[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 102 (Wednesday, June 24, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4588-S4589]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

  Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I wish to begin by talking about two 
subjects. The first of those is the nuclear agreement that our Nation 
and five other nations are seeking to negotiate with Iran, and the 
second is I wish to do something we don't do often enough and thank 
some people, people who serve all of us, some folks in the Coast Guard.
  But I wish to start with the agreement that we and part of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, plus one--Germany--are 
attempting to negotiate with the country of Iran. We are closing in, I 
hope, on a historic nuclear agreement with Iran.
  Today, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, 
and Germany are hard at work trying to hammer out a final nuclear deal 
with Iran that will hopefully put an end to that country's pursuit of 
nuclear weapons. We have a key role to play in the fate of this 
potential nuclear deal.
  If the P5+1 and Iran can forge a final deal, then Congress will have 
its chance to support or reject it by voting on a resolution that would 
prohibit lifting the sanctions against Iran. So it is my great hope 
that when Congress comes back from our Fourth of July recess--holiday 
recess--we will be returning to the news that the negotiators have 
succeeded in striking what they believe to be a fair deal.
  We will then begin our job of considering whether that deal 
represents the best path forward for our Nation's security and the 
security of other nations, including our allies.
  Should this agreement come together, I will assess the final nuclear 
deal on how it implements three key requirements that were articulated 
in last April's nuclear framework. Let me just take a moment and 
explain these three requirements.
  First, any final agreement must block all of Iran's pathways to 
developing a nuclear weapon. The Iranians will have to agree to 
measures that prohibit them from acquiring weapons-grade plutonium, 
enriching enough uranium to build a bomb and developing a covert 
nuclear program.
  Fortunately, as part of April's nuclear framework, the P5+1 agreed in 
principle to close off Iran's four pathways to a nuclear weapon, and 
here is how.
  Iran would no longer have a source of weapons-grade plutonium, as the 
framework requires Iran's heavy water reactor to be redesigned so that 
it no longer generates a plutonium byproduct needed for a bomb.
  Iran would lose one path to acquiring enough enriched uranium to 
build a bomb by being forced to reduce its current centrifuge inventory 
of almost 20,000 down to 5,000 units. Moreover, the remaining 5,000 
centrifuges would be Iran's oldest and least capable variants, making 
it almost impossible for Iran to restart weapons-grade enrichment 
activities.
  Under the framework, Iran would lose its other path to acquiring 
enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. Iran will be required to 
dramatically reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium from 10 tons to 
just 300 kilograms and will not be able to enrich above 3.7 percent.
  Lastly, the framework eliminates the ability of Iran to covertly 
develop a nuclear weapon by monitoring not just the declared facilities 
but also subjecting the country's entire nuclear supply chain to 
inspections and continuous surveillance.
  If a final agreement makes good on these promises in a verifiable 
way--in a verifiable way--then it will earn my support.
  Some have argued that a final agreement must require Iran to 
dismantle its entire nuclear infrastructure so that it cannot enrich 
uranium even for peaceful nuclear energy. This is an unnecessary 
requirement on Iran in my view. If that country agrees to these four 
roadblocks to a nuclear weapon, then Iran should be able to maintain an 
enrichment program that is verifiably limited to producing only 
peaceful nuclear energy.
  That brings me to my second requirement. In any final agreement, Iran 
must submit to uncomfortable and intrusive inspections.
  If weapons inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency 
identify a facility they suspect of housing illicit nuclear activity, 
then these inspectors should be granted access to these undeclared 
sites. If Iran fails to grant access to the inspectors, then Iran 
should be in violation of the agreement, and that should trigger 
expedited and appropriate consequences for Iran.
  In the weeks since the announcement of the April framework agreement, 
we have heard some contradictory claims coming from Iran's Supreme 
Leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei. He has said that Iran will not allow 
inspections of military sites.
  Well, perhaps the Supreme Leader is only playing to a hard-line 
domestic audience in Iran. Perhaps he is attempting to return and to 
rhetorically

[[Page S4589]]

walk back on the concessions his negotiating team promised to the P5+1 
nations or perhaps he is just not being honest.
  Whatever the case may be, I certainly do not trust the Iranian 
Supreme Leader nor do I want my acceptance of a deal to be based solely 
on his rhetoric. To borrow a phrase from President Reagan--a phrase we 
have heard in this Chamber hundreds of times since I came here 14 years 
ago--final deals should not be predicated on the mantra ``trust but 
verify.'' Rather they should embody the principle of ``distrust and 
verify.''
  To that end, the final deal must have a system of consequences and 
incentives in place to ensure that Iran complies with its promises to 
submit to inspections.
  Third, any lifting of sanctions against Iran must be conditional on 
the Iranians meeting and implementing core requirements of the nuclear 
deal. Iran must prove to us they are serious about following through on 
their commitments. If they live up to their promises, only then should 
they be rewarded with phased sanctions relief.
  Fortunately, the administration has made this a sticking point in the 
negotiations. As the President said upon the announcement of the 
nuclear framework on April 2, ``[Sanctions] relief will be phased in as 
Iran takes steps to adhere to the deal. If Iran violates the deal, 
sanctions can be snapped back into place.''
  Additionally, after announcing the nuclear framework, Secretary Kerry 
made clear that the Iranians will not get sanctions relief until they 
have implemented their obligation to the satisfaction of the 
international inspectors and the United States. These are the words of 
Secretary Kerry:

       Iran has a responsibility to get the breakout time to the 
     one year . . . . When that is done and certified by the IAEA 
     that [Iran] has lived up to that nuclear responsibility, and 
     we make that judgment with them, at that point we would begin 
     the phasing of sanctions relief.

  Now, Secretary Kerry and President Obama are right to insist on this 
point. They are right to insist on this point. I imagine this is one of 
the details still being worked out in talks. But if Iran is serious 
about abandoning its nuclear weapons ambitions--I hope they are--they 
must agree to take action before being rewarded with sanctions relief.
  For 2\1/2\ years--2\1/2\ years--our negotiating team has been working 
tirelessly to strike a deal with Iran that strengthens our Nation's 
security, our allies' security, and the security of the broader Middle 
East. Whatever the outcome next week, we owe these negotiators a debt 
of gratitude for their service and their dedication.
  At the end of the day, however, I feel confident that we will reach a 
deal that blocks Iran's pathways to a bomb, subjects Iran to intrusive 
inspections, and only provides sanctions relief after Iran takes 
action.
  If the final deal includes these three key provisions, then it will 
certainly have my support. Moreover, I think if each Senator and 
Representative evaluates this deal on its merits, forgets about the 
rhetoric, forgets about the preconceived notions and considers the 
alternatives, then this deal will enjoy broad support in this Congress.
  Mr. President, I want to set these remarks aside now. Before our 
current Presiding Officer took the Chair, I mentioned to our colleague 
before him that I had a two-part address. This is like a day-night 
doubleheader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Daines). The Senator has used his 10 
minutes.
  Mr. CARPER. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an extra 6 
minutes.
  May I prevail on the Senator from Ohio?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. PORTMAN. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CARPER. I thank the Senator from Ohio for his kindness.

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