[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 103 (Thursday, June 25, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4631-S4632]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

  Mr. BOOKER. Madam President, I rise as negotiations between the P5+1 
nations and Iran enter their final phase. The President deserves our 
thanks for his commitment to eliminating the nuclear threat we face 
from Iran, and we owe the negotiating team our gratitude for their 
tireless and ongoing work to achieve a meaningful deal.
  For decades, Iran has posed a serious, real, and ongoing threat to 
the U.S. national security interests. Iran's pursuit of its hegemonic 
ambitions in the Middle East has manifested in the training and arming 
of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's forces and terrorist 
organizations such as Hezbollah. More recently, Iran's increased 
intervention in the conflicts in Yemen and Iraq pose dangerous and 
unpredictable regional consequences. Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei 
continues his horrific and unacceptable calls for the destruction of 
the State of Israel and has not yet come clean about the dimensions of 
Iran's nuclear program.
  The stakes of these nuclear negotiations clearly could not be higher. 
Nothing less than the peace and security of the Middle East hangs in 
the balance.
  The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the hard-fought legislation 
crafted by Senators Bob Corker, Ben Cardin, and New Jersey's own 
Senator Menendez--of which I am a cosponsor--sets up a clear and 
constructive process for Congress to weigh in on any final deal that 
touches upon the statutory sanctions Congress has enacted.
  With just days remaining before a final deadline, Congress must 
continue to voice its concerns and exercise its oversight authority. To 
me, this role is at the bedrock of our role, and Congress must play its 
role. As my senior Senator, Senator Menendez, has stated: If the 
interim period is just a short-term pause that preserves for Iran the 
ability to quickly restart its nuclear program, we will have failed the 
American people, and we will have our allies and friends to whom we 
have vowed to protect from Iranian aggressions.
  Any final agreement must build in the ability to hold Iran to its 
commitments and to prevent the absolute nightmare of a nuclear Iran 
from being realized.
  My intent today is to ensure that the administration, which has 
worked tirelessly to prevent Iran from gaining access to a nuclear 
weapon, has the best possible chance of success once the final 
agreement reaches Congress. The framework agreement released on April 
2, 2015, leaves gaps, some of which I would like to spend a few moments 
highlighting today.
  First, a robust and comprehensive inspections and verification regime 
must be the foundation of any deal that is

[[Page S4632]]

reached. With Iran's known enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, 
as well as a heavy water reactor at Arak, under international 
oversight, the country's leaders would almost certainly look elsewhere 
to conduct any secret nuclear work.
  Iran, of course, denies any desire to build a bomb, but distrust of 
Iran is based on deep historical precedence. Iran secretly built and 
operated Natanz and Fordow, and they still haven't come clean about 
their past military nuclear activities at Parchin. Therefore, ensuring 
a robust inspections regime is critical for my support of a final deal.
  The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action--JCPOA--fact sheet released on 
April 2 stated that Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA 
to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of covert facilities 
anywhere in the country.
  It was hoped that rapid inspections would underwrite the 
verifiability of the agreement, so if Iran were suspected of violating 
the agreement, the IAEA would have access to those suspected sites.
  According to the latest reports, the IAEA would have the ability to 
investigate undeclared sites; however, Iran would still be able to 
dispute those requests in an international forum made up of five 
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council--the United States, 
Britain, France, Russia, and China--plus Germany, the EU, and Iran. As 
we look forward to examining the contours of an inspection regime, we 
must be wary of any proposal that allows Iran to jam up the IAEA and 
the dispute resolution process, while removing any evidence of 
violations that are occurring.
  Our negotiators should expect questions from this Chamber: Are there 
clear loopholes for cheating? Does the administration have high 
confidence that Iran is not making bomb material at its declared 
nuclear facilities and that the inspectors are able to detect 
clandestine facilities?
  Our standard will be an arrangement that prevents Iran from dodging 
or hiding from an inspections regime. Our intelligence, together with 
enhanced inspections, must be able to ensure that the United States 
will catch Iran if it takes the risk of pursuing a secret pathway to 
nuclear weapons and pursuing secret nuclear activities.
  Let's not forget that Iran has a dismal record of compliance with its 
international obligations. Iran has a 30-year record of cheating on the 
nonproliferation treaty--30 years of cheating. Iran has a 30-year 
record of cheating, but already the Ayatollah stated that Iran will not 
allow inspections at military sites today. Khamenei is already 
backtracking on major commitments agreed to by negotiators on all 
sides.
  This is a serious issue, and in my opinion, it is a clear ploy by 
Iran to frustrate the negotiations and move the goalpost on these 
negotiations. Even more so, understanding the history, this reinforces 
how much we don't know about the military dimension of Iran's past 
activities. We have no baseline for monitoring Iran moving forward 
without an understanding of what has been sought in the past.
  This is not new. The IAEA has raised these concerns. The April 2 
JCPOA says: ``Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address 
the IAEA's concerns regarding the past military dimensions of its 
program.''
  Secretary Kerry stated in April that past military dimensions ``will 
be part of a final agreement. If there's going to be a deal, it will be 
done.'' I applaud the Secretary's commitment to ensuring that the 
Iranians' past behavior will play a clear role in the ongoing 
negotiations.
  We know that in this Chamber, my colleagues will examine this 
closely. We will also examine timelines. In the best-case scenario, for 
10 to 15 years, Iran will limit its research and development, limit its 
domestic enrichment capacity, will not build new enrichment facilities 
or heavy water reactors, will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium, 
and will accept enhanced transparency measures. After 15 years, when it 
is allowed under the terms of the agreement to build its stockpile, it 
will only be able to do so for peaceful purposes.
  But I believe we have to be clear-eyed about the other scenario, 
which is that after 10 to 15 years--a blip in time for a regime that 
has been under sanctions for decades--Iran ramps up its research and 
development efforts on advanced centrifuges, installs these 
centrifuges, and decides to break out.
  Would this deal enhance the intelligence picture of Iran's nuclear 
capability? That is an important question. If so, would it adequately 
inform our military options should Iran attempt that breakout?
  Are there assumptions being made that in the short term Iran may 
undergo internal political changes that will make them more favorable 
to the West? Are we assuming that in making this deal? Relying on such 
assumptions would be a dangerous gamble. There are no assurances about 
what the future state of their regime will be.
  Finally, Congress must be clear that this deal must not only be 
credible to Congress, but it must also satisfy Iran's neighbors that 
have much to gain from an Iran that follows established international 
norms and far too much to lose if we allow a deal that leaves Iran's 
neighbors vulnerable to reckless rhetoric and aggression. If other 
countries believe we have wavered in our resolve to get the strongest 
possible deal, it will be very difficult to discourage other countries 
from developing or pursuing a weapon. This could lead to proliferation, 
and such proliferation would be catastrophic. It would be a 
catastrophic blow to an already unstable and unpredictable region. This 
is not an abstract concern; Iran's neighbors are watching these 
negotiations carefully.
  While I sincerely hope that in 50 years future Senators will discuss 
how the United States did what no other nation was able to do--build a 
comprehensive sanctions regime that brought Iran to the negotiating 
table, neutralized the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East, and succeeded in putting an end to dangerous calls for the 
destruction of Israel--success is not certain. Success is not an 
inevitability.
  I will not judge this deal before I see a final agreement. I 
encourage my colleagues to read the final text, as I am sure they will, 
before making judgments about the deal. We need to see what is in it.
  Under the Joint Plan of Action, we have seen unprecedented 
inspections of Iran's nuclear infrastructure take hold. Iran's enriched 
stockpile has shrunk. There are limitations on their enrichment 
processes. Enrichment has been confined to one facility. This is 
progress. It is my hope that the negotiators are building upon this 
progress and working toward a comprehensive final deal. There is much 
at stake. The bar is set high--as it should be--for a deal, and the 
questions I have raised are among the many that will be asked and that 
must be asked as we examine a final deal in the coming weeks.

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