the Senate.
  Many have expressed reservations about the agreement, and I share 
some of those reservations. It is not a perfect agreement, but it is a 
strong one. Many people have said no deal is better than a bad deal, 
but that doesn't mean that the only deal we can agree to is a perfect 
deal. The last perfect deal we got was on the deck of the USS Missouri. 
What a cost we had to pay for that, including the only use of a nuclear 
weapon in war--actually, two weapons.
  This agreement is, in my opinion, the most effective, realistic 
option available to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon anytime 
in the next 15 years and beyond. Iran must never, ever have a nuclear 
weapon. And after 15 years, we will still have every option we 
currently have, up to and including the use of military force, to 
prevent Iran from getting a bomb. Moreover, while critics have eagerly 
pointed out what they see as flaws in the deal, I have heard no 
persuasive arguments that there is a better alternative.
  The agreement imposes a series of physical limits on Iran's nuclear 
program, especially its production of the fissile material it would 
require to make a bomb. The agreement's verification provisions are 
extremely strong, with 24/7 monitoring of and unfettered access to 
Iran's nuclear sites and ongoing surveillance of Iran's nuclear supply 
chain.
  Let me briefly review the central limits on its nuclear program that 
Iran has agreed to and the verification provisions. Together they are 
designed to prevent Iran from trying to get a nuclear weapon and to 
detect them, if they do, with enough time to respond forcefully and 
effectively.
  The agreement will prevent Iran from using weapons-grade plutonium as 
the fissile material for a nuclear weapon by requiring Iran to redesign 
and rebuild the Arak nuclear reactor, which, if completed as planned, 
could have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for one or two bombs 
each year. Under the agreement, it won't be able to do that. Iran has 
to pull out the core of the nuclear reactor and fill it with concrete 
to destroy it. And Iran can't get any sanctions relief until it does 
that.
  The agreement also significantly reduces and limits Iran's production 
of uranium which, in its highly enriched form, can also be used in a 
bomb. Iran currently has about 19,500 centrifuges capable of enriching 
uranium, and it has stockpiled about 10 tons of low-enriched uranium. 
Under the agreement, Iran has to go down to about 5,000 first-
generation centrifuges for enriching uranium and down to 300 kilograms 
of low-enriched uranium--a 98-percent reduction. Iran does not get any 
sanctions relief until it does that.
  Right now, it would take Iran about 2 to 3 months to get one weapon's 
worth of weapons-grade uranium. That is called the breakout time. The 
longer the breakout time is, of course, the better. This agreement will 
increase the breakout time to 1 year for the first decade. Because of 
the inspections included in the agreement, if Iran tried to cheat at 
their nuclear facilities and dash for a bomb, we would catch them 
almost instantaneously and have more than enough time to respond 
effectively. Iran's nuclear facilities will be subject to 24/7 
monitoring and unfettered access by the inspectors of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA. Limitations on Iran's nuclear 
facilities and strict verification make it impossible for Iran to dash 
for a bomb at its known nuclear facilities for the next 15 years.
  But the verification provisions are also important for another 
reason. They make it much more difficult for Iran to be able to go for 
a bomb in secret as well. Beyond the 24/7 monitoring of and unfettered 
access to Iran's nuclear sites, international inspectors will also be 
guaranteed access to any site in Iran that they have suspicions about, 
including military sites.
  Now, a lot has been made about a provision in the agreement for 
resolving disputes when the IAEA seeks to access suspicious sites in 
Iran. That process can take up to 24 days. A lot of confusing and 
misleading things have been said about this. First of all, it is 
important to again emphasize that there is continuous monitoring at 
Iran's declared nuclear sites and unique safeguards on Iran's nuclear 
supply chain. That is not what the 24-day controversy is about.
  Where the 24 days come in is in those cases where Iran disputes the 
IAEA's demand for access to a suspicious, undeclared site. People have 
expressed concerns that 24 days is too long. Prime Minister Netanyahu 
has likened this to giving a drug dealer 24-days' notice before you 
check his premises, saying that is a lot of time for a drug dealer to 
flush a lot of drugs down the toilet.
  But here is the problem for Iran and the problem with this criticism. 
You can't hide radioactive material such as uranium. It leaves traces 
behind, and they can be detected for far, far longer than 24 days. One 
nuclear expert has said:

       If Iran were to flush the evidence down the toilet, they'd 
     have a radioactive toilet. And if they were to rip out the 
     toilet, they'd have a radioactive hole in the ground.

  Uranium-235 has a half-life of over 700 million years, and the half-
life of uranium-238 is over 4 billion years. The IAEA will catch Iran 
after 24 days.
  Now, it is true that there are some activities--related to weapons 
design, for example--that don't use nuclear materials and are much 
easier to hide. That is a genuine challenge that inspectors and our 
intelligence efforts will face. But the fact is that you can move a 
computer that you are doing design work on in 24 seconds or erase stuff 
in 24 milliseconds. I am sure it is actually a lot faster than that. 
But Iran is still not allowed to conduct those activities under the 
agreement and will face severe consequences if they get caught.
  So the bottom line is that the IAEA's guaranteed access to suspicious 
sites will help support the verification of the agreement.
  Perhaps more importantly, we will also have ongoing surveillance of 
Iran's nuclear supply chain. That means that in order to make a nuclear 
weapon in the next 15 years, and even beyond, Iran would have to 
reconstruct every individual piece of the chain--the mining, the 
milling, the production of centrifuges, and more--separately and in 
secret. And it would have to make sure it didn't get caught in any of 
the steps. This agreement--plus our own comprehensive intelligence 
efforts--would make it exceedingly unlikely that Iran

[[Page S6567]]

would be able to get away with any of that. And Iran would therefore 
risk losing everything it gained from the deal and the reimposition of 
sanctions, to say nothing of military attack.
  We don't have to trust the regime's intentions to understand the 
reality it would face. Attempting to cheat on this agreement would 
carry an overwhelming likelihood of getting caught and serious 
consequences if it does.
  We still have work to do to diminish the threat Iran poses to our 
national security and, of course, to the safety of our allies in the 
Middle East, beginning with Israel. As sanctions are lifted, the non-
nuclear threat to the region may very well grow. We will need to 
bolster our support to regional counterweights such as Saudi Arabia. 
And, of course, we will need to maintain our terrorism-related 
sanctions, which are unaffected by the deal.
  We also need to work very closely with Israel, our greatest friend in 
the region, in order to assure its security. As a Jew, I feel a deep 
bond with Israel. As a Senator, I have worked very hard to strengthen 
our country's bond with that nation and to bolster its security, and I 
will continue to do that. A nuclear-armed Iran would be a truly grave 
threat to Israel, and so I believe this agreement will contribute to 
the security of Israel because it is the most effective available means 
of preventing Iran from becoming nuclear armed, so do a number of very 
senior Israeli security experts, including some of the former heads of 
Israel's security services.
  There is no doubt in my mind that this deal represents a significant 
step forward for our own national security.
  One concern has been raised about what happens after year 15 when 
many of the restrictions in the deal expire. Well, there will still be 
major checks on Iran's nuclear program after that date. Under the deal, 
Iran will be subject to permanent, specific prohibitions on several of 
the steps necessary to build a bomb. Iran's nuclear program will still 
be subject to heightened monitoring by the IAEA and Iran's nuclear 
supply chain will still be subject to uniquely intrusive monitoring, 
which will limit Iran's ability to divert nuclear materials and 
equipment to a secret program without being detected.
  Iran must never, ever have a nuclear weapon. We will still have every 
option we currently have, up to and including the use of military 
force, to prevent that from happening.
  But we also must begin now to make the case to the world that the 
danger posed by an Iranian nuclear weapon will not expire in 15 years, 
and remind Iran that should it begin to take worrisome steps, such as 
enrichment inconsistent with a peaceful program, we stand ready to 
intervene.
  That said, we don't know what the world will look like in 15 years. 
As long as this regime holds power, Iran will represent a dangerous 
threat to our security. But it is possible that by 2031, Iran may no 
longer be controlled by hardliners determined to harm our interests. 
More than 60 percent of Iran's population is now under the age of 30. 
These young Iranians are increasingly well educated and pro American.
  We don't know how this tension within Iran will work out. But I think 
if we reject this agreement, we will lose this opportunity with the 
people of Iran. If we back out of a deal we have agreed to, we will 
only embolden the hardliners who insist that America cannot be trusted. 
We will be doing self-inflicted damage to American global leadership 
and to the cause of international diplomacy.
  What is more, the alternatives that I have heard run the gamut from 
unrealistic to horrifying. For example, some say that should the Senate 
reject this agreement, we would be in a position to negotiate a better 
one. But I have spoken to the Ambassadors or Deputy Chiefs of Mission 
of each of the five nations who helped broker the deal with us, and 
they all agree that this simply would not be the case. Instead, these 
diplomats have told me that we would not be able to come back to the 
bargaining table at all and that the sanction regimes would likely 
erode or just fall apart completely, giving Iran's leaders more money 
and more leverage and diminishing both our moral authority throughout 
the world and our own leverage. That is just the reality. And of course 
Iran would be able to move forward on its nuclear program, endangering 
our interests in the region--especially Israel--and making it far more 
likely that we will find ourselves engaged in a military conflict 
there. If Iran cheats on this agreement and we are a part of it, we 
will have a say in the international response. If we are not a part of 
this agreement, we will not.

  Now, most opponents of the agreement do not seek or want war with 
Iran--even if opposition to the agreement makes such a war, in my 
opinion, more likely--but some of them do. One of my colleagues 
suggested that we should simply attack Iran now--an exercise he 
believes would be quick and painless to the United States. In fact, he 
compared it to Operation Desert Fox, intimating that it would be over 
and done with in a matter of days. But this is pure fantasy, at least 
according to what our security and intelligence experts tell us, and it 
is certainly not the lesson anyone should have learned from the 
disastrous invasion of Iraq.
  The Middle East is an unstable, unpredictable, largely unfriendly 
region. We know that military undertakings in the region are likely to 
bring very painful, unpredictable consequences. That is partly why we 
should give diplomacy a chance. Yet, a number of my colleagues and 
others were intent on opposing such a diplomatic solution even before 
the agreement was reached.
  In March----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. FRANKEN. I ask unanimous consent for another 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  In March, 47 of my Republican colleagues took the unprecedented step 
of sending a letter to Iran's leaders just as these sensitive 
negotiations were nearing an accord. It was a clear attempt to 
undermine American diplomacy and signaled that they would oppose any 
deal with Iran, no matter what the terms. So it is not surprising that 
these critics now oppose the finished deal, but it is disappointing 
that they refuse to acknowledge, let alone take responsibility for the 
dire consequences that would almost certainly result from killing it.
  It is possible that there would not be a war if we reject the 
agreement, but what seems undeniable is that if we and we alone were to 
walk away from an agreement that we negotiated alongside our 
international partners, that would be a severe blow to our standing and 
our leadership in the world.
  Diplomacy requires cooperation and compromise. You don't negotiate 
with your friends; you negotiate with your enemies.
  Indeed, no one who is for this deal has any illusions about the 
Iranian regime, any more than the American Presidents who made nuclear 
arms agreements with the Soviet Union had illusions about the nature of 
the Communist regime there.
  For a long time, it looked as if our only options when it came to 
Iran would be allowing it to have a nuclear weapon or having to bomb 
the country ourselves. This agreement represents a chance to break out 
of that no-win scenario. To take the extraordinary step of rejecting it 
because of clearly unrealistic expectations, because of a hunger to 
send Americans into another war, or, worst of all, because of petty 
partisanship would be a terrible mistake.
  I therefore urge my colleagues to prevent this resolution of 
disapproval from moving forward and to vote in support of the 
agreement.
  Thank you.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Ms. HIRONO. Mr. President, I support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action that we have agreed to with our international partners and with 
Iran. This agreement, implemented effectively, is the best option we 
have to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
  I sit on the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees. We have had 
numerous hearings. I have engaged with the administration. I have met 
with our international partners. I have studied the deal itself. I have 
read the commentary and analyses from all different perspectives. I 
have asked hard

[[Page S6568]]

questions. I have reached my conclusions based on the facts before us. 
This decision was not easy and should not be easy.
  Like every Member of this body, I am committed to Israel's security. 
I am concerned about the alarming statements against Israel and Iran's 
support for terrorism. These concerns are real and valid.
  Nuclear proliferation is one of the most consequential national 
security matters facing the world. Clearly, a nuclear Iran is 
unacceptable to all of us. So I would expect that any agreement to stop 
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon would be given serious, thoughtful 
consideration. Yet, there are those in this body and elsewhere who 
oppose even the idea of a diplomatic solution--at least one negotiated 
by the Obama administration. They have made clear their intention to 
oppose the agreement even while the negotiations were taking place.
  For the first time I am aware of in U.S. history, dozens of Senators 
signed an open letter to a foreign government--the government of an 
adversary, no less--stating that any agreement reached by this 
administration would be undone. Before the actual ink was put to paper 
on the agreement, that was their message. Then, within hours of the 
deal's announcement, the same voices that opposed negotiations in the 
first place started denouncing it as a bad deal. Some claimed we could 
get a better deal. Others said that no deal was preferable, despite the 
fact that Iran was within 2 to 3 months of getting a nuclear bomb. I am 
fairly certain these people hadn't read the deal before they made such 
statements at the very outset. That is not how we should conduct 
foreign policy. Our national security, the security of Israel, and the 
stability of the Middle East are too important to turn into campaign 
ads or political rhetoric.
  As we prepare to vote this afternoon, I would ask my colleagues to 
set politics aside and focus on the facts. The fact is, this agreement 
is the best option we have to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
  First, we reached this agreement with the backing of our 
international partners, including China and Russia. I, along with some 
of my colleagues, met with Ambassadors of these countries, and I asked 
them point-blank: Would you come back to the table to bargain for 
another agreement if the United States walked away?
  They said: No. There already is an agreement. It is the one that 
Congress should be supporting.
  The Ambassador to the United States from the UK also said no.
  I would remind my colleagues that after decades of U.S. unilateral 
sanctions against Iran, it was the weight of international sanctions 
that forced Iran to the table. We need our partners to make this deal 
work, and our partners have committed that if we choose this path, they 
will stand with us, they will be with us.
  Second, the terms of this agreement, implemented effectively, cut off 
Iran's ability to create a bomb. Their uranium stockpiles will be all 
but eliminated. We will have unprecedented oversight over the entire 
nuclear supply chain.
  The U.S. intelligence community has indicated that it will gain 
valuable new insights through this agreement. Indeed, with the 
information that can be garnered through this agreement, our 
intelligence community will be able to provide information that will 
enable us to make sure Iran stands up and abides by the provisions of 
this deal.
  We will have veto authority of what goes into Iran and we will know 
what comes out of Iran.
  These unprecedented oversight provisions have the support of arms 
control experts, nuclear scientists, diplomats, and military and 
intelligence leaders, all of whom believe this deal will make the 
difference.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Ms. HIRONO. I ask unanimous consent for 1 more minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. HIRONO. Finally, this agreement isn't about trust. The deal 
requires verification that Iran is cooperating before sanctions can be 
lifted. If Iran cheats, we can snap back sanctions with international 
support. We can initiate military operations if we need to. Let me 
repeat. The deal before us does not prevent the United States from 
taking military action if needed.
  This agreement is not perfect; however, rejecting this deal means 
risking our international cooperation, our security, and our ability to 
prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
  Based on the facts before us, this agreement deserves our support. 
Let's put politics aside. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing 
the resolution before us today. I urge my colleagues to support the 
agreement.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. President, for more than half a century, the United 
States has led global efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Since the 1970s, the international community has set rules and 
procedures to prevent these weapons from spreading, particularly to 
unstable regions plagued by international and civil war.
  Today, the world faces precisely this challenge in Iran. A nuclear 
weapon in the hands of Iran is a very real and dangerous threat not 
only to Israel and the entire Middle East but to all of humanity.
  We are in unanimous agreement that Iran must never become a nuclear 
weapons state. Iran has given us good reason to be skeptical of its 
intentions. It has misled the world about its nuclear program, is a 
state sponsor of terrorism, and is a destabilizing force in the Middle 
East. With nuclear weapons, the threat posed by Iran would increase 
exponentially. Because of these factors, we cannot ever trust Iran or 
ever give it a free pass on its destabilizing activity in the region 
and around the globe. As we speak today, Iran has the capability to 
develop a nuclear weapon within 3 months. With the Iran nuclear 
agreement, that will no longer be possible.
  I believe that our negotiators achieved as much as possible and that 
if the agreement they negotiated is strictly implemented, it can do the 
job. On the other hand, if we walk away now, our diplomatic coalition 
will likely fall apart and the prospects for any renewed efforts would 
not be promising.
  Together with many other Senators, I met with the Ambassadors of the 
five countries that joined in the effort to reach this agreement--Great 
Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia. Their message was unified 
and crystal clear: If the United States walks away right now, we will 
be on our own and they will not come back to the table.
  I acknowledge that the agreement carries risks, but, as recently 
stated in a letter signed by 29 leading American nuclear scientists, 
including six Nobel laureates, this agreement contains ``more stringent 
constraints than any previous negotiated nonproliferation framework.''
  The agreement puts strict limits on Iran's nuclear program for the 
next 15 years. It reduces Iran's existing nuclear program to a fraction 
of its current size. It virtually eliminates Iran's plutonium 
capabilities and reduces its uranium capability by two-thirds. It 
pushes back the time required before Iran would be capable of building 
a nuclear bomb from 3 months to more than 1 year.
  As I said earlier, this agreement is not based on trust. It imposes 
the most invasive, stringent, and technologically innovative 
verification regime ever negotiated. The agreement empowers inspectors 
to use the most advanced and intrusive methods to monitor Iran's 
compliance. This verification system will provide an unprecedented 
amount of reliable information and insight into Iran's nuclear program, 
ensuring that if Iran ever tries to develop a nuclear weapon, we will 
find out about it in time to stop them.
  After 15 years, under both this agreement and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, Iran will remain bound never to seek nuclear 
weapons. In paragraph 3 of the agreement, Iran categorically makes the 
following binding obligation: ``Under no circumstances will Iran ever 
seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.''
  Under the agreement, Iran will be required to give the IAEA detailed 
plans for how it intends to develop nuclear technology for peaceful 
use. It will remain forever subject to IAEA inspection to verify that 
it never seeks nuclear weapons or engages in any nuclear weapons-
related activities. If the

[[Page S6569]]

IAEA ever finds anything suspicious--not just in 10 or 15 or 25 or 40 
years but forever--then it will be the IAEA's duty to promptly report 
its suspicions to the world. The IAEA's ability to verify Iran's 
compliance is the key to this agreement.

  It will be critical to provide international inspectors with the 
support they require to detect, investigate, and respond to any 
suspicious nuclear activity before Iran has time to cover up the 
evidence.
  With our support, the IAEA can and must aggressively investigate any 
indication of Iranian nuclear weapons activities and report promptly 
and unequivocally if Iran cheats. Likewise, we must be prepared to 
react at any time if the IAEA sounds the alarm.
  I supported the tough sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating 
table in the first place. There are mechanisms in this agreement to 
snap back sanctions quickly and prevent a Chinese or Russian veto.
  Even without nuclear weapons, Iran poses very real risks, 
particularly to Israel, our closest friend in the region, and to our 
partners in the Arabian Peninsula. The administration has assured us 
that it is working closely with regional partners to enhance their 
security. Congress must be an active, insistent, and bipartisan partner 
in this effort, both with this President and his successors.
  We must increase our security assistance to Israel to unprecedented 
levels. I have always been a strong supporter of Israel. When Saddam 
Hussein was developing nuclear weapons in 1981, I supported Israel's 
decision to bomb the Osirak reactor. When Israel needed more funding 
for a missile defense system in 2010, I voted to accelerate the 
development of the Iron Dome system. When Hamas attacked Israel in 
2012, I supported its right to self-defense. We must continue to ensure 
Israel's qualitative military edge in the region and promptly finalize 
our new 10-year memorandum of understanding to cement our security 
assistance commitments. Likewise, we must strengthen our relationships 
with all of our regional partners. The countries of the Arabian 
Peninsula require our assistance to counter threats from Iran.
  Our cooperation in ballistic missile defense and countering violent 
extremists through intelligence sharing and interdiction must continue 
and be enhanced. Over the past 2 months, I have consulted with many 
stakeholders, groups, advocates, and concerned constituents on both 
sides of this debate. Without exception, their passion is born of an 
unwavering desire to secure a lasting peace for the Middle East, 
Israel, the United States, and the world. This is a passion I share.
  The world has come together in a historic way. With the agreement, we 
gain much, but most importantly, we avoid missing the significant 
diplomatic opportunity to ensure that Iran never emerges as a nuclear 
weapons state. With this agreement, we will maintain the international 
solidarity that will enable us to reimpose sanctions if Iran ever does 
try to get a nuclear weapon. We will keep and continue to improve all 
of our capabilities required to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear 
weapons state, including a military option.
  I thank Secretary Kerry, Secretary Moniz, and the entire U.S. 
negotiating team for their tireless efforts and service to our country 
in helping reach this agreement. I also thank President Obama for his 
leadership and commitment to diplomacy.
  I urge the Senate to come together to support this diplomatic effort 
to prevent Iran from ever getting a nuclear weapon--not just this month 
or this year but forever. We must be ever-vigilant to ensure that every 
part of this agreement is verified.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, Congress presently has the heavy 
responsibility to conduct a thorough and rigorous review of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. After numerous briefings from 
officials involved in the negotiations, consultation with scientific 
and diplomatic experts, meetings with Rhode Islanders, and a great deal 
of personal reflection, I have decided to support the plan. I do so 
because it blocks the pathways through which Iran could pursue a 
nuclear weapon, establishes unprecedented inspections of Iran's nuclear 
facilities and other sites of concern to the international community, 
and preserves our ability to respond militarily if necessary. The 
agreement also ensures the international sanctions regime against Iran 
can snap back into place if the Iranian Government reneges on its 
commitments.
  This agreement, reached by the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, China, Russia, and Iran, establishes strict and comprehensive 
monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify 
compliance and prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The 
agreement does not take any options off the table for President Obama, 
or for future Presidents. It ensures no sanctions relief will be 
provided unless the Iranian Government undertakes a series of 
significant steps to satisfy IAEA requirements.
  This agreement is the product of a joint effort among six sovereign 
countries, which working together have more force and effect than 
separated. I am encouraged that the other countries party to this 
agreement have committed to enforce this agreement and to ramp up 
enforcement of other international agreements against Iran's terror 
activities. I have also heard their warnings that if we walk away from 
this agreement before even giving it a try, the prospect of further 
multilateral negotiations yielding any better result is ``far-
fetched.'' Joining with other world powers in this important effort 
bears a price in the United States' ability to negotiate unilaterally. 
That should be a surprise to no one. Critics of this agreement fail to 
acknowledge the leverage and strength behind a unified, international 
effort to block Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and no one has 
offered a credible alternative that would lead to a nuclear weapons-
free Iran.
  This hard-fought bargain is the product of the canny determination of 
Secretary of State John Kerry, Energy Secretary and nuclear physicist 
Ernest Moniz, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy 
Sherman, and of many months of hard work on the part of many dedicated 
American officials. It is also a testament to President Obama's 
steadfast resolve to reach a diplomatic solution to one of the most 
pressing security challenges of our time.
  As more than 100 former American Ambassadors emphasized in their 
letter to the President endorsing the agreement, ``the most effective 
way to protect U.S. national security, and that of our allies and 
friends, is to ensure that tough-minded diplomacy has a chance to 
succeed before considering other more costly and risky alternatives.''
  This agreement is also supported by more than two dozen leading 
American scientists, who found the deal to be ``technically sound, 
stringent, and innovative'' in its restrictions on Iran's nuclear 
capabilities and its monitoring and verification of Iran's compliance 
with the agreement.
  By eliminating Iran's ability to gain a nuclear weapons capability 
for at least a decade, the deal allows the United States and the 
international community to focus needed energy and resources on other 
critical challenges Iran poses to the region, such as its support for 
Hezbollah and Syrian President Bashar Assad, as well as its human 
rights abuses.
  Bilateral cooperation between the United States and Israel will be as 
important as ever as we go forward. This should include tangible 
demonstrations of support for Israel through deepened military and 
intelligence cooperation. President Obama has already declared his 
intention to provide ``unprecedented'' levels of military financing and 
equipment to Israel, on top of the record support already in place.
  As former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor Chuck Freilich has 
said, ``The agreement, a painful compromise, not the one the U.S. or 
anyone else wanted, but the one it was able to negotiate, serves 
Israel's security.'' This conclusion is echoed in the words of 
officials from our Gulf Cooperation Council partners, like Qatar's 
Foreign Minister Khalid al-Attiyah, who said ``This was the best option 
among other options,'' and ``we are confident that what they [the 
negotiators] undertook makes this region safer and more stable.''
  I appreciate the thoughtful input of the many Rhode Islanders with 
whom I

[[Page S6570]]

met and who have reached out to me with opinions on both sides of this 
issue. It is, of course, a hallmark of our great democracy that we can 
openly and civilly debate these important questions. So too, I believe 
that through international engagement we can encourage a freer and more 
liberal society to emerge from the grip of the ayatollahs. That, with 
strong multilateral efforts to contain Iran's continuing mischief in 
the surrounding Middle East, provides the prospect of this becoming an 
historic turning point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hoeven). The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I have been watching this debate as 
carefully as I possibly can. I think it has been very thoughtful. I 
think it is interesting that Members of this body have read the same 
agreement and come to different conclusions. It is not surprising. 
There are a lot of complications in this. Nobody can really know 
exactly how everything is going to turn out. So it does not surprise me 
that people have come to different conclusions.
  I also agree with the Members of this body when they say this is 
probably one of the most important votes they will ever take. We are 
talking about a nuclear Iran and how we can potentially prevent that. 
That, obviously, would be a threat to world peace.
  I know that sitting back in Oshkosh, WI, well before I ever became a 
Senator, I heard Members of parties declare definitively: We cannot 
allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Well, the sad fact is, I think 
this agreement puts it on a path to obtaining that weapon.
  I also agree with President Obama in his speech really chastising 
those of us who don't agree with him when he says this is a pretty 
simple decision. I think it is a pretty simple decision. I just come at 
it from a totally different perspective and obviously draw a completely 
different conclusion from that.
  Let me read a couple quotes that have been brought forth by Members 
of this body during this debate.
  First:

       Most importantly, this agreement cannot be based on hope or 
     trust. History belies both in our experience with Iran. This 
     deal is not the agreement I have long sought.

  Another Senator:

       We are legitimizing a vast and expanding nuclear program in 
     Iran. We are, in effect, rewarding years of deception, 
     deceit, and wanton disregard for international law.

  Another Senator:

       This agreement with the duplicitous and untrustworthy 
     Iranian regime falls short of what I had envisioned.

  Yet another:

       This deal is not perfect and no one trusts Iran.

  In my 4\1/2\ years in the Senate, I have been trying to find those 
areas of agreement. I agree with those comments. But what is kind of 
surprising about all of those quotes, these are quotes from individual 
Senators--I won't name them--Senators who are going to vote to approve 
this awful deal. I think something else we can all agree on is that 
Iran is our enemy.
  Let me read a couple other quotes.

       Early this year, after his congregation broke out with a 
     death to America chant, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
     said: Yes, of course. Yes, death to America, because America 
     is the original source of this pressure. Death to America. 
     Death to America.

  Then only 2 days ago the Supreme Leader said: I say that you Israelis 
will not see the coming 25 years. And, God willing, there will not be 
something named the Zionist regime in the next 25 years.
  So I agree that we cannot trust Iran. We cannot trust the Supreme 
Leader. I agree that Iran is our enemy. So my decision to vote for 
disapproval of this deal rests on a very simple premise: Why in the 
world would we ever enter a deal that will give tens of billions and 
eventually hundreds of billions of dollars to our enemy, our avowed 
enemy--an enemy that I have to remind this body was responsible, 
because of their IEDs, for the killing of 196 troops in Iraq and many 
more wounded and maimed, a regime that back in the late 1970s took 52 
U.S. hostages for 444 days? That regime has not changed its behavior in 
all these intervening years. They are our enemy. Again, let me point 
out, why in the world would we ever agree to a deal that will 
strengthen our enemy's economy and our enemy's military? It seems 
pretty obvious. I agree with President Obama. This is a simple 
decision. But I disagree. He thinks it is a good deal. I think it is a 
very bad deal.
  In my remaining time--I want to be respectful of my colleagues--I do 
want to talk about what this debate and what this vote is actually 
about. This is not a straight up-or-down vote to approve an 
international agreement that would be deemed a treaty. This body gave 
up our ability to deem this a treaty and provide advice and consent 
when we voted on my amendment to deem it a treaty.
  President Obama, on his own authority, his article II powers, said: 
No, something this important, this consequential is not a treaty, it is 
an Executive agreement, and I can go it alone. And he basically did 
until the Senators from Tennessee and Maryland came together and 
recognized the fact that a key part of this deal is the waiver or 
lifting of the congressionally imposed sanctions that we put in place--
against the President's objection, by the way--in 2012. What this 
debate is all about is whether President Obama can retain that waiver 
authority.
  Regardless of how this turns out, President Obama, again, has 
negotiated this deal. He has run to the United Nations Security Council 
and gotten them to agree to it. The process will be put in place to 
lift those sanctions from the United Nations that, by the way, were put 
in place in resolutions that would have required the suspension or 
halting of the uranium enrichment capability, which is not part of this 
deal, unfortunately.
  So it is extremely important for the American people to understand 
that we are not debating and we are not going to be voting on the 
actual deal itself. We are going to be voting on something that has 
pretty weak involvement, pretty minor involvement, because President 
Obama has pretty well blocked us, blocked the American people from 
having a voice on a deal which is so important, so consequential, and 
which I believe is going to be so damaging to America's long-term 
interest, a deal which I believe really will put Iran on a path to 
obtaining a nuclear weapon. We are going to be lifting the arms 
embargo. We are already lifting the embargo on ballistic missile 
technology. And let me reiterate that we are going to be injecting tens 
of billions and eventually hundreds of billions of dollars to 
strengthen the economy and the military of our avowed enemy.
  It is a simple decision for me, which is why I will vote to 
disapprove this very bad deal.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Wisconsin for 
his comments.
  I rise today in opposition to this agreement. I do so because I 
believe it is bad for our country and bad for the world.
  There are very few votes we take here in the Senate that have such a 
profound effect on our national security and the kind of world our kids 
and our grandkids are going to inherit as this upcoming vote we will 
take next week on this nuclear deal.
  Over the past couple of months, I have taken the time to read the 
agreement carefully. I have attended the classified briefings. I have 
listened to my colleagues. I have talked to a lot of experts on both 
sides of the issue. I did take my time in coming to a decision because 
I was hopeful that we would be able to have an agreement that I could 
support and others could as well.
  I have also listened to my constituents back home in Ohio. They have 
looked at this agreement too. They understand what is at stake. They 
have strong views on it. My calls and letters and emails are 
overwhelmingly opposed.
  Through the process, what I did was I measured the agreement not 
based on just some abstract concept I might have, I actually based it 
on the actual objectives and criteria that were set out by the 
international community, the United Nations, and the United States of 
America, our government. I looked at it based on the redlines we had 
drawn. One of my great concerns about this agreement is that those 
redlines have not been honored. The broad

[[Page S6571]]

goal, of course, the biggest redline is that Congress, the Obama 
administration, the United Nations Security Council--everyone was very 
clear: Iran must stop and dismantle its nuclear weapons program. That 
is the most basic redline.
  You have to remember that when Congress on a bipartisan basis enacted 
these crippling sanctions on Iran, it was not just to bring Iran to the 
table, which was the result, it was actually to get them to abandon 
their nuclear weapons program. That was the point.
  I supported tougher sanctions to give leverage to the Obama 
administration even though, seriously, they did not want that leverage. 
They resisted Congress increasing those sanctions. In fact, they 
initially opposed any role for Congress in reviewing the agreement.

  The Senator from Tennessee is here, the chairman of the committee, 
and he will tell you they are somehow reluctant even for Congress to 
have a role here, even to help them to be able to negotiate a better 
agreement. That was probably an indication of where we were going.
  Despite that resistance, serious sanctions were enacted and Iran did 
come to the table. I had hoped then that with firm U.S. leadership--
leading from the front, not from behind--we would be able to bring the 
international community along to ensure that we did meet the criteria I 
talked about earlier, longstanding, U.S.-international criteria. 
Unfortunately, after reviewing the terms of this agreement, it is 
explicitly clear that these redlines, these objectives, the criteria we 
have set out, have not been met.
  We now have an obligation to reject this deal and begin to restore 
the consensus, both at home and abroad, that the Iranian Government 
must be isolated economically and diplomatically until it agrees to the 
longstanding terms on which the United States and the international 
community have long insisted. Some will say that is fine, but that is 
impossible. I respectfully disagree.
  I respectfully quote President Obama, who has said repeatedly that no 
agreement is better than a bad agreement; meaning keeping the sanctions 
in place is better than a bad agreement. I believe that is where we 
are. This is a bad agreement.
  Among the many serious flaws of this deal is the fact that Iran can 
continue research and development on more advanced centrifuges and can 
resume enrichment in 15 years, providing, at best, only temporary 
relief. Inspections, one of the most important safeguards we have, are 
not anywhere, anytime, as was talked about by the administration. Under 
this deal, Iran can delay the inspection of suspected nuclear sites for 
up to 24 days--and there is even a process to get to those 24 days. If 
the Iranians cheat, as they have in the past, we would have to employ a 
convoluted process to convince the international community to restore 
sanctions, a process I don't think we can rely on.
  It is also important to note that other than reimposition of 
sanctions, the agreement does not specify any clear mechanism to 
enforce outcomes of the dispute resolution process, nor does it 
identify penalties for failure to comply. This means that the only 
realistic preagreed punishment for any violation--no matter how big or 
how small--is full reimposition of sanctions.
  In a way, as I look at this, this is like having the death penalty as 
the only punishment for all crimes. I don't think that is realistic. I 
don't think you are going to get the international community to go 
along with that. That is why I worry about the compliance and the 
sanctions.
  Given that only a full-blown Iranian violation would likely convince 
enough countries to reimpose all sanctions, I don't think the agreement 
provides the concrete tools to address less overt but still subversive 
forms of Iranian cheating that are designed to test international 
resolve and establish a new baseline for acceptable behavior. By the 
way, based on past behavior, this is likely.
  In addition, of course, the inspections regime is subject to side 
deals between the United Nations, the International Atomic Agency, and 
Iran that none of us are allowed to see. This is contrary, by the way, 
to the Iran review act that was passed by Congress and was signed into 
law by the President of the United States. The language of that 
legislation is pretty clear. It requires the law to transmit to 
Congress ``the agreement as defined in subsection (h)(1) including all 
related materials and annexes.''
  Then, when it talks about what that means it means, it says 
``including annexes, appendices, codicils, side agreements, 
implementing materials, documents, guidance, technical or other 
understandings,'' and so on and so forth. It is all here. That is in 
the agreement that we had with the President of the United States 
because it was part of the review act that he signed into law.
  Based on recent press reporting, of course we are also hearing that 
Iran will be allowed to self-inspect, use its own inspectors and 
equipment to report on possible military dimensions of past suspected 
nuclear activity at one of its most secretive and important military 
facilities at Parchin.
  Allowing a country accused of hiding a secret and illegal nuclear 
weapons program to implement verification measures for a facility where 
this program is believed to have been hidden certainly undermines the 
President's claim that the Iran deal ``is not built on trust, it is 
built on verification.''
  Perhaps, most troubling is that this agreement ends Iran's 
international isolation without ending the behavior that caused Iran to 
be isolated in the first place.
  As the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, based on our own 
State Department analysis, Iran's nuclear program is just one part of a 
broader strategy that is dangerous and destabilizing. According to some 
estimates, of course, Iran will receive up to $150 billion in sanctions 
relief early in the agreement--by the way, with or without sustained 
compliance--which will encourage the Iranians to cause trouble, to 
further support terrorist groups they sponsor.
  National Security Advisor Susan Rice acknowledged something that I 
think is pretty plain. She said:

       Iran is sending money to these groups now while they're 
     under sanctions and they'll have more money to do it when 
     sanctions are relieved.

  Within 5 years, the agreement lifts the embargo on conventional 
weapons and lifts the ballistic missile embargo within 8 years--a last-
minute concession to Iran in the rush by the administration to get to 
yes. At a minimum, this deal will ensure that Iran remains a threshold 
nuclear power but with a new set of tools and more resources to hurt 
our interests and those of our allies in the region, including Israel.
  I believe it is clear that the deal, as currently written, will set 
up a conventional arms race in the Middle East. The President says the 
alternative to this deal is war. In fact, a Middle East bristling with 
arms will increase the risks of war--increase the risks of war because 
of this deal.
  I have been involved in international negotiations. As U.S. Trade 
Representative, I understand they can be tough. I know both sides have 
to make concessions, but I also know that does not mean the United 
States of America concedes on fundamental principles, on the redlines. 
We have to have the courage to stand behind our legitimate public 
pronouncements, whether it is with the use of chemical weapons by the 
Assad regime in Syria, whether it is the violation of both Minsk cease-
fire agreements by the Russians and their proxies in eastern Ukraine or 
our commitment that Iran must stop and dismantle its march toward 
nuclear weapons. These are all things you negotiate. These are all 
things you have to be firm on and tough on. It is not easy, but as 
Americans that is what we do.
  There was a speech written that was never given, that was meant to be 
given on November 23, 1963. It was the day John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated. He said in that speech about America's role: Our 
generation, our Nation, by destiny--rather than choice--are the watch 
guards on the walls of world freedom.
  That is who we are. We have to be tough in these negotiations and 
stand tall. Other countries look to us to be tall, to help build the 
consensus. That is what we had to do, and I believe we did not do in 
this what I am sure was a very difficult negotiation.
  We have to honor our redlines. If we expect them to be effective in 
promoting peace and stability, we must lead. In particular, we have to 
say

[[Page S6572]]

what we mean and mean what we say if we are going to stop nuclear 
proliferation. The way this agreement developed I think will encourage 
other countries who are interested in pursuing nuclear weapons to say: 
I don't care what the U.N. says. I don't care what the United States 
says. What I see here is everything is negotiable. That is the message, 
I am afraid, this agreement will send.
  The administration's position is that the only alternative to this 
agreement is war. That is what they are saying. As noted, if anything, 
I think this agreement will further destabilize an already turbulent 
region, but there is an alternative. The alternative to this bad deal 
is a better deal. Supporters of this agreement have compared this 
agreement to Ronald Reagan's arms control negotiations with the 
Soviets.
  I want to just touch on that for a moment because I have heard a lot 
of that on the floor. I take a very different lesson from that analogy 
to Ronald Reagan. President Reagan succeeded by raising the pressure, 
not reducing it. He increased the cost of bad behavior until that 
behavior changed. He didn't strike a deal unless it fulfilled the core 
goals he had laid out, his redlines. He didn't want a deal for a deal's 
sake, and he was patient. At the Reykjavik summit in 1986, Ronald 
Reagan walked away from what would have been a major nuclear 
disarmament treaty with the Soviets because he felt the costs to U.S. 
national security were too high. He was criticized for walking away, 
but he kept trying. He held firm, and 1 year later he successfully 
concluded negotiations on the intermediate nuclear forces treaty.
  This body must not sign off on an agreement that fails to honor our 
redlines, that strengthens Iran's destabilizing influence in the 
region, and does nothing to address the behavior that threatens our 
allies and our legitimate national security interests in this country.
  We should reject this agreement with Iran and tighten those sanctions 
on a bipartisan basis. The President should then use the leverage that 
only America possesses to negotiate an international agreement that 
does meet the longstanding goals of the United Nations, of the 
international community, of the United States of America, of this 
Congress, and of the President himself.
  We can't afford to get this one wrong, folks. We owe it to our 
children and grandchildren to get this right. As I noted in the 
beginning of my remarks, this is about what kind of a world they are 
going to inherit.
  I urge my colleagues in the Senate to join me in rejecting the deal 
and pursuing a better way.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, for 23 years as a member of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I 
have had the privilege of dealing with major foreign policy and 
national security issues.
  Many of those have been of a momentous nature. This is one of those 
moments.
  I come to the issue of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with 
Iran as someone who has followed Iran's nuclear ambition for the better 
part of two decades.
  Unlike President Obama's characterization of those who have raised 
serious questions about the agreement or who have opposed it, I did not 
vote for the war in Iraq, I opposed it--unlike the Vice President and 
the Secretary of State who both supported it. My vote against the Iraq 
war was unpopular at the time, but it was one of the best decisions I 
have ever made. I have not hesitated to diplomatically negotiate with 
our adversaries or enemies, as is evidenced, for example, by my vote 
for the New START treaty with Russia.
  I also don't come to the question as someone--unlike some of my 
Republican colleagues--who reflexively opposes everything the President 
proposes.
  In fact, I have supported President Obama--according to Congressional 
Quarterly--98 percent of the time in 2013 and 2014. On key policies--
ranging from voting for the Affordable Care Act to Wall Street reform, 
to supporting the President's Supreme Court nominees, defending the 
administration's actions in the Benghazi tragedy, shepherding within 1 
vote for the authorization for use of military force to stop President 
Assad's use of chemical weapons when I was chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, to so much more--I have been a reliable 
supporter of the President, but my support is not and has not been 
driven by party loyalty but rather by principled agreement, not 
political expediency. When I have disagreed, it is based on principled 
disagreement.
  The issue before the Senate now is whether to vote to approve or 
disapprove the agreement struck by the President and our P5+1 partners 
with Iran. This is one of the most serious national security, nuclear 
nonproliferation arms control issues of our time. It is not an issue of 
supporting or opposing the President. This issue is much greater and 
graver than that, and it deserves a vote.
  With this agreement, I believe we have now abandoned our long-held 
policy of preventing nuclear proliferation, and we are now embarked not 
upon preventing it but on managing it or containing it, which leaves us 
with a far less desirable, less secure, and less certain world order.
  So I am deeply concerned that this is a significant shift in our 
nonproliferation policy and about what it will mean in terms of a 
potential arms race in an already dangerous region.
  Why does Iran, which has the world's fourth largest proven oil 
reserves, with 157 billion barrels of crude oil, and the world's second 
largest proven natural gas reserves, with 1,193 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, need nuclear power for domestic energy?
  We know that despite the fact that Iran claims their nuclear program 
is for peaceful purposes, they have violated the international will, as 
expressed by various U.N. Security Council resolutions, and by deceit, 
deception, and delay advanced their program to the point of being a 
threshold nuclear State.
  It is because of these facts and the fact that the world believes 
Iran was weaponizing its nuclear program at the Parchin military base--
as well as developing a covert uranium enrichment facility in Fordow, 
built deep inside a mountain, raising serious doubts about the peaceful 
nature of their civilian program--and their sponsorship of state 
terrorism that the world united against Iran's nuclear program.
  So in that context let's remind ourselves of the stated purpose of 
our negotiations with Iran. Simply put, it was to dismantle significant 
parts of Iran's illicit nuclear infrastructure to ensure that it would 
not have nuclear weapons capability at any time. We said we would 
accommodate Iran's practical national needs but not leave the region 
and the world facing the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran at a time of 
its choosing. In essence, we thought the agreement would be rollback 
for rollback. You roll back your infrastructure, we roll back our 
sanctions. At the end of the day, what we appear to have is a roll back 
of sanctions and Iran only limiting its capability but not dismantling 
it or rolling back.

  What did we get? We get an alarm bell should they decide to violate 
their commitments and a system for inspections to verify their 
compliance. That, in my view, is a far cry from dismantling.
  Now, while I have many specific concerns about the agreement, my 
overarching concern is that it requires no dismantling of Iran's 
nuclear infrastructure and only mothballs that infrastructure for 10 
years. Not even one centrifuge will be destroyed under this agreement. 
Fordow will be repurposed, Arak redesigned. The fact is everyone needs 
to understand what this agreement does and does not do so they can 
determine whether providing Iran permanent relief in exchange for 
short-term promises is a fair trade.
  This deal does not require Iran to destroy or fully decommission a 
single uranium enrichment centrifuge. In fact, over half of Iran's 
currently operating centrifuges will continue to spin at its Natanz 
facility. The remainder, including more than 5,000 operating 
centrifuges and 10,000 not yet functioning, will merely be disconnected 
and transferred to another hall at Natanz, where they could be quickly 
reinstalled to enrich uranium.
  Yet we, along with our allies, have agreed to lift the sanctions and 
allow

[[Page S6573]]

billions of dollars to flow back into Iran's economy. We lift 
sanctions, but even during the first 10 years of the agreement Iran 
will be allowed to continue R&D activity on a range of centrifuges, 
allowing them to improve their effectiveness over the course of the 
agreement.
  Clearly, the question is: What did we get from this agreement in 
terms of what we originally sought? We lift sanctions, and at year 8 
Iran can actually start manufacturing and testing advanced IR-6 and IR-
8 centrifuges that enrich up to 15 times the speed of its current 
models. At year 15, Iran can start enriching uranium beyond 3.67 
percent, the level at which we become concerned about fissile material 
for a bomb. At year 15, Iran will have no limits on its uranium 
stockpile.
  This deal grants Iran permanent sanctions relief in exchange for only 
temporary--temporary--limitations on its nuclear program. Not a rolling 
back, not dismantlement, but temporary limits. In fact, at year 10, the 
U.N. Security Council resolution will disappear, along with the dispute 
resolution mechanism needed to snap back U.N. sanctions and the 24-day 
mandatory access provision for suspicious sites in Iran.
  The deal enshrines for Iran and, in fact, commits the international 
community to assisting Iran in developing an industrial-scale nuclear 
program, complete with industrial-scale enrichment.
  Now, while I understand this program will be subject to Iran's 
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, I think it fails to appreciate Iran's history of deception in 
its nuclear program and its violations of the NPT. It will, in the long 
run, if we believe there is a violation, make it much harder to 
demonstrate that Iran's program is not in fact being used for peaceful 
purposes because Iran will have legitimate reasons to have advanced 
centrifuges and a robust enrichment program. We will then have to 
demonstrate its intention is dual use and not justified by its 
industrial nuclear power program.
  Within about a year of Iran meeting its initial obligations, Iran 
will receive sanctions relief to the tune of $100 billion to $150 
billion, not just in the release of frozen assets that don't amount to 
that amount, but also in renewed oil sales of another million barrels a 
day as well as relief from sectoral sanctions in the petrochemical, 
shipbuilding, shipping, port sectors, gold and other precious metals, 
and software and automotive sectors.
  Iran will also benefit from the removal of designated entities, 
including major banks, shipping companies, oil and gas firms from the 
U.S. Treasury list of sanctioned entities. ``Of the nearly 650 entities 
that have been designated by the U.S. Treasury for their role in Iran's 
nuclear and missile program or for being controlled by the government 
of Iran, more than 67 percent will be delisted within 6 to 12 months,'' 
according to testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  For Iran, all this relief comes likely within a year, even though its 
obligations stretch out for a decade or more. Considering the fact it 
was President Rouhani who, after conducting its fiscal audit after his 
election, likely convinced the Ayatollah that Iran's regime could not 
sustain itself under the sanctions and knew that only a negotiated 
agreement would get Iran the relief it critically needed to sustain the 
regime and the revolution, the negotiating leverage was and still is 
greatly on our side.
  However, the JCPOA, in paragraph 26 of the sanctions heading of the 
agreement, says, ``The U.S. Administration, acting consistently with 
the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain 
from reintroducing or reimposing sanctions specified in Annex II, that 
it has ceased applying under this JCPOA.''
  I repeat: The United States will have to refrain from reintroducing 
or reimposing the Iran sanctions act that we passed unanimously, which 
expires next year and was critical in bringing Iran to the table in the 
first place.
  In two hearings I asked Treasury Secretary Lew and Under Secretary of 
State Wendy Sherman whether the United States has the right to 
reauthorize sanctions to have something to snap back to, and neither 
would answer the question, saying only it was too early to discuss 
reauthorization.
  But I did get my answer from the Iranian Ambassador to the United 
Nations who, in a letter dated July 25 of this year, said:

       It is clearly spelled out in the JCPOA that both the 
     European Union and the United States will refrain from 
     reintroducing or reimposing the sanctions and restrictive 
     measures lifted under the JCPOA. It is understood that the 
     reintroduction or reimposition, including through extension 
     of the sanctions and restrictive measures will constitute 
     significant nonperformance which would relieve Iran from its 
     commitments in part or in whole.

  The administration cannot argue sanctions policy both ways. Either 
they were effective in getting Iran to the negotiating table or they 
were not. Sanctions are either a deterrent to breakout or a violation 
of the agreement or they are not. Frankly, in my view, the overall 
sanctions relief being provided, given the Iranians' understanding of 
restrictions on the reauthorization of sanctions, along with the 
lifting of the arms and missile embargo well before Iranian compliance 
over years is established, leaves us in a weaker position and, to me, 
is unacceptable.
  If anything is a fantasy, it is the belief that snapback without 
congressionally mandated sanctions, with EU sanctions gone and 
companies from around the world doing permissible business in Iran, 
will have any real effect. As the largest state sponsor of terrorism, 
Iran--which has exported its revolution to Assad in Syria, the Houthis 
in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, directed and supported attacks against 
American troops in Iraq--will be flush with money not only to invest in 
their domestic economy but to further pursue their destabilizing 
hegemonic goals in the region.
  If Iran can afford to destabilize the region with an economy 
staggering under sanctions and rocked by falling oil prices, what will 
Iran and the Quds Force do when they have a cash infusion of more than 
20 percent of their GDP--the equivalent of an infusion of $3.4 trillion 
into our economy?
  And if there is a fear of war in the region, it will be one fueled by 
Iran and its proxies, exacerbated by an agreement that allows Iran to 
possess an industrial-sized nuclear program and enough money in 
sanctions relief to significantly continue to fund its hegemonic 
intentions throughout the region.
  This brings me to another major concern with the JCPOA, namely the 
issue of Iran coming clean about the possible military dimension of its 
program. For well over a decade, the world has been concerned about the 
secret weaponization efforts conducted at the military base called 
Parchin. The goal we in the international community have long sought is 
to know what Iran accomplished at Parchin, not necessarily to get Iran 
to declare culpability but to determine how far along they were in 
their nuclear weaponization program so that we know what signatures to 
look for in the future.
  David Albright, a physicist and former nuclear weapons inspector and 
founder of the Institute for Science and International Security, has 
said, ``Addressing the IAEA's concerns about the military dimensions of 
Iran's nuclear programs is fundamental to any long-term agreement . . . 
an agreement that sidesteps the military issue would risk being 
unverifiable.''
  The reason he says an agreement that sidesteps the military issues 
would be unverifiable is because it makes a difference if you are 90 
percent down the road in your weaponization efforts or only 10 percent 
advanced. How far advanced Iran's weaponizing abilities are has a 
significant impact on what Iran's breakout time to an actual 
deliverable weapon will be.
  The list of scientists the P5+1 wanted the IAEA to interview were 
rejected outright by Iran. After waiting over 10 years to inspect 
Parchin, they are now given 3 months to do all of their review and 
analysis before they must deliver a report in December of this year.
  How the inspections and soil and other samples are to be collected 
are outlined in two secret agreements the U.S. Congress is not privy 
to. The answer as to why we cannot see those documents is because they 
have a confidentiality agreement between the

[[Page S6574]]

IAEA and Iran which, they say, is customary, but this issue is anything 
but customary.
  Let me quote from an AP story of August 14:

       They say the agency will be able to report in December. But 
     that assessment is unlikely to be unequivocal because chances 
     are slim that Iran will present all the evidence the agency 
     wants, or give it the total freedom of movement it needs to 
     follow up the allegations. Still, the report is expected to 
     be approved by the IAEA's board, which includes the United 
     States and other powerful nations that negotiated the July 14 
     agreement. They do not want to upend their July 14 deal, and 
     will see the December report as closing the books on the 
     issue.

  It would seem to me what we are doing is sweeping this critical issue 
under the rug.
  Our willingness to accept this process in Parchin is only exacerbated 
by the inability to achieve anytime, anywhere inspections, which the 
administration always held out as one of those essential elements we 
would insist on and could rely on in any deal. Instead, we have a 
dispute resolution mechanism that shifts the burden of proof to the 
United States and its partners to provide sensitive intelligence, 
possibly revealing our sources and methods by which we collected the 
information, and allow the Iranians to delay access for nearly a 
month--a delay that would allow them to remove evidence of a violation, 
particularly when it comes to centrifuge research and development and 
weaponization efforts that can be easily hidden and would leave little 
or no signatures.
  The administration suggests that other than Iraq, no country was 
subjected to anytime, anywhere inspections. But Iran's defiance of the 
world's position, as recognized in a series of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, does not make it any other country. It is their violations 
of the NPT and the Security Council resolutions that created the 
necessity for a unique regime and for anytime, anywhere inspections. 
The willingness to accept these limitations are a dangerous bellwether 
of our willingness to enforce violations of the agreement as we move 
forward.
  If what President Obama said in his NPR interview of April 7, 2015--
``a more relevant fear would be that in year 13, 14, 15 they have 
advanced centrifuges that enrich uranium fairly rapidly, and at that 
point breakout times would have shrunk almost down to zero''--is true, 
it seems to me, in essence, this deal, at best, does nothing more than 
that kick today's problem down the road for 10 to 15 years. At the same 
time it undermines the arguments and evidence of suspected violations 
we will need because of the dual-use nature of their program to 
convince the Security Council and the international community to take 
action.
  It is erroneous to say this agreement permanently stops Iran from 
having a nuclear bomb. Let us be clear. What the agreement does is to 
recommit Iran not to pursue a nuclear bomb--a promise they have already 
violated in the past. It recommits them to the NPT treaty--an agreement 
they have already violated in the past. It commits them to a new 
Security Council resolution outlining their obligations, but they have 
violated those in the past as well.

  So the suggestion of permanence in this case is only possible for so 
long as Iran complies and performs according to the agreement because 
the bottom line is, this agreement leaves Iran with the core elements 
of its robust nuclear infrastructure.
  The fact is, success is not a question of Iran's conforming and 
performing according to the agreement. If that was all that was needed, 
if Iran had abided by its commitments all along, we wouldn't be faced 
with this challenge now. The test of success must be, if Iran violates 
the agreement and attempts to break out, how well will we be positioned 
to deal with Iran at that point?
  Trying to reassemble the sanctions regime, including the time to give 
countries and companies notice of sanctionable activity, which had been 
permissible up to then, would take up most of the breakout time, 
assuming we could even get compliance after significant national and 
private investments had taken place. That, indeed, would be a fantasy. 
It would likely leave the next President, upon an Iranian decision to 
break out, with one of two choices: Accept Iran as a nuclear weapons 
state or take military action. Neither is desired, especially when Iran 
will be stronger, economically resurgent, a more consequential actor in 
the region, and with greater defensive capabilities, such as the S-300 
missile defense system being sold to them by Russia.
  So the suggestion of permanency in stopping Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon depends on performance. Based on the long history of 
Iran's broken promises, defiance, and violations, that is hopeful. 
Significant dismantlement, however, would establish performance up 
front, and therefore the threat of the capability to develop a nuclear 
weapon would truly be permanent, and any attempt to rebuild that 
infrastructure would give the world far more than 1 year's time.
  The President and Secretary Kerry have repeatedly said the choice is 
between this agreement or war. I reject that proposition, as have most 
witnesses--including past and present administration members involved 
in this issue--who have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and who support the deal but reject the binary choice between 
the agreement or war. If the P5 had not actually achieved an agreement 
with Iran, would we be at war with Iran today? I don't believe so.
  I believe we can still get a better deal, and here is how: We can 
disapprove this agreement without rejecting the entire agreement. We 
should direct the administration to renegotiate by authorizing the 
continuation of negotiations and the joint plan of action--including 
Iran's $700 million-a-month lifeline, which to date has accrued to 
Iran's benefit to the tune of $10 billion--and pausing further 
reductions of purchases of Iranian oil and other sanctions pursuant to 
the original JPOA. Iran will continue to want such relief as well as 
avoid a possible military attack, so they are incentivized to come back 
to the negotiating table.
  We can provide specific parameters for the administration to guide 
their continued negotiations and ensure that a new agreement does not 
run afoul of Congress. A continuation of talks would allow the 
reconsideration of just a few but a critical few issues, including the 
following:
  First, the immediate ratification by Iran of the Additional Protocol 
to ensure that we have a permanent international agreement with Iran 
for access to suspect sites.
  Second, a ban on centrifuge R&D for the duration of the agreement to 
ensure that Iran won't have the capacity to quickly break out just as 
the U.N. Security Council resolution and snapback sanctions are off the 
table.
  Third, close the Fordow enrichment facility. The sole purpose of 
Fordow was to harden Iran's nuclear program to a military attack. We 
need to close the facility and foreclose Iran's future ability to use 
this facility. If Iran has nothing to hide, they shouldn't need to put 
it deep under a mountain.
  Fourth, the full resolution of the ``possible military dimensions'' 
of Iran's program. We need an arrangement that isn't set to whitewash 
this issue. Iran and the IAEA must resolve the issue before permanent 
sanctions relief, and failure of Iran to cooperate with a comprehensive 
review should result in automatic sanctions snapback.
  Fifth, extend the duration of the agreement. One of the single most 
concerning elements of the deal is its 10- to 15-year sunset of 
restrictions on Iran's program, with off-ramps starting after year 8. 
We were promised an agreement of significant duration, and we got less 
than half of what we are looking for. Iran should have to comply for as 
long as they deceived the world's position, so at least 20 years.
  Sixth, we need agreement now about what penalties will be 
collectively imposed by P5+1 for Iranian violations, both small and 
midsized, as well as a clear statement as to the so-called grandfather 
clause in paragraph 37 of the JCPOA, to ensure that the U.S. position 
about not shielding contracts entered into legally upon reimposition of 
sanctions is shared by our allies.
  Separately from the agreement but at the same time, we should extend 
the authorization of the Iran Sanctions Act, which expires in 2016, to 
ensure that we have an effective snapback option.

[[Page S6575]]

  We should immediately implement the security measures offered to our 
partners in the gulf summit at Camp David, while preserving Israel's 
qualitative military edge.
  The President should unequivocally affirm and Congress should endorse 
a declaration of U.S. policy that we will use all means necessary to 
prevent Iran from producing enough enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb, 
as well as building or buying one, both during and after any agreement. 
After all, that is what Iran is committing to. We should authorize now 
the means for Israel to address the Iranian threat on their own in the 
event Iran accelerates its program.
  We must send a message to Iran that neither their regional behavior 
nor nuclear ambitions are permissible. If we push back regionally, they 
will be less likely to test the limits of our tolerance toward any 
violation of a nuclear agreement.
  The agreement that has been reached failed to achieve the one thing 
it set out to achieve--it failed to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear 
weapons state at a time of its choosing. In fact, in my view, it 
authorizes and supports the very roadmap Iran will need to achieve its 
target.
  I know the administration will say that our partners will not follow 
us, that the sanctions regime will collapse and that they will allow 
Iran to proceed--as if our allies weren't worried about Iran crossing 
the nuclear weapons capability threshold anymore. I heard similar 
arguments from Secretary Kerry when he was chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, as well as from Wendy Sherman, David Cohen, and 
others, when I was leading the charge to impose new sanctions on Iran. 
That didn't happen then, and I don't believe it will happen now.
  Despite what some of our P5+1 Ambassadors have said in trying to 
rally support for the agreement--clearly, since they want this deal, 
they are not going to tell us they are willing to pursue another deal, 
echoing the administration's admonition that it is a ``take it or leave 
it'' proposition--our P5+1 partners will still be worried about Iran's 
nuclear weapons desire and the capability to achieve it, and the United 
States is the indispensable partner to ultimately ensure that doesn't 
happen.
  They and the businesses from their countries and elsewhere will truly 
care more about their ability to do business in a U.S. economy of $17 
trillion than an Iranian economy of $415 billion. And the importance of 
that economic relationship is palpable as we negotiate T-TIP, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement.
  At this point, it is important to note that, over history, Congress 
has rejected outright or demanded changes to more than 200 treaties and 
international agreements, including 80 that were multilateral.
  Whether or not the supporters admit it, this deal is based on hope--
hope that when the nuclear sunset clause expires, Iran will have 
succumbed to the benefits of commerce and global integration; hope that 
the hardliners will have lost their power and the revolution will end 
its hegemonic goals; and hope that the regime will allow the Iranian 
people to decide their fate, unlike the green revolution of 2009. Hope 
is part of human nature, but unfortunately it is not a national 
security strategy. The Iranian regime, led by the Ayatollah, wants 
above all to preserve the regime and its revolution, so it stretches 
incredulity to believe they signed on to a deal that would in any way 
weaken the regime or threaten the goals of the revolution.
  I understand this deal represents a tradeoff, a hope that things may 
be different in Iran in 10 to 15 years. Maybe Iran will desist from its 
nuclear ambitions. Maybe they will stop exporting and supporting 
terrorism. Maybe they will stop holding innocent Americans hostage. 
Maybe they will stop burning American flags. Maybe their leadership 
will stop chanting ``Death to America'' in the streets of Tehran. Or 
maybe they won't.
  I know that in many respects it would be far easier to support this 
deal, as it would have been to vote for the war in Iraq at the time. 
But I didn't choose the easier path then, and I am not going to now. My 
devotion to principle may once again lead me to an unpopular course, 
but if Iran is to acquire a nuclear bomb, it will not have my name on 
it.
  It is for these reasons that I will vote for cloture and to 
disapprove the agreement.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, just inquiring--it is my understanding 
that Senator Warner and Senator Coons are to speak now. Is that 
correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no order to that effect.
  Mr. CORKER. It is my understanding that we have agreed to that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is under the control of the Democratic 
leader.
  Mr. CORKER. How much time is left? That is really what I was getting 
at.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant Democrat leader.
  Mr. DURBIN. I would say to the Senator from Tennessee through the 
Chair, it is my understanding that we have two 5-minute segments now. 
Senator Warner and Senator Coons each claim 5 minutes.
  Mr. CORKER. It is my understanding, then, that we will have that and 
then we move to an alternating session until the time of the vote. Is 
that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is equally divided time until the vote, 
after the time allotted for the Democratic leader.
  Mr. CORKER. And there is 10 minutes left on the Democratic side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifteen minutes.
  Mr. CORKER. I thank the Presiding Officer.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant Democratic leader.
  Mr. DURBIN. The Senator from Virginia can proceed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to join my colleagues in speaking 
on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
  While this deal is far from perfect, I believe it is the best option 
available to us right now for preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear 
weapon.
  I share many of the concerns with this agreement that have been 
expressed by my colleagues, but the choice I ultimately had to make was 
between accepting an imperfect deal or facing the serious ramifications 
throughout the world if Congress rejects a deal that has the support of 
the international community, including many of our allies.
  As I reviewed this agreement, I kept two fundamental questions in 
mind: No. 1, does this agreement advance the goal of keeping Iran free 
of nuclear weapons, and No. 2, is there a viable alternative that would 
be superior to this deal?
  As many colleagues before me have outlined, this deal outlines a 
significant reduction in Iran's fissile material stockpile, reducing 
their uranium stockpile by 98 percent. It restricts Iran's production 
capacity and completely removes their ability to produce weapons-grade 
plutonium. It further limits Iran's research and development 
activities. These reductions and restrictions on Iran's nuclear 
infrastructure will extend Iran's breakout time from a matter of months 
to at least 1 year over the next 15 years.
  This agreement also established a verification regime that includes 
continuous inspections. With the assistance of our intelligence 
community, verification goes beyond the four corners of this agreement. 
What this means is that we will have significantly more information 
about Iran's nuclear program with this deal than we would have without 
it.
  The other major question we have to ask is, Is there a viable 
alternative to this deal? I have given those opponents numerous 
opportunities to convince me there was a viable alternative. The 
conclusion I have reached is that there is not.
  I have been a strong supporter of tough international sanctions that 
helped bring Iran to the negotiating table in the first place. Since I 
have been in the Senate, I have supported every important piece of 
sanctions legislation passed by Congress. But during my deliberations, 
I spoke with representatives of many foreign governments--not the EU or 
the P5+1 entirely but also those nations, particularly in Asia--about 
whether they would be

[[Page S6576]]

willing to uphold sanctions to pressure Iran if we turned this deal 
down. In virtually every case, the response I got from allies was that 
if Congress were to reject this deal, the vast international sanctions 
that we have in place would fall apart. As we saw in the literally 
dozens of years prior, just U.S. unilateral sanctions alone are not 
enough.
  I have determined that moving forward with this international 
agreement is our best option now to advance U.S. and world security.
  I know we have other Members who want to speak, but let me add a 
couple of final comments.
  While I support this deal, I believe there are additional actions 
Congress can and should take to strengthen it. I want to make sure that 
we--the United States--have the ability to respond to any Iranian 
activities with all means at our disposal.
  While the inspections provided in this deal will give us better 
insight, there is more we can do. I am working with my colleagues--both 
supporters and opponents of the deal--on efforts to shore up its weaker 
points. I will work to clarify that Congress retains the ability to 
pass sanctions against Iran for nonnuclear misbehavior. My hope is that 
in future legislation, we will spell out that this agreement will not 
shield foreign companies if sanctions must be reimposed because of 
Iranian violations. And I will seek more reporting from the 
administration, including on how Iran uses any funds received through 
sanctions relief.
  Moving forward, I will work with colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle to ensure Israel's security. I will press the administration and 
work with my colleagues to ensure that Israel preserves a qualitative 
military edge. I will look for ways to strengthen our commitments to 
Israel and support additional efforts to stop Iran from advancing both 
the nuclear agenda and from other efforts to destabilize the region.

  Let me assure you that this agreement is the beginning and not the 
end of our combined international efforts to keep Iran free--not just 
today and not just for the next 15 years but forever--from having a 
nuclear weapon.
  Before my colleague from Delaware speaks, I want to thank him for his 
efforts and many of us who spent a great deal of time the last few 
weeks of August talking about how we could build upon this agreement to 
make it stronger. He received assurances from the President and 
letters. I know that he and I and others are working on how we can even 
move beyond those assurances to make sure that we can look back on this 
agreement and recognize that we move not only the issue of peace but 
the issue of security going forward.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cassidy). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I would like to thank my colleague from the 
great State of Virginia and a number of other colleagues who have 
dedicated a great deal of time to reflecting and to consulting together 
about what is the wisest and best path forward. The Senator from 
Maryland who is ably leading the floor debate and is the minority 
ranking member on the Foreign Relations Committee and my colleague, and 
the Senator from Colorado, who will speak following me, are among many 
whom I have closely consulted. As was just remarked upon on the floor 
by the talented Senator from Virginia, this is a deal with flaws and 
with challenges that we must work together to address. I am hopeful and 
eager to find that path with the administration and with my colleagues 
to ensure that we do everything we can to deploy the full measure of 
America's military and economic capabilities to ensure the security of 
Israel and to ensure that this agreement--now that it is clear it will 
move forward--is fully, thoughtfully, and thoroughly implemented.
  I want to rise briefly to address what I understand is now a 
scheduled cloture vote at 3:45 today. On critical and historic issues 
such as the nuclear agreement with Iran, I think the American people 
deserve to know how their individual Members of Congress--whether in 
the Senate or the House--will vote as their representatives. Over the 
years that I have served here, there have been far too many issues that 
were decided by a procedural vote--by a cloture vote--rather than by 
getting to the substance of the underlying issue. I think the American 
people deserve better than to have a critical issue such as this 
complex deal ultimately resolved with a procedural vote.
  As we proceed to that vote later today, I wanted to let those who are 
watching know that is not the end of debate on this issue. If the 
cloture vote fails, as I believe it will, it means we will simply 
continue the debate and may take up another vote or several votes next 
week.
  This morning leader Reid made a fair offer to Senator McConnell, the 
majority leader, on this floor to have a single up-or-down vote by a 
60-vote margin, to clearly show the American people how every Member of 
this Chamber feels about this deal--to allow us to vote on the 
substance. It is my hope that the majority leader will reconsider and 
that either today or next week we will have the opportunity to have 
that up-or-down vote and to let the American people know exactly where 
each of us stands and then get to the demanding and difficult work of 
building a bipartisan coalition to deal with the challenges of this 
deal, to insist on effective deterrence of Iran's nuclear ambitions and 
to find a path together to joining the international community that is 
joined in the implementation of this deal.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BENNET. Mr. President, I would like to speak on the agreement the 
P5+1 powers reached on Iran's nuclear program.
  I was an early cosponsor of the bill that gave Congress an 
opportunity to evaluate the agreement. Because of that legislation, we 
have had extensive discussion and debate. This Chamber has a history of 
voting on critical national security issues at a 60-vote threshold, and 
I would have preferred an up-or-down vote on the merits. But, as too 
often happens, politics have prevailed, and this will likely be the 
only vote we will have on this agreement. So this vote serves as the 
vote on the substance.
  In 2003, Iran was operating approximately 164 centrifuges and had 
virtually no enriched uranium. By 2009, when the current administration 
took office, Iran had between 4,000 and 5,000 centrifuges installed.
  Over the next few years, Congress passed increasingly tough sanctions 
that the administration, to its credit, set out to implement. As a 
member of the banking committee in 2010, I helped write and pass those 
sanctions.
  By 2013, even in the grasp of the toughest international sanctions 
regime, Iran's nuclear program had raced forward.
  The country had 19,000 centrifuges installed, 10 bombs worth of 
enriched uranium, and 2 to 3 months' breakout time to a bomb.
  The harsh reality is that today Iran stands on the threshold of a 
nuclear weapon.
  So we have to weigh the agreement against this set of facts.
  Our goal throughout this process has been clear: to prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon.
  Like many Members of this Chamber, I have undertaken an exhaustive 
review of the agreement and a lengthy consultation process.
  This included briefings from our own national security and 
intelligence experts, international verification experts, regional 
experts, former Israeli military and intelligence officials, and the 
P5+1 Ambassadors as well as Israel's Ambassador to the United States.
  My conclusion is that the JCPOA is more likely to prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon than the plausible alternatives. For that 
reason, I will vote to support the agreement.
  It is no surprise to me that there are sincere, heartfelt differences 
of opinion about the merits of this deal. I have deep concerns about 
what the shape of Iran's nuclear program could look like beyond the 15 
year horizon. But I also believe that implementation of this agreement 
is the best of bad options.
  If Congress rejects this agreement, Iran will receive billions of 
dollars of sanctions relief and there will be no oversight of its 
nuclear program. That is an unacceptable result.
  Some have argued that the United States could reject this agreement 
in favor of returning to the negotiating table. But this logic only 
holds if the

[[Page S6577]]

international coalition holds, and everything I heard this summer tells 
me that won't happen.
  While this agreement has flaws, it is clearly better than the 
alternatives. The agreement is the best option for preventing Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon, and it maintains all of our options to 
respond to a move by Iran to break out to a bomb.
  The agreement doesn't eliminate the deep concerns I hold about Iran's 
horrific acts of terror and its hegemonic pursuits, but all of Iran's 
malevolent acts would only be more dangerous if backed by a nuclear 
weapon.
  We must also help our closest ally in the region, the State of 
Israel, defend itself. Let me be clear. The survival of the State of 
Israel is essential to the security of the Jewish people, and, as far 
as I am concerned, Israel's survival is essential to our humanity.
  For these reasons and for our own security, we cannot allow Iran to 
acquire a nuclear weapon, and we must be crystal clear that we will use 
force to prevent it from doing so. In fact, we will have more 
credibility to use force if this agreement is in place, and we will 
have more legitimacy when we work to build an international coalition 
to respond to Iranian cheating.
  There are risks to the successful implementation of the agreement, 
and the President and Congress must now work to make it stronger. I 
have worked with others in the Senate to push the administration toward 
that goal.
  Since the announcement of the agreement, I have also worked with 
Senator Cardin to develop a legislative package to address the 
accumulated shortcomings of our policies towards Iran and to strengthen 
the agreement.
  Among other measures, our legislation will ensure that we track the 
resources Iran obtains from sanctions relief and work with our regional 
partners to counter conventional Iranian threats. It also invests in 
our intelligence capabilities and provides Israel deterrence to ensure 
Iran cannot shield covert systems and facilities, no matter how deeply 
they are buried.
  As we implement this agreement, we must set in place a strategy with 
our partners to ensure that Iran appreciates the consequences of its 
violations, for the next 15 years and beyond.
  My grandparents, John and Halina Klejman, and my mother Susanne 
Klejman had everyone and everything they knew taken from them in the 
Holocaust. Yet, as my grandmother always told me, they were the lucky 
ones--they had the chance to rebuild their shattered lives in a country 
that accepted them and let them succeed beyond their wildest dreams.
  We live in dangerous times, and whether you support the agreement or 
not, we must develop a cohesive strategy for U.S. policy in the Middle 
East that addresses the grave security concerns in the region. Separate 
from Iran's nuclear program, the region is threatened by war, sectarian 
violence, a terrible refugee crisis, and acts of barbaric brutality 
that belong to another century. We should seize this opportunity to 
play a constructive role in addressing these threats.
  Our young men and women in the Armed Forces have been asked to 
sacrifice so much. None of us can have any doubt that, if called upon 
again, they would rise to any challenge, anywhere in the world. We 
honor their courage and spirit of sacrifice by exhausting diplomatic 
options before we turn to military ones. This isn't a sign of weakness 
but proof of our strength. And it will help us rally our allies to our 
side if ultimately we need to turn to military action.
  Our primary objectives are to prevent Iran from having a nuclear 
weapon, make sure Israel is safe, and, if possible, avoid another war 
in the Middle East. This agreement represents a flawed but important 
step to accomplish those goals. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that we are now 
going to have brief comments, alternating between the two sides. We 
will begin with Senator Gardner.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. GARDNER. Mr. President, I wish to thank the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee for his work to get us to this point, the 
countless hearings he has held, the briefings that we have had to fully 
understand the fine details and to scrutinize every aspect of the 
agreement that is now before us. I also wish to thank the ranking 
member and the Senator from New Jersey for their tireless efforts on 
the committee when it comes to the process that is before us.
  Make no mistake. There is not a single Member in this body, in the 
Senate or House of Representatives, or the American public who would 
complain about the President's initial goals--the goals he laid out as 
recently as October of 2012, as he began negotiations with Iran.
  I quote the President:

       Our goal is to get Iran to recognize it needs to give up 
     its nuclear program and abide by the U.N. resolutions that 
     have been in place. . . . But the deal we'll accept is--they 
     end their nuclear program. It's very straightforward.

  But the deal we got from the administration is anything but the 
straightforward ending of a nuclear program. I have listened very 
carefully to the hearings we have held. I have listened to the 
classified briefings. I have studied the language of the text--language 
that says things such as this: ``Requests for access pursuant to 
provisions of this JCPOA will be made in good faith, with due 
observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum 
necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities 
under this JCPOA.''
  Senator Collins from Maine a couple of days ago said it very well: 
``Not only will Iran retain its nuclear capability, but also it will be 
a far richer nation and one that has more conventional weapons and 
military technology than it possesses today.''
  This doesn't end the nuclear program as the President stated was his 
goals. It continues it. It paves a patient pathway to an industrialized 
nuclear complex in Iran. With the blessings of the world community, a 
flourishing economy, a lifting of the conventional arms embargo, a 
lifting of the ballistic missile embargo--and that is a good deal for 
us?
  Over the last several days, I have heard colleague after colleague 
who are supporting this deal come to the floor to say things such as: 
This deal is flawed. It is not the best. It needs improvement. Since 
when did a bad option in the Senate become the only option in the 
Senate? Since when did second, third, fourth, fifth best for this 
country become the best for this country?
  Several months ago I had the opportunity--as have many colleagues--to 
visit with Prime Minister Netanyahu to talk about the dance of 
porcupines created by entering this deal--the nuclear tripwire that 
will be set up because this does not end Iran's nuclear program. 
Through this deal, we have given up the golden nuggets of leverage that 
we had with Iran--our leverage of sanctions that were beginning to 
work. In fact, in the briefings that we have all attended, analysts 
have said that our sanctions are eroding support for the regime daily, 
hurting their economy, devaluing their currency, and bringing them to 
the table. Yet the deal that we have allows continued uranium 
enrichment, repeal of U.N. resolutions, and removal of the Iran nuclear 
issue from their agenda. That is the benefit of the bargain that the 
United States is about to enter into.
  We heard talk over the past several days about status quo versus 
hypothetical. Here is the status quo that we will be entering into: a 
status quo that in 5 years allows conventional arms to resume in Iran, 
a status quo that will allow ballistic missiles to resume in 8 years 
and advanced centrifuge research to continue.
  As the chairman of the committee stated yesterday, talking about how 
one IRH centrifuge could replace vast numbers of the current 
centrifuges they have today, they will be allowed to keep apparently 
all for radioisotope purposes.
  Why do they need ballistic missiles and conventional arms for 
radiation treatment? We have desanctioned and delisted numerous 
individuals, people who were the fathers of the Iranian nuclear 
program, the A.Q. Khan of Iran, delisted, desanctioned under this deal.
  Conglomerates of companies like IKO are delisted and desanctioned 
under this deal. These are a group of companies that were sanctioned in 
2003 not

[[Page S6578]]

because of nuclear arms-related issues but because of their threat to 
the world financial system. That conglomerate is now desanctioned under 
the terms of the deal. Sure, the United States gets to sanction them on 
our own, but as we heard today, yesterday, and the day before, the 
sanctions the United States has apparently aren't enough, and that is 
why we have to enter into this deal. Yet we have, as Juan Zarate said, 
the Sword of Damocles holding over Iran's head with the snapback 
provisions that apparently are good enough when we do them on our own.
  One of the things that hasn't been talked about very much over the 
past several weeks is a letter that Secretary Kerry sent to every 
Senator on September 2. I think that was around the same day that 
enough votes were achieved to block or sustain the President's 
filibuster.
  In the first paragraph of this letter that every Senator received, 
there are two sentences that I want to make sure everybody here 
recognizes.

       We share the concern expressed by many in Congress 
     regarding Iran's continued support for terrorist and proxy 
     groups throughout the region, its propping up of the Asad 
     regime in Syria, its efforts to undermine the stability of 
     its regional neighbors, and the threat it poses to Israel.

  In the very next sentence, Secretary Kerry goes on to say:

       We have no illusion that this behavior will change 
     following implementation of the JCPOA.

  We have no illusion that Iran's behavior will change. That is the 
status quo.
  The letter goes on to detail what we are going to do once this deal 
is entered into:

       Additional U.S.-GCC working groups are focused on 
     counterterrorism, military preparedness . . . and the goal of 
     building political support for multilateral U.S.-GCC 
     ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation.

  So we are going to enter into some deals to fight ballistic missiles 
that this deal allows in 8 years.
  The letter goes on to say that we will push back against Iran's arms 
transfers. Conventional arms embargoes will be lifted in 5 years. The 
letter then goes on to say that we will work on Iran's Missile 
Technology Control Regime guidelines about the transfer of sensitive 
systems, such as ballistic missile technology, and yet this deal allows 
ballistic missiles in 8 years.
  The letter goes on to say:

       U.S. support for Israel and our Gulf partners has never 
     been a partisan issue, and we believe these proposals would 
     receive wide bipartisan support.

  This is a partisan deal with bipartisan opposition, and I will submit 
that the only element of bipartisanship on the Senate floor today is 
the opposition.
  I urge my colleagues to vote to invoke cloture. The American people 
deserve to know where the United States Senate stands and deserves to 
know where their Members of the Senate stand with the United States.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, in accordance with the law, Congress has 
been reviewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for the past 53 
days. I have spent countless hours reading, being briefed and poring 
over the intelligence. I have diligently worked to make an informed 
decision, one that weighs risk and considers a future 10, 15, 25 years 
from now. Without question, this vote is among the most serious I have 
taken. This vote has monumental and enduring consequences.
  Throughout my review of this deal, my questions have been: How does 
this deal affect the safety and security of the United States? And how 
does this deal affect the safety, security and viability of Israel?
  For all my time in both the House and Senate, I have been an 
unabashed and unwavering supporter of Israel. I have persistently 
supported the sanctions that brought Iran to the table. I have been 
insistent on foreign aid and military assistance to Israel that 
maintains its qualitative military edge on missile defense. With the 
horrors of the Holocaust in mind, I have been deeply committed to the 
need for a Jewish homeland, the State of Israel, and its inherent 
ability to defend itself, and for the United States to be an unwavering 
partner in Israel's defense. I have been and always will be committed 
to those principles.
  I took an extensive review of this deal. I took a workman-like 
approach, covering every aspect of the deal: military, intelligence, 
diplomatic, economic. I actually read the deal, both the classified and 
the unclassified annex. I met the U.S. diplomats, nuclear experts and 
the national security staff who negotiated the deal. I actively 
participated in every classified and unclassified briefing available to 
me. I took the additional step of traveling to Vienna to meet with the 
Director General of the IAEA and his technical staff to evaluate for 
myself, first hand, the inspection and verification requirements. I 
have listened to my constituents, including leaders in the Jewish 
community. I did my homework.
  Throughout, I asked the tough questions. And I questioned the answers 
to those questions. These were my key questions: No. 1, does this 
agreement block the four pathways to a nuclear bomb: highly enriched 
uranium at Natanz, highly enriched uranium at Fordow, weapons grade 
plutonium, and covert attempts to produce fissile material? No. 2, is 
it verifiable? No. 3, do inspections work to detect overt and covert 
violations of the agreement? No. 4, what is the impact of a 24-day 
delay to get an inspection? No. 5, does the IAEA have the capacity to 
implement the agreement? No. 6, what sanctions will be lifted, when and 
under what conditions? No. 7, do snapback sanctions really have a snap? 
No. 8, if we reject this deal, what are the alternatives that would be 
effective and achievable?
  The answer to my first question--does it block the four pathways to a 
nuclear bomb?--is yes. This deal sufficiently blocks the four pathways 
to get to a bomb. There is no shortcut to a nuclear bomb. This deal 
fundamentally addresses that fact.
  First, it blocks Iran's ability to have weapons-grade plutonium. The 
Arak reactor would be redesigned. Spent fuel would be sent out of Iran 
in perpetuity. Efforts to use Arak for weapons-grade plutonium would be 
detected.
  Second, it drastically cuts Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities by 
reducing Iran's inventory of active centrifuges at Fordow and Natanz. 
The deal also monitors the uranium supply chain and procurement channel 
for 25 years.
  Third, it reduces Iran's uranium stockpile below levels needed to 
make a single bomb. It cuts the uranium stockpile by 98 percent, to 300 
kilograms, for 15 years. It puts uranium enrichment of the remaining 
stockpile at 3.67 percent.
  Fourth, by blocking the pathways, it makes it very difficult for Iran 
to develop a separate covert program.
  In answering my second and third questions--is it verifiable? do 
inspections work to detect overt and covert violations of the 
agreement?--I have found that this deal provides sufficient 
verification and inspection mechanisms. The IAEA has extensive access 
to Iran's declared nuclear sites, making the detection of violations 
and a covert program more likely. The IAEA also has direct access to 
centrifuge manufacturing sites to conduct inspections on short notice. 
Under Iran's additional protocol, the verification and inspection 
process has also been scientifically reviewed and validated by the U.S. 
Department of Energy's nuclear scientists and endorsed by 29 of the 
Nation's top scientists, including several Nobel prizewinners who 
described the inspection process as ``innovative and stringent.''
  In answer to my fourth question--what is the impact of a 24-day delay 
to get inspections?--the IAEA will have daily access to Iran's declared 
nuclear facilities: Natanz, Arak and Fordo. The 24-day process would 
apply to undeclared sites only. These would be sites where the IAEA 
suspects Iran is conducting covert nuclear activities.
  In answer to my fifth question--does the IAEA have the capacity to 
implement the agreement?--I would say, yes. After visiting the IAEA in 
Vienna and delving into the organization, I believe that it has 
sufficient expertise to implement this deal. But all nations involved 
in its funding, including but not limited to the United States, have to 
be aggressively involved in monitoring the resources of the 
organization.
  In answer to my sixth question--what sanctions will be lifted, when 
and under what conditions?--the parts of

[[Page S6579]]

the agreement that would lift sanctions are among its most complicated 
and controversial elements. I would have preferred a glidepath over a 
3-year period, or longer, for sanctions relief. Under the agreement, 
however, no sanctions will be lifted until Iran takes key steps: limits 
its uranium enrichment program, resolves issues with possible military 
dimensions, converts the Arak facility, and allows for proper 
inspections. And these steps must be certified by the IAEA, which will 
deliver its key assessment of possible military dimensions on December 
15.
  When these requirements are met, the U.S. will lift sanctions in key 
sectors: oil and gas; banking and financial services; insurance 
related; shipping, ship building and transport; gold and precious 
metals; software; and people, including international travel visas. 
That process will take 6 months to 1 year. The sanctions are lifted, 
not terminated, and can be snapped back, per the agreement.
  Which takes us to my seventh question--do snapback sanctions really 
have a snap? Russia, China, India, and our European partners were very 
active members of the negotiations with a common interest in Iran not 
having a nuclear weapon. I believe they would support a snapback in 
sanctions if a violation was identified and verified. But the snapback 
sanctions mechanism, while innovative, is untested.
  Finally, I have asked if we reject this deal what the alternatives 
are that would be effective and achievable. I have considered the 
alternatives very closely, but in the end, they don't present a more 
viable option to this deal. The two alternatives are more sanctions or 
military action.
  Some have suggested we reject this deal and impose unilateral 
sanctions to force Iran back to the table, but maintaining or stepping 
up sanctions will only work if the sanction coalition holds together. 
It is unclear if the European Union, Russia, China, India, and others 
would continue sanctions if Congress rejects this deal. At best, 
sanctions would be porous or limited to unilateral sanctions by the 
U.S., but these are the same reasons that the efficacy of the snapback 
provision is questioned. If you don't think snapback works, enhanced 
sanctions won't work either.
  There are also those who have proposed military action as an 
alternative to end Iran's nuclear program, but taking military 
airstrikes against Iran would only set the program back for 3 years. It 
would not terminate the program. Iran would continue to possess the 
knowledge of how to build a bomb and could redouble its resolve to 
obtain a weapon, completely unchecked. Iran would almost certainly use 
Hezbollah or other proxies to attack Israel or conduct terrorist or 
cyber attacks against U.S. interests. The military option is always on 
the table for the United States. We are not afraid to use it. But 
military action should be the last resort, since it will have only 
temporary effects versus the longer term effects of this deal.
  No deal is perfect, especially one negotiated with the Iranian 
regime. I have concluded that this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
is the best option available to block Iran from having a nuclear bomb. 
For these reasons, I will vote in favor of this deal. However, Congress 
must also reaffirm our commitment to the safety and security of Israel.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, please advise both sides of the time 
remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republicans have 11 minutes 20 seconds, 
Democrats have 5 minutes 5 seconds.
  The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, over the past 5 months, we have learned 
much about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the intentions of 
Iran's ayatollahs. We know the nuclear deal will release billions of 
dollars to the terrorist-sponsoring Iranian regime. We know Qasem 
Soleimani and other terrorists who have killed Americans will be 
relieved of international sanctions. We know the side deals between the 
IAEA and Iran--side deals we have yet to see in this Senate--may 
entrust the Iranian regime to collect its own verification samples at 
its most secret nuclear facilities, allowing Iran to monitor itself 
instead of insisting on real, verifiable, and independent inspections.

  We know the right to enrich at all, which this administration 
conceded early on in these negotiations, will trigger an arms race in 
the Middle East. Just this week, the ambassador from the United Arab 
Emirates told the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that 
if this deal goes through, the UAE may no longer abide by its 
nonproliferation agreements and may begin an enrichment program. I fear 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other countries may follow suit.
  We know the ayatollahs--fresh from the negotiating table at Vienna--
continue to lead Quds Day crowds in chants of ``Death to America'' and 
issue threats at our president and our people.
  And, yes, we know that the deal will begin to expire in a mere 10 to 
15 years, unleashing a nuclear-capable Iran on the world, free of 
international sanctions, with a healthier economy, and without the 
restraints that American diplomacy has painstakingly cultivated over 
the past decade.
  But, in the end, our vote on the Iran nuclear deal won't turn on any 
of these particulars. Ultimately, this vote isn't about specific 
centrifuge numbers or enrichment levels or the exact scope of sanctions 
relief. No, it is simpler than that.
  This vote is about history. It is about the responsibility of this 
Senate and the greatest Republic in history. It is about where we want 
the course of history to lead for our children and our grandchildren.
  This vote is not about a party or a President. After all, the 
Iranians chant ``Death to America,'' not ``Death to Democrats,'' not 
``Death to Republicans,'' not ``Death to our President,'' but ``Death 
to America.'' Just this week, the Iranians again labeled America the 
Great Satan.
  So this vote is about empowering an evil, terror-sponsoring regime 
and continuing this history or seizing the moment to change history. If 
this deal is approved, in just a few years, Iran may test a nuclear 
device, as North Korea did in 2006, just 12 years after a similar 
nuclear agreement. With a rumbling explosion that will shake the Earth, 
Iran may announce its status as a nuclear power and the opening of a 
second nuclear age that our Nation has struggled so long to prevent.
  If Iran goes nuclear, history will not remember kindly the Senators 
who supported this nuclear deal. It won't remember your hand-wringing, 
your anguished speeches, your brow-furrowing. It won't remember your 
gullible beliefs about the flawed inspection system or unworkable 
enforcement mechanisms. It won't remember your soft rationalizations 
that this deal is ``better than nothing'' or ``the only alternative to 
war.''
  History will remember your vote and only your vote. It will remember 
that you opened the gate to Iran's path to a nuclear weapon. It will 
remember you as the ones who flipped the strategic balance of the 
Middle East and the world toward the favor of our enemies. And it will 
remember you, this Senate and this President, as the ones who, when 
given the chance to stop the world's worst sponsor of terrorism from 
obtaining the world's worst weapon, blinked when confronted with this 
evil.
  A world menaced by a nuclear-capable Iran is a terrifying prospect. 
Over the past three decades, Iran has waged a low-intensity war on the 
United States and our partners. Iran has financed and trained Hezbollah 
and Hamas terrorists to do its bidding as their proxy. Iran fueled the 
virulent insurgency whose roadside bombs and suicide attacks devastated 
Iraq and sadly killed or maimed thousands of American troops. And Iran 
has sowed unrest throughout the Middle East and propped up Syrian 
dictator Bashar al-Assad, creating a crisis that has engulfed the 
entire region and that is fast spreading beyond its borders and other 
parts of the world.
  Iran has done all of this without nuclear weapons. Should it be 
allowed to continue enrichment and conduct research and development on 
nuclear technology--as this deal lets it--the ayatollahs will grow even 
more brazen, fearsome, reckless, and insulated from conventional forms 
of deterrence and pressure. Upon the expiration of this deal--or its 
repudiation by the ayatollahs at a time of their choosing--

[[Page S6580]]

Iran's strategy of terror and intimidation will become nuclearized.
  That is the world we may face in a few short years because of your 
votes. That is the threat we will confront if you bestow your blessing 
on a nuclear program run by the anti-American, anti-Israel, Jihadist 
regime in Tehran.
  So we should soberly recognize that the context of this vote isn't a 
debate that is fast coming to a close. The context isn't demagoguery or 
backroom pressure from a lameduck President, and it isn't the effect of 
this vote on our political fortunes.
  The context for this vote is the broad sweep of history.
  In late 1936, Winston Churchill spoke on the years of British 
appeasement in the face of German rearmament. He observed:

       The era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing 
     and baffling expedients, of delays, is coming to a close. In 
     its place we are entering a period of consequences.

  Churchill's words are as true today as they were then. We are 
entering a period of consequences. Because of your vote today, the 
consequences may well be nuclear. God help us all if they are.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I am pleased that shortly we will have a 
chance to vote. I would have preferred the vote to be on the final 
passage of the resolution with the 60-vote threshold. I regret that was 
not agreed to.
  I will vote what I think is in the best interest of our country, to 
keep Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state, and our best chance to 
avoid a military option. I have already indicated that I intend to 
oppose the agreement and I have given my reasons on the floor and I 
will not repeat them at this moment.
  But I wish to speak about what happens after this vote is over and 
whatever votes take place next week, with the deadline being next 
Thursday. At that time, I hope everyone here recognizes that it is 
important for us to put division aside. I wish to remind some of my 
colleagues of what happened 14 years ago on a vote with Iraq, the 
authorization for force. I voted against that resolution. And when that 
vote was over, Democrats and Republicans, proponents and opponents, 
joined together to support our troops and our mission under the 
leadership of President Bush to give America the best chance for its 
foreign policy to succeed.
  So when the votes are over, I hope that Democrats and Republicans, 
proponents and opponents of the plan will work towards congressional 
involvement. Working with the President gives us our best opportunity 
to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state and gives us the 
least risk of using a military option. I say that because my colleague 
from Maryland outlined that very clearly. A military option--although 
we must have that option in our quill--a military option will not solve 
the problem and it has a lot of collateral consequences.
  I hope we can work together, because that is what is in the best 
interest of the U.S. Senate. That is what is in the best interest of 
the United States of America.
  I look forward to working with Senator Corker and all members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the U.S. Senate to see how 
Congress can work together with our President so that we can achieve 
that goal.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. RUBIO. Mr. President, I will be brief. I know the Senator from 
Tennessee would like to close on this matter.
  I think everything that needs to be said about the details of this 
deal has already been said. I do want to be recorded for history's 
purposes, although I know what is going to happen in regards to this if 
it goes through. Iran will immediately use the money in sanctions 
relief to begin building up its conventional capabilities. It will 
establish the most dominant military power in the region outside of the 
United States, and it will raise the price of us operating in the 
region. They are going to build anti-access capabilities, rockets 
capable of destroying our aircraft carriers and ships, continue to 
build these swift boats, these fast boats that are able to swarm our 
naval assets so that it will make it harder and harder for U.S. troops 
to be in the region. They will also work with other terrorist groups in 
the region to target American service men and women. They may or may 
not deny that they are involved, but they will target us and raise the 
price of our presence in the Middle East until they hope to completely 
pull us out of that region. They will also continue to build long-range 
missiles capable of reaching the United States. Those are not affected 
by this deal, and they will continue to build them as they have been 
doing.
  Then, at some point in the near future, when the time is right, they 
will build a nuclear weapon, and they will do so because at that point 
they will know that they have become immune, that we will no longer be 
able to strike their nuclear program, because the price of doing so 
will be too high.
  This is not just the work of imagination; it exists in the world 
today. It is called North Korea, where a lunatic possesses dozens of 
nuclear weapons and a long-range rocket that can already reach the 
United States, and we cannot do anything about it. An attack on North 
Korea today would result in an attack on Tokyo or Seoul or Guam or 
Hawaii or California. So the world must now live with a lunatic in 
possession of nuclear weapons.
  This is the goal Iran has as well--to reach a point where they become 
immune to any sort of credible military threat because the price of a 
military strike would be too high, and then they become an established 
nuclear weapons power. Never in the history of the world has such a 
regime ever possessed weapons so capable of destruction.
  Iran is led by a supreme leader who is a radical Shia cleric with an 
apocalyptic vision of the future. He is not a traditional geopolitical 
actor who makes decisions on the basis of borders or simply history or 
because of ambition. He has a religious apocalyptic vision of the 
future--one that calls for triggering a conflict between the non-Muslim 
world and the Muslim world, one that he feels especially obligated to 
trigger. And he is going to possess nuclear weapons? This is the world 
that we are on the verge of leaving our children to inherit and perhaps 
we ourselves will have to share in.
  So I want to be recorded for history's purposes if nothing else to 
say that those of us who opposed this deal understood where it would 
lead, and we are making a terrible mistake. I fear that the passage of 
this deal will make it even harder for us to prevent it. I hope there 
is still time to change our minds.
  But here is the good news. Iran may have a Supreme Leader, but 
America does not. In this Nation, we have a republic, and soon we will 
have new leaders, perhaps in this chamber but also in the executive 
branch. I pray on their first day in office they will reverse this deal 
and reimpose the sanctions and back them up with a credible threat of 
military force, or history will condemn us for not doing what needed to 
be done in the world's history.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, a lot has been said about the impact of 
this agreement. I would like to speak for a moment about the impact of 
no agreement. What if the Republicans and those who oppose this 
agreement have their way and this agreement goes away? Iran is still a 
nuclear threshold state. If you have your way and stop this agreement, 
the result will be literally leaving in Iran the capacity to build 10 
nuclear weapons today. And the timing on that: 2 to 3 months before 
they have the fissile material for a nuclear weapon--if you have your 
way and kill this agreement.
  That is some holiday surprise, that if we walk away from this 
agreement, this effort for inspection, Iran could develop a nuclear 
weapon. That is the reality. If you have your way, there will be no 
inspectors. Iran will be closed off to the world. How can that possibly 
make the Middle East safer for Israel or for any other country in the 
world? How can it make it safer if we as a coalition who have worked so 
hard to build this agreement fail in the effort?
  What I have listened for during the last 3 days of debate is any 
suggestion from the other side of the aisle about

[[Page S6581]]

what is the alternative to this agreement. Now, some have been bold 
enough to say it is military, and we shouldn't wince at the prospect of 
a military solution. One Senator on the other side of the aisle said 4 
days is all we need to take them out; we will take care of Iran. I have 
heard that before, I say to my friends. I heard it before the invasion 
of Iraq where we were going to be greeted as liberators, and it would 
be a matter of weeks before our troops would be coming home. It didn't 
turn out that way.
  What we are trying to do and what the President is trying to do is to 
start a diplomatic process to avoid the military option, to avoid a 
war. That is why I am supporting it. I think it is the right thing to 
do. I am sorry that the vote we are about to cast here is a procedural 
vote. Twice, Senator Reid has asked Senator McConnell to give us a 
straight, up-or-down, clean vote on this question of disapproval by a 
60-vote margin, and twice Senator McConnell has objected and insisted 
instead on this procedural vote. We know where everyone stands. 
Everyone in this chamber has publicly declared where they stand on this 
matter. That should be the rollcall that we take next. Unfortunately, 
we are faced with a procedural rollcall.
  I will close by saying one word about the Members on this side of the 
aisle. For 6 weeks I have contacted them--and in fact harassed them--
asking them what they were going to do on this important question. For 
any people who are critical of this Senate, believing it is too 
superficial and too partisan, I will tell you that on this side of the 
aisle they took their time, they read the agreements, they were briefed 
by the intelligence agencies and Department of Defense, and they made 
up their mind and announced their position publicly. It is a proud 
moment for this institution because I think that is what we all believe 
to be our responsibility.
  As we close this debate, I ask those who support the agreement to 
vote no on the cloture motion.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, before I make closing comments, I ask 
unanimous consent to waive the mandatory quorum call with respect to 
the cloture vote this afternoon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I wish to begin by thanking the vast 
majority of this body for the fact that over--for four times since 
2010, Members of this body almost unanimously passed sanctions that 
brought Iran to the table--people on both sides of the aisle. I want to 
thank people for that.
  I want to thank this body for another reason. When we realized that 
the President was going to negotiate with Iran and do so through what 
was called a nonbinding political commitment and that he was going to 
take this agreement directly to the U.N. Security Council--he was not 
going to cause it to be a treaty, but he was going to cause it to be an 
agreement that he could execute without our involvement--because of the 
fact that we brought Iran to the table through the sanctions that we 
collectively put in place, we rose up and we passed a bill on a 98-to-1 
basis that allowed us to go through this process we are going through 
today.
  I want to thank Senator Cardin, who has been an outstanding ranking 
member. I want to thank Senator Menendez before him, who was an 
outstanding chairman and ranking member.
  What this agreement said we would do is we would debate. I want to 
stop there and say that I think we have had a dignified debate. People 
on both sides of the aisle have handled themselves as Senators, and I 
am very proud of that.
  The other piece of that was that we would vote, that we would let the 
people of this country know where we stood. We have a bipartisan 
majority that disapproves of this deal. The most substantial foreign 
policy people on the Democratic side oppose this deal. Always we have 
known that yes, we were going to do this under regular order, and under 
regular order what that means is there is this procedural vote where 
the Senate decides that debate has ended and we are going to move to a 
final vote. We are at that juncture, and I ask my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle that on a 98-to-1 basis voted to allow us to 
vote to now vote yes on this cloture motion, to allow the Members of 
this Senate, who have handled themselves so responsibly, to be able to 
record on a majority basis where we stand on this issue.
  The majority of the people in the Senate believe that this deal that 
has been negotiated is not in the national interest of this country, 
will not make our Nation or the Middle East safer, and I hope that all 
of us are going to have that opportunity to vote after we pass this 
procedural hurdle. I hope that all Members will vote to allow this to 
proceed to a final vote within the next few days.
  With that, I yield the floor.


                             CLOTURE MOTION

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to rule XXII, the Chair lays before 
the Senate the pending cloture motion, which the clerk will state.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Senate amendment 
     No. 2640.
         Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, James Lankford, Kelly 
           Ayotte, John Thune, Cory Gardner, Mike Crapo, Ron 
           Johnson, Joni Ernst, Tom Cotton, James M. Inhofe, Thad 
           Cochran, Bill Cassidy, Pat Roberts, Johnny Isakson, 
           Jerry Moran, John McCain.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call has been waived.
  The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on 
amendment No. 2640, offered by the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. 
McConnell, to H.J. Res. 61, shall be brought to a close?
  The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 58, nays 42, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 264 Leg.]

                                YEAS--58

     Alexander
     Ayotte
     Barrasso
     Blunt
     Boozman
     Burr
     Capito
     Cardin
     Cassidy
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Ernst
     Fischer
     Flake
     Gardner
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Heller
     Hoeven
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kirk
     Lankford
     Lee
     Manchin
     McCain
     McConnell
     Menendez
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Paul
     Perdue
     Portman
     Risch
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Rubio
     Sasse
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Sullivan
     Thune
     Tillis
     Toomey
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--42

     Baldwin
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Booker
     Boxer
     Brown
     Cantwell
     Carper
     Casey
     Coons
     Donnelly
     Durbin
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Hirono
     Kaine
     King
     Klobuchar
     Leahy
     Markey
     McCaskill
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Peters
     Reed
     Reid
     Sanders
     Schatz
     Shaheen
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wyden
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 58, the nays are 
42.
  Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn not having voted 
in the affirmative, the motion is rejected.
  The majority leader.


                        Cloture Motion Withdrawn

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the 
cloture motion with respect to H.J. Res. 61.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REID. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk for 
amendment No. 2640.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Senate amendment 
     No. 2640.
         Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, John Barrasso, Bob Corker, 
           Steve Daines, David Perdue, Tom Cotton, Susan M.

[[Page S6582]]

           Collins, Deb Fischer, Shelley Moore Capito, Mike Crapo, 
           Ron Johnson, Cory Gardner, Marco Rubio, Lamar 
           Alexander, James M. Inhofe, Mike Rounds.

                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk for 
H.J. Res. 61.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on H.J. Res. 61, a 
     joint resolution amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
     to exempt employees with health coverage under TRICARE or the 
     Veterans Administration from being taken into account for 
     purposes of determining the employers to which the employer 
     mandate applies under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
     Care Act.
         Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, John Barrasso, Bob Corker, 
           Steve Daines, David Perdue, Tom Cotton, Susan M. 
           Collins, Deb Fischer, Shelley Moore Capito, Mike Crapo, 
           Ron Johnson, Cory Gardner, Marco Rubio, Lamar 
           Alexander, James M. Inhofe, Mike Rounds.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, the issue before us is of immense 
consequence to our country. The American people are entitled to a real 
voice and to know where their elected Senators stand on this important 
issue.
  Until recently, this was a principle Members of both parties seemed 
to endorse rather overwhelmingly. In fact, not a single Democrat--not 
one--voted against the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. We all recall 
it passed 98 to 1. They told us this was an issue too important for 
political games.
  This is what one Democratic colleague said just last week:

       As a caucus that was opposed to games with filibusters over 
     the last four years, I would think it would be really 
     regrettable if we didn't ultimately go to the floor and cast 
     our votes for or against this deal.

  But that was last week, apparently. Democratic Senators just voted to 
filibuster and block the American people from even having a real vote 
on one of the most consequential foreign policy issues of our time.
  It is telling that Democrats would go to such extreme lengths to 
prevent President Obama from even having to consider legislation on 
this issue. If the President is so proud of this deal, then he 
shouldn't be afraid.
  We all know the amount of time the administration has spent here 
asking all of these guys to take a bullet for the team--and, of course, 
the team is Team Obama. They all wanted to have a say. When it came 
time to have a say, they said it was more important that the President 
not have to veto a resolution of disapproval--more important to him 
than to them.
  This is a deal that was designed to go around Congress and the 
American people from the very start. We all remember the President 
didn't want to submit it to us at all. It was going to be an executive 
agreement, it is still an executive agreement, and he didn't want us to 
have any say at all.
  Senator Corker and Senator Cardin worked together and developed a 
proposal--overwhelmingly proposed and supported--to give us a chance to 
weigh in on this important deal.
  It would empower Iran to maintain thousands of centrifuges and to 
become a recognized nuclear-threshold state, forever on the edge of 
developing a nuclear weapon. That is what is before us.
  It would effectively subsidize Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Assad regime 
in Syria--which, by the way, is now going to apparently include a 
Russian military base in Syria--by showering tens of billions of 
dollars on their benefactors in Tehran.
  It would leave Iran with an enrichment capability just as the Iranian 
leadership is again calling for Israel's destruction and praying every 
day for our destruction. This deal is sure to have many consequences 
that will last well beyond this administration.
  Yet as things presently stand, it would limp along with little or no 
buy-in or input from Congress or from the American people--who we know 
overwhelmingly opposed the deal in spite of the President's best 
efforts to sell it to them. This shouldn't be an acceptable outcome for 
our friends on the other side, even those who support the deal. I 
predicted earlier--and I predict again today--we are going to have a 
raft of new bash-Iran proposals introduced by our friends on the other 
side, who are going to be born again Iran bashers.
  So let me make it clear to all of our colleagues, we have voted, we 
are going to vote again, but we are voting on the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act. We are not going to be taking up bills that have 
fewer than enough cosponsors to override a Presidential veto. If we 
want to make a law, as we did with Corker-Cardin, show us enough 
cosponsors to make a law, but we are not interested in using floor time 
for get-well efforts over on the other side to try to fool their 
constituents into thinking: Oh, I really, really was serious about 
Iran, in spite of the fact that I voted for the deal that you hate.
  We only have so much floor time in the Senate. We are going to try to 
use it on serious proposals that have a chance of becoming law, and my 
assumption is the President is not going to want to revisit this issue. 
He got what he wanted. He is not going to want to revisit this issue. 
So if we want to do anything further about this Iranian regime, bring 
me a bill with enough cosponsors to override a Presidential veto, and 
we will take a look at it.
  Otherwise, the American people will give us their judgment about the 
appropriateness of this measure 1 year from November because this is 
not an ordinary issue. This is an issue with a real shelf life. This is 
a regime that is still going to be there a year and a half from now.
  And, of course, as we know, it is an Executive agreement only. So if, 
perchance, there is a President of a different party, I would say to 
our Iranian observers of the debate that it will be looked at anew 
based upon Iranian behavior between now and then.
  As others have said, the Iranian Parliament is apparently going to 
get to weigh in. I heard the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee say that. I guess they are going to get a vote.
  But our friends on the other side want to employ a procedural device, 
which, as the Democratic leader has pointed out, is commonly used here, 
but the question is, on what kind of measure is it used?
  This is no ordinary measure. This is different.
  So we will have another opportunity to see whether we want to move 
past this procedural device.
  The President is proud of the deal. I don't know why he would be 
reluctant to veto a resolution of disapproval that is put on his desk. 
He is having press conferences about it. He is bragging about it. He 
thinks this is really great.
  I don't know what they are protecting him from. I would think he 
would have a veto ceremony and invite all you guys to join him and 
celebrate. What are you protecting him from?
  We will have a chance next week, one more chance, to allow him to say 
how he feels about the resolution of disapproval. We know how he feels 
about it already. For the life of me, I can't get why he is reluctant 
to veto this resolution of disapproval, in effect, underscoring again 
what a great deal he thinks it is for America.
  So we will revisit the issue next week and see if maybe any folks 
want to change their minds and give us a chance to remove the 
procedural roadblock and give the President what he has been asking 
for.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I want to be as respectful of my friend as I 
need to be, but let's speak reality.
  We are in a Congress that is dominated by the Republicans. They 
control the House by a large margin, and they control the Senate by a 
large margin.
  The legislation that is before this body was proposed, legislated, 
and brought to us by Republican leadership. It is their legislation, 
not ours.
  I didn't spend all my time in my office visiting with people today; I 
watched the speeches. It was stunning--the nonreality that is facing my 
Republican friends. They dwelled, a number of them, on what is going on 
in the Middle East. Not once--not once--did anyone mention the worst 
foreign-policy decision ever made by our great country, the invasion of 
Iraq. It has destabilized that part of the world for a long, long time 
to come. For what? So

[[Page S6583]]

my friends can blame all the problems in the Middle East on the 
President, but they are blaming the wrong person. We can't take what we 
have because they want to rewrite history. History is as it is, and 
people are writing history as it is.
  Now the part of history that they are trying to rewrite is history 
that is taking place in this body. We offered, on two separate 
occasions, publicly before the American people and in this body: Do you 
want a vote? We will let you have a vote. Both times it was objected to 
because in the convoluted reasoning, I guess, of my friend, he thinks 
that people who are watching all of this have no common sense and can't 
understand the English language.
  We offered to have a vote on this on two separate occasions. It was 
objected to both times. Now, the inane response is you are 
filibustering this. I know why there are filibusters because we have 
had to file cloture more than 600 times because of filibusters by the 
Republicans. Never in the history of the country has there ever been 
anything close to it.
  Now, what were most of those filibusters on? On motions to proceed. 
On this legislation that came before this body, we said we don't need a 
vote on a motion to proceed, go to the bill, go to it. We also said, as 
part of the agreement, let the leader offer the first amendment, and he 
did that.
  Now, a 60-vote threshold, my friend talks as if: Oh, wowee, where in 
the world did this come from? Why would they ever consider 60 votes on 
this?
  First, I know it is late in the day. I didn't bring the subject up, 
but my friend the Republican leader is talking about a world that 
doesn't exist anymore. And who created this world that doesn't exist 
anymore? My Republican friends.
  This is July 30, 2011, from Senator McConnell:

       Now, look, we know that on controversial matters in the 
     Senate, it has for quite some time required 60 votes. So I 
     would say again to my friend, [that is me] it is pretty hard 
     to make a credible case that denying a vote on your own 
     proposal is anything other than a filibuster.

  A little while later:

       I wish to make clear to the American people Senate 
     Republicans are ready to vote on cloture on the Reid proposal 
     in 30 minutes, in an hour, as soon as we can get our 
     colleagues over to the floor. We are ready to vote. By 
     requiring 60 votes, particularly on a matter of this enormous 
     importance, it is not at all unusual. It is the way the 
     Senate operates.

  Another one, a few months later:

       Mr. President, I can only quote my good friend [that is me] 
     the majority leader who has repeatedly said, most recently in 
     early 2007, that in the Senate it has always been the case we 
     need 60 votes. This is my good friend the majority leader 
     when he was the leader of this majority in March of 2007, and 
     he said it repeatedly both when he was in the minority or 
     leader of the majority, that it requires 60 votes certainly 
     on measures that are controversial.

  There is no question the measure before this body--using the words of 
my friend the Republican leader--is something that is important. There 
is no question that this measure has been controversial. Also, using 
his words, is this legislation of enormous importance? I think so. At 
least that is my mind.

  Quoting from a little while later:

       So who gets to decide who is wasting time around here? None 
     of us have that authority to decide who is wasting time. But 
     the way you make things happen is you get 60 votes at some 
     point, and you move the matter to conclusion, and the best 
     way to do that is to have an open amendment process. That is 
     the way this place used to operate.

  And I say ``used to operate.'' That is my own editorial comment.
  Two or three months later:

       Madam President, reserving the right to object, what we are 
     talking about is a perpetual debt ceiling grant, in effect, 
     to the President. Matters of this level of controversy always 
     require 60 votes. So I would ask my friend, the majority 
     leader--

  Referring to me as the majority leader--

     if he would modify his consent request and set the threshold 
     for this vote at 60?

  I am not going to be reading these forever, but I will read one more:

       Well, as we all know, it takes 60 votes to do everything 
     except the budget process. We anticipate having a vote to 
     proceed to the 20-week Pain-Capable bill sometime before the 
     end of the year as well.

  That was just the early part of August of this year.
  So, Mr. President, my friend is in a dire situation, and I understand 
that. The House is in a terrible state of disarray. They do not know 
what they are going to do. On one hand, what they say they are going to 
do is--the President can't send the papers to them. So they want to 
have a vote on that. The papers didn't come to them. And then they turn 
right around and are going to vote on a resolution of approval. I guess 
they do not need the papers for that. Then they are going to vote on 
more sanctions. Then they don't know what they are going to do. It is 
very unusual, when one party controls both branches of the bicameral 
legislature, that they do not know how to work together, but obviously 
they are not working together here. So I understand my friend's 
frustration. This is a situation where he has lost the vote, and it is 
a situation where he is simply not in touch with reality as it exists.
  So I want to say to everyone within the sound of my voice that the 
Senate has spoken and has spoken with a clarion voice and declared that 
the historic agreement to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon 
will stand. That is what this agreement is all about. It is about 
whether Iran should have a nuclear weapon. And the countries you 
wouldn't think would be involved in supporting something such as this--
they know the importance of it themselves, and they agreed to go along 
with this agreement. They helped us negotiate it. China, Russia--they 
agreed to it. The Senate has spoken with a clarion voice and declared 
that this historic agreement to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear 
weapon will stand.
  So I say, my fellow Americans--and I say that with all respect for 
everybody who is out there listening or will read about this--our 
allies and negotiating partners around the world should know that 
today's outcome was clear, decisive, and final. There is now no doubt 
whatsoever that the United States Congress will allow this historic 
agreement to proceed. Efforts by opponents to derail this agreement 
were soundly rejected by a margin much larger than anyone thought 
achievable even a few days ago.
  Any future attempts, as my friend is talking about, to relitigate 
this issue--I guess we will be in a position like with the Affordable 
Care Act. Are we going to try to repeal it 60 times? Are we going to 
try to break that record? Any future attempts to relitigate this issue 
in the Senate will meet the same outcome and will be nothing more than 
wasted time--time we can't afford to waste with a government shutdown 
looming in a matter of weeks, more of the disarray of my friends the 
Republicans. We are not making up closing government. The government 
was closed 2 years ago for almost 3 weeks. So we take those threats 
seriously. And I would hope we could get around to doing something 
about that rather than having wasted cloture motions on something on 
which we agreed to have a vote. Filibusters are an effort to stop 
debate. We said when I came in here Tuesday--Tuesday, Wednesday, 
Thursday--if you want more time than that to debate, go ahead and do 
it. We are not in any way stopping debate, as was done by my Republican 
colleagues hundreds of times in years past. So this can be relitigated. 
Let's do it over 60 times to try to break the Affordable Care Act 
record, if you choose, but this matter is over with. It is something of 
such importance, but we should move on to something else. We have so 
much to do in this body--so much to do.
  We have our highway situation that is deteriorating. We have hundreds 
of thousands of bridges that are in a state of disrepair and need 
refurbishing and some of them need to be replaced. Today I met with the 
regional transportation authority, someone who represents 80 percent of 
the population in our State. We are in desperate shape all over Nevada 
as far as doing something about highways, but we are not doing anything 
about highways, we are fiddling around on that patching stuff. We had 
something done, and I was happy to get that done.
  We have cyber security issues. As we are here talking right now in 
this body, we have groups, individuals, and countries trying to hack 
us--they are not trying; they are doing it. We have not had the ability 
to get cyber security legislation before this body. It is something we 
have brought up as an afterthought. We have Senator Burr and Senator 
Feinstein and the bill they

[[Page S6584]]

produced. It is not my favorite. I think we could do better than that. 
But I support their legislation. We have to do something. Let's start 
someplace doing something that is important for the American people.
  So I say to everyone here that it is time we move on to something 
else. This matter is over. You can continue to relitigate it, but it is 
going to have the same result.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, as the Democratic leader frequently 
reminded me when he was the majority leader, the majority leader always 
gets the last word.
  I enjoyed hearing the Democratic leader's history lesson, going back, 
as I recount--I am sure I will leave some out--to the Iraq war 
resolution, which he voted for, as did Hillary Clinton, to a recitation 
of past debates from ObamaCare, to you name it, including complaining 
about highways, a bill Senator Boxer and I worked on and actually 
passed that he voted against, which hopefully will soon be in 
conference, but none of that has anything to do with what is before us 
today.
  The issue before us today is the Iran nuclear agreement. We know how 
the American people feel about it. They are overwhelmingly opposed to 
it. We know how the Israelis feel about it. They are overwhelmingly 
opposed to it. We know our Sunni-Arab allies are now visiting the 
Russians to talk about arms purchases because they do not trust us 
anymore. We know the President wanted to transform the Middle East, 
and, by golly, he has. Our friends don't trust us and our enemies are 
emboldened.
  So the issue is not over. The Democratic leader saying the issue is 
over doesn't make it over.
  This agreement and the foreign policy of this administration is best 
summed up by Jimmy Carter. A couple of months ago, he was asked to sum 
up the Obama administration's foreign policy, and this is almost a 
direct quote. He said he couldn't think of a single place in the world 
where we are in better shape now than we were when the President came 
to office. That is Jimmy Carter.
  Foreign policy will be a big issue going into 2016, and this 
agreement is a metaphor for all of the mistakes this President has 
made. You name the area of the world, and you will see the results. So 
no amount of saying the issue is over makes it over. It is still on the 
floor of the Senate. We will have an opportunity again next week to 
move past this procedural snag to give all Members of the Senate an 
opportunity to vote up or down on a resolution of disapproval, which we 
know is supported on a bipartisan basis.
  And I end with this: There is bipartisan opposition to this deal--
bipartisan opposition to this deal. Only Democrats support it. So if 
the President is so proud of it, I can't figure out what these folks 
over here are protecting him from.
  You guys should all be invited down to the veto signing. Break out 
the champagne, celebrate, take credit for it. You own it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, one last thing. I recognize my friend is 
going to be next, and I am going to be very short here.
  I am glad my friend brought up my vote on Iraq. I have stated on 
national TV, I have stated every chance I get that the biggest mistake 
I ever made in my public service was voting for that bill. And I 
learned it quickly. It was just a matter of a few short months after I 
voted that I realized I had been misled in voting for that. But that 
doesn't matter. I voted for it, and, as some say in some circles, I 
have repented publicly for having done that. So my feeling about the 
Iraq war has not changed, the mere fact I had voted for that.
  I would also say this in closing: I hope the one thing we can agree 
on here as Democrats and Republicans is that the ability of Iran for 
the next 15 years to build a nuclear weapon is pretty well taken care 
of. No one has to agree with that part of my statement, but the one 
thing I hope we can agree on--I would hope we would work together to 
make sure we continue, as indicated in the letter Senator Kerry wrote 
to everybody, all of us, and the Cardin legislation--I hope everyone 
will take a look at that because, as I said in a statement I gave on 
Tuesday morning, I have looked at what was suggested in the Kerry 
letter to make Israel more safe and more secure and some of the 
suggestions that Senator Cardin had in his outline. These are things on 
which I hope we can work together. Put this to one side for the time 
being. Let's hope in the future we can work together to make sure the 
only true democracy in that part of the world, this ally of ours, is 
safe and secure. And we will continue everything we can to make sure 
they are, I repeat, safe and secure.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate majority leader.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, there is no question the Israelis need 
a lot of reinforcement, no question they need to know for sure we are 
on their side because this administration has just entered into an 
agreement that by all objective standards could even threaten their 
very existence. So I think there is no question the Israelis need every 
reassurance we can possibly give them.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I want to rise and offer some thoughts on 
the comments we just heard from the majority leader and from our 
leader. I want to say a word about process, and I want to say a word 
about partisanship.
  Let me start with a word to all of my colleagues. I respect your 
position on this deal however you voted. I am not here to stand and 
name-call or chastise anybody who reaches a different position on this 
bill than I do because it is a hard matter, and I don't think we serve 
the body well by challenging folks who reach a different position.
  Let me say a word about process. The allegation has been made on the 
floor in recent days that this vote, including the vote that was just 
taken, was somehow a procedural blocking of the vote on the deal. That 
is just not the case.
  I was one of the coauthors of the review act that is currently before 
us, and as we worked on the act in the Foreign Relations Committee, 
everyone understood that it would take 60 votes to pass either a motion 
of approval or disapproval. We worked on the act in January and 
February--months before a framework was on the table. Democrats wanted 
a 60-vote threshold for a motion of disapproval, but Republicans wanted 
a 60-vote threshold for a motion of approval, and that was the 
understanding of everyone in the committee when we cast a 19-to-0 vote 
to pass this in early April, and it was clearly understood when we cast 
a 98-to-1 vote on the floor of this body.
  A 60-vote threshold was understood. It was so clearly understood that 
that is the way we do things around here that 47 Members of the Senate 
put that in a letter to the leaders of Iran. So this is not an unusual 
thing to ask for a 60-vote threshold. In fact, the Democrats have asked 
twice in last 3 days: Let's have an up-or-down vote on the motion of 
disapproval with a 60-vote threshold--and our request for a vote on the 
merits has been twice blocked by the majority.
  I hope we will have a chance to vote on the merits again next week 
under the 60-vote threshold that we all agreed to, but regardless of 
whether we do or whether we don't, this is a completely transparent 
vote because all 100 Members of the Senate have indicated what their 
position is. I respect everybody's position, but it is very clear, and 
the clear rule is, under the review act we just passed, by this vote 
this deal will now go forward as we agreed it would a few months back.
  Partisanship. The majority leader suggested the position that is 
being taken on this side of the aisle is just to protect the President. 
I find that insulting. That is basically saying that on this side of 
the aisle my colleagues didn't do the work to dig into the deal. So let 
me just say a word about my colleagues--my colleagues in the minority 
in this body.
  This deal was announced on the 15th of July. Did anyone on this side 
of the aisle run out and take a position on the deal within hours after 
it was out? Did anyone on this side of the aisle say, yes, I know what 
I am going to do and

[[Page S6585]]

I haven't even read the bill. Has this side of the aisle in lockstep 
all taken exactly the same position with respect to this bill? No.
  On this side of the aisle, we haven't approached it in a partisan 
way. On this side of the aisle, every Member took the time to master 
the details and make their own decision. Some announced their decision 
a few days after the deal was announced, some announced their decision 
7 weeks after the deal was announced. On this side of the aisle there 
is a difference of opinion--42 of us support the deal, 4 of us do not 
support the deal--but we respect each other's opinions, and we have 
approached it as a matter of conscience.
  So I categorically reject the statement and the implication by the 
majority leader that this is just something over here that is being 
done casually to protect the President. I would ask my colleagues in 
the majority: Compare the diversity of opinion and the time it took to 
reach an opinion and the respect that we have for each other's 
position--compare that on this side of the aisle with your own track 
record on this bill, with the speed with which people announced that 
they were opposing it, some even admitting they were opposing it before 
they read it.
  Contrary to the claim of the majority leader that there is no 
bipartisan support for this deal, I have to say, Senator John Warner, 
Republican, 36-year Member of the Senate, chair of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, wrote with Senator Carl Levin, former chair of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, ``Why Hawks Should Support the Iran 
Deal''; Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor for two Republican 
Presidents and general, strongly supports this deal; GEN Colin Powell, 
Republican, Secretary of State, strongly supports this deal. There is 
bipartisan support for this deal. It is just that in this body the 
minority has been willing to have differences of opinion and respect 
those differences and not approach this in a partisan manner. That is 
not exactly the case with respect to the other side. I applaud my 
colleagues for treating this as a matter of conscience, for reaching 
the conclusions they reached, even differences of opinion, and 
respecting each other's views.
  Under the terms of the review act, as we agreed to it, we have now 
taken a vote. Unless the majority will allow us to have a vote on the 
merits, pursuant to the 60-vote threshold, this vote will stand and the 
deal will go forward. I hope we can vote on the merits. I hope the 
majority will agree to let us do what we agreed to do when we passed 
the review act just a couple of months ago.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I was not planning to speak--I know 
Senator Capito is next in line--but I am really disappointed in my 
friend from Virginia indicating that somehow people on this side of the 
aisle did not study this deal, did not spend time understanding the 
details, and somehow people on this side of the aisle, in a knee-jerk 
way, made their decision. That is an insult, not something I would 
expect--not something I would expect to come from my friend on the 
other side of the aisle.
  I have enjoyed so much working with him and I will continue to. I 
respect him greatly. But, look, I don't want to start tit-for-tatting 
this. Certainly Senator Feinstein came out immediately in support of 
this, Nancy Pelosi came out immediately in support of this, and no 
doubt there were some people on this side of the aisle that did the 
same. I came out in opposition for this after--after--two Democrats had 
come out in opposition. So I wish those comments had not been made.
  We had 12 hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee, well attended 
by people on both sides of the aisle. I just take offense that somehow, 
because there is bipartisan opposition and only partisan support--that 
somehow those who support are more bipartisan. Now, I don't know. That 
is a leap I have not heard.
  I have said hundreds of times that if this deal achieved what the 
President said it was going to achieve, I would be voting for it. If 
this dismantled Iran's nuclear program, I would be voting for it. If 
this didn't industrialize their program, I would be voting for it. He 
said it would end their nuclear program. There would be 100 votes on 
the floor for that. This is a far cry from that.
  So I am sorry to have this kind of conversation on the Senate floor, 
but I have to say I have sat here listening to the speeches. I think 
people on both sides of the aisle have thought a great deal about this. 
I do think there has been extreme pressure. My friends on the other 
side of the aisle have told me they have never been addressed in such a 
personal manner by the administration--never. So, yes, there has been 
pressure. I understand that, by the way. If the shoe were on the other 
foot, it would be taking place. I got that.
  But, look, I think the debate has been thoughtful. I think, by and 
large, the vast majority of people on both sides of the aisle have been 
thoughtful. After the debate we have had, I am discouraged that my 
friend on the other side of the aisle would indicate that somehow 
because there is bipartisan opposition--bipartisan opposition--the most 
informed Members on the other side of the aisle, the ranking member of 
the Foreign Relations Committee and the former ranking member and 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, are voting against that--
and because we happen to agree with the leading Members on the 
Democratic side, we are partisan? So I am sorry.
  Now, back to the procedure. There is no question--I have said this 
over and over--I understand regular order, and this bill was drafted 
under regular order. I got it. I understand that certainly the 
procedures in this body are that cloture is to end debate, and that 
takes 60 votes. I got it. It doesn't take but about a week here to 
understand the importance of cloture.
  So I have always known, and I have said this, that a threshold to get 
us to a place for final passage was going to be 60 votes. But we also 
passed the bill with 98 votes that said we wanted to vote. One Senator 
was missing who supported it. It would have been 99 to 1.
  So, look, I understand there can be debate about filibuster and all 
of that, but to say there was some preagreement--I mean, the text of 
the deal, the text of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act says that 
we are going to go through regular order. We caught a lot of grief over 
that as a matter of fact. I am sorry.
  A lot of people on our side wanted a privileged motion. We understand 
the leader on the other side didn't like privileged vehicles because he 
felt he lost control of the floor. We discussed that thoroughly last 
January.
  So, look, I understand how cloture is used. I understand how cloture 
is used. I got it. I understand it takes 60 votes, people in here 
saying, yes, we agree that we should end debate and, yes, we want to 
move on. I know that hasn't happened today. I understand a lot of times 
cloture is used as a vote, as you just indicated you believe that it 
does, but I just want to say, again, there has been no agreement. We 
understand the threshold. We understand the hurdle. We understand we 
didn't achieve it today. But to say that Members on this side somehow--
because we agree with the leading Members on the other side that this 
deal doesn't accomplish the goals the President said he wanted to 
achieve, that that makes us partisan, I am sorry, I disagree.
  We had many discussions in our office about the merits of this and 
the demerits of this. The fact is, I do think this agreement is fatally 
flawed. I am despondent over the fact that when we had a boot on the 
neck of this rogue nation that is the No. 1 exporter of terrorism 
around the world--when we had a boot on their neck--we gave away our 
leverage, and in 9 months--in 9 months--they are going to have all 
their money back, the major sanctions relieved, and no apparent change 
of behavior. Even Secretary Kerry in his letter to us said he doesn't 
expect that.
  So, look, I am disappointed that we have agreed, that the 
administration has agreed, and that, unfortunately, a minority of 
people in this body agree, and they have kept us from being able to 
send a disapproval to the President to veto. I am disappointed, when an 
agreement has been agreed to by this the President and by others that 
allows them to industrialize their nuclear program and gives them 
incredible--incredible--economic access.

[[Page S6586]]

  I think maybe the Senator might have responded to some recent 
comments on the floor. I hope that is the case. But I haven't seen 
anything but dignity on this floor over the last several days, people 
being incredibly knowledgeable--which they never would have been 
without this bill that the Senator from Virginia helped us bring about, 
crucial, in helping make that occur.
  But what has happened here is everybody in this body now knows more 
about this than they ever would have. Everyone has taken the time, I 
think, to understand this in great detail. And just because there are a 
few people who come out quickly on our side and on your side--and on 
your side--that doesn't diminish the fact that people have arrived at 
their decisions based on conscience as to whether they support it or 
not. I am disappointed, on the other hand, that we weren't able to move 
beyond cloture and to a final vote.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  My understanding is Senator Capito now has the floor.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, could I ask my friend to yield to me for 2 
minutes? And I apologize to my colleague, but two of my favorite 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Through the Chair, two of my favorite members of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee who have been critically important 
to us having this debate on foreign policy--Senator Kaine and Senator 
Corker--they are two Members I deeply respect.
  Let me just make this observation. I think Senator Corker is 
absolutely correct. As a result of Senator Kaine and Senator Corker--
and I am proud of the role I played--the Members of the United States 
Senate have had more information about a major foreign policy issue 
than in the history of this country. We have had the exposure to 
classified briefings. We have had the incredible opportunity to try to 
understand the JCPOA and to make our independent judgments on that. So 
I think this process has worked the way it should work.
  I share disappointment that we couldn't go to a vote on the merits 
with a 60-vote threshold because I think that was what was anticipated, 
and we all understood it was going to take 60 votes to move this. I 
think it would have been better if we went directly to that type of a 
vote rather than what has gone forward. So I just want to underscore 
that.
  The other point I want to underscore--and I agree with Senator Corker 
and Senator Kaine--is that many Members of the Senate, in a relatively 
short period of time, made a decision. They didn't think it was a close 
call, so they made their judgments. In reality, it was a lot more 
Republicans than Democrats. But that was the case. A lot of Members 
took a lot of time to try to understand this and really labored on the 
issue. I know that because I made my official position known just about 
a week ago, and I know in talking to many colleagues the process they 
went through.
  I don't question the motives of any Member. I think each Member is 
trying to do what they believe is in the best interests of our country. 
I know the two Senators--I know them personally. I am just making my 
own observations. I know that is how they believe also. But I do think 
the process we set up lent itself to getting the material, waiting for 
the hearings, listening to the administration make their point, reading 
the classified documents, trying to understand how the IAEA interacts 
in the review process--that it was important to understand all of that 
before drawing a conclusion.
  I applaud most Members of the Senate who dove into it in order for 
that to be the case. I needed to make that point. I can tell you this: 
With Senator Corker and Senator Kaine, I really feel blessed to serve 
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think our country is well 
served by both. I know that we are going to work together to provide 
our country the strength it needs to deal with the international 
challenge and to carry out the responsibility of the Senate.
  I thank the Senator for yielding.
  I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. President, before I start my formal remarks, I would 
like to make a few comments about what has occurred in terms of the 
cloture vote and in terms of some of the discussion that we have had 
most recently.
  I wanted to react, first of all, to something the minority leader 
said in his remarks. He basically said that we, as Republicans, are 
trying to rewrite history. He went into a long explanation of why he 
believed that. It really struck me, with these young folks who are 
sitting right here in front of us. We are not trying to rewrite 
history. We are trying to write a future for these young kids that is 
safer, that is strong, where we as the United States are making 
agreements that are in their best interests--not just for tomorrow or 
the next 5 years or 6 years but the next 30, 35, 40 years. I am not 
interested in rewriting history. But writing history for the future I 
am interested in.
  The other reaction I have is that I am very disappointed in what has 
happened here, that we can't have a straight up-or-down vote. When I 
was in the West Virginia Legislature, in the house of delegates, 
believe it or not, our votes were not taken. They were voice votes, 
except in very rare occasions when we would have a rollcall. We all 
know the difference between a voice vote and a rollcall vote. A 
rollcall vote is a part of history. People see exactly what you are 
intending and how you are going to vote. On a voice vote, you can 
almost say: Well, I voted yes or I voted no. Nobody can really pin you 
down on that.
  I was one of the few Republicans in the house of delegates who voted 
in favor of making every single vote we had a rollcall vote. I am 
pleased to say, the legislature didn't change it that year but they 
finally did change it.
  As the Senator from Virginia said, everybody knows what everybody is 
going to do on this vote. I don't understand what the controversy is to 
move forward over the procedural motions and to then have that vote to 
have it as a part of history. This is your rollcall vote. This is your 
voice on this Iran agreement. I hope next week the body changes its 
mind, we move forward, and we have an affirmative vote on the motion of 
disapproval.
  Today I want to talk, obviously, about these issue because I have 
deep concerns about them. I believe that this debate should revolve 
around three key questions. Will this agreement eliminate Iran's path 
to a nuclear weapon? Will it improve the security situation in the 
Middle East? Will it make America safer for the young, for us, and for 
the future generations?
  Unfortunately, after much study I have concluded that the answer is 
no to all of these questions. I do not believe the President's 
agreement would make America safer or our allies safer. To the 
contrary, the agreement will provide Iran with the resources to 
continue to finance terror throughout the Middle East and around the 
world.
  Even if Iran were to comply with this agreement in full, this deal 
virtually guarantees that Iran will become a nuclear threshold nation 
with an industrial nuclear program. We know that. It is legitimized in 
this agreement. Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism. 
Everybody has said that in this body. It is acknowledged nationwide. 
The windfall of cash that will flow to Iran--the signing bonus and the 
continuing impact of sanctions relief under this deal--will only 
increase its ability to prop up the Syrian regime, finance Hezbollah, 
and threaten America's allies such as Israel.
  One of the actions you learn when you grow up is that past behavior 
is a great predictor of future action. Even as its own economy has been 
hampered by the economic sanctions and the pressure from those 
sanctions brought Iran to the table, in the name of ``our people are 
suffering''--whether it is food or whether it is economic conditions--
what have they been doing? They have been financing terror in their 
region. Terrorism is a priority for them, even as their own people are 
suffering.
  National Security Advisor Susan Rice agrees. She says: ``We should 
expect that some portion of that money would go to the Iranian military 
and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior that we 
have seen in the region up until now.''

[[Page S6587]]

  That is the National Security Advisor. The President and the 
Secretary of State have said that the sanctions will snap back into 
place if Iran violates this agreement. I have been in Washington now 
for 15 years. I have never seen anything snap anywhere in the Halls of 
Congress. We know that the current sanctions against Iran cannot be 
easily snapped back. We know that. It doesn't even pass the sniff test, 
as we say.
  It took more than a decade for the United States, working with our 
allies, to construct the sanctions that brought Iran to the table. This 
type of effective sanctions regime cannot be brought back over and 
over. I have listened to a lot of speeches. A lot of my colleagues on 
both sides, no matter how they voted, what they believe, have said 
exactly the same thing. On another note, we need to examine the end of 
the international restrictions on selling ballistic missile technology 
to Iran and the end of the conventional arms embargo contained in this 
agreement.
  The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in July that ``under no circumstances should we 
relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and 
arms trafficking.'' The administration chose to reject this advice. It 
really surprised many of us who did not know that these were even on 
the table. We didn't even know they were part of a bargaining chip that 
anybody was going to play.
  The President's agreement would remove all international limitations 
on Iran's missile program in 8 years, contradicting early promises from 
the administration that restrictions would remain in place. Ballistic 
missiles are not a necessary component of a peaceful nuclear program. 
Iran's continued efforts to improve this technology should send a clear 
message to this Chamber of their intentions. In addition, the arms 
embargo on conventional arms will be lifted in 5 years.
  Indeed, Iran's President said last month: ``We will buy, sell and 
develop any weapons we need and we will not ask permission or abide by 
any resolution for that.''
  The end of the arms embargo and ballistic missile restrictions will 
strengthen Iran's ability to threaten Americans, our allied forces, and 
our citizens. The President's agreement does not contain the necessary 
enforcement measures to protect future generations from a nuclear Iran. 
Any agreement worthy of congressional approval should include rigorous, 
immediate inspections of suspected nuclear sites.
  Senior administration officials publicly called for ``anywhere, 
anyplace''--I heard it repeatedly--inspections. Yet the President's 
agreement fails to live up to that. Indeed, Iran can block access to 
suspected nuclear facilities for 24 days or even longer. We have not 
even seen these side deals. This is part of the discussion. The bill 
that we passed that said that we were going to have the right to debate 
this says explicitly in the language that the side agreements were to 
be turned over to Congress for our inspection before we made this vote.
  Finally, those who support ratifying the Iran agreement frequently 
argue that the only alternative is war. I disagree. I reject that 
notion. Under that false misguided premise, the American people are 
being told we should simply accept any deal, regardless of how flawed 
it may be. When asked if our only option was the agreement or war, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that ``we have a range of 
options.''
  The President's agreement does not live up to the administration's 
prior statements on important items such as inspections, elimination of 
advanced centrifuges, and ballistic missiles. A better agreement with 
Iran could be forged from the positions taken by senior administration 
officials during the negotiation.
  A better deal was possible. The American people should accept nothing 
less. Some argue that we should approve this deal, despite its faults, 
and then use the threat of separate legislation or tough talk to keep 
Iran in check. To me that is just seeking cover. Those of us who are 
going to vote in agreement with this Iran deal are then going to turn 
around in a week, 10 days or 2 days and say: Let's get tough on Iran on 
this. Let's make sure we protect Israel. Let's give more military aid 
to Israel. All of the rhetoric you are already hearing we can do now. 
We can do that now by disagreeing with the Iran agreement that the 
President has put forward. The better course for us is to reject this 
agreement and reopen negotiations.
  I believe that stronger sanctions could also force Iran to accept a 
better agreement that will improve the security of the Middle East and 
the world. The danger to the United States, Israel, and other American 
allies posed by Iran is real. As the current refugee crisis and prior 
acts of terror clearly demonstrate, instability and violence in the 
Middle East reverberates into other parts of the world.
  I do not believe that the President's agreement reduces that threat 
of violence or adds to the stability of the region. Instead, the 
agreement will strengthen Iran's position--you can already tell by 
their swaggering bravado of rhetoric that we hear--and leave the United 
States with fewer ways to combat nuclear proliferation. For those 
reasons, I will vote to reject the President's nuclear agreement with 
Iran.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.


                             Climate Change

  Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I rise today for the 110th time to ask 
my colleagues to wake up to climate change. Long after today's debate 
has died down, it will still be looming and threatening. We stand now 
at the precipice of an environmental catastrophe. The burning of fossil 
fuels has unleashed a flood of carbon pollution that is pushing the 
climate system planetwide into conditions that are unprecedented in 
human history. It has already permanently altered the world that we 
will leave to future generations. If we keep sleepwalking through this 
and allow the carbon flood to continue, we will leave even bigger 
changes and risk absolute catastrophe.
  Last month marked the 10th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. When 
that storm made landfall in Southeast Louisiana on August 29, 2005, it 
was a category 3 hurricane. Katrina's 125-mile-per-hour winds pushed a 
massive storm surge before it that overtopped New Orleans' systems of 
levees and flooded the city. By the end, Katrina killed an estimated 
1,200 people and caused more than $100 billion in damage. Images of 
broken levees, flooded streets, and people stranded on their rooftops 
are seared into our national memory. This natural disaster--compounded 
by manmade errors--showed how vulnerable we are to major storms and how 
vigilant we must be in planning for these extreme events.
  We can't say that climate change caused Katrina, but we do know that 
climate change increases the risk posed by future storms. The oceans 
are warming, and warmer water temperatures load the dice for more 
intense storms and heavier rainfall. Meanwhile, sea levels rise on the 
shores of the gulf coast and the Southeastern States. Storm surges 
riding in on higher seas will push even more floodwater inland. For 
those who suffered in the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, we owe them 
to learn from that catastrophe and take to heart the human threat we 
face from climate change--lost lives, lost property, and scarred 
communities. But that seems unacceptable to some on the Republican 
side. That would be admitting to the scale of the problem, would oblige 
them to offer a solution, and would offend the fossil fuel industry. 
The polluters' grip on the Republican Party is remorseless.

  President Obama went to New Orleans to honor the memory of those lost 
in Katrina and to hail the city's resurgence. But get this: Before the 
President's visit, Louisiana Governor and Republican Presidential 
candidate Bobby Jindal sent a letter to President Obama urging him not 
to talk about climate change, not to insert what he called ``the 
divisive political agenda of liberal environmental activism.'' Really? 
So when is it OK to talk about climate change, and what does Governor 
Jindal have to say about it? ``I'm sure that human activity is having 
an impact on the climate,'' he said. ``But I would leave it to the 
scientists to decide how much, what that means, and what are the 
consequences.'' Sounds to me like just another version of that 
Republican climate denial classic, ``I'm not a scientist.''

[[Page S6588]]

  OK, Governor. Let's leave it to the scientists. The scientific 
community has determined that human activity is responsible for just 
about all of the warming we have observed around the globe since the 
1950s.
  In 2012, scientists from Louisiana State University and the Southern 
Climate Impacts Planning Program, which is a consortium of researchers 
from NOAA, LSU, Texas A&M, and the University of Oklahoma, reported on 
the risks climate change poses for Louisiana and the gulf coast. 
Through their research, they found the following:

       Over the past century, both air and water temperatures have 
     been on the rise across the region.
       Rising ocean temperatures heighten hurricane intensity, and 
     recent years have seen a number of large, damaging 
     hurricanes.
       In some Gulf Coast locations, local sea level is increasing 
     at over 10 times the global rate, increasing the risk of 
     severe flooding.
       Saltwater intrusion from rising sea levels damages 
     wetlands, an important line of coastal defense against storm 
     surge and spawning grounds for commercially valuable fish and 
     shellfish.

  I don't need to tell the Presiding Officer the importance of the fish 
and shellfish industry to the State of Louisiana.
  The study's lead author, Hal Needham, said:

       Climate change is already taking a toll on the Gulf Coast, 
     but if we act now to become more resilient, we can reduce the 
     risks, save billions in future costs, and preserve a way of 
     life.

  I certainly don't need to tell the Presiding Officer about the way of 
life.
  Dr. Needham continues:

       The Gulf Coast is one of the first regions to feel the 
     impacts of climate change.

  Sea level rise is already an immediate problem for Louisiana, and it 
is one that is going to get rapidly worse.
  This chart comes from the New Orleans Times-Picayune. It shows how 
sea level rise will inundate the Louisiana coast. This area on the 
chart is New Orleans. Red areas, such as these, will be lost underneath 
1 foot of sea level rise, 2 feet of sea level rise will inundate the 
orange areas, and the yellow areas will be lost and will disappear 
under water at 3.3 feet--1 meter--of sea level rise.
  According to analysis from the Risky Business Project, mean sea level 
at Grand Isle, LA, will likely rise up to 2.4 feet by 2050. That takes 
us over the orange. It will rise up to 5.8 feet by 2100--i.e., at the 
end of this century. All of the red, all of the orange, all of the 
yellow, and more will be inundated. The Risky Business Project 
estimates that by 2030, almost $20 billion in existing coastal property 
in Louisiana will likely be below mean sea level. People own that 
property. That is $20 billion that will be lost. That is a lot to ask 
people to pay. By 2050, that number--the value of lost land to sea 
level rise--increases to between $33 billion and $45 billion.
  The science is clear. Just look to the scientists at LSU, Tiger 
scientists. The threat is real. Yet, for Governor Jindal, climate 
change should not be mentioned. It is inconvenient.
  Republican Presidential candidates--except one, the senior Senator 
from South Carolina--would rather avoid any talk of it. They all 
protest the President's Clean Power Plan to limit carbon emissions from 
powerplants, but which of them offers an alternative? None. And, like 
his fellow candidates, Governor Jindal's stated position is to have no 
plan.
  State and national scientific agencies and experts, local officials 
around the country, corporate leaders, military professionals, 
physicians and health care professionals, and faith leaders are all 
telling us this is a problem and begging us to wake up. Yet, the 
Republican Presidential candidates and, frankly, the Republican Party 
here in the Senate have nothing--nothing. They don't even want to talk 
about it.
  The American people are in favor of action. Polling from Stanford 
University and the New York Times shows that two-thirds of Americans, 
including half of Republicans, favor government action to reduce global 
warming, and two-thirds, including half of Republicans, would be more 
likely to vote for a candidate who campaigns on fighting climate 
change. So why doesn't the GOP have a climate plan?
  Regular Louisianans are doing their part to rebuild their State's 
natural defenses. Common Ground Relief, a Lower Ninth Ward-based 
operation aimed at creating resilient gulf coast communities, has been 
planting marsh grass and trees--about 10,000 trees every year--in the 
wetlands and barrier islands along the Louisiana coast. Those natural 
barriers can absorb some of the power of big storms and take some of 
the pressure off the new levees. Last July, New Orleans mayor Mitch 
Landrieu joined Pope Francis at the Vatican to discuss global 
challenges, including climate change. Mayor Landrieu recalled the 
memory of Katrina. I will quote him:

       We have now become a warning to all the others. Neglected 
     environmental degradation has consequences. The poor are hit 
     the hardest and they suffer the most. The levees broke, the 
     water flooded in, and in the blink of an eye, the Gulf of 
     Mexico surged over the rooftops of a great American city. 
     Thousands of us, many of the most vulnerable who couldn't 
     find a way to evacuate the city, were left behind as if their 
     lives did not have value.

  We know that we are loading the dice for more damaging weather with 
our relentless carbon pollution. To pretend this threat does not exist 
is to put property at risk, to put communities at risk, and to put 
American lives at risk. And incidentally, it is also to put our heads 
in the sand.
  Eventually the Republican Party is going to have to break itself free 
from the clutches of the fossil fuel industry. They are going to have 
to. They are losing the American people, their own young voters. And 
they are going to have to rise up to their duty to serve the people of 
their States and of this country. It is my hope that when they get 
around to doing that, it won't be too late, but it is time to wake up.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The esteemed Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. President, I rise to add my voice for the 
bipartisan disapproval of the President's nuclear agreement with Iran 
that we have been debating all week and that we will continue to 
debate. I do so in the spirit that resulted in 83 U.S. Senators from 
both sides of the aisle writing a letter just last year to the 
President of the United States. This letter hasn't gotten a lot of 
attention in this debate, and I certainly think it should.
  In that spirit, the Senate, in an incredibly bipartisan way--by the 
way, several of those Senators are still here. There were 41 Democrats, 
41 Republicans, and 1 Independent who signed this letter to the 
President of the United States saying: These are the strategic goals we 
want in this agreement, these are the goals we should have for the 
security of the United States, and these are the goals we think will 
protect America and our allies. None of these have been met in the 
nuclear agreement we have been debating. This letter says that Iran 
must dismantle its nuclear weapons program and it must be prevented 
from ever having a path to a nuclear bomb. It also states that Iran 
should have no inherent right to enrichment.
  I commend my colleagues to reread this letter. The President's 
nuclear deal clearly does not meet the goals that are laid out in the 
letter. Nonetheless, it has become clear that a number of Senators on 
the other side of the aisle are going to vote to support the 
President's agreement despite having signed that letter. That is going 
to be a personal decision for them, but if you are a signatory, you 
ought to take another look at the letter you signed to the President 
and the American people in 2014.
  I will lay out a few of my concerns about the deal. I think many of 
my colleagues have done a fantastic job this week. I don't want to name 
names, but there are so many on both sides of the aisle--again, 
bipartisan--who have raised their concerns about the President's 
Iranian nuclear deal.
  One of the biggest frustrations I think so many of us have seen as we 
have done our sacred duty in this body--to read the agreement, to 
understand the details, to go to all of the hearings and briefings, to 
reach out to experts in the field--as we have raised questions about 
this agreement, what we don't get is straight talk. What we have been 
getting, unfortunately, is spin.
  I think Senator Coats did a great job yesterday of explaining how 
this agreement is filled with ambiguities, with language that allows it 
to mean so many different things to so many different people, including 
Iranians. Let

[[Page S6589]]

me provide a few examples that many of us have raised and that I have 
spoken on the floor about in the past, but I think they are important 
enough and they bear repeating.
  First, Secretary Kerry came and said to us: There is no grandfather 
clause in this agreement. So we see Europeans rushing now to invest in 
Iran. The Secretary said there is no grandfather clause. Here is what 
paragraph 37 of the agreement says:

       In such an event that sanctions are reimposed, the 
     provisions in this paragraph would not apply with retroactive 
     effect to contracts signed between any party in Iran or 
     Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of 
     application.

  That sure sounds like a grandfather clause to me, but we are told it 
is not.
  Second, there has been much talk about this snapback provision, but 
there is no provision in this agreement that says ``snap back.'' We 
talked about how we are going to immediately increase sanctions 
overnight.
  I had the opportunity to be a part of the Bush administration's team 
that was economically isolating Iran. We went around the world to our 
allies--we had to threaten, in many cases, our European and other 
allies to divest out of Iran. That is how we got the economic isolation 
of Iran. It took years to do this. It took years. Yet, this 
administration is saying: Overnight, despite the fact that European 
companies are already in Tehran investing, we are going to snapback 
sanctions overnight. It is not a snap. Divestiture out of Iran is a 
slog, and it will take years, again. The snapback is a fallacy.
  Finally, Senator Ayotte and others have done a great job of raising 
questions about a basic scenario that is laid out--very important--with 
regard to other paragraphs in this agreement. In an important 
hypothetical, which is actually very likely, we have asked Secretary 
Kerry and Secretary Lew--a number of us: Let's assume sanctions are 
lifted. In six to nine months, the economy starts humming, the Annex II 
sanctions are lifted, is Iran still a sponsor of terrorism--the world's 
largest sponsor of terrorism--and they commit an act of terror. This 
body goes to reimpose sanctions; whoever the next President is agrees 
because of some heinous act of terrorism. What Iran can do is cite 
either paragraph 26 or paragraph 37 that states: ``If sanctions are 
reinstated, in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to 
cease performing its commitments'' under the entire agreement.
  So what happens? We resanction Iran for a terrorist action that they 
are likely to take. They say: Hey, we can legally walk. Read paragraph 
26. Read paragraph 37. Read our letter to the U.N. Security Council. It 
is all laid out there. They walk, legally; the sanctions are lifted, 
they are still the No. 1 sponsor of terrorism in the world, their 
economy is humming, and they are on the verge of getting a nuclear 
weapon.
  We have asked that question to the administration leaders who 
negotiated this deal time and time again, and they have never given us 
an answer as to why that is not a correct reading of this agreement--
because it is.
  These are just a few examples. Many of my colleagues have done an 
outstanding job of looking at different parts of this agreement and 
expressing our concerns, but just as important is what our constituents 
think. What do Alaskans think? What do the American people think? Like 
all of my colleagues, I spent my recess back home in Alaska, and I 
spoke to hundreds of my fellow Alaskans at townhall meetings, 
roundtable discussions, our State fair.
  Remarkably, I did not have one Alaskan come up to me saying: I really 
think you should support that Iranian nuclear deal of the President's. 
Every single interaction I had was in opposition to this agreement, and 
it was visceral, particularly among Alaska veterans. We are a proud 
State. We have the largest number of veterans per capita of any State 
in the Union. But whether they were recent vets from Iraq or 
Afghanistan or Vietnam vets, they literally would look at me and say: 
What on Earth are we doing? Help me understand that, Senator Sullivan. 
What are we doing? Visceral.
  During this debate this week, even some of my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle--they are not big supporters--are using terms such as 
``seriously flawed,'' ``deeply flawed,'' ``serious concerns,'' ``falls 
short in many areas.'' Across the country, Americans are overwhelmingly 
opposed to this deal by a margin of 2 to 1. And the more the public 
knows about the deal, the more they dislike it. These poll numbers in 
terms of support are dropping. Right now, the latest poll, 21 percent 
of Americans--that is it--support this deal.
  The people are wise. They elected us to listen, and we should do so. 
They might not know all the details as some of us do, but they know--
they know--I saw it from my constituents--that something is 
fundamentally wrong with this agreement.
  So we have to ask ourselves why. Why? Why are Americans--the more the 
President and John Kerry talk about this agreement, the more Americans 
become opposed to it. And why are even the supporters, as we saw this 
week, so tepid in their support?
  Now, all negotiations require compromise. All negotiations require 
concessions. We all know this. We have negotiated. In fact, many of my 
colleagues, particularly on the other side, emphasize this. Concessions 
are part of what we do. They are part of an agreement, but at a certain 
point, concessions become humiliations. If they are too significant and 
too frequent, concessions are humiliations. No one likes to be 
humiliated, but especially proud citizens of a great Nation like the 
United States do not like to be humiliated.
  That is what I believe is going on here. This, I believe, explains 
the visceral reaction we have seen in opposition to this deal. 
Americans feel that our concessions not just to any country, but to the 
world's No. 1 sponsor of terrorism, have gone so far that they are 
humiliating to our great country. People feel that our concessions have 
gone so far, it is as if we are treating Iran as an equal, and Iran is 
not an equal to the United States of America.
  I first started to realize this and sense it during a closed briefing 
with Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman. She was sent to brief the 
Senate on the secret side deal between the IAEA and Iran involving the 
inspection regime at the Parchin military facility, long suspected as 
Iran's premier nuclear weapons facility. Senator McCain spoke about 
this briefing yesterday. For those of us--again, Democrats and 
Republicans--who went to this briefing, it was pretty remarkable, and I 
am not saying that in a positive way. It was actually unbelievable to 
have a senior member of the Obama negotiating team first begin the 
briefing by telling us she had seen this secret side deal, but she 
didn't have a copy of it, and she wasn't allowed to have a copy of it 
because it was just between Iran and the IAEA. So the Iranians had it, 
they were reading it, but not us. No matter that the President had just 
signed a law--the Corker-Cardin law--that required the administration 
to provide this agreement to the Congress. No matter that the United 
States is a board member of the IAEA--not only a board member; we are 
the country that came up with the idea of the IAEA. This was an 
American initiative in the 1950s. Our board member could have demanded 
this agreement, but we were told it was just between Iran and the IAEA.
  This, of course, was an affront to the law, to the American people, 
but the worst was yet to come. Under Secretary Sherman then actually 
described the substance of this secret side deal, the essence of which 
we all know now because it was eventually leaked to the press. Here is 
the essence of that side deal: Iran will conduct the inspections at the 
Parchin nuclear facility by themselves, with no one else present. Let 
me repeat that. No one else is allowed in that facility. Iran will 
conduct the inspections by itself. They will take air samples. They 
will take environmental samples. She was literally describing Iranian 
officials with a camera filming themselves in the facility with no one 
else there, and they were going to give this film and these samples--
whose chain of custody we can't trust--to IAEA officials, who are not 
allowed in the facility.
  Every jaw in that room dropped, every Senator--Democrat, Republican. 
I remember looking around the room. We couldn't believe it. Heads were 
shaking. The U.S. Senate was stunned.
  After claims by the President that his agreement had the most 
intrusive inspection regime ever, after being told by the President 
that his agreement

[[Page S6590]]

had nothing to do with having to trust Iran--it wasn't about trusting 
Iran--we are told in a briefing by one of his top negotiators that with 
regard to the most suspicious nuclear weapons facility site in Iran, 
the Iranians will inspect themselves.
  The AP broke the story, and when they did, they stated that the 
secret side deal at Parchin will ``let the Iranians themselves look for 
signs of the very activity they deny--past work on nuclear weapons.''
  Let me repeat that. This is the AP. The side deal--that we are 
agreeing to, by the way, in the Senate, or that some of my colleagues 
are--will ``let the Iranians themselves look for signs of the very 
activity they deny--past work on nuclear weapons.''
  This secret side deal is absurd on its face. This secret side deal 
will let Iran cheat with impunity. This secret side deal is fully and 
unequivocally based on trusting the Iranians, regardless of what the 
administration officials say about the deal. And this secret side deal 
is not just some kind of concession; it is a humiliation. The IAEA has 
never done this with any country, ever--especially a country that is a 
serial cheater and continues to be the world's No. 1 sponsor of 
international terrorism.
  For these reasons alone, as Senator Perdue mentioned yesterday, the 
Senate should reject the President's deal. It certainly doesn't square 
with many of the demands in the March 2014 Senate letter from 83 U.S. 
Senators last year, one of which was: We believe Iran must fully 
resolve concerns addressed in the United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, including any military dimensions of its nuclear 
program. Well, that is not going to happen in Parchin. We believe Iran 
must also submit to a long-term and intrusive inspection and 
verification regime--83 Senators said this to the President. That is 
not going to happen at Parchin either. But these kind of absurd 
concessions go much further than the Parchin inspection side deal, and 
they are the driving force for why so many Americans reject this deal 
so overwhelmingly.

  When we agreed to lift sanctions on General Soleimani, the head of 
the Quds Force, that wasn't a concession, that was a humiliation. 
Senator Ernst said last night it was a slap in the face to our 
veterans, many of whom were killed by IEDs supplied by General 
Soleimani.
  When the leader of Russia, one of our so-called international 
partners, met with General Soleimani recently to discuss arms 
transfers, that wasn't a concession, that was an outrage.
  When the United States, in the President's agreement, states that it 
wants ``a new relationship with Iran'' and they don't respond in kind 
in the agreement but respond by saying ``Death to America'' in their 
weekly chants, that is not a concession, that is a humiliation.
  When we agree in the agreement to ``protect Iran from nuclear 
security threats, including sabotage''--that is in the agreement--that 
is not a concession, that is an outrage.
  When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says that under no 
circumstances should Iran ever obtain ballistic missiles and only days 
later the Secretary of State agrees to lift the ban on ballistic 
missiles and conventional weapons, that is not a concession, that is an 
abdication.
  When we go into minute detail in this agreement--dozens of pages on 
our obligations to lift sanctions, including our obligations to 
literally import Iranian pistachios--that kind of detail--yet we can't 
get four American hostages released, that is not a concession, that is 
a humiliation.
  Finally, when we give the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism 
upfront relief and tens of billions of dollars in a signing bonus and 
we are told by administration officials that certainly Iran is going to 
use some of those proceeds to conduct terrorism activities against 
Americans and our allies, that is not a concession, that is a 
surrender.
  It is a culmination of the so-called concessions that give our 
constituents the sinking feeling that the President's agreement is 
decidedly not in our interest. That is dangerous for our country, and 
it is the scope and number of these concessions that solidify the sense 
that during these negotiations we have slowly and subtly ceded our 
power to a country that just recently was considered the world's No. 1 
pariah state.
  When these negotiations began, every country in the world was 
standing against Iran and international sanctions were crippling them. 
That is what brought them to the table, as Senator Corker mentioned 
earlier today. And guess what. This was due not to the international 
community's leadership, not to China, not to Russia, not to the 
European Union, this was due to the leadership of the United States of 
America, the Members in the Democratic Party and Republican Party of 
the Congress, and members of the Bush administration and the Obama 
administration. That is what brought them to the table--American 
leadership, Congress, and the executive branch working together.
  Remarkably, the deal the President and the administration have 
negotiated has flipped all of this on its head. It is incredible that 
we are at this point, as if we are treating Iran as an equal, blessed 
by all the world's great powers. Make no mistake, we are, as Senator 
Cardin and others mentioned--this deal legitimizes Iran's nuclear 
program and it blesses Iran as a threshold nuclear power.
  So the question has to be asked: Why not stick the original goals set 
out by the Senate just a year ago, in 2014, in the letter to the 
President to dismantle Iran's nuclear capabilities, to prevent them 
from having enrichment capability.
  Well, according to the President, he has stated, ``There is no one 
who thinks that Iran would or could ever accept that, and the 
international community does not take that view that Iran can't have a 
peaceful nuclear program.''
  The Congress of the United States and the Senate of the United States 
thought that just a year ago. So it is remarkable that the President 
says now there is no way we can get that done. Why not go back to Iran 
and the P5+1 and get a better deal, one without the serious flaws that 
so many Members, Democratic and Republican, have stated over the last 
week?
  In a remarkable interview with the Atlantic Monthly, Secretary Kerry 
talks about how, if we sought a better deal, if he went back and sought 
a better deal--a deal, by the way, that 83 Senators said we needed to 
have--we would be ``screwing Iran and the Ayatollah, and we will be 
confirming the Ayatollah's suspicion that the United States is 
untrustworthy.'' That is a quote from the Secretary of State of the 
United States. In another interview, Secretary Kerry said he would ``be 
embarrassed'' to go out and try for a better deal.
  What is most remarkable of all is that in attempts to sell this deal 
to the Congress and the American people, the President and his team no 
longer emphasized that Iran, the world's biggest sponsor of terrorism, 
is isolated, is a pariah state, but instead they emphasized that our 
most important ally in the Middle East, Israel, is, and so, too, is the 
Congress, and so, too, will be the United States if we don't approve 
the President's deal.
  On August 5, the President stated that ``every nation in the world 
that has commented publicly supports this agreement, except Israel.'' 
And U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power, our Ambassador, recently stated, 
``If we walk away, there is no rewrite of the deal on the table. We 
would go from a situation in which Iran is isolated to one in which the 
United States is isolated.''
  This rhetoric represents a fundamental shift in a world view. We have 
been debating this Iranian deal for the past week, but we really are 
debating America's role in the world. There is a world view that is 
taking hold with this administration, one where America is no longer 
the leader of the free world but a player as part of an international 
partnership, one where we don't lead by example but are being led by 
others, one where we are leading from behind, one where we are 
embarrassed--that is in the Secretary of State's words--rather than 
steadfast, and one where we are more worried about ``screwing'' the 
head of a pariah state than standing with our most steadfast ally in 
the region, the nation of Israel.
  This kind of deal that we are debating today is what an echo chamber 
produces. This is what happens when you want a deal too badly, when you 
will

[[Page S6591]]

not walk away from the table during negotiations, when your view of 
America's leadership role in the world is tentative, tepid, and not 
confident, and this is what happens when you fail to listen to the 
American people. This is what happens. Right turns wrong, good turns 
bad, a country that recently was a pariah state, the largest state 
sponsor of terrorism, is steering the negotiations and welcomed to the 
community of nations, and top officials in the United States of America 
are afraid that we will become isolated if we demand a stronger deal 
that keeps us and our allies safe. This, in effect, is how bad and 
dangerous policy is made.
  I would like to conclude by talking about our role with regard to 
this agreement. History has shown that on most major foreign policy 
issues, when the United States of America is most effective and most 
strong is when the Congress and the Executive are working together. 
That is the way our Constitution was structured, and that has been 
America's history since the founding of the Republic. The examples 
abound from this Chamber. The Louisiana Purchase--something important 
to you, Mr. President--passed the Senate, bipartisan majority vote 24 
to 7; NATO was ratified by bipartisan majority, 82 to 13; the first 
strategic arms limitations negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
bipartisan majority, 88 to 2; even something as controversial as 
relinquishing control of the Panama Canal to Panama, bipartisan 
majority, 68 to 32.
  More recently in 2010, this body voted to further reduce nuclear arms 
with the Russians, bipartisan majority, 71 to 26.
  One common area of agreement is that everybody who has talked about 
this agreement this week on both sides of the aisle has stated it was 
one of the most important national security issues facing the United 
States in a generation, whether and how and to what degree the world's 
largest sponsor of terrorism is going to obtain a nuclear weapon.
  But perhaps for the first time in U.S. history, an agreement that is 
so grave and important for the national security of our great Nation is 
going to move forward, not with a bipartisan majority in the U.S. 
Senate but a partisan minority in both Houses. Such result will 
undermine America's strength and I believe shows a profound disregard 
for our constitutional form of government. Even the Iranian Parliament 
is going to need a majority to pass this agreement, but the world's 
greatest democracy will not, and I believe that is another humiliation.
  Finally, just a few hours ago we saw what has been a theme throughout 
this entire process--how the administration has been dismissive of the 
American people, not wanting a role for the American people through 
their representatives in Congress to weigh in on this deal.
  If the President is so proud of this agreement, he shouldn't be 
directing Democrats to filibuster it. I believe the vote we just took 
is a sad day for the U.S. Senate. If this deal was good for the country 
and our allies, I would certainly be gladly supporting it, but it is 
not, and a bipartisan majority of the Senate knows it. That is why a 
bipartisan majority of this body is voting against it. We are doing so 
because it is a bad deal, a deal that will make the world more 
dangerous, and we are doing so because the American people see that, 
too, and they are counting on us to protect them.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Ms. KLOBUCHAR. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the agreement reached 
in July on Iran's nuclear program.
  Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is one of the most 
important objectives of our national security policy. I have strongly 
advocated for and supported the economic sanctions that brought Iran to 
the negotiating table. While the agreement is by no means perfect, I 
have concluded it is our best available option to put the brakes on 
Iran's development of a nuclear weapon, and that is why I support it.
  I do this with my eyes wide open to the nature of the Iranian regime, 
including its human rights abuses, its unjustified detention of 
American citizens, its threats against Israel, and its destabilizing 
actions in the region, including its support for terrorist groups.
  Over the last several weeks, I have reviewed the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action as agreed to by the P5+1 nations and Iran. I have 
attended briefings with national security and nuclear experts. I have 
spoken with Minnesotans who hold strong views on both sides of this 
issue. Finally, I have met with the Ambassadors from the other five 
nations involved in these negotiations and asked detailed questions 
about what their countries and others would do if Congress does not 
approve the agreement.
  After a lot of thought and discussion, I have concluded that an Iran 
in possession of a nuclear weapon would make an already volatile 
situation much worse by greatly increasing the danger to Israel and our 
other allies in the Mideast. If we were to reject this agreement, Iran 
would be able to continue all of its destabilizing activities while 
continuing its pursuit of the most destructive weapon in the world.
  I have deep respect for those who hold different views on this 
subject and acknowledge that this was a difficult decision. As I have 
proven through my votes and my actions since coming to the Senate, I am 
deeply committed to protecting Israel's security, including full aid 
funding and support for security measures such as Iron Dome.
  In conjunction with my support for this agreement, I will push the 
administration and my colleagues in Congress for additional assistance 
to Israel and our other regional allies to strengthen their security. I 
will also continue to support efforts to combat terrorist groups in the 
Mideast.
  These are the reasons that led to my decision.
  First of all, I believe this agreement, while imperfect, curbs Iran's 
ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Before negotiations began in 2013, 
we were moving steadily closer to the nightmare scenario of Iran 
obtaining a nuclear weapon. Even under the pressure of massive economic 
sanctions, Iran was continuing to build its nuclear infrastructure. It 
was installing more and more centrifuges, accumulating a stockpile of 
enriched uranium, and building a reactor capable of producing spent 
fuel that can be reprocessed into plutonium.
  That point deserves to be emphasized. The situation prior to the 
negotiations was not a good one. We had the strongest sanctions regime 
in place, and it has brought Iran to the table, but Iran was still on 
the path to developing a nuclear weapon. We have heard that without the 
restrictions imposed on its program, Iran could produce a weapon in as 
little as 2 to 3 months. This negotiated agreement will put the brakes 
on Iran's development of a nuclear weapon.
  As recently noted in an open letter by 29 top American nuclear 
scientists, including 6 Nobel Laureates, the agreement contains ``more 
stringent constraints than any previously negotiated nonproliferation 
framework.''
  Specifically, the agreement requires Iran to first of all give up 98 
percent of its stockpile of enriched uranium and not enrich uranium to 
the levels needed to create nuclear weapons. It would require Iran to 
disconnect two-thirds of its centrifuges, with restrictions on where 
and how it can operate the remaining ones. It limits uranium enrichment 
to a single facility. Fordow, the fortified site that Iran long sought 
to hide from the world, will be converted into a research facility. The 
core of Arak, the heavy water reactor, will be removed and filled with 
cement, rendering it unusable for the production of weapons-grade 
plutonium.
  It will open its nuclear facilities to continuous monitoring and 
allow stringent inspections of its uranium supply chain. It will 
permanently commit to never seeking, developing, or acquiring nuclear 
weapons.
  Second, if Iran cheats on this deal, sanctions can be reimposed or, 
as they say, snapped back. In addition--and this is very important to 
me--U.S. military options remain on the table, just as they were before 
the deal. We are not bringing back ships. We have not agreed to do 
anything to take the military option off the table. This agreement by 
no means limits or lessens our country's ability to use force against 
Iran if it violates this agreement and pursues nuclear weapons.
  If Iran attempts to develop a nuclear weapon, the terms of this 
agreement

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will have given us more information and more limited targets in the 
event that military action becomes necessary.
  It should also be noted that this agreement does not in any way 
constrain the ability of future Presidents or Congresses to authorize 
military force against Iran.
  Third, rejecting the agreement would lead to a splintering of the 
international partnership that has been critical to preventing Iran 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon, that has been critical to bringing 
them to the table, and that has been critical to these economic 
sanctions. They would not be nearly as effective if we had done them 
alone.
  Some have argued that we should reject this deal so we can return to 
the negotiating table. Yet, I recently met with the Ambassadors 
representing the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. 
Not one of them believed that abandoning this deal would result in a 
better deal. Instead, it would allow Iran more time to build up its 
nuclear infrastructure. The countries that have been our partners in 
this effort would no longer be unified. The sanctions regime would 
start to fray, splintering the international consensus on Iran and 
leaving its nuclear program unconstrained.
  Finally, this agreement must move in parallel with increased 
commitment to security assistance for Israel and our other allies in 
the region. In my view, the most troubling issue with this agreement 
that one my colleagues has addressed is that sanctions relief Iran will 
receive after it implements key restrictions on its nuclear program 
will provide it with additional funds, and a certain portion of those 
funds could be funneled into Iran's destabilizing activities around the 
region.
  I am deeply committed to the security of our allies and want to 
ensure that we are taking steps, in parallel with this nuclear 
agreement, to enhance our allies' ability to defend themselves. I want 
to see further enhancements of our security assistance to Israel, 
greater defense cooperation with our Arab allies, and stronger actions 
to counter Iranian militant activities.
  We are in the midst of discussing other initiatives in this Chamber 
to provide additional assistance and enhance the security of Israel and 
our allies in the region. I will work with my colleagues and the 
administration as we move forward. That is how I will end. I call upon 
the administration and all of my colleagues to work together to help 
ensure that this agreement works and to help ensure that we provide the 
assistance necessary to protect Israel and our allies.
  As I said earlier, I have deep respect for people who have different 
views. We have had a lengthy debate. We have looked at this agreement 
now for over a month and had time to ask questions of the Energy 
Secretary and the Secretary of State and anyone we could about this 
agreement. So the time is now here where I believe this agreement 
should be approved. And, again, we have different views. I think it is 
very important, given the heated nature at times of this debate, that 
we come together when this is over to stand up for Israel, our beacon 
of democracy in the Mideast, and continue to work together on a 
bipartisan basis on our Mideastern policy.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sullivan). The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. LEE. Mr. President, I would like to thank the majority leader for 
scheduling this debate about the agreement struck by the Obama 
administration and the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is 
important to highlight right up front what this deal is. It is nothing 
more than a political agreement between President Obama and the current 
leaders of Iran. This deal does not have the support of the American 
people, nor will it have the consent of their elected representatives 
here in Congress. At no point in the course of negotiating this deal 
did the Obama administration seek the advice and consent of the Senate 
or display any respect for the constitutional limits of the Executive 
in foreign affairs.
  Nevertheless, I am glad the Senate has been debating this agreement 
because this is how the Senate is supposed to function, on the basis of 
open and robust deliberation. I hope it is how the Senate will function 
well into the future on matters of national security and domestic 
policy.
  But if the debate we are trying to have today could be congressional 
deliberation at its best, the Obama administration's deal with Iran is 
the product of diplomacy at its worst. As the negotiations neared 
completion earlier this year, President Obama began building his case 
for the deal on the specious claim that the only alternative to the 
deal was war.
  This black-or-white setup--the notion that the art of statesmanship 
is little more than navigating a series of binary either-or 
propositions--is plainly absurd. It misses the mark. We learned this 
from the fiasco following the New START treaty in 2010. At that time, 
President Obama and Secretary Clinton warned that it was the only way 
to reset the relationship with Russia. But now, 5 years later, we know 
it was, in fact, the starting point for the worst era of U.S.-Russia 
relations since the Cold War. But the Obama administration has repeated 
this ``my way or war'' maxim with such faithful devotion and emotional 
conviction that it appears at some point along the way they began to 
believe it themselves. They actually started to believe it, even 
thought it was wrong.
  Just look at the facts regarding this deal.
  Fact No. 1: The centerpiece of the agreement is the lifting of 
significant portions of the multilateral financial, energy, and 
transportation sanctions currently imposed against Iran. Lifting these 
sanctions--lifting them prior to any meaningful action by Iran in 
exchange--will immediately give the world's largest supporter of 
terrorism access to tens of billions of dollars in currently frozen 
assets. That is just on day one. Welcoming Iran with open arms to the 
global marketplace will provide untold future riches to Tehran's 
revolutionary government.
  The current sanctions are not perfect, but they are in place for a 
very good reason: to restrict Iran's access to resources we know its 
radical leaders will use to acquire nuclear weapons and continue 
exporting terrorism not only throughout the region but throughout the 
world. This is not a matter of speculation. It is not a matter of 
hyperbole. It is exactly what Iran's own leaders have told us in no 
uncertain terms.
  Those sanctions were originally put in place in response to Iran's 
repeated violations of previous nuclear agreements. It is complete 
fantasy to believe they can be revived in the future when--not if but 
when--they cheat on this deal.
  Fact No. 2: Nothing in the agreement will prevent Iran from 
developing a nuclear weapon. It won't. Under the terms of this deal, 
the Iranian Government will be allowed to conduct research on more 
advanced nuclear centrifuges after only 8 years. After 15 years, there 
will be no limits whatsoever on their nuclear fuel production--no 
limits whatsoever. To believe that this deal will stop the Iranian 
nuclear weapons program requires an act of blind faith. In fact, it 
requires us to disregard the facts altogether.
  Fact No. 3: This agreement will increase Iran's access to 
conventional weapons and ballistic missiles. It will do this by 
providing for the removal of the U.N. conventional arms and ballistic 
missile technology embargo. If this seems out of place in an agreement 
that was supposed to be about Iran's nuclear weapons program, well, 
that is because it is. It is entirely out of place for this type of an 
agreement. It was never supposed to be part of the deal. But you see, 
in the eleventh-hour negotiations, the Ayatollah demanded it, sensing--
rightly--that the Obama administration was unlikely to object.

  This deal is not the work of savvy negotiation. No, this deal is the 
product of desperate capitulation. For years, this administration has 
been dead set on reaching a deal, any deal with the mullahs in Iran. 
That is why they got the deal they did, an agreement that fulfills a 
wish list for the Iranians and the sprawling network of terrorist 
groups that depend on their largesse, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the 
Houthis in Yemen, and Bashar al-Assad's tyrannical regime in Syria.
  And what does the United States get in exchange? Well, we get a 
promise from the Ayatollah to abandon Iran's 35-year quest for 
deliverable nuclear

[[Page S6593]]

weapons--weapons they crave for the explicit purpose, as they put it, 
of wiping Israel off the face of the Earth and fulfilling the 
aspiration of their infamous motto ``Death to America.''
  Evidently, this is good enough for the Obama administration and for 
the supporters of this deal, but it is not good enough for the American 
people--not even close.
  In fact, the public opposes the proposed deal by a 2-to-1 margin, but 
not because they are clamoring for war with Iran. The truth is that 
most Americans would prefer a diplomatic solution to the problems posed 
by Iran's apocalyptic, nuclear, ambitious theocracy. But this is not a 
diplomatic solution. This diplomacy won't solve anything.
  I would note that the public's overwhelming opposition to the Iran 
deal did not catch the Obama administration by surprise. In fact, 
public opposition to the deal was one of the primary reasons why the 
administration decided not to submit the agreement to the Senate for 
ratification as a treaty.
  When Secretary Kerry testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee just a few weeks ago, I asked him to explain why the 
agreement with Iran was not submitted to the Senate as a treaty for 
ratification--ratification requiring two-thirds of the Members of this 
body who support it. His answer was, in effect, to say that the deal 
does not amount to a treaty because it is a multilateral agreement, one 
that involves more countries than just Iran and the United States.
  But the inclusion of multiple parties to an international agreement 
has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on whether it can be considered a 
treaty. There is no shortage of examples of this, of examples of 
multilateral agreements that have been ratified by the Senate, 
including the Chemical Weapons Convention, including the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
  In fact, as I pointed out to Secretary Kerry at the time, the State 
Department's own Web site provides a definition of the word ``treaty'' 
that includes multilateral agreements, which is why I think the more 
honest and troubling answer was the one that he provided just 1 day 
earlier when Congressman Reid Ribble of Wisconsin asked Secretary Kerry 
the exact same question: Why does the Obama administration not consider 
the Iran deal to be a treaty?
  This was Secretary Kerry's response to that question asked just 1 day 
earlier in the other body. Secretary of State John Kerry said as 
follows:

       Well, Congressman, I spent quite a few years trying to get 
     a lot of treaties through the United States Senate, and 
     frankly, it's become physically impossible. That's why. 
     Because you can't pass a treaty anymore.

  This is indefensible. Secretary Kerry's appeal to expedience shows an 
ignorance of--or disdain for--both principle and precedent. The Senate 
has not lost the ability to ratify a treaty. No, the Senate is 
perfectly capable of ratifying treaties, as it did 160 times during the 
George W. Bush administration. It is just reluctant to ratify unpopular 
treaties and treaties that undermine U.S. interests. There is a 
distinction between these two types of treaties.
  From the Obama administration's perspective, this is a problem with 
the Senate. But from the perspective of the Constitution, this is the 
purpose of the Senate, and it is exactly why the framers included the 
Senate in the treaty-making process.
  Article II, section 2 of the Constitution states that the President 
``shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.''
  The sharing of the treaty-making power between the Executive and the 
Senate is not a quirk, nor is it optional. It is a constitutional 
command. Both branches are essential. They are essential to this 
process. Without both branches, you cannot make a treaty and have it 
take effect.
  The Executive is best suited to manage negotiations with foreign 
nations, but only legislative consent can grant the kind of broad 
political consensus necessary to ensure that the United States lives up 
to the terms of an agreement in the long run.
  In ``The Federalist,'' Alexander Hamilton defended the sharing of 
treaty-making power between the Executive and the Senate. He wrote: 
``The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of 
human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests 
of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its 
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of [the] 
President of the United States.''
  Of course, not all international agreements are treaties, and those 
that aren't do not need legislative consent in order to go into effect. 
But, historically, agreements that make long-term commitments or 
include significant changes to the United States' relationship to 
another country have been considered treaties and have, therefore, been 
submitted to the Senate for approval.
  As I see it, the Iran deal fits both of these categories quite 
comfortably. The terms of the deal purport to extend well beyond 
President Obama's remaining time in office. According to the 
administration's own reckoning, this agreement will fundamentally alter 
the relationship between the United States and Iran.
  People of good faith can disagree about whether the Iran deal should 
be considered a treaty or merely an executive agreement, though not on 
the farcical grounds provided by Secretary Kerry.
  But this debate is worth having. This is the debate that we should be 
having. It is worth it for the sake of our national security and for 
the health of our political institutions, and it is a debate that must 
include the Senate, just as the Constitution itself requires.
  The past few months have been a case study of the dysfunction and the 
danger that result when the Executive chooses to ignore, instead of 
engage with, the Senate in order to determine whether an international 
agreement should be considered a treaty.
  The President's go-it-alone approach has become all too familiar in 
the realm of domestic policy.
  President Obama has spent much of the last 6\1/2\ years justifying 
his will-to-power Presidency on the basis of expediency. Constitutional 
restraints and historical precedent have only slowed--never stopped--
the President's routine abuse of power to unilaterally impose his 
domestic policy preferences on the country. Now, with this Iran deal 
failing to receive the support of even half of the Senate, the 
President appears willing to extend his imperial Presidency, even to 
the area of foreign policy.
  We must do everything in our power to stop this Iran agreement from 
receiving congressional sanction. The facts are clear. This is a bad 
deal for global security, it is a bad deal for our allies--including, 
especially, Israel, our strongest ally in the Middle East--and it is a 
bad deal for the American people. But we must also learn from this 
experience.
  Later this year, the Obama administration will negotiate a major 
climate change agreement, what will be known as the Paris Protocol. 
Already the administration has indicated it does not intend to submit 
the protocol to the Senate for ratification, even though the agreement 
would call for a significant expansion of the already broad powers of 
our Federal regulatory regime.
  It would empower unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats to seize even 
more control over the American energy sector and insert themselves ever 
further into the everyday lives of the American people.
  On account of its expected size, scope, cause, and effect on the 
American economy, failure to submit the Paris Protocol to the Senate as 
a treaty would be an unprecedented and dangerous abuse of Executive 
power.
  Now is the time to make clear to ourselves, to the White House, and 
to the American people that the Senate understands and plans to defend 
the centrality of the treaty-making process to the negotiation of 
international trade agreements and the full and rightful role of the 
Senate in that important process.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from the great State of Alaska.
  Ms. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I join my colleagues this afternoon in 
speaking on a joint resolution on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action with Iran.
  I wanted to make clear my position on this agreement. We use the term

[[Page S6594]]

``deal'' in the Senate talking about the Iran deal. I almost feel like 
we need to put it in quotation marks because in my mind a deal is 
something that has been negotiated in give-and-take, back-and-forth, 
and there is an agreement that is relatively evenhanded or fair on both 
sides. I do not believe that this deal is a fair deal. I will support 
the resolution of disapproval when we have that opportunity for that 
vote.
  This is not where I hoped I would be on this because I do believe--
and I do believe strongly--that diplomacy is the way that we solve 
disagreements around the world. I think that most of us were actually 
very hopeful when the administration began negotiation some years ago 
with the aim and with the purpose that Iran would cease its nuclear 
program and end its progress toward a nuclear weapon.
  I believe that our world would be safer if we were able to achieve 
those goals--without question--and these are goals that the President 
himself articulated. He stated specifically that this was his aim.
  But, unfortunately, this agreement fails to meet those goals. Simply 
put, this agreement is not in our national interest.
  After considerable study and considering the terms of the agreement 
and the views of experts on both sides, the many closed hearings that 
we had, the many public hearings that were out there, I have concluded 
that this is not just a bad deal, but I think this is a sad deal. I 
think this is a sad time for us because of this deal.
  In fact, this is a deal that borders on capitulation and appeasement, 
a deal that rewards nuclear extortion. Those are pretty tough words, 
but that is where I feel we are--a deal which is far worse than no deal 
at all.
  I reject, absolutely out of hand, the statement from our President 
that we have no choice, that it is either this deal or it is war. That 
is a false choice, and I think it is wrong to put it that way before 
the American people.
  Certainly, these negotiations were hard. They were very difficult. 
That is the nature of these negotiations and deliberations.
  But other options do exist, and we have been on the floor for several 
days talking back and forth about them. Well, what else is there? Well, 
first, there are the sanctions that got Iran to the table in the first 
place. There are even stronger sanctions that can be imposed. There is 
continued diplomacy. It is not an apt description to say it is this 
deal or it is war.

  Before I discuss my specific objections to the agreement, I would 
like to place my views on this agreement in context with my views on 
international agreements in general. I am certainly not opposed to 
joining with international partners in making the world a better and a 
more peaceful place. On issues ranging from the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities to the new START treaty, I have 
worked with the administration. I have been there.
  I approach these issues with an open mind and an open heart, and I 
have strived to maintain an open mind on this agreement. But quite 
honestly it is hard, it is really hard, if not impossible, to maintain 
an open heart when it comes to Iran. Iran is not a country that is open 
to resetting relations with a world that clearly is seeking peace and a 
civil society. Before it entered into this agreement, Iran wasn't 
talking about a reset here, and it has shown no evidence of changing 
its ways because of where we are with this agreement now.
  We hear every day that Iran's senior leaders are leading the chant 
``Death to America.'' And they said this before the agreement. One 
would think maybe now there has been this agreement that tone would 
change. But no, despite all the efforts of Secretary Kerry and others, 
they are still chanting ``Death to America'' today. That hasn't 
changed.
  In fact, just yesterday the Supreme Leader called again for the 
obliteration of Israel. These are not rabble rousers in the street. 
These are the leaders in Iran who are calling repeatedly for ``Death to 
America'' and to wipe Israel off the map. Say what you will about the 
reportedly moderate President Rouhani, but the facts speak for 
themselves.
  We have The Washington Post's Tehran correspondent who has been in 
jail since July of 2014. Iran continues to hold him on trumped-up 
espionage charges, and he is not alone. Iran also holds an American 
pastor, a U.S. marine who traveled to Iran to visit family members, and 
it is believed to hold Robert Levinson, who was kidnapped from an 
island off of Iran's coast. Iran continues to persecute Christians and 
Baha'is in its own country. These are flagrant human rights violations.
  The facts do not suggest to me this is a regime that is ready for 
reform. I am not speaking about human rights violations that occurred 
at an early time in history. This is here, this is now. These 
persecutions, these human rights violations, these imprisonments are 
right here, right now.
  If this were not enough to cause one to question whether we can trust 
Iran to change its ways, consider this. Iran is a key funder of Hamas 
and Hezbollah, committed to the destruction of the State of Israel. It 
funds the rockets which are launched into Israel's sovereign territory 
from Gaza, southern Lebanon from Syria, and these rockets don't just 
threaten Iran's sworn enemy, the State of Israel. They also endanger 
civilian populations in the countries from which they are launched by 
inviting, if not demanding, immediate retaliation from Israel. So one 
has to ask the question: Is this a nation that is committed to peace 
and good global citizenship? Hardly. It just is not.
  I think we recognize--and the Presiding Officer, in his capacity 
before coming to the Senate, has been engaged in diplomatic 
negotiations, and he knows that in diplomacy we often end up 
negotiating with those who don't share our views, don't share our 
values. It is important for us to look at what Iran gives the world in 
return for this agreement. In light of the progress Iran has made in 
its quest to develop a nuclear weapon, it was imperative to me that an 
agreement--if we were going to get to an agreement--must not simply 
arrest Iran's nuclear ambition but require the abandonment of those 
ambitions. It had to stop those nuclear ambitions. The agreement before 
us, viewed in absolutely the most favorable light, simply does not 
accomplish this goal. At best we have pushed the pause button. At best 
it puts a pause on Iran's final preparations towards becoming a full-
fledged nuclear state.
  And even then, to regard that pause as meaningful requires me to 
suspend disbelief. I have to suspend my disbelief that Iran can be 
trusted to live up to the terms of the agreement. I must believe that 
even though Iran is not required to fully disclose the military 
dimensions of its existing nuclear program, the international 
verification mechanisms are indeed effective. I can't do that.
  I must also believe that other nations will be inclined to 
meaningfully call out Iran on violations and not simply rationalize 
them away in order to keep up the appearances this deal is working. I 
don't think that is going to happen.
  Each of these assumptions is just a bridge too far. I can't get 
there. And I hear from Alaskans, as I know my colleague in the Chair 
does, when they are asking me: Hey, what happened to these anytime, 
anywhere inspections this administration was promising? Now they are 
not there. They are asking about these snapback sanctions. It is a 
pretty catchy word, but what exactly does it mean? How feasible is it? 
Is it practicable in its implementation?
  And I can't look at them squarely in the eye and say: Sure, you can 
count on those snapback provisions to come into play. And even if we 
could get them back in, we know those sanctions would be weaker, would 
be less effective than what we have now.
  Alaskans are also asking: Well, what about these side agreements--
these side agreements between Iran and the IAEA--how is it only they 
know what is going on there?
  And we can't go back to our constituents, we can't go back to the 
good people of the great State of Alaska and say with confidence: Yes, 
we have these provisions on verification that give us that security; 
yes, snapback sanctions are practicable; no, there are no side, secret 
agreements. We can't do that.
  Before causing the release of billions of dollars in frozen Iranian 
assets and allowing sanctions to expire, I need some clear and 
convincing and unequivocal evidence this agreement will

[[Page S6595]]

achieve what it set out to achieve. Ideally, I seek Iran's commitment 
to change its ways, to act as a responsible player on the world stage. 
It was through sanctions--and we keep hearing this on both sides, 
whether you support this agreement or do not support this agreement--
that Iran was brought to the table in the first place by crippling 
sanctions. We will lose our leverage with Iran once those sanctions are 
dialed back. Whether it is 9 months or longer, we lose that leverage. 
So I am very concerned about where we are with unfreezing assets and 
releasing sanctions.
  Many of us have spoken on the floor here about how Iran will now have 
billions of dollars to spend creating further chaos in the Middle East 
or arming Israel's enemies or developing rockets which someday might be 
used to deliver nuclear weapons. You can count me as one of the 
skeptics. I do not believe Iran will choose to do good with these 
newfound sources of revenue. I do not believe that they are going to be 
putting these resources into rebuilding roads and hospitals and 
infrastructure. I am that skeptic, and I think I join many here in 
noting what we have seen even under crippling sanctions, when Iran 
didn't have access to the frozen resources and funds that will be 
available to them under the deal, they still found a way to direct and 
finance acts of terrorism throughout the Middle East. Should we give 
them more money in their hands to do more mischief? Count me as a 
skeptic.
  As you know, I focus a great deal on the energy issues as the 
chairman of the energy committee. I am very concerned about the 
opportunities this agreement affords Iran's oil sector--opportunities 
that come at the expense of America's energy producers and our overall 
economy in the near term. The Energy Information Administration here in 
Washington and the International Energy Agency in Paris estimates that 
lifting sanctions on Iran could raise Iranian output by some 700,000 
barrels per day.
  Now, we recognize that production is going to take some time to ramp 
up and to bring back online--perhaps well into next year and beyond--
but it will come. What we do have in place and ready to go is Iran's 
floating storage facilities. They are ready to go now and to move that 
oil out onto the market. And these supplies will do what? They will 
work to push down global oil prices.
  We know that will be a good thing for consumers everywhere, but what 
do we do here in this country? We ban the exports of our oil. In 
effect, we sanction ourselves. So we are going to let Iran have access 
to the global oil market, put some 700,000 barrels a day of oil out 
there, gain new revenues to help their economy, and also do whatever 
else they may do--create that havoc and chaos and mischief, and fund 
terrorism.
  We are going to see oil tankers filling up at Kharg Island instead of 
Galveston. They are going to be setting sail for our allies in South 
Korea, Japan, and elsewhere. Our diplomacy is going to benefit Iranian 
producers while our antiquated domestic export ban is going to harm 
American producers.
  This misalignment--and I have outlined it in several white papers out 
there--can be corrected. We can correct it legislatively, and the 
administration can correct it. And now that the President claims he has 
his veto-proof margin of support for the Iran deal, I think there is 
even greater urgency for this Congress to move on this issue. That is 
another issue, but I think it is important to raise. It is just one of 
the many issues that I believe demonstrates that Iran is looking at 
this as a good deal for them. They got the most out of this negotiation 
and gave the least.
  Iran's strategy of nuclear extortion has not been disabled. To the 
contrary, it has been rewarded. What do they get? What do they get? 
They get a pathway to nuclear weapons, ICBM program, conventional 
weapons, sanctions gone, and a stronger economy. It sounds like a 
pretty good deal for Iran. It sounds like a pretty good deal for Iran 
but certainly not for the security of this country and not for the 
security of our allies.
  I suspect that many of my colleagues, even some who are voting for 
this agreement, concur with my conclusion that Iran is getting a better 
deal. We have seen a flurry of comments not only in print but we have 
certainly heard great discussion on the floor that this agreement is 
flawed, it is not what we wanted, and it is not what we would have 
negotiated.
  The comments from colleagues supporting this say we have to take it 
because there is no other option here. The President has said it is 
this or it is war; there is no other option. If you don't like this 
plan, what is your plan? Then they say we can't have the administration 
walk away because American prestige will suffer if Congress forces the 
administration to walk away from this deal. This is not about American 
prestige, and this should not be about a President's legacy. This is 
about our security as a nation.
  Just this morning, I met with a family with three young girls in high 
school from Juneau, AK. They were doing a walk-through of the Capitol, 
and they came over to my hideaway. We were talking, and I let them know 
I was finishing the comments on my statement here. We got to talking 
about this agreement, and they wanted to know my position on it. I 
said: Quite simply, I cannot support an agreement that fails to make 
our Nation a safer place, that fails to make the world a safer place.
  It has been suggested that this agreement is better than no deal; in 
other words, that a bad deal is better than no deal at all. I cannot 
accept this. I cannot accept this, and I don't think this is a 
situation where we are holding out for the perfect; to use the 
expression, we can't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. I am not 
looking for a perfect deal. I am not looking for a perfect deal, but I 
am demanding one that makes our Nation a safer place--safer with the 
deal than without--and this agreement doesn't do it. I place the blame 
firmly with the administration.
  The President did not work with this Congress. He did not throughout 
the course of the negotiations try to align our expectations with the 
direction he was taking to determine what a good agreement might look 
like that we could all concur with.
  So I am not surprised that this deal remains so unpopular with the 
American public. There are a bunch of polls out there. The latest one 
from Pew says only about 20 percent of the American people support this 
agreement. I do think it is important to note that on this floor we do 
have a bipartisan majority of Members in who oppose this deal. I 
understand that is true in the House as well. I think that is 
important. And I do think it is unfortunate, with the vote we took just 
hours ago, that we are not able to get to a straight up or down vote on 
the resolution of disapproval at this point in time. The whole premise 
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act--something that 98 of us 
agreed voted for, was that we, as the representatives from our 
respective States around the country, would be able to speak yea or nay 
to this issue by way of a vote.
  The American people want Iran out of the nuclear weapons business--it 
is pretty simple--and that means dismantlement. The American people 
want their President to demonstrate backbone in the negotiations, not 
capitulation, not appeasement--not appeasement of Iran, whose leaders 
seem to take continued pride in this pattern of unacceptable and often 
reprehensible behavior. This deal simply does not get us there. That is 
why I join so many others in opposition.
  I thank the Presiding Officer for the privilege of the time on the 
floor, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to oppose this 
agreement with Iran. And they are going to have another chance.
  Traveling around Wyoming during August and part of September, I 
talked to hundreds of people. I found four who thought maybe we ought 
to give this a try--until I asked them this key question. I asked: Do 
you trust Iran? Now, I have 100 percent of the people saying no.
  A contractor who had done business in Iran said that right after he 
signed the contract over there, the Iranian who was working the 
negotiations with him said: You do realize that when you sign the 
contract is when the negotiations begin. That is whom we are working 
with on this.
  Iran's nuclear program is one of the most significant threats facing 
the

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United States and the world today. The implications of this deal will 
have serious consequences for the Middle East and especially our allies 
in the Middle East.
  Russia and China are especially interested in this deal because of 
how it changes the international playing field. The President was so 
pleased that Russia signed on. Well, of course they did. They get to 
sell unlimited arms and technology. They gave up nothing.
  Ultimately, this deal will have serious consequences for the national 
security of the United States. I ask you, Do you trust Iran?
  Several of my colleagues said there is no other alternative. That is 
how it always is with a contract or a treaty or an agreement. You have 
to vote for or against it. I am very disappointed in our negotiators. I 
don't think they were negotiators.
  I remember the President saying we would be able to have inspections 
anytime. That is just as believable as when we were going through 
ObamaCare and he said: If you like your insurance policy, you can keep 
it. Nobody got to. This is in that same category, except this is more 
serious. We are talking about world peace. We are talking about 
security.
  Sanctions brought them to the table. It was leverage. It worked. Then 
we gave that up so we could sit down and talk to them, and then we 
didn't leave the table when they wouldn't agree to things that were 
absolutely needed. What kind of negotiation is that? That is where you 
trust the Iranians?
  Iran's goal is to use its nuclear program to extort its neighbors and 
threaten its enemies, and it has made it very clear that it considers 
the United States their No. 1 enemy. We cannot afford to make the kind 
of strategic blunder that would give Iran a nuclear weapon. We should 
not give up the advantages we have that were working to prevent Iran's 
nuclear ambitions. That is why we should oppose this deal. Again I ask: 
Do you trust Iran?
  President Obama has said that if we don't accept this deal, then the 
only other option is war with Iran, but this isn't true. I don't think 
anybody believes that. It is the President's way of trying to convince 
the American people that his way is the only way--just like ObamaCare--
and that is not true.
  One of the advantages of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act that 
was passed out of the Senate committee unanimously is that by requiring 
the President to submit the deal to Congress for review, both the House 
and the Senate as well as the public can see what is in the deal--kind 
of see what is in the deal.
  I really object to the other side saying we didn't read that. We read 
what was available. I reviewed the deal. I have heard the 
administration's arguments in favor of it, and I don't believe this 
deal is the best way to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. I 
don't think it prevents them from getting a nuclear weapon.
  I have heard from experts in diplomacy, from experts in arms control 
and proliferation, from experts in the military, from national security 
and intelligence experts who say that this deal is not the only way to 
prevent Iran's nuclear ambitions. Do you trust Iran?
  I mentioned that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act is important 
because it requires the deal and all its documents to be sent to 
Congress for review, but I do understand there are separate side 
agreements between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency--and 
so far as I can tell nobody from the United States has looked at those. 
Those have not been reviewed by Congress because they haven't been 
submitted for our review. I am told these side agreements deal with the 
military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program--the parts of Iran's 
program that will allow them to launch a nuclear weapon against Israel 
or American forces in the Middle East or eventually, with enough work, 
anywhere in the world, including America. You don't sell someone a 
weapon whose intent is to kill you. Do you trust Iran?
  I am deeply concerned that we don't have all the facts about this 
deal. We need the facts about Iran's military program--facts about how 
confident the administration can be that Iran is complying with the 
rules. We should not move forward with any agreement until we have a 
full understanding of all of the components that are part of it and are 
convinced it is a good deal. Do you trust Iran?
  Understanding all of the components of this deal isn't just about the 
documents that were submitted to Congress; it is also about 
understanding what happens when Iran has the freedom and resources to 
grab for power and position in the region. Do you trust Iran?
  The administration has said this deal is a pathway to security and 
stability. Unfortunately, this administration has consistently 
misjudged critical moments in the region--most recently, for not taking 
the Islamic State seriously and developing a real strategy to defeat 
it. Agreeing to this deal is yet another example of the administration 
misjudging the difficult and dangerous situation in the Middle East by 
believing Iran will not take advantage of the situation to attack our 
allies and undermine American interests.
  There are numerous ways Iran can take advantage of this deal, such 
as--mentioned frequently--using the huge cash infusion that comes with 
this deal to support Hezbollah or buying arms from Russia. This 
agreement is not a pathway to peace or stability. It is Iran's 
springboard to grow into the Middle East's most dangerous bully.
  There is even a little provision in here that any contracts entered 
into before snapback can't be broken. How many contracts do we think 
they will hurry up and do if they get the right to do them? They will 
do every one they need to do--exactly what they want to do. Do you 
trust Iran?
  For more than a decade, the United States and our allies have used 
sanctions effectively to prevent Iran from achieving its nuclear 
ambitions. Those sanctions took years to implement and demonstrated the 
commitment of our international partners to prevent an outcome that 
would be a disaster. Under this agreement, we would be giving up those 
sanctions in exchange for the hope that we can trust Iran. It sounds to 
me like we are giving up the most important tool we have to prevent a 
nuclear-capable Iran in exchange for nothing. Do you trust Iran?
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this deal. It is not the best we can 
get. We will have another opportunity to vote. It ignores the reality 
of the complex and dangerous political situation in the Middle East, 
and it relies on nothing more than hope that Iran will keep its 
promise, despite all the times Iran has failed to do so in the past. It 
trades an effective system of sanctions that has worked to prevent 
Iran's nuclear ambition for nothing. It gives Iran everything it needs 
to pour money and resources into attacking our allies and making the 
region more dangerous. I don't trust Iran, and I didn't find anybody in 
Wyoming who does.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

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