[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 128 (Tuesday, September 8, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H5791-H5794]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   NOTICE OF INTENTION TO OFFER RESOLUTION RAISING A QUESTION OF THE 
                        PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE

  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 2(a)(1) of rule IX, I 
rise to give notice of my intention to raise a question of the 
privileges of the House.
  The form of the resolution is as follows:
  Whereas Rule IX of the Rules of the House of Representatives states 
that a question of the privileges of the House ``shall be, first, those 
affecting the rights of the House collectively, its safety, dignity, 
and the integrity of its proceedings; and second, those affecting the 
rights, reputation, and conduct of Members, Delegates, or the Resident 
Commissioner, individually, in their representative capacity only'';
  Whereas the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (in this 
preamble referred to as the ``Review Act'') was passed by the Senate on 
May 7, 2015, by a vote of 98-1;
  Whereas the House of Representatives passed the Review Act on May 14, 
2015, by a vote of 400-25;
  Whereas the Review Act was signed by President Barack Obama on May 
22, 2015, becoming Public Law No. 114-17;
  Whereas section 135(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as 
enacted by section 2 of the Review Act) states, ``Not later than 5 
calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating to the 
nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit to the 
appropriate congressional committees and leadership--(A) the agreement, 
as defined in subsection (h)(1), including all related materials and 
annexes'';
  Whereas section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as 
enacted by section 2 of the Review Act) states, ``The term `agreement' 
means an agreement related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes 
the United States, commits the United States to take action, or 
pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise agrees to take 
action, regardless of the form it takes, whether a political commitment 
or otherwise, and regardless of whether it is legally binding or not, 
including any joint comprehensive plan of action entered into or made 
between Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials 
related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, side 
agreements, implementing materials, documents, and guidance, technical 
or other understandings, and any related agreements, whether entered 
into or implemented prior to the agreement or to be entered into or 
implemented in the future'';
  Whereas on July 14, 2015, the Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (in this preamble referred to as the ``IAEA'') and 
the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed the 
``Roadmap for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues 
regarding Iran's Nuclear Program'', which refers to two ``separate 
arrangements'' between the IAEA and Iran;
  Whereas the first of these separate arrangements seeks to clarify and 
resolve longstanding questions about the possible military dimensions 
of Iran's nuclear program, including those identified in the IAEA 
Director General's report to the Board of Governors, designated ``GOV/
2011/65'';
  Whereas section G(38) of that report states, ``Since 2002, the [IAEA] 
has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran 
of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related 
organizations, including activities related to the development of a 
nuclear payload for a missile, about which the [IAEA] has regularly 
received new information'';
  Whereas the Roadmap describes the second of these separate 
arrangements as an effort to resolve outstanding issues regarding the 
military facility at Parchin;
  Whereas in his November 29, 2012, report to the Board of Governors, 
the Director General of the IAEA stated, ``As you will recall, the 
[IAEA] has information indicating that Iran constructed a large 
explosives containment vessel at the Parchin site in which to conduct 
hydrodynamic experiments. Despite repeated requests, Iran has still not 
granted the [IAEA] access to the Parchin site. Satellite imagery shows 
that extensive activities, including the removal and replacement of 
considerable quantities of earth, have taken place at this location. I 
am concerned that these activities will have seriously undermined the 
[IAEA's] ability to undertake effective verification. I reiterate my 
request that Iran, without further delay, provide access to that 
location and substantive answers to the [IAEA's] detailed questions 
regarding the Parchin site'';
  Whereas an August 20, 2015, report by the Associated Press includes 
draft text of the Parchin separate agreement, which details a process 
by which Iran will provide photographs, videos, soil samples, and other 
materials in lieu of giving the IAEA access to the Parchin site;
  Whereas Dr. Olli Heinonen, a 27-year veteran of the IAEA and its 
former Deputy Director General and chief inspector, stated, ``Much of 
the current concerns arise from the reported arrangements worked out 
between the IAEA and Iran in the side documents to address PMD 
[possible military dimension] issues. If the reporting is accurate, 
these procedures appear to be risky, departing significantly from well-
established and proven safeguards practices. At a broader level, if 
verification standards have been diluted for Parchin (or elsewhere) and 
limits imposed, the ramification is significant as it will affect the 
IAEA's

[[Page H5792]]

ability to draw definitive conclusions with the requisite level of 
assurances and without undue hampering of the verification process'';
  Whereas the self inspection and verification by Iran of its own 
nuclear weapons-related activities performed at the Parchin military 
facility are inadequate and incapable of demonstrating Iran's 
compliance with safeguards against nuclear weapons development, as 
established by the IAEA or the international nuclear agreement with 
Iran;
  Whereas on July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
Federation, and Germany) and Iran announced that the parties had agreed 
to a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
  Whereas section C(13) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
requires Iran's parliament and president to implement the Additional 
Protocol to Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA;
  Whereas section C(14) of the agreed Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action requires Iran to fully implement the ``Roadmap for Clarification 
of Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran's Nuclear 
Program'', which was agreed to with the IAEA;
  Whereas the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is necessarily 
predicated on and interdependent with the two side agreements between 
the IAEA and Iran, all of which are mutually reinforcing and 
indivisible;
  Whereas State Department spokesman John Kirby issued a public 
statement on July 19, 2015, stating that ``today the State Department 
transmitted to Congress the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its 
annexes, and related materials. These documents include the 
Unclassified Verification Assessment Report on the JCPOA and the 
Intelligence Community's Classified Annex to the Verification 
Assessment Report, as required under the law. Therefore, Day One of the 
60-day review period begins tomorrow, Monday, July 20'';
  Whereas section 135(c)(1)(E) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as 
enacted by section 2 of the Review Act) states, ``it is critically 
important that Congress have the opportunity, in an orderly and 
deliberative manner, to consider and, as appropriate, take action 
affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress'', thereby 
providing the right to the House collectively, and the Members of the 
House individually in their representative capacities, to review the 
Iran nuclear agreement, as defined in section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, in order to determine what action, if any, to take;
  Whereas section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as 
enacted by section 2 of the Review Act) specifically requires the 
President to provide Congress with the text of ``side agreements'' and 
``related agreements'', including those agreements ``between Iran and 
any other parties'';
  Whereas the State Department's transmission to Congress did not 
include the text or materials relating to the two side agreements 
between the IAEA and Iran and was therefore incomplete as a matter of 
law;
  Whereas on July 21, 2015, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
Bob Corker and Ranking Member Ben Cardin sent a bipartisan letter to 
the State Department requesting the actual text of the two separate 
agreements between the IAEA and Iran;
  Whereas on July 22, 2015, Congressman Mike Pompeo and Senator Tom 
Cotton, along with the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of 
the Senate, sent a letter to the President requesting the text of the 
two separate agreements between the IAEA and Iran;
  Whereas on August 4, 2015, Congressman Pompeo sent a further letter 
to the President, co-signed by the House Majority Leader and 92 other 
Members of the House, requesting the President to provide the text of 
the two separate agreements between the IAEA and Iran;
  Whereas contrary to the law and these requests, the President did not 
provide the text of the separate agreements to Congress or any of its 
Members;
  Whereas on July 22, 2015, State Department spokesman John Kirby 
stated, ``There's no side deals. There's no secret deals between Iran 
and the IAEA that the P5+1 has not been briefed on in detail'';
  Whereas in an August 5, 2015, letter to Members of Congress, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield 
contradicted this claim, saying, ``The Roadmap refers to two `separate 
agreements' between the IAEA and Iran. Within the IAEA system, such 
arrangements related to safeguards procedures and inspection activities 
are confidential and are not released to other member states'';
  Whereas on July 28, 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry told the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, in responding to the statement that 
National Security Advisor Susan Rice has seen the actual text of the 
two side agreements, ``I don't believe Susan Rice, National Security 
Advisor, has seen it'';
  Whereas responding further to whether he has seen the actual text, 
Secretary Kerry said, ``No, I haven't seen it, I've been briefed on 
it'';
  Whereas on July 29, 2015, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz stated, 
``I, personally, have not seen those documents'';
  Whereas on July 31, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest 
stated, ``Our negotiators were briefed on the contents of that 
agreement'' (a reference to the side agreements);
  Whereas being briefed second- or third-hand, including by Obama 
Administration officials who themselves have not read the actual text 
of the side agreements, is akin to a game of telephone and is not the 
same thing as allowing Members of Congress to read the actual text of 
the agreements;
  Whereas the congressional review period prescribed in section 135(b) 
of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as enacted by section 2 of the Review 
Act) to review the Iran nuclear agreement begins only ``if an 
agreement, including all materials required to be transmitted to 
Congress pursuant to subsection (a)(1)'' is transmitted by the 
President to the Congress for review;
  Whereas on July 14, 2015, President Obama stated, ``This deal is not 
built on trust. It is built on verification'' ;
  Whereas it is impossible for the President, Congress, and the 
American people to consider and determine whether to support or oppose 
an Iran nuclear agreement without reviewing key inspection and 
verification details contained in the text of the two side agreements 
between the IAEA and Iran;
   Whereas the determination by the Parliamentarian of the House of 
Representatives, acting as an Officer of the House, that the President 
has transmitted to Congress the agreement and related materials as 
required by law, and therefore to begin counting the elapsing of the 
congressional review period beginning on July 20, 2015, deprives the 
House collectively and the Members of the House individually in their 
representative capacities, of the right to the review the Iran nuclear 
agreement;
  Whereas the Congressional Record for the legislative day of July 27, 
2015, is incorrect, listing under the heading ``Executive 
Communications'' the following entry: ``A letter from the Assistant 
Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a 
letter and attachments satisfying all requirements of Sec. 135(a) of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-17), as received July 19, 2015; jointly 
to the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, the 
Judiciary, Oversight and Government Reform, and Ways and Means'';
  Whereas the House of Representatives is scheduled to vote on a 
resolution of disapproval of the Iran nuclear agreement as soon as 
September 9, 2015, a procedure provided for under section 135(e)(4) of 
the of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as enacted by section 2 of the Review 
Act);
  Whereas such a vote is injurious to the integrity of the proceedings 
of the House as it violates the process provided under section 135 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as enacted by section 2 of the Review 
Act), which is contingent upon both the President's transmittal of the 
Iran nuclear agreement and all related documents, including side 
agreements, and the observance of the congressional review period 
provided in such section 135;
  Whereas in her August 5, 2015, letter to Members of Congress, 
Assistant Secretary of State Frifield inaccurately

[[Page H5793]]

stated, ``The United States does not have a right to demand these [side 
agreement] documents from the IAEA'';
  Whereas Dr. Heinonen, the former Deputy Director General and chief 
inspector of the IAEA stated, ``According to the IAEA rules and 
practices, such documents could be made available to the members of the 
IAEA Board'';
  Whereas Dr. Heinonen further stated, ``The issue of confidentiality 
is an important matter for the IAEA. However, it should not be used as 
a blanket to stop legitimate questions, particularly regarding 
verification methods at Parchin. Historically, the IAEA has not viewed 
such issues as confidential. The IAEA and its member states have 
disclosed much more detailed facility-specific approaches at regular 
safeguards symposia. Additionally, in 2007 the IAEA Iran Work Plan 
addressing outstanding issues, accumulated over several years, was made 
available to all IAEA member states, and the Board also received a 2012 
document from Iran related to very specific PMD [possible military 
dimensions] questions, which happened while the IAEA was negotiating 
with Iran for greater clarity and access'';
  Whereas part I, section 5 of IAEA Information Circular 153 provides 
that ``specific information relating to such implementation [of 
measures to safeguard nuclear materials] in the State may be given to 
the Board of Governors and to such Agency staff members as require such 
knowledge'';
  Whereas Article VI of the Statute of the IAEA authorizes the Board of 
Governors of the IAEA to direct the work of the IAEA, including in 
safeguarding nuclear materials and ensuring the peaceful ends of a 
participating member state's nuclear program;
  Whereas Rule 18 of the Rules of the Board of Governors of the IAEA, 
entitled ``Circulation of Documents of Particular Importance'', 
establishes procedures by which member states of the IAEA Board of 
Governors may access relevant documents related to their duties;
  Whereas the United States serves on the Board of Governors of the 
IAEA and has both the need and the authority to access the actual text 
of the two side agreements between the IAEA and Iran;
  Whereas on July 30, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 
speaking on behalf of the President of the United States, stated, ``I 
will acknowledge that I don't know exactly what the requirements are of 
the Iran Review Act, so I'm not sure exactly what that means [Congress 
is] asking for'';
  Whereas on April 6, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest 
stated, ``[W]e do believe that Congress should play their rightful role 
in terms of ultimately deciding whether or not the sanctions that 
Congress passed into law should be removed'';
  Whereas on April 7, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest 
further stated, ``[M]embers of Congress should consider the agreement 
and decide whether or not the President has achieved his stated 
objective of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, shutting 
down every pathway they have and making them cooperate with the most 
intrusive set of inspections that have ever been imposed on a country's 
nuclear program'';
  Whereas the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was negotiated 
and agreed to by the Obama Administration, fails to accomplish those 
objectives;
  Whereas any recognition by the House of Representatives of the 
transmittal by the President of an Iran nuclear agreement that does not 
include all of the materials required by law, including the text of the 
2 side agreements agreed to between the IAEA and Iran, violates the 
rights of the Members of the House individually in their representative 
capacity, impeding their ability to make a fully informed decision on 
how to vote on behalf of their constituents, as conceived and provided 
for in the enactment of the Review Act;
  Whereas Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has labeled 
Iran the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism;
  Whereas the Web site WhiteHouse.gov states that Iran currently has a 
2-3 month breakout time to build a nuclear bomb;
  Whereas legislative action on an Iran nuclear agreement is one of the 
most important issues that will ever come before the House, as it 
directly affects the safety and security of the Members of the House 
and their constituents;
  Whereas the taking of legislative action without reasonable 
consideration and knowledge damages the reputation and credibility of 
the House collectively and its Members individually in their 
representative capacities; and
  Whereas the President's failure to follow a law that he signed is an 
affront to the dignity of the House and cannot be ignored: Now, 
therefore, be it
  Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
  (1) reaffirms its legal right to obtain all materials, including the 
full text of all side agreements, comprising the Iran nuclear 
agreement, as defined in section 135(h)(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, as enacted by section 2 of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
of 2015 (in this section referred to as the ``Review Act''), which was 
signed into law by President Obama;
  (2) directs the Parliamentarian of the House of Representatives not 
to recognize, for purposes of determining the dates of the 
congressional review period prescribed in section 135(b) of Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (as enacted by section 2 of the Review Act), any 
agreement and related documents submitted by the President that do not 
include the actual text of the two side agreements between the IAEA and 
Iran;
  (3) directs the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the 
Officers of the House to correct Executive Communication numbered 2207, 
appearing on page 5522 in the Congressional Record of the legislative 
day of July 27, 2015, to state the following: ``A letter from the 
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs, Department of State, 
transmitting a letter and attachments which does not satisfy all 
requirements of Sec. 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-
17), as received July 19, 2015; jointly to the Committees on Foreign 
Affairs, Financial Services, the Judiciary, Oversight and Government 
Reform, and Ways and Means'';
  (4) instructs the Speaker of the House of Representatives to dispatch 
without delay a notification to the President, on behalf of the whole 
House, entitled ``Failure to Follow the Law'' and stating that--
  (A) the President's transmittal of that agreement to the House is 
incomplete as a matter of law;
  (B) consequently, the congressional review period provided in section 
135 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as enacted by section 2 of the 
Review Act) has not begun; and
  (C) pursuant to section 135(b)(3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
(as so enacted), until the end of the congressional review period, 
``the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or 
otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to 
Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such 
sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a)'';
  (5) instructs the Speaker of the House of Representatives, on behalf 
of the whole House, to return the agreement and related materials 
provided in the President's transmission of July 19, 2015, in order 
that the President may provide a full and complete transmission of all 
materials required by law, including the text of side agreements; and
  (6) instructs the Speaker to take such actions as may be necessary to 
provide an appropriate remedy to ensure that the integrity of the 
legislative process is protected and to report his actions and 
recommendations to the House.

                              {time}  1438

  And, Mr. Speaker, if you didn't catch it, I am happy to repeat it.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under rule IX, a resolution offered from the 
floor by a Member other than the majority leader or the minority leader 
as a question of the privileges of the House has immediate precedence 
only at a time designated by the Chair within 2 legislative days after 
the resolution is properly noticed.
  Pending that designation, the form of the resolution noticed by the 
gentleman from Illinois will appear in the Record at this point.

[[Page H5794]]

  The Chair will not at this point determine whether the resolution 
constitutes a question of privilege. That determination will be made at 
the time designated for consideration of the resolution.

                          ____________________