[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 111 (Thursday, July 16, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5172-S5174]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. McCONNELL (for himself and Mr. Paul):
S. 1784. A bill to require the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to
be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1784
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Prisons
Accountability Act of 2015''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons leads a law
enforcement component of the Department of Justice with a
budget that exceeds $6,900,000,000 for fiscal year 2015.
(2) With the exception of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons has the largest
operating budget of any unit within the Department of
Justice.
(3) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons oversees 122
facilities and is responsible for the welfare of more than
208,000 Federal inmates.
(4) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons supervises more
than 39,000 employees, many of whom operate in hazardous
environments that involve regular interaction with violent
offenders.
(5) The Director of the Bureau of Prisons also serves as
the chief operating officer for Federal Prisons Industries, a
wholly owned government enterprise of 78 prison factories
that directly competes against the private sector, including
small businesses, for Government contracts.
(6) Within the Department of Justice, in addition to those
officials who oversee litigating components, the Director of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the
Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Director of
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Director of the
Community Relations Service, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the National
Institute of Justice, the Director of the Office for Victims
of Crime, the Director of the Office on Violence Against
Women, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Deputy Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Director
of the United States Marshals Service, 94 United States
Marshals, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice,
and the Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair
Employment Practices, are all appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(7) Despite the significant budget of the Bureau of Prisons
and the vast number of people under the responsibility of the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the Director is not
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
SEC. 3. DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS.
(a) In General.--Section 4041 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking ``appointed by and serving
directly under the Attorney General.'' and inserting the
following: ``who shall be appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall
serve directly under the Attorney General.''.
(b) Incumbent.--Notwithstanding the amendment made by
subsection (a), the individual serving as the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons on the date of enactment of this Act may
serve as the Director of the Bureau of Prisons until the date
that is 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
(c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to limit the ability of the President to appoint
the individual serving as the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons on the date of enactment of this Act to the position
of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons in accordance with
section 4041 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by
subsection (a).
______
By Mr. CORNYN (for himself, Mr. Paul, and Mr. Cruz):
S. 1786. A bill to establish a commission to examine the United
States monetary policy, evaluate alternative monetary regimes, and
recommend a course for monetary policy going forward; to the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of
the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1786
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Centennial Monetary
Commission Act of 2015''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Constitution endows Congress with the power ``to
coin money, regulate the value thereof''.
(2) Following the financial crisis known as the Panic of
1907, Congress established the National Monetary Commission
to provide recommendations for the reform of the financial
and monetary systems of the United States.
(3) Incorporating several of the recommendations of the
National Monetary Commission, Congress created the Federal
Reserve System in 1913. As currently organized, the Federal
Reserve System consists of the Board of Governors in
Washington, District of Columbia, and the Federal Reserve
Banks organized into 12 districts around the United States.
The stockholders of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks include
national and certain state-chartered commercial banks, which
operate on a fractional reserve basis.
(4) Originally, Congress gave the Federal Reserve System a
monetary mandate to provide an elastic currency, within the
context of a gold standard, in response to seasonal
fluctuations in the demand for currency.
(5) Congress also gave the Federal Reserve System a
financial stability mandate to serve as the lender of last
resort to solvent but illiquid banks during a financial
crisis.
(6) In 1977, Congress changed the monetary mandate of the
Federal Reserve System to a dual mandate for maximum
employment and stable prices.
(7) Empirical studies and historical evidence, both within
the United States and in other countries, demonstrate that
price stability is desirable because both inflation and
deflation damage the economy.
(8) The economic challenge of recent years--most notably
the bursting of the housing bubble, the financial crisis of
2008, and the ensuing anemic recovery--have occurred at great
cost in terms of lost jobs and output.
(9) Policymakers are reexamining the structure and
functioning of financial institutions and markets to
determine what, if any, changes need to be made to place the
financial system on a stronger, more sustainable path going
forward.
(10) The Federal Reserve System has taken extraordinary
actions in response to the recent economic challenges.
(11) The Federal Open Market Committee has engaged in
multiple rounds of quantitative easing, providing
unprecedented liquidity to financial markets, while
committing to holding short-term interest rates low for a
seemingly indefinite period, and pursuing a policy of credit
allocation by purchasing Federal agency debt and mortgage-
backed securities.
(12) In the wake of the recent extraordinary actions of the
Federal Reserve System, Congress--consistent with its
constitutional responsibilities and as it has done
periodically throughout the history of the United States--has
once again renewed its examination of monetary policy.
(13) Central in such examination has been a renewed look at
what is the most proper mandate for the Federal Reserve
System to conduct monetary policy in the 21st century.
SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT.
There is established a commission to be known as the
``Centennial Monetary Commission'' (in this Act referred to
as the ``Commission'').
SEC. 4. DUTIES.
(a) Study of Monetary Policy.--The Commission shall--
(1) examine how United States monetary policy since the
creation of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in 1913 has affected the performance of the United
States economy in terms of output, employment, prices, and
financial stability over time;
(2) evaluate various operational regimes under which the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Open Market Committee may conduct monetary policy in
terms achieving the maximum sustainable level of output and
employment and price stability over the long term,
including--
(A) discretion in determining monetary policy without an
operational regime;
[[Page S5173]]
(B) price level targeting;
(C) inflation rate targeting;
(D) nominal gross domestic product targeting (both level
and growth rate);
(E) the use of monetary policy rules; and
(F) the gold standard;
(3) evaluate the use of macro-prudential supervision and
regulation as a tool of monetary policy in terms of achieving
the maximum sustainable level of output and employment and
price stability over the long term;
(4) evaluate the use of the lender-of-last-resort function
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as a
tool of monetary policy in terms of achieving the maximum
sustainable level of output and employment and price
stability over the long term; and
(5) recommend a course for United States monetary policy
going forward, including--
(A) the legislative mandate;
(B) the operational regime;
(C) the securities used in open market operations; and
(D) transparency issues.
(b) Report on Monetary Policy.--Not later than December 1,
2016, the Commission shall submit to Congress and make
publicly available a report containing a statement of the
findings and conclusions of the Commission in carrying out
the study under subsection (a), together with the
recommendations the Commission considers appropriate.
SEC. 5. MEMBERSHIP.
(a) Number and Appointment.--
(1) Appointed voting members.--The Commission shall contain
12 voting members as follows:
(A) Six members appointed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, with four members from the majority party
and two members from the minority party; and
(B) Six members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, with four members from the majority party and two
members from the minority party.
(2) Chairman.--The Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the majority leader of the Senate shall jointly designate
one of the members of the Commission as Chairman.
(3) Non-voting members.--The Commission shall contain 2
non-voting members as follows:
(A) One member appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(B) One member who is the president of a district Federal
reserve bank appointed by the Chair of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
(b) Period of Appointment.--Each member shall be appointed
for the life of the Commission.
(c) Timing of Appointment.--All members of the Commission
shall be appointed not before January 5, 2015, and not later
than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Vacancies.--A vacancy in the Commission shall not
affect its powers, and shall be filled in the manner in which
the original appointment was made.
(e) Meetings.--
(1) Initial meeting.--The Commission shall hold its initial
meeting and begin the operations of the Commission as soon as
is practicable.
(2) Further meetings.--The Commission shall meet upon the
call of the Chair or a majority of its members.
(f) Quorum.--Seven voting members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum but a lesser number may hold hearings.
(g) Member of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term
``Member of Congress'' means a Senator or a Representative
in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress.
SEC. 6. POWERS.
(a) Hearings and Sessions.--The Commission or, on the
authority of the Commission, any subcommittee or member
thereof, may, for the purpose of carrying out this Act, hold
hearings, sit and act at times and places, take testimony,
receive evidence, or administer oaths as the Commission or
such subcommittee or member thereof considers appropriate.
(b) Contract Authority.--To the extent or in the amounts
provided in advance in appropriation Acts, the Commission may
contract with and compensate government and private agencies
or persons to enable the Commission to discharge its duties
under this Act, without regard to section 3709 of the Revised
Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5).
(c) Obtaining Official Data.--
(1) In general.--The Commission is authorized to secure
directly from any executive department, bureau, agency,
board, commission, office, independent establishment, or
instrumentality of the Government, any information, including
suggestions, estimates, or statistics, for the purposes of
this Act.
(2) Requesting official data.--The head of such department,
bureau, agency, board, commission, office, independent
establishment, or instrumentality of the government shall, to
the extent authorized by law, furnish such information upon
request made by--
(A) the Chair;
(B) the Chair of any subcommittee created by a majority of
the Commission; or
(C) any member of the Commission designated by a majority
of the commission to request such information.
(d) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
(1) General services administration.--The Administrator of
General Services shall provide to the Commission on a
reimbursable basis administrative support and other services
for the performance of the functions of the Commission.
(2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the
assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), at the request of the
Commission, departments and agencies of the United States
shall provide such services, funds, facilities, staff, and
other support services as may be authorized by law.
(e) Postal Service.--The Commission may use the United
States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions
as other departments and agencies of the United States.
SEC. 7. COMMISSION PERSONNEL.
(a) Appointment and Compensation of Staff.--
(1) In general.--Subject to rules prescribed by the
Commission, the Chair may appoint and fix the pay of the
executive director and other personnel as the Chair considers
appropriate.
(2) Applicability of civil service laws.--The staff of the
Commission may be appointed without regard to the provisions
of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the
competitive service, and may be paid without regard to the
provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of
that title relating to classification and General Schedule
pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not
receive pay in excess of level V of the Executive Schedule.
(b) Consultants.--The Commission may procure temporary and
intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5,
United States Code, but at rates for individuals not to
exceed the daily equivalent of the rate of pay for a person
occupying a position at level IV of the Executive Schedule.
(c) Staff of Federal Agencies.--Upon request of the
Commission, the head of any Federal department or agency may
detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of such
department or agency to the Commission to assist it in
carrying out its duties under this Act.
SEC. 8. TERMINATION.
(a) In General.--The Commission shall terminate on June 1,
2017.
(b) Administrative Activities Before Termination.--The
Commission may use the period between the submission of its
report and its termination for the purpose of concluding its
activities, including providing testimony to committee of
Congress concerning its report.
SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out this Act and such sums shall remain
available until the date on which the Commission terminates.
______
By Ms. COLLINS:
S. 1799. A bill to provide authority for certain depository
institutions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Community Bank
Sensible Regulation Act of 2015, a bill which would allow financial
regulators to exempt community banks from unnecessary and unduly
burdensome requirements, if doing so is in the public interest. My bill
would provide this authority to the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve, and would apply to financial
institutions with less than $10 billion in assets.
The aim of my legislation is to allow the financial regulators to
exempt community banks from highly complex regulations designed to
protect our financial system from systemic risks that would arise from
the failure of larger banks. All banks, large and small, should be
well-capitalized and properly regulated, but that does not mean that
our financial regulators must impose a ``one size fits all'' regulatory
regime across the board without regard to the risks posed to the
financial system by banks with fundamentally different business models
and of vastly different sizes.
Some regulations that are appropriate or essential for larger banks
may make no sense when applied to community banks. For example, current
law requires community banks to demonstrate that they are in compliance
with the Volcker Rule--which restricts proprietary trading and hedge
fund investments by banks--even though community banks rarely engage in
such trading. Even so, community banks must shoulder the burden of
complying with this complex regulation. My bill would allow the
regulators to exempt community banks from the Volcker Rule.
As the GAO has noted, smaller banks are ``disproportionately affected
by increased regulation, because they are less able to absorb
additional costs.'' These costs are significant. According
[[Page S5174]]
to industry representatives, the cost of complying with regulations
absorbs 12 percent of total bank operating expenses, and is two-and-a-
half times greater for small banks than for large banks.
The cost of regulation puts community banks at a competitive
disadvantage vis-a-vis larger banks. Over the past 2 decades, the share
of the U.S. banking industry represented by community banks has
declined from 40 percent to just 18 percent. Over the same period, the
share of the market represented by the five largest banks has grown
from roughly 18 percent to 46 percent. I am concerned that unnecessary
regulation will accelerate these trends, and ironically, contribute to
the further consolidation of the banking industry into a handful of
``too big to fail'' banks.
Community banks play an essential role in meeting the credit needs of
their customers, particularly small businesses, homeowners, and
farmers. Although community banks represent just 18 percent of total
banking assets, they are responsible for half of our nation's small
business loans. With small business formation at generational lows, it
is essential that we preserve and protect their access to credit, as
they are the major driver of job creation in our country. In addition,
community banks provide \3/4\ of our Nation's agricultural loans, a
line of finance that requires highly specialized knowledge of farming
and a long-term perspective suited to agricultural cycles.
Regulators should be able to tailor their regulations to take the
distinctive nature of community banks into account. My bill would allow
regulators to exempt community banks from unnecessary and burdensome
regulations where it is in the public interest to do so. I urge my
colleagues to support it.
____________________