Congressional Record, Volume 161 Issue 130 (Thursday, September 10, 2015)

[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 130 (Thursday, September 10, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H5891-H5911]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

FINDING THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH SECTION 2 OF THE IRAN
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT REVIEW ACT OF 2015

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 412, I call up
the resolution (H. Res. 411) finding that the President has not
complied with section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of
2015, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 412, the
resolution is considered read.
The text of the resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 411

Whereas section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as enacted by section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review
Act of 2015, defined the term ``agreement'' as meaning ``an
agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that
includes the United States, commits the United States to take
action, or pursuant to which the United States commits or
otherwise agrees to take action, regardless of the form it
takes, whether a political commitment or otherwise, and
regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, including
any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made
between Iran and any other parties, and any additional
materials related thereto, including annexes, appendices,
codicils, side agreements, implementing materials, documents,
and guidance, technical or other understandings, and any
related agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior
to the agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the
future.'';
Whereas section C(14) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action requires Iran to implement the ``Roadmap for
Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues
regarding Iran's Nuclear Program'' (referred to as

[[Page H5892]]

the ``Roadmap'') which was agreed to with the IAEA;
Whereas the Roadmap identifies two separate, confidential
agreements between the IAEA and Iran, one to address
remaining outstanding issues related to ``Possible Military
Dimensions'' of Iran's nuclear program, and another
``regarding the issue of Parchin'';
Whereas both of those agreements constitute side agreements
within the meaning of section 135(h)(1);
Whereas section 135(a)(1)(A) requires the President to
transmit the agreement, including any side agreements, as
defined by section 135(h)(1) to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership;
Whereas the Executive Communication numbered 2307 and
captioned ``A letter from the Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a
letter and attachments satisfying all requirements of Sec.
135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-17),
as received July 19, 2015'', did not include the text of
either side agreement with the IAEA; and
Whereas the President has not subsequently transmitted to
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership the
text of the separate agreements identified in the Roadmap:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That--
(1) the President has not complied with section 2 of the
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 because the
communication from the President did not constitute the
agreement as defined by section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954; and
(2) the period for review by Congress of nuclear agreements
with Iran under section 135(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 has not commenced because the agreement has not yet been
transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees and
leadership.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The resolution shall be debatable for 2
hours, equally divided and controlled by the chair of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the minority leader or their respective designees.
The gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) will control 1 hour. The
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) and the gentleman from Maryland
(Mr. Cummings) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce).

General Leave

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 days to revise and extend and submit extraneous materials on
this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I think we all know why we are here to debate this
resolution today. The bottom line is that, for those of us that were
involved in this agreement, we always thought that international
inspections were going to be done by international inspectors, not by
the Iranians, not by those in the Iranian regime.
Whether you like the Iran agreement or not, one thing I think all
Members can agree on is that sound verification must be the bedrock of
any viable agreement.
Iran cannot cheat and get away with it. And the reason this is an
issue for us is because Iran has cheated on every past agreement. That
is why the verification was so important.
The problem is key aspects of this verification agreement have not
been presented to Congress to review. Indeed, there are two separate
arrangements agreed to between Iran and an arm of the U.N. here, the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
One is regarding the regime's past bomb work, of which there are a
thousand pages of evidence that the IAEA tell us about, and the other
involves access to the Iranian military base at Parchin, where that
evidence shows that that testing took place.
In order to fully assess the agreement, Members of Congress should
have access to these documents. This is especially important since Iran
will almost certainly treat these arrangements as setting a standard
for future IAEA requests to access any suspicious sites, especially
military sites, since they have made it clear nobody is going to their
military sites.
Physical access by the IAEA to Parchin is critical to understanding
Iran's past bomb work. This is where ``Iran constructed a large
explosives containment vessel,'' to quote the IAEA.
Why did they do it? To conduct experiments related to the
development, say the international inspectors, of nuclear weapons. Iran
has blocked the international inspectors' access to Parchin for years.
In the meantime, we are told by those inspectors that they watch on
spy satellite as Iran bulldozes and paves over this site and then paves
over the site again.
If the international inspectors cannot attain a clear understanding
of the experimentation that took place, then the United States will
have great difficulty figuring out how long it would take Iran to rush
toward a nuclear weapon.
In recent congressional testimony, administration officials expressed
confidence in their access to suspicious sites that the agreement
provides the IAEA.
Yet, these separate arrangements have the potential to seriously
weaken our ability to verify the agreement as a whole even is true,
that Iran is going to do self-inspections here, which is what Iran
asserts.
Mr. Speaker, the history of Iranian negotiating behavior, as we know,
is to pocket past concessions. And then what do they do? They push for
more and more and more.
The separate arrangement agreed to between the IAEA and Iran
regarding inspection of the facilities at Parchin will almost certainly
be regarded by that government in Iran as a precedent for their IAEA
access to future suspicious sites in Iran.
In other words, if you don't get access to this site, you are not
going to get access to other military sites where there is evidence
that the same type of thing has occurred.
So if Iran won't let international inspectors do the international
inspecting today, what makes us think that the Iranians will allow
intrusive terms to these agreements in the future after sanctions have
been lifted when we find evidence of the next site?
I have little doubt that the side deals of today will become central
to the agreement's verification provisions tomorrow. This makes it
imperative that these agreements are made available to Congress.
Mr. Speaker, 350 Members of this House, Democrats and Republicans--I
think we had the majority of the Democrats, and I think we had every
Republican--wrote to Secretary Kerry last fall.
Iran's willingness to resolve concerns over its bomb work, as we said
in that letter, is a fundamental test of Iran's intention to uphold a
comprehensive agreement. That is why we all wrote that letter together,
in order to make that point.
The administration once took the same position that we are taking
right now on the House floor as well, but it gave that position away in
negotiations. It gave away that position.
Reviewing these side agreements is critical to understanding whether
Iran intends to pass that test. We need access to those agreements.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, after several years of difficult negotiations with a
dangerous and malevolent regime, the administration and representatives
of the other P5+1 nations reached an agreement with Iran over its
nuclear program.
The primary objective of the United States in the negotiations was to
prevent Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. Given the
unthinkable consequences of Iran, the world's foremost sponsor of
terrorism, obtaining the bomb, this has been an overriding national
security imperative of the United States for decades.
As an American and as a Jew who is deeply concerned about the
security of Israel, it is also intensely personal.
I believe our vital interests have been advanced under the agreement,
since it would be extremely difficult for Iran to amass enough
fissionable material to make a nuclear weapon without giving the United
States ample notice and time to stop it.
We will still need to guard against any Iranian effort to obtain
nuclear material or technology from proliferators abroad, a reality
even if Iran had given up all enrichment.
But the agreement likely gives the world at least a decade and a half
without the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon and without going to
war to

[[Page H5893]]

make that so. That is a major achievement.
The United States realized this objective by securing a number of
important provisions in the agreement, including the power to snap back
sanctions, in whole or in part, and not subject to a veto in the United
Nations.
The United States and its allies also procured an extensive and
intrusive inspections regime that lasts for 25 years or more. By
applying to the whole chain of the enrichment process, from the ground
to the centrifuge, it realistically precludes Iran from developing a
hidden and parallel enrichment process.
With respect to those inspections, I think it is very important to
clarify something which I often hear the opponents obscure, and that is
there are inspections with respect to Iran's prior military work,
inspections of known nuclear sites and inspections of other sites which
we may suspect Iran may conduct work in the future. And the mechanisms
with respect to each are different.
With respect to the known nuclear sites, there are 24/7 eyes on
Iran's enrichment activities that would be the most extensive and
intrusive inspections any nation has seen of its nuclear program.

{time} 1430

With respect to its potential sites--that is sites we don't know,
where we suspect in the future they may do work--we will have a
mechanism to obtain inspections in a timely way and certainly in a
timely enough way that, if they were to ever utilize radioactive
material, they would be detected.
Finally, we have the inspections into their prior military work. I
will say this with respect to the prior military work, those of us that
have reviewed the intelligence know that we have an extensive bank of
information about what Iran had been doing in the past. To the degree
that we need a baseline for what Iran's work has been, we have that
baseline, and I think that is a pivotal consideration going forward.
As recently as yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence
stated that he has great confidence that we can determine if Iran fails
to comply with the agreement.
For me, it is the size and sophistication of Iran's nuclear
enrichment capability after 15 years that is the key challenge. At that
point, it is the work necessary to produce the mechanism for the bomb
that becomes the real obstacle to a breakout, and that work is the most
challenging to detect. Nevertheless, I have searched for a better,
credible alternative and concluded that there is none.
When it comes to predicting the future, we are all looking through
the glass darkly, but if Congress rejects the deal agreed to by the
administration and much of the world, the sanctions regime will, if not
collapse, almost certainly erode.
This does not mean that Iran necessarily dashes madly for a bomb, but
it will almost certainly move forward with its enrichment program,
unconstrained by inspections, limits on research, and development of
new centrifuges, metallurgy, or other protections in the deal.
In short, Iran will have many of the advantages of the deal in access
to money and trade with none of its disadvantages. Instead of rejecting
the deal, therefore, Congress should focus on making it stronger.
First, we should make it clear that, if Iran cheats, the
repercussions will be severe.
Second, we should continue to strengthen our intelligence
capabilities to detect any form of Iranian noncompliance.
Third, we should establish the expectation that, while Iran will be
permitted to have an enrichment capability for civilian use, it will
never, never be permitted to produce highly enriched uranium, and if it
attempts to do so, it will be stopped with force.
Fourth, we will share with Israel all the technologies necessary to
maintain its regional military superiority and, if necessary, to
destroy Iran's nuclear facilities no matter how deep the bunker.
Finally, we are prepared to work with Israel and our Gulf allies to
make sure that every action Iran takes to use its newfound wealth for
destructive activities in the region will prompt an equal and opposite
reaction, and we will combat Iran's malignant influence.
The Iranian people will one day throw off the shackles of their
repressive regime, and I hope that this deal will empower those who
wish to reform Iranian governance and behavior. The 15 years or more
this agreement provides will give us the time to test that proposition.
Then, as now, if Iran is determined to develop the bomb, there is
only one way to stop it, and that is by the use of force; but the
American people and others around the world will recognize that we did
everything possible to avoid war.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Nunes), chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Speaker, although the Obama administration has pitched
the Iran nuclear accord as a way to prevent the Ayatollahs from
developing nuclear weapons, the agreement lifts the key restrictions on
Iran's nuclear activities after 10 to 15 years. Many of my fellow
Members wonder how the administration can be so naive as to pave the
way for an Iranian bomb in the course of trying to prevent an Iranian
bomb.
Well, the answer is clear to me. The President is gambling. He is
betting that the very act of engaging with Iran will moderate the
regime's behavior so that, in a decade or so from now, we won't have to
worry about it anymore. He has called his engagement with Iran a
calculated risk. Indeed, it is a risk.
As I said, the President is placing a bet; but why would anyone bet
on the moderation of the Iranian regime? It has not changed one iota
since the Ayatollahs seized power in 1979. Thirty-six years later, Iran
is the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism. It is also
responsible for the deaths of thousands of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
Obama has spoken of the Ayatollah Khamenei as possibly seeking to
rejoin the community of nations. This is a thin reed to justify giving
Iran a path to the bomb in the near future. With their ritual ``death
to America'' chants, I don't know how the Iranians could make it any
more clear that they do not want to rejoin the community of nations.
They want to blow up the community of nations.
Soon after the Iranian agreement was signed, Khamenei himself tweeted
a silhouette image of President Obama holding a gun to his head. I just
don't understand what is more clear that this regime could do to make
its intentions clearer to the American people, but our President sees
things differently.
As he told The New York Times, if the nuclear agreement is signed,
``Who knows? Iran may change.''
Well, consider this: if you are rolling the dice at a casino, who
knows? You may roll a 7. If you are at the roulette wheel, who knows?
It may land on your number. When you are gambling, one thing is for
sure; in the long run, the casino always wins.
Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, this is not about a casino, nor is it
about a gambler losing money. This is about gambling on human lives,
U.S. lives and our Western allies' lives.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey), the ranking member of the
Committee on Appropriations.
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, reasonable people disagree about the merits
and shortcomings of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
In the strongest democracy in the world, we have a sacred duty to
uphold the high standard of debate and govern responsibly. That is why
I am profoundly disappointed by vitriolic personal attacks and
character assassinations on both sides of this debate; and I am
outraged by the Republicans' attempt to score political points on this
critical issue of national and global security.
The threat to pursue wasteful litigation and to tie the hands of our
President until the end of his term are particularly outrageous, when
the Senate has indicated it will not even consider these measures. I
strongly oppose the blatantly irresponsible partisan political measures
before the House this week.

[[Page H5894]]

As ranking Democratic member of the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, I have participated in
dozens of classified and unclassified Iran briefings with the Obama
administration, including members of our negotiating team and
colleagues in Congress during the last 2 years.

I have thoroughly evaluated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
released in July, met with foreign leaders, nuclear experts, and heard
from thousands of thoughtful and passionate constituents.
After careful consideration, I will vote against approval of the
agreement. Sufficient safeguards simply are not in place to address the
risk associated with this agreement, and it will not dismantle Iran's
nuclear infrastructure.
First, in 15 years, Iran will become an internationally recognized
nuclear threshold state capable of producing highly enriched uranium to
develop a nuclear weapon.
Second, relieving U.N. sanctions on conventional arms and ballistic
missiles and releasing billions of dollars to the Iranian regime will
lead to a dangerous regional weapons race and enable Iran to bolster
its funding of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Bashar al-Assad.
Third, the deal does not explicitly require Iran to fully disclose
its previous military work before sanctions relief is provided.
Inspectors will not have anytime, anywhere access to the most
suspicious facilities, particularly the Parchin military complex, with
a process that lacks transparency and could delay inspectors access for
up to 24 days.
Finally, there are no clear accountability measures regarding
punishment for minor violations of the agreement. In recent weeks, the
administration has responded to some of my concerns by committing to
additional security assistance to Israel and our Gulf partners and to
improving international cooperation on countering Iran's nonnuclear
destabilizing activities.
I will work in Congress and with the administration to expeditiously
implement these commitments to enhance--not just maintain--nonnuclear-
related sanctions to establish stronger mechanisms to deter Iran and to
ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon.
One of my highest priorities will continue to be the protection of
Israel's qualitative military edge so that our closest ally in the
region can defend itself against all threats from Iran or its proxies.
In the same week, my colleagues, that Congress holds this important
vote, Iran's Supreme Leader vowed again to annihilate the Jewish State
of Israel and to vilify the Great Satan that he calls the United States
of America.
It is my sincere hope that we can work together in a bipartisan way
moving forward. The security of the United States of America and our
allies depends on it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), who chairs the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on the Middle East and North Africa and was the author of some of the
Iran sanctions laws that are in force today.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my esteemed chairman for his
leadership on this critical issue. I also want to congratulate Mr.
Pompeo, whose resolution we are discussing.
Mr. Speaker, this deal will allow Iran to become nuclear capable in
just a short order. It will allow Iran to grow and expand its military.
It will allow Iran to continue with its support for terror. These facts
are indisputable.
What is also indisputable is that the regime in Tehran detests the
United States, the West, and the democratic Jewish State of Israel, our
steadfast partner. The Supreme Leader of Iran constantly incites chants
of ``death to America'' and ``death to Israel.'' Are we not listening?
Through its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran seeks to make this
threat into a reality. Earlier this week, the Supreme Leader threatened
that Israel will no longer exist in just 25 years.
Because of this agreement, Mr. Speaker, the regime will now have the
weapons; it will now have the capabilities to pose an even greater
threat to us, to Israel, and to our interests in the region. Giving a
regime that openly calls for and works toward our destruction and the
destruction of Israel is insane. We are providing Iran a path to
nuclear weapons and increased conventional weapons capability.
This isn't just bad policy. It is dangerous. It is naive to think
that this nuclear deal with Iran won't make us and the world less safe,
less secure, and less peaceful. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, we must reject
it.
I thank Chairman Royce and Mr. Pompeo for this resolution.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Clyburn), the distinguished assistant Democratic
leader.
Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated between the United States, the
permanent 5 members of the United Nations Security Council plus
Germany, the European Union, and Iran.
I support this deal because it is the best available option to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, an outcome that all of us
agree must be prevented. The opponents of this agreement say that Iran
supports terrorism. I don't disagree with that.
This deal, however, is about only one issue--the issue that the
entire world agrees is by far the most pressing--preventing Iran from
getting a nuclear weapon. It is precisely because Iran is so nefarious
that this deal is so important.

{time} 1445

As dangerous as Iran is and may remain, Iran would be far more
dangerous if they acquired a nuclear weapon. This deal is the best way
to prevent that unacceptable outcome.
The opponents of this agreement say that we can't trust the Iranians
to abide by the agreement's strict restrictions on their nuclear
program. That may be true. And I wouldn't be supporting the agreement
if it required us to trust the Iranians, but it doesn't.
This deal is built around the strictest verifications ever devised.
If Iran tries to dash toward a bomb, we will be more likely to catch
them using the verification procedures under this deal than we would be
without it.
With this deal in place, if you do catch Iran dashing toward a
nuclear weapon, all options will be on the table to stop them. But
military force must always be a last resort. I have not heard any of
the opponents of this agreement present any realistic diplomatic
alternative that would be anywhere near as likely to stop Iran from
getting a nuclear weapon, and if we reject this deal, military action
will become more likely.
Whenever we send Americans into harm's way, we must be able to look
them and their families in the eye and honestly tell them that we have
exhausted every other option. This deal is a diplomatic option we must
exhaust. This deal's opponents present no other.
The late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, said: ``You don't make
peace with friends. You make it with unsavory enemies.''
We are now faced with three choices: this deal, a drastically
increased likelihood of military confrontation, or a nuclear Iran. I
support this deal, and I ask my colleagues to join me in doing so.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Smith), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, Global
Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, what was previously
unacceptable, an Iranian nuclear state, is now inevitable under the
terms and conditions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Tragically, the deal is riddled with serious flaws, gaps, and huge
concessions to Iran. Taken as a whole, the deal poses an existential
threat to Israel and other friends in the region--and is a significant
risk to the United States.
Not only is Iran now permitted to continue enriching uranium--a
previous nonnegotiable red line was no enrichment whatsoever--but under
this agreement, Iran will be able to assemble an industrial-scale
nuclear program once the agreement begins to sunset in as little as a
decade.
And make no mistake about it, Iran's decades-long rabid hatred of
Israel

[[Page H5895]]

shows no sign of abating anytime soon. Yesterday, the Times of Israel
reported that Iran's Supreme Leader said to Israel, ``You will not see
the next 25 years,'' adding that the Jewish state will be hounded until
it is destroyed.
Mr. Speaker, inspections are anything but anytime or anywhere, the
Obama administration's previous pledge to the Nation and the world. We
have learned that the IAEA has entered into a secret agreement that
precludes unfettered, robust inspection. That also violates the Corker
law. We have not gotten that information.
Mr. Speaker, Iran is the world's leading supporter of terrorism. This
agreement provides tens of billions of dollars for weapons and war-
making materiel.
The Supreme Leader also criticized any call to end its ballistic
missile program, another eleventh hour concession. The Supreme Leader
called that stupid and idiotic, and that they should mass produce such
weapons and means of delivery.
Countries build ICBMs, Mr. Speaker, to deliver nukes.
The administration was reluctant, but I held two hearings and the
chairman held several hearings on the Americans being held hostage.
Pastor Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson
remain in jail--abused, tortured, or missing. Why are they not free?
President Obama continues to tell Congress and the American people
that the Iran nuclear agreement is the best deal possible and advances
peace. Such boasting collapses under scrutiny. What was previously
unacceptable--an Iranian nuclear state--is now inevitable under the
terms and conditions of what is officially known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Tragically, the deal is riddled with serious flaws, gaps, and huge
concessions to Iran. Taken as a whole, the deal poses an existential
threat to Israel, our allies in the region--and even poses significant
risks to the United States.
Not only is Iran now permitted to continue enriching uranium--a
previous nonnegotiable redline was no enrichment whatsoever--under this
agreement, Iran will not be required to dismantle its bomb-making
technology and will have an internationally recognized, industrial-
scale nuclear program once the agreement begins to ``sunset'' in as
little as a decade.
And make no mistake, Iran's decades-long rabid hatred of Israel shows
no sign of abating anytime soon. Yesterday, the Times of Israel
reported that Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said to
Israel: ``You will not see (the) next 25 years,'' adding that the
Jewish state will be hounded until it is destroyed.
On the inspections front, Supreme Leader Khamenei has stated that he
will ``never'' permit inspectors to inspect Iran's military bases. Even
after the agreement was signed, the Iranian Minister of Defense
reportedly said that ``Tehran will not allow any foreigner to discover
Iran's defensive and missile capabilities by inspecting the country's
military sites.''
Inspections under this agreement are anything but ``anytime,
anywhere''--the Obama Administration's previous pledge to the nation
and the world. We have learned that the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) has entered into a secret side agreement to preclude
unfettered, robust inspection, and in another bizarre concession by the
Administration and our negotiating partners, even allows Iran to self-
monitor in certain circumstances.
Yet the agreement itself contains many limits on access by IAEA
inspectors to suspected sites, including a 24-day period in which Iran
is allowed to continue to refuse the IAEA's request to visit a facility
followed by a very long process needed to increase pressure on Iran to
permit access if it still blocks access by inspectors. During this
period, Iran will have sufficient time to remove, cover up, or destroy
any evidence. ``Managed access'' would be better called ``manipulated
access'' as inspectors will get access to suspected sites only after
consultations between the world powers and Iran, over nearly a month.
Given Iran's repeated cover-ups of its clandestine nuclear program,
its refusal to give the IAEA access to its Parchin military facility
(where Iran is believed to have tested detonators for nuclear
warheads), and its stone-walling the IAEA concerning evidence that it
had done extensive research and development on a nuclear explosive
device, verification is fundamental to ensure that Iran is abiding by
the agreement's terms. Secretary of State John Kerry, after an Iranian
history of refusal to allow inspections at Parchin, would only assure
us of inspections there ``as appropriate,'' whatever that means.
Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman has said that pledges by Obama
Administration officials that the agreement would guarantee ``anywhere,
anytime'' inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities were only
``rhetorical.'' Mere words without substance? Why would our allies in
the region trust us if our word--and negotiating positions--are indeed
only rhetorical flourish?
The key restriction on Iran's nuclear program--the ability to enrich
at high levels--begins to expire in as little as 10 years. Once these
restrictions expire, Iran could enrich on an industrial scale and the
U.S. and its allies will be left with no effective measures to prevent
Iran from initiating an accelerated nuclear program to produce the
materials needed for a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Speaker, the IAEA has uncovered significant evidence that Iran
has engaged in activities related to the development of a nuclear
weapon. Despite many agreements with the IAEA in which Iran has pledged
to provide satisfactory information, the IAEA has repeatedly said that
Iran has given it virtually nothing. Secretary Kerry has said that the
U.S. has ``absolute knowledge'' of Iran's past military activities
regarding its nuclear program, but Gen. Michael Hayden, the former
Director of the CIA, recently testified to Congress that the U.S. did
not have that capability.
Furthermore, as witnesses testified at a joint hearing in July by
three Foreign Affairs subcommittees, there is ample evidence that Iran
has a longstanding nuclear collaboration with North Korea. In light of
the abundant evidence they will present, what gives the Administration
certainty that the Iranians won't at some point during this agreement
acquire fissile material beyond what they are allowed to produce for
themselves or actual warheads from North Korea?
Why was the Iran-North Korea nuclear collaboration not factored into
the Iran nuclear agreement? Surely Secretary Kerry is aware of the
Iran-North Korea nuclear linkage. Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs Douglas Frantz, previously a high-ranking Kerry Senate
aide, wrote a 2003 article about Iran's ties to the North Korean
nuclear program. Are we to believe Frantz and Kerry never discussed
this issue? He dodged the question at today's committee hearing.
Mr. Speaker, in March 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1747 which, inter alia, established an embargo on
the export from Iran of all arms and related materials, thereby banning
all states and groups from purchasing or receiving arms from Iran. The
resolution also called on all states to ``exercise vigilance and
restraint'' in their supply of any items covered by the U.N. Register
of Conventional Arms to Iran.
However, reports indicate that Russia is eager to sell massive
amounts of military hardware to Iran. Major General Qassem Suleimani,
Iran's Revolutionary Guard leader, recently visited Russia. How will
this shape other regional conflicts in which Iran is currently
involved, including Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? After the conventional arms
embargo is lifted in just 5 years, what limitations, if any, will there
be on Iran's ability to export arms, specifically heavy weapons?
Besides Russia, who else will sell weapons to Iran? China?
Moreover, the Administration and its supporters of the Iranian
nuclear agreement downplay the possibility of Saudi Arabia, for
example, producing a nuclear weapon as part of a Middle East arms race.
However, the Saudis are building King Abdullah City for Atomic
Renewable Energy to train nuclear scientists and already have greater
science and mathematics capacity than Pakistan had when it developed
nuclear weapons. Why couldn't and why wouldn't the Saudis join the
nuclear arms race when faced with a more nuclear and conventionally
armed Iran? Secretary Kerry would have us believe that the Saudis and
others in the region would prefer the current agreement to an effort to
achieve a more effective one and would agree not to pursue nuclear
weapons even though Iran is on the path to develop or acquire its own.

Mr. Speaker, ballistic missiles are a central component of any
country's nuclear weapons program as they allow for the quick, accurate
delivery of nuclear weapons over long distances. While the agreement
calls for Iran to abide by all U.N. Security Council resolutions--
including the requirement that ``Iran shall not undertake any activity
related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons,''
Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's criticized the call for
Iran to end its ballistic missile program, characterizing it as ``a
stupid, idiotic expectation'' and claiming ``The Revolutionary Guards
should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the
present level. They should mass produce.''
In an 11th hour concession by the Obama Administration and others,
the agreement ``sunsets'' U.N. sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile
program after 8 years, and also requires that the European Union do the
same. U.S. intelligence estimates Iran to have the largest arsenal of
ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Congress has received expert
testimony that ``no country that has not aspired to possess nuclear
weapons has ever opted to sustain'' a costly, long-range missile
program.

[[Page H5896]]

Simply put, countries build ICBMs to deliver nukes.
Under this agreement, the Iranians have stated they are under no
obligation to stop developing ballistic missiles. In fact, this
agreement would allow them the two things they need to advance their
program: money and foreign assistance.
Iran dared to insert ballistic missiles and conventional weapons into
the nuclear negotiations without fear of disturbing the talks.
Meanwhile, the Administration was reluctant to use its leverage during
the negotiations to free the four Americans held hostage in Iran today.
Pastor Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati, Jason Rezaian, and Robert Levinson
remain in jail--abused, tortured or missing.
Mr. Speaker, the agreement requires ``full implementation'' by
October 15 of the commitments in the ``roadmap'' made by Iran to the
IAEA in their 2011 agreement, following which the IAEA is to provide
its ``final assessment on the resolution of all past and present
outstanding issues.'' However, there is no stated penalty if Iran
continues to refuse to provide sufficient information to fully answer
the IAEA's questions, which Iran cannot do without admitting it had a
secret nuclear weapons program.
Iran has repeatedly agreed to answer the IAEA's questions regarding
extensive evidence that it had a secret research and development
program regarding a nuclear device, including fitting it onto a
ballistic missile. All that resulted was the Iranians stonewalling the
inspectors.
Is the failure to resolve the possible military dimensions as
required by the IAEA a violation of the agreement? Why would Iran
provide any information now when there is nothing in the agreement to
compel it to do so?
Iran currently is the world's leading supporter of terrorism, and
this agreement provides funding that will drastically expand Iran's
regional destabilization efforts--from Israel to Iraq to Yemen to
Lebanon and elsewhere. The Administration disputes the figure of $150
billion to be released to Iran, but even a portion of that amount would
provide significant resources to fund Iran's terrorism in the region--
threatening our allies in the region and global security.
Moreover, the Administration underestimates the revenue from both
rising oil prices at some point and the tax revenues from increased
commercial investment and activity.
Congress should oppose in any way possible the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, reinstate comprehensive, robust sanctions and direct
the executive branch to resume the struggle to craft an enforceable
accord to ensure no nuclear weapons capability for Iran--ever.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Visclosky), the ranking member of the
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my strong support for the Iran nuclear
agreement.
As the ranking member of the Defense Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee, I am acutely aware of the harmful influence
Iran and its proxies have on the security situation in the greater
Middle East. However, despite my clear and deep distrust of Iran, I
firmly support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, given the
improvement it works.
This hard-fought multilateral agreement will severely limit Iran's
nuclear ambitions, establish a verifiable and robust inspection regime,
allow for the timely reinstatement of sanctions for violations of this
agreement, and in no way limit U.S. military options.
I cannot argue that the agreement is perfect, and I am frustrated at
its limited scope. However, in any negotiation, especially one among
sovereign nations, each having their own economic and security
considerations, some compromise is necessary. Critically, I believe the
agreement reached accomplishes the goal of preventing Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon.
I concur with the sentiments of my esteemed friend and former Senator
Richard Lugar, who recently wrote that congressional rejection of the
Iran deal would ``kill the last chance for Washington to reach a
verifiable Iranian commitment not to build a nuclear weapon'' and
``destroy the effective coalition that brought Iran to the negotiating
table.''
I believe it is vital for the duration of the agreement that the U.S.
leads the international community to maintain focus on Iran's
compliance and ensure that Iran does not undermine regional stability
through other pathways. To accomplish this, we must remain steadfast in
our commitments to Israel and all our regional partners.
I ask all to constructively work to improve the security situation in
the Middle East, rather than using all of their energy to undermine the
agreement. We cannot rely on force of arms alone to bring lasting
stability to any region of the world.
In conclusion, I do hope that the exhaustive multilateral negotiation
that led to this agreement will serve as a template for future U.S. and
international engagement on other outstanding issues that have led to
instability and violence in the region.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Poe), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. POE of Texas. I thank the chairman, the gentleman from
California, for his leadership on this critical national security
issue.
Mr. Speaker, this Iranian deal promises peace--peace in our time--by
guaranteeing a nuclear weaponized Iran in our children's time.
Anyone who has read the Iran Nuclear Agreement Act should support
this legislation before us. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Act, known as
the Corker bill, is to allow representatives of the American people--
us--to read what is in the deal before we vote on the deal. The nuclear
deal with Iran may be the most important international agreement in our
lifetime.
The Corker bill is crystal clear when it comes to defining exactly
what the President needs to provide Congress before the review period
of 60 days begins. The President is obligated under the law--and let me
read a portion of the law that the President signed. Here is what it
says:

Congress is allowed to have the agreement itself and any
additional materials related thereto, including annexes,
appendices, codicils, side agreements, implementing materials
documents, and guidance, technical or other understandings,
and any related agreements.

The logic behind this requirement is simple and essential: Congress
cannot review an agreement without having access to everything,
including the fine print. We need to see all the secret side deals, Mr.
Chairman.
Testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary Kerry, who
was making the deal for us, said that even he had not seen the secret
side deals. And these secret deals are not just technical formalities.
The deals I am talking about are the IAEA agreement to let Iran inspect
itself at the Parchin military facility. The Parchin facility is known
as the place where Iran has worked to build nuclear warheads.
There is absolutely nothing normal about allowing Iran to inspect
itself. That is what this side agreement apparently does, if we ever
get to see the whole thing.
I was a judge in Texas for a long time. It is like having a burglar
coming to trial and saying: ``Judge, I want 12 burglars on my jury.''
We would never let that happen, but we will let Iran inspect itself? We
want to see these side secret deals.
And these revelations may be only the tip of the iceberg. What else
is included in these secret deals, these side deals? Well, we really
don't know because we haven't been furnished--by law--these deals.
It is the legal right of Congress to know all of those details before
voting to approve or disapprove this nuclear agreement. We in Congress
are the representatives of the people. Isn't it about time we start
reading all the information before we vote? I don't know that Congress
has learned that lesson.
The citizens of this country have a right to know absolutely about
these side deals. The President signed the Corker bill. It is the law.
He has to live by it, whether he likes it or not.
And that is just the way it is.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. In 2002, the President of the United States and this
Congress voted to address the perceived threat of a mushroom cloud
coming from Iraq by going to war, a war that unleashed massive violence
in the Mideast and threatens the world even today.
The Obama administration, faced with the actual threat of a nuclear
weaponized Iran, has chosen, instead,

[[Page H5897]]

the path of diplomacy, the path of peace, and I am proud to support
this historic agreement.
As the President said: ``This deal demonstrates that American
diplomacy can bring about real and meaningful change--change that makes
our country, and the world, safer and more secure.''
Voices inside and outside the Congress are calling for a rejection of
this historic agreement, among them the same neocons who stampeded the
United States into war with Iraq. They were wrong then, and they are
wrong now. Iran is now 2 to 3 months from being able to produce a
nuclear weapon, and yet the critics have offered no credible
alternative to a deal that blocks all the paths to a nuclear weapon.
Now, we know this deal is not perfect. Iran is a bad actor. The
President and all of us would have much preferred a deal that prohibits
Iran from enriching any uranium forever and maintains sanctions until
Iran changes its behavior and becomes a responsible member of the world
community. But that deal didn't happen--because it never could have
happened.
This deal greatly improves the outlook for peace by blocking all of
Iran's paths to a nuclear weapon, and this is carefully spelled out in
the agreement itself, often in very technical language: Iran's
stockpiles of rich uranium will be reduced from enough for 10 bombs to
less than 1; the number of Iran's installed centrifuges is reduced by
over two-thirds; and far from trusting Iran, the deal demands the most
robust, intrusive inspections regime ever in an international
agreement.
We heard yesterday, many of us, from the ambassadors from five of our
allies in the P5+1. These ambassadors said if the United States walks
away, the deal collapses. Iran would be without any constraints to move
ahead with its nuclear weapons program. All paths would be open. There
would be no inspections whatsoever, no insight into Iran's activities.
The ability of the United States to build meaningful international
coalitions would be eroded for the foreseeable future.
I view this upcoming vote on Iran as one of the most important of my
career, and, my colleagues, I would say that is true for everyone. It
is one of the most important of my life. For me, the choice is clear:
diplomacy over war.
Colleagues, let's remember, nothing is off the table. But why
wouldn't we choose peace and give peace a chance?

{time} 1500

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Part of diplomacy is making certain that you have verification, and
our problem here is that the Iranians are boasting right now that the
U.S. is not going to have access--or any other international inspectors
are going to have access--to their military sites where they do this
work. The problem is that inspectors don't get 24 hours' notice; they
get 24 days' notice, and then they go through a process in which Iran
and China and Russia can block.
The former head of the CIA Michael Hayden testified in front of the
Foreign Affairs Committee that we never believed that the uranium at
Iran's declared facilities would ever make its way into a weapon. We
always believed that that work would be done somewhere else, in secret.
So again, if you cannot get international inspectors into Parchin
where they did that work, what makes you think, what makes us believe,
that in the future we are going to have international inspectors, once
that is the established premise, go anywhere else, go anywhere else?
As Hayden said, requiring consultations between the world powers in
Iran takes inspections from the technical level and puts it at the
political level, which he calls a formula for chaos, obfuscation,
ambiguity, and doubt.
And we do not even know how bad the capitulation was in the site
agreements, a capitulation that will undermine the ability to catch
Iranian cheating. That is why we are concerned about the way this was
negotiated.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr.
Pompeo), the author of H. Res. 411.
Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Chairman Royce. A great deal about what we
have learned has come out of your committee, about what we have learned
about this deal and what the Iranians' objectives are. So thank you for
all the hard work that the Foreign Affairs Committee has done related
to this agreement.
Mr. Speaker, there are lots of things to say about the Iranian deal
that this President has set up, but this bill is very narrow and very
simple and very straightforward. It is aimed to establish a simple
precedent, which says, if the President signs something into law, he is
going to fulfill the obligation which he has made for himself.
I have listened to the debate so far today. I can tell you that we
have not had any Member of this House stand up and tell you that they
have read the entire agreement. I suspect that we will not. That is
because there is no American who has read the entire agreement. That is
right--not the President of the United States, not the Secretary of
State, not Undersecretary Sherman. No Member of Congress, no member of
the public, no American citizen has read this entire agreement. And yet
we have got Members who say: This a great deal, and I am excited to
vote for it.
I don't know how one can feel that way about an agreement that one
has not read.
We have Members of Congress stand up and demand that they see the
text of bills that rename post offices, and yet this is a historic
agreement, and many of my colleagues are saying they are going to vote
for it without even knowing what the details are about important
components of how we are going to verify whether the Iranian regime has
complied with this agreement. I think that is deeply troubling.
I think, as Representatives, we have a moral obligation to understand
what it is we are voting on. I think we have a constitutional duty to
require that the President comply with his obligations, and I know
there is a legal obligation for the President to turn over every
element of this deal.
Mr. Speaker, in July, Senator Cotton and I traveled to Vienna, where
we were informed by the Deputy Director of the IAEA of these two secret
side deals. He looked us straight in the eye and said he had read them
but I wasn't going to get to.
I think that is wrong. I think that makes it impossible for a Member
of Congress to support this agreement.
He informed me--that is, the Deputy Director of the IAEA informed
me--that Iranians had read these two secret side deals, but Senator
Cotton and I weren't going to get to read them.
I have spent the intervening 50 days asking, cajoling, demanding,
praying that this President would do what he is required to do under
Corker-Cardin and what every Member of Congress is entitled to have--
that is, provide us with the deal. Well, we don't have that.
H. Res. 411 simply says we, as Members of Congress, are going to
demand that this President comply with what Corker-Cardin sets out.
Show us the terms of the deal. Allow us the opportunity to read the
agreement so that we can form judgments and the American people can
form judgments about its scope.
In the absence of that, H. Res. 411 makes clear that the President
can't lift sanctions. That was the deal. In exchange for not demanding
that this be a treaty, Corker-Cardin said what we want is simple
transparency; just show us the simple terms of the deal. And this
President couldn't do it.
I ask all of my colleagues to vote for H. Res. 411 and demand that
the President show us the secret side deals.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Becerra), the chairman of the House
Democratic Caucus.
Mr. BECERRA. I thank the ranking member, Mr. Schiff, for yielding the
time.
Mr. Speaker, the goal of America and the international community in
our negotiations with Iran is and has been to prevent Iran from
producing and possessing nuclear weapons. By all accounts, Iran had
already reached a point where it was perhaps just months away from
crossing that nuclear threshold--I repeat, months away; not years, not
decades--months away.
So few votes can be taken more seriously than one intended to halt
the spread of nuclear weapons. That is why

[[Page H5898]]

this Congress and the American people should support the agreement
negotiated to prevent Iran from producing and possessing nuclear
weapons, and we should vote here in this Congress against any of these
congressional measures attempting to thwart its implementation.
The negotiated agreement provides for inspection and verification, a
regime which Iran had to consent to and it must now submit to. That
regime for inspection and verification is not just credible, it is
enforceable, and those who have conducted nuclear inspections will tell
you that. Ask those who deal with nuclear materials, and they will tell
you that. And ask those who have butted heads with and had to negotiate
with Iran, and they will tell you that.
Our ability to respond as well, should Iran decide to regress from
its obligations, is real and it is robust. Nothing in this negotiated
agreement is based on trust. The inspections, the penalties, they all
are mandatory and unambiguous in their terms.
No deal is perfect. We can all think of ways of making a deal better.
But thinking is not doing, and speculation won't stop Iran from
reaching a nuclear weapons capability.
It should escape no one's notice that every measure, every economic
sanction in place today against Iran has failed to stop Iran's lurch
towards a nuclear weapon--remember, perhaps only months away from that
nuclear threshold.

It was time for America and our international partners to take this
to another level before the only alternative available to all of us was
the use of military force. This is why the U.S., Great Britain,
Germany, France, Russia, and China joined together to force and drive
Iran to the negotiated agreement.
How often, these days, can we utter the names of those six countries
together working for the same cause?
This agreement constitutes a meaningful and enforceable check on
Iran's nuclear ambitions and any intentions it might have to cheat.
Back in July when this agreement was reached, I stated that it ``must
constitute measurable progress in halting nuclear proliferation,
driving the region and the world further away from nuclear
Armageddon.''
The negotiated agreement meets that test, and with the support of
Great Britain, Germany, France, yes, even Russia, and, yes, even China,
we will hold Iran to that test. And that is why we should support the
negotiated agreement.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
California (Mrs. Mimi Walters).
Mrs. MIMI WALTERS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in firm
opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. This deal represents a direct
threat to the United States, Israel, and the world.
Recently, I visited Israel and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Prime Minister Netanyahu was firm in his warning--this is a very bad
deal, and it could result in grave consequences for the world.
First, this deal allows Iran to continue to enrich uranium that can
be used to develop a nuclear weapon.
Second, this deal abandons the President's promise of anytime,
anywhere inspections to a process that allows Iran to delay up to 24
days.
Third, this agreement would result in the comprehensive lifting of
the economic sanctions that have stifled Iran's quest for a nuclear
weapon.
Bottom line, this deal presents far too many risks for the U.S. and
far too many rewards for Iran. When the Ayatollah chants ``death to
America,'' he means it, and that should cause serious concern in every
American citizen.
It is time for America to wake up and understand the danger and
threat this deal presents to our national security.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
First, I want to address briefly the very strained interpretation I
think my friends are giving the Corker legislation. To accept the
arguments of the opposition to the deal, you would have to accept the
proposition that the Corker legislation requires the administration to
provide an agreement between the IAEA and Iran to which the United
States is not a party, to which the United States has no obligation,
and of which the IAEA is precluded from providing to the
administration. That seems to me a very farfetched interpretation of
the Corker legislation.
What's more, if you accept the argument that we can't have a vote on
the agreement until we have this document between the IAEA and Iran,
then why has the majority scheduled a vote on the agreement for
tomorrow? So it is inconsistent with what their own majority has
scheduled.
But finally, I don't think anyone is fooled by the nature of this
procedural motion or bill. No one expects, in the least, that anyone
who has voiced their opposition to the agreement is somehow going to
change their opinion if they have access to this private document
between the IAEA and Iran. What's more, as we know, the IAEA enters
into these agreements with individual nations around the world, so this
is not at all unique to the situation with Iran.
One final point I would like to make: We are now well into the debate
on the agreement, and for all the arguments that have been advanced as
to why we should have concerns about provisions in the agreement or
concerns about Iranian behavior, many of which I share, there is one
thing we have heard precious little about from the opposition to the
deal, and that is, what is the credible alternative?
So, I ask the question: What is the credible alternative?
And the answer, from what I am able to divine from the scarce
attention that the opposition pays to this----
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Loudermilk). The time of the gentleman
has expired.
Mr. SCHIFF. I yield myself an additional minute.
The answer, as far as I can discern from the opposition to the deal,
is this: This is how the alternative would work.
Congress rejects the deal. Congress, the administration, then,
somehow goes out and persuades the rest of the world to maintain
sanctions, even when we rejected an agreement adopted by the other
major powers, and even when those other powers tell us explicitly that
there will be no new negotiations. But somehow we maintain the
sanctions regime under this theoretical alternative.
And what? Iran gives up all enrichment and comes back to the table
prepared to capitulate everything?
That seems so fanciful, so far removed from the reality of the
situation, that it is no surprise that the opposition devotes very
little, if any, time to discussing a credible alternative, because,
indeed, there is no credible alternative.
So, again, this is why I think it is so important for us to focus on
how we can strengthen the constraints in the agreement, mitigate the
risks that we will face, and that is a much more constructive path
forward than rejection of this, seeing Iran going back to spinning up
its centrifuges, picking up where they left off at 20 percent
enrichment and going beyond, picking up where they left off with 19,000
more centrifuges and thousands of kilos of uranium.
Is that really the path we want to go down? I think not.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

{time} 1515

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
There was a credible alternative. There was a credible alternative
that this body passed by a vote of 400-20, bipartisan legislation which
the administration blocked in the Senate, legislation which would have
put that additional pressure on the regime in Iran.
Knowing that the United States is the 800-pound gorilla, knowing that
countries do not have the option and companies around the world do not
have the option of making a choice when they have to make that choice
between doing business with the United States or doing business with
Iran, they have to do business with the United States.
We have put that bill into the Senate. The administration blocked it.
That legislation would have ensured the type of pressure on Iran that
would have forced the Ayatollah to make a choice between real
compromise--real compromise--on his plan to construct a weapon or
economic collapse for that regime.
We would have had that leverage in this negotiation. That leverage
was

[[Page H5899]]

given up by this administration by blocking that bill in the Senate in
the last Congress. And, frankly, that option is still available to us.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot).
Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, tomorrow is September 11, a solemn day in our history
when thousands of Americans lost their lives in the worst terror attack
in our history.
It is disturbing that we happen to be debating whether a state
sponsor of terror should have a glide path to nuclear weapons at this
time. But we are.
I have been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee for a long
time, almost 20 years now. I chaired the Subcommittee on the Middle
East and North Africa.
I can tell you without any reservation that this deal with Iran is a
disaster. It will weaken the security of our allies in the region, and
it will make Americans less safe here at home.
If this deal goes through, Iran will receive up to $150 billion. That
is 25 times what Iran currently spends on its entire military. Does
that seem like a good idea?
We are talking about the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism
here. This money will fund more and more terror across the globe and
here.
My district is the greater Cincinnati area. GE aircraft engines is
headquartered there. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base is just up the
road. They have been top potential targets for ICBMs, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, since the cold war.
This deal allows Iran to get more sophisticated ICBM technology from
Russia, which will allow them to target not only Tel Aviv, but
Washington and New York and Cincinnati. This is just nuts.
What happened to the ``anytime, anywhere'' inspections? Gone. It will
take months to get the inspectors in. And, by that time, they will have
moved the incriminating evidence elsewhere.
The bottom line is the Obama administration wanted a deal, any deal,
more than the Iranian mullahs did. This administration was willing to
sell out Israel and our allies in the region and make us less safe here
at home.
This is a lousy, lousy deal, and it ought to be rejected.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume
just to take a brief moment to respond to my colleague from California.
I wish it were so simple that a credible alternative was the passage
of a bill in Congress that had not passed before that we could pass now
and, through the mere act of our legislation, compel the rest of the
world to join us in a new negotiation and a stronger round of
sanctions. We simply don't have that power to coerce the rest of the
world with a bill we pass here in Congress.
What is more, to imagine that a new sanctions bill will somehow force
Iran to come back to the table ready to concede its entire enrichment
program is simply not credible. If that is what we are left with, we
are really left with no really good alternative.
Again, I think that is precisely why we need to move forward with the
agreement that has been reached between the world powers and Iran.
At this point, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman
from Minnesota (Ms. McCollum).
Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, the Iran nuclear agreement is fundamental
to the national security of the United States.
I applaud the tremendous efforts of Secretary Kerry and Secretary
Moniz, who worked in concert with the world's most powerful military
and economic nations to reach a verifiable agreement that will deny the
ability of Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.
In a past era, when politics was civil and foreign policy was
bipartisan, this diplomatic agreement would have been championed by
Republicans and Democrats as a nonproliferation triumph, as it is today
in Great Britain, our greatest ally. This agreement will prevent Iran
from developing a nuclear weapon.
As an Israeli intelligence analyst has said, ``This is not about
trust and goodwill between sides. It is the strict inspection and
verification regimes that will ensure the success of the agreement.''
And if Iran violates the agreement, sanctions will ``snap back'' and
the international community together will take action.
I strongly support this agreement, and I am grateful for President
Obama's unwavering leadership in the face of hostile and unprecedented
attacks from Republicans and Israel's Prime Minister.
The New York Times calls the Republican efforts a ``vicious battle
against Mr. Obama'' and an ``unseemly spectacle of lawmakers siding
with a foreign leader against their own Commander in Chief.''
I want to be crystal clear: I support our Commander in Chief.
The Republicans and Israeli opponents of this agreement are the same
neocons who sold the war in Iraq to America based on lies, distortions,
and misinformation.
And now what do the Republicans offer as an alternative? Nothing.
They have no plan, no plan other than to kill this agreement, which
means that Iran will either obtain a nuclear weapon or the U.S. goes to
war to stop them. Well, let me tell you: I am not interested in another
Republican war in the Middle East.
Now is the time to put the national security of the American people
first. Let's reject this Republican game playing and support a tough
diplomatic agreement that will stop Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster), the chairman of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure.
Mr. SHUSTER. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice strong opposition to this fatally
flawed Iran deal.
By signing the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, the
President agreed to allow all documents, secret annexes, and side deals
to be reviewed by the U.S. Congress.
But, once again, President Obama has not complied with the law of the
land and, therefore, does not have the authority to waive sanctions on
Iran.

By lifting sanctions on the Iranian regime, a nation that finances
the likes of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups will receive
over $100 billion in assets and no doubt will continue to fund
terrorist organizations at probably greater levels than they are able
to do today, those terrorist organizations with the motto ``death to
America.''
Have we learned nothing from our past mistakes? The same person that
negotiated the deal with North Korea also led the discussions with
Iran.
We must ask ourselves, Is the world a safer place when unstable
nations like North Korea are testing nuclear weapons?
The number one responsibility of the United States Congress charged
to us in the Constitution is national security.
This agreement jeopardizes our security because I believe, as the
Prime Minister of Israel believes, that this will ensure that Iran will
get a nuclear weapon.
For the security of America and our friends and allies around the
world, we must oppose this agreement.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), the distinguished minority
leader.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
commend him for his extraordinary leadership as the ranking member on
the Intelligence Committee, which has served us so well.
His leadership has served us so well in this debate today and in our
deliberations leading up to this debate. It has served us well in the
ongoing as we use intelligence to protect the American people. So I
thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
I did not go to the well as usual for the leader, but I wanted to be
here because I have some materials that I want to share with you, Mr.
Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, I think today and tomorrow, the next 24 hours, is a
very, very special time in the Congress of the United States. Members
will be called upon to make a decision that affects our oath of office,
to protect and support the Constitution and, of course, the American
people.
This is a moment that we are prepared for. That is what I have this

[[Page H5900]]

binder here for, to say I commend my colleagues because they have spent
thousands of hours reviewing the agreement, reviewing the annexes and
the classified materials, speaking with experts, gaining information,
acquiring validation from outside sources other than the administration
and the agreement itself, conversations with each other, conversations
with their constituents, all to have, again, a sense of humility that
we all don't know everything about this subject.
And we have to get our assurances from those whose judgment we
respect, as well as to support this agreement on the merits. It is a
very fine agreement.
I will take a moment just to talk about my own credentials because I
see that people are doing that in their statements. I read with
interest Senator Menendez' statement where he talks about his service
in the Senate, and I will talk about mine in the House.
For over 20 years, I have served as a member of the Intelligence
Committee both as a member of the committee, as the top Democrat on the
committee, and as the Speaker and leader ex officio over the years,
longer than anyone in the history of the Congress.
I went to the Intelligence Committee because I had a major concern
which sprang from my district, which was a very big interest there in
stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Plowshares, an organization dedicated to that purpose, was founded
there. They saluted President Reagan and the actions that he took when
he was President. And they are very actively supporting this agreement
now.
But I mentioned my credentials because I brought that experience to
make a judgment on the agreement after it was negotiated.
Of course we were briefed, as members of the committee and members of
the leadership, on the ongoing as to the progress that was being made
in negotiations.
Again, having been briefed all along the way, I still was pleasantly
pleased to see what the final product was. What the President
negotiated was remarkable. It was remarkable in several respects.
One was that the P5, the permanent members of the Security Council,
plus one--that would be Germany--the P5 nations negotiated this
agreement with Iran: China, Russia, France, the U.K., the United
States.
This is quite remarkable, that all of those countries could come to
agreement. And an important part of that leadership was the leadership
of President Obama to have that engagement sustained over a couple-year
period.
Now, President Bush took us a bit down this path, and that is
referenced in an op-ed that was put forth by Brent Scowcroft.
When he supported this legislation, he says that ``The deal ensures
that this will be the case for at least 15 years and likely longer.''
But he talks about the fact that this has been a goal, as what Ronald
Reagan did with the Soviet Union arms control and what President Nixon
did with China. It was a negotiation.
And he talked about the fact that this particular agreement was one
that was worked on under the presidency of President Bush. Actually, he
places it in time.
So let me read his comment:
``Congress again faces a momentous decision regarding U.S. policy
toward the Middle East. The forthcoming vote on the nuclear deal
between the P5+1 and Iran (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, or JCPOA) will show the world whether the United States has the
will and sense of responsibility to help stabilize the Middle East, or
whether it will contribute to further turmoil, including the possible
spread of nuclear weapons. Strong words perhaps, but clear language is
helpful in the cacophony of today's media.
``In my view, the JCPOA''--as it is known--``meets the key objective,
shared by recent administrations of both parties, that Iran limit
itself to a strictly civilian nuclear program with unprecedented
verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the U.N. Security Council.''
He goes on for a couple of pages.
Mr. Speaker, I will submit for the Record Brent Scowcroft's
statement.

[From the Washington Post, August 23, 2015]

The Iran Deal: An Epochal Moment That Congress Shouldn't Squander

(By Brent Scowcroft)

Congress again faces a momentous decision regarding U.S.
policy toward the Middle East. The forthcoming vote on the
nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran (known as the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) will show the world
whether the United States has the will and sense of
responsibility to help stabilize the Middle East, or whether
it will contribute to further turmoil, including the possible
spread of nuclear weapons. (Strong words perhaps, but clear
language is helpful in the cacophony of today's media)
In my view, the JCPOA meets the key objective, shared by
recent administrations of both parties, that Iran limit
itself to a strictly civilian nuclear program with
unprecedented verification and monitoring by the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. Security
Council. Iran has committed to never developing or acquiring
a nuclear weapon; the deal ensures that this will be the case
for at least 15 years and likely longer, unless Iran
repudiates the inspection regime and its commitments under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
Additional Protocol.
There is no more credible expert on nuclear weapons than
Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, who led the technical
negotiating team. When he asserts that the JCPOA blocks each
of Iran's pathways to the fissile material necessary to make
a nuclear weapon, responsible people listen. Twenty-nine
eminent U.S. nuclear scientists have endorsed Moniz's
assertions.
If the United States could have handed Iran a ``take it or
leave it'' agreement, the terms doubtless would have been
more onerous on Iran. But negotiated agreements, the only
ones that get signed in times of peace, are compromises by
definition. It is what President Reagan did with the Soviet
Union on arms control; it is what President Nixon did with
China.
And as was the case with specific agreements with the
Soviet Union and China, we will continue to have significant
differences with Iran on important issues, including human
rights, support for terrorist groups and meddling in the
internal affairs of neighbors. We must never tire of working
to persuade Iran to change its behavior on these issues, and
countering it where necessary. And while I believe the JCPOA,
if implemented scrupulously by Iran, will help engage Tehran
constructively on regional issues, we must always remember
that its sole purpose is to halt the country's nuclear
weapons activities.
Israel's security, an abiding U.S. concern, will be
enhanced by the full implementation of the nuclear deal. Iran
is fully implementing the interim agreement that has placed
strict limits on its nuclear program since January 2014 while
the final agreement was being negotiated. If Iran
demonstrates the same resolve under the JCPOA, the world will
be a much safer place. And if it does not, we will know in
time to react appropriately.
Let us not forget that Israel is the only country in the
Middle East with overwhelming retaliatory capability. I have
no doubt that Iran's leaders are well aware of Israel's
military capabilities. Similarly, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) members have impressive conventional
militaries, and the United States is committed to enhancing
their capabilities.
Congress rightfully is conducting a full review and hearing
from proponents and opponents of the nuclear deal. However,
the seeming effort to make the JCPOA the ultimate test of
Congress's commitment to Israel is probably unprecedented in
the annals of relations between two vibrant democracies. Let
us be clear: There is no credible alternative were Congress
to prevent U.S. participation in the nuclear deal. If we walk
away, we walk away alone. The world's leading powers worked
together effectively because of U.S. leadership. To turn our
back on this accomplishment would be an abdication of the
United States' unique role and responsibility, incurring
justified dismay among our allies and friends. We would lose
all leverage over Iran's nuclear activities. The
international sanctions regime would dissolve. And no member
of Congress should be under the illusion that another U.S.
invasion of the Middle East would be helpful.
So I urge strongly that Congress support this agreement.
But there is more that Congress should do. Implementation and
verification will be the key to success, and Congress has an
important role. It should ensure that the International
Atomic Energy Agency, other relevant bodies and U.S.
intelligence agencies have all the resources necessary to
facilitate inspection and monitor compliance. Congress should
ensure that military assistance, ballistic missile defense
and training commitments that the United States made to GCC
leaders at Camp David in May are fully funded and implemented
without delay. And it should ensure that the United States
works closely with the GCC and other allies to moderate
Iranian behavior in the region, countering it where
necessary.
My generation is on the sidelines of policymaking now; this
is a natural development. But decades of experience strongly
suggest that there are epochal moments that should not be
squandered. President Nixon realized it with China.
Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush realized it with the
Soviet Union. And I believe we face it with Iran today.

[[Page H5901]]

{time} 1530

Ms. PELOSI. I also want to quote another Republican--Brent Scowcroft
served in the administration of President George Herbert Walker Bush--
Senator John Warner joined Senator Carl Levin. These are two chairmen
of the Senate Armed Services Committee--one a Democrat, but before him,
a Republican, John Warner. They talk about they support this. They say:

The deal on the table is a strong agreement on many counts,
and it leaves in place the robust deterrence and credibility
of a military option. We urge our former colleagues not to
take any action which would undermine the deterrent value of
a coalition that participates in and could support the use of
a military option. The failure of the United States to join
the agreement would have that effect.

Mr. Speaker, I submit Carl Levin and John Warner's statement for the
Record.

Why Hawks Should Also Back the Iran Deal

(By Carl Levin and John Warner)

We both were elected to the Senate in 1978 and privileged
to have served together on the Senate Armed Services
Committee for 30 years, during which we each held committee
leadership positions of chairman or ranking minority member.
We support the Iran Agreement negotiated by the United States
and other leading world powers for many reasons, including
its limitations on Iran's nuclear activities, its strong
inspections regime, and the ability to quickly re-impose
sanctions should Iran violate its provisions.
But we also see a compelling reason to support the
agreement that has gotten little attention: Rejecting it
would weaken the deterrent value of America's military
option.
As former chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
we have always believed that the U.S. should keep a strong
military option on the table. If Iran pursues a nuclear
weapon, some believe that military action is inevitable if
we're to prevent it from reaching its goal. We don't
subscribe to that notion, but we are skeptical that, should
Iran attempt to consider moving to a nuclear weapon, we could
deter them from pursuing it through economic sanctions alone.
How does rejecting the agreement give America a weaker
military hand to play? Let's imagine a world in which the
United States rejects the nuclear accord that all other
parties have embraced. The sanctions now in place would
likely not be maintained and enforced by all the parties to
the agreement, so those would lose their strong deterrent
value. Iran would effectively argue to the world that it had
been willing to negotiate an agreement, only to have that
agreement rejected by a recalcitrant America.
In that world, should we find credible evidence that Iran
is starting to move toward a nuclear weapon, the United
States would almost certainly consider use of the military
option to stop that program. But it's highly unlikely that
our traditional European allies, let alone China and Russia,
would support the use of the military option since we had
undermined the diplomatic path. Iran surely would know this,
and so from the start, would have less fear of a military
option than if it faced a unified coalition.
While the United States would certainly provide the
greatest combat power in any military action, allies and
other partners make valuable contributions--not just in
direct participation, but also in access rights, logistics,
intelligence, and other critical support. If we reject the
agreement, we risk isolating ourselves and damaging our
ability to assemble the strongest possible coalition to stop
Iran.
In short, then, rejecting the Iran deal would erode the
current deterrent value of the military option, making it
more likely Iran might choose to pursue a nuclear weapon, and
would then make it more costly for the U.S. to mount any
subsequent military operation. It would tie the hands of any
future president trying to build international participation
and support for military force against Iran should that be
necessary.
Those who think the use of force against Iran is almost
inevitable should want the military option to be as credible
and effective as possible, both as a deterrent to Iran's
nuclear ambitions and in destroying Iran's nuclear weapons
program should that become necessary. For that to be the
case, the United States needs to be a party to the agreement
rather than being the cause of its collapse.
In our many years on the Armed Services Committee, we saw
time and again how America is stronger when we fight
alongside allies. Iran must constantly be kept aware that a
collective framework of deterrence stands resolute, and that
if credible evidence evolves that Iran is taking steps
towards a nuclear arsenal, it would face the real possibility
of military action by a unified coalition of nations to stop
their efforts.
The deal on the table is a strong agreement on many counts,
and it leaves in place the robust deterrence and credibility
of a military option. We urge our former colleagues not to
take any action which would undermine the deterrent value of
a coalition that participates in and could support the use of
a military option. The failure of the United States to join
the agreement would have that effect.

Ms. PELOSI. Again, I refer to the statements of my colleagues. They
are thoughtful; they are serious, and they are courageous in support of
the agreement.
I would like to thank President Obama and the entire administration
for being available as Members sought clarification to respond to their
concerns. I want to thank the President, Secretary Kerry, Secretary
Moniz, Secretary Lew, and so many others for their leadership and
availability to us in a bipartisan way in our Democratic Caucus.
For years, Iran's rapidly accelerating enrichment capability and
burgeoning nuclear stockpile has represented one of the greatest
threats to peace and security anywhere in the world. We all stipulate
to that. That is why we need an agreement.
That is why I am so pleased that we have so many statements of
validation from people. The experts say:

This agreement is one of the greatest diplomatic
achievements of the 21st century.

It is no wonder that such a diverse and extraordinary constellation
of experts have made their voices heard in support of this--again, I
use the word--``extraordinary'' accord.
On the steps of the Capitol the other day with our veterans and with
our Gold Star moms who have lost their sons, we heard the words of
diplomats and soldiers, generals and admirals and diplomats by the
score--Democrats, Republicans, and nonpartisan.
We heard from our most distinguished nuclear physicists; we heard
from those scientists, and we heard from people of faith. I would like
to quote some of them. More than 100 Democratic and Republican former
diplomats and ambassadors wrote:

In our judgment, the JCPOA deserves congressional support
and the opportunity to show that it can work. We firmly
believe that the most effective way to protect U.S. national
security and that of our allies and friends is to ensure that
tough-minded diplomacy has a chance to succeed before
considering other more risky alternatives.

That is the diplomats.
The generals and admirals wrote:

There is no better option to prevent an Iranian nuclear
weapon. If the Iranians cheat, our advanced technology,
intelligence, and the inspections will reveal it, and U.S.
military options remain on the table. And if the deal is
rejected by America, the Iranians could have a nuclear weapon
within a year. The choice is that stark.

Twenty-nine of our Nation's most prominent nuclear scientists and
engineers wrote:

We consider that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action the
United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will
advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East
and can serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation
agreements.

I quote ``and can serve as a guidepost for future nonproliferation
agreements.''

This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent
constraints than any previously negotiated nonproliferation
framework.

They went on to say more.
Mr. Speaker, 440 rabbis urged Congress to endorse the statement,
writing:

The Obama administration has successfully brought together
the major international powers to confront Iran over its
nuclear ambitions. The broad international sanctions move
Iran to enter this historic agreement.

They urge support.
Mr. Speaker, 4,100 Catholic nuns wrote to Congress stating:

As women of faith, followers of the one who said, ``Blessed
are the peacemakers,'' we urge that you risk on the side of
peace and vote to approve the Iran nuclear deal.

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew warned of the hazards of rejecting the
agreement, reminding us that foreign governments will not continue to
make costly sacrifices at our demand. I say this in response to
something that my distinguished colleague from California said:

Indeed, they would be more likely to blame us for walking
away from a credible solution to one of the world's greatest
security threats and would continue to reengage with Iran.

He went on to say:

Instead of toughening the sanctions, the decision by
Congress to unilaterally reject the deal will end a decade of
isolation of Iran and put the United States at odds with the
rest of the world.

We certainly don't want to do that.
Today, something very interesting happened, Mr. Speaker. It was a
statement put forth by U.K. Prime Minister

[[Page H5902]]

David Cameron, French President Francois Hollande, and German
Chancellor Angela Merkel. They wrote an op-ed for the Washington Post
and said:

This is an important moment. It is a crucial opportunity at
a time of heightened global uncertainty to show what
diplomacy can achieve.

This is not an agreement based on trust or any assumption about how
Iran may look in 10 or 15 years. It is based on detailed, tightly
written controls that are verifiable and long-lasting.
They went on to say:

We condemn in no uncertain terms that Iran does not
recognize the existence of the State of Israel and the
unacceptable language that Iran's leaders use about Israel.
Israel's security matters are and will remain our key
interests, too. We would not have reached the nuclear deal
with Iran if we did not think that it removed a threat to the
region and the nonproliferation regime as a whole.
We are confident that the agreement provides the foundation
for resolving a conflict on Iran's nuclear program
permanently. This is why we now want to embark on the full
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
once all national procedures are complete.

Our own President wrote to Congressman Jerry Nadler:

I believe that JCPOA, which cuts off every pathway Iran
could have to a nuclear weapon and creates the must robust
verification regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear
program, is a very good deal for the United States, for the
State of Israel, and for the region as a whole.

Many of us share the views that had been expressed by those in a
position to make a difference on this agreement.
Tuesday night, again after the votes here in this House, dozens of
Members supporting the nuclear agreement stood on the steps of the
Capitol. We were honored to be joined by military veterans and Gold
Star families, men and women whose sacrifices remind us of the
significance of putting diplomacy before war. They remind us of the
significance of this historic transformational achievement.
Congratulations. These nuclear physicists, they congratulated the
President on this agreement. I congratulate him, too.
Our men and women in uniform and our veterans and our Gold Star moms
remind us of our first duty, to protect and defend the American people.
I am pleased to say we achieve that with this agreement.
I urge my colleagues to support the agreement and to vote ``no'' on
the other items that are being put before us today.
I think we all have to, as we evaluate our decision, ask ourselves:
If we were the one deciding vote as to whether this agreement would go
forward or that we would fall behind, how would we vote? None of us has
the luxury to walk away from that responsibility.
I am proud of the statements that our colleagues have made, the
agreement the President has reached; and I know that tomorrow we will
sustain whatever veto the President may have to make.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. McHenry), the deputy chief whip and a member of the
Financial Services Committee.
Mr. McHENRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for his leadership on
this important matter of national security.
Today, I rise in opposition to this bad nuclear deal the President
has negotiated. I don't oppose it because the President negotiated it.
I don't oppose it because it was brought forth by this administration.
I oppose it because it is bad for the security of America. It is bad
for the security of the world. It is bad for the security of our most
sacred ally, Israel. It is bad for the nonproliferation strategies the
world has had to mean that we have fewer nuclear weapons on this
planet.
Now, you have to ask yourself a few basic questions: Has Iran
warranted the trust of the international community to enter into this
agreement? The answer is no. It is very clear by their actions over the
last 20 and 30 years that they should not be trusted.
Number two, we hear the Supreme Leader of Iran saying, time and
again, ``death to America and Israel.'' He has declared his nation is
committed to the destruction of Israel. He has called America the Great
Satan.
Now, how can we believe a country is fully committed to our
destruction yet, at the same time, uphold their end of the bargain? We
can't. We must oppose this agreement based off of what is best for
international security and what is best for our Nation's security.
We also have to oppose this because it will mean, during my lifetime
or during my children's lifetime, we will have more nuclear weapons,
not fewer.
This is a bad agreement, and we should reject it.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield the balance
of my time and the ability to control the time to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cummings).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, since 1998, I have had the privilege of sending a group
of high school students each year to Israel where they are paired with
Israeli teens to learn about what life is really like in Israel.
When these students return, they have learned life lessons that stay
with them forever, but just as important, they have made friendships
that will also last a lifetime.
I am a proud and strong friend and ally of Israel, and I have been
for a very long time. This is why I believe we must support the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and why I am here to oppose the
resolution. The world cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran, and I will
not stand by as Iran continues to gain ground towards that objective.
This agreement puts real, concrete steps in place to prevent Iran
from obtaining nuclear weapons, steps that have already begun to
degrade Iran's ability to produce nuclear material.
According to the independent experts, this deal ``effectively blocks
the plutonium pathway for more than 15 years.'' These experts also
assess that, without the deal, Iran may shrink its breakout time to a
few weeks or even days.
The steps outlined in the agreement complement existing prohibitions
on the development of a nuclear weapon by Iran.

{time} 1545

Under this agreement, the international community will have
unprecedented access to ensure that Iran never gets one.
This agreement will not be monitored merely according to the goodwill
of Iran. Its enforcement mechanisms are verifiable and transparent.
Under this agreement, there will be more inspectors than ever in
Iran. These inspectors will have daily access to Iran's declared
nuclear sites and will be able to have access to undeclared sites that
they suspect may be involved in nuclear activity. Inspections will be
regular, and they will be invasive. They will not be oriented around
Iranian convenience but, rather, around compliance, ensuring that the
international community remains safe and, indeed, informed.
If at any time Iran is found to be in violation of the agreement, the
full brunt of international sanctions will snap back, once again
hobbling the Iranian economy.
It is important to note that many sanctions will still be in place.
Relief will come only from those sanctions related to nuclear
activities. Bans on technology exports, restrictions against the
transfer of conventional weaponry and WMD technology, sanctions based
on terrorism activities, and bans on foreign assistance will all
continue.
Without this deal, experts estimate that Iran will have enough
nuclear material for weapons in 2 or 3 months. During negotiations,
Iran stopped installing centrifuges, but they will resume if this
agreement falls apart, potentially accelerating that timeline.
The opponents of this agreement propose rejecting this deal and
pursuing a stronger one, but that plan could have grave consequences.
If the United States rejects this deal, Iran will continue developing
more sophisticated enrichment technologies. By the time any new
negotiations begin, Iran would likely already be a nuclear state. There
is also no guarantee that Iran would return to the negotiating table
after having wasted 2 years on this agreement.

[[Page H5903]]

Is this worth the risk? I do not believe that it is. We should
support this agreement.
This agreement accomplishes a critical goal: establishing a set of
verifiable provisions to prevent Iran from developing enough nuclear
material to build a bomb.
This deal does not change, in any way, our solemn commitment to
protecting Israel, nor does this prevent us from using any other
measures if Iran should violate this agreement, including using the
full force of the strongest military in the world.
But the United States must lead not only with our military might; we
have worked diligently to achieve a peaceful resolution to this issue,
and it is time for us to show our integrity and values for which we
stand.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Sam Johnson), a true American hero who served this country
with distinction in Korea and in Vietnam and as a prisoner of war for
nearly 7 years.
Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. I thank the chairman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, at this grave hour, I come to express my opposition to
President Obama's deal with Iran.
To this day, Iran chants ``death to America.'' In fact, Iran is the
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. Its regime has the blood of
America's servicemembers on its hands.
Iran is our enemy.
The President asks us to trust Iran; but what has Iran done to earn
our trust? Nothing. This is a deal of surrender, and, with it, Iran
will go nuclear.
The alternative isn't war. The alternative is to strike a better
deal. I say this as one of the few Members of Congress who has seen
combat, who has fought two wars, and who has spent nearly 7 years as a
POW.
So I say to my colleagues on the other side of the aisle: Do the
right thing. Put country above party. Listen to the American people.
Uphold your most sacred duty--safeguard our Republic from those who
seek to destroy it. Vote this deal down.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. Norton).
Ms. NORTON. I thank my good friend for yielding to me on this
important subject for our country today and in the foreseeable future.
Mr. Speaker, while many Republicans have been trying to find a way,
just this very day, not to have a vote on the Iran agreement, I have
been searching for a way to represent my 650,000 constituents by voting
on any version offered. Five nations, whose systems differ from one
another in every conceivable way, and the United Nations have approved
this deal, but the Republicans are torn on whether to even vote on the
deal at all.
No wonder.
Left with no credible argument against the deal, itself, Republicans
have changed the subject, even knowing that Iran is close to getting
the bomb as I speak and risking the loss of U.S. international
credibility. Instead, Republicans cite side agreements. However, they
have all of the information available to any nation on all nuclear
agreements, or they cite issues not under negotiation at all, like
Iran's role in the Middle East.
Here is what my constituents cite, Mr. Speaker:
$12,000 in Federal taxes per resident--the most per capita in the
United States--but no vote on the Iran deal or on anything else on this
House floor. With statehood, D.C. would vote ``yes'' and be counted
just as Uncle Sam counts our taxes every single year.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. Pittenger), a member of the Committee on Financial
Services.
Mr. PITTENGER. I thank the chairman for yielding this time. I thank
him for his strong leadership to reject this administration's agreement
with Iran.
Mr. Speaker, this deal is a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy in the
Middle East and towards the Iranian Government. For years, the Iranian
Government has actively opposed U.S. interests in the region and has
directly financed some of the world's most oppressive terrorist groups,
most notably, Hezbollah.
As a result of this agreement, over $100 billion will be released
from repatriated oil profits back to the mullahs in Iran, and 46 banks
in Iran will now be approved to transmit money through the
international financial system. Look at what they have done previously
with their finances. We gave them $700 million a month as a
precondition just to come to the negotiations--$12 billion over a 16-
month period. You can see their footprint in Lebanon; you can see it in
Iraq; you can see it in Yemen; you can see it in Syria; you can see it
in South America.
Mr. Speaker, what we are doing today is going to translate into
increased, enhanced terrorist activities throughout the world. May we
look back on this day as one of the most consequential votes we will
take tomorrow in this Chamber, as consequential as what we did in
declaring war against Japan and Germany. May we recognize the reality
of what is taking place.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. DeSaulnier).
Mr. DeSAULNIER. I thank the gentleman from Maryland, the
distinguished ranking member of the committee.
Mr. Speaker, I want to speak as a freshman Member of this body who
has been able to learn a great deal about this difficult, difficult
area of the world--a place where America has invested too many lives
and too much money--and to talk about my journey in coming to the
decision to vote with the President and feeling like he deserves a
congratulatory note for this accomplishment in a very difficult and
complex piece of diplomacy, perhaps equal to the difficulty and the
complexity of this area of the world which has had so much turmoil and
history.
I have spent the last 60 days taking every opportunity to listen to
constituents and experts.
I, with a small group of my freshman colleagues, have been personally
briefed at the White House by President Obama. I traveled to Israel for
the first time and met with high-level Israeli officials for almost 2
hours, including with Prime Minister Netanyahu. I learned about the
3,000 years of history and animosity amongst groups and also of the
very close proximity in which those groups have lived for thousands of
years and shared their difficult history. I met with leaders of our
international coalition, and I continue to be a staunch supporter of
the U.S.-Israeli relationship as, I believe, most of my colleagues on
both sides are.
I held six townhalls--a certain measure of masochism, perhaps, by a
freshman Member--that took hours, meeting with both pro and opponents
in my district, in the San Francisco Bay Area. We received over 1,000
phone calls, emails, and constituent questions on this issue, and more
than 70 percent of them were in favor of the proposal.
Ultimately, at the heart of my decision in supporting a deal is the
possibility that this deal promotes the long-term investment in peace
on this difficult part of our planet. In addition, it creates security
and stability, ultimately, for the United States. I believe that this
accord is our best option for achieving both of those goals.
As recently as yesterday, I was able to listen to advisers and
leaders who represent our coalition partners. The sanctions regime, due
in large part to the European Union's participation, deflated Iran's
economy and forced them to the negotiating table. In 2012, Iran's
economy shrank for the first time in two decades by almost 2 percent.
This is the final proposal, I believe, if the U.S. were to withdraw.
Our coalition partners that helped negotiate this deal and create the
ability and the leverage to negotiate will not come back to the table.
Our authority and standing in the world community will be severely
diminished.
There are some who say that Iran cannot be trusted, and I think we
all agree on that. The future of this rollout is not black-and-white,
and it has many unknowns and hypotheticals on both the supporters' and
the opponents' sides. We do not know if Iran will cheat, but we do know
that oversight and compliance is strong and consequential, and
consequences for cheating will be enforced by the international
community.
In my view, it is in the national security interests of the United
States of

[[Page H5904]]

America to support this agreement. It is an opportunity to let
diplomacy work and to put it in action.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Kentucky (Mr. Guthrie), a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee
and the Education and the Workforce Committee.
Mr. GUTHRIE. I thank the chairman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my disapproval of President
Obama's deal with Iran.
I ask myself this question: Has Iran earned the right to be trusted?
We must ask this because we know there are secret deals that my
colleagues and I were not privileged to. Therefore, a vote to support
this deal is a vote to trust Iran.
The behavior of Iran's leaders over the last 30 years offers no
indication that the next decade will be any different; and now, with
these secret details, we cannot know if the deal is verifiable,
enforceable, and accountable.
The people who know Iran best trust them the least. Iran's neighbors
have already requested additional arms from the United States to
protect themselves from this very deal. Any deal should include these
three powerful principles: safety, security, stability. This deal falls
short, and I cannot support it.

{time} 1600

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, this has probably been one of the most
difficult decisions I have had to make during my time in Congress. For
the record, I still have deep reservations about the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action.
However, while it is not without flaws or risks, I believe the plan
presents our best chance to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions and protect
the security of the United States and our allies, particularly the
State of Israel.
The preamble to the agreement is both critically important and
crystal clear when it states that ``Iran reaffirms that under no
circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear
weapons.'' And we will hold Iran to it in perpetuity, as they have
committed.
Mr. Speaker, I do not trust Iran. But this agreement is built on
verification, not trust, and I believe that it includes the needed
monitoring and enforcement tools.
If Iran violates the deal in any way, increased international
monitoring will allow us to know quickly and act decisively.
Conversely, if we were to abandon this agreement despite the
international community's support, Iran's nuclear ambitions could go
unchecked, and that is not a risk I am willing to take.
Mr. Speaker, like many of my constituents, I still have significant
concerns with the agreement and with Iran's pattern of behavior,
particularly its support of terrorism.
That is why I am committed to exercising rigorous oversight of this
plan's implementation, leaving no doubt that cheating will result in
severe repercussions.
As the President has said publicly and he has reiterated to me
personally, all of our options remain on the table when it comes to
responding to failed Iranian commitments, including military options
and the reimposition of sanctions, either in whole or in part, either
unilaterally or multilaterally.
Additionally, all the terrorism-related sanctions are outside the
scope of this agreement and remain in force, and I am committed to
providing any further tools necessary to constrain Iran's destructive
nonnuclear activities.
Mr. Speaker, Congress should also establish an oversight commission
or Select Committee to ensure Iranian adherence to the deal and
recommend courses of action in response to any breach of Iranian
commitments.
This would be in addition to the Oversight Committee related to
Intelligence or the Foreign Affairs Committee or other committees,
including the Armed Services Committee that might also have
jurisdiction.
The more eyes on Iran in this agreement in making sure that they are
living up to the commitments, the better.
Mr. Speaker, we need to show our resolve and ability to execute the
fundamental objectives of the JCPOA, preventing an Iranian nuclear
weapon.
While I have deep concerns about aspects of the deal, rejecting it
now would potentially lead us down an even darker path without the
support of the international community and with severe and
unpredictable consequences.
I will vote to support this deal and what I believe is now our best
chance to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threat, our best chance
for an international community united in support of our interests, and
our best option for peace. We must give diplomacy a chance to work.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Donovan), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, I believe the House of Representatives will
stand on the right side of history in rejecting this dangerous deal. I
have asked myself, as many people in this Chamber have asked, ``Why is
this a good deal for the United States?''
Iran is holding four Americans illegally hostage in their country.
That was not part of the negotiations. Iran continues to support
worldwide terrorism. There is no restrictions on that in this deal.
Fifty billion dollars will be immediately released to the regime with
no restrictions on its use. That was not part of the deal. They
continue to develop ICBMs, intercontinental ballistic missiles, that
could reach the American mainland. There were no restrictions on that
during this deal.
We are told by the administration that, if we reject this deal, the
rest of the P5+1 will not join us. Well, last week Iran's top cleric
said America remains Iran's number one enemy.
Days after the deal was announced, Iran's Supreme Leader called for
``death of America,'' not the death of France, not the death of Great
Britain, not the death of Russia, not the death of China. It was the
death of America.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hultgren). The time of the gentleman has
expired.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield another 30 seconds to the gentleman.
Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Speaker, since when is America afraid to stand
alone?
I was one of the fortunate freshman that got to go to Israel recently
and I sat with the Prime Minister, who told us this deal guarantees
that, in 15 years, Iran will have a nuclear arsenal. Just yesterday the
Supreme Leader tweeted that Israel won't exist in 25 years.
I also visited the Holocaust Museum and, like many people who weren't
alive during that historic tragedy, I asked myself, ``Why didn't anyone
stop this?'' Well, my fear is that some day in the near future people
are going to ask, ``Why didn't America stop Iran?''
The bottom line is that this is a bad deal for America. It is a bad
deal for Israel, and it is a bad deal for the world.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time each
side has?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 14 minutes
remaining, and the gentleman from California has 27 minutes remaining.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
Kentucky (Mr. Yarmuth).
Mr. YARMUTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of this historic
agreement with Iran. It is good for America, absolutely critical for
Israel, and is a historic step toward a more stable Middle East.
We entered into P5+1 negotiations with one prevailing goal, to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That is what this
agreement does.
Under this deal, Iran can never have a nuclear weapon. I want to
repeat that because there has been a lot of false reports and
fearmongering about Iran being able to build a bomb in 10 years or 15
years. Under this deal, Iran can never have a nuclear weapon.
This is the third provision of the deal: ``Iran affirms that under no
circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear
weapons.''
Iran has agreed to never have a nuclear weapon. With this agreement
in place, we will have an unprecedented inspection regimen to guarantee
it.
IAEA inspectors will have more access in Iran than in any other
country

[[Page H5905]]

in the world. No nuclear site is off limits. They will have access
wherever they need it, whenever they need it, and at every single stage
of the process.

This agreement is built on verification and full cooperation. If Iran
fails to meet either of those standards, if at any point inspectors
believe that Iran is stonewalling or being uncooperative, the deal is
violated and strict sanctions return.
Mr. Speaker, this is a good deal, and there is no possibility of a
so-called better deal. Our partner nations have made it clear that, if
we walk away from this agreement, they will not support the tough
sanctions that have brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first
place.
That is the reality. As a result, a vote against this agreement is a
vote to weaken international sanctions against Iran. It is a vote to
allow them a clear path to a nuclear weapon, and it is a vote to make
Israel less safe and the Middle East more dangerous.
I urge my colleagues to recognize that reality, to support this
agreement and allow our President and our Nation to take these historic
steps toward a more peaceful world.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Latta).
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to
President Obama's disastrous Iran nuclear deal. This deal not only
threatens the safety and security of the United States, one of our
closest allies, Israel, it threatens the safety and security of the
entire world.
It fails to prevent Iran from eventually having a nuclear weapon, the
exact opposite of what it is intended to do. Iran now simply just has
to wait a decade before becoming a nuclear power.
In the meantime, because Iran gets everything they need and want in
return for so-called reductions in their nuclear capabilities, they can
dramatically expand their dominance in the region, build up their
ballistic missile and weapons capabilities, grow their economy and
military, and have even greater ability to fund and promote terrorism.
Mr. Speaker, can we really expect to trust a government like Iran's
whose leaders chant ``Death to America''?
I strongly advise my colleagues to oppose this horrible deal. Our
Nation and our allies deserve better.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Connecticut (Ms. Esty).
Ms. ESTY. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action not as a perfect agreement, but as the only viable path
forward to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. I do not come
to this decision lightly or easily.
Iran is a deadly state sponsor of terrorism, and the Iranian regime
has repeatedly threatened America and our close ally, Israel.
Despite decades of sanctions by the United States, Iran has come
within months of succeeding in its effort to acquire sufficient
material for a nuclear bomb.
Mr. Speaker, the question before us today is not, Is this a perfect
agreement that addresses all of Iran's dangerous behavior? The truth is
there are no perfect options in dealing with this regime.
Instead, we must ask: ``Will this agreement verifiably prevent a
nuclear armed Iran? Will this agreement advance American national
security interests in the region? Will this agreement advance the
national security of our ally, Israel?''
Through a very long and deliberate process, I have reached the
conclusion that the answer to these three questions is yes.
I believe that it is better to have this imperfect international
agreement that we can aggressively enforce than to have no agreement at
all.
During August I spent a week in Israel meeting with political and
military leaders and hearing from ordinary citizens who are deeply
concerned about Iran's intentions.
As I stood on the Golan Heights, I could see the smoke rising from
shelling in Syria. That smoke is a visible sign of the chaos and danger
in the region for both the United States and for the entire Middle
East.
I am keenly aware of the very real threats Iran poses to Israel's
security and to our national security. I share the deep concerns of
many of my constituents, of many Jewish leaders, who distrust Iran.
That is why, Mr. Speaker, I believe that, after this week's vote, we
have another critical choice to make. It is an important choice to make
for our children, our grandchildren, and our men and women in uniform.
Our choice is this: Will we come together as Americans to enforce the
Iranian nuclear agreement in the years to come?
As the Iran nuclear agreement goes into effect, we must work
together--no matter our vote this week--to enforce Iran's commitments
and to stand prepared to act decisively when Iran tests our resolve. We
cannot afford to cast a vote and walk away.
Mr. Speaker, we have the greatest opportunity to achieve stability in
the region when we lead our allies and work with other international
partners, as we did when we created the international sanctions that
have brought Iran to the negotiating table.
The Iranian nuclear agreement is the beginning of a long-term,
multinational commitment. We must stand strong with our allies. We must
commit to ensuring that the inspectors have the access and resources to
carry out the agreement.
We must stand ready to act, to lead the world to respond to signs of
cheating or other Iranian efforts to undermine its obligations.

{time} 1615

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Lance).
Mr. LANCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to urge rejection of the
underlying Iranian agreement. The President did not submit to Congress
two inspection side agreements secretly negotiated between the IAEA and
Iran.
Congress and the American people have no information on what these
secret side agreements entail, although news reports have suggested
that Iran will be able to inspect at least some of its own military
facilities.
Under the underlying agreement, the world's leading state sponsor of
terrorism--an antagonist of the United States, of Israel, and of
several Arab nations, a 35-year-old regime known for horrible human
rights abuses--will receive at least $100 billion immediately, some of
which will undoubtedly be used for terrorism.
A better underlying agreement can be negotiated, making sure Iran
does not acquire nuclear weapons or ICBMs whose only purpose can be
militaristic. It is important to note that a clear majority of the
American people and a clear majority of both houses of Congress--
Republicans and some Democrats, together the representatives of the
American people--oppose this deal.
This is the most consequential vote I shall cast as a Member of
Congress on foreign policy since I have been privileged to be here.
I urge rejection of the Iranian agreement, which is not in the best
interests of the national security of the United States.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to just clear up some things. The IAEA's separate
arrangements with Iran are not part of the agreement within the
definition of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. The separate
arrangements were negotiated between the IAEA and Iran to resolve
outstanding issues. The arrangements between Iran and the IAEA are
considered safeguard confidentials, meaning that the IAEA does not
share the information with member states.
The U.S. also has safeguard confidentials, arrangements with the
IAEA, and we would not want any member state to be able to request
access to information about our nuclear infrastructure.
Beyond that, Mr. Speaker, IAEA Director General Amano has declared
that the arrangements between the IAEA and Iran are technically sound
and consistent with the Agency's long-established practice. They do not
compromise the IAEA safeguard standards in any way.
Let's be clear. There is no self-inspection of Iranian facilities,
and the IAEA has in no way given responsibility for nuclear inspections
to Iran, not now and certainly not in the future. That is not how the
IAEA does business.
Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time I have remaining?

[[Page H5906]]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 6\1/2\
minutes remaining.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Diaz-Balart), a member of the Committee on Appropriations
and the Committee on the Budget.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak against a deal
which I believe will become one of the most dangerous mistakes in U.S.
history. This deal does not stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear program.
It recognizes and legitimizes their nuclear program in short order.
It allows Iran to develop ballistic missiles and brings an end to the
arms embargo against that regime. It frees up hundreds of billions of
dollars to fund and export terrorism. I am convinced that this deal
will also lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. This deal,
Mr. Speaker, is one of the biggest mistakes that we, our children, and
our grandchildren will pay a very dear price for.
Mr. Speaker, history will record this deal as the moment that the
United States and the world granted the largest, most dangerous sponsor
of terrorism that which it covets the most, nuclear weapons and the
means to deliver them.
I hope I am wrong, Mr. Speaker, but I fear that I am not.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to be clear that this agreement isn't based on
trust. It is based on the most intrusive verification regimen in
history. The international inspectors will have 24/7 access to
surveillance of enrichment facilities and reactors and regular
nonrestricted access to all other declared sites.
Beyond declared facilities, the inspection provisions give the
international inspectors the access they need, when they need it, to
carry out the most intrusive inspection system ever peacefully
negotiated.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Shimkus).
(Mr. SHIMKUS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SHIMKUS. Mr. Speaker, this Chamber has a lot of heroes. Sam
Johnson is one of those. I am proud to have followed him, and I salute
him.
I have been fortunate to do many things. I was an Army officer in
West Germany, a high school teacher, and a local elected official. Now,
as a Member of Congress, I am honored to cast votes for the people that
I represent.
My constituents want the President to follow the law, as is his
responsibility under article II of the Constitution. The President did
not submit all the necessary documents as required under the law. I and
my constituents want to know what is in these side agreements.
To my colleague from Maryland, those assurances are not good enough
when we are going down this path of peace and war to trust the IAEA
with no documents, not being able to see that.
Our primary responsibility here is to protect our citizens against
all enemies, foreign and domestic. This deal gives Iran more money.
They will remain the number one state sponsor of terror. They will
continue to chant ``death to America'' and ``death to Israel.'' They
will not free our citizens.
Now, we assure that Iran will get nuclear weapons; the region will go
into a nuclear arms race, and the world and the U.S. will be less safe.
This is a terrible deal, an embarrassing deal, and one we will regret
in the future.
Vote to fully disclose this deal; vote against the deal, and vote to
keep the sanctions on.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Perry), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. PERRY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding to me.
Mr. Speaker, no one wants Iran to have a nuclear weapon; I certainly
don't think the President wants them to, but I think it is clear that
they are going to. The question is when. Clearly, the President tried
to make a good deal. I don't think he thinks that Iran can be trusted,
but I do think he thinks that they won't cheat.

Mr. Speaker, the road to hell was paved with good intentions, and I
am sure that the administration had and has good intentions, but the
facts remain. Iran has been cheating, literally, for thousands of
years--or at least that region has--and certainly, we know the facts.
The facts are, for the last 36 years, Iran has cheated on every
single agreement they have signed. They are cheating at this very
moment. An agreement that is based on that, that they wouldn't cheat,
is an agreement that is fatally flawed.
Mr. Speaker, this is the same country that won't cheat, this is the
same country that leaders recognize and recommend the stoning of women,
the hanging of homosexuals, the sponsor of mass terrorism. This is the
nation that we have signed an accord with.
Mr. Speaker, the other side will tell you that this is a great
agreement with robust controls and an inspection paradigm. With all due
respect, none of us know what that is; yet the pillar of this agreement
is based upon solely that, an inspection paradigm that is so robust
that Iran can't cheat, and no one knows what it is. We are literally
voting for something and on something that we don't know what it is,
and we are being urged to vote for it.
Mr. Speaker, Iran cannot be trusted. The blood will not be on my
hands from these rockets that Hamas launches into Israel and these
American soldiers that come home in body bags in the future.
I just want to let everybody know that the blood will not be on my
hands and the hands of those who vote against this agreement.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from California (Mr. Farr).
Mr. FARR. Mr. Speaker, I have been listening to this debate all day,
and I really have to be, I guess, angered by the amount of misstatement
of fact here and about this House being so negative about this country
and about our President.
You can't get away with criticizing Presidents or leaders of other
countries being negative about us when you are standing around being
negative about our own country and our own President.
This agreement is about trust, and it isn't about trust with Iran. It
is about trust with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nobody has
spoken about what that Agency does, other than the chairman, about how
important it is.
It has been around since 1957. We helped create it. It has 2,400
employees. We probably trained most of them. They know about
inspections. They are an international organization. They don't belong
to anybody. No country owns them.
You can't go and trash all day that they have a secret agreement with
Iran when they have a secret agreement with the United States and with
Russia and with China and with all the other signatories. That is their
business. They go in and verify.
We don't allow them to go into our top classified areas without some
agreement of how you are going to handle that classified information.
They are not going to release that information to other countries. They
wouldn't have any credibility.
When you are asking that the President release that information, he
doesn't have it. He doesn't own it. It is the IAEA and Iran. What if
Iran was saying, We don't want to enter into this agreement because we
don't know what the IAEA has entered into with the United States?
Stop trashing the process. Trust this organization. We have been
proud of it for 58 years. It is the top cop on nuclear inspections, all
the 1,100 facilities around the world, nuclear power plants, military
bases with nuclear equipment, weapons. They are the inspectors. They
are the ones that trust and verify. Give them a chance.
Everybody in the world thinks this is the toughest agreement ever
negotiated. Why would we not be celebrating it? This is diplomatic
history. We have done great things here, and you want to trash it, and
you want to trash the administration. That is not America. Give peace a
chance.

[[Page H5907]]

Vote ``no'' on this awful bill.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, some of us have seen this before. Some of us were around
for the North Korean nuclear agreement, and President Obama's Iran
nuclear deal looks increasingly like the dangerous deal that we struck
with that regime in North Korea.
In 1994, the U.S. Government signed a deal with North Korea that,
according to then-President Clinton, would make the United States, the
Korean peninsula, and the world safer, in his words.
The agreement, we were told, did not rely on trust, but would instead
involve a verification program which would stop the North Koreans from
ever acquiring a nuclear bomb. That sounds familiar today.
Unfortunately, the North Korean deal had holes that you could fire a
ballistic missile through. The deal did not dismantle North Korea's
program. It committed the United States to rewarding North Korea with
large quantities of fuel oil without requiring the regime to implement
the terms.
Worst of all, the deal relied on inspection provisions that were
naive and ultimately were worthless. The predictable result was that,
on October 4, 2002, North Korea revealed it had been lying all along
and that it had continued to secretly develop nuclear weapons.
Four years later, North Korea's dictator, Kim Jong Il, ordered an
underground nuclear test, and today, North Korea is a global menace,
and it supports and sponsors terrorism, and it is the most unstable
nuclear power on Earth. There is a reason why some of us raise these
issues.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from North
Carolina (Mr. Rouzer).
Mr. ROUZER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to this
so-called Iran deal because it paves the way for Iran to obtain nuclear
capabilities that will not only threaten Israel and create an arms race
in the Middle East, but will also be a direct threat to America.

{time} 1630

Time and time again, the Government of Iran has demonstrated its
unwillingness to be transparent and open regarding their nuclear arms
development and fraudulent behavior. Let's not forget that we just
recently discovered two of their secret nuclear facilities, and who
knows how many more they have.
The sanctions relief included as part of this deal guarantees that
Iran, the world's number one sponsor of terrorism, will have billions
more to fund their evil acts. And if there is any confusion, Iran's
stated intentions of wiping Israel off the face of the Earth and its
public chants of ``death to America'' make their intentions very clear.
Mr. Speaker, America has always stood for what is right--the greatest
force for good mankind has ever known. Let's keep it that way and
defeat this agreement.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho).
Mr. YOHO. Mr. Speaker, I stand in opposition to this deal. This is a
terrible deal for America, for the Middle East, and for the world.
This is a deal that can't be verified. The IAEA, as so eloquently
talked about by my colleague across the aisle, is the same IAEA that
had their inspector buying nuclear material for North Korea.
This is a deal that will embolden Iran. It will make them stronger.
They are the number one sponsor of terrorism in the world, shouting,
``Death to America.'' When they stop having the rhetoric from their
Ayatollah and from their President saying ``death to America'' and they
start denouncing terrorism and release our hostages, then we can go
forward with this. But this will do nothing but embolden Iran, make
them stronger, and make the Middle East more unstable.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Zeldin), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.
The Congress is not on the clock, because we haven't received the
entire agreement. And for anyone out there who wants to be supportive
of this deal, let's think what the President was telling the American
public and all of us.
The House has a deal that wasn't based on trust; it is built on
verification. How do you support a deal based on verification without
knowing what the verification is?
I would be happy to yield if anyone wanted to stand up and explain
how you support a deal without knowing what the verification is. You
can't. That is why we are asking for it.
And for those who say that opposing this deal is somehow negative
towards America, I took an oath to be an officer of the United States
military, willing to fight and die in protection of our freedoms and
liberties. I love this country. I took an oath to serve here the
members of my district because I love America.
So don't tell me that somehow opposing this deal is negative toward
America. I oppose this deal because I love my country.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Roskam).
Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, did you notice something? Did you notice
that, for the past 2 years, the President of the United States has said
that if we were going to have a deal, it was going to be based on full
disclosure?
Mr. Speaker, the President said that we were going to know all of the
information. And the State Department submitted to the Congress a
document that said: Here is all the information.
But after that, Mr. Speaker, you know what we found out? There are
two secret deals. There are two secret side deals, side arrangements,
that we have not seen.
Now, think about it. There are two alternatives: either this is
sacrosanct between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Iranian Government and no one is allowed to see it under the law--no
one absolutely; it is totally confidential--or it is not.
Now, how can it be, Mr. Speaker, that some elements of the
administration have been briefed on those documents but they have not
been disclosed to Congress and they have not been disclosed to the
American public? How can that be?
I will tell you how it can be. Because this is absurd. The
administration has not disclosed material information.
And so why are we here today? Why is Chairman Royce managing this
time? Why are we contemplating this resolution that is brought forth by
Congressman Pompeo and Congressman Zeldin? It is to say this:
Administration, you have not complied. Therefore, Corker-Cardin has not
been invoked. Therefore, the House is not going to vote on this
nefarious deal.
This is an awful deal, Mr. Speaker, and it should be wholeheartedly
rejected with all urgency. I urge the passage of this resolution to
make it very clear that we are not going to be complicit. We are not
going to be complicit, Mr. Speaker. We are not going to be midwives and
bring into the world this awful thing. We won't be complicit.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
A few speakers ago, there was a statement made about folks loving
America. Well, guess what. We all love America. The fact that we may
have disagreements with regard to this proposal does not take away from
our love of this great country. We may differ, but the fact still
remains that we love our country. And I just want to make that clear,
because it is sickening to hear those kinds of comments.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr.
Emmer).
Mr. EMMER of Minnesota. The American people have spoken and
overwhelmingly oppose this agreement. Our allies in the region, who
know Iran best, oppose this deal. The President, enabled by Senate
Democrats, continues to live in a fantasyland.
The President's track record in the region is appalling: Libya,
Yemen, Somalia, Benghazi, the reset with Russia, red lines in Syria,
his failed ISIL strategy, and his catastrophic withdrawal from Iraq,
just to name a few, now handing billions, intercontinental ballistic
missiles, and a legal pathway to a nuclear weapon to Iran.

[[Page H5908]]

The American people deserve the truth rather than lies and half-
truths about snapback sanctions; secret side deals; anytime, anywhere
inspections; Iran's right to enrich uranium or plutonium; and, as we
stand here today, Congress' role in this bad deal.
Members of Congress must ask themselves two questions: Does this deal
make us more secure? Does this deal make us more safe? The answer to
both questions is a resounding, no, it doesn't.
Secretary of State Kerry said ``no deal is better than a bad deal.''
I couldn't agree more.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Loudermilk).

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Mr. Speaker, let's be clear: Iran is an enemy to the
United States of America, not by our declaration but by a proclamation
of the most senior military leaders of that nation that have stated
their destiny is to destroy the United States of America. Now, I was
recently told by the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, that
when someone says they want to destroy you, believe them.
So what are we to trust? Are we to trust Iran, when they say that
their destination, their goal, is to destroy the people of the United
States of America? Or do we trust them when they say that they will
commit to not develop a nuclear weapon? Or do we trust an international
organization who has details about verification that they won't even
share with the representatives of the people of this Nation who would
be drastically affected by that?
Oh, yes, but I have been told it is not about trust; it is about
verification. But the details of the most critical part of that
verification are being kept secret from the Members of this Congress
who are expected to approve this deal that would have drastic effects
upon the people of the United States.
I would submit to you that those who chant ``death to America,'' the
leaders in Iran, know the details of it.
We must stop this now.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Tennessee (Mrs.
Blackburn).
Mrs. BLACKBURN. I thank the chairman for the work that he has done on
this issue and the awareness that he has helped to raise not only with
Members of this body, but with the American people.
The American people are speaking out. They do not want this Iran deal
to be on the books. And there are goods reasons why.
As I was home and talking to my constituents, many are like me. They
are a mom, they are a grandmother, and they fear for what this will do
to our country. They fear for what it will do to the safety of our
children and future generations. They are asking the right questions:
Does Iran deserve the right to be trusted? Absolutely not.
When their neighbors don't trust them, should we trust them? The
answer is of course not.
Is this a transparent agreement? Of course not. The secret side deals
that have been made, why would we do that? Why would we incentivize,
create a pathway, for Iran to have a nuclear weapon?
I think what we should do is require the President to come forward
with every component to expose this so we know what kind of future this
creates for our children and our grandchildren.
Mr. CUMMINGS. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Returning to an argument I was making earlier about this body's
experience with North Korea, it does look to me like many are willing
to concede to Iran the same loopholes that we gave North Korea.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah has declared that his country would never
agree to anywhere, anytime inspections. That is what is a little
confusing about this. Especially, he says, in Iranian military sites.
What we are informed of is that Iran is going to do its own inspection
at Parchin. Without a full picture of Iran's nuclear program, without
full ability to inspect these sites, we will be verifying in the dark,
just as we were with North Korea.
The Ayatollah is also demanding sanctions be lifted before Iran
dismantles its nuclear infrastructure. In short, the Supreme Leader,
again, is not going to let international inspectors into the places he
builds his secret weapons, and yet he wants billions of sanctions in
relief that he could funnel into terrorist groups that he funds,
including Hezbollah and Hamas.
Just like North Korea, Iran wants its rewards upfront. Again, like
North Korea, what is Iran demanding? The best prize of all: the stamp
of international legitimacy for its nuclear program.
The truly stunning thing about this nuclear deal is that even if Iran
fulfills all of its commitments in a few short years, the mullahs will
be free from restraints, have international blessing for Iran's nuclear
program, and will have billions of dollars that they will use, in my
opinion, for destabilizing the region. Because the IRGC controls most
of these business contracts, their military controls the contracts.
It is not too late to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but to
do so, we need to learn from our mistakes; and if we don't, the
Ayatollah, just like Kim Jong-il before him, will have, in my view, an
easy path to the bomb.
Mr. CUMMINGS. May I inquire as to how much time we have remaining,
Mr. Speaker?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 3 minutes
remaining. The gentleman from California has 8\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I want to make it clear that this agreement is not based
on trust; it is based on the most intrusive verification regimen in
history.
There has been a lot of talk about $100 billion--others have floated
other figures--in sanctions relief, but we know that it is more like
around $50 billion, and it is conjecture as to how Iran will spend this
money. Our terrorism sanctions will remain firmly in place to combat
the money that Iran passes to any terrorist groups.

{time} 1645

This is a good deal, not because the President says so, not because I
say so, not because anyone else in this Chamber says so. It is a good
deal because the experts say so.
Nuclear physicists, disarmament experts, antinuclear proliferation
experts, members of the intelligence community--including the former
head of Mossad--and our allies all agree that the right thing to do to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is to support this deal.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Weber).
Mr. WEBER of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, Neville Chamberlain landed at Heston Aerodrome on
September 30, 1938, and spoke to the crowds. He said: ``The settlement
of the Czechoslovakian problem has been achieved.''
He said, ``This morning I had another talk with German Chancellor,
Herr Hitler, and here is the paper that bears his name on it, as well
as mine.''
He went on to say, ``We regard the agreement signed last night and
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two
peoples never to go to war again.''
Later that day, he stood outside of 10 Downing Street and read again.
He said: ``My good friends, for the second time in our history, a
British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with
honour.''
He said, ``I believe it is a peace for our time. We thank you from
the bottom of our hearts. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.''
Mr. Speaker, we all know how that turned out.
My friends, if this deal passes--and make no mistake, it is quite a
deal for Iran--Americans will not get a quiet night's sleep.
As long as Barack Hussein Obama is in office aiding and abetting the
Iranian terroristic regime, we will not be safe and Americans will not
sleep well.
This is a bad deal. You don't argue, you don't make deals with the
devil, deals with the enemy. Do we not learn from history?
Did we not learn anything from World War II?

[[Page H5909]]

This is a bad deal. I urge my colleagues to vote this deal down. It
is time to put America first.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Members are reminded to refrain from
engaging in personalities toward the President.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Gohmert).
Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, we have heard some try to demean the
importance of what the chairman and others here on the Republican side
are trying to do right now.
The fact is that, when we talk about the information that has not
been provided about the outside agreements with the IAEA, it is not
only material, relevant, but it is also critical.
I am reading directly from the Iran deal. Eight years after the
adoption date or when the IAEA has reached the broader conclusion that
all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever
is earlier--it goes on to talk about sanctions that will be lifted.
Another place, same thing, or when the IAEA has reached the broader
conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful
activities, then another protocol is lifted.
If we don't know what the agreement is with the IAEA, then these
years mean nothing. The IAEA, I have already heard say, as far as it
knows, nuclear material is being used for peaceful purposes. That would
mean that these years are worthless.
We have got to have the secret agreements.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time we have
remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland has 1\1/2\
minutes remaining. The gentleman from California has 6 minutes
remaining.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
With regard to what the gentleman just stated, I would refer him to
Senator Bob Corker, who drafted the process that gave Congress the
right to review the agreement. In talking about this situation that we
are addressing today, he says that the motion is not worth considering.
Apparently, he feels satisfied that the arrangement with regard to the
IAEA has been satisfied.
Let's also focus with the matter at hand, and the matter at hand is
preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, instead of working on
pointless partisan measures like this one and others we will be
considering tomorrow.
This entire piece of legislation that we have been debating is about
accusations that the President did not comply with the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act. Even, as I said a moment ago, the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee does not believe that.
Let's get back to the business of the people and stop wasting their
money and wasting their time.
I urge a ``no'' vote on this resolution, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I guess the point that I would begin by making is that Iran won't
have to cheat like North Korea did to get close to a bomb, and that is
because the essential restrictions on Iran's key bomb-making technology
expire or, in the words of the agreement, sunset in 10 to 15 years.
After these restrictions expire, Iran will be left with an
internationally recognized industrial scale nuclear program. Iran could
even legitimately enrich to levels near weapons-grade under the pretext
of powering a nuclear navy. All these activities are permissible under
the nonproliferation treaty, and all would be endorsed by this
agreement.
Indeed, to quote the President, President Obama said, of this
agreement, in year 13, 14, 15, Iran's breakout times would have shrunk
almost down to zero.
A former State Department official testified to the Foreign Affairs
Committee that this sunset clause is a disaster. It is a disaster as it
will enable the leading state sponsor of terrorism to produce enough
material for dozens of nuclear weapons, all under the terms of the
agreement.
As another expert witness pointed out, the bet that the
administration is taking is that, in 10 to 15 years, we will have a
kinder, gentler Iran. The agreement does not dismantle Iran's nuclear
infrastructure. Iran doesn't have to dismantle any centrifuges or give
up any of its nuclear facilities. Even Iran's once-secret facility at
Fordo, buried under a mountain top, does stay open.
Instead, the deal temporarily restricts elements of the program. It
does do that. It restricts elements of the program, but it does it in
exchange for something else that is permanent.
What is permanent in this, as opposed to temporary? What is permanent
is the sanctions relief. Key restrictions begin to expire after only 8
years.
If fully implemented, this agreement will destroy the Iran sanctions
regime, which Congress has built up over decades, despite opposition
from several administrations.
I will remind the Members again, this was a hard-fought case over
several administrations; and, in point of fact, in the prior Congress,
myself and Eliot Engel had legislation which would have put additional
pressure on Iran that passed here by a vote of 400-20.
It was the administration and it was Secretary of State Kerry who
made certain that that bill was bottled up in the Senate and could not
see the light of day.
Now, the billions in sanctions relief that Iran will get up front
will support its terrorist activity, but those billions are just a
downpayment, as this agreement reconnects Iran to the global economy.
One of the things that bothers me most about this is that Iran is not
a normal country with normal businessmen running those companies. When
those companies were nationalized, they were turned over to the IRGC.
They were turned over, basically, to the leaders in the military, and
they were turned over to the clerics.
As future contracts go forward with Iran, it is that entity that is
going to be rewarded. It is going to have the political power.
For those of us that hoped to see change in Iran, now the best
connected people in Iran are going to be the IRGC leaders. If we think
for a minute what that will mean for those that would like to see real
change, I think we lost a historic opportunity here to put the kind of
pressure that would have forced change, but we did not do that.
In a major, last-minute concession--and this is the final point I
would make--the President agreed to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Iran,
and in 5 years, Iran will be able to buy conventional weapons and, in 8
years, ballistic missiles.
Russia and China want to sell these dangerous weapons to Iran, and
that is why they pushed. That is why it was Russia pushing, at the
eleventh hour, after we thought this agreement was done.
The reason we were waiting those extra days is because Russia was
running interference for Iran, saying: Oh, no, wait. We also want the
arms embargo lifted, including the ICBM embargo lifted.
As the Secretary of Defense of our country testified, the reason that
we want to stop Iran from having an ICBM program is that the ``I'' in
ICBM stands for intercontinental, which means having the capability of
flying from Iran to the United States.
Ask yourself why Iran wants to build ICBMs, why it is that the
Ayatollah says it is the duty of every military man to figure out how
to help mass-produce ICBMs.
Someone once asked President Kennedy the difference between our space
program and the ICBM program that Russia was building at that time, and
he quipped ``attitude.'' Kennedy's answer was ``attitude.''
The answer here is that attitude counts for a lot, and the attitude
in the regime, when they say they are not even going to be bound by
this and are now going to transfer rockets and missiles to Hezbollah
and Hamas, tells us a lot about their attitude.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, for years, the Congress, the President,
our European partners, and the international community have imposed a
series of tough economic sanctions on Iran with the goal of preventing
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Those

[[Page H5910]]

sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table and I commend President
Obama, Secretary Kerry, and the entire team, along with our P5+1
partners, for their efforts to negotiate an agreement to prevent Iran
from building a nuclear weapon.
The question for Members of Congress, who will vote on this
agreement, is whether it achieves its stated goals. Given the
importance of this question, I believe every Member of Congress has an
obligation to thoroughly review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), consider the testimony presented at the Congressional
hearings, and listen to competing views before reaching a final
judgment.
Since the JCPOA was submitted to Congress on July 19, 2015, I have
carefully reviewed all of its terms, attended the classified briefings
and numerous presentations, and reviewed the transcripts of all the
hearings that have been held in both the House and the Senate. I have
also met with opponents and supporters of the agreement. While I
respect the opinions of those on both sides of this issue, I have
concluded that this agreement advances the national security interests
of the United States and all of our allies, including our partner
Israel. This agreement is the best path to achieve our goal--that Iran
never obtains a nuclear weapon. Indeed, I firmly believe that, should
Congress block this agreement, we would undermine that goal,
inadvertently weaken and isolate America, and strengthen Iran.
The benefit of any agreement must be measured against the real-world
consequences of no agreement. Many forget that when these negotiations
began in earnest two years ago, Iran was a threshold nuclear weapons
state and remains so until and unless this agreement is implemented. As
Prime Minister Netanyahu warned at the United Nations in 2012, Iran was
a few months away from having enough highly enriched uranium to produce
its first bomb. Today, prior to the implementation of this agreement,
it has a nuclear stockpile that, if further enriched, could produce up
to 10 bombs. It currently has installed nearly 20,000 centrifuges that
could convert that fuel into weapons material. Indeed, many analysts
believe that the combination of Iran's nuclear stockpile and its
centrifuges would allow it to produce enough weapons-grade nuclear
material for a bomb in two months.
In addition, Iran has been enriching some of its nuclear material at
its deep underground reactor at Fordow, a very difficult target to hit
militarily. Moreover, Iran was in the process of building a heavy-water
reactor at Arak, which could generate plutonium to be used for a
nuclear weapon. Finally, Iran has been operating for years under an
inadequate verification regime that increases the risks of a covert
program going undetected.
This agreement blocks all of these paths to acquiring weapons-grade
nuclear material and puts in place an inspection system that assures
the detection of any violation and future dash to acquire a nuclear
weapon. The Interim Agreement has already neutralized Iran's stockpile
of highly enriched uranium that Prime Minister Netanyahu highlighted in
his speech. This final agreement will significantly scale back the
remainder of its program. Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium will be
cut from 9,900 kg to 300 kg, and that remainder will be limited to low-
enriched uranium that cannot be used for a weapon. In addition, the
agreement removes two-thirds of Iran's installed centrifuges. No
enrichment activities may be conducted at Fordow for a period of 15
years, and the facility at Arak will be permanently converted to one
that does not produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Taken together, these measures will extend the breakout time from
about two months to at least a year and put in place layers of
verification measures over different timelines, including some that
remain in place permanently. It is generally agreed that these measures
would allow us to detect any effort by Iran to use its current nuclear
facilities--Natanz, Fordow, or Arak--to violate the agreement. The main
criticism with respect to verification is that the agreement does not
sufficiently guard against an effort by Iran to develop a secret
uranium supply chain and enrichment capacity at a covert place.
However, the reality is that the agreement permanently puts in place an
inspection mechanism that is more rigorous than any previous arms
control agreement and more stringent than the current system. The
agreement ultimately requires inspections of any suspected Iranian
nuclear site with the vote of the United States, Britain, France,
Germany, and the European Union. Neither the Chinese nor the Russians
can block such inspections in the face of a united Western front. Are
we really better off without this verification regime than with it?
In exchange for rolling back its nuclear program and accepting this
verification regime, Iran will obtain relief from those sanctions that
are tied to its nuclear program. However, that relief will only come
after Iran has verifiably reduced its nuclear program as required.
Moreover, if Iran backslides on those commitments, the sanctions will
snap back into place. The snapback procedure is triggered if the U.S.
registers a formal complaint against Iran with the special commission
created for that purpose. In addition, those U.S. sanctions that are
not related to the Iranian nuclear program will remain in place,
including U.S. sanctions related to Iran's human rights violations,
support for terrorism, and missile program.
There are some who oppose the agreement because it does not prevent
Iran from engaging in adversarial actions throughout the Gulf, the
Middle East, and elsewhere. That conduct, however, was never within the
scope of these negotiations nor the objective of the international
sanctions regime aimed at preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon. President Reagan understood the distinction between changing
behavior and achieving verifiable limits on weapons programs. He
negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, not because
he thought it would change the character of ``the Evil Empire'' but
because limiting their nuclear arsenal was in the national security
interests of the U.S. and our allies. That reality is also true today.
An Iranian regime with nuclear capability would present a much greater
threat to the region than an Iran without one. In fact, today, as a
threshold nuclear weapons state, Iran wields more influence than it
will under the constraints of this agreement. That is why our focus has
appropriately been on reining in the Iranian nuclear program.
The lifting of the sanctions will certainly give Iran additional
resources to support its priorities. Given the political dynamic in
Iran, some of those additional resources will likely be invested to
improve the domestic standard of living. But even if all the resources
were used to support their proxies in the region, respected regional
observers agree that they are unlikely to make a significant strategic
difference. Moreover, any effort by Iran to increase support for its
proxies can be checked by the U.S. and our allies through
countermeasures. Finally, it is clear that any alternative agreement
opponents seek would also result in the lifting of the sanctions and
freeing up these resources.
In my view, opponents of the agreement have failed to demonstrate how
we will be in a better position if Congress were to block it. Without
an agreement, the Iranians will immediately revert to their status as a
threshold nuclear weapons state. In other words, they immediately pose
the threat that Prime Minister Netanyahu warned about in his U.N.
speech. At the same time, the international consensus we have built for
sanctions, which was already starting to fray, would begin to collapse
entirely. We would be immediately left with the worst of all worlds--a
threshold nuclear weapons state with diminished sanctions and little
leverage for the United States.
I disagree with the view that we can force the Iranians back to the
negotiating table to get a better deal. All of our European partners
have signed on to the current agreement. Consequently, the U.S. would
be isolated in its quest to return to negotiations. And in the unlikely
event that we somehow returned to negotiations, the critics have not
presented a plausible scenario for achieving a better agreement in a
world where fewer sanctions means less economic pressure.
The bottom line is that if Congress were to block the agreement and
the Iranians were to resume nuclear enrichment activities, the only way
to stop them, at least temporarily, would be by military action. That
would unleash significant negative consequences that could jeopardize
American troops in the region, drag us into another ground war in the
Middle East, and trigger unpredictable responses elsewhere. Moreover,
the United States would be totally isolated from most of the world,
including our Western partners. The folly of that go-it-alone military
approach would be compounded by the fact that such action would only
deal a temporary setback to an Iranian nuclear program. They would
likely respond by putting their nuclear enrichment activities deeper
underground and would likely be more determined than ever to build a
nuclear arsenal.
We don't have to take that path. This agreement will give us a long
period of time to test the Iranians' compliance and assess their
intentions. During that period, it will give us a treasure trove of
information about the scope and capabilities of the limited Iranian
nuclear program. Throughout that period and beyond, we reserve all of
our options, including a military option, to respond to any Iranian
attempt to break out and produce enough highly enriched material to
make a bomb. But we will have two advantages over the situation as it
is today--a more comprehensive verification regime to detect any
violation and a much longer breakout period in which to respond.
As former Secretary Clinton has indicated, the fact that we have
successfully limited the scope of Iran's nuclear program does not mean
we have limited its ambitions in the region. We must continue to work
with our

[[Page H5911]]

friends and allies to constantly contain and confront Iranian
aggression in the region. The United States and Israel must always
stand together to confront that threat. The fact remains that Iranian
support for their terrorist proxy Hezbollah continues to destabilize
Lebanon and poses a direct threat to Israel, as does its support for
Hamas. We must do all we can to ensure that our ally Israel maintains
its qualitative military edge in the region, including providing
increased funding for Israel's Arrow anti-ballistic missile and Iron
Dome anti-rocket systems. Consideration should also be given to
previously denied weapons if a need for such enhanced capabilities
arises. We must always remember that some of Iran's leaders have called
for the destruction of Israel and we must never forget the awful past
that teaches us not to ignore those threats.
The threats Iran poses in the region are real. But all those threats
are compounded by an Iran that is a threshold nuclear weapons state.
This agreement will roll back the Iranian nuclear program and provide
us with greater ability to detect and more time to respond to any
future Iranian attempt to build a nuclear weapon.
For all of the reasons given above, I've concluded that this is an
historic agreement that should be supported by the Congress.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 412, the previous question is ordered on
the resolution and on the preamble.
The question is on the resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 245,
nays 186, not voting 2, as follows:

[Roll No. 492]

YEAS--245

Abraham
Aderholt
Allen
Amash
Amodei
Babin
Barletta
Barr
Barton
Benishek
Bilirakis
Bishop (MI)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blum
Bost
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Buchanan
Buck
Bucshon
Burgess
Byrne
Calvert
Carter (GA)
Carter (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Clawson (FL)
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Comstock
Conaway
Cook
Costello (PA)
Cramer
Crawford
Crenshaw
Culberson
Curbelo (FL)
Davis, Rodney
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Dold
Donovan
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers (NC)
Emmer (MN)
Farenthold
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Garrett
Gibbs
Gibson
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (LA)
Graves (MO)
Griffith
Grothman
Guinta
Guthrie
Hanna
Hardy
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Heck (NV)
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Hice, Jody B.
Hill
Holding
Hudson
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurd (TX)
Hurt (VA)
Issa
Jenkins (KS)
Jenkins (WV)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jolly
Jones
Jordan
Joyce
Katko
Kelly (MS)
Kelly (PA)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kline
Knight
Labrador
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Latta
LoBiondo
Long
Loudermilk
Love
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
MacArthur
Marchant
Marino
Massie
McCarthy
McCaul
McClintock
McHenry
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McSally
Meadows
Meehan
Messer
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moolenaar
Mooney (WV)
Mullin
Mulvaney
Murphy (PA)
Neugebauer
Newhouse
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Olson
Palazzo
Palmer
Paulsen
Pearce
Perry
Pittenger
Pitts
Poe (TX)
Poliquin
Pompeo
Posey
Price, Tom
Ratcliffe
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rice (SC)
Rigell
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney (FL)
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Rouzer
Royce
Russell
Ryan (WI)
Salmon
Sanford
Scalise
Schweikert
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Stefanik
Stewart
Stivers
Stutzman
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Trott
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walker
Walorski
Walters, Mimi
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westerman
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (IA)
Young (IN)
Zeldin
Zinke

NAYS--186

Adams
Aguilar
Ashford
Bass
Beatty
Becerra
Bera
Beyer
Bishop (GA)
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Boyle, Brendan F.
Brady (PA)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Bustos
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardenas
Carney
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chu, Judy
Cicilline
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Courtney
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
DeSaulnier
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle, Michael F.
Duckworth
Edwards
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Esty
Farr
Fattah
Foster
Frankel (FL)
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Graham
Grayson
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hastings
Heck (WA)
Higgins
Himes
Hinojosa
Honda
Hoyer
Huffman
Israel
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
Kirkpatrick
Kuster
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lawrence
Lee
Levin
Lewis
Lieu, Ted
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lynch
Maloney, Sean
Matsui
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Meng
Moore
Moulton
Murphy (FL)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Norcross
O'Rourke
Pallone
Pascrell
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree
Pocan
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rangel
Rice (NY)
Richmond
Roybal-Allard
Ruiz
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell (AL)
Sherman
Sinema
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Speier
Swalwell (CA)
Takai
Takano
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Titus
Tonko
Torres
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters, Maxine
Watson Coleman
Welch
Yarmuth

NOT VOTING--2

Maloney, Carolyn
Wilson (FL)

{time} 1722

So the resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated against:
Ms. WILSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 492, had I been
present, I would have voted ``no.''

____________________