[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 129 (Wednesday, September 9, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6490-S6525]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                HIRE MORE HEROES ACT OF 2015--Continued

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, in anticipation of the majority leader 
and minority leader coming to the floor in a moment, I will begin the 
debate, a debate on the most consequential vote I will ever take as an 
elected official. Certainly, in my 41 years of public service, I have 
never had a decision to make as serious, as complex, and as meaningful 
as the decision we will make on the Iran nuclear deal negotiated by the 
administration and the President.
  I rise in opposition to that agreement and to explain why I will vote 
against it, but before I do, I want to compliment three or four members 
in particular on the Foreign Relations Committee: former Chairman 
Menendez from New Jersey, Ranking Member Cardin from Maryland, and 
Chairman Corker from Tennessee. Throughout the entire debate on the 
Iran nuclear deal, they have been forthright in being sure everybody 
got every question they wanted answered, that every issue was exposed, 
and that everybody had the time to participate to the fullest degree 
possible. Great leadership on the part of Senator Corker, great 
leadership on the part of Senator Cardin, and great assistance on the 
part of Senator Menendez.
  In the end, in committee, I voted for the resolution of disapproval 
to vote against the nuclear arrangement with the Iranians, and I want 
to talk about why. First of all, the President said a vote against the 
deal is a vote for war. I argue with that conclusion. In fact, I think 
a vote against the deal is a vote of strength. A vote for the deal is 
an

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appeasement to the Iranian people, to the Iranian ayatollahs, and to a 
group of people who have not been trustworthy in negotiations with our 
country for the past 60 years.
  Second, I think it is a vote against strength and for appeasement, 
when in fact there has never been a time more important to the United 
States of America to be stronger than today.
  Think about this. The bodies of young Syrian children are washing up 
on the shore of the Mediterranean. The Russians have established a 
beachhead in the Crimea, the Ukraine, and now in the Arctic. Last week, 
our President went to Alaska and the Chinese sent five ships off the 
coast just to wave the Chinese flag in the face of our President.
  Our diplomacy around the world is faltering and failing because we 
are not resolved. We are not as strong as we used to be. Diplomatically 
we are not respected and militarily we are not feared. It is time we 
made sure the vote we cast on this Iranian nuclear deal is not a vote 
that sends another signal of weakness but instead a signal of strength.
  Why am I voting against the Iranian nuclear deal? There are five 
principal reasons. No. 1 is the basis upon which I voted for the New 
START treaty 5 years ago. When I voted for that treaty, I was on the 
Foreign Relations Committee as well, and the questions I asked at that 
time are the same questions I am asking now about what is not a 
treaty--what I think is a treaty but what the President calls an 
agreement: No. 1, is it enforceable; No. 2, do we have inspections; No. 
3, do we have credibility; No. 4, have I seen all the documents; and, 
No. 5, is it best for my children and grandchildren and the future of 
my country?
  First, I haven't seen all the documents, and we now find out we will 
never see all of them because the addendums to the IAEA will not be 
available to us as Members of the Senate. That is No. 1. No. 2, can we 
have inspections? Well, yes, you can have inspections, kind of or sort 
of. Yes, you get 24 hours' notice and then 24 days to approve and then 
the Iranians have a say over who gets to inspect and we don't have a 
part. That is not a fair deal.
  When I voted for the New START treaty, the principal reason I finally 
did was this: Russians were allowed in the United States to inspect our 
nuclear warheads; we were allowed in Russia to inspect theirs. We had 
absolute credibility in the inspection regime. We knew what we were 
getting, and it was an enforceable treaty. This is not that. This is 
one that can be cheated on too easily and far too easily for the 
American people and the security of my children and grandchildren.
  And what about my children and grandchildren--why are they of 
interest to me in this vote? They are because they are our future. The 
future of all mankind is the young people today who will run these 
countries in the years ahead, unless there is a rogue nation with 
nuclear weapons that could disrupt the world's balance of power, and 
that is just what the Iranians are capable of doing. So I want to make 
sure I don't do anything that would facilitate the Iranian use of 
nuclear weapons in the future. I don't think this deal protects us from 
that, and that is why I am going to vote against it.
  Lastly, I want to comment about the issue of a cloture vote. I 
understand there will be a vote to filibuster the final vote on the 
resolution of disapproval rather than having a resolution of 
disapproval. I think that is wrong. I think the American people deserve 
to know where each of us stand, and the people of Georgia deserve to 
know where Johnny Isakson stands--what I am going to do and why I am 
going to do it.
  A vote against cloture is to protract having a final vote on the 
resolution of disapproval and leaves open the whole issue. It is not 
fair to the American people, it is not right for the American people, 
and it is avoiding our responsibility. So I will vote for cloture so we 
can go to a final vote on the resolution of disapproval, and I hope 
every Member of the Senate will do the same. To do anything less is 
wrong for America, wrong for our heritage, and wrong for our future.
  So I end where I began. I thank Senator Corker, Senator Menendez, and 
Senator Cardin for their forthright leadership. I have studied hard, I 
have worked hard to try to find the best parts of this deal and the 
worst parts of this deal. I find it fails in those five tests I have 
given it and I will vote no. I will vote for the resolution of 
disapproval and vote against the treaty with Iran on the Iran nuclear 
deal.
  With that said, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Colleagues, before the Senate is a resolution that 
would disapprove of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed to by 
the United States, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, the European Union, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
  I have long said the Senate should assess this deal by employing a 
simple standard: Will it further or will it harm the national security 
interests of the United States and her allies? By that measure, I 
believe Senators must vote to disapprove of the deal.
  I truly wish that wasn't the case, but it is a predictable outcome 
when one considers the mindset with which the administration appeared 
to approach these negotiations. The President's overall foreign policy 
has long been guided by policies and desires to withdraw forward-
deployed conventional military power from operational theaters, to 
reduce America's commitments and capabilities, and to rely upon 
international organizations to uphold international order.
  That is the type of mindset that guided the administration's 
negotiators on this deal, and it has resulted in a flawed deal that a 
majority of Congress and a broad swath of the American people now seem 
poised to reject--and that is a bipartisan majority.
  The American people were led to believe that negotiations with Iran 
would be about ending its nuclear program, but that is not what the 
deal before us would do. Instead, the President's deal would bestow 
international recognition upon Iran's nuclear program by the most 
powerful nations on Earth. There is no question that Iran's nuclear 
program is designed to develop a nuclear weapon--no question. This is 
not about peaceful nuclear energy.
  Yet the President's deal would leave Iran as a nuclear threshold 
state forever on the edge of developing a nuclear weapon. It would 
allow Iran to maintain thousands of centrifuges--1,044 IR-1 centrifuges 
in Fordow and 5,060 centrifuges at Natanz--as well as advanced research 
and development programs.
  The President's deal with Iran will also give the regime access to 
literally billions of dollars. The President himself has acknowledged 
that at least some of that cash windfall is likely to be used to 
support terrorism.
  It is already clear that Iran is meddling in Bahrain, in Yemen, in 
Lebanon, and in Afghanistan, and the President's deal will only 
strengthen terrorist proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthi insurgents 
in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria.
  Iran is working to prop up and protect Assad's regime in Damascus, 
and it is working with Shia militias in Iraq to expand its influence 
even further--just as Iran once supplied Iraq's Shia militias with the 
weapons to maim and kill our soldiers and marines.
  Iran has a long history of employing terrorism as a tool for 
defending the regime--not just against its neighbors, not just against 
Israel, but also against America.
  On September 20, 1984, with support and direction from Iran, the Shia 
militants of Hezbollah carried out a suicide car bombing against the 
American embassy in Beirut, 31 years ago. Two dozen people died that 
day; among them, Chief Warrant Officer Kenneth Welch of the U.S. Army. 
His son, Brian, has lived with that loss ever since. I want all of our 
colleagues to know he is sitting with us in this Gallery this 
afternoon. He is right here with us listening to this debate.
  So I ask my colleagues: How could we support a deal that would not 
only

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strengthen terrorist groups like Hezbollah, but also would effectively 
subsidize the activities of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, a group that 
has been accused of helping Shiite militias attack and kill Americans 
in Iraq?
  The $100 billion Iran is expected to reap from this deal is also 
certain to be invested in Iran's war economy for defense of the regime 
and will undoubtedly strengthen the hand of the Revolutionary Guards.
  The Council on Foreign Relations has referred to the group as the 
regime's ``money machine'' because of its varied business interests 
with Iran. As the Council noted in a 2013 backgrounder, the Guards were 
estimated to have ties to more than 100 companies controlling about $12 
billion in construction and engineering capital, and one of its 
fellows, Ray Takeyh, has linked the group to ``university laboratories, 
weapons manufacturers, and companies connected to nuclear technology.''
  Now, the administration has attempted to make light of the benefits 
to Iran's economy, military, and terrorist arms from the lifting of 
sanctions. Secretary Kerry observed that $100 billion is ``nothing''--
nothing--``compared to what gets spent'' in the region.
  ``Iran's military budget is $15 billion,'' he said, while ``the Gulf 
states' military budget is $130 billion.''
  But what is lost on Secretary Kerry is the fact that Iran and its 
proxies have pursued asymmetric capabilities against the United States, 
not to mention Israel and our moderate Sunni allies.
  Iran has carefully studied the tactics and capabilities brought to 
bear by our forces in Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other campaigns. And because it has, the 
regime has decided to invest in anti-access and area-denial 
capabilities, cyber warfare capabilities, espionage, and other means to 
avoid fighting directly against our strengths.
  The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, in an assessment 
of the nuclear deal with Iran, expanded on that point. Here is what 
they had to say:

       Iran has acquired and developed various capabilities to 
     execute this asymmetric strategy, including anti access/area 
     denial . . . it possesses the region's largest arsenal of 
     short and medium ballistic missiles, as well as a growing 
     arsenal of cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, to 
     target military and energy installations throughout the Gulf, 
     including U.S. ships. It also has a sizeable fleet of fast 
     attack craft, submarines and large numbers of torpedoes and 
     naval mines for choking off Hormuz and attacking 
     aforementioned targets. The S-300 air defense systems could 
     stymie U.S. air operations around the Gulf, in addition to 
     complicating any strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

  That is from the Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs.
  Now, there is another worrying aspect of the cash windfall from this 
deal as well. It will also serve to advance Tehran's efforts to divide 
the United States from the very allies who helped us bring Iran to the 
table in the first place. As Iranian trade expands with the other P5+1 
countries, they will grow even more reluctant to hold Iran accountable 
for the inevitable violations of the deal.
  We need not have ended up here. We didn't have to be in this place. 
The President had the opportunity to declare a firm policy to end 
Iran's nuclear program and to enact additional sanctions while Iran's 
war economy was ailing. But, no, that is not what he did.
  Instead, the administration attempted to rely on the ambiguity of its 
military policy by claiming at every stage that it sought to keep ``all 
options on the table.'' But that was never a policy. It was a talking 
point--a talking point was not going to deter Iran.
  As I alluded in a speech delivered at AIPAC a few years ago, the only 
way the administration is going to be able to persuade Iran to cease 
its pursuit of a nuclear weapon and to dismantle its enrichment 
capability is if it was prepared to make the Supreme Leader of Iran 
believe--believe--that the survival of his regime was actually at 
stake.
  In other words, the only way the Iranian regime could have been 
expected to negotiate to preserve its own survival--rather than simply 
delay as a means to pursue nuclear weapons--is if the administration 
had imposed the strictest sanctions while concurrently enforcing a firm 
declaratory policy that reflected a commitment to a potential use of 
force, if that became necessary. But, no. The administration chose to 
pursue negotiations and sanctions consecutively rather than 
simultaneously, as it also failed to articulate a clear consequence for 
the crossing of red lines.
  Thus, while the President had an opportunity to exercise political 
leadership and work with the Congress to craft a stronger policy toward 
Iran that would have better served our national security, he chose the 
path of concessions instead. Indeed, the administration allowed for a 
series of concessions throughout these lengthy negotiations.
  Rather than anytime, anywhere inspections, the deal creates a process 
within which Iran can delay inspections for at least up to 24 days.
  Rather than dismantle Iran's enrichment capability, some centrifuges 
will be put in storage, enrichment will continue, and research and 
development will go on--all legitimatized by the President's deal. Now, 
at the end of the 10- and 15-year milestones, Iran's breakout time will 
be reduced to nearly zero.
  Concessions were made on the conventional weapons ban and ballistic 
missile technology embargo too. Despite the fact that the International 
Atomic Energy Agency reported in 2011 that ``Iran has carried out 
activities relevant to the development of a nuclear device,'' the 
administration made further concessions regarding the possible military 
dimensions of Iran's program.
  Assessing this deal strategically, it can only be understood as part 
of a broader strategy to concede a larger sphere of influence to the 
Iranian regime while weakening our commitment to our moderate Sunni 
allies and Israel. Now, that is just fitting within the overall 
administration's view of reducing America's overseas commitments, its 
reliance upon international organizations, and its seeming 
determination to withdraw our forward deployed presence. But in terms 
of our traditional strategy, it makes no sense at all, as Iran's 
capability and power will be stronger in every single regard.
  Writing in the Wall Street Journal in April, two former Secretaries 
of State noted that Iran's representatives remain committed to a 
revolutionary, anti-western concept of the international order. They 
observed that:

       Absent any linkage between nuclear and political restraint, 
     America's traditional allies will conclude that the U.S. has 
     traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to 
     Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their 
     own nuclear balances and, if necessary, call in other powers 
     to sustain their integrity.
       Does America still hope to arrest the region's trend 
     towards sectarian upheaval, state collapse, and the 
     disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now 
     accept this as an irremediable aspect of the regional 
     balance?

  Regrettably, it appears that the administration has traded the 
appearance of nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony.
  The President famously suggested that if countries like Iran were 
willing to unclench their fist, they would find an extended hand. From 
that hand the Iranians took concession after concession after 
concession on enrichment, on U.N. Security Council resolutions, on 
centrifuges, on missiles, on the conventional arms embargo, and on 
sanctions--concessions on every one of those issues.
  Under the President's deal with Iran, nearly every aspect of Iran's 
national power will be strengthened: economic power, diplomatic power, 
espionage power, conventional warfare power, and the power Iran derives 
from supporting proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, 
and the Assad regime.
  So when supporters of this flawed deal ask ``what is the 
alternative,'' there is a simple answer: political leadership. It is 
the next President and the next Congress that will have to deal with 
the consequences of this deal; and if we are united in ending Iran's 
nuclear program, we can make clear to the Iranians that their weapons 
program is simply unacceptable.
  Remember: It was the sanctions enacted by Congress, over the 
objections of President Obama--many people have forgotten that he 
didn't want the sanctions they ended up getting--that

[[Page S6493]]

caused sufficient concern within the regime to compel the Supreme 
Leader to allow the negotiations in the first place.
  That is why, throughout the previous Congress and the beginning of 
this Congress, I attempted to pass additional sanctions and made a 
commitment to a strong declaratory policy against Iran--an idea some of 
our colleagues may now deem necessary to pursue through legislation 
given the terms of the nuclear deal with Iran.
  But Congress alone cannot provide Presidential leadership. It can 
provide for the defense capabilities required to contain and combat 
threats like Iran. It can reassure regional allies, like Israel, that 
this Executive deal is not a treaty and can be revisited. And when Iran 
cheats on this deal, we can resolve to use the tools available to us to 
stop its nuclear weapons program. In short, Congress can lay the 
groundwork for the next President. But Congress needs real Presidential 
leadership, too.
  Just this morning, we saw reports that Iran's Supreme Leader had 
ruled out any real rapprochement with the U.S. after this nuclear deal. 
We saw the Supreme Leader state his desire to see Israel cease to exist 
in the coming years. Against that backdrop, we now have the President's 
deal with Iran before us.
  Any objective net assessment of this deal must conclude that it will 
strengthen the Supreme Leader's regime. No question about it. Any 
objective assessment must also conclude that America and her allies 
will be made less safe by the President's deal with Iran. Well, 
certainly that is the conclusion I have reached as well. This is the 
conclusion many Democrats have reached. This seems to be the conclusion 
the American people have reached as well.
  I wish this was a deal I could support, but it isn't. I urge my 
colleagues to join me and many others in voting for the resolution of 
disapproval.
  In fact, we know there is a bipartisan majority of the United States 
Senate in opposition to this deal. We know that already. We know there 
is a huge majority of Americans who oppose this deal. We know that 
every single Democrat who has come out for the deal has immediately 
started making excuses about how we need to get tougher with Iran--
every single one of them.
  So that is what is before us, and it will be before us until next 
week.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, first of all, I wish to thank our leader 
and I wish to thank Senator Reid for allowing us to come to this vote 
without a motion to proceed so we can begin this debate in a sober and 
responsible manner.
  I thank the leader. I know many Members on the other side of the 
aisle were concerned about maybe nefarious amendments being a part of 
this debate on the front end. I thank you for the way you set up this 
procedure so that we are focused only on the resolution of disapproval. 
That is something I know the other side had wanted, and I appreciate 
your setting it up in that manner.
  I also thank Senator Cardin. I thank him for being such a tremendous 
partner on the committee. I thank him for his diligence in making what 
I know was a tough decision on the substance. I truly appreciate his 
ability and the way he worked with us to ensure that we have this 
debate and this opportunity to vote.
  Let me step back and refresh people's memory. I know there has been a 
lot of discussion, and there are some who purposefully try to confuse 
what is happening here. But the fact is that the President decided long 
ago that he was not going to pursue a treaty. He instead was going to 
pursue what is called a nonbinding political commitment, and he was 
going to go directly to the U.N. Security Council for approval. As a 
matter of fact, he has already done that.
  In the course of discussions, we realized, just as the leader 
mentioned, it was actually we who brought Iran to the table. We had 
four tranches of severe sanctions that, as was mentioned, in most cases 
were objected to by the administration, but it was those sanctions and 
then the international community agreeing with those sanctions that 
brought Iran to the table in the first place. We had discussions. We 
realized that we understand the President planned to do this with an 
Executive agreement.
  By the way, I think everyone understands that when the President does 
that, it is only binding on his administration, it is not binding on 
future administrations, whereas a treaty, which goes through a whole 
different process, is binding on future Presidents.
  Because we had played such a role, we ended up with the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act, and this agreement has now put us in place to 
debate this issue and to decide as a body whether we want to approve it 
or disapprove it. I thank Senator Cardin for his efforts in making that 
happen.
  I thank all the Senators in this body--98 of them; 1 was missing that 
day--who voted to put us in this place. As a matter of fact, I think 
all of us know that if it weren't for that, we would be having no 
discussion. This would have already been implemented. The President 
already went to the U.N. Security Council, and it is this pause that 
has allowed us to weigh in this way on behalf of the American people 
and to express whether we approve or disapprove of this agreement.
  Let me say this: When the President began back in 2012 and he said 
that he was going to negotiate with the P5+1 on this Iranian nuclear 
deal to end their nuclear program, I thought, that is outstanding. As a 
matter of fact, if the President can do that and if he had done that, I 
am sure we would have had 100 votes in favor of that. As a matter of 
fact, in other instances, he mentioned that he wanted to dismantle 
their nuclear program. Again, as the leader has mentioned, had he 
achieved that, none of us would be debating this issue. We would be 
thrilled with that outcome. But it was very evident that was not the 
course of action which was being pursued when we had the first 
agreement, the JOPA.
  We had another round. We had additional concessions. Finally, we got 
to the point where we all realized that what was happening--instead of 
a dismantling or instead of ending Iran's nuclear program, what this 
agreement does, if we were to approve it, it agrees to the 
industrialization of their nuclear program. We have a state sponsor of 
terror, and this agreement is approving the industrialization of their 
program.
  I think everyone knows that one of the great fallacies in this deal 
is that not only, with our approval, are they industrializing their 
program, but in 9 months all of the leverage shifts. Their country has 
a $409 billion economy. In the next 9 months, this country is going to 
get about $100 billion. That has not been disputed. Think about it--25 
percent of their economy is going to be given to them in 1 year. Think 
about an $18 trillion country such as ours. If we were to get $4 to $5 
trillion, think what we would be able to do with those resources. Over 
that 9-month period, regardless of what they do with PMD, regardless of 
what they do with other issues, the rest of the big economic sanctions 
are going to be relieved. Their economy is going to be growing. They 
are going to be cash-rich. They are going to be a much stronger 
country.
  I think it is probably important to talk about whom we are dealing 
with. I know Senator Cotton has alluded to this before, as have many 
others, but when we went to Baghdad through the years, most of us sat 
down with General Odierno. On his coffee table, he would have in front 
of him all of the devices Iran was using to kill and maim our soldiers. 
I think you will remember that there was actually a rush at one time to 
rush out humvees to try to protect our soldiers from having their limbs 
and body parts dismembered. Once we did that, the Iranians developed 
another device. It was made of copper. When it exploded, it would go 
through any type of metal. It was used to kill Americans. It was used 
to dismember them. As a matter of fact, when you see people in 
Tennessee, Wyoming, Kansas, or in other places walking up and down the 
street with prosthetics, that was Iran. Iran was responsible for the 
dismembering of so many Americans.
  They are the same people, by the way, who are supporting Assad right 
now. An amazing thing--the IRGC, which is the arm that directly reports 
to the Supreme Leader, is the shock

[[Page S6494]]

force in Syria right now that is keeping Assad afloat.
  The ranking member and I recently went to see a display by the 
Holocaust Museum. A gentleman named Caesar had documented what Assad, 
with Iran's support, is doing to everyday Syrians in the country. As we 
sit here, what they are doing is torturing people. As a matter of fact, 
I wish you could see the pictures. They are actually amputating 
people's genitals. As we are sitting here in this comfortable setting, 
Iran is supporting Assad's ability to do that to his own people. We see 
on the TV screens what is happening. People are flooding out from Syria 
and flooding out from Iraq to get away from what is happening right now 
in the Middle East.
  We know that Hezbollah--another arm of Iran--through one of its 
proxies right now, is destabilizing Lebanon.
  We know that Hamas is being supplied rockets--sophisticated rockets, 
I might add--from Iran to shoot into Israel.
  We know that in Bahrain, where we have thousands of troops to keep 
the Strait of Hormuz open, they are supplying terrorist organizations 
there to disrupt that government and cause harm to the people who are 
serving us.
  So this is whom we are dealing with--the greatest state sponsor of 
terror that we know. We only named three, by the way. We named Syria, 
we named Sudan, and we named Iran.
  Obviously, when we worked through the first agreements and in the 
interim agreement where we agreed to enrich, that was quite a shock to 
most of us. Then they went through the first big round to reach this 
comprehensive agreement, and that agreement addressed a number of the 
issues the leader just laid out. But prior to going to Geneva, there 
were still, in this final round, some issues that needed to be 
addressed.
  I had one of those few calls with Secretary Kerry where I felt as 
though he was listening. I talked to him at length. I told him: 
Secretary Kerry, a lot of people are going to have difficulty ever 
approving a deal that allows Iran to industrialize their program like 
this.
  But how you finish these last pieces is going to say a lot 
qualitatively about how we really plan to implement this deal. At that 
time, of course, we still had the issues of previous military 
dimensions. Some people call it possible military dimensions. But we 
know they were developing a nuclear weapon. You certainly heard the 
presentation regarding how we are dealing with Parchin. It is really 
pretty amazing, after the AP report came out, how this has actually 
survived late-night comedy. We know that if the IAEA gives a report on 
Iran's previous military dimensions--I think you know Iran is supposed 
to be supplying the IAEA information and access to scientists regarding 
what they were doing. But regardless of what the quality of this is--if 
it is a D-minus report or an A-plus report--the fact is that they still 
get the sanctions relief they are seeking over the next 9 months.
  In addition to that, the inspections process--we have all had 
concerns about the fact that we have to wait 24 days. By the way, there 
is a lot of misunderstanding about the 24 days. That is after the IAEA 
raises a concern. That is after Iran responds to that. Some people have 
written that it could take as many as 40 to 45 days for this to occur. 
But then there is a 24-day period.
  Our leader referred to the IR-1. Iran has done a masterful job 
because they have gotten the P5+1 to focus on their IR-1 centrifuges. 
They have 19,000 of them. They are antiques. Truly, they are antiques. 
What they have going on right now is the development of IR-2s, IR-4s, 
IR-6s, IR-8s.
  I would ask you to go down to the SCIF and let some of our 
intelligence people tell you the speed--the difference between the IR-8 
and IR-1.
  Let me say to you without giving any classified information that in a 
room the size of where I am standing to this back wall and actually 
much closer this way, in a small room like that, Iran can actually do 
the equivalent of 720 IR-1s. With a 24-day inspection process, our 
ability to detect in very small areas of Iran--a very large country--
this type of thing is going to be very difficult.
  So I talked to Secretary Kerry about those two things, and I am 
sorry, I feel as if we totally punted on those issues, and then for 
good measure, as has been mentioned many times, we threw in the lifting 
of the conventional arms embargo. I mean, where did that come from? 
What did that have to do with the nuclear power? We threw in the 
lifting of ballistic testing in 8 years. Again, what was that about? 
Then, with some really special and peculiar language meant, I think, to 
confuse, we lifted immediately their ability to test ballistic weapons.
  So let me say again that all of this we know is being done with a 
country that has no practical need for enrichment. They have one 
nuclear reactor--one. They can buy enriched uranium so much cheaper on 
the market. They have absolutely no need for 19,000 centrifuges. They 
have no need for an underground facility to protect from bombing. They 
have no need for the facility at Arak that produces plutonium.
  Many people have said that Iran wants to have the ability to deal 
with medical isotopes. They want to show to the rest of the Middle East 
that they are sophisticated. Do you know how many centrifuges they 
would need to do that? Five hundred.
  So what has all this been about? They have put their people through 
such grief, such economic depravity. They have been isolated from the 
world. They are a rogue community. And they have done all that to 
create a program that has, as we know, only one need, and that is so 
they can develop a nuclear weapon.
  I am very disappointed with where we have come up, and I am 
disappointed to add this as another problem. We are doing all this 
without a strategy in the Middle East. I wrote an op-ed in the 
Washington Post--not that anybody reads them--to talk about my 
disapproval of this deal. When you think about it, one of the great 
tragedies--again, we are seeing it play out on television. John McCain 
has been so good at talking about this issue. But what we are seeing 
play out right now is no strategy in the Middle East. It is the 
greatest humanitarian disaster of my lifetime.
  So what is going to happen without any strategy to push back against 
Iran, to push back against what they are doing in Syria, what they have 
been doing in Lebanon, what they are doing in Yemen, what they are 
doing in Bahrain, what they are doing certainly against Israel--Hamas--
without a strategy, this is going to be the de facto strategy.
  I will remind everyone again that in 9 months all the leverage goes 
away. Right now we have leverage over them. In 9 months, they have all 
their money and the sanctions have been relieved. Many of you have read 
statements that have been issued by the Supreme Leader and others that 
if we try to put sanctions on them for their terrorist activities, 
violations of human rights or other activities, you know what they are 
going to say. They are going to say: Hey, I am sorry. You are violating 
the agreement.
  Remember, this President has tried to obligate not just us from 
putting additional sanctions in place, but he has tried to keep State 
and local governments from putting sanctions in place. He is actually 
acting as a buffer against those people who in good conscience would 
want to push back against the terrible human rights activities that are 
taking place and the terrorism that is being exported.
  Again, this is going to be our strategy. Think about it. In a year, 
before the next President takes office, let's say we want to put 
sanctions in place to push back because Iran is supplying additional 
arms to Assad, as it appears Russia is doing right now, what is Iran 
going to say? Well, we are just going to begin development of our 
nuclear program.
  What if we say that we know they are in violation of the nuclear 
program, and therefore we are going to put sanctions in place, what are 
they going to say? Well, we are just going to resume the nuclear 
program.
  So in 9 months, literally, the leverage shifts from us to them. We 
are going to be very reticent to challenge them on any violations of 
this agreement. Candidly, we are going to be reticent to push back 
against the things they are doing to destabilize the region.

[[Page S6495]]

  I will close with this. I appreciate the leader setting up this 
debate. I appreciate Senator Reid allowing us to do this. I appreciate 
that 98 Senators have said: Look, this is probably the biggest foreign 
policy issue we are going to deal with during our time here in the U.S. 
Senate. I hope what is going to happen over the course of the next 
several days is that we will continue to express our approval by some, 
our disapproval by others--a bipartisan majority--and the reasons as to 
why some approve this.
  At the end of the day what I hope will happen is that--since all 98 
Senators in this body said they wanted to debate this and wanted the 
opportunity to vote up or down on the substance of this deal--we will 
have enough colleagues in this Chamber who will agree that because it 
is the biggest foreign policy issue of our day and because 98 Senators 
stood up and said: No, Mr. President, you cannot implement this deal 
until we express whether we approve or disapprove this deal, we will 
have far more than 60 Senators who will agree to allow us to get to a 
final vote so everybody in this Senate can be accountable.
  This is an important issue. I thank my colleagues for the time to be 
able to discuss it in this way.
  With that, I will yield the floor. I thought Senator Cardin was next, 
but it looks as if it will be Senator Durbin.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority whip.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator 
from Arizona, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, be 
recognized and that I be recognized following his remarks.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator from Utah, the President pro tempore, 
advise the Senate if we are operating under a unanimous consent 
agreement as to time allocations?
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, the time is equally divided.
  Mr. DURBIN. Between which hours?
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time until 5 p.m. today is equally 
divided.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, will the President pro tempore be kind 
enough to tell me how much time has been used by the Republican side 
since 2:15 p.m.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Approximately 45 minutes.
  Mr. DURBIN. I do not object.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am really glad that the distinguished 
leader of the Armed Services Committee is going to speak next. The 
Senator from Arizona probably has more knowledge of the Middle East 
than almost anybody in this body, but it was my understanding that we 
were going to rotate back and forth.
  We actually have people who have asked to speak. Senator Reid had 
asked to speak, but he decided not to do so. Senator Cardin was going 
to speak. We were going to rotate between Republicans and Democrats.
  Senators had signed up for time to speak, and that was the procedure 
we were going to follow. It wasn't going to be just Republicans on the 
floor and then Democrats, but it appears the majority whip wishes to 
alter that status.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, we have Senators on the Democratic side 
prepared to speak when the Republicans are ready to yield.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Illinois that I 
will be more than happy to yield to any speaker on the other side. I 
was under the impression that we were going to be going back and forth, 
and I think that would contribute to the debate. If the Senator from 
Illinois or the Senator from Hawaii or anyone else wishes to speak, I 
will be glad to yield.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be 
equally divided between both sides of the aisle and that following the 
recognition of a speaker on our side, an opportunity be given to a 
speaker on the Democratic side and that we alternate back and forth 
using the time that is allotted for the debate.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object. The 
Republican side has already used 45 minutes, so I hope the Senator from 
Texas is saying that between 2:15 p.m. and 5 p.m. the time will be 
equally divided, and we will rotate from one side to the other.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask consent to amend the request.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Texas has the floor.
  Mr. CORNYN. I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, am I recognized?
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, again, I say to the Senator from Illinois 
that the usual way I have seen around here for many years is one side 
will speak, and then the other side will make their argument. If the 
Senator from Illinois wants to stack up all of his time on that side so 
there is no back and forth, I don't think that is the intent of what we 
are trying to achieve here.
  Mr. DURBIN. I say to my friend from Arizona, I have told you, we have 
Democratic Senators prepared to speak. So when my friends are ready to 
give up the floor, we will be glad to recognize our Democratic 
Senators.
  Mr. McCAIN. We have been in since 2:15 p.m.
  Mr. DURBIN. We have been waiting patiently.
  Mr. McCAIN. I know their schedules are very crowded, but I would hope 
that maybe one of them could wander over and speak. This is a fairly 
important issue.
  Mr. DURBIN. I say to my friend from Arizona, we have a Democratic 
Senator prepared to speak at this moment.
  Is the Senator prepared to yield?
  Mr. McCAIN. Prepared to speak at this moment?
  I yield to whichever Senator on the other side wishes to speak.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. President.
  A President of the United States once said of his Nation's enemy that 
we cannot ``wish away the differences between our two societies and our 
philosophies, but we should always remember that we do have common 
interests and the foremost among them is to avoid war.'' In pursuing 
that cause, he said:

       We will be prepared to protect our interests and those of 
     our friends and allies, but we want more than deterrents. We 
     seek genuine cooperation. We seek progress for peace.

  It was President Reagan who seized the opportunity during the Cold 
War and President George H. W. Bush who carried it forward. Together 
they achieved commitments from the United States and the Soviet Union, 
enemies through and through, to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons, bringing us ever closer to a world free of the threat of 
nuclear annihilation. It ingrained in us a tradition of pragmatism--the 
idea that even with countries we deeply distrust and whose behavior we 
abhor, we cannot ignore the opportunity to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.
  The Joint Comprehension Plan of Action that the United States 
negotiated with Iran and the other members of the P5+1 preserves that 
tradition, to ``seek progress for peace.''
  This deal is not perfect, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee so ably explained. We had to make concessions, and that is 
because it was negotiated between sovereign countries pursuing 
diplomacy and not unconditional surrender.
  I hear complaints about one provision or another, and some of those 
criticisms are valid, but we don't have the luxury of sending our 
negotiators back to Vienna. If we do that, things will fall apart. 
Every ambassador from the P5+1 has made clear that the multilateral 
sanctions that brought Iran to the table will be upended. We would be 
isolated diplomatically, Iran's nuclear program would be unconstrained, 
and Iran would get most of its money too.
  Of course, we could levy harsh unilateral sanctions ourselves, and 
that would be emotionally satisfying to many, but they won't bite. They 
did not when Iran went from 300 centrifuges to more than 18,000, and 
they won't now.
  The question in this debate is whether to approve the deal or dump 
it. There is no door No. 3, but we don't

[[Page S6496]]

need to feel resigned because, as a deal, it is quite a good one. 
Experts in the nonproliferation space almost unanimously affirm that it 
is a strong deal. It blocks each one of Iran's pathways to the bomb and 
places its nuclear program under strict international supervision. 
There is no alternative to this agreement, and certainly no military 
option, that eliminates 98 percent of Iran's fissile material or two-
thirds of its operating centrifuges.
  Now, I will grant that critics make a few very persuasive arguments 
that have more to with how we view Iran than how we view this deal. 
First they say that it places too much trust in Iran, but the opposite 
is true. This agreement is not based on trust or shared values, and we 
have no reason to assume that Iran will comply with its terms in good 
faith. That is why the agreement adopts a robust inspections and 
verification regime that will be in place for up to 25 years. We will 
be monitoring Iran's entire nuclear supply chain--from uranium mining, 
milling, and enrichment to the manufacturing and replacement of 
centrifuges--so we will know if Iran is diverting uranium or 
centrifuges to secret facilities.
  If Iran does try to break out to acquire the bomb, all options remain 
on the table to stop it, including the use of military force. And 
because the agreement provides us more information about Iran's nuclear 
program, our military options will be more effective and have the 
backing of the international community because we will have exhausted 
diplomacy first.
  The other concern, and I think this is a valid one, is that this deal 
should not be overstated in terms of its impact on our priorities and 
alliances in the region. It is important on the nuclear issue, but in 
October we will have many of the same challenges in the Middle East 
that we have in September. Iran is still the world's leading state 
sponsor of terror and nothing in this deal will deter us from working 
to contain Iran's regional aspirations, including its support of Hamas 
and Hezbollah. But our efforts can now occur with a nuclear-armed Iran 
off the table.
  I wish to personally offer some words to those Americans who love 
Israel with a personal passion and commitment that I share. Your 
skepticism is well earned and based in faith and history--based in 
familial relationships and culture. It is core of who we are.
  My colleagues rightly want to know what happens next. What is the 
United States prepared to do to protect loved ones in a dangerous 
neighborhood? Whether one supports this deal or not, we can all agree 
that America's commitment to Israel remains unshakeable, and we will 
continue, Democrats and Republicans united, to stand with Israel. Even 
as we work to restrict Iran's nuclear ambitions, we will continue to 
thwart Hamas and Hezbollah. We are committed to cooperating with Israel 
on intelligence and security at the highest levels ever and continuing 
to ensure that Israel's qualitative military edge is protected. When 
this debate is over, we must find new ways to enhance our joint efforts 
to counter threats that endanger Israel every day.

  We are debating what may be the most important foreign policy choice 
of the decade. Our decision will have consequences for the security and 
the stability of the new Middle East. If Congress chooses to oppose 
this agreement, we will witness an unraveling of the international 
sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table, with Iran moving 
ever faster toward the bomb and our country left with few choices 
besides another war in the Middle East.
  We have shown as a country that we have the will to protect 
ourselves, our allies, and our interests--using military force when 
truly necessary. We will continue to stand with Israel despite whatever 
temporary disagreements our governments may have. We do not 
underestimate or understate the challenges we have and the role of our 
military in shaping events for the better, but in this instance, with 
eyes wide open, we ought to pursue peace first.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I wish to thank the majority leader, the 
Senator from Kentucky, for conducting the debate on this agreement with 
the seriousness and gravity it deserves. In doing so, he has acted in 
the best traditions of the Senate, and I thank him for it.
  I wish to also thank my colleague, the Senator from Tennessee, the 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who I believe just gave a 
very eloquent presentation of the situation as we are debating today.
  Today begins the culmination of a monumental debate that our Nation 
has conducted for the past 3 months. This debate is not about whether 
we support diplomatic solutions to international challenges or whether 
we are willing to negotiate with the Iranian regime or whether we 
should go to war with Iran. That is not what this debate is about, 
despite the President's sad, partisan attempts to make it so.
  It is always preferable to solve international problems without 
resorting to military force, but the ultimate test of any diplomacy is 
not merely whether it avoids the use of force but whether it secures 
our national security interests. Put simply, I believe the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action fails this test and it fails by the very 
criteria the administration itself once laid out as a good deal.
  Three years ago, President Obama said the goal of negotiations with 
Iran was to ``get Iran to recognize it needs to give up its nuclear 
program and abide by U.N. resolutions that have been in place.'' This 
is what the President said:

       The deal we'll accept is they end their nuclear program. 
     It's very straightforward.

  In reality, the deal doesn't require Iran to end its program; it 
simply suspends it for a period of years. As the President said in 
April, ``Iran is not going to simply dismantle its program because we 
demand it to do so.'' Let's contemplate that. ``Iran is not going to 
simply dismantle its program because we demand it to do so.''
  Unfortunately, the administration's concessions didn't stop there. On 
November 24, 2013, Secretary Kerry said:

       There is no right to enrich. We do not recognize a right to 
     enrich.

  However, in the final deal, the administration not only conceded the 
right to enrich, it also allowed Iran to maintain an industrial-scale 
enrichment capability that will only grow in size and sophistication.
  On the issue of Fordow, the once covert nuclear facility that was 
built deep into a mountain, President Obama said in December 2013 that 
Iran had no need--no need--for such a facility if all it sought was 
peaceful nuclear energy. Yet the final deal allows Iran to maintain 
nearly 1,000 centrifuges at Fordow and conduct nuclear-related testing 
there during the entire life of the agreement.
  On the issue of Iran's breakout capacity, President Obama said in 
December of 2013 that in the deal he envisions, the Iranians ``as a 
practical matter, do not have a breakout capacity.'' Here, too, the 
administration reversed itself, conceding to a breakout capacity in 
establishing the arbitrary standard of 1 year.
  Similarly, on the so-called possible military dimensions, or PMD, of 
Iran's past nuclear activities, Secretary Kerry said this April:

       They have to do it. It will be done. . . . It will be part 
     of a final agreement. It has to be.

  Just 2 months later--2 months later--Secretary Kerry reversed 
himself, saying:

       We're not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what 
     they did at one point in time or another. We know what they 
     did. We have no doubt. We have absolute knowledge.

  My friends, this kind of hubris is astonishing. I know of no 
intelligence professional who would share that level of certainty. But 
perhaps Secretary Kerry's reversal is because the final deal does not 
require Iran to resolve the PMD issue prior to receiving sanctions 
relief.
  Furthermore, the chief of Iran's atomic energy agency has said 
sanctions relief will proceed regardless of the resolution of the PMD 
issue. That was the chief of Iran's atomic energy agency.
  The mechanism to resolve longstanding international concerns about 
the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program is contained 
in a side agreement between Iran and the

[[Page S6497]]

IAEA which neither the administration nor the Congress has seen. Get 
this: There is an agreement on inspection and verification that this 
Congress, before we vote, will never have seen and the American people 
will never have seen. How in the world, on the most important aspect of 
any agreement--verification--the provisions for which are not known to 
the Members of this body. That alone is a reason to demand--to demand--
what are those side agreements? Maybe they are nothing. Maybe they are 
something we would approve of. We don't even know what in the world 
they are.
  The administration provided a classified briefing on what they know 
to be in the side agreement, and suffice it to say that I think most of 
us--even on both sides of the aisle--would agree that briefing is one 
of the more bizarre and disturbing aspects of this deal. They called it 
unconventional. That is generous.
  What is more, inspections of Iran's facilities will be conducted by 
the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. There will be no 
Americans allowed on the ground, and the details of how these 
monitoring activities will occur are contained in another side 
agreement between the IAEA and Iran.
  Here is the problem: Verifying that Iran is not cheating on this deal 
requires a full accounting of the possible military dimensions of 
Iran's nuclear program. To verify that Iran has ceased its nuclear 
weapons-related activities necessarily requires that we know the full 
extent of these past activities--the personnel, facilities, equipment, 
and materials used and over what time period. We do not have that 
information.
  President Obama has said this deal is based on verification, not 
trust, but the means of verification are in many cases suspect. This 
presents a major problem. We will vote in the coming days on the Iran 
deal, but we cannot even read certain foundational documents pertaining 
to how that verification will occur, and our own government is not even 
a party to those agreements. I find that deeply troubling. It may 
account for, as more Americans know more about it, the overwhelming 
majority of Americans who do not approve of this deal.
  Even more troubling, however, is that the administration also 
conceded its longstanding and repeated promises that its diplomacy was 
limited exclusively to the nuclear fight. For nearly a decade, the 
international arms embargo has significantly hurt Iran's ability to 
build up and modernize its aging military.
  Not long before the deal was announced, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, before our committee--General Dempsey--told the 
Committee on Armed Services that ``under no circumstances should we 
relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and 
arms trafficking.'' Is there anything in this agreement that does that? 
In fact, it is the opposite.
  In 5 years, the international arms embargo against Iran will be 
lifted, freeing up the regime to acquire advanced conventional military 
means capabilities such as fighter aircraft, air defense systems, and 
anti-ship missiles. With billions of dollars in sanctions relief, Iran 
is sure to find plenty of states that are eager to sell those weapons, 
especially Russia and China.
  In 8 years, the agreement would legitimate and accelerate Iran's 
development of ballistic missiles, including ICBMs, whose only 
conceivable military purpose would be to deliver nuclear weapons. This 
concession was made even as the Director of National Intelligence 
concluded earlier this year that ``Iran's ballistic missiles are 
inherently capable of delivering WMD''--that is weapons of mass 
destruction--``and Tehran already has the largest inventory of 
ballistic missiles in the Middle East.''
  In this way, the administration's Iran deal not only paves the 
Islamic Republic's path to a nuclear capability, it also furthers that 
regime's emergence as a dominant military power in the Middle East. 
This has direct and dangerous implications for the United States--
especially our Armed Forces. After all, the ultimate guarantee that 
Iran will not get a nuclear weapon is not a 109-page document; it is 
the capability of the U.S. military to do what is necessary to prevent 
it if all else fails.
  The administration says that the military option will remain on the 
table if Iran violates the agreement, and that is true. Yet the 
agreement itself would enable Iran to construct the very kind of 
advanced military arsenal that could raise the cost of employing our 
military option should it become necessary. In short, if this agreement 
fails and U.S. servicemembers are called upon to take military action 
in Iran, their lives clearly would be at greater risk because of the 
terms of this deal.
  As we debate the technical details of this agreement, this is the 
bigger picture we must stay focused on: the strategic implications of 
this agreement on nuclear proliferation, regional security, and the 
balance of power in an increasingly chaotic Middle East. This has been 
the focus of our oversight on the Committee on Armed Services, and from 
this perspective, this bad Iran deal only looks that much worse.
  Iran is not just an arms control challenge; it is a geopolitical 
challenge. For years, many of us have urged the administration to adopt 
a regional strategy to counter Iran's malign activities in the Middle 
East. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee pointed out what 
has been done by these IEDs that Qasem Soleimani sent into Iraq to kill 
and maim our men and women who are serving in the military. 
Unfortunately, if such a strategy exists, there is no evidence of it. 
Instead, we have watched with alarm as Iran's military and intelligence 
operatives have stepped up their destabilizing activities in Iraq, 
Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Gaza, and elsewhere.
  Iran did all of this under the full pressure of sanctions. Now Iran 
will receive tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief. To be 
sure, a good amount of that money will go to Iran's priorities, but 
much of it will also surely flow to Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps 
and Quds Force--groups that, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff also mentioned, were responsible for the deaths of several 
hundred U.S. servicemembers. This will have enormous consequences for 
stability in the Middle East and for America's credibility.
  For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations have sought to 
contain the malign influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Our allies and 
partners have entrusted much of their own security to the United States 
because they believed our commitments were credible. In this way, 
America's role in the region has been to suppress security competition 
between states with long histories of mistrust and to prevent that 
competition from breaking down into conflict.
  I fear this agreement will further undermine our ability and 
willingness to play that vital stabilizing role. Our allies and 
partners in the Middle East have increasingly come to believe that 
America is withdrawing from the region and doing so at a time when Iran 
is aggressively seeking to advance its geopolitical ambitions. Now we 
have made a deal with Iran that will not only legitimize the Islamic 
Republic as a threshold nuclear state with an industrial enrichment 
capability but will also unshackle this regime in its long-held pursuit 
of conventional military power and may actually consolidate the Islamic 
Republic's control in Iran for years to come. The dangerous result is 
that our allies and partners will be increasingly likely to take 
matters into their own hands--and, indeed, we already see evidence of 
that.
  These fateful decisions may well manifest themselves in a growing 
regional security competition, new arms races, nuclear proliferation, 
and possible conflict, all of which would demand more, not less, U.S. 
leadership and presence in the region.
  Ultimately, this is what I find most troubling about the Iran deal. 
It embodies and will likely exacerbate the collapse of America's global 
influence that is occurring under this administration and indeed has so 
often been catalyzed by its policies.
  Just consider--just consider, my colleagues, how much more dangerous 
our world has become. A malign form of Russian influence is expanding 
in Europe and Eurasia. Vladimir Putin is using 21st century weapons to 
further his 19th century ambitions of the Russian Empire--most 
dramatically in

[[Page S6498]]

Ukraine where Putin seeks to annex the territory of a sovereign 
country.
  Our President goes to Estonia and days later Russia abducts an 
Estonian agent on Estonian territory. What message does that send? 
China's leaders also appear to feel emboldened. Our President visits 
Asia, and the next week China escalates tensions with a U.S. partner in 
the South China Sea. Our President visits Alaska and five--for the 
first time five Chinese warships show up in the Aleutians, violating 
the 12-mile limit.
  Meanwhile, China continues its military modernization while building 
and militarizing land features in international waters. Again, there is 
no deterrence. Cyber attacks against our Nation are increasing in 
regularity and severity. In just the past year, we have been attacked 
by North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. The administration does what? 
Nothing. There is no deterrence, so the attacks continue.
  We have watched the hard-won gains of our men and women in uniform 
melt away in Iraq following the President's decision to withdraw all of 
our troops in 2011 over the objections of his military leaders and 
commanders on the ground. Of course, there is the conflict in Syria, 
which has claimed 220,000 lives and counting, spawned the largest and 
most threatening terrorist army in the world, involved the repeated use 
of weapons of mass destruction, destabilized the entire Middle East, 
and led to the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.
  There is no one who was not deeply moved by the picture of the 3-
year-old baby on the beach. My friends, that is a direct result of 
Obama's foreign policy and have no doubt about it. Amidst all of these 
growing threats, for 4 years now the Budget Control Act and 
sequestration have cut our military by hundreds of billions of dollars 
for no strategic rationale whatsoever. Congress has, unfortunately, 
been complicit in this disaster, but if the President showed as much 
personal engagement and willingness to compromise with the Republicans 
as he did with the Iranians, we could repeal the Budget Control Act and 
sequestration and fund the government tomorrow.
  Through it all, my colleagues, what have we heard from our President? 
We have been told that America's influence is limited, as if that is 
not always the case. We have been told there are no good options to the 
challenges we face, as if there ever are in the real world. We have 
been told we cannot solve every problem in the world, as if that 
absolves us from ever attempting to solve any problem. We have been 
told the administration's worst failures are always someone else's 
fault and that no policy of theirs, after 6 years in power, is ever to 
blame.
  We have been told the only alternative to our current mess of a 
foreign policy is war and that anyone who disagrees with this 
President--Republicans and Democrats; they make no distinction--is a 
warmonger--is a warmonger. Again and again, where there should be 
leadership and statesmanship, there is only a parade of truisms and 
defeatist rhetoric and straw man arguments and partisan attacks.
  This has tainted and cheapened our national discourse, as evidenced 
by the fact that unlike past landmark diplomatic agreements, this one 
will likely come into force on a party-line minority vote. Let me 
emphasize that. This Iranian deal will likely be rejected by a 
bipartisan majority of both Houses of Congress. If there is a precedent 
in American history for such a thing, I cannot think of it.
  Indeed, a recent Pew poll found that only 21 percent of Americans 
approve of the Iranian deal. This has also diminished our standing in 
the world. Our words ring hollow. Our reassurances fail to reassure. 
Our warnings are not heeded. Our redlines are crossed. Our moral 
influence is being discredited and tarnished. Americans sense this and 
so do our adversaries. They perceive it as weakness, and it is 
provocative.
  We need leadership, a strategy, and policies to address this crisis 
in our foreign policy, especially the broader threat posed by Iran. 
This larger response should include, among other steps, increasing 
sanctions against Iran for its malign activities in the Middle East and 
its human rights abuses, new security assistance for our allies and 
partners in the region, and once and for all eliminating the specter of 
sequestration.
  This Congress should take up this effort with new legislation. I look 
forward to working on it with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. 
That time will come. However, the question now before this body is 
whether to disapprove of the administration's deal with Iran. I will 
vote yes. I disapprove of this deal because it would not cut off Iran's 
path to a nuclear weapon, it would pave a new one. I disapprove of this 
deal because it would legitimize the Islamic Republic as a threshold 
nuclear state with an industrial enrichment capability that will grow 
unfettered after the key terms of the deal end.
  I disapprove of this deal because it unshackles Tehran's pursuit of 
conventional military power. I disapprove of this deal because it rests 
on the assumption--the hope, really--that in a decade or so we may be 
dealing with a better Iranian regime. Yet the deal itself will likely 
strengthen the current Iranian regime. This deal is not in our national 
security interests. Congress and the American people should reject it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cotton). The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, as has been said, the time is equally 
divided. Obviously, Republicans have spent a great deal of time on the 
floor. The order, just for people on our side who are coming and going 
on our side--we know the next speaker is Senator Feinstein, but it was 
a preagreed order of Hatch, Cornyn, Barrasso, and Gardner. It is my 
understanding that we may only have about 15 to 20 minutes of time left 
on our side until 5 o'clock. I just say that for the convenience of 
Members.
  Will the Presiding Officer tell us exactly how much time we have on 
our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republicans have approximately 10\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. CORKER. I say that for the convenience of people on our side who 
may come and go. That is the order. I know that obviously--how much 
time does the Democratic side have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democrats have approximately 1 hour 15 
minutes.
  Mr. CORKER. So just based on the process put forward by the minority 
whip--obviously we will have one more speaker over here. I assume you 
will have Democrats to fill the time on your side until 5. I want to 
make that known to people. Thank you.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the 
nuclear agreement with Iran. I do so because I believe this diplomatic 
achievement provides the only option that prevents Iran from obtaining 
a nuclear weapon. I would like to take just a moment to say thank you 
to our negotiating team and commend them on a job that I believe was 
well done and to thank them for their concerted effort to explain the 
agreement to the Congress over the past 2 months.
  I have been in this body for a long time. There have been many 
different agreements. I can never remember a time where the Senate has 
been briefed more assiduously than it has with this agreement. As the 
Presiding Officer knows, we sat this morning for 2 hours and listened 
to the top heads of our intelligence agencies discuss with us the 
particulars of this agreement.
  American negotiators have worked with negotiators from the world's 
major powers--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia, and 
the EU--and reached an agreement that will prevent Iran from developing 
a nuclear weapon for at least the next 15 years and I believe longer.
  I cannot emphasize this enough: the agreement represents the world 
coming together to put an end to Iran's nuclear program. By contrast, 
if the Senate disapproves of this agreement, we are on our own.
  As of last night, 42 Senators have announced their support for the 
agreement. In practical terms, that means the Senate will not 
disapprove of this agreement. We have conducted a full review and the 
opponents of this deal have failed, but the opponents are still holding 
out the false hope that there can be a better deal.

[[Page S6499]]

  Let me be clear: there is no better deal. No one, no state, no leader 
has proposed one. The only alternative to the agreement we now have is 
no agreement at all. Should the Congress reject this accord, the United 
States, which led this effort, would be deserting our allies and 
negotiating partners. That is because this is not just an agreement 
between the United States and Iran. It is an agreement between the 
world's major powers, the largest most powerful Nations in the world, 
and Iran. It is one approved by the 15 members of the United Nations 
Security Council.
  Brent Scowcroft, someone I know well, see annually, and the former 
National Security Advisor to President George H.W. Bush, recently 
wrote:

       There is no credible alternative were Congress to prevent 
     U.S. participation in the nuclear deal. If we walk away, we 
     walk away alone.

  I think it may be helpful to remind my colleagues and the American 
people how we got where we are today. First of all, preventing Iran 
from acquiring a nuclear weapon has been a longstanding and bipartisan 
national security objective. In 2003, Europe led the first effort to 
halt Iran's nuclear program. The next decade saw five separate major 
rounds of failed negotiations and an ever-advancing Iranian nuclear 
program. Iran went from having a few centrifuges spinning to being a 
threshold nuclear power.
  Following the revelations that Iran was installing centrifuges at 
Natanz last decade and disclosure in 2012 by our government and allies 
that Iran was turning a mountain near Qom into a deeply buried 
centrifuge chamber, Iran has seen sanctions escalate and felt 
international isolation, but its nuclear enrichment continued and 
advanced.
  The United States, with strong support from this Chamber, led an 
effort to install devastating multilateral sanctions with the goal of 
bringing Iran to the negotiating table. Those sanctions were effective 
because they were supported by the world's powers and importers of 
Iranian oil. In fact, the United States does not do much business with 
Iran. We do not import Iranian oil and U.S. banks don't process Iranian 
financial transactions. Unilateral U.S. sanctions are of little value 
by themselves, unless we are willing to sanction allies' banks.
  Indeed, multiple U.N. resolutions, EU sanctions, and the cooperation 
of our partners and allies successfully pressured Iran over its nuclear 
activities. Over time, the international sanctions that we helped build 
and continually enforced reduced Iranian oil exports from 2.5 million 
barrels per day to less than 1 million, reduced the number of countries 
that import Iranian oil from 23 to 6, prohibited Iran from repatriating 
more than $100 billion in foreign currency, reduced Iran's GDP by 
nearly 6 percent in 1 year, caused major inflation, and basically ended 
international investment in Iran's economy.
  The sanctions worked. Iran elected a reform government with a new 
President to negotiate an end to the sanctions and revive its economy. 
And despite its doubts, Iran sent a negotiating team to meet with the 
governments of the P5+1 nations.
  In November 2013 we signed the interim agreement that froze and even 
reversed Iran's nuclear program. According to the IAEA, and verified by 
U.S. intelligence, Iran has abided by the interim agreement for more 
than 1\1/2\ years. As we all know, in July 2015 the P5+1 signed the 
final agreement, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action.
  The agreement is the result of years of careful diplomacy among the 
world's powers. It was only possible because other nations abided by 
our sanctions at their own economic sacrifice. They believe that these 
sanctions worked, have achieved their result, and now should be 
suspended as Iran dismantles much of its nuclear infrastructure. These 
countries, which were so critical to our ability to impose sanctions, 
have told us directly they won't go back to the table to negotiate a 
new deal.
  To my colleagues who plan to vote in opposition to this agreement, I 
hope they have thought long and hard about what message this would send 
to the world. The consequences of rejecting this carefully negotiated 
deal would reach far beyond Iran. It would signal that the United 
States isn't willing or able to lead the world in confronting global 
challenges.
  Since the agreement was reached, I have spoken with many diplomats 
and statesmen. They are scratching their heads, wondering why the U.S. 
Congress is lining up with Iranian hard-liners in opposition to this 
agreement, instead of siding with the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and 
China, along with all the other members of the U.N. Security Council.
  Last week, Saudi Arabia announced its support for the agreement. 
Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir, who is known to many in this body, 
concluded his country's support by saying this agreement ``will 
contribute to security and stability in the region by preventing Iran 
from acquiring a nuclear capability.''
  During the August recess, a former head of state from one of our 
closest allies sat with me and said: ``You know, we are one of the 
nations you trust the most. We follow U.S. leadership and have agreed 
to the Iran deal, and now your Congress wants to back out. Why should 
we ever follow you again?''
  Many diplomats I have spoken with have echoed the former Prime 
Minister's statement. If Congress rejects the agreement, the world will 
be unlikely to follow us on other important issues in the future and I 
believe the Executive foreign policy obligations and responsibilities 
of a President of our country are diminished. Our ability to lead 
against global threats, to be the indispensable nation, I believe, 
ends.
  I understand that many Members of the Senate don't support our 
President, but by disapproving of this agreement we also undermine the 
ability of any future President to speak for the United States and 
carry out his or her constitutional role in conducting foreign policy.
  I have been involved in national security issues for many years, and 
I can't recall a time in recent memory when the world was united to 
this degree on such a complex issue. Even Russia and China are with us. 
We shouldn't squander the opportunity.
  Many of my colleagues have already described the terms of the 
agreement and how it constrains and allows for intrusive monitoring of 
Iran's nuclear program. For me, the arguments of Secretary of Energy 
Ernest Moniz are particularly persuasive. As we all know, he is a 
distinguished nuclear physicist from MIT, and he played a central role 
in the negotiations. He is a true expert of unimpeachable integrity, 
and he knows the nuclear world.
  He has said over and over again--and I have heard it personally at 
least five times--that every pathway to a bomb--plutonium, uranium, and 
covert--is blocked by this deal. The deal blocks Iran's uranium pathway 
to a bomb at Natanz and Fordow by reducing Iran's installed centrifuges 
by two-thirds--from more than 19,000 to 6,000--for at least 10 years. 
It reduces Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium by more than 97 
percent, to no more than 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium 
for 15 years, not enough nuclear material for a single weapon. It 
requires intrusive IAEA inspections of Iran's centrifuge production--
their careful labeling--and storage facilities for 20 years. And it 
requires IAEA inspections for 25 years of Iran's entire nuclear supply 
chain.
  The agreement blocks Iran's plutonium pathway to a bomb at Arak by 
modifying Iran's only heavy water reactor so that it cannot produce 
weapons-grade plutonium and requires all spent fuel capable of being 
reprocessed for plutonium to be shipped out of the country.
  The agreement blocks Iran's covert plutonium pathway to a bomb 
nationwide by requiring 24/7 IAEA access to all of Iran's declared 
nuclear sites for 15 years and by empowering the IAEA to use its most 
advanced monitoring techniques and equipment to ensure Iran cannot 
tamper with its devices or evade nuclear monitoring, and it guarantees 
IAEA access to any suspected--suspected--nuclear site within 24 days, 
including military facilities, and providing access to all of Iran's 
nuclear sites under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty permanently.
  Most notably, the agreement imposes a perpetual prohibition against 
Iran ever seeking, developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon.

[[Page S6500]]

  The terms of this agreement are unparalleled. The IAEA has never had 
this kind of access in any country. As the vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, I can say we have looked at this issue very 
carefully.
  As the Presiding Officer knows, as late as this morning, I can say 
that if Iran doesn't comply with its obligations, we will know about 
it, and we will be able to snap-back the sanctions that are suspended 
under this agreement.
  The administration has provided Congress with documents detailing the 
verification measures in this agreement. At an unclassified level, the 
executive branch has written: ``The United States is confident that it 
will be able to verify that Iran is complying with its commitments 
under the JCPOA, including its commitment not to pursue a nuclear 
weapon.''
  The Senate has also received a classified annex to the assessment 
from the intelligence community, which I think some of my colleagues 
have reviewed, and I would hope everyone would. The Senate Intelligence 
Committee has met with the heads of the U.S. intelligence agencies--as 
I just said--as recently as this morning to receive testimony and ask 
questions on our ability to ensure that Iran is complying with the 
terms of the nuclear agreement. From the reports and those hearings, I 
am very comfortable saying that the covert path to a bomb is closed, 
period.
  I recognize that this agreement doesn't address other problems the 
United States and the international community have with Iran. Iran 
continues to support terrorist groups, prop up Bashar al-Assad, and 
undermine stability across the Middle East. It is a serial abuser of 
human rights and is improperly detaining American citizens. These are, 
of course, reprehensible policies and, of course, we will continue to 
oppose them. But a nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically compound these 
problems.
  In my view, this agreement presents us with an opportunity to begin a 
broader discussion with Iran. As Iran, hopefully, will become more 
integrated into the global community and give up some of its bad ways, 
we can test whether Iran will move toward rejoining the community of 
nations. Rejecting this agreement only strengthens the hard-liners who 
lead the chants of ``Death to America.''
  Eighty-eight percent of Iranians are under the age of 54, and 41 
percent are under the age of 25. They defied predictions and elected a 
moderate replacement to President Ahmadinejad in the hopes that Iran 
will chart a new course. Clearly, this agreement won't change Iran's 
behavior overnight, and it would be unrealistic to expect Iran's 
cooperation on every issue, but it would also be foolish to throw the 
opportunity away and to give the hard-liners another reason to turn 
their backs on reform.
  More importantly, I am not willing to cede America's global 
leadership to reject this nuclear agreement or ignore the possibility 
of resolving the region's crises in favor of the myth of a better deal. 
There is no better deal.
  For these reasons, I join the large numbers of diplomats, scientists, 
retired U.S. flag officers, rabbis, arms controls advocates, national 
security experts, and intelligence professionals in supporting this 
agreement with Iran.
  I urge my colleagues, most sincerely, to oppose the resolution of 
disapproval and support this historic agreement.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). The majority whip.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I listened carefully to the eloquent 
remarks of the distinguished Senator from California and all of the 
countries around the world that embrace this deal, and I didn't hear 
mentioned once the nation of Israel, our most significant and important 
ally in the Middle East. And it is because, in fact, they do not 
approve.
  As we have heard from the Prime Minister several months ago, this 
paves the way to a nuclear weapon. It completely transforms American 
policy, which had been to deny Iran a nuclear weapon, and it paves the 
path to a nuclear weapon.
  But as I was contemplating this debate, I decided it was important 
for me to visit with Rick Kupke of Arlington, TX. Rick was one of 53 
Americans who were held hostage and held for 14 months in Iran at the 
time of the Iranian Revolution. In an interview with one of our 
newspapers in Fort Worth, when asked about this deal with Iran, he 
said:

       This is probably the worst agreement of this kind I've seen 
     in my lifetime.

  This is an experienced, seasoned Foreign Service officer. He 
continued:

       I don't know why they think the Iranians are going to abide 
     by any agreement. They never have.

  So I approach this agreement between President Obama and the regime 
in Tehran with a tremendous amount of skepticism.
  But this debate shouldn't be a partisan one, and I worry that it is 
quickly becoming partisan, based on the stated intention of the 
minority leader, Senator Reid, the Senator from Nevada, to actually 
filibuster and prevent an up-or-down vote on this resolution of 
disapproval. This is something that apparently is being actively 
encouraged by the President of the United States. Just a short time 
after the President himself signed the bill--a bipartisan bill with 98 
votes in the Senate, which sets up the procedure by which this 
resolution will be voted on--the President, the minority leader, and, 
apparently, many Democrats are tempted to filibuster this most 
important national security issue that I have confronted and seen since 
I have been in the Senate--and many would say during their lifetime.
  The President has really taken the low road, I am sorry to say. He 
has claimed that those chanting ``Death to America'' in Iran are 
``making common cause with the Republican caucus.'' That is the 
President of the United States. I would like to point out there are 
several influential leaders of the President's own party who are 
opposed to this deal and they include some of this Chamber's most 
expert and respected Members in the field of foreign affairs.

  First of all, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senator Cardin, to whom I personally express my admiration and respect 
for his courage--he pointed out in his remarks, when he announced he 
would vote for the resolution of disapproval, that the deal 
``legitimizes Iran's nuclear program.'' He also said: ``Under this 
agreement, Iran is permitted to be able to enrich to a level that will 
take them extremely close to breakout, legally.''
  The junior Senator from Maryland has made clear he shares the 
concerns many of us have expressed; that this deal leaves far too much 
of Iran's nuclear infrastructure intact and indeed legitimizes their 
nuclear program--something our stated national policy just a short time 
ago was to oppose.
  The senior Senator from New York, Mr. Schumer--perhaps one of the 
Members on that side of the aisle whose vote was most anticipated 
before he announced it--announced he is for the resolution of 
disapproval. He said: ``I believe Iran will not change, and under this 
agreement it will be able to achieve its dual goals of eliminating 
sanctions while ultimately retaining its nuclear and non-nuclear 
power.''
  Senator Schumer makes the point that Iran has gotten everything it 
wants. It has a pathway to a nuclear weapon, it has retained its 
nuclear infrastructure, and it has gotten an elimination of sanctions.
  The former chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Menendez, on August 18 announced his 
decision to oppose this bad deal. He said the deal ``failed to achieve 
the one thing it set out to achieve--it failed to stop Iran from 
becoming a nuclear weapons state at a time of its choosing.'' In fact, 
he said it ``authorizes and supports the very roadmap Iran will need to 
arrive at its target.''
  These are not members of the Republican caucus. These are respected 
members of the Democratic caucus.
  There used to be a time--and I hope it returns quickly--where matters 
of this gravity and seriousness, threats to our national security, were 
treated with bipartisan cooperation and consensus building, but 
apparently the President didn't get that memo--encouraging folks on 
that side of the aisle to prevent even an up-or-down vote on the 
resolution of disapproval and presumably cutting short the debate and 
hoping people across America aren't really paying attention to exactly 
how bad this deal is and how

[[Page S6501]]

much it makes the world more dangerous rather than safer.
  I hope our colleagues, even if they will vote for this deal or will 
vote against the resolution of disapproval--I hope they will allow us 
to have the sort of fulsome debate this serious issue deserves. Then 
they will be held accountable, as we will, for their vote either for or 
against the resolution of disapproval.
  I note that President Obama seems to want to arrogate to himself not 
even an authority that the Ayatollah Khamenei appears to have. 
Ayatollah Khamenei said the Iranian Parliament will vote on this deal, 
but apparently President Obama doesn't feel the United States Senate 
should have the same opportunity the Iranian Parliament is going to 
have--to vote on the merits or lack of merits on this deal.
  I hope our colleagues across the aisle will rethink their partisan 
opposition to actually even having an up-or-down vote on the resolution 
of disapproval. This could well be, as many have said before me, one of 
the most consequential foreign policy issues to come before us in a 
long time, and we ought to treat it with that sort of seriousness.
  The American people need to listen--and they are listening--and they 
will hold all of us accountable for our decisions.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I have been listening to my friend from 
Texas, and I couldn't agree with him more about the need for us to work 
in a bipartisan manner to strengthen America's foreign policy.
  I believe in the independence of Congress, and I very much support, 
along with Senator Corker, the review we are doing. I think this is 
critically important to the American people. We are having our debate, 
as we should. I do think, though, that while we are an independent 
branch, when this debate is over, we have to come together and work in 
the best interests of America, and I look forward to broad support in 
Congress to do everything in our power to make sure Iran does not 
become a nuclear weapons state. I think we can, in a positive way, as 
we move forward. I mentioned yesterday when I was on the floor about 
things we can do.
  Yes, there is disagreement on whether to vote for or against the 
resolution of disapproval, but I hope there is no disagreement that we 
need to work together with a broad consensus of Congress to give this 
country its strongest possible position moving forward, whether this 
agreement is approved or not.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield to one of the important members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the junior Senator from 
Delaware, who has spent a lot of time on this issue. He has been a very 
constructive member of our committee, very instrumental in the passage 
of the Iran review act. Senator Coons.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I rise to discuss one of the greatest 
threats we face today in America, a great threat to our vital ally 
Israel and to global security--the nuclear weapons ambitions of Iran 
and the options that remain before us for blocking those ambitions.
  On July 14, after years of negotiations between the United States, 
our international partners, and Iran, the administration reached a 
comprehensive agreement to freeze and roll back aspects of Iran's 
nuclear program in exchange for relief from the sanctions that have 
crippled Iran's economy. Our key partners in imposing and enforcing the 
sanctions that drove Iran to the negotiating table--the UK, Germany, 
France, the EU, China, and Russia--also joined in negotiating and 
ultimately ratifying this deal.
  Thanks to bipartisan legislation that passed this Chamber nearly 
unanimously, Congress is now fulfilling its duty to review this deal 
under the authority of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. As a 
public servant and Member of this body, I am grateful for the 
opportunity to join my colleagues to thoughtfully debate this vital and 
important issue. As a body, we owe that to the American people. As a 
Senator from Delaware, I owe that to Delawareans--to participate in a 
vigorous debate on an issue with profound and far-reaching 
consequences, not just for our Nation but for the whole global 
community.
  In preparation for this vote, I have dedicated myself to studying and 
understanding the content and consequences of the deal, and I am 
grateful to the bipartisan leadership of Chairman Corker and Ranking 
Member Cardin in convening more than a dozen hearings of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, as well as classified briefings; to the dozens of 
experts who came before us, both against and in favor of the deal, to 
provide us with analysis and insight; and to the thousands of 
Delawareans who have reached out to me by phone, by email, by text, and 
in person to express their strongly held views both against and for 
this agreement.
  As are many of my fellow Delawareans and Americans, I am deeply 
suspicious of Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism. I 
am also deeply suspicious of Iran's intentions for its nuclear program, 
given its long record of cheating on past deals and of consistently 
expressing virulently anti-American, anti-Semitic, and anti-Israel 
views.
  Iran is a dangerous regime that is today dangerously close to having 
enough fissile material to build a nuclear bomb. A nuclear-armed Iran 
would be a profound threat to our Nation's security and our interests 
around the world, as well as the security of our vital ally, Israel, 
and all of our partners in the Middle East.
  In response to these undeniable realities, we have successfully built 
a global coalition over the past decade united in their determination 
to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. They, too, see clearly 
the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. Bipartisan actions by Congress and 
the administration to enact and enforce sanctions have brought us to 
this point where our major European allies, as well as Russia and 
China--countries with which we often disagree--have all signed off on a 
comprehensive agreement to roll back and restrain Iran's nuclear 
program. The challenge we are discussing on the floor today is whether 
to move ahead with our partners in this deal or to turn aside from it 
and attempt to seek a stronger deal.
  From the day it was announced, this agreement has been sharply 
criticized by many in Congress and by the leaders of our vital ally 
Israel. After a close reading of this lengthy and complex agreement, I, 
too, have deep and persistent concerns about this deal.
  If Iran simply complies with the plain language of this deal, it will 
first gain tens of billions of dollars in sanctions relief that it will 
likely use to strengthen its support for terrorism and its proxies and 
rogue regimes and that will make it more resilient to future sanctions. 
Most importantly, the deal leaves in place key nuclear facilities and 
programs that over 10 to 15 years or more will allow Iran to develop a 
large-scale uranium enrichment capability that could be used to quickly 
make material for nuclear weapons if it decides to violate this 
agreement and the nonproliferation treaty.
  To look at those realities and not recognize them as significant 
challenges or flaws would be to miss the core content of this deal. On 
the other hand, the agreement achieves several critical goals that 
could not be easily achieved by any other means, that freeze or roll 
back Iran's nuclear ambitions. To get any sanctions relief, Iran must 
give up 97 percent of its existing stockpile of 12 tons of enriched 
uranium. It must disable two-thirds of their 19,000 centrifuges and 
permanently restructure its heavy water reactor at Arak so it can no 
longer produce weapons-grade plutonium.
  I have heard no questions or challenges to the technical aspects of 
these significant accomplishments in the deal.
  Most importantly, in my mind, Iran has agreed to thorough, intrusive, 
around-the-clock inspections of all of its declared and known nuclear 
sites, its uranium mines, uranium mills, centrifuge production, and 
uranium enrichment facilities for 15 years and more. Iran pledges under 
this agreement to abandon all efforts to develop or acquire a nuclear 
weapon, and the U.N. has ratified a unique arrangement under which the 
United States alone is able to reimpose U.N. sanctions on Iran for 
cheating on this deal at any point.

[[Page S6502]]

  Finally, our own military and intelligence community confirm that the 
option of military action against Iran remains available at all times 
and will only be strengthened by the significant additional 
intelligence we will likely gain through regular inspections of Iran's 
nuclear infrastructure.
  While many Americans, including thousands in my home State, have 
expressed strong opinions about this agreement, and while I, too, agree 
with many criticisms of this deal, none of us knows with certainty what 
will happen if instead Congress rejects this agreement. Will the 
strength of the U.S. banking system and our unilateral sanctions 
genuinely be strong enough to force our key allies and Iran back to the 
negotiating table? Is it possible to negotiate a stronger deal than 
this or will the nations that have dedicated years, along with us, to 
these negotiations now abandon sanctions and proceed without us to 
implement the deal with Iran, simply isolating us rather than Iran?
  Meetings and discussions I have held with ambassadors of our key 
partners, as well as with leaders in financial policy and foreign 
policy, have ultimately persuaded me we are unlikely to be able to 
reimpose effective multilateral sanctions and renegotiate our way to a 
better deal if we reject this one.
  Don't just take my word for it. Former Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Paulson and former Chairman of the Fed Board Paul Volcker have 
reached the same conclusion publicly and in a whole series of private 
conversations have reinforced my conclusion.
  Last week I delivered an address at the University of Delaware in my 
home State to explain in more detail why I have ultimately decided to 
support this deal. Today I am here to speak to my colleagues in the 
Senate because I believe strongly this floor must be a place of 
vigorous, spirited, and honest debate. Though nearly every one of my 
colleagues--in fact, probably as of today all of my colleagues--have 
made their arguments, announced their positions and decisions, and 
discussed their conclusions, as I have in my home State and as many 
others have with the media, I still believe we cannot ignore this floor 
as an important place for debate and discussion. I think it is 
particularly important on an issue that has always in the past garnered 
such strong and bipartisan support as our Nation's enduring support for 
Israel.

  So let me be clear about my position and where I stand. I will 
support this agreement and vote against measures to disapprove it in 
this Congress. I will support this agreement because it puts us on a 
known path of limiting Iran's nuclear program for 15 years with the 
full support of the international community. The alternative, I fear, 
is a scenario of uncertainty and isolation.
  Finally, I will support this agreement despite its significant flaws 
because it is the better strategy for the United States to lead a 
coalesced global community in containing the spread of nuclear weapons. 
I support this deal aware of its flaws, and I am committed to working 
tirelessly with my colleagues to overcome the limitations of the 
agreement, to ensure the security of Israel, and to contain and deter 
Iran's ambitions.
  That is why I did not make my final decision to support this deal 
until I secured, to me, valuable additional commitments from the 
administration--including a letter from the President offering specific 
reassurances across seven different areas, including that our allies 
and other members of the P5+1 will stick by us in strictly enforcing 
this deal, even as their economic engagements with Iran grow, and that 
we will continue to aggressively and by all means necessary address 
Iran's support for terrorism and its proxies, and that our commitment 
to Israel's security will remain unshakeable.
  Moving forward, I hope to work with colleagues to focus on 
strengthening Israel's conventional military deterrent against Iran, 
vigorously interdicting and countering Iranian support for terrorism 
and its proxies, strengthening the nonproliferation treaty, so that in 
15 years Iran leaves one cage--the JCPOA--and enters another--the 
constraints of an appropriately strengthened and bolstered NPT, and 
developing a clear and thorough plan with our European allies for 
active enforcement to enact a policy of zero tolerance of Iranian 
cheating on the agreement.
  There are few votes in the Senate that will have as much consequence 
to the security of our Nation and Israel's as this one. I am voting to 
support this agreement not because I think it is perfect or because I 
believe it is a perfect mechanism to end nuclear proliferation. I am 
voting for it because I believe it is our most credible opportunity in 
our current situation to lead a global community in containing a 
profound nuclear threat while preserving America's ability in the 
future to use economic power and military might to successfully 
dismantle Iran's nuclear program should diplomacy fail.
  My support for this agreement also represents a statement about U.S. 
leadership of an international system based on institutions that we 
developed following the Second World War to help bring about a rules-
based international system of mutual security.
  The United Nations and the IAEA were established following the great 
conflict of the Second World War to help prevent the spread and threat 
of nuclear war. We, the United States, helped lead the establishment of 
these institutions just as we led the international community to reach 
this deal to limit Iran's nuclear program.
  While neither our current international system nor this deal with 
Iran is perfect, they represent the collective will of our 
international partners and a vision for America's place in the world 
for which I will fight. While we reserve the right to use force, if 
necessary, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, we should 
uphold the international system that we helped create, and to do so we 
should support this deal.
  The legitimacy of this order is yet another reason we must ensure 
adequate oversight and verification of this nuclear deal because its 
failure will be a blow to the international system which gave it birth.
  In closing, Scripture offers us many stories, from Genesis to 
Deuteronomy to Isaiah and the gospels, in which we are encouraged to 
pursue diplomacy before resorting to conflict. My support of this 
agreement in no small part is an attempt to heed that advice.
  We cannot trust Iran. But this deal, based on distrust, verification, 
deterrence, and strong multilateral diplomacy, ultimately, I have 
concluded, offers us our best opportunity to prevent a nuclear-armed 
Iran.
  I support this deal with my eyes wide open, aware of its flaws as 
well as its potential, and I will remain committed to work with my 
colleagues to minimize the negative consequences and ensure we reap the 
maximum benefits of this agreement.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Coons. I know he went 
through a very deliberative process in reaching his conclusions. I know 
of his commitment to preventing Iran from having a nuclear weapons 
capacity, his strong support for regional security in the State of 
Israel. I know the process he went through because we had many 
conversations during the August recess. I know his statement is 
heartfelt, and I know he did what he thought was best. I just want to 
underscore that and thank him for his counsel and friendship.
  I am going to yield to Senator Kaine. Before I do that, I think it is 
important to point out that we are here today in this review in a very 
open and transparent way in large measure because of Senator Kaine.
  Senator Corker filed a review statute--I guess it was now several 
months ago--and through conversations with Senator Kaine he was able to 
get a framework that ultimately led to the passage of the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act by a 98-to-1 vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate. 
I was proud to be part of that effort, working with Senator Corker, but 
it would not have been possible without Senator Kaine. He was the one 
who recognized that we needed to find a common path--a nonpartisan 
path--for a transparent review that protected not just the role of the 
United States Congress, but the executive and legislative branch, and I 
applaud him for those efforts.
  Senator Kaine is a very valuable member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, one of our most

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trusted members in so many areas of foreign policy, and I am proud to 
have him as my friend and colleague.
  I yield the floor to Senator Kaine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I thank my ranking member and friend, the 
Senator from Maryland, for those kind words.
  Mr. President, I rise to discuss the Iran deal currently being 
debated in the Senate. We have not had a national security issue during 
my time in the Senate that has received so much attention in committee 
and on the floor of this body as this, and that is appropriate. The 
debate has been, and will continue to be, thorough and vigorous. That 
is appropriate, and I respect the views of my colleagues regardless of 
how they will vote on this matter.
  I wish to spend a few minutes recapping why I support the deal. I did 
speak on the floor early in August about this. Since that time, a 
number of leaders have come out in support of the deal: former Senators 
John Warner, Richard Lugar, Sam Nunn, and Carl Levin; General Brent 
Scowcroft, General Colin Powell; and today, former head of the IAEA 
Commission Uzi Eilam. After I briefly talk about my reasons for 
support, I want to address three final points: one, the Republican 
argument on the floor today that it is wrong to have a 60-vote 
threshold for the vote on a resolution of disapproval; two, the 
arguments that Vice President Cheney made against the deal yesterday; 
three, finally, the place of vigorous diplomacy as a tool of American 
strength.
  So first, to quickly recap why I support the deal: I support it 
because it is better than the status quo for 15 to 25 years. I don't 
compare it with a hypothetical alternative. We can create a 
hypothetical to justify a position. If we can, let's talk about the 
status quo.
  Before diplomacy started, Iran had rocketed ahead to 19,000 
centrifuges and 12,000 kilograms of enriched uranium, a plutonium 
reprocessing facility under construction, and we had very few 
inspections. The system was very opaque. That was the status quo.
  The best description of the Iranian status quo was the description 
that Prime Minister Netanyahu made to the U.N. in September of 2012. 
That was a speech known because he drew a bomb dialogue, and that sort 
of cartoon was known. But if we go into the guts of his speech, he gave 
a description of where the Iranian program was, and then he concluded 
and he said this: I want to thank the international community because 
the sanctions you have imposed together have hurt the Iranian economy, 
but ``we have to face the truth.'' The sanctions have not stopped the 
Iranian nuclear program. In fact, there is a pretty good argument that 
the sanctions accelerated the program.
  So if we go back to the status quo, it is an accelerated program, 
with 19,000 centrifuges and enough enriched uranium for multiple 
weapons. What we get with this deal, for 15 years disabling two-thirds 
of the centrifuges, for 15 years rolling back enriched uranium to 300 
kilograms--not even enough for one weapon--for permanently disabling 
the plutonium facility, for 25 years enhanced inspections--more than 
any nation has to comply with--we get in this deal much better than we 
would have with the status quo that existed before diplomacy, and that 
is why I support it.
  The second point, the argument about the 60-vote threshold. I am 
surprised to hear arguments on the floor that it is somehow wrong to 
use a 60-vote threshold on this bill. When I was in my first 2 years in 
the Senate and in the majority, the 60-vote threshold was used on 
everything--immigration, minimum wage, turning off the sequester. 
Sometimes we exceeded the 60-vote threshold. Many times we exceeded 50 
votes, but we couldn't get to 60 on minimum wage. We couldn't get to 60 
on turning off the threshold, but there was an insistence: We need to 
get to 60 votes. I can't think of a single issue of importance in my 
first 2 years in the Senate where the 60-vote threshold wasn't invoked.
  As my ranking member, Senator Cardin, mentioned, I was one of the 
coauthors of the Review Act under which we are now proceeding. The act 
was clear, and it was understood by all that action in the Senate to 
pass either a motion of approval or a motion of disapproval, either 
one, would be by a 60-vote threshold. We talked about this explicitly 
in committee, we talked about it before the vote on the floor, and we 
voted in favor of the act by a 98-to-1 margin. I think the current 
majority party understood that. As was indicated in the letter of 47 to 
the leadership of Iran, it was stated very plainly we would understand 
this would be a three-fifths, 60-vote threshold. That is what happens 
in the Senate, so we shouldn't change the rules now.
  The debate has been full, vigorous, and fair. We have spent a lot of 
time on this and we are going to spend more, and that is appropriate. 
There is now a complete accountability because all 100 Senators have 
declared exactly where they are and their position. We should stick 
with the agreement we made a few months ago, and treat this Resolution 
of Disapproval under a 60-vote rule.
  Point No. 3, the Vice President's arguments yesterday. I respond to 
them because I think Vice President Cheney basically made two 
arguments, and they are the two arguments that have been repeated in 
different ways on the floor. Let me address those two main arguments.
  No. 1, we can't trust Iran. I agree. I think everyone on the 
Democratic side agrees, and there is nothing about this deal that 
involves trust. That is why we have insisted that Iran subject itself 
to intrusive inspections by the IAEA for 25 years, and then, following 
that, to the additional protocol inspections required of all NPT 
members. The IAEA inspections--130-plus inspectors in the country--will 
enable us to catch Iran cheating and give us the intel that will be 
incredibly helpful if we ever need to take military action against 
them. It is that inspections intel that caused our two former 
colleagues, Senators John Warner and Carl Levin--chairs of the Armed 
Services Committee--to write an article recently, ``Why Hawks Should 
Also Back the Iran Deal.'' It is because inspections give us intel, 
which increases the credibility of our military threat.
  Now, the Vice President's response to this, interestingly enough, is: 
Wait. We can't trust IAEA inspections. They are going to do it wrong. 
They have the wrong protocols, and we can't trust them.
  Folks, that argument has been made in this body before by the Vice 
President and others. Vice President Cheney promoted that we go to war 
with Iraq, and he repeatedly made the case in 2002 and 2003 that we had 
to do that to stop Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Two weeks before the 
war began, in early March, the IAEA issued a report indicating, ``we 
have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival 
of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.'' The Vice President then went to 
the airwaves with others and led a campaign to trash the credibility of 
the IAEA, to say that neither the integrity of their inspections nor 
their accuracy could be trusted. After that, we entered into war 
against Iraq saying that the IAEA was wrong. And what did we find? What 
we found was the inspectors and investigators and engineers and 
scientists of the IAEA were right, and Vice President Cheney and others 
were wrong. We have been down the path before of trying to trash the 
IAEA and said they couldn't be trusted, and it was a horrible 
disservice to America and the world that we didn't give those 
inspections a chance. We shouldn't go down that path again.
  The Vice President made a second argument yesterday--here is a 
different and better strategy for dealing with Iran--the same strategy 
that the previous administration followed: Heavy sanctions, threats of 
military force, but no diplomacy.
  But the Cheney doctrine didn't work with Iran. Under that strategy, 
the Iranian nuclear program rocketed ahead, centrifuges, enriched 
uranium, growing by the day. The Prime Minister of Israel, Prime 
Minister Netenyahu, acknowledged this before the U.N. in September of 
2012. And when the Vice President was confronted with this by Chris 
Wallace over the weekend on television, he had no answer for it. He 
couldn't answer for it because the advance of the Iranian program under 
the Cheney doctrine cannot be disputed.
  I was interested in his speech yesterday when he tried to justify 
that the strategy had worked when they tried it. Again, he ignored it.
  So if we go back to the preferred doctrine of no diplomacy, 
sanctions, and

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military threat, we are likely to get what we just got before, and that 
is an acceleration of the Iranian nuclear program. We should not go 
back down that path.
  Let me conclude with a story about my favorite President, Harry 
Truman. Truman was a bold and courageous wartime President. He fought 
in World War I as a captain. He made tough decisions to use the atomic 
weapons in Japan. He came back to a war-weary Congress and said: Give 
military support to Greece against Soviet bloc expansion. He came to a 
war-weary Congress and said: We have to put troops into North Korea. 
Nobody would say Harry Truman was a softy. He had military bona fides. 
Truman also was the President who made sure that America was the first 
nation to recognize the State of Israel, and he always held that as one 
of his proudest accomplishments. It is one of the reasons that he is my 
favorite President.
  In October 1945, 70 years ago next month, President Truman did 
something that seems minor but was really important. He called 
reporters into his office at the White House and said: I have something 
to show you.
  He unveiled that he had redesigned the seal of the Presidency of the 
United States. The seal is the eagle. The seal has the arrows of war in 
one claw and the olive branches of diplomacy in the other claw. Truman 
had redesigned the seal so that the eagle was now turned to face the 
olive branches of diplomacy before the arrows of war--this wartime 
President. He explained: Look, I am a wartime President and I will use 
military force, but American values are such that we should always 
prefer diplomacy before the military.
  We have the strongest military in the world. As a Virginian, I am so 
proud of it. We use it when needed. I have voted twice in 2\1/2\ years 
in the Senate as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to 
use military force. When I cast that vote, it is a very personal one 
for my State, for me, and my family. These votes are the hardest votes 
we take. But Truman believed--and I believe--that it is fundamentally a 
part of our values that we prefer diplomacy first. Before we use 
military action, we have to be engaged in vigorous diplomacy with 
allies and adversaries if we can see a path to possibly create a more 
peaceful world. Other Presidents have reached the same conclusion, not 
only President Truman--President Kennedy, in negotiating the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union; President Nixon, in going to 
China when China was supporting the North Vietnamese against us; 
President Reagan, in negotiating against the evil empire, the Soviet 
Union, over their nuclear program; and now President Obama. Our great 
Presidents have realized that diplomacy isn't just for friends. 
Diplomacy is important, even and especially with adversaries if you can 
see a path--a possibility--to a more peaceful world.
  Here is something that is fascinating. Just as a strong military 
enhances diplomacy, strong diplomacy enhances our military might. That 
is true in this case. If we do a deal, we get an Iranian pledge that 
they will never pursue, develop or acquire nuclear weapons, caps on 
their programs for 15 years, and inspections forever. These tools will 
increase our intelligence. They will increase our legal justification 
to take military action if they break the pledge that is in paragraph 1 
of the agreement.
  It will also increase the likelihood that America will have global 
support if military action is necessary. But what if we walk away from 
diplomacy now? We lose the military intelligence that inspections will 
give us. We give up a clear legal justification for military action 
if--God forbid--we should need it. We weaken the likelihood that other 
nations will support military action if it is necessary.
  In this case, diplomacy strengthens--not weakens--the American 
credibility of our military threat. Trying diplomacy here will keep the 
world's attention on Iranian behavior. Walking away from diplomacy here 
will put the world's attention on American negotiating tactics and why 
we decided that we would rather go it alone. I believe the article I 
branch should send the message that we value diplomacy as a first 
option, just as President Truman did 70 years ago.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Kaine for his leadership 
on the review act. I know the statements and his position are heartfelt 
and ones that he comes to with full passion. I thank the Senator very 
much for his contribution.
  I am now pleased to yield to Senator Sanders. The two of us came to 
the Senate together. We served in the House of Representatives. He is 
one of the most passionate voices in this country. It is an honor to 
have him here on this issue.
  I yield to Senator Sanders.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. I thank my friend from Maryland.
  Mr. President, I rise to speak about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, the agreement that the United States negotiated with China, 
France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Iran. I support the 
agreement and will oppose the resolution of disapproval, as I believe 
this approach is the best way forward if we are to accomplish what all 
of us want to accomplish; that is, making certain that Iran does not 
acquire a nuclear weapon, an occurrence which would destabilize the 
region, lead to a nuclear arms race in the area, and would endanger the 
existence of Israel.
  It is my firm belief that the test of a great nation, with the most 
powerful military on Earth, is not how many wars we can engage in but 
how we can use our strength and our capabilities to resolve 
international conflicts in a peaceful way. Those who have spoken out 
against this agreement, including many in this Chamber, and those who 
have made every effort to thwart the diplomatic process are many of the 
same people who spoke out forcefully and irresponsibly about the need 
to go to war with Iraq--one of the worst foreign policy blunders in the 
modern history of our country. Sadly, people such as former Vice 
President Dick Cheney and many of the other neocons who pushed us into 
war in Iraq were not only tragically wrong then; they are wrong now. 
Unfortunately, these individuals have learned nothing from the results 
of that disastrous policy and how it destabilized that entire region. I 
fear that many of my Republican colleagues do not understand that war 
must be a last resort, not the first resort. It is easy to go to war. 
It is not so easy to fully comprehend the unintended consequences of 
that war.
  As the former Chairman of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, I 
have talked to veterans from World War II to Iraq, and I have learned a 
little bit about what the cost of war entails. In Iraq and Afghanistan, 
we lost over 6,700 brave men and women, and many others have come home 
without legs, without arms, and without eyesight. Let us not forget 
that 500,000 veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan came back to 
their families with post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain 
injury--500,000 brave Americans. The suicide rate of young veterans is 
appallingly high. The divorce rate of those who served is appallingly 
high, and the impact on their children is appallingly high. God knows 
how many families have been devastated by these wars.
  We should also not forget that many hundreds of thousands of innocent 
Iraqi men, women, and children who died in that war, and those whose 
lives who have been completely destabilized, hundreds of thousands of 
people whose lives have been totally altered, including those who are 
fleeing that country today with only the clothes on their backs as 
refugees. The cost of war is real. It is easy to give great speeches 
about how tough we are, but let us not forget the cost of war on the 
men and women who serve in our military and people in other countries.
  Yes, the military option should always be on the table, but it should 
be the last option. We have to do everything we can to reach an 
agreement to ensure that Iran does not get a nuclear weapon without 
having to go to war. I believe we have an obligation to pursue 
diplomatic solutions before resorting to military engagement--
especially after nearly 14 years of ill-conceived and disastrous 
military engagements in that region.
  The agreement before us calls for cutting off Iran's pathways to the

[[Page S6505]]

fissile materials needed for a nuclear weapon by reducing its stockpile 
of uranium by 98 percent and restricting the level of enrichment of 
uranium to well below the level needed for weaponized uranium. The 
agreement requires Iran to decrease the number of installed centrifuges 
by two-thirds, dismantle the country's heavy water nuclear reactor so 
that it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium, and commit to 
rigorous monitoring, inspection, and verification by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.
  Only after Iran has demonstrated to the international community its 
compliance with the tenets of this agreement, the United States and 
European Union will lift the sanctions that helped bring Iran to the 
negotiating table in the first place. This agreement also contains a 
mechanism for the snapback of those sanctions if Iran does not comply 
with its obligations.
  Does this agreement achieve everything I would like? No, it does not. 
But to my mind, it is far better than the path we were on with Iran 
developing nuclear weapons capability and the potential for military 
intervention by the United States and Israel growing greater by the 
day.
  Let us not forget that if Iran does not live up to this agreement, 
sanctions may be reimposed. If Iran moves toward a nuclear weapon, all 
available options remain on the table. I think it is incumbent upon us, 
however, to give the negotiated agreement a chance to succeed. It is 
for these reasons that I will support the agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on the 
Democratic side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 16\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I don't know that we have faced a debate 
of this historic importance for 12 years, because it was about 12 years 
ago that we voted on the floor of the Senate on whether to invade Iraq. 
Senators don't forget those debates. What is at stake is war. What is 
at stake is human lives--not only the enemy but the innocent and those 
who are friends.
  I remember that debate very well. There were 23 of us who voted 
against the invasion of Iraq--one Republican, Lincoln Chafee, and 22 
Democrats. At the time, we were told by Vice President Cheney, 
Secretary Rumsfeld, and others that Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction and we had to stop them for fear that they would use those 
weapons against our allies and our friends and even against the United 
States. It turned out that there were no weapons of mass destruction--
none. After the invasion, they scoured the country and could find no 
evidence of those weapons.
  The cost of that war is incalculable. The numbers only tell part of 
the story. There were 4,844 Americans who lost their lives. Tens of 
thousands have come home with traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic 
stress disorder. The cost to our Treasury is in the trillions. That and 
the war in Afghanistan--incidentally, the longest war in our history--
were efforts in the Middle East to try to bring some order to chaos. 
Only limited success emerged from those efforts after all of the costs 
were paid in human life and treasure.
  Those who are quick to talk about a military option to deal with the 
Iranians should be reminded, as the Senator from Vermont just said, of 
the extraordinary cost of that alternative. I have always felt then and 
now that diplomacy should be the first effort to try to avoid military 
action, to try to avoid a war. That is what this is about.
  This President, Barack Obama, decided to make the sanctions regime 
tougher than ever. To do it, he had to engage countries from around the 
world that depended on Iranian oil and were prepared to stop importing 
Iranian oil to punish them until they would come to the negotiating 
table. He gets absolutely no credit for that from the other side of the 
aisle--none--but he should.

  He then took our major leaders and allies in the world and brought 
together a P5+1 coalition. We met with the Ambassadors from these 
countries. It was hard, just as an amateur student of history, to sit 
across the table from the Ambassadors of China, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and France and imagine that coalition coming together 
for any purpose that would serve the United States in the cause of 
world peace, but they did. The P5+1 came together and entered into a 
serious negotiation in an effort to stop the Iranians from developing a 
nuclear weapon. That was the goal. That was the reason for the 
sanctions.
  There are many aspects of Iranian foreign policy and conduct which 
are reprehensible to me even to this day that don't reach that level of 
nuclear weaponry, but we focused on nuclear weaponry because we knew 
that was critical. If Iran developed a nuclear weapon, it would 
threaten our greatest friend and ally in the Middle East, Israel, as 
well as other countries that have worked closely with the United 
States, and trigger an arms race on the Arabian Peninsula, which would 
have been devastating. So we set out to stop that from happening.
  Something happened during the course of that negotiation which was 
unprecedented in the history of the United States. On March 9, 2015, 47 
Republican Senators sent a signed a letter to the Ayatollah, the 
Supreme Leader in Iran. I have read the letter over and over again and 
still cannot believe it. On March 9, 2015, 47 Republican Senators sent 
an open letter to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran which 
basically said: We know you are in negotiation with the United States 
over stopping the development of a nuclear weapon, but understand--this 
letter makes it clear--that this President does not have the last word.
  That has never happened before. I have asked those who studied the 
history of this country if there was ever a time when the United States 
of America was involved in delicate international negotiations and a 
group of Senators or Congressmen wrote to the other side--to the 
Iranians--to tell them to think twice before negotiating with the 
United States of America. It has never happened. It is unprecedented.
  So 47 Republican Senators who did not want to wait until the 
agreement was reached or written decided in advance to warn the 
Ayatollah in Iran not to negotiate with the United States or to assume 
that any agreement would be enforceable with Congress or future 
Presidents. What a contrast that 47 Republicans would decide in the 
midst of negotiations to send that letter--what a contrast with the 
Democratic side of the aisle.
  For the last 6 weeks, I have been in touch with my colleagues over 
here--they are probably tired of hearing from me--talking about this 
agreement and where they stood. I know, but for a few, what they went 
through. Many of them were trying to educate themselves on the terms of 
this agreement because it is complicated. They were talking to experts 
in the field. One Senator came back and spent 5 hours with the 
intelligence agencies here in Washington trying to understand the 
complexities of this agreement and how they worked.
  After all of that time, after all of that reflection, and after all 
of that study, these Senators announced their positions. Forty-two 
supported the President's position, and four opposed the President's 
position. Instead of prejudging the agreement or assuming the agreement 
was bad, they took the time to read it and study it. They took the time 
to use their responsibilities as Senators to make sure they understood 
this historic document, and 42 came out in favor of it.
  I will tell the Presiding Officer that at this point in history, we 
have a tough decision to make--whether we as a nation will pursue this 
agreement in an effort to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon or 
the alternative. I have yet to hear a critic of this agreement honestly 
present the alternative. The alternative is obvious.
  Today Iran owns enough fissile material to make 10 nuclear weapons. 
The Prime Minister of Israel has warned the world that they are only 
months away from developing a nuclear weapon in Iran. Yet we hear from 
the other side of the aisle that we should walk away from any 
inspections or agreement to stop a nuclear weapon. What is going to 
happen the next day in Iran if that point of view prevails? What 
happens if this agreement we have entered into should founder and fail? 
The door is closed, no inspectors, no negotiations, and Iran is on its 
own. That is not the recipe for a safer world. That is not the recipe 
for a safer Israel, as far

[[Page S6506]]

as I am concerned, and that is why I support this.
  I am happy to be joined in my support with leaders such as GEN Colin 
Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under a Republican 
President and former Secretary of State under a Republican President, 
who has endorsed this agreement. He has told us: Don't trust Iran. 
Mistrust Iran, if you will, and verify.
  We are going to send in scores of inspectors to verify--inspectors 
who have access to everything in Iran--and if there is a dispute over 
access, it is one that can be resolved in a matter of days or weeks.
  I might add that there are telltale pieces of evidence for the 
development of nuclear weapons that the Iranians could never destroy in 
that of period of time. We will know if they have breached this 
agreement, and in knowing that, we have created the authority within 
the United Nations for the United States alone to reimpose sanctions 
based on a breach of this agreement by Iran.
  It is an extraordinary agreement. Could it be stronger? Of course. 
But when we look back throughout history at the skeptics who have 
attacked Presidents of both political parties who have tried to reach 
agreements to create a more peaceful world, this is no different. When 
President Ronald Reagan--literally a deity in the Republican Party--
decided to sit down and negotiate with Mikhail Gorbachev over nuclear 
weapons, the conservative wing of the Republican Party said he was 
signing a suicide pact, wasting his time, and threatening the United 
States--Ronald Reagan--in negotiating with Gorbachev. The same held 
true when Richard Nixon decided to open negotiations with China. The 
critics on the right were quick to condemn him. Chinese were sponsoring 
North Vietnamese who were killing American soldiers. There were plenty 
of reasons not to do it. Richard Nixon did it with bipartisan support, 
and the world is a better place for the courage he showed.
  At this point, as we bring this aspect of the debate to a close--and 
I see Senator Reed is here and will be recognized soon--we listened 
carefully to those who are critical of this agreement. It turns out 
that not a single Republican Member of the House or Senate is 
supporting this agreement--not one. It is hard to think back in 
diplomatic history when there has been such a partisan division within 
Congress on an issue of this historic importance and magnitude, but 
that shouldn't deter us. We need to work with our allies so we can move 
forward with the inspections and the deadlines to make certain we do 
everything in our power to bring peace to the Middle East, short of 
war. Those who want military action should speak up and say so. I 
don't. I want to see this done through diplomatic means, and I believe 
this effort is a good-faith effort to achieve that.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, the vote the Senate will soon take on a 
resolution to disapprove the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or 
JCPOA, is both momentous and historic. I, along with my colleagues, 
have carefully and conscientiously reviewed this agreement. We have 
each applied our independent judgment as to whether or not it achieves 
the primary objectives the President set out in the negotiations when 
they began in November 2013--to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon.
  Since the conclusion of the negotiations, I have reviewed the text of 
the agreement, attended and participated in hearings of the Armed 
Services Committee and Banking Committee with government witnesses and 
nongovernment witnesses, received a series of classified briefings, and 
reached out to Rhode Islanders for their views. These venues--all of 
them--provided a full range of views and opinions and were critical in 
my review and decision with respect to the JCPOA.
  In my view, evaluating the JCPOA rests on three factors. The first is 
the sufficiency of the provisions to cut off all Iranian pathways to a 
nuclear weapon. The second is the ability to conscientiously and 
continuously monitor and verify adherence to these provisions. Finally, 
we have to evaluate whether this agreement will leave us in a better 
position than a rejection of the agreement.
  This last point of whether the agreement leaves us in a better 
position than rejecting it touches on two alternatives suggested by 
opponents of this agreement. The first suggested alternative is that 
there is a better agreement awaiting us if we simply reject the JCPOA 
and impose even more stringent sanctions. The second suggested 
alternative is that, without the JCPOA and with the possibility that an 
enhanced sanctions regime cannot be reconstituted, we can exercise a 
military option which will be more effective and less costly than 
following through with the JCPOA.
  For reasons I will discuss in detail in the course of my remarks 
today, the JCPOA, in my view, does provide adequate measures to 
interdict Iranian pathways to a nuclear weapon and an unprecedented 
monitoring and verification regime moving forward. In addition, our 
national intelligence means will provide further insights into Iranian 
activities. In this regard, we will be aided by many international 
partners whose intelligence activities are acutely focused on Iran.
  As such, I believe the JCPOA, if scrupulously implemented, will 
accomplish our objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon and is a better option than the alternative suggested in lieu of 
the JCPOA. That is why I intend to support the agreement and will vote 
against the resolution of disapproval.
  To begin this discussion, I think it is important to recognize where 
we were when President Obama began his efforts to cut off all Iranian 
pathways to a nuclear weapon. Perhaps the most revealing description 
comes from Uzi Arad, who in 2009 was the National Security Advisor to 
newly elected Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Arad described Iran's 
nuclear capacity in an interview with Ha'aretz, an Israeli newspaper. 
In his words, ``The point of no-return was defined as the point at 
which Iran has the ability to complete the cycle of nuclear fuel 
production on its own; the point at which it has all the elements to 
produce fissionable material without dependency on the outsiders. Iran 
is now there.'' That was in 2009.
  This was the situation that confronted the President and the world in 
2009. To glibly suggest today, as some do, that the international 
community could negotiate Iran back, after they pass the ``point of no 
return,'' to a position of ``no enrichment'' is to ignore the reality 
of Iranian efforts, particularly from the mid-2000s forward. For 
example, in 2006 the Iranians possessed fewer than 400 centrifuges in a 
research facility. By 2009 they had well over 8,000 centrifuges, 
together with the essential elements of a nuclear program, taking them 
beyond the ``point of no return,'' as indicated by Uzi Arad.
  Former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to President 
George Herbert Walker Bush, GEN Colin Powell, recently made this point 
as well. He said that Iran has ``been on a superhighway for the last 
ten years to create a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons program, with 
no speed limit.''
  In a similar vein, Amos Yadlin, former head of the Israeli Defense 
Forces Military Intelligence Directorate and now director of the 
Institute for National Security Studies, made the point that any 
analysis or possible options regarding the Iranian nuclear program must 
begin with the recognition that they have already passed the ``point of 
no return.'' In his words, ``[t]he starting point for comparing the 
various scenarios is not one in which Iran has zero nuclear 
capabilities, but one in which Iran has been--however illegitimately--a 
nuclear threshold state since the beginning of the current decade.''
  The Iranians advanced their nuclear program as the international 
community insisted on no enrichment but failed either through 
sanctions, negotiations, or other actions to significantly interrupt 
Iranian progress on its nuclear infrastructure or nuclear know-how. 
Instead, when the negotiations began under President Obama, Iran had 
already acquired approximately 19,000 centrifuges and other essential 
components of the nuclear program.
  Indeed, the administration's diplomatic effort to build an 
international

[[Page S6507]]

coalition to give effect to the sanctions, which ultimately forced the 
Iranians to negotiate, was done with the P5+1's recognition that a ``no 
enrichment'' approach would not lead to negotiations. This was not a 
realistic option.

  With that prologue, let me now turn to the elements of the agreement 
that were critical to my judgment. In the area of cutting off pathways 
to provide nuclear material for nuclear weapons and Iran's enrichment 
capacity, this agreement accomplishes a key objective. It constrains 
and, through the interrelated verification measures, eliminates Iran's 
ability to produce either plutonium or uranium for a nuclear weapon.
  On the uranium pathway, the JCPOA requires Iran to cap its stockpile 
of low enriched uranium, LEU, to 300 kilograms over 15 years. Why is 
this significant? First, before November 2013 and the initiation of the 
interim agreement, Iran had more than 12,000 kilograms of LEU. If fully 
enriched, this is enough to make seven to eight nuclear weapons.
  Second, with this cap Iran will not have sufficient LEU in country to 
enrich and achieve the quantity necessary to produce a single weapon, 
even with additional enrichment. In other words, it will have to break 
a term of the agreement--the 300 kilogram cap of LEU--to have enough 
feedstock to further enrich and to make the quantity needed for even a 
single weapon.
  On the plutonium pathway, Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild the 
heavy water research reactor in Arak. The redesigned and rebuilt 
reactor, the design of which must be approved by the P5+1, may only 
support nonmilitary nuclear research in radioisotope production. Why is 
this significant? Arak has been one of the most concerning elements of 
Iran's suspected nuclear weapons infrastructure, and this fundamental 
change to the reactor ensures Iran's plutonium pathway for a nuclear 
weapon is shut off.
  In an alternative scenario, if completed, the heavy water reactor at 
Arak could have been a proliferation risk of unmatched proportion 
within their program. It could have allowed Iran to take easily 
acquired natural uranium from the ground and, over a period of time and 
through a series of reprocessing steps, make weapons-grade plutonium 
without the need for centrifuges for enrichment. The elimination of 
this heavy water reactor, as the Iranians previously envisioned it, is 
enormously significant.
  Further, under the agreement, Iran will be forced to use its first 
generation centrifuge technology, known as IR-1s. This is a significant 
check on the program because these are Iran's most inefficient 
centrifuges. While Iran will be able to install more advanced 
centrifuges in the future, it will be required to abide by the 
enrichment plan submitted to the IAEA and to be consistent with the 
limitation inherent in the Additional Protocol. Also, it is significant 
that the P5+1 will have 10 years of evaluating, measuring, and 
assessing Iran's intentions to determine whether its plans and programs 
are indeed exclusively peaceful, as stated by the preamble to the 
JCPOA.
  More broadly, the agreement's research and development measures 
provide the international community with insight into Iran's nuclear 
program. This is a significant opportunity to gauge Iran's intentions 
and willingness to abide by and comply with its commitments. The JCPOA 
establishes limitations on advanced centrifuge research, development, 
testing and deployment in the first 10 years. After that period of 
time, the international community will continue to have a critical 
``distrust-and-verify'' mechanism built into the program. Iran must 
abide by its enrichment and research and development plan and submit it 
to the IAEA. This plan is subject to all of the IAEA's inspection and 
monitoring tools.
  Furthermore, the JCPOA includes a permanent prohibition on Iran 
conducting research and development activities that could contribute to 
design and development of a nuclear explosive device. This significant 
prohibition goes well beyond the limitations of the non-nuclear weapons 
statement in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  Taken together, closing off the pathways to a weapon and the 
constraints on enrichment and R&D, Iran's breakout time for a single 
nuclear weapon will remain at least 1 year for each of the first 10 
years of this agreement and, critically, Iran's breakout time will 
remain longer than the two to three months it was in November of 2013.
  Before I move on to the next area of discussion, I acknowledge that 
legitimate concerns have been raised about Iranian activities after the 
first 10 years of the agreement, sometimes referred to as the ``out 
years.'' During this time, Iran's breakout time could shrink 
substantially. However, the initial 10 years of the JCPOA will be 
critical for the international community to measure and assess Iran's 
intentions.
  A recent analysis of the JCPOA by Robert Einhorn, a noted expert in 
nonproliferation and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is 
instructive in this area. In his words:

       If Iranian leaders . . . believed their national interests 
     were best served by having nuclear weapons, they would run 
     major risks in going forward, with no guarantee of success. 
     Even in the `out years,' the JCPOA's rigorous monitoring 
     arrangements will remain in force. The world will have gained 
     intimate knowledge of Iran's nuclear program, which would 
     give the United States prompt warning of any Iranian effort 
     to make a dash for the bomb.

  In any case, the P5+1 must begin now to communicate its insistence 
that Iran operate consistent with a peaceful nuclear program after the 
initial 10-year period. The international community must convey in 
stark terms to the Iranians that a rapid buildup of enrichment capacity 
after 10 years, beyond what they need for their existing nuclear fuel 
cycle, will be considered an abandonment of the principles embodied in 
JCPOA, and that the P5+1 will need to evaluate alternative options.
  Now, if my colleagues will allow me to discuss the area of 
inspection, monitoring, and verification. For me, the agreement must be 
built on a principle of ``distrust and verify.'' Former Secretary of 
State Colin Powell put it nicely. He said: ``It's don't trust, never 
trust, and always verify.'' And the architecture our negotiators 
designed to verify compliance with this agreement took this approach 
and set new precedents in key areas: access, modern technological 
monitoring, and the requirement for affirmative approval for certain 
actions. Thus, this is a custom-built, rigorously ``red teamed'' 
verification regime that is more stringent than any other previously 
created.
  Specifically, the JCPOA does the following: Inspectors from the IAEA 
will have regular access to all of Iran's nuclear-related facilities. 
This includes Iran's two primary sites at Natanz and Fordow.
  Inspectors will have cradle-to-grave access to Iran's nuclear supply 
chain, including uranium mines, mills, and centrifuge production and 
storage facilities that support Iran's nuclear program for at least 10 
years and in many cases longer.
  The verification regime established by this agreement has the effect 
of making the entire Iranian nuclear program auditable. This is a 
powerful tool that will make it possible for IAEA inspectors to know 
whether Iran is diverting material to a possible covert program.
  Iran has agreed to apply provisionally the IAEA's Additional 
Protocol. This Additional Protocol to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards 
agreement further augments the agency's ability to investigate 
suspected clandestine facilities and activities. Of great importance, 
this is an enduring requirement for Iran beyond the JCPOA's terms.
  A dedicated and exclusive procurement channel for Iran's nuclear 
program will be established to manage all purchases of the nuclear 
supplier group's ``trigger list'' and dual-use items. This additional 
step provides an intrusive authorization and transparency mechanism 
through which the IAEA can control what is coming into the country and 
gauge whether the requirement is consistent with the needs of the 
program and Iran's intentions. Any such procurement outside that 
channel would be a violation of the JCPOA.
  This agreement is often casually compared to the 1994 Agreed 
Framework with North Korea. Not only are there significant differences 
between the two, but provisions of the JCPOA were specifically written 
to provide

[[Page S6508]]

more stringent verification based on the lessons from the 1994 
agreement. One of the most significant differences was pointed out 
again by Robert Einhorn. As he indicated, a key weakness of the 1994 
Agreed Framework was that ``it only provided for IAEA monitoring at the 
nuclear facility at Yongbyon. It did not provide for monitoring in the 
rest of the country because that was the only declared site.''
  Under the JCPOA, Iran must implement and abide by the Additional 
Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, an addendum that the IAEA designed to address the 
ability of a nation to covertly develop a nuclear weapons program, as 
Iraq did after the first Gulf War. The Additional Protocol applies to 
all facilities that take part in any element of the nuclear fuel cycle 
of a state. The JCPOA is significantly more stringent in this regard 
than the 1994 framework.
  More specifically, the Additional Protocol will allow IAEA inspectors 
access to suspected undeclared nuclear sites anywhere in the country so 
as to prevent Iran from conducting clandestine nuclear activity. If 
Iran does not provide access, it is in violation of the agreement and 
sanctions will be reimposed.
  Iran's compliance with the Additional Protocol in the years after the 
term of the JCPOA will continue to provide the IAEA with a powerful 
tool to conduct inspections of Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Again, 
the creation of the Additional Protocol was in direct response to 
previous efforts to circumvent the IAEA's monitoring efforts in Iraq 
and North Korea.
  An additional element of the monitoring and compliance regime is the 
independent and unilateral role that the U.S. Intelligence Community 
and its intelligence liaison services will play in validating Iran's 
compliance or noncompliance. While we can never be certain that these 
intelligence efforts will provide a complete picture of all Iranian 
nuclear activities, they provide a critical assessment of Iran's 
compliance with the agreement, Iran's perceptions of the cost and 
benefits of compliance with the agreement, and key insights into the 
Iranian leadership's priorities for the program. As a member of both 
the Armed Services Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
these activities and insights will also serve as a critical tool for my 
colleagues and me to gauge the success or failure of this agreement.
  Over the course of the Armed Services Committee hearings, there was 
detailed questioning on several topics but one in particular: the 24-
day period of time that Iran has available to it under the agreement to 
potentially delay access for IAEA inspectors to a facility suspected of 
prohibited activity. Secretary Moniz offered a helpful insight into 
this area. He said:

       The 24-day period is itself new in the sense there has 
     never been any time limit in terms of access to undeclared 
     sites. Again, to repeat, on nuclear materials we have very, 
     very sensitive capabilities and historically those have been 
     proved.

  But Secretary Moniz went on to speak candidly as he said:

       With regard to nonnuclear materials, it gets more 
     difficult. However, when one has nuclear weapons specialized 
     activity, such as explosively driven neutron initiators, we 
     would not be without tools to detect activities in that kind 
     of a time period. But clearly, as one gets farther and 
     farther away into let's say, just conventional explosive 
     testing, which is something militaries do normally, then it's 
     a question of intelligence putting together the context for 
     suspicious activities. But nuclear material, in the end, you 
     need to do nuclear materials to get to the weapon and that's 
     where we have extraordinary techniques.

  Now, critics of the agreement have said that this 24-day period of 
time is too long and offers Iran too much time to cover up its 
activities. As Secretary Moniz stated clearly, this is a possibility as 
it relates to certain non-nuclear activities. However, if Iran 
introduces fissile materials into these activities, Iran's ability to 
cover its tracks in 24 days is extremely unlikely.
  I also believe this part of the agreement is an area where Iran's 
intentions need to be subjected to constant questioning and evaluation. 
If Iran is challenging the IAEA inspectors at every turn, it should be 
interpreted as an indication of its intent with respect to the 
permanent commitment it made on the third page of the agreement: ``Iran 
reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or 
acquire nuclear weapons.''
  This is a strong restatement of its basic obligations as a non-
nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A 
pattern of frustrating IAEA inspectors should be seen as a clear 
warning of possible reneging on this central commitment.

  Let me at this juncture discuss the duration of the agreement. 
Critics have made a variety of comments in this area of duration. Some 
argue that Iran can begin enriching beyond the low-enriched limit of 
3.67 percent fissile uranium at year 16. That is true, but Iran could 
do that tomorrow without this agreement. Nevertheless, some argue that 
this agreement simply suspends Iran's program in place for a decade. In 
my view, this is not an accurate characterization as many of the access 
and verification elements of the agreement go well past 10 years or 15 
years. Indeed, some are permanent. Iran's commitment under the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty and its Additional Protocol remain in place, 
and their compliance with it will be a key metric for the P5+1. 
Further, the international community's ability to impose sanctions 
always remains available.
  Now I want to address the area of possible military dimensions or 
PMD. Iran has agreed to address all the past and present outstanding 
PMD issues in a comprehensive and time-limited manner. This requirement 
is laid out clearly in paragraph 66 of Annex I of the JCPOA. It is 
further articulated in more detail in the IAEA's July 14, 2015, ``Road-
map for the Clarification of Past & Present Outstanding Issues 
regarding Iran's Nuclear Program.''
  Resolving the issue of PMD is critical for a number of reasons. It is 
critical that the IAEA is able to complete its investigation of PMD and 
issue an independent assessment of any nuclear weapons-related work 
Iran has conducted in the past. The IAEA made clear in the Director 
General's November 2011 report on PMD that unanswered questions remain. 
The U.N. Security Council has endorsed and reinforced the requirement 
that Iran address these questions.
  Under the agreement, if Iran complies, the IAEA will again gain 
access to Parchin, and the IAEA will be provided the additional 
accesses to people, places, and other items it has requested. However, 
Iran gets nothing in the way of sanctions relief if it does not address 
these unanswered questions to the satisfaction of the IAEA.
  Some critics of the agreement have also suggested that IAEA has 
outsourced to Iran its inspection of Parchin, the most infamous of 
Iran's suspected facilities. I have been briefed extensively on this 
matter in a classified setting. Those briefings are consistent with the 
conclusion of IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. He has stated the 
agreement with the Iranians is, in his words, ``technically sound'' and 
does not--again in his words--``compromise [the IAEA's] safeguards 
standards in any way.''
  Secretary Moniz has further assured me of this fact. We know the 
Iranians have repeatedly attempted to eradicate any sign of their 
activities at the Parchin site. Thus, it is unlikely that any 
significant PMD-related activities have occurred there in the last 4 
years. We do not know what signs of past activities will remain at the 
site. Importantly, the IAEA will be able to confirm whether there is 
any ongoing nuclear-related activity at that location.
  Critics of the arrangement to inspect Parchin have also suggested 
that the IAEA has entered into a secret side deal with Iran. In fact, 
the United States and all the other NPT member countries--Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty countries--have confidential agreements with the 
IAEA which cannot be shared.
  These agreements vary by country, but they are designed to protect 
the integrity of the IAEA inspection process and the sensitive 
technical and design information about peaceful national nuclear 
programs. The IAEA and the Obama administration have taken 
extraordinary steps to brief Congress on this agreement in a classified 
setting. These briefings have been informative and helpful to 
understand more fully what we can expect in the months and years ahead.
  Now, I would like to discuss at this point the topic of the arms 
embargo

[[Page S6509]]

and missile sanctions, which is part of this arrangement. Like many of 
my colleagues, I remain concerned about the elements of this agreement 
that relate to these issues. The inclusion of these provisions in the 
JCPOA is directly related to the fact that the United States secured 
these measures in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 to pressure 
Iran to address the international community's concerns with respect to 
its nuclear program. Since these sanctions were deemed by the P5+1 to 
be related to the nuclear program through the U.N. Resolution, they 
were within the ambit of sanctions relief.
  Nevertheless, moving forward, this is an area where the United States 
needs to leverage the available sanctions and additional tools under 
other U.N. Security Council resolutions to keep pressure on Iran. For 
example, other U.N. Security Council resolutions prohibit Iranian 
transfers of arms to groups such as the Houthis in Yemen, nonstate 
actors in Lebanon, which includes Hezbollah, the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and Shi'a militias in Iraq, as well as North Korea, Libya, 
and several sub-Saharan states in Africa.
  This will mean the Treasury Department, the State Department, and the 
Intelligence Community must double their efforts to identify prohibited 
activities and build the international architecture necessary to 
counter it and deter them.
  It also means working with our partners on the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, or MTCR, to prevent the spread of critical missile 
technologies, and with our more than 100 partners under the Bush 
administration's Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, to help 
limit Iranian missile-related imports or exports.
  It may also mean what former Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs Nick Burns recently suggested to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, which is that we will need to, in his words, ``reconstitute 
a coalition of sanctions countries against Iran five years from now on 
conventional weapons, eight years from now on ballistic missiles.'' I 
believe the next 5 years will provide the international community a 
critical measuring stick for Iranian intentions, and we must be 
prepared to lead efforts to preclude Iran from obtaining enhanced 
military technologies.
  Now, a bulk of the work that will be done and will be so central to 
our efforts will be done by the IAEA. The IAEA will be responsible for 
carrying on the ground the implementation of this agreement on behalf 
of the P5+1. While critics of the agreement are quick to call into 
question the technical expertise and skills of the IAEA, it is 
comprised of individuals with extensive training and experience and a 
deep commitment to the importance of nonproliferation work.
  A recent study by Tom Shea, a noted safeguards expert with experience 
at the IAEA and in the laboratory community, concludes:

       The IAEA's capabilities have been extended, strengthened 
     and refined over the years in response to real-world 
     proliferation cases in Iraq and North Korea. Its current 
     capacity reflects the international community's decades-long 
     investment in the organization, and the continuing commitment 
     of states around the world to its mission.

  I would also note that upwards of 200 IAEA technical experts will be 
devoted to implementing this agreement. This number far exceeds any 
number of experts and inspectors devoted to any one country by the 
IAEA.
  Allow me now to focus on the area of sanctions and our ability to 
reapply them. First, it is critical that we remember Iran will receive 
no new sanctions relief if it does not complete its nuclear commitments 
and the IAEA's inspectors verify those steps. Let me be specific here. 
Prior to granting any further sanctions relief, Iran must, as verified 
by the IAEA, demonstrate that it has implemented the necessary steps 
with respect to, No. 1, the Arak heavy water research reactor; No. 2, 
its overall enrichment capacity; No. 3, its centrifuge research and 
development; No. 4, the Fordow fuel enrichment plant; No. 5, its 
uranium stocks and fuel; No. 6, its centrifuge manufacturing; No. 7, 
completing the modalities and facilities-specific arrangements to allow 
the IAEA to implement all transparency measures and the Additional 
Protocol and Modified Code 3.1; No. 8, its centrifuge component 
manufacturing transparency; and, No. 9, addressing the past and present 
issues of concern relating to PMD.
  This means that Iran must take significant steps to roll back and 
freeze its nuclear program before it gets anything in the way of 
sanctions relief. In testimony before the Senate banking committee, 
Adam Szubin, the acting Under Secretary of Treasury said:

       We expect that [process] to take at least six to nine 
     months. Until Iran completes those steps, we are simply 
     extending the limited relief that has been in place the last 
     year and a half under the Joint Plan of Action. There will 
     not be a cent of new sanctions relief.

  Moreover, while the President will waive the application of the 
nuclear-related sanctions under the terms of the JCPOA, the U.S. 
sanctions, which include the Central Bank and other financial 
sanctions, will remain available until Congress acts to terminate them. 
This will allow Congress to monitor an extended period of Iran's 
compliance before taking any such action. This also gives the President 
a strong hand because the ability to quickly snap back nuclear-related 
sanctions means that we can again shut off, to a substantial degree, 
Iran's access to the international financial system, to international 
markets, and to international financing that relies on access to the 
U.S. banking system.
  It is important to note that this agreement does not take away the 
tools available to the President to target sanctions against Iran's 
violation of human rights or to damage Iran's ability to finance 
terrorism. U.S. secondary sanctions remain in place.
  As Richard Nephew, a fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at 
Columbia University, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
under the agreement:

       [The] United States will still be able to pressure banks 
     and companies into not doing business with the IRGC, the Quds 
     Force, Qasem Soleimani, and Iran's military and missile 
     forces. This is both due to direct risk of U.S. secondary 
     sanctions, which remain in place, and an improvement in 
     international banking practices since 9/11.

  These secondary sanctions are not insignificant tools, and our use of 
them in response to human rights violators and terrorism are not a 
violation of the agreement. As Under Secretary Szubin recently told the 
Senate banking committee on the matter of terrorism sanctions:

       [O]ne of the most powerful [tools] . . . is that when we 
     sanction Iranian terrorist supporters, our designation is 
     amplified internationally. What I mean by that is, when we 
     name a Hezbollah financier, a Hezbollah money launderer, any 
     bank worldwide, not just American banks, any bank worldwide 
     that facilitates transactions for that designated entity 
     faces very severe sanctions from the U.S., sanctions that no 
     bank wants to face.

  Under Secretary Szubin has also indicated that the United States will 
do more in the area of terrorism-related sanctions. Should Iran decide 
to continue its destabilizing actions in the region, increasing the 
cost in this area will be critical, so it is important to note the 
administration's willingness to ramp up pressure in the face of such 
conduct by the Iranians.
  Particular attention has rightly been paid to the amount of sanctions 
relief Iran will receive and Iran's likely use of that sanctions 
relief. This is an important issue. While we do not know what Iran will 
do with it, we do know a couple of things. First, the amount of 
sanction relief is not $100 or $150 billion as some critics of the deal 
have suggested. According to the Treasury Department, the number is 
between $50 and $60 billion. While this number is significant, it is 
one-third of what many critics have asserted.
  Second, it is likely that Iran will invest a portion of this money 
into its economy to address the concerns of its people and to begin to 
recover from the international sanctions regime, but it may also invest 
in its financing of terrorism across the region. General Dempsey has 
rightly suggested, ``[t]he answer is probably a little bit of both.'' 
What we will need to do is monitor closely, particularly via our 
Intelligence Community, where Iran is making its investments and 
actively counter those maligned activities.
  Now, I believe the JCPOA is the best option available to us right 
now. Critics recommend rejecting the JCPOA and advocating a regime of 
new and increasingly crippling sanctions that are

[[Page S6510]]

more effective to ensuring Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. It 
is my view that this alternative is not feasible at this time and may, 
indeed, be counterproductive.
  Moreover, the options for enhanced sanctions and even military 
operations remain available to the United States and our P5+1 partners 
should Iran at any time fail to comply with the JCPOA. Indeed, 
noncompliance would be more likely to find an international commitment 
for aggressive action than a rejection of the JCPOA. Such a rejection 
could give the Iranians the opening to argue that it can resume all of 
its existing activities prior to the interim agreement and insist that 
international sanctions have been nullified by our rejection of the 
JCPOA.
  If the United States were now to say ``this deal is not good 
enough,'' it would likely have the immediate effect of alienating us 
from our partners and, therefore, empowering Iran. Iran would seize 
this opening to drive a wedge between us and our European allies, as 
well as Russia and China. Such an action by the United States would 
play right into the hands of Iran, both in terms of the viability of 
the multilateral sanctions regime and in terms of the obligations it 
has already agreed to take under this agreement.
  It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the United States can 
break, at this juncture, with its most critical economic partners on 
the Iran nuclear program and then secure more stringent sanctions.
  Another complicating factor in this scenario is the outcome for the 
hardliners in Iran. Undoubtedly, their narrative can gain additional 
traction in Tehran and they may be able to seize an even greater amount 
of power and influence. This makes the ``more sanctions'' approach more 
concerning because it could produce the unintended consequence of 
empowering the most strident elements in Iran.
  The second most common option discussed by critics of this agreement 
is the military option. In this regard, it is critical that we 
understand some points up front. Unless we are prepared to invade and 
occupy Iran, executing a military option to destroy the nuclear 
infrastructure will only delay Iran's nuclear program. It will not bomb 
away Iran's knowledge, and it will empower significantly the hardliners 
in Iran who are committed to developing a nuclear weapon. They will 
likely disperse and disguise their activities so that military strikes 
are increasingly ineffective and produce significant collateral damage, 
which will be exploited by the Iranians for propaganda purposes.
  On this issue of delay, General Dempsey provided two important 
insights. First, in response to a question asking for his military 
assessment on what is more effective in delaying or stopping the 
Iranian nuclear program at this time or in the near future, a military 
strike or this P5+1 agreement, he said:

       First . . . I would like to point out that the military 
     options remain. Secondly, I think a negotiated settlement 
     provides a more durable--and reduces near term risk, which 
     buys time to work with regional partners to address the other 
     malign activities.

  He also said:

       Our government's policy has been they will not get a 
     nuclear weapon and nothing we're talking about here today 
     should change that policy.

  This agreement does not change that longstanding and clearly 
articulated U.S. policy.
  I also agree with the assessment of former Senators John Warner and 
Carl Levin--both of whom served terms as the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee--that a vote against this deal is a vote to 
undermine the deterrent value and credibility of our military option.
  Closer examination of the military option raises the critical 
question of our objective if we were to use force--to delay the nuclear 
program or to overthrow the regime so as to eliminate the nuclear 
threat? In either case, a daunting scenario emerges. As previously 
discussed, if our focus is limited only to Iran's nuclear program, the 
United States--likely alone or nearly alone--will need to conduct a 
similar option every few years, as the Iranians will undoubtedly make 
their nuclear program an operation that is conducted in smaller and 
more numerous locations in areas that are increasingly difficult to 
locate and deeper in the ground or masked by civilian activities in 
populated areas.
  If we conduct such targeted strikes, analysts suggest that the 
Iranians will respond. Such responses could include attacks against 
U.S. forces in the gulf region and Afghanistan; attacks against Israel 
by Iran's most capable proxy, Hezbollah; attacks against our partners 
in the GCC; attacks against the region's energy infrastructure; or a 
combination of all of the above. Along with the significant economic 
consequences, the loss of personnel and resource drain on our Nation's 
military could be severe. Ironically, an additional consequence would 
be a shift in resources away from the campaign against the Islamic 
State in the Levant--or ISIL--particularly in Iraq, and our ongoing 
efforts to consolidate the international community's gains in 
Afghanistan.
  On the other hand, if our military objective was regime change, I 
would first remind my colleagues of the Iraq war and all of the 
implications that exercising that military option had on the region.
  In 2012, Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution wrote:

       An occupation of Iran would require up to one million U.S. 
     and other foreign troops over an extended time and, hence, 
     would indeed be implausible. But an invasion, with the single 
     goal of deposing the government, could be considered a 
     possibility under extreme circumstances--if for example there 
     were unmistakable evidence that Iran's current government was 
     preparing a major attack on Israel, or if it responded to any 
     U.S. ``surgical'' air campaign with an all-out global 
     terrorist response, using Hezbollah and various elements of 
     its security apparatus.

  Although Michael O'Hanlon makes a distinction between an 
``occupation'' and an ``invasion,'' our experience in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan should demonstrate that the deployment of ground forces to 
effect regime change is unlikely to produce a quick exit, so we must be 
prepared for his ``implausible''--an expensive occupation with a 
million military personnel on the ground.
  Thus, as some observers continue to discuss the military option 
regardless of the scope and intent of it, I would urge them to ensure 
that their analysis goes beyond the first day, first month, or first 6 
months of conflict and rather considers the first year, first 5 years, 
and first decade of conflict. Our Nation has seen the great cost of war 
over the past 15 years.
  This agreement retains the military options for the Commander in 
Chief and at the same time establishes an arrangement with the Iranians 
that allows us to test vigorously and monitor invasively the intentions 
of the Iranian regime's nuclear program. This is one major reason at 
this point that the JCPOA is the most compelling option.
  A number of noted national security experts and a number of my 
colleagues and Americans have discussed the importance of ensuring Iran 
is not only constrained with respect to its nuclear program but also 
with respect to its regional hegemonic aspirations and its support 
directly and indirectly of terrorism. These negotiations did not cover 
other hostile, objectionable actions by Iran--namely, its support of 
terrorism, its destabilizing activities across the region, its abuse of 
its own people, and ongoing detention of American citizens. We cannot 
condone or ignore these critical issues, and they all must be 
addressed. But absent implementation of this agreement, the threats 
posed by Iran would likely be amplified as it returns to deliberate and 
focused efforts to build a nuclear infrastructure.
  The choice before us under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act is 
exclusively on the nuclear dimension. But without the JCPOA, I suspect 
the Iranian nuclear challenge will grow quickly, adding further menace 
to their regional aspirations and their support of terrorism. 
Critically, any of these other objectionable Iranian behaviors would be 
far more dangerous if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.
  As I said earlier, I evaluate this agreement with great skepticism. 
Iran is a major sponsor of terrorism and a leader in other 
destabilizing activities across the Middle East. As I mentioned 
previously, though, the negotiations to secure this agreement were not 
focused on Iran's support of terrorism. This matter remains 
outstanding, and charting a pragmatic and implemen-

[[Page S6511]]

 table strategy to counter it is critical to U.S. national security 
interests.
  More broadly, however, these negotiations are not without precedent. 
During the Cold War, we negotiated with the Soviets despite their 
persistent destabilizing activities in many parts of the world. In 
fact, President Nixon was still in negotiation with the Soviets even 
while they still supported the North Vietnamese.
  Graham Allison, a noted nonproliferation expert at Harvard's Belfer 
Center, noted in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee recently that ``claims that the U.S. cannot reach 
advantageous agreements to constrain nuclear arms with states we are 
seeking to contain, or subvert, or even overthrow . . . are . . . 
wrong. [The Reagan] administration's core national security strategy 
for competition with the Soviet Union . . . states that `U.S. policy 
towards the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external 
resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to 
weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism;' and `engaging the Soviet 
Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and 
enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of 
strict reciprocity and mutual interest.' ''
  Even with the JCPOA, I do not suspect that the Iranian support for 
their proxies will automatically abate under this agreement, and I do 
not think this agreement is a forcing mechanism for modifying Iranian 
behavior in the region. I do, however, think this agreement takes the 
near-term scenario of a nuclear-armed Iran bent on supporting its 
proxies in the Middle East off the table. And I believe it is for the 
time being sensible for the United States and our partners to take 
stock of Iran's willingness to comply with this agreement; monitor its 
activities closely in the region to see if they increase, decrease, or 
remain the same; and, in parallel, work with our regional partners to 
counter Iran's asymmetric threats.
  On the matter of our regional partners in the Middle East, I see two 
critical matters that must be addressed.
  First, our partners in Israel rightly see Iran as a significant and 
ongoing threat to their national security. It is incumbent upon the 
United States to better understand the concerns of the Israelis with 
respect to their gaps in addressing the Iranian problem set and to 
identify areas of cooperation on military and intelligence matters that 
address these gaps and maintain their qualitative military edge at all 
times.
  Second, it is also critical that our partners and allies know that 
the United States will not abandon the region in the wake of this 
agreement. This message is critical for all of our partners to hear and 
understand.
  The May 2015 joint statement following the United States and Gulf 
Cooperation Council meeting at Camp David provided a roadmap for how 
the administration intends to proceed. The joint statement indicates 
that the United States will be increasing training and exercise 
engagements with GCC special operation forces elements so as to better 
enable our partners to confront Iran's asymmetric capabilities, as well 
as enhancing the ballistic missile defense capabilities of the GCC and 
improving their interoperability to increase collective defense in 
order to counter Iran's support of terrorist proxies. These are 
important and essential efforts that will consume significant time and 
effort in the Middle East, and it will be critical that we ensure that 
they are resourced appropriately. The added benefit of these activities 
is that they will provide the U.S. military with additional access and 
capabilities in the region to ensure that the military option remains 
credible to the Iranians and available to the President.
  Mr. President, I approached this vote with deep suspicion regarding 
Iran, and I see the agreement for what it is--a combination of 
opportunities and risks. I believe these negotiations were necessarily 
focused on denying Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon. A nuclear-armed 
Iran would be a formidable force in the Middle East and, as it has 
repeatedly demonstrated, not a force for peace and stability. Moreover, 
a nuclear-armed Iran would likely prompt a nuclear arms race in the 
region that through accident or design could lead to catastrophe. This 
agreement provides a framework to close off Iran's pathways to a 
nuclear weapon.
  Rejecting the resolution of disapproval is vitally important, but 
effective, unrelenting implementation of the JCPOA will be the real 
test. As such, it is critical that both the President and the Congress 
exert every effort to ensure that there are unstinting efforts to 
monitor and sustain the provisions of the agreement. This effort 
demands constant attention and ample--more than ample funding for the 
indefinite future.
  As Gen. Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor to 
President George Herbert Walker Bush, recently stated in a Washington 
Post op-ed supporting the agreement:

       Implementation and verification will be the key to success, 
     and Congress has an important role. It should ensure that the 
     [IAEA], other relevant bodies and U.S. intelligence agencies 
     have all the resources necessary to facilitate inspection and 
     monitor compliance.

  I believe General Scowcroft is correct. Iranian compliance and the 
implementation phase of this agreement is critical no matter how you 
vote on the resolution of disapproval.
  It is also important that we ensure that the administration is able 
to follow through on the commitments they have made to our allies and 
partners in the Middle East, especially to the State of Israel. Again, 
General Scowcroft makes an excellent point. The United States must 
work, in his words, ``closely with the GCC and other allies to moderate 
Iranian behavior in the region, countering it where necessary.'' Absent 
support and resourcing for the implementation phase of this agreement, 
these efforts may not happen and our efforts to reassure our partners 
in the region may fail.
  Soon, this debate will be over. I believe sustaining the JCPOA will 
leave us in a strong position to counter potential Iranian 
proliferation. But regardless of the outcome of this debate, we must 
not relax our efforts in countering Iranian nuclear aspirations, 
regional aggression, and the sponsorship of terrorism. I believe the 
JCPOA will give us valuable tools to monitor and interdict their 
pathways to a nuclear weapon, but it will require day-to-day 
surveillance and, where necessary, intervention to increase our chances 
of success.
  In many respects, we are at a moment that recalls the emotional words 
of Winston Churchill:

       Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of 
     the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

  We have concluded an agreement that dramatically constrains Iran's 
nuclear ambitions. Now the hard work begins each day to ensure that our 
aspirations become real.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lee). The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. BLUMENTHAL. Mr. President, I am honored to follow my friend and 
colleague from Rhode Island in his very eloquent and powerful remarks, 
and I wish to add my own on the same topic. The question of whether the 
Senate should accept the agreement between the P5+1 and Iran to end 
their illicit and treacherous nuclear program is one of the most 
difficult and critical matters of national security that I have 
confronted since my election to the Senate.
  I am deeply grateful to many in my State of Connecticut, here in 
Washington, DC, and around the country who have offered me their 
insight, interest, and involvement--most especially the people of 
Connecticut who have given me their thoughts in letters, in emails, 
phone calls, and in one-on-one conversations across our State in a vast 
variety of settings, whether at parades or fairs or in one-on-one 
meetings or meetings in groups. I have made my decision based on 
conscience and conviction. I will vote to accept the proposed agreement 
concerning Iran's nuclear program and against the resolution of 
disapproval before the Senate.
  My two paramount goals have been consistently and constantly to 
prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and to do so by peaceful means. I believe 
this agreement, using diplomacy, not military force, is the most viable 
remaining path now available--now available--to prevent a nuclear-armed 
Iran.
  This agreement is not the one I would have negotiated or accepted, 
but

[[Page S6512]]

it is better than no deal. This agreement is an opportunity for us to 
push back and deter Iran, and it brings on us a special obligation of 
vigilance and vigorous enforcement. It can be made better. It can be 
improved and strengthened through unilateral action by the United 
States and through consultation and collaboration with our allies, not 
resuming or reopening the negotiations but acting in collaboration with 
our allies, as well as through actions we can take as a nation alone 
and working closely with our ally, our friend, our critical partner in 
the Middle East, the State of Israel.
  The administration set forth a case that the current agreement 
immediately reduces Iran's nuclear program and places it under a series 
of overlapping safeguards. Together these measures push a threshold 
nuclear power back from the brink. The agreement imposes an intrusive 
inspection and surveillance regime relying on international 
certification and verification by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Future U.S. Presidents have the authority immediately and 
through Executive order to reimpose our sanctions if Iranian actions 
are inconsistent with our national security.
  Rejecting this agreement is fraught with unacceptable risk. Our 
formal negotiation partners and allies have signaled clearly they are 
simply not coming back to the table--a point confirmed in my direct 
conversations and meetings. There is no better deal available now. The 
present sanctions will soon become unenforceable, producing an economic 
windfall for Iran whether or not the United States accepts this 
agreement. The United States, instead of Iran, would be isolated, and 
Iran's nuclear program would be unconstrained. Rejection would fracture 
our unified efforts with our allies and greatly weaken international 
pressure on Iran and undermine American leadership on this issue and 
others, especially if economic sanctions are needed in the event of a 
violation.
  This agreement has shortcomings, no doubt, and they are serious. I 
have listened to my colleagues, including Chairman Corker, whom I 
deeply respect, and others here today, enumerate a number of them. Yet 
I remain convinced the most constructive and clear-eyed role for 
Congress is to support specific steps to make implementation and 
enforcement of this agreement stronger and more effective. In fact, in 
my view, the day after this agreement is approved and accepted is as 
important as the agreement itself--the day after, the months after, and 
the years after because that is when this agreement must be enforced 
vigorously and strenuously and unyieldingly.
  I have taken additional time to look beyond this agreement to create 
a blueprint for diplomatic steps to strengthen it. Specifically, I am 
working with the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland, to craft new legislation. 
Congress must act to encourage and enable diplomacy with Iran, which is 
not only possible but critically important. Now we must begin the 
process of addressing those shortfalls and shortcomings, unwanted 
impacts and consequences revealed during congressional review of the 
agreement.
  No. 1, countering Iranian terror with dollar-for-dollar sanctions. To 
counter Iran's role as a leading state sponsor of terrorism, Congress 
must sustain and expand existing sanctions that crack down on terror 
financing and demand their full enforcement by both the United States 
and the European Union.
  I will continue--indeed, I will increase--pressing Secretary of State 
John Kerry to take long overdue, aggressive steps to interdict arms to 
Hezbollah, and I will work to block Hezbollah's financing and 
logistical support from Iran, applying tools and techniques available 
through our banking and financial system.
  No. 2, empowering our allies to counter Iran and terror proxies. We 
must renew and reinvigorate our efforts to protect our allies, 
especially Israel--our major strategic partner in the Middle East--from 
the threat of Iran and its terror proxies. We need a new framework of 
defense cooperation that takes into account how this agreement will 
affect the changing threat from Iran.
  Congress must work to expand Israel's qualitative military edge and 
bolster intelligence cooperation. The Pentagon must establish new joint 
training exercises that involve strategic air assets and invite Israeli 
pilots to train flying long-range bombers. Now is the time to aid 
Israel with extra F-35 Joint Strike Fighter squadrons and the tankers 
they need to cut off any threat to Israel--well before it reaches their 
borders. No equipment should be precluded if needed for Israel's self-
defense.
  As a member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, I will work to 
establish such a parallel agreement with Israel to cover threats, both 
nuclear and conventional, along with an ongoing joint review forum, 
bringing together the United States, Israel, and NATO members to 
enhance our deterrent capabilities.
  No. 3, preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. The United States must 
reaffirm unequivocally that Iran will never be allowed to obtain a 
nuclear weapon and that all available options will be used to stop it 
from ever accumulating enough highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade 
plutonium to produce one. Such a policy is consistent with this 
agreement.
  Congress must articulate in statute that that policy is 
unchallengeable and that Iranian violations both during this agreement 
and afterward will be met with strong, unquestionable action. It must 
be clear we will defend our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region, 
and those vital interests include preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. It 
is a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy.
  As a member of the agreement, the United States is in a stronger 
position to deter and remedy violations, whether through economic 
sanctions or military action as a last resort. If the agreement is 
rejected and economic sanctions or military actions are ever necessary, 
we would act alone. That is a simple fact about our rejection. If the 
agreement is accepted, we act with a coalition of allies and partners 
with the legitimacy and credibility of diplomacy having run its course 
and with the intelligence produced by inspections that will help to 
guide any military action necessary as a last resort. There will be 
popular support at home, which is absolutely necessary for such action. 
That support is essential because acting without it will make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the President to in effect seek to 
enforce the very terms of an agreement this Nation has rejected, if 
that is the result.
  Most importantly, this agreement cannot be based on hope or trust. 
History belies both in our experience with Iran. This deal is not an 
agreement I have long sought, it is not the agreement I would have 
preferred, but it makes the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran less 
imminent. It requires the United States and the international community 
to sustain their commitment to verify and enforce its provisions over 
many years, and I am ready to join in the hard work of preventing a 
nuclear-armed Iran on this difficult diplomatic path.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, I come to the floor to discuss what I 
believe is probably the most important foreign policy issue I have 
worked on in my time in the Senate. It is one of great consequence to 
our Nation and also to our allies.
  I don't come to this decision lightly, but there are many reasons I 
would urge this body to disapprove the agreement that has been entered 
into between the Obama administration, the Iranian Government, and the 
P5+1 nations.
  First of all, we need to understand the country we are dealing with. 
Just today the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: I am 
saying to Israel that they won't live to see the end of these 25 years. 
With Allah's help, there will be no such thing as a Zionist regime in 
25 years.
  Of course, this is not the first time we have heard this from the 
Supreme Leader or the leaders of Iran. We are in this position even 
after having entered this agreement and having had the President go to 
the U.N. to seek approval of this agreement prior to coming to the 
Congress. We know that while this agreement was being negotiated, the 
Iranian Foreign Minister

[[Page S6513]]

was smiling for the cameras and negotiating the agreement, while the 
President of Iran was actually at rallies in Iran where they were 
shouting ``Down with America'' and ``Death to Israel.''
  Iran itself has a history that is important for us to understand. 
That history is a history of noncompliance. Iran has time and time 
again failed to comply with U.N. resolutions and failed to meet its 
obligations. Iran has violated U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran 
has violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the past. Iran has 
consistently been unresponsive to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in the past--the IAEA--and Iran has failed to answer questions 
about its past nuclear weapons activities. If there is no covert, 
undeclared nuclear facility in Iran today, Olli Heinonen, a former IAEA 
Deputy Director, has said it would be the first time in 20 years.

  So one of the important issues, I believe, for any of us in reviewing 
this agreement is: What is the inspection regime that would be put in 
place to assure not only that we are doing a full inspection at the 
declared facilities of Iran but also the undeclared facilities? The 
reality is that under this agreement, the process for seeking 
inspection by the IAEA for undeclared facilities is a process that only 
a lawyer could love--and I happen to be one--because if we look at the 
language of the actual agreement, we will see in paragraph 75 that ``if 
the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or 
activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations 
that have not been declared under the comprehensive safeguards 
agreement'' the IAEA first has to ``provide Iran [with] the basis for 
such concerns and request clarification.''
  So that is the first step. Then, ``if Iran's explanations do not 
resolve the IAEA's concerns, the Agency may request access to such 
locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of undeclared 
nuclear materials and activities'' and the IAEA also has to ``provide 
Iran the reasons for access in writing and will make available all 
relevant information.''
  Then, Iran may come back and ``propose to the IAEA alternative means 
of resolving the IAEA's concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the 
absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities . . . . ''
  So if those alternatives aren't accepted from Iran, then, ``if the 
two sides are unable to reach satisfactory agreements to verify the 
absence of'' an undeclared nuclear facility, then at that point there 
is a process that goes into place, and that process--which has been 
described on this Senate floor--can take up to 24 days.
  But we need to understand there is a whole litigation process that 
occurs even before those days, and this can be a much longer process.
  Then, how does this get resolved? This gets resolved essentially by a 
committee process. So then we have a committee resolve all of this. 
That is why I say this is a lawyer's dream in terms of an inspection 
regime here.
  Then, if we look at paragraph 78 of the agreement, ``The members of 
the Joint Commission, by consensus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 
members, would advise on the necessary means to resolve the IAEA's 
concerns.''
  This process, if we add up all the days, is a lengthy process. Again, 
it certainly is so far away from the anytime, anywhere inspection 
regime. We have to understand that Iran has a history of using every 
means possible to delay inspections, especially to areas that are 
undeclared or they are trying to hide their nuclear facilities. That is 
why I describe it as an inspection regime that only a lawyer could love 
because this will allow Iran to litigate access to their undeclared 
sites, and we already know they have a history of doing that.
  One of the issues I have taken a keen interest in since I have been 
in the Senate is Iran's missile program. We have heard all along from 
the administration that they were not going to address Iran's support 
of terrorism, that they were going to keep that issue separate--that 
they were going to keep separate issues of Iran's support for terrorism 
around the world--we have heard about that in this debate today--their 
support for groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, their support for the Houthis 
in Yemen, their support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, their support 
for terrorism around the world. Yet at the last minute in this 
agreement, the administration conceded two incredibly important points: 
No. 1, allowing Iran to have the resolutions lifted on having arms 
sales and transactions within 5 years, and then, No. 2, within 8 years, 
lifting the U.N. resolutions on missiles or ICBMs.
  As our own Secretary of Defense has described, the significance of 
course in ICBMs is the ``I,'' which means intercontinental, meaning 
missiles that can hit the United States of America. Yet that was lifted 
at the last minute, and that was lifted over the objections, over the 
recommendations of our highest military officer, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman Martin Dempsey.
  This has been a focus of mine in the Senate because I have been 
concerned that we have heard in the Armed Services Committee from many 
of our top defense and intelligence officials that the preferred method 
for Iran to deliver a nuclear weapon to the United States of America 
would be an ICBM and that this certainly represents a threat to America 
and to our allies.
  In fact, I was so concerned about this that last summer I wrote the 
President of the United States, and 26 Senators joined me in the letter 
that I wrote to the President. In that letter, I expressed the belief 
that the Iranian deal should address Iran's ICBM missile program. The 
reason I wrote and led this effort is because we had been hearing for 
years before the Senate Armed Services Committee from people such as 
the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, who testified 
before the committee in February of 2014, that ``we judge that Iran 
would choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering 
nuclear weapons.''
  In 2013, we also heard from Director Clapper that the Iranians are 
developing two systems that could have intercontinental capability as 
early as 2015. Here we are in 2015. Some have estimated it may take a 
few more years. Regardless, according to public testimony from our 
intelligence community, Iran could have ICBM capability in the next few 
years, and here we have, in conjunction with this agreement, our 
blessing because we agreed that the U.N. resolution against their 
missile program that said, no, Iran, you cannot have ICBM capability, 
now it is OK. It will be legitimate for them to have ICBM capability.

  Why do they need ICBM capability if they don't have any interest in 
delivering the most destructive weapons to the world--to countries on 
the other side of the world, including our own?
  So as I said, this issue was against the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff's advice. When I heard public reports--there were reports 
bubbling up about the agreement before it was signed that Iran was 
pressuring, with support from other countries like Russia, to lift the 
arms embargo, to lift the missile embargo. I was so worried about it 
that a week before the agreement I asked Chairman Dempsey in the Armed 
Services Committee, on July 7, about the reports that these resolutions 
may be lifted on arms and missiles. He told me that under no 
circumstances should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic 
missile capability and arms trafficking. Yet that is exactly what 
happens in this agreement.
  The Chairman came back to our committee after the agreement was 
signed to testify about the agreement, and I asked him again about 
including this in the agreement. He told me it was against his military 
advice to lift the arms resolution and to lift the missile resolution.
  So as I look at the grave concerns we should have for our national 
security, this is one of the top concerns--an insufficient inspection 
regime legitimizing their ability to have ICBM capability, allowing 
them in 5 years to legitimately have more arms. We already know they 
are supplying arms and cash around the world to their terrorist 
proxies. This agreement of course gives them, within a 9-month period, 
billions of dollars more cash to support terrorism.
  One of the things I have heard on the floor today from my colleagues 
on the other side of the aisle who are supporting this agreement is 
that somehow this leaves on the table all of the

[[Page S6514]]

tools we need to deal with Iran's support for terrorism--which, of 
course, destabilizes the region. Except the problem is that nobody has 
told the Iranians this point because they have a very different 
viewpoint on this agreement. Iran has taken the position that if any of 
the sanctions are reimposed, they can walk away from the agreement.
  If we look at paragraph 26 of this agreement, I would argue the 
language in the agreement actually allows them to make that argument, 
unfortunately.
  Tehran has specifically stated that it will treat the imposition of 
any sanctions that are similar to those that were in place before this 
deal as a reason to walk away.
  So why is this important? It is important because we know they 
support terrorism around the world. My colleagues have said we have to 
deal with their support for terrorism, and we still have the tools in 
our toolbox to issue tough sanctions to deal with their terrorism, even 
while being part of this agreement. The problem is that the language 
doesn't necessarily bear that out in the agreement.
  In a July 20 letter, Iran told the U.N. Security Council that it 
would ``reconsider its commitments under the JCPOA if the effects of 
the termination of the Security Council, European Union, or United 
States nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures are impaired 
by continued application or the imposition of new sanctions with a 
nature and scope identical or similar to those that were in place prior 
to the implementation date, irrespective of whether such new sanctions 
are introduced on nuclear-related or other grounds, unless the issues 
are remedied within a reasonably short time.''
  In other words, Iran is taking the viewpoint, under the language of 
this agreement, that if we reimpose any of the sanctions that are 
lifted as part of this agreement--which, by the way, these are the 
toughest sanctions, right? These are the tools in our toolbox--even if 
they commit acts of terrorism, they can walk away from this agreement.
  So let's put this all together. Iran, within 9 months, gets more cash 
for this agreement. They get to keep their infrastructure for their 
nuclear program because they get to keep their centrifuges. They are 
now in a position where people are doing business with them--because we 
know that many countries around the world want to be able to do 
business with Iran, so an infusion of cash and relationships there. And 
then they are continuing to support terrorism. They commit through 
their proxies a major terrorist event that triggers something that we 
want to do here--we want to take tough sanctions against them because 
they have supported a terrorist attack against us or our allies. Yet 
they are going to take the position that we can't reimpose any of their 
sanctions no matter what they do because of the language of the 
agreement in paragraph 26. They are interpreting it that way.
  So if you are Iran, right now, this is a pretty good deal for you. 
You can get the cash. You can get the legitimatization. People are 
doing business with you again. You can continue to support terrorism, 
and our hands apparently, in their view, are tied on sanctions.
  So when I hear from those supporting the agreement that somehow we 
still have all the tools in our toolbox to deal with terrorism, it 
seems to me that if we look at the language of this agreement and how 
the Iranians are supporting it, we have tied our hands, and we will be 
in a weaker position to deal with their support for terrorism around 
the world no matter how egregious their behavior is.
  This is a real issue when I think about our national security, when 
they have the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world and they 
will now have legitimate access to developing their ICBM program with 
the lifting of sanctions in the U.N. and the legitimate purchasing of 
arms. We know there are countries like Russia that are lining up to 
sell these arms to them, and then we are going to weaken our ability to 
impose terrorism-related sanctions in the future.
  I heard many of my colleagues talking earlier about the 60-vote 
threshold in the United States Senate. When we voted on the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act, we voted on it, I believe, 98 to 1. We 
would think at that point we wouldn't be worried at all about actually 
getting to the debate on the actual bill. So I hope my colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle, when they voted for the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act, were serious about having a substantive vote, 
given that this was a vote of 98 to 1 on this agreement. I believe the 
American people deserve nothing less than a substantive vote on the 
merits of this agreement as provided for by the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act.
  I know that many of my colleagues are here to speak, but I want to 
raise one final issue that we have heard about on this floor; that is, 
actually being able to see the full text of this agreement. We all know 
that when you have an agreement, especially with a country that has a 
history of cheating, language matters. We know that because the 
Iranians are already taking all kinds of different positions on what 
the language means in this agreement to their benefit. Yet we have not 
been given access to the two-side agreements between the IAEA and Iran. 
By the way, that is in direct violation of the express language of the 
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, which says Congress should have 
access to side agreements. But what we do know about these side 
agreements that has been reported in the press is truly disturbing; 
that is, as to the side agreements themselves, information has been 
leaked that indicates Tehran could declare some areas as suspected 
nuclear sites, including the Parchin military complex, off-limits to 
inspectors and that Iran could even be permitted to self-inspect there.
  Can you imagine allowing a country with a history of cheating the 
ability to self-inspect or collect their own samples in terms of how 
inspections would be done? Yet those who are supporting the agreement 
are saying this is a robust inspection method.
  I would ask my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who are 
supporting this agreement, does it not trouble you that you have not 
been given access to the language of these side agreements given that 
what has been leaked about them is that they pertain to the actual 
inspection process at important sites such as Parchin? I would hope 
that our constituents would expect us to review every word of the 
language of something so important to our national security. That, in 
and of itself, I would say, is a reason to be highly skeptical of this 
agreement, along with the other issues I have raised.
  Finally, we have a long history in this body of debating important 
international agreements, including agreements that deal with very 
fundamental issues involving our foreign policy--issues that involve 
nuclear nonproliferation, issues that involve many sensitive treaty 
issues. We have a long history of actually debating these in a 
bipartisan manner and working in a bipartisan manner to approve 
agreements. Yet on this agreement, we are left in a position where a 
majority of the Senate on a bipartisan basis has said that we have 
serious reservations about this agreement and have declared that we are 
going to vote against this agreement. Yet the administration is 
continuing to push forward to get this done, to make sure that this 
agreement is fully implemented without reaching out in a bipartisan 
fashion to ensure that the strength of the Congress in a bipartisan 
fashion is behind something so important to our national security.
  That should say something about the merits of this agreement. This 
agreement is deeply flawed. This is an agreement that I believe does 
not protect our national security. In fact, in the long run it will 
undermine our security in this country by giving Iran more cash, 
legitimizing their nuclear weapons program in terms of keeping their 
infrastructure for that program, legitimizing their ICBM program, and 
hurting our ability to impose further sanctions if they conduct acts of 
terrorism, which they certainly have a history of doing through their 
proxies.
  I hope as we continue this debate, we will disapprove this agreement, 
which I do not believe protects our national security.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tillis). The Senator from Indiana.

[[Page S6515]]

  

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I intend to speak at much greater length on 
this issue perhaps tomorrow. I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
participate in this colloquy. I will be brief. I know my colleagues are 
waiting to speak also.
  First, I want to commend Senator Corker, the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. Together with his work with Senator 
Cardin, we have a bipartisan agreement supported by some of the most 
knowledgeable foreign policy experts on the Democratic side and on the 
Republican side before us. Had Senator Corker not been able to make 
that arrangement, it would have been a done deal before the Congress 
even saw what was agreed to in this negotiation with Iran.
  I think my colleagues here have been amazed at the difference between 
what we were told the agreement did and didn't do and what we actually 
learned it does and doesn't do as we pored over it, word by word, annex 
through annex, looking at every piece of information here that is 
relevant to our decision. I am thankful for the work of Senator Corker, 
who has taken some heat for not doing more. He saved us and saved the 
American people from not having the ability for us to examine this in 
detail. That is what this debate here is all about. The American people 
deserve to know what is in this agreement. The consequences of this for 
the future of America, for the future of the world are significant and 
almost mind-boggling. We have to get it right. To get it right, we need 
to read every word.
  Here I am, shortly after the delivery of the 157 pages, together with 
the annexes, over a weekend poring through each sentence, trying to 
understand exactly what we have here and what we are dealing with, and 
I am amazed at what I have come up with. Instead of going through the 
various items--I will talk about more about this tomorrow, and it has 
been well presented by my colleague from New Hampshire and others this 
afternoon, including the majority leader--I would like to discuss 
something that I don't think has been raised yet. That something is the 
ambiguity that exists throughout this agreement and particularly in the 
annexes to the agreement. We know that there are two secret agreements 
which we don't have access to. How anyone can go forward and support an 
arrangement when you have side secret agreements and you are not 
allowed to know what they are--that in and of itself should be reason 
not to support an agreement. But having said that, let me spend a 
little bit of time regarding these ambiguities and the vagueness of 
some of the language here that I think have major implications.
  The annex uses familiar forms of mushy language. I am going to quote 
here: ``as determined,'' ``where appropriate,'' ``among others,'' ``as 
mutually determined,'' and ``when beneficial.'' What are the actual 
obligations that we are undertaking if we vote for this agreement that 
is full of words like that? This is not clear to me, nor would I think 
it is clear to anyone in the administration.
  We questioned the administration on this issue. They have essentially 
said: Well, this is to be determined at a later date or if this issue 
comes up, we will try to get some consensus on how to go forward. My 
own conclusion is that this language is not a mistake. These people who 
negotiated on our benefit have had a lifetime of negotiating 
engagement. I assume many of them were attorneys, lawyers that know and 
understand that a definition of a word or a phrase is everything. You 
have to understand exactly what it is or you are going to end up with 
confusion.
  These ambiguous obligations, I think, were purposefully designed to 
placate the Iranians, offering them a vision of a robust military 
nuclear infrastructure, developed not only with the acquiescence of the 
West but with our material assistance. Further, if we examine the 
agreement text--let alone the annex text--this same pattern with 
misleading ambiguity holds. In many of the detailed commitments that 
are specified in the agreement and the annexes available to us, these 
conditional ambiguous terms dominate.
  I couldn't help but notice that this wasn't an occasional occurrence. 
I asked my staff to go through and look at some of these ambiguous 
definitions and count the number of them. The phrase ``as appropriate'' 
or ``where appropriate''--``achieving this as appropriate'' or 
``obligated to this as appropriate'' or ``where appropriate''--was 
sprinkled throughout the text 34 times. ``As mutually determined'' or 
``by consensus to be concluded'' occurred 28 times, implying that 
future agreements or conditional commitments are there as against 
current commitments. At the same time, the phrase ``Iran intends to'' 
occurs more frequently than it should in place of affirmative 
obligations.
  To any lawyer representing a client, whether you are buying a house, 
leasing a car, leasing an apartment or entering into a business 
contract, you can go to that lawyer and basically say: Look, I want an 
out. Or if you are on the other end of the negotiating process, you can 
say: Put some ambiguous vague language in there--``to be determined,'' 
``as appropriate,'' ``by consensus''--so that if something goes wrong 
here, I have an excuse to opt out.
  I think that is exactly what Iran was trying to do. If we come up 
with what we think is a breach of the agreement, it is easy for Iran to 
say: That needs to be by consensus; and without consensus, we see that 
as saying such and such, and you see it wrong. If we press the case 
with Iran, that, of course, gives them the option of withdrawing from 
the agreement. At an important time, now having over $100 billion in 
their hands, now having signed up contracts with many nations around 
the world--long-term contracts for delivery of oil, minerals or 
whatever--now having put themselves in a much different position with 
the sanctions lifted, they may use that exact language as a means of 
escaping. Or if you turn it on its head and turn it the other way 
around, Iran says: Well, wait a minute; our intentions are such and 
such. You didn't understand what we were trying to say to you.
  Then how are we going to respond? This puts us in a very tenuous 
position.
  I can recall a number of times when I told my wife: I thought you 
were going to stop and pick up milk on the way home.
  Well, I intended to do that, but I got a phone call.
  Wait a minute. I thought you were going to clean the garage on 
Saturday.
  I intended to do that, but Joe called and said: Let's go play golf.
  I intended. It was a good intention. That is fine in any kind of a 
marital relationship or any other kind of relationship. Many of those 
are just meaningless things. But when you are talking about an 
agreement that binds the United States on the basis of how its 
negotiating adversary interprets and uses these words, it can put you 
in real trouble.
  I don't think anybody has talked about that yet. I wanted to bring 
that up. As I said, I am going to be talking about my position and how 
I came to the decision not to support this tomorrow. This is a sloppily 
written agreement that can bind the United States to obligations that 
we are not even yet aware of and that can give Iran an out if it so 
chooses. It comes to that point in time when, with a 3-month or so 
breakout toward having nuclear weapon capability, they simply say: 
Sanctions are gone, we have our money, we have done the research, even 
some with assistance of U.S. scientists and the members of the 
negotiating team, we are in a great position to go forward, and we are 
just going to do it. We can use this language to opt-out of the 
agreement. That is just one more reason why each of us should carefully 
try to understand what is and what isn't in this agreement and weigh 
this as we try to make a judgment in terms of whether we should go 
forward or whether we have signed on to a very bad deal here and should 
vote against it.

  With that, I yield to my colleagues who have been patiently waiting 
to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. LANKFORD. Mr. President, I would like to take a moment and recap 
the day and some of the issues I heard on the floor. I have been on the 
floor quite a bit today and heard a lot of the debate. As I processed 
through some of the debate, I heard--and we will see if some of my 
colleagues agree with this--a lot of conversation on the details of the 
agreement in trying to

[[Page S6516]]

walk through the actual process. What does the text say? There seem to 
be two very different opinions about this. I will share what I am 
hearing.
  There are key things that Iran needs to be able to complete a nuclear 
weapon, and it doesn't seem that this agreement stops them in the 
process, and it seems that the goal of this agreement was to stop them 
from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
  What does Iran need? Well, they need time. This agreement gives them 
time. It lays out a schedule, backs up and slows down the process of 
inspections. It allows them time to be able to finish their research.
  It allows them money. That is a key aspect that they need not only 
for their funding of terrorism but to actually be able to complete the 
technological research they have to have in those facilities. Billions 
of dollars are released to Iran almost immediately in this agreement 
for them to be able to complete their research.
  It allows them ballistic missile capability, which is shocking to a 
lot of people I talked to in my State. They assume this deal actually 
slows down their ballistic missile research and capability. It actually 
doesn't. It actually paves the path for them and gives them permission 
to continue their ballistic missile research.
  It allows them to be able to continue toward highly enriched uranium. 
Again, a lot of people I talked to have been surprised at that because 
the assumption was, after hearing about it from the President so many 
times, they shouldn't be allowed to have uranium and shouldn't be 
allowed to do that. That was the conversation 5 years ago, but now the 
conversation is, how much uranium can they enrich and what does that 
look like?
  There have been some conversations today by individuals who have said 
that this will decrease the number of centrifuges they have. That is 
entirely correct. It does decrease the number of centrifuges, but let 
me give an illustration. If your company had 20 computers that were 
built in 1995 and you were told you could replace those 20 computers 
from 1995 with 3 computers from this year, would you take that deal? I 
bet you would. That is the deal we are giving to Iran. We are telling 
them they will have to get rid of two-thirds of their oldest 
centrifuges--their oldest, originally built--but they can still keep 
5,000 of even their oldest centrifuges and they can install 1,000 of 
their newest technology centrifuges and keep those going. I would 
certainly think that is a deal they would take--and by the way, they 
are taking it, and they are asking us to take it as well.
  They have time, they have money, they have ballistic missile 
research, they have highly enriched uranium and the permission to be 
able to continue their work on their most advanced centrifuges, and 
they have additional defensive capabilities. They are allowed to 
continue to stockpile conventional weapons under this agreement and to 
even add things such as surface-to-air defense capabilities to be able 
to defend their military sites.
  So you tell me, does Iran have what it needs to be able to complete a 
nuclear weapon under this deal--time, money, ballistic missiles, 
ability to be able to complete their research, advanced centrifuges, 
and defensive weaponry to be able to put around their facilities? Yes.
  Here are some of the things which we don't know, which we really 
can't discuss, and which we would appreciate being able to discuss 
today--the side deals. We have the documents that have come in. In 
fact, I have posted them on my Web site, and many others have done the 
same. We want Americans to be able to read those things because most 
Americans, when they read them, are stunned with what this agreement 
says. But what we can't get is the side deal.
  Again, I have heard over and over from the President that we are not 
going to trust Iran, we are going to verify. We don't trust, we are 
going to verify. Literally, with the side agreements--people keep 
hearing ``What is the side agreement?'' Here is what the side agreement 
is. The main agreement gives broad parameters. For instance, it says we 
will have inspections. Well, that is great. How are the inspections to 
be done? Well, that is in the side agreement. So we are agreeing that, 
yes, there will be inspections. When we asked the question about how 
the inspections were to be done, we were told that we can't read that 
document, that it is a separate agreement between the U.N. and Iran. 
Literally I cannot verify how we are going to verify. I have been told 
to trust and verify. I can't verify how we are verifying. That seems 
absurd to me, and it is hard for me to imagine anyone in this body 
would say: Yes, I would sign off on something I have never read and 
have never seen. In fact, the people in the administration have said 
they have never read or seen it. Yet we are being asked to sign off on 
it and to give our authorization to say: Yes, we will support that. I 
have a problem with that, and it is one of many reasons why I cannot 
support this deal.

  What I have heard over and over again by individuals who do support 
this deal today is that this is the deal, it is in front of us, the 
President has agreed to it, and it will look bad if we don't agree to 
it. My problem is not looking bad; my problem is a nuclear-armed Iran. 
That is the problem. At the end of the day, this is not about saving 
face as America, this is about protecting U.S. interests and U.S. 
citizens and those of our friends in the gulf. This is not about saving 
face for the President.
  I have heard over and over again: It would be too hard to get the 
coalition back together to be able to renegotiate this. May I remind 
everyone that the reason we have this coalition together is because the 
crippling sanctions are one thing--you cannot do business with America 
and with Iran. That is the deal. If we continue the sanctions in place, 
it is not about getting the band back together, it is about leaving 
those sanctions in place, and if you want to do business with the 
United States, you will also have to agree to not do business with 
Iran. It is not about getting everyone back together. Leave them in 
place and let's finish renegotiating it.
  I have heard over and over again: It is either war or it is this. 
Quite frankly, I think this deal in its place takes us closer to a 
conventional war. Why? Because it allows Iran to begin to almost 
immediately begin stockpiling conventional weapons. Those in the gulf 
region are so concerned about that that we are promising them they can 
get more weapons and buy more advanced weapons from us. How does a 
conventional arms race in the Middle East take us further from war? 
Under this agreement, it destabilizes.
  I have heard over and over again today: What is our message to the 
world when the rest of the world has signed off on this and yet we say 
no? Well, here is our message to the world: Iran is screaming ``Death 
to America,'' not death to other countries, except for Israel. They are 
chanting ``Death to Israel.'' Israel is also standing up and saying: 
This is a terrible deal for our nation and the stability of the world.
  It is not about our message to the world; it is about standing up and 
being the world's superpower. That is who we are. Let's take 
responsibility for our position in the world and be able to finish well 
while we are doing it.
  I have also heard multiple times today: Well, let's sign off on this 
deal and then we will have tougher diplomacy in the future. I have to 
say that every time I heard that, I smiled and thought, are you kidding 
me? What do you mean, we will sign off on this deal and then we will do 
tougher diplomacy in the future? With what leverage? This is our 
leverage. The sanctions are the leverage. We are not going to get 
tougher in the future. This is the toughest moment. It gets softer from 
here.
  Iran is still the single largest sponsor of terrorism in the world. 
They made no change in their actions against Yemen and leading the coup 
in Yemen. They made no change in their actions propping up Assad in 
Syria.
  We are giving this away if we sign on to this agreement. This deal is 
built on hope, not on facts and trust, and I know everyone in this body 
hopes to get a diplomatic solution. We cannot base an agreement with 
Iran on hope. If we cannot verify it, if we cannot see the documents, 
if there has been no change in behavior, I think we should assume we 
still have status quo Iran.
  Let's push back. Let's get the better deal. Let's not allow advanced 
centrifuges to stay in place. Let's not

[[Page S6517]]

allow them to continue their ballistic missile testing. These are not 
hard issues to be able to finish. The deal is half-cooked. Let's get it 
fully baked, and let's finish a diplomatic solution but not just hope 
that this works out in the days ahead.
  With that, I yield back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. PERDUE. Mr. President, I rise tonight to speak about a very 
troubled time in my life and in this body. I didn't think this moment 
would arise in my tenure here in the U.S. Senate, but tonight I am very 
troubled about being a Member of this body.
  Just a few short months ago, we told the American people, in our 
Foreign Relations Committee, that we could work together. We 
unanimously passed a bill that gave this body, the U.S. Congress, a 
right that the President and his administration had denied us by not 
allowing this to be treated as a treaty. Yet we stand here tonight--
even though a unanimous bill came out of the committee and 98 Senators 
voted for us to get a look and a vote on this deal--without the ability 
to tell the people back home that we will, in fact, have a vote on this 
deal. I find that terribly troubling. As a matter of fact, I am 
embarrassed. The people back home deserve better than this body is 
providing.
  There is bipartisan opposition to this deal. There are good Democrats 
who in their deep conscience are going to oppose the President, and I 
respect that, but there is not bipartisan support for this deal. There 
is a huge difference. Only one group in this body is supporting this 
President's deal with Iran. I am troubled by that.
  I applaud Senator Cardin, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee. I applaud Senator Corker as the chairman of that committee. 
Under their leadership, we got to this point. Without this deal, 
without a vote, we wouldn't even be sitting here tonight. We would 
already be implementing this deal, and we would have told the American 
people: Yes, we don't have the constitutional balance between the 
United States and the House of Representatives and the legislative 
branch that the Constitution calls for. We gave up.
  Well, here we are. I would like for every Member of this body who is 
going to vote for this deal to answer to the people back home: How does 
this make the world safer for their children and their children's 
children?
  In the Presiding Officer's business career and in my business career, 
we have seen a lot of deals and we have negotiated a lot of deals. The 
way I look at deals is to try to evaluate what both sides get in a 
deal. So let's look at this from that perspective.
  First of all, Iran gets a windfall for bad behavior. They have 30 
years of noncompliance with NPT requirements, and the first thing we 
are going to do is give them a windfall--somewhere between $60 and $150 
billion.
  We know by the administration's own admission that we can depend on 
some of that money--last year $6 billion went to terrorist support 
around the Middle East and other parts of the world from Iran. Last 
year Iran spent $17 billion supporting their own military. That puts 
this windfall into perspective. One of the first things Iran did when 
the administration announced this deal is they sent representatives to 
Moscow. Does it take much imagination to see that their behavior is not 
going to change in this deal just because we give them a windfall? As a 
matter of fact, we are encouraging bad behavior.
  Second, I would like to know where our four American hostages are. 
They get to keep them.
  Third, Iran gets to enrich. This is my biggest problem, and I have 
said it many times. My biggest problem with this deal is that we gave 
up the ability right off the bat to stop Iran from enriching. To me, 
that is the fundamental problem in this deal. Breakout without 
enriching capabilities is 2 to 3 years, not 2 to 3 months like this 
deal provides. As a matter of fact, the President himself said this 
deal, after 13 years, allows Iran to have a breakout period that is 
basically zero. Who are we kidding here? And after 15 years, all bets 
are off. What we have done is provided a pathway to enriched uranium, 
and I find that very troubling.
  Unlike many other countries that have similar nuclear programs that 
are peaceful and are not allowed to enrich, we allowed this bad actor 
to step up and be treated the same as countries such as Germany, Japan, 
Holland, Brazil, and Argentina. I find that very troubling.
  Fourth, they get access to the world's arms market in just 5 short 
years. Why is that important? It is important because of their support 
of terrorism, but also, more importantly, it gives them access to a 
nuclear weapons capability through technology available only through 
the arms market.
  Fifth, after 8 short years, they get access to the intercontinental 
ballistic missiles technology. Why in the world does a rogue nation 
like Iran that says they only want a civil nuclear program for power 
generation--why in the world in the eleventh hour do this 
administration and our negotiators give up and give them the right to 
have access, after 8 short years, to ballistic missile technology? They 
currently have a missile that has a 1,200-mile range. That very easily 
brings Israel and Eastern Europe into range. If they have access in 8 
years to ballistic missile technology, their only intent can be to have 
a missile that can deliver a missile armed with a nuclear warhead to 
Washington, DC, and points beyond. I find that very troubling.

  Sixth, Iran gets access to technology for centrifuges. This is almost 
the most unbelievable thing. Not only do they get to keep every 
centrifuge, they are not destroying every centrifuge; they don't have 
to destroy any one. But I agree with what Senator Lankford just said, 
and that is this: They have antiques right now. What we are allowing 
them to do is to trade up to modern technology, and IR-6 and IR-8 
centrifuges. There is only one reason for that. It shortens the time 
for them to develop enough fissile material to have a nuclear weapon.
  Seventh, Iran gets to limit and delay inspectors. This is only 
important because we allow them to enrich; don't miss that. But what we 
have done is allow them to dictate the inspection protocol. I have 
never seen a deal where that was allowed, honest to goodness. This to 
me is unconscionable. The fact that we have secret deals, yes, this is 
important, but the fact that we are allowing them--with no U.S. 
participation, by the way, on the ground in Iran with the IAEA--we are 
allowing Iran to actually take samples under the protocol of 
inspection.
  The side deals are unconscionable. I would never in business sign a 
deal where every legal document was not exposed. How in the world--I 
understand these side agreements are normal operating procedure within 
the IAEA and their countries that they are inspecting. This is 
different. This is a public global deal, dealing with a rogue country 
such as Iran, and we need to see that. I can't imagine how we would 
approve a deal--anybody would approve a deal and go home and explain to 
their constituents how this makes sense for the safety of their 
children and grandchildren when we don't know what is in every legal 
document.
  Now, what did we get? I would argue that basically, from what I hear, 
the No. 1 goal of this administration is a legacy for this failed 
President. I am sorry, but that is the only real benefit I can see. We 
get Iran, the world's largest sponsor of terrorism and proven violator 
of past nuclear agreements to promise to be a good actor. Really? That 
is what we get? Yet, the Ayatollah just today--just today--said that 
Israel will not exist in 25 years. This does not sound to me like a 
good actor who is going to change their behavior because we have 
brought them into the community of nations.
  Why do we believe the word of a nation that has been a revolutionary 
pariah since 1979? Have we forgotten that 52 United States American 
citizens, members of our embassy, for 444 days were held hostage in 
Tehran just 35 short years ago? This is the same regime, these are the 
same clerics, the same mentality, that created that situation. We just 
now have entered into the most devastating foreign policy agreement in 
my lifetime and maybe in the history of the United States. No deal that 
I can read in history puts the United States in more jeopardy going 
forward than this nuclear deal with Iran.
  Under this deal, we get an Iran that will continue its bad behavior. 
I think that is easy to predict. Their sponsorship of terror continues. 
Their human

[[Page S6518]]

rights violations have worsened. Even during the negotiations, they 
continued to back Assad's murderous regime in Syria, which is the 
source of one of the most devastating humanitarian crises of the 21st 
century that is just now coming to light.
  The Presiding Officer and I made a trip, along with the leader, just 
a few months ago. We sat in Jordan and we listened to the plea of those 
people over there who are receiving refugees. They are telling us how 
serious this plight is. Now the media has picked up on it, and we see 
the devastating impact of what is going on in the Middle East. This 
deal is a manifestation of a much bigger problem.
  This President has failed in this foreign policy requirement that the 
executive branch is given in our Constitution. This is just a 
manifestation of a bigger failure, but it is devastating to the future 
security of our kids. Today, Iran has a national holiday called Death 
to America Day. As a matter of fact, one of the hostages, one of the 
four hostages just this year, earlier this year, was moved from the 
second worst prison in Iran to the worst prison in Iran, and guess what 
day he was moved on? Death to America Day. I find that insulting.
  As we just heard, there are three things--I have a little different 
view of what a country needs to have a nuclear weapon. First of all, I 
am an engineer, so this will be very pedantic, and I will move very 
quickly with this. But, quickly, a country needs three things. First of 
all, they have to have fissile material. We allow this in this deal. 
There is a pathway for them to get there legally. They don't have to 
violate this agreement. They will eventually get there in a very short 
period of time.
  The second thing is they have to have a device for a warhead. In five 
short years they have access to the military arms community where that 
is totally accessible today.
  Third, they have to have a delivery mechanism. In eight short years, 
as we just said, they will have access to intercontinental ballistic 
missile technology. Basically, in eight years, if they want to break 
out, they will have missile technology that can bring a missile warhead 
right down on our heads here in this chamber.
  Without domestic enrichment, Iran's breakout period is really 2 to 3 
years, again, not 2 to 3 months. President Obama has claimed that we 
could not get a deal without giving them the right to enrich. I don't 
understand that. This brought them to the table in the first place. We 
gave up on that too early. The President gave us a false choice, and I 
am insulted by that, and people back home are too. It is either this 
deal--and everybody agrees this is a bad deal; even the Democrats today 
are telling us how flawed this deal is. I didn't hear one person today 
stand up and tell us how great this deal was. Basically, I heard this 
is the best deal we can get. Let's give it a try. We can't be any worse 
off in 10 years. I would argue yes, we can, and yes, we will be worse 
off in 10 years.

  It is absolutely possible to have a better deal. We don't need P5+1 
if, in fact, we have the determination to make our own sanctions stick. 
This $18 trillion economy is big enough to bring them back to the table 
and absolutely get the kind of deal that would protect our kids and 
grandkids.
  In previous deals with South Africa and Libya, just as two examples, 
they gave up their enriching capabilities in order to be accepted into 
the NPT fraternity of countries that are good actors regarding 
proliferation of nuclear technology. This deal not only allows Iran to 
enrich but it gives their illicit nuclear enrichment program the 
blessing of the international community. The President and the 
negotiators even threw in technical assistance for Iran's enrichment 
program. I just don't understand that. As a dumb business guy, I just 
don't understand how they, in good conscience and without smirking, can 
stand in front of the American people and say this is a good deal. In 
fact, I don't hear many people saying that. Even Secretary Kerry 
basically said this is the best deal we can get, we can't get a better 
deal, and the only alternative is war. I am insulted by that.
  The second thing, they need to design for a warhead. We talked about 
how getting into the arms community allows them to do that. We don't 
know whether they have it or not today. Iran would need many things, 
but one thing they need is access to capital and access to global 
markets to drive their economy. But let's remember one thing: Why do 
they need all of this in the first place? Why did this get negotiated? 
Because they want a nuclear weapon.
  The goal in this agreement, according to the administration, was 
never to allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons State. Yet, we see 
nothing but pathways that allow them to do that, even legally. I just 
don't understand how the administration and a few Democrats are 
standing up today and saying this is a good deal, and we need to vote 
for it because it won't preclude Iran from ever becoming a nuclear 
weapons State. It just doesn't do that.
  As a matter of fact, in 1994, we signed a similar deal with North 
Korea. The President at that time, President Clinton, told the American 
people that if we voted on that deal, that deal would guarantee we 
would never have a nuclear weapon on the peninsula of Korea. How did 
that work out for us? I would argue today that we are facing a similar 
situation that is just as predictable. Looking at the facts, we can see 
this deal all but guarantees a nuclear Iran. I can't support this in 
good conscience.
  This is one of the worst deals I have seen in my lifetime. I am 
embarrassed that we sit here in front of the American people and 
actually have to discuss this. This is so bad, it is so threatening to 
our children and our children's children that we have to stand up and 
we have to fight this all the way through to get a vote on it, first of 
all, and to defeat this.
  I urge my colleagues to join me tonight and this week in opposing 
this deal.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk for 
substitute amendment No. 2640.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on Senate amendment 
     No. 2640.
         Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, James Lankford, Kelly 
           Ayotte, John Thune, Cory Gardner, Mike Crapo, Ron 
           Johnson, Joni Ernst, Tom Cotton, James M. Inhofe, Thad 
           Cochran, Bill Cassidy, Pat Roberts, Johnny Isakson, 
           Jerry Moran, John McCain.


                             Cloture Motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. I send a cloture motion to the desk for the underlying 
resolution, H. J. Res. 61.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on H.J. Res. 61, a 
     joint resolution amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
     to exempt employees with health coverage under TRICARE or the 
     Veterans Administration from being taken into account for 
     purposes of determining the employers to which the employer 
     mandate applies under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
     Care Act.
         Mitch McConnell, John Cornyn, James Lankford, Kelly 
           Ayotte, John Thune, Cory Gardner, Mike Crapo, Ron 
           Johnson, Joni Ernst, Tom Cotton, James M. Inhofe, Thad 
           Cochran, Bill Cassidy, Pat Roberts, Johnny Isakson, 
           Jerry Moran, John McCain.

  Mr. McCONNELL. For the information of all colleagues, this cloture 
motion would ripen on Friday, but I am optimistic that we will be able 
to get consent to have the vote tomorrow afternoon.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BOOZMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the Senator 
from Georgia, and I certainly associate myself with them.
  This debate is vital. Despite President Obama's initial objections to 
congressional oversight, the American

[[Page S6519]]

people deserve a vote in this critical national security matter, which 
I would note has been negotiated behind closed doors.
  The bill that we passed in May accomplished that. Now the Senate 
Democrats are talking about taking that away by filibustering this 
debate.
  How we went from passing Senator Corker's bill by a vote of 98 to 1 
just a few months ago to a potential filibuster is baffling to the 
American people. Our constituents want this debate. They have a number 
of concerns about this deal. We are their voice. We are here to 
represent them, not to protect the President from a difficult veto.
  When these discussions began, President Obama claimed we would be 
able to diplomatically dismantle Iran's nuclear program. The final 
agreement suggests this is far from the case. It is apparent that the 
President and his negotiating partners were willing--eager, even--to 
give in to every demand made by the world's largest State sponsor of 
terrorism. The goalposts were moved from dismantling Iran's clandestine 
nuclear weapons program to blindly hoping we can contain it.
  The deal President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry have 
orchestrated has several key faults. For starters, under the deal, Iran 
is not required to destroy a single centrifuge, not one. That means 
well over 1,000 centrifuges will remain in place at Fordow, one of 
Iran's most infamous nuclear sites. Many will continue to operate. This 
is no ordinary facility; it is a fortified, underground military bunker 
built into the side of a mountain. It was constructed in secret, and it 
has served only one purpose: to covertly produce weapons-grade, highly 
enriched uranium.
  When the talks began, the President was adamant that Fordow must be 
closed as part of the final agreement. However, over the course of the 
negotiations, the President caved. The Iranians will be able to 
maintain the capacity to continue enrichment activities at Fordow.
  The President claims that verification will ensure Iran's compliance. 
Verification appears to be exactly where this deal is lacking any 
punch. There is nothing in this deal that lets us confidently say we 
know what is truly going on at any of the nuclear sites in Iran.
  There are no anytime, anywhere inspections, including at Fordow. Even 
worse, international inspectors will not even be the ones handling the 
inspections at the country's military complex in Parchin. The Iranians 
themselves will be. How this is acceptable to anyone is astonishing. 
There is absolutely no reason, given the regime's history, to believe 
that the Iranian inspectors will be honest about what is going on in 
Parchin.
  A lack of verification is far from the only troubling aspect of this 
agreement. The Iranian regime believes that the agreement gives them 
full, permanent relief from sanctions.
  Lifting sanctions will provide Iran with approximately $100 billion 
in previously frozen assets which the administration has ultimately 
admitted will go, at least in part, to the Iranian military and its 
terrorist offshoots. It was hard enough to get the international 
community to commit to sanctions in the first place. With a reprieve of 
this nature, we will never be able to reestablish them should Iran not 
live up to its end of the agreement, which is a strong possibility 
given the Iranian regime's actions in the past.

  Along with sanctions relief, the international arms embargo and ban 
on ballistic missile research will also be lifted. Within the next 8 
years, Iran will have access to modern offensive weapons. This does not 
bode well for peace in the region. It puts our security and that of our 
allies at great risk. Remember, we are talking about the world's 
leading state sponsor of terror.
  What we are giving up as a result of this deal, the sanctions relief, 
the arms embargo, the ongoing enrichment, makes the world a more 
dangerous place. We have a responsibility to ensure that Iran never 
achieves its goal of becoming a nuclear power. If Iran goes nuclear, 
Saudi Arabia and other nations in the region surely will follow. The 
deal gives us little confidence that we will be successful in this 
regard.
  A nuclear Iran could be devastating for America and our allies. This 
is about saving our children and grandchildren from the prospects of 
nuclear war. I cannot confidently say this agreement will accomplish 
this goal. In fact, I fear it moves us in the wrong direction. For that 
reason, I oppose the deal and intend to support the resolution of 
disapproval.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mrs. ERNST. Mr. President, as we come together and debate President 
Obama's agreement on Iran, I believe it is one of the most 
consequential national security decisions we may ever face. I have 
heard my peers talk many times about the things that trouble them, the 
things they fear, the ``things that keep us up at night.'' I will tell 
you that this nuclear agreement is one of those things that keeps me up 
at night, as a mother, as a grandmother, and as a soldier.
  Having proudly worn our Nation's uniform for over 20 years and having 
deployed to the region, I can tell you that protecting and defending 
this country is something I take very seriously and very personally. I 
had hoped our President would approach the American people with a deal 
that reflected the high ground our Nation has stood on against Iran for 
decades.
  Unfortunately, now that I have seen the available details, I believe 
the President has not negotiated a good deal with Iran. The agreement 
before us fails to dismantle Iran's nuclear program and does not end 
Iran's support of terrorism. The President has squandered his 
opportunity to enhance our national security and the security of our 
Israeli and Arab allies by failing to live up to his own goal of ending 
Iran's capability to build a nuclear weapon.
  The administration is asking the American people to accept a deal 
which will, at best, freeze Iran's nuclear program for 8 years--that 
is, if the Iranians actually live up to their end of the bargain. One 
of the major failures in this deal is the lack of anytime, anywhere 
inspections to ensure that they do. In April, the President's own 
Secretary of Energy, Dr. Moniz, a nuclear physicist whom the President 
often refers to as a leading authority on nuclear programs. He said: 
``We expect to have anywhere, anytime access'' when referring to what 
our country needed to ensure Iran was abiding by a nuclear agreement.
  How can we ever be certain of compliance if Iran decides to cheat and 
we have a weak inspection regime as part of this deal? I would argue 
that we can't. Another part of this debate that has been very troubling 
to me is that the President continues to tell the American people there 
are only two options: his agreement or war. During one of his major 
speeches on this deal, he actually mentioned the word ``war'' 50 times 
in an attempt to hammer this false choice home.
  Despite this misinformation campaign designed to pressure the 
American people into agreeing to a bad deal, our military leaders and 
distinguished former administration officials clearly denied that our 
choice is either support the deal or go to war with Iran. In testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey disagreed with the President's 
assessment that the American people face a choice of supporting the 
agreement or going to war with Iran.
  Later that same week, the President's pick to lead the U.S. Navy said 
war was not the only alternative and that we need to use the full set 
of capabilities that the joint force and the Navy can deliver to deter 
that. The military contribution is also just a subset of a whole-of-
government approach, along with our allies in the region. It is not 
just leaders within our military saying this.
  Gen. Michael Hayden, former Director of the CIA and NSA, said:

       There is no necessity to go to war if we don't sign this 
     agreement. There are actions in between those two extremes.

  Dr. Richard Haas, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
said: ``I would echo that'' during the same hearing. Ambassador 
Edelman, a former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Ambassador 
to Turkey, said: ``I agree with you, I don't think those are the only 
alternatives.'' Ambassador Nicholas Burns, a former top U.S. negotiator 
with Iran on its nuclear programs and former Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, said: ``I don't believe that war would be 
inevitable. . . .''

[[Page S6520]]

  Rather than misrepresenting the facts and our country's options, I 
challenge the supporters of the agreement to explain to the American 
people why they are supporting a flawed and bad deal today, when we 
should be putting our citizens' interests and their security first. I 
would also note that this administration was willing to leave the 
negotiating table without securing an end to Iran's support of 
terrorism.
  Iran is the world's leading sponsor of terror. We are giving them a 
free pass in this deal to continue those efforts. In addition to the 
billions of dollars in sanctions relief, which leaves Iran poised to 
double down on its support of terrorism, the President also agreed to 
lift the U.N. arms embargo for advanced conventional weapons and 
ballistic missiles.
  As a veteran of Kuwait and Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, I am beside myself, as are many other Americans who served in 
Iraq, regarding the President's support for sanctions relief for one 
terrorist in particular: the leader of Iran's elite covert force, the 
Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani.
  General Soleimani is directly responsible for the deaths of several 
hundred Americans and the wounding of thousands more during the Iraq 
war. Throughout the Iraq war, we lost many Americans, killed in action, 
and many more wounded by Iraq Shia militia who were supported or 
controlled by General Soleimani. In 2010, Ambassador James Jeffrey, 
then-U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, said: ``Up to a quarter of the American 
casualties and some of the more horrific incidents in which Americans 
were kidnapped . . . can be traced without doubt to these Iranian 
groups.''
  One of the significant tolls to attack American servicemembers was an 
improvised explosive device, IED, known as an explosively formed 
penetrator or EFP. These EFPs were provided by Iran exclusively to 
groups they controlled in order to kill Americans.
  If you ask American servicemembers who served in Iraq during the war, 
they will tell you these types of IEDs used by Iranian-supported Shia 
militias were some of the most deadly and devastating types emplaced by 
any of the Iraqi insurgency groups, including Al Qaeda in Iraq. While 
many of my colleagues share the concern regarding General Soleimani and 
Iran's targeting of Americans during the Iraq war, we seldom hear from 
Americans who have firsthand experience in fighting these Iranian-
supported Iraqi Shia militias.
  My staff recently spoke to a currently serving U.S. Army officer, 
originally from Waterloo, IA, who deployed with the 1st Calvary 
Division on a 15-month deployment to Iraq during the surge. This Iowan 
described to us the impact Iran's effort in Iraq had on him and his 
tank platoon in Baghdad saying:

       The threat of EFPs was quite real during our deployment to 
     Iraq. Understanding the pipeline from Iran into Iraq, the 
     abundance of the munitions and the lethality on US Forces, 
     the sense of peril never left our psyche. While I was never 
     fearful of losing a limb, I knew if I was struck, I would 
     follow certain death, one that I welcomed ten months into a 
     fifteen month deployment.

  Removing sanctions on Soleimani is an embarrassment for this 
administration and in the words of some of our Iraq veterans, ``a slap 
in the face.'' Then there is Luke, a retired Army servicemember with 
the storied 101st Airborne Division. While on patrol during the 
division's second tour to Iraq, Luke lost his leg in combat, after his 
vehicle was hit with an Iranian-made EFP.
  He told us that ``we come home blown up and try to put our lives back 
together only to hear that our country is going to be lifting sanctions 
that will free up billions for Iran to kill more innocents. We may not 
be at war with them, but they're at war with us. I'm a wounded veteran 
and I spend a great deal of time helping other guys like me. I can 
assure you that this deal directly affects us. It is a slap in the face 
to all veterans. All those who served. . . .''
  We owe it to veterans and our current servicemembers who have 
sacrificed to stop Iran's support of terror. I urge the President and 
my colleagues to consider Iran's true intent and not to underestimate 
Iran's will to enhance its capability to destabilize the Middle East, 
threaten American security, and the security of our allies in the 
region and around the globe.
  In closing, the decision we make on this agreement will have lasting 
results for our Nation, the world, and future generations of Americans.
  I urge all of my colleagues to reject the President's bad deal and 
put the security of the American people, our allies, and the global 
community first.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. BURR. Mr. President, we are here today to engage in an honest and 
open debate about the nuclear agreement that the administration has 
brokered with Iran.
  Let me at this point commend Chairman Corker for the way he and his 
committee have handled a very difficult process that has not been 
coordinated with the administration, where their consideration was for 
Congress to be cut out. I think Chairman Corker has done a wonderful 
job and inserted the Senate of the United States where it should be, as 
part of this agreement.
  I am here to tell you that this deal is not based on absolute value, 
absolute knowledge of Iran's activities or its intentions--including 
its nuclear ambitions--but it is naively and dangerously based on faith 
and hope. Our national security should not be based on faith and hope. 
Our Nation's security is too precious to be based on faith and hope 
alone--faith that we will detect any Iranian efforts to cheat and hope 
that the Iranians will not cheat.
  Secretary of State John Kerry told the American people in June that 
``we know what they did,'' ``we have no doubt,'' and ``we have absolute 
knowledge of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear 
program.'' Let me say that again: ``We have absolute knowledge of the 
possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.''
  As chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I can tell you we don't 
have absolute knowledge of anything. Our intelligence is good, but it 
is not perfect, and it is disingenuous for Secretary Kerry to suggest 
otherwise.
  We must accept the self-evident fact that Iran has a horrific record 
of complying with nonproliferation commitments. When our best tools are 
faith and hope, we are putting our own national security, as well as 
our allies', at risk.
  I respectfully ask my colleagues, as you consider your vote on this 
agreement, to think about the following questions:
  Do you know where every potential nuclear facility is located?
  Do you know the location or activity of every nuclear-related 
laboratory, whether it is in a military facility or a university 
campus?
  Do we know whether Iran intends to purchase sensitive nuclear 
materials from a rogue nation or whether we will detect the sale or the 
transfer of that nuclear material?
  Do we know the intentions of the Supreme Leader or what he and his 
successor may be thinking in 10 years?
  Do we know everything about Iran's past culpability, its future 
intent or ability to conceal illicit, nuclear activities?
  Have we assumed too much about Iran's willingness to abide by the 
agreement?
  Unlike Secretary Kerry, I do not believe that we know everything 
about Iran's past nuclear efforts. I do not have faith that we know, 
with any degree of certainty, this regime's intentions, as he suggests.
  Our intelligence community does amazing things, and I am continually 
impressed with the dedication, drive, and the capability of its people. 
Our intelligence community regularly provides our civilian and military 
leadership insights and assessments on the toughest national security 
problems, but they never--they never--claim--and I wouldn't believe 
them if they did--to have absolute knowledge of any issue. Again, 
intelligence is imperfect.
  Secretary Kerry told the American people and the Members of this 
body:

       No part of this agreement relies on trust. It is all based 
     on thorough and extensive transparency and verification 
     measures.

  With all due respect, the Secretary is oversimplifying the very 
complex and difficult world of treaty compliance and verification. The 
Secretary should come clean and truthfully state that this agreement 
does not rely on trust; it relies on hope and faith--faith that we will 
detect any Iranian efforts to

[[Page S6521]]

cheat and hope that Iran will not cheat.
  My colleagues should be mindful before casting their votes. Your eyes 
should be wide open to the uncertainty we as a nation are accepting 
with this agreement. If the IAEA and our intelligence community are not 
100 percent certain and our collective assumptions respect wrong and we 
get caught unaware or we are surprised, the consequences will be 
significant. They could be disastrous and we will, without a doubt, 
regret entering into this agreement.
  The agreement the administration has negotiated with Iran is based on 
faith that we know everything about the nuclear program today and hope 
that the Iranian regime will abide by the terms of this agreement.
  The administration is displaying misguided faith that Iran will not 
use the billions of dollars soon to be available to continue its 
efforts to fund terrorist proxies worldwide. I call my colleagues' 
attention to recent comments by National Security Advisor Susan Rice, 
who said: ``we should expect'' that some of the money Iran gets under 
sanctions relief as a result of the nuclear deal ``would go to the 
Iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad 
behavior that we have seen in the region.''
  Again, this deal ignores the facts and instead hopes that it will 
work out. Iran is the world's central bank of terrorism, and this 
additional income is not likely to be solely dedicated to streamlining 
their postal delivery routes in Iran.
  Secretary Kerry testified in July that ``they [Iran] are committed to 
certain things that we interpret as terrorism.''
  The administration is relying on faith that the IAEA and our 
intelligence community will be able to detect any trace of nuclear 
material and any prohibited activity and has hope that the IAEA will 
continue to have ``access'' to Iranian nuclear sites--``access'' that 
in some cases is being defined as ``the ability to deliver things to 
Iranians at the gate of a facility, so they can conduct their own 
surveillance''--anytime, anywhere to deliver the equipment to the 
Iranians and ask them to do self-inspections inside the gate.
  If the IAEA is prevented from gaining the necessary access to 
declared or suspected facilities in a timely manner, we will be at a 
significant--significant--disadvantage, and the sanctions pressures we 
have obtained over years of efforts cannot be remade overnight.
  Our reliance on the IAEA is now also tied to two side agreements with 
Iran that Members of this body have not yet been provided. I will 
remind my colleagues that when the President signed the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act, the law required him to provide to Congress the 
agreement and ``all related materials and annexes,'' and that has not 
happened. Yet the administration asked that we have faith that these 
will not have a material effect on the agreement and our ability to 
ensure Iranian compliance with its terms.
  It raises additional questions. Do we have absolute certainty that we 
know what those agreements include? Do we understand how they may 
affect Iran's activities, assumptions or willingness to abide by the 
terms of its agreements with the United States? Do we know without a 
doubt where every potential nuclear facility is located?
  The President argued:

       Although it may take 24 days to finally get access to [a] 
     site . . . high school physics will remind us that that 
     [nuclear materials] leaves a trace. And so we'll know that, 
     in fact, there was a violation of the agreement.

  I don't have absolute certainty that this is true and question the 
administration's willingness to give up a requirement for anywhere, 
anytime access. If Iran isn't hiding anything, why wouldn't they offer 
that access?
  Do we trust Iran's claim that they don't have a covert facility? Do 
we have faith that they do not? Are we hoping that they do not build 
one? Do we or can we have absolute certainty on this issue?
  A former IAEA deputy director stated in 2013 that ``if there is no 
undeclared [nuclear] installation today . . . it will be the first time 
in 20 years that Iran doesn't have one.''
  Ultimately, I believe this deal is built on a foundation that is far 
more unstable than the administration would have us believe.
  While I realize that all the parties involved in this deal have been 
trying to spin the narrative to their benefit, I cannot believe that a 
deal as tough as the administration would have us believe would be 
referred to by the Iranian President as a ``legal, political, and 
technical victory for Iran.''
  The administration has chosen to trade all of our economic leverage--
leverage that was working--for a near-term possible delay in Iran's 
breakout timeline. No doubt we will still have leverage, but it will be 
limited, perversely, given the President's statements about opponents 
of this deal to military action, something we have tried to avoid for 
many years as it relates to Iran. The administration hopes that it will 
not have to use military action.
  Can you tell me with absolute certainty what the Supreme Leader's 
intentions are? Can you tell me what he is thinking or what he will be 
thinking in 10 years when Iran will have rebuilt its struggling economy 
and will be nearing the end of what limited restraints may remain on 
its nuclear research and development activities? Did we just enable a 
regime based on a false choice that we didn't fully understand?
  One of the President's chief criticisms, typical of his straw-man 
approach to debate, has been to suggest that opponents of the deal only 
want a military action. Oddly enough, it is the President's own 
agreement with the Iranians that has stripped us of all leverage except 
military action if the agreement is not adhered to. The strategic 
decision to engage Iran in the resulting deal cannot be based on 
absolute certainty of Iran's nuclear programs or its intentions. The 
agreement is based on questionable assumptions, allows far too much 
maneuvering by Iran, and naively trusts the regime that has a history 
of evasive activities and false declarations to the very body, the 
IAEA, entrusted with enforcing the agreement.
  Do we know without a doubt what is going on in every laboratory in 
Iran, whether it is on a military facility or a university campus?
  I applaud the efforts of our negotiators, our intelligence community, 
and our diplomats, but I am sorry to say that they were sent on a 
fool's errand by the President. They were provided a false choice 
between this agreement and war. The narrative just doesn't add up.
  I have spent the better part of 15 years as a member of the House or 
Senate Intelligence Committee. I understand the nature and the nuance 
of intelligence work, and I know that there are no absolute certainties 
in this business.
  This deal is based not on an absolute knowledge of Iran's activities 
and its intentions, as the administration would have us believe, but as 
you can see, it is naively based on faith and hope.
  I, for one, will not vote to enable a regime that supports terrorism, 
evades international inspections, disregards U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, and is opposed to the very existence of another nation in 
the region. The United States has effectively led the international 
community and enacted sanctions that have restrained the hostile 
regime, and it now looks as though this administration will undo those 
years of efforts and enable the same regime by filling its coffers with 
badly needed resources.
  I don't know with absolute certainty where this agreement will lead, 
but I do understand that there are too many unanswered questions to 
move forward.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this agreement.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it has been a long day. We have heard 
about everything that can be heard from a lot of different people, and 
I have come to some conclusions that there are some things that are 
incontrovertible after hearing both sides of the debate all day long. 
There are six things we should be looking at. I will quickly summarize 
these. I think it is kind of a good wrapup.
  There are six things. First of all, this deal rewards and legitimizes 
Iran for violating international laws and treaties and United Nations 
Security Council resolutions. I say it rewards and legitimizes.

[[Page S6522]]

  The second thing it does is it rewards Iran with $100 billion 
dollars. You heard it today. That could be a floating figure. We are 
not sure just how much it is, but we do know this: what they do with 
their money is to expand their influence with terrorist organizations.
  The third thing is it places the Middle East on the brink of a new 
arms race. This is something we have heard from others for quite some 
time, and now we already have some countries coming forward with what 
their intentions are.
  The fourth thing is it fails to dismantle Iran's enrichment 
infrastructure. That has been stated by a lot of people. No one really 
is denying that.
  And fifth, it places no restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile 
program. You have to keep in mind we have been talking about bombs all 
day, but you have to deliver the bombs to make them effective. That is 
when the missile program comes into play.
  And sixth--and I think it is most important--there is, in my opinion, 
no verification at all.
  I would like to summarize all of that real quickly. In speaking about 
the fact that the agreement rewards and legitimizes Iran's violations, 
keep in mind they have violated almost every international law or 
treaty or United Nations Security Council resolution. The Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for developing nuclear weapons--
they have violated that. The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which has to do with the freedom of expression, the 
freedom of religion, freedom from discrimination, and freedom from 
torture--they have violated that. The International Convention against 
the Taking of Hostages--several people have mentioned today--I think 
the junior Senator from Georgia asked: What about the four hostages who 
are over there?
  I would carry that one step further. One of the hostages is an FBI 
agent named Robert Levinson. Robert Levinson now holds the record of 
having been held hostage longer than anyone else in history, and he is 
still there. He is still there at a time we are in this process.
  The U.N. security resolutions on access to nuclear facilities--they 
have violated that. I think everyone knows that.
  Iran has shown from time to time they can't be trusted. The Director 
General of the IAEA has said Iran has consistently failed to provide 
information or access needed to allay the IAEA's concerns about the 
weapons potential.
  So that is the first thing. The second thing is rewarding the world's 
leading sponsor of terrorism. The United States does not normally 
negotiate with terrorists. This is something I have heard for many, 
many years, as long as I have been here, until now. Iran remains the 
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, as we have heard all day 
today.
  According to the State Department's ``2009 Country Reports on 
Terrorism,'' they have provided training and weapons to the Taliban 
fighting our forces in Afghanistan. Iranian IEDs have killed U.S. 
troops in Iraq. They have paid the Taliban in Afghanistan to kill U.S. 
troops. Iran supports Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and 
Assad in Syria.
  I had occasion to be in the Persian Gulf on the USS Carl Vinson just 
a few weeks ago. It was during the negotiations. There I was in the 
Persian Gulf at the same time an Iranian ship was taking weapons down 
to Yemen to kill Americans. That was while we were negotiating.
  Iran is bankrolling the slaughter of tens of thousands of Syrians and 
has publicly committed to the annihilation of the State of Israel and 
has called for ``Death to America'' while we are in the middle of 
negotiations.
  General Austin, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, made the 
statement--and I was there when he made this statement--that ``Iran 
represents the most significant threat to the central region . . . Iran 
continues to pursue policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and 
goals throughout the Middle East.''
  As was stated by my good friend before me, even Susan Rice, who would 
do almost anything the President asks, has said we can expect some of 
this money--this $100 billion dollars or whatever the amount ends up 
being--is going to be used to fortify their terrorist friends. So we 
can only conclude the financial windfall estimated to be over $100 
billion will be used to fortify more terrorism.
  The third point I think was made today is--and these are the six I 
think have become incontrovertible--this agreement places the Middle 
East on the brink of a new arms race.
  Dr. Kissinger, who testified before our committee--the Armed Services 
Committee just the other day--when testifying regarding the ongoing 
nuclear negotiations with Iran, said, ``The impact of this approach 
will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it.''
  We all recall last month, when Prime Minister Netanyahu warned us and 
said, ``The deal that was supposed to end nuclear proliferation will 
actually trigger nuclear proliferation. It will trigger a nuclear arms 
race in the Middle East.''
  Saudi Arabia has been talking recently about possibly being the first 
to jump in there on this new program, so we can expect that to happen. 
We know it is going to happen.
  The fourth thing is, the agreement fails to dismantle Iran's 
enrichment infrastructure. I think that has been driven home by many 
people here. And it permits Iran to retain its enrichment 
infrastructure, including advanced centrifuges and continued 
development of its enrichment technology. That is something that is now 
pretty much agreed to.
  Fifth, and next to last, is it places no restrictions on Iran's 
ballistic missile development. People have not talked much on the floor 
about this fact. They have talked about the bomb, but there has to be a 
delivery system before the bomb can be effective.
  I can remember in 2007 that our unclassified intelligence report said 
that by 2015 Iran would have the bomb and a delivery system. Well, here 
it is 2015, and they weren't that far off. So we know what the 
capability is out there, what they are planning on doing, and the U.S. 
intelligence assesses--this is the quote and this is very significant--
``that Iran's ballistic missiles are inherently capable of delivering 
weapons of mass destruction and that Iran's program on space launch 
vehicles improves Tehran's ability to develop longer range missiles, 
including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).''
  What no one has mentioned on this thing is we made an arrangement in 
the previous administration knowing that Iran was going to have this 
capability. We have some 30 ground-based interceptors, but they are all 
on the West Coast, because we thought that was where it was going to 
have to come from. But guess what. All of a sudden Iran is going to be 
coming from the other direction. Well, the first thing this President 
did when he took office was to do away with our commitment.
  We had an arrangement with the Czech Republic to have a ground-based 
interceptor there. I remember so well that one of the best friends we 
have over there made the statement: Are you sure if we enrage Russia by 
having this system that you are not going to pull the rug out from 
under us?
  I said: Absolutely.
  That was Vaclav Klaus, one of our best friends over there.
  I said: Absolutely.
  Of course, that is what the President did. Now we have that same 
problem with the delivery system.
  The last thing I think is most important--and I may be the only 
Member of the Senate who believes this, but I look at this and I go 
back home. A lot of times you don't find the wisdom here in Washington; 
you have to go back home. Certainly over this past month, being around 
my State of Oklahoma, people have asked the question: Well, wait a 
minute, if they have all this time once accused of something or if the 
IAEA should say ``We believe they are making a bomb in a certain 
location''--once they do that, if they have the ability under this deal 
to delay that not just 24 hours, not just 24 days, but they can go on 
and delay it for two additional periods by applying to the joint 
commission for 15 days and then the Minister of Foreign Affairs for 15 
days--that is 54 days. I suggest we stop and think about that. If we 
know somebody has something, but they have 54 days to either destroy it 
or hide it or put it someplace else, they are going to do it.

[[Page S6523]]

  So my people in Oklahoma say there just isn't any kind of 
verification. And we all remember what Ronald Reagan said: ``Trust, but 
verify.''
  These pages are too young to remember what happened with the Soviet 
Union and all those problems, but clearly that was the major concern at 
that time. So this is the situation that was pointed out way back 
during the joint presentation of the House and the Senate by Netanyahu. 
If he would just change his registration, I would love it if he would 
run for President of the United States. He is the kind of guy we need. 
He made the statement at that time that no deal is going to be better 
than the bad deal that is on the table. I believe that is true.
  I had occasion to publish an op-ed last week in the Wall Street 
Journal urging States to hold fast to their sanctions on Iran. Even if 
they consider strengthening and expanding those sanctions, here is the 
thing people don't understand. The reason the President gets by with 
not calling this a treaty that would have to be confirmed and verified 
by this body is that it is dealing with the States and not the Federal 
Government. So my hope is that many other States will be doing what we 
are doing in the State of Oklahoma and holding on to our sanctions and 
not releasing any of them. I think that could certainly be, if this 
thing becomes a reality, one of the few things we can do.
  I will end with a quote from then President Bill Clinton in 1994. I 
remember this because I was there, and I heard him make this statement. 
After the deal with North Korea, this is what he said:

       This is a good deal for the United States. North Korea will 
     freeze and then dismantle its nuclear program. South Korea 
     and our allies will be better protected. The entire world 
     will be safer as we slow the spread of nuclear weapons. The 
     United States and international inspectors will carefully 
     monitor North Korea to make sure it keeps its commitments.

  Two decades later, the Defense Intelligence Agency announced that it 
had ``moderate confidence'' that North Korea has a nuclear weapon small 
enough to be placed on a ballistic missile.
  So that is what is going on. In today's New York Times--I don't know 
how anyone can take them seriously when we have the guy who is the real 
boss over there--the Ayatollah Khamenei, talking about Israel, said: 
I'm telling you first, you will not be around in 25 years. We will 
annihilate you in that period of time. Then he talked about the United 
States. He said: Iranians must not forget the United States is the 
Great Satan. Ayatollah Khamenei warned, criticizing those calling for 
better relations, wanting to show this Satan as an angel, but the 
Iranian nation has pushed this Satan out. We should not allow it to 
sneak back in through the window.
  These are the guys we are negotiating with. With that, I would say 
this is not a treaty, it is not a deal, it is surrender.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                           Planned Parenthood

  Mr. LEE. Mr. President, last month, before the August recess, the 
Senate took up legislation introduced by my friend Senator Joni Ernst 
that would have ended Federal funding for Planned Parenthood, 
transferring subsidies to other women's community health clinics. 
Unfortunately, the bill failed on its first vote, but the questions 
raised by the Planned Parenthood scandal and the challenges it presents 
to Congress and to the American people have only grown since then.
  At issue are undercover videos released over the last few months that 
provide an unprecedented behind-the-scenes glimpse inside America's 
leading abortion provider. These undercover videos were captured by a 
pro-life organization called the Center for Medical Progress. They 
contain images and conversations unlike anything ever before submitted 
for public scrutiny. So far, CMP has released 16 hours of footage 
depicting what appears to be the routine mutilation of American 
children, born and unborn; the harvesting and sale of those children's 
body parts for profit; the means by which Planned Parenthood avoids 
public detection of and perhaps criminal prosecution for their actions; 
and, finally, in many ways the most terrifying of all, the nonchalant, 
blood-chilling amusement Planned Parenthood personnel seem to derive 
from all of the above.
  To date, no one has rebutted the evidence contained in these videos. 
Planned Parenthood's friends and political clients gamely try to change 
the subject. They take umbrage and they shoot the messenger. They 
deflect and distract as best they can--the political equivalent of a 
checkmated lawyer banging his shoe angrily on the table. Even the 
guilty deserve a defense, after all. But they are guilty. We all know 
it. You only have to watch the videos for 5 minutes and you know it is 
true.
  The subjects of these videos are sincere and candid--casually sharing 
the secrets of their grisly business with people they think are their 
co-conspirators. The evidence points to only one conclusion: Planned 
Parenthood really does these horrifying things. Planned Parenthood 
makes money at it and laughs about it over lunch. But aside from the 
primary evidence, do you know how else we know it is true? Because if 
it were false, we would know for sure that it was false. The mainstream 
media--Big Abortion's loudest shoe banger of them all--would be 
thundering Planned Parenthood's vindication from every headline, every 
homepage, every network satellite. If these videos were false--if a 
pro-life group somehow fabricated this narrative of Planned 
Parenthood's greed, barbarism, and cruelty--it would be a story.
  Who are we kidding? It would be the story, a career-making scoop, 
with fame, Pulitzer Prizes, lucrative book deals, and speaking tours 
awaiting the journalist who broke the story. Yet if you open a 
newspaper, click on the legacy media sites, and turn on the news--
nothing. You see nothing. The major networks have gone dark on the 
videos over the last month, and major newspapers have scrubbed the 
scandal from their front pages.
  Why the silence? Simple. They know it is true too. The media looked 
for the facts, they found them, and then they turned away. In the case 
of the Planned Parenthood undercover videos in the court of public 
opinion, as they taught me in law school: Qui tacit consentire 
videtur--the media's silence indicates the media's consent.
  Everyone who has watched these individual videos knows they have the 
power to change minds and in only one direction. So the pro-abortion 
news media is doing everything they can to suppress the videos' 
exposure.
  So tightly have the wagons been circled that the media can't even 
attack the Center for Medical Progress as much as they would surely 
like to because doing so would require context. That context would be 
exceedingly painful here.
  Even describing these videos--even mentioning them to a wider 
audience--can only lead to curious Google searches, then tweets, then 
Facebook shares, YouTube views, and inevitably to public horror at what 
people would see and the organization responsible for that horror. 
This, Planned Parenthood's friends in the media cannot allow, and so 
they ignore the undercover videos, just like they tried to ignore the 
harrowing case of Dr. Kermit Gosnell in 2013, the perennial scandal of 
dangerous clinic conditions and the horror of partial-birth abortion in 
years past.
  Every pro-choice activist, including those with press credentials, 
knows that the greatest threat to abortion-on-demand is the truth about 
what it entails. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn put it in his Nobel lecture: 
``[Violence] is necessarily interwoven with falsehood.''
  The media hides the truth about Planned Parenthood and about Big 
Abortion--even at the expense of their own credibility, even to the 
endangerment of vulnerable women and the enrichment of monsters.
  Like Tolkien's Gollum, they must protect the ``precious.'' I am not a 
reporter, nor am I an editor or a producer. I am certainly not a 
network

[[Page S6524]]

news anchor, a job for which I lack the skills, the experience and, 
alas, the hairline necessary for that position. I am a lawyer by 
training and now a Senator. Therefore, I cannot make leading 
newspapers, news sites, and television networks tell this story, but it 
occurs to me I can try to tell it myself on the Senate floor. More than 
just tell that story, I can make the case to our colleagues and to our 
fellow Americans. For the next several weeks, for as long as it takes, 
I will come to the floor of the Senate--the American people's great 
deliberative Chamber--and make that case. The public deserves to know 
the truth about Planned Parenthood, the inhumanity it practices, the 
laws it may be breaking, and the lies it tells. Taxpayers deserve to 
know what their money--more than a half billion dollars last year 
alone--is paying for and how their taxes might be more conscionably 
spent.
  Americans deserve to know what evil is abroad in their land and what 
good can be done to overcome it. In the struggle between Planned 
Parenthood and its victims, President Obama and his party have sided a 
rich and violent special interest group over the innocent women they 
exploit, the tiny children they mutilate, and the vulnerable 
communities they poison.
  I harbor no illusions about softening such weaponized extremism with 
a few floor speeches, nor do I believe that the 45 Senators who voted 
in August to reaffirm Planned Parenthood's eligibility for hundreds of 
millions of dollars in Federal funding will change their minds--at 
least not yet.
  The history of our Nation is the story of a good and loving people 
who stubbornly, if sometimes slowly, overcome narrow, prejudicial 
legacies. When presented with the truth, Americans have always come to 
see and defend the innate dignity of our once overlooked brothers and 
sisters and welcome them out of the shadows and into our hearts and our 
society.
  Indeed, the gradual embrace of our youngest Americans is well 
underway. In fact, it is gaining momentum all the time. With every 
Instagrammed ultrasound image, every overjoyed Facebook post, and every 
advance in embryology and obstetrics, Americans move closer and closer 
to the truth about the unborn. At the same time, every new undercover 
video released by the Center for Medical Progress is bringing us all a 
little closer to the truth about Planned Parenthood.
  In coming weeks, I hope these speeches might help my colleagues and 
anyone who might be listening to come a little closer to the truth 
about both. As I make the case against using taxpayer funds to 
facilitate, protect, and promote Planned Parenthood's deceptions and 
violence, I hope my colleagues on the other side of these questions 
will join me from time to time. A good debate is always more fruitful 
than a monologue. But as long as Planned Parenthood's friends remain 
mute, I will endeavor to improve upon the silence and, hopefully in 
time, improve upon our inadequate legal protections for the dignity of 
human life.
  As I said, even the guilty deserve a defense, but so do the innocent. 
However vulnerable they may be--both children in the womb and mothers 
in the waiting room--however forsaken, however afraid, the innocent are 
never defenseless. Their defense is the truth, and I am going to do 
what I can to tell it.
  I thank the Presiding Officer and yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. FISCHER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FISCHER. Mr. President, I rise this evening to discuss the 
recent nuclear deal with Iran. I join my colleagues in opposition to 
this deal, and I agree with many of the arguments that have been put 
forward. Like so many Nebraskans who have contacted me to express their 
opposition, I have a number of concerns regarding this deal.
  One of the difficulties when it comes to explaining opposition to the 
deal is the sheer volume of the problems with it. There is no simple 
and succinct way to package all of the deal's weaknesses, which range 
from highly technical questions about access to suspicious sites to 
broad overreaching problems.
  Overall, I believe that, while the administration claims this deal 
permanently prohibits Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, the plain 
language of this agreement simply does not support that claim. I am 
very worried that inspectors do not have the access they need to verify 
Iran's compliance. Moreover, there is no effective mechanism for 
punishing the low-level violations that Iran is sure to attempt. 
However, even if you put aside the technical questions and assume the 
agreement will function exactly as it is intended, the fact of the 
matter is that all meaningful restrictions on Iran's nuclear program 
expire in 15 years. At that point, Iran's program is legitimatized, and 
it is free to build an industrial-scale enrichment program if it 
chooses. This means the 1-year breakout time the administration has 
placed so much emphasis on is only temporary.
  In their analysis of the agreement, the nonproliferation experts at 
the Institute for Science and International Security concluded that 
after year 15 of the agreement, ``Iran could have in place a nuclear 
infrastructure that could produce significant quantities of weapon-
grade uranium rapidly and turn that material into nuclear weapons in a 
matter of months.'' Some may contend that even if it is not a permanent 
prohibition, as the administration claims, it is still better than the 
status quo. Even if we are right back where we started in 10 or 15 
years, buying time isn't a bad thing, they insist. But, colleagues, we 
won't be right back where we started. We will be in a far worse 
position.
  Iran's current program was built in violation of its Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty obligations and U.N. Security Council resolutions. 
The illegality of its program served as the basis for international 
sanctions, and it relegated Iran to a pariah status in the community of 
nations. Now, with this deal, Iran's program is legitimatized. It is 
welcomed as a member in good standing with the NPT, and the sanctions 
regime is repealed, not temporarily waived. Thus, if the United States 
sought to limit Iran's program after year 15, we would be attempting to 
rebuild a sanctions regime from scratch and to target a program that, 
under this agreement, is deemed to be acceptable.
  Supporters of this agreement, many of whom argue that the sanctions 
regime is already on the brink of collapse, need to ask themselves 
this: How likely is it that sanctions could ever be imposed if Iran 
rapidly expands its program after year 15 of this agreement? I think 
the answer is that it would be incredibly unlikely. Is permanently 
giving up our ability to sanction Iran in exchange for a temporary 
delay of its nuclear aspirations a fair trade? Of course not. Is buying 
10 to 15 years' time worth agreeing to the perpetual instability of an 
unrestrained nuclear Iran after that point? No.
  There are many other reasons to conclude that we will be in a worse 
position in 15 years despite the administration's claims to the 
contrary. Not only will Iran's nuclear program be able to proceed 
without limitations, but it will be far richer with this agreement. 
There is some debate about how much Iran will receive when the 
agreement comes into effect. But whether it is $50 billion or $100 
billion or $150 billion, there is no disagreement that Iran stands to 
profit massively from this deal. Moreover, as sanctions are repealed 
and trade resumes, Iran's economy will grow, bringing further profit to 
that regime. Although the administration argues that alternative 
restrictions can be used to hinder Iran's support for terrorist groups, 
it is difficult to believe that relieving sanctions pressure and 
infusing Iran with cash will do anything other than improve the 
positions of Iran's proxies and the terror groups that it funds.
  The additional resources will also allow Iran to increase its 
military capabilities, which will further be enhanced by the 
negotiators' decision to end the U.N. conventional weapons and 
ballistic missile technology embargoes on Iran. I find this decision to 
lift the embargoes--particularly on the transfer of ballistic missile 
technology to Iran--highly concerning and a compelling example of just 
how this deal fails to advance our interests.

[[Page S6525]]

  Rolling back Iran's ballistic missile program has been a key 
objective of the United States for some time because, as Director of 
National Intelligence Clapper put it in his statement assessing 
worldwide threats before the Armed Services Committee this year, 
``Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of 
delivering nuclear weapons.''
  Secretary Carter, in his confirmation hearing, built on this and 
unequivocally stated that Iran's ballistic missile development was ``a 
threat not only to the United States, but friends and allies in the 
region.''
  Last year I joined a number of my colleagues in sending a letter to 
the President urging him to use the negotiations process to achieve 
further restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile program. The 
administration's response to our letter stated that Iran's ballistic 
missile program ``will need to be addressed in the context of a 
comprehensive solution.'' This position was repeated by the U.S. 
negotiators. Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman also stated on 
multiple occasions that Iran's ballistic missile program ``has to be 
addressed as part of a comprehensive agreement.''
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, weighed 
in at a July 7 hearing before our Senate Armed Services Committee, 
testifying that ``under no circumstances should we relieve pressure on 
Iran relative to ballistic missile capabilities and arms trafficking.'' 
Then, a week later, news reports surfaced that negotiators had agreed 
to an eleventh hour Iranian demand that the embargoes be lifted.
  Indeed, when the deal was announced on July 14, the President 
revealed that after 5 years, the conventional weapons embargo will be 
removed, and after 8 years, restrictions related to ballistic missile 
technology would also expire. I will repeat that point. Instead of 
exchanging sanctions relief for further limitations on Iran's ballistic 
missile development, as many of us in this body had urged, U.S. 
negotiators agreed at the last minute to relax those restrictions. 
These are the weapons that our intelligence community tells us will be 
Iran's preferred way to deliver a nuclear weapon, and our most senior 
military officer testified that we should ``under no circumstances'' 
relieve that pressure. When the administration said Iran's ballistic 
missile programs would have to be addressed, few would have guessed 
that this is what they meant.
  Now, Secretary Kerry has argued this concession won't have an impact 
because many other tools, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime 
and the Proliferation Security Initiative, are available to prevent 
Iran from acquiring ballistic missile technology. But the United 
Nations restrictions were imposed in order to bolster those measures 
which were on the books long before the U.N. measures were passed. 
Removing them will give our counter-proliferation efforts one less tool 
to limit Iran's military development and, in particular, its ability to 
build an ICBM that is capable of hitting the United States.
  The administration has also argued that keeping the embargo on 
conventional weapons in effect for 5 years and 8 years with respect to 
those ballistic missile restrictions is a victory. After all, they 
claim, Iran, Russia, and China wanted to have those restrictions 
removed immediately. Watering down last-minute demands of a minority of 
negotiators is not a victory for the United States. Any attempt to 
argue that we were lucky to avoid complete capitulation to the demands 
of Iran and Russia and China admits a negotiating atmosphere so 
dysfunctional that no positive agreement could have emerged.

  I believe the repeal of the U.N. embargoes will foster Iran's 
conventional weapons and ballistic missile development. Thus, under 
this agreement, in 15 years we are likely to see an Iran that has 
emerged as a threshold nuclear state with an advanced enrichment 
program, has a more advanced conventional army, and commands a larger, 
better trained, and better equipped proxy force. It may even have an 
ICBM with which it can threaten to retaliate against any U.S. attack. 
All of this will be achieved without violating the agreement that is 
before us today, which reflects how far short it falls of advancing 
U.S. interests.
  Worst of all, legitimizing Iran's nuclear program diminishes the 
chance that sanctions could ever be imposed on Iran in the future, and 
fostering its military development undermines the threat of force 
should Iran ever attempt to develop a nuclear weapon.
  I believe this vote will be one of the most important I will make as 
a U.S. Senator, and it is worthy of a robust debate. I am disappointed 
that more of my colleagues--in particular those on the other side of 
the aisle--have not come to the floor to share their opinion, their 
position. I find their silence deafening.
  As I have looked around this Chamber today, I have been wondering, 
where are the supporters of this agreement? Why are they not on the 
floor to defend the substance of this deal? Forget the politics. Forget 
the false choices, the straw men, and the bluster. We should be here to 
debate substance.
  In conclusion, I cannot support an agreement that attempts to trade 
inadequate short-term limits for dangerous long-term concessions.
  Nebraskans and all Americans and their families are depending on us 
to ensure that our Nation's security is protected. This deal should not 
be approved.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. FISCHER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________