[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 92 (Wednesday, June 10, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3986-S4017]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will 
resume consideration of H.R. 1735, which the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 1735) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2016 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military 
     personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other 
     purposes.

  Pending:

       McCain amendment No. 1463, in the nature of a substitute.
       McCain amendment No. 1456 (to amendment No. 1463), to 
     require additional information supporting long-range plans 
     for construction of naval vessels.
       Cornyn amendment No. 1486 (to amendment No. 1463), to 
     require reporting on energy security issues involving Europe 
     and the Russian Federation, and to express the sense of 
     Congress regarding ways the United States could help 
     vulnerable allies and partners with energy security.
       Vitter amendment No. 1473 (to amendment No. 1463), to limit 
     the retirement of Army combat units.
       Markey amendment No. 1645 (to amendment No. 1463), to 
     express the sense of Congress that exports of crude oil to 
     United States allies and partners should not be determined to 
     be consistent with the national interest if those exports 
     would increase energy prices in the United States for 
     American consumers or businesses or increase the reliance of 
     the United States on imported oil.
       Reed (for Blumenthal) amendment No. 1564 (to amendment No. 
     1463), to increase civil penalties for violations of the 
     Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.
       McCain (for Paul) modified amendment No. 1543 (to amendment 
     No. 1463), to strengthen employee cost savings suggestions 
     programs within the Federal Government.
       Reed (for Durbin) modified amendment No. 1559 (to amendment 
     No. 1463), to prohibit the award of Department of Defense 
     contracts to inverted domestic corporations.
       McCain (for Burr) amendment No. 1569 (to amendment No. 
     1463), to ensure criminal background checks of employees of 
     the military child care system and providers of child care 
     services and youth program services for military dependents.
       Feinstein (for McCain) amendment No. 1889 (to amendment No. 
     1463), to reaffirm the prohibition on torture.
       Fischer/Booker amendment No. 1825 (to amendment No. 1463), 
     to authorize appropriations for national security aspects of 
     the Merchant Marine for fiscal years 2016 and 2017.
       Burr/McCain amendment No. 1921 (to amendment No. 1569), to 
     improve cybersecurity in the United States through enhanced 
     sharing of information about cybersecurity threats.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I was first going to offer an amendment, 
but both the chairman and ranking member of the committee suggested 
that I wait until after they have had a chance to review some of the 
technical details. So I will speak on an amendment that I will in all 
probability offer at a later time.
  My amendment really goes to how we make sure we help our troops with 
the many stresses that are in their lives. My goal is to add money to 
funding our commissaries. This amendment, which I will offer at a later 
time, restores $322 million in cuts to commissaries proposed by the 
Department of Defense. It would authorize $1.4 billion in funding--the 
same level that is in the House National Defense Authorization Act and 
in the House Defense appropriations bill. It offsets the $322 million 
for commissaries by reducing the Pentagon's budget in failed policies 
to buy spare parts. They have a lot of waste there, and we think we can 
find the $322 million we need there, and that is the technical issue we 
need to work, also known as the offset. But what is not technical is 
the fact that we have to make sure our commissaries function at their 
current level.
  Commissaries represent one of the most significant and lasting 
benefits for military members and their families. Commissaries have 
been around since 1826, giving military families the ability to shop at 
a network of stores. The commissary system is simple. If you are Active 
Duty, Reserve, National Guard, or a retired member of the family, you 
have access to 246 commissaries worldwide. They are particularly 
important to many of our troops overseas, and they give military 
families affordable access to healthy foods.
  The benefits of commissaries are significant. They feed those people 
who are actually members of our military. They help military families 
stretch their budgets, and they also help provide jobs to family 
members in the military who work in those commissaries.
  Our distinguished colleagues on the authorizing committee, Senator 
McCain and Senator Jack Reed, are themselves military men. Senator 
McCain is a graduate of the Naval Academy and Senator Jack Reed 
graduated from West Point. They know that one of the big expenditures 
right now for our military is rising health costs. The military itself 
is looking at how to make sure they keep our troops healthy not only 
while they are doing their job but also how to keep them healthy so 
that when they move on, they will be in excellent shape. The 
commissaries do those kinds of things. They provide what grocery stores 
provide--fresh fruits and vegetables. They provide healthy foods.
  Also, for example, my own commissary at Fort Meade, which is part of 
the Healthy Base Initiative, has shown people how to stretch their 
dollar more so they can get more for their family budget and also has 
actual recommendations on how to add nutrition--save money and add 
nutrition. If we want to bend the health care cost curve, while we are 
looking at important medical research, research shows that good food 
leads to good health.
  The other thing is this: Military members get a significant savings 
from commissaries. The average savings is about 30 percent on a grocery 
bill. For a family of four, that comes to over $4,000 a year. Everyone 
knows how much military families are stretched, and for our men and 
women who are enlisted, this is a really big deal. We need to make this 
available for them.
  What many people don't realize is that the commissaries not only 
create jobs, but 60 percent of commissary workers are spouses of men 
who serve in the military. About 100,000 jobs are supported through 
commissaries. The other thing the DOD wants to do is cut their hours. 
Well, if they cut their hours, that does cut jobs, but it also cuts 
opportunity.
  When you are in the military, you work around the clock. You are not 
on the clock; you work around the clock. So if you are a military 
police officer, you could be getting off of duty late at night. If you 
are someone who repairs our helicopters or airplanes, you could be 
getting off at night.
  The commissary at Fort Meade serves agencies such as the National 
Security Agency. They essentially work a 36-hour day. They work around 
the clock, 24 hours a day. Our commissary isn't open 24 hours a day, 
but I can tell you it can't be open from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. and still 
meet the needs of our military workforce.
  The Department of Defense wants to make the commissaries more self-
sustaining, and we don't argue with that. We can always find 
efficiencies and look at new ways to do things. But don't cut $322 
million and further cut it close to $1 billion over the next 4 years.
  What we want to do is make sure our military families have what they 
need. First of all, we want them to have good food. We want them to be 
able to go to these commissaries at hours that work for military 
families. We also want to look at the long-range effects of bending the 
health care curve.
  I am going to come back to the commissary at Fort Meade. I am very 
proud of the fact that Fort Meade is what we call a compassionate post. 
That means if you are in the U.S. Army and you have a special needs 
child, one of the highly desirable places to be based is at Fort Meade. 
Why? Because Anne Arundel County has one of

[[Page S3987]]

the best programs for special education in the State and in the 
country. You also have access to Kennedy Krieger, which is one of the 
internationally iconic agencies that address the needs of children with 
not only special needs but multiple special needs.
  We are very happy that Fort Meade is in Maryland and that it is known 
as a compassionate post. But think of those families who have a child 
with cerebral palsy or multiple complications that might even require 
the child to constantly need a respirator. All of these things go on 
along with the stress of being a military family. We can certainly keep 
the commissaries open so that they can get the food they need for their 
families and have the commissaries open during the hours that work for 
them. This is what real life in the military is.
  After Desert Storm, I remember when the Appropriations Committee met 
under the leadership of Senator Byrd and Senator Ted Steven. They asked 
General Schwarzkopf what he needed in an after-action report. He said: 
We need better intelligence. And we worked really hard to upgrade to 
where we are. He also said: We need better food. We need better food 
for our troops, and people need to believe their families are being 
taken care of while they are in harm's way.
  We ask a lot from our military, and our military families are now 
asking us: Don't cut the commissaries. Keep them open. Keep them 
affordable. Keep them available. Once we clarify the technicalities of 
the offset, which is required, I will come back and offer my amendment, 
which I hope will pass the Senate with a 100-to-0 vote.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                    Amendment No. 1569, as Modified

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I modify my amendment No. 1569 by 
accepting the second-degree amendment No. 1921, offered by the Senator 
from North Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is 
so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

             TITLE XVII--CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING

     SECTION 1701. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Cybersecurity Information 
     Sharing Act of 2015''.

     SEC. 1702. DEFINITIONS.

       In this title:
       (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.
       (2) Antitrust laws.--The term ``antitrust laws''--
       (A) has the meaning given the term in section 1 of the 
     Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12);
       (B) includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
     (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that section 5 of that Act 
     applies to unfair methods of competition; and
       (C) includes any State law that has the same intent and 
     effect as the laws under subparagraphs (A) and (B).
       (3) Appropriate federal entities.--The term ``appropriate 
     Federal entities'' means the following:
       (A) The Department of Commerce.
       (B) The Department of Defense.
       (C) The Department of Energy.
       (D) The Department of Homeland Security.
       (E) The Department of Justice.
       (F) The Department of the Treasury.
       (G) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (4) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term ``cybersecurity 
     purpose'' means the purpose of protecting an information 
     system or information that is stored on, processed by, or 
     transiting an information system from a cybersecurity threat 
     or security vulnerability.
       (5) Cybersecurity threat.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the term ``cybersecurity threat'' means an action, not 
     protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
     United States, on or through an information system that may 
     result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the 
     security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an 
     information system or information that is stored on, 
     processed by, or transiting an information system.
       (B) Exclusion.--The term ``cybersecurity threat'' does not 
     include any action that solely involves a violation of a 
     consumer term of service or a consumer licensing agreement.
       (6) Cyber threat indicator.--The term ``cyber threat 
     indicator'' means information that is necessary to describe 
     or identify--
       (A) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns 
     of communications that appear to be transmitted for the 
     purpose of gathering technical information related to a 
     cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability;
       (B) a method of defeating a security control or 
     exploitation of a security vulnerability;
       (C) a security vulnerability, including anomalous activity 
     that appears to indicate the existence of a security 
     vulnerability;
       (D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an 
     information system or information that is stored on, 
     processed by, or transiting an information system to 
     unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or 
     exploitation of a security vulnerability;
       (E) malicious cyber command and control;
       (F) the actual or potential harm caused by an incident, 
     including a description of the information exfiltrated as a 
     result of a particular cybersecurity threat;
       (G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if 
     disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by 
     law; or
       (H) any combination thereof.
       (7) Defensive measure.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 
     the term ``defensive measure'' means an action, device, 
     procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied to 
     an information system or information that is stored on, 
     processed by, or transiting an information system that 
     detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected 
     cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.
       (B) Exclusion.--The term ``defensive measure'' does not 
     include a measure that destroys, renders unusable, or 
     substantially harms an information system or data on an 
     information system not belonging to--
       (i) the private entity operating the measure; or
       (ii) another entity or Federal entity that is authorized to 
     provide consent and has provided consent to that private 
     entity for operation of such measure.
       (8) Entity.--
       (A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     paragraph, the term ``entity'' means any private entity, non-
     Federal government agency or department, or State, tribal, or 
     local government (including a political subdivision, 
     department, or component thereof).
       (B) Inclusions.--The term ``entity'' includes a government 
     agency or department of the District of Columbia, the 
     Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, 
     American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other 
     territory or possession of the United States.
       (C) Exclusion.--The term ``entity'' does not include a 
     foreign power as defined in section 101 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
       (9) Federal entity.--The term ``Federal entity'' means a 
     department or agency of the United States or any component of 
     such department or agency.
       (10) Information system.--The term ``information system''--
       (A) has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 
     44, United States Code; and
       (B) includes industrial control systems, such as 
     supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed 
     control systems, and programmable logic controllers.
       (11) Local government.--The term ``local government'' means 
     any borough, city, county, parish, town, township, village, 
     or other political subdivision of a State.
       (12) Malicious cyber command and control.--The term 
     ``malicious cyber command and control'' means a method for 
     unauthorized remote identification of, access to, or use of, 
     an information system or information that is stored on, 
     processed by, or transiting an information system.
       (13) Malicious reconnaissance.--The term ``malicious 
     reconnaissance'' means a method for actively probing or 
     passively monitoring an information system for the purpose of 
     discerning security vulnerabilities of the information 
     system, if such method is associated with a known or 
     suspected cybersecurity threat.
       (14) Monitor.--The term ``monitor'' means to acquire, 
     identify, or scan, or to possess, information that is stored 
     on, processed by, or transiting an information system.
       (15) Private entity.--
       (A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     paragraph, the term ``private entity'' means any person or 
     private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, 
     trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or 
     nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent 
     thereof.
       (B) Inclusion.--The term ``private entity'' includes a 
     State, tribal, or local government performing electric 
     utility services.
       (C) Exclusion.--The term ``private entity'' does not 
     include a foreign power as defined in section 101 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801).
       (16) Security control.--The term ``security control'' means 
     the management, operational, and technical controls used to 
     protect against an unauthorized effort to adversely affect 
     the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an 
     information system or its information.
       (17) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security 
     vulnerability'' means any attribute of hardware, software, 
     process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the 
     defeat of a security control.

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       (18) Tribal.--The term ``tribal'' has the meaning given the 
     term ``Indian tribe'' in section 4 of the Indian Self-
     Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b).

     SEC. 1703. SHARING OF INFORMATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

       (a) In General.--Consistent with the protection of 
     classified information, intelligence sources and methods, and 
     privacy and civil liberties, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
     Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal 
     entities, shall develop and promulgate procedures to 
     facilitate and promote--
       (1) the timely sharing of classified cyber threat 
     indicators in the possession of the Federal Government with 
     cleared representatives of relevant entities;
       (2) the timely sharing with relevant entities of cyber 
     threat indicators or information in the possession of the 
     Federal Government that may be declassified and shared at an 
     unclassified level;
       (3) the sharing with relevant entities, or the public if 
     appropriate, of unclassified, including controlled 
     unclassified, cyber threat indicators in the possession of 
     the Federal Government; and
       (4) the sharing with entities, if appropriate, of 
     information in the possession of the Federal Government about 
     cybersecurity threats to such entities to prevent or mitigate 
     adverse effects from such cybersecurity threats.
       (b) Development of Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--The procedures developed and promulgated 
     under subsection (a) shall--
       (A) ensure the Federal Government has and maintains the 
     capability to share cyber threat indicators in real time 
     consistent with the protection of classified information;
       (B) incorporate, to the greatest extent practicable, 
     existing processes and existing roles and responsibilities of 
     Federal and non-Federal entities for information sharing by 
     the Federal Government, including sector specific information 
     sharing and analysis centers;
       (C) include procedures for notifying entities that have 
     received a cyber threat indicator from a Federal entity under 
     this title that is known or determined to be in error or in 
     contravention of the requirements of this title or another 
     provision of Federal law or policy of such error or 
     contravention;
       (D) include requirements for Federal entities receiving 
     cyber threat indicators or defensive measures to implement 
     and utilize security controls to protect against unauthorized 
     access to or acquisition of such cyber threat indicators or 
     defensive measures; and
       (E) include procedures that require a Federal entity, prior 
     to the sharing of a cyber threat indicator--
       (i) to review such cyber threat indicator to assess whether 
     such cyber threat indicator contains any information that 
     such Federal entity knows at the time of sharing to be 
     personal information of or identifying a specific person not 
     directly related to a cybersecurity threat and remove such 
     information; or
       (ii) to implement and utilize a technical capability 
     configured to remove any personal information of or 
     identifying a specific person not directly related to a 
     cybersecurity threat.
       (2) Coordination.--In developing the procedures required 
     under this section, the Director of National Intelligence, 
     the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, 
     and the Attorney General shall coordinate with appropriate 
     Federal entities, including the National Laboratories (as 
     defined in section 1702 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 
     U.S.C. 15801)), to ensure that effective protocols are 
     implemented that will facilitate and promote the sharing of 
     cyber threat indicators by the Federal Government in a timely 
     manner.
       (c) Submittal to Congress.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this title, the Director of 
     National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the 
     appropriate Federal entities, shall submit to Congress the 
     procedures required by subsection (a).

     SEC. 1704. AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PREVENTING, DETECTING, 
                   ANALYZING, AND MITIGATING CYBERSECURITY 
                   THREATS.

       (a) Authorization for Monitoring.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, a private entity may, for cybersecurity purposes, 
     monitor--
       (A) an information system of such private entity;
       (B) an information system of another entity, upon the 
     authorization and written consent of such other entity;
       (C) an information system of a Federal entity, upon the 
     authorization and written consent of an authorized 
     representative of the Federal entity; and
       (D) information that is stored on, processed by, or 
     transiting an information system monitored by the private 
     entity under this paragraph.
       (2) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be 
     construed--
       (A) to authorize the monitoring of an information system, 
     or the use of any information obtained through such 
     monitoring, other than as provided in this title; or
       (B) to limit otherwise lawful activity.
       (b) Authorization for Operation of Defensive Measures.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, a private entity may, for cybersecurity purposes, 
     operate a defensive measure that is applied to--
       (A) an information system of such private entity in order 
     to protect the rights or property of the private entity;
       (B) an information system of another entity upon written 
     consent of such entity for operation of such defensive 
     measure to protect the rights or property of such entity; and
       (C) an information system of a Federal entity upon written 
     consent of an authorized representative of such Federal 
     entity for operation of such defensive measure to protect the 
     rights or property of the Federal Government.
       (2) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be 
     construed--
       (A) to authorize the use of a defensive measure other than 
     as provided in this subsection; or
       (B) to limit otherwise lawful activity.
       (c) Authorization for Sharing or Receiving Cyber Threat 
     Indicators or Defensive Measures.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) and 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law, an entity may, 
     for the purposes permitted under this title and consistent 
     with the protection of classified information, share with, or 
     receive from, any other entity or the Federal Government a 
     cyber threat indicator or defensive measure.
       (2) Lawful restriction.--An entity receiving a cyber threat 
     indicator or defensive measure from another entity or Federal 
     entity shall comply with otherwise lawful restrictions placed 
     on the sharing or use of such cyber threat indicator or 
     defensive measure by the sharing entity or Federal entity.
       (3) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be 
     construed--
       (A) to authorize the sharing or receiving of a cyber threat 
     indicator or defensive measure other than as provided in this 
     subsection; or
       (B) to limit otherwise lawful activity.
       (d) Protection and Use of Information.--
       (1) Security of information.--An entity monitoring an 
     information system, operating a defensive measure, or 
     providing or receiving a cyber threat indicator or defensive 
     measure under this section shall implement and utilize a 
     security control to protect against unauthorized access to or 
     acquisition of such cyber threat indicator or defensive 
     measure.
       (2) Removal of certain personal information.--An entity 
     sharing a cyber threat indicator pursuant to this title 
     shall, prior to such sharing--
       (A) review such cyber threat indicator to assess whether 
     such cyber threat indicator contains any information that the 
     entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal 
     information of or identifying a specific person not directly 
     related to a cybersecurity threat and remove such 
     information; or
       (B) implement and utilize a technical capability configured 
     to remove any information contained within such indicator 
     that the entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal 
     information of or identifying a specific person not directly 
     related to a cybersecurity threat.
       (3) Use of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures 
     by entities.--
       (A) In general.--Consistent with this title, a cyber threat 
     indicator or defensive measure shared or received under this 
     section may, for cybersecurity purposes--
       (i) be used by an entity to monitor or operate a defensive 
     measure on--

       (I) an information system of the entity; or
       (II) an information system of another entity or a Federal 
     entity upon the written consent of that other entity or that 
     Federal entity; and

       (ii) be otherwise used, retained, and further shared by an 
     entity subject to--

       (I) an otherwise lawful restriction placed by the sharing 
     entity or Federal entity on such cyber threat indicator or 
     defensive measure; or
       (II) an otherwise applicable provision of law.

       (B) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
     construed to authorize the use of a cyber threat indicator or 
     defensive measure other than as provided in this section.
       (4) Use of cyber threat indicators by state, tribal, or 
     local government.--
       (A) Law enforcement use.--
       (i) Prior written consent.--Except as provided in clause 
     (ii), a cyber threat indicator shared with a State, tribal, 
     or local government under this section may, with the prior 
     written consent of the entity sharing such indicator, be used 
     by a State, tribal, or local government for the purpose of 
     preventing, investigating, or prosecuting any of the offenses 
     described in section 1705(d)(5)(A)(vi).
       (ii) Oral consent.--If exigent circumstances prevent 
     obtaining written consent under clause (i), such consent may 
     be provided orally with subsequent documentation of the 
     consent.
       (B) Exemption from disclosure.--A cyber threat indicator 
     shared with a State, tribal, or local government under this 
     section shall be--
       (i) deemed voluntarily shared information; and
       (ii) exempt from disclosure under any State, tribal, or 
     local law requiring disclosure of information or records.
       (C) State, tribal, and local regulatory authority.--

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       (i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), a cyber 
     threat indicator or defensive measure shared with a State, 
     tribal, or local government under this title shall not be 
     directly used by any State, tribal, or local government to 
     regulate, including an enforcement action, the lawful 
     activity of any entity, including an activity relating to 
     monitoring, operating a defensive measure, or sharing of a 
     cyber threat indicator.
       (ii) Regulatory authority specifically relating to 
     prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats.--A cyber 
     threat indicator or defensive measures shared as described in 
     clause (i) may, consistent with a State, tribal, or local 
     government regulatory authority specifically relating to the 
     prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats to 
     information systems, inform the development or implementation 
     of a regulation relating to such information systems.
       (e) Antitrust Exemption.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in section 1708(e), it 
     shall not be considered a violation of any provision of 
     antitrust laws for 2 or more private entities to exchange or 
     provide a cyber threat indicator, or assistance relating to 
     the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a 
     cybersecurity threat, for cybersecurity purposes under this 
     title.
       (2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall apply only to 
     information that is exchanged or assistance provided in order 
     to assist with--
       (A) facilitating the prevention, investigation, or 
     mitigation of a cybersecurity threat to an information system 
     or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting 
     an information system; or
       (B) communicating or disclosing a cyber threat indicator to 
     help prevent, investigate, or mitigate the effect of a 
     cybersecurity threat to an information system or information 
     that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information 
     system.
       (f) No Right or Benefit.--The sharing of a cyber threat 
     indicator with an entity under this title shall not create a 
     right or benefit to similar information by such entity or any 
     other entity.

     SEC. 1705. SHARING OF CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE 
                   MEASURES WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

       (a) Requirement for Policies and Procedures.--
       (1) Interim policies and procedures.--Not later than 60 
     days after the date of the enactment of this title, the 
     Attorney General, in coordination with the heads of the 
     appropriate Federal entities, shall develop and submit to 
     Congress interim policies and procedures relating to the 
     receipt of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by 
     the Federal Government.
       (2) Final policies and procedures.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this title, the Attorney 
     General shall, in coordination with the heads of the 
     appropriate Federal entities, promulgate final policies and 
     procedures relating to the receipt of cyber threat indicators 
     and defensive measures by the Federal Government.
       (3) Requirements concerning policies and procedures.--
     Consistent with the guidelines required by subsection (b), 
     the policies and procedures developed and promulgated under 
     this subsection shall--
       (A) ensure that cyber threat indicators are shared with the 
     Federal Government by any entity pursuant to section 1704(c) 
     through the real-time process described in subsection (c) of 
     this section--
       (i) are shared in an automated manner with all of the 
     appropriate Federal entities;
       (ii) are not subject to any delay, modification, or any 
     other action that could impede real-time receipt by all of 
     the appropriate Federal entities; and
       (iii) may be provided to other Federal entities;
       (B) ensure that cyber threat indicators shared with the 
     Federal Government by any entity pursuant to section 1704 in 
     a manner other than the real-time process described in 
     subsection (c) of this section--
       (i) are shared as quickly as operationally practicable with 
     all of the appropriate Federal entities;
       (ii) are not subject to any unnecessary delay, 
     interference, or any other action that could impede receipt 
     by all of the appropriate Federal entities; and
       (iii) may be provided to other Federal entities;
       (C) consistent with this title, any other applicable 
     provisions of law, and the fair information practice 
     principles set forth in appendix A of the document entitled 
     ``National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace'' 
     and published by the President in April 2011, govern the 
     retention, use, and dissemination by the Federal Government 
     of cyber threat indicators shared with the Federal Government 
     under this title, including the extent, if any, to which such 
     cyber threat indicators may be used by the Federal 
     Government; and
       (D) ensure there is--
       (i) an audit capability; and
       (ii) appropriate sanctions in place for officers, 
     employees, or agents of a Federal entity who knowingly and 
     willfully conduct activities under this title in an 
     unauthorized manner.
       (4) Guidelines for entities sharing cyber threat indicators 
     with federal government.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this title, the Attorney General shall 
     develop and make publicly available guidance to assist 
     entities and promote sharing of cyber threat indicators with 
     Federal entities under this title.
       (B) Contents.--The guidelines developed and made publicly 
     available under subparagraph (A) shall include guidance on 
     the following:
       (i) Identification of types of information that would 
     qualify as a cyber threat indicator under this title that 
     would be unlikely to include personal information of or 
     identifying a specific person not directly related to a cyber 
     security threat.
       (ii) Identification of types of information protected under 
     otherwise applicable privacy laws that are unlikely to be 
     directly related to a cybersecurity threat.
       (iii) Such other matters as the Attorney General considers 
     appropriate for entities sharing cyber threat indicators with 
     Federal entities under this title.
       (b) Privacy and Civil Liberties.--
       (1) Guidelines of attorney general.--Not later than 60 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this title, the Attorney 
     General shall, in coordination with heads of the appropriate 
     Federal entities and in consultation with officers designated 
     under section 1062 of the National Security Intelligence 
     Reform Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1), develop, submit to 
     Congress, and make available to the public interim guidelines 
     relating to privacy and civil liberties which shall govern 
     the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber 
     threat indicators by a Federal entity obtained in connection 
     with activities authorized in this title.
       (2) Final guidelines.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this title, the Attorney General shall, in 
     coordination with heads of the appropriate Federal entities 
     and in consultation with officers designated under section 
     1062 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 
     (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1) and such private entities with industry 
     expertise as the Attorney General considers relevant, 
     promulgate final guidelines relating to privacy and civil 
     liberties which shall govern the receipt, retention, use, and 
     dissemination of cyber threat indicators by a Federal entity 
     obtained in connection with activities authorized in this 
     title.
       (B) Periodic review.--The Attorney General shall, in 
     coordination with heads of the appropriate Federal entities 
     and in consultation with officers and private entities 
     described in subparagraph (A), periodically review the 
     guidelines promulgated under subparagraph (A).
       (3) Content.--The guidelines required by paragraphs (1) and 
     (2) shall, consistent with the need to protect information 
     systems from cybersecurity threats and mitigate cybersecurity 
     threats--
       (A) limit the impact on privacy and civil liberties of 
     activities by the Federal Government under this title;
       (B) limit the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of 
     cyber threat indicators containing personal information of or 
     identifying specific persons, including by establishing--
       (i) a process for the timely destruction of such 
     information that is known not to be directly related to uses 
     authorized under this title; and
       (ii) specific limitations on the length of any period in 
     which a cyber threat indicator may be retained;
       (C) include requirements to safeguard cyber threat 
     indicators containing personal information of or identifying 
     specific persons from unauthorized access or acquisition, 
     including appropriate sanctions for activities by officers, 
     employees, or agents of the Federal Government in 
     contravention of such guidelines;
       (D) include procedures for notifying entities and Federal 
     entities if information received pursuant to this section is 
     known or determined by a Federal entity receiving such 
     information not to constitute a cyber threat indicator;
       (E) protect the confidentiality of cyber threat indicators 
     containing personal information of or identifying specific 
     persons to the greatest extent practicable and require 
     recipients to be informed that such indicators may only be 
     used for purposes authorized under this title; and
       (F) include steps that may be needed so that dissemination 
     of cyber threat indicators is consistent with the protection 
     of classified and other sensitive national security 
     information.
       (c) Capability and Process Within the Department of 
     Homeland Security.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this title, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, in coordination with the heads of the appropriate 
     Federal entities, shall develop and implement a capability 
     and process within the Department of Homeland Security that--
       (A) shall accept from any entity in real time cyber threat 
     indicators and defensive measures, pursuant to this section;
       (B) shall, upon submittal of the certification under 
     paragraph (2) that such capability and process fully and 
     effectively operates as described in such paragraph, be the 
     process by which the Federal Government receives cyber threat 
     indicators and defensive measures under this title that are 
     shared by a private entity with the Federal Government 
     through electronic mail or media, an interactive form on an 
     Internet website, or a real time, automated process between 
     information systems except--

[[Page S3990]]

       (i) communications between a Federal entity and a private 
     entity regarding a previously shared cyber threat indicator; 
     and
       (ii) communications by a regulated entity with such 
     entity's Federal regulatory authority regarding a 
     cybersecurity threat;
       (C) ensures that all of the appropriate Federal entities 
     receive in an automated manner such cyber threat indicators 
     shared through the real-time process within the Department of 
     Homeland Security;
       (D) is in compliance with the policies, procedures, and 
     guidelines required by this section; and
       (E) does not limit or prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures 
     of communications, records, or other information, including--
       (i) reporting of known or suspected criminal activity, by 
     an entity to any other entity or a Federal entity;
       (ii) voluntary or legally compelled participation in a 
     Federal investigation; and
       (iii) providing cyber threat indicators or defensive 
     measures as part of a statutory or authorized contractual 
     requirement.
       (2) Certification.--Not later than 10 days prior to the 
     implementation of the capability and process required by 
     paragraph (1), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, in 
     consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal 
     entities, certify to Congress whether such capability and 
     process fully and effectively operates--
       (A) as the process by which the Federal Government receives 
     from any entity a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure 
     under this title; and
       (B) in accordance with the policies, procedures, and 
     guidelines developed under this section.
       (3) Public notice and access.--The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall ensure there is public notice of, and access 
     to, the capability and process developed and implemented 
     under paragraph (1) so that--
       (A) any entity may share cyber threat indicators and 
     defensive measures through such process with the Federal 
     Government; and
       (B) all of the appropriate Federal entities receive such 
     cyber threat indicators and defensive measures in real time 
     with receipt through the process within the Department of 
     Homeland Security.
       (4) Other federal entities.--The process developed and 
     implemented under paragraph (1) shall ensure that other 
     Federal entities receive in a timely manner any cyber threat 
     indicators and defensive measures shared with the Federal 
     Government through such process.
       (5)  Report on development and implementation.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this title, the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall submit to Congress a report on the development 
     and implementation of the capability and process required by 
     paragraph (1), including a description of such capability and 
     process and the public notice of, and access to, such 
     process.
       (B) Classified annex.--The report required by subparagraph 
     (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
     a classified annex.
       (d) Information Shared With or Provided to the Federal 
     Government.--
       (1) No waiver of privilege or protection.--The provision of 
     cyber threat indicators and defensive measures to the Federal 
     Government under this title shall not constitute a waiver of 
     any applicable privilege or protection provided by law, 
     including trade secret protection.
       (2) Proprietary information.--Consistent with section 
     1704(c)(2), a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure 
     provided by an entity to the Federal Government under this 
     title shall be considered the commercial, financial, and 
     proprietary information of such entity when so designated by 
     the originating entity or a third party acting in accordance 
     with the written authorization of the originating entity.
       (3) Exemption from disclosure.--Cyber threat indicators and 
     defensive measures provided to the Federal Government under 
     this title shall be--
       (A) deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from 
     disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, 
     and any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of 
     information or records; and
       (B) withheld, without discretion, from the public under 
     section 552(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United States Code, and any 
     State, tribal, or local provision of law requiring disclosure 
     of information or records.
       (4) Ex parte communications.--The provision of a cyber 
     threat indicator or defensive measure to the Federal 
     Government under this title shall not be subject to a rule of 
     any Federal agency or department or any judicial doctrine 
     regarding ex parte communications with a decisionmaking 
     official.
       (5) Disclosure, retention, and use.--
       (A) Authorized activities.--Cyber threat indicators and 
     defensive measures provided to the Federal Government under 
     this title may be disclosed to, retained by, and used by, 
     consistent with otherwise applicable provisions of Federal 
     law, any Federal agency or department, component, officer, 
     employee, or agent of the Federal Government solely for--
       (i) a cybersecurity purpose;
       (ii) the purpose of identifying a cybersecurity threat, 
     including the source of such cybersecurity threat, or a 
     security vulnerability;
       (iii) the purpose of identifying a cybersecurity threat 
     involving the use of an information system by a foreign 
     adversary or terrorist;
       (iv) the purpose of responding to, or otherwise preventing 
     or mitigating, an imminent threat of death, serious bodily 
     harm, or serious economic harm, including a terrorist act or 
     a use of a weapon of mass destruction;
       (v) the purpose of responding to, or otherwise preventing 
     or mitigating, a serious threat to a minor, including sexual 
     exploitation and threats to physical safety; or
       (vi) the purpose of preventing, investigating, disrupting, 
     or prosecuting an offense arising out of a threat described 
     in clause (iv) or any of the offenses listed in--

       (I) section 3559(c)(2)(F) of title 18, United States Code 
     (relating to serious violent felonies);
       (II) sections 1028 through 1030 of such title (relating to 
     fraud and identity theft);
       (III) chapter 37 of such title (relating to espionage and 
     censorship); and
       (IV) chapter 90 of such title (relating to protection of 
     trade secrets).

       (B) Prohibited activities.--Cyber threat indicators and 
     defensive measures provided to the Federal Government under 
     this title shall not be disclosed to, retained by, or used by 
     any Federal agency or department for any use not permitted 
     under subparagraph (A).
       (C) Privacy and civil liberties.--Cyber threat indicators 
     and defensive measures provided to the Federal Government 
     under this title shall be retained, used, and disseminated by 
     the Federal Government--
       (i) in accordance with the policies, procedures, and 
     guidelines required by subsections (a) and (b);
       (ii) in a manner that protects from unauthorized use or 
     disclosure any cyber threat indicators that may contain 
     personal information of or identifying specific persons; and
       (iii) in a manner that protects the confidentiality of 
     cyber threat indicators containing personal information of or 
     identifying a specific person.
       (D) Federal regulatory authority.--
       (i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), cyber 
     threat indicators and defensive measures provided to the 
     Federal Government under this title shall not be directly 
     used by any Federal, State, tribal, or local government to 
     regulate, including an enforcement action, the lawful 
     activities of any entity, including activities relating to 
     monitoring, operating defensive measures, or sharing cyber 
     threat indicators.
       (ii) Exceptions.--

       (I) Regulatory authority specifically relating to 
     prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats.--Cyber 
     threat indicators and defensive measures provided to the 
     Federal Government under this title may, consistent with 
     Federal or State regulatory authority specifically relating 
     to the prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats to 
     information systems, inform the development or implementation 
     of regulations relating to such information systems.
       (II) Procedures developed and implemented under this 
     title.--Clause (i) shall not apply to procedures developed 
     and implemented under this title.

     SEC. 1706. PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY.

       (a) Monitoring of Information Systems.--No cause of action 
     shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private 
     entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the 
     monitoring of information systems and information under 
     section 1704(a) that is conducted in accordance with this 
     title.
       (b) Sharing or Receipt of Cyber Threat Indicators.--No 
     cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court 
     against any entity, and such action shall be promptly 
     dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of cyber threat 
     indicators or defensive measures under section 1704(c) if--
       (1) such sharing or receipt is conducted in accordance with 
     this title; and
       (2) in a case in which a cyber threat indicator or 
     defensive measure is shared with the Federal Government, the 
     cyber threat indicator or defensive measure is shared in a 
     manner that is consistent with section 1705(c)(1)(B) and the 
     sharing or receipt, as the case may be, occurs after the 
     earlier of--
       (A) the date on which the interim policies and procedures 
     are submitted to Congress under section 1705(a)(1); or
       (B) the date that is 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this title.
       (c) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed--
       (1) to require dismissal of a cause of action against an 
     entity that has engaged in gross negligence or willful 
     misconduct in the course of conducting activities authorized 
     by this title; or
       (2) to undermine or limit the availability of otherwise 
     applicable common law or statutory defenses.

     SEC. 1707. OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Biennial Report on Implementation.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     the enactment of this title, and not less frequently than 
     once every 2 years thereafter, the heads of the appropriate 
     Federal entities shall jointly submit and the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector 
     General of the Intelligence Community, the Inspector General 
     of the Department of Justice, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Defense, and the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Energy, in consultation with the Council of 
     Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, shall jointly 
     submit to Congress a

[[Page S3991]]

     detailed report concerning the implementation of this title.
       (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       (A) An assessment of the sufficiency of the policies, 
     procedures, and guidelines required by section 1705 in 
     ensuring that cyber threat indicators are shared effectively 
     and responsibly within the Federal Government.
       (B) An evaluation of the effectiveness of real-time 
     information sharing through the capability and process 
     developed under section 1705(c), including any impediments to 
     such real-time sharing.
       (C) An assessment of the sufficiency of the procedures 
     developed under section 1703 in ensuring that cyber threat 
     indicators in the possession of the Federal Government are 
     shared in a timely and adequate manner with appropriate 
     entities, or, if appropriate, are made publicly available.
       (D) An assessment of whether cyber threat indicators have 
     been properly classified and an accounting of the number of 
     security clearances authorized by the Federal Government for 
     the purposes of this title.
       (E) A review of the type of cyber threat indicators shared 
     with the Federal Government under this title, including the 
     following:
       (i) The degree to which such information may impact the 
     privacy and civil liberties of specific persons.
       (ii) A quantitative and qualitative assessment of the 
     impact of the sharing of such cyber threat indicators with 
     the Federal Government on privacy and civil liberties of 
     specific persons.
       (iii) The adequacy of any steps taken by the Federal 
     Government to reduce such impact.
       (F) A review of actions taken by the Federal Government 
     based on cyber threat indicators shared with the Federal 
     Government under this title, including the appropriateness of 
     any subsequent use or dissemination of such cyber threat 
     indicators by a Federal entity under section 1705.
       (G) A description of any significant violations of the 
     requirements of this title by the Federal Government.
       (H) A summary of the number and type of entities that 
     received classified cyber threat indicators from the Federal 
     Government under this title and an evaluation of the risks 
     and benefits of sharing such cyber threat indicators.
       (3) Recommendations.--Each report submitted under paragraph 
     (1) may include recommendations for improvements or 
     modifications to the authorities and processes under this 
     title.
       (4) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (b) Reports on Privacy and Civil Liberties.--
       (1) Biennial report from privacy and civil liberties 
     oversight board.--Not later than 2 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this title and not less frequently than once 
     every 2 years thereafter, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
     Oversight Board shall submit to Congress and the President a 
     report providing--
       (A) an assessment of the effect on privacy and civil 
     liberties by the type of activities carried out under this 
     title; and
       (B) an assessment of the sufficiency of the policies, 
     procedures, and guidelines established pursuant to section 
     1705 in addressing concerns relating to privacy and civil 
     liberties.
       (2) Biennial report of inspectors general.--
       (A) In general.--Not later than 2 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this title and not less frequently than once 
     every 2 years thereafter, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector General of the 
     Intelligence Community, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Defense, and the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Energy shall, in consultation with the Council 
     of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, jointly submit 
     to Congress a report on the receipt, use, and dissemination 
     of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures that have 
     been shared with Federal entities under this title.
       (B) Contents.--Each report submitted under subparagraph (A) 
     shall include the following:
       (i) A review of the types of cyber threat indicators shared 
     with Federal entities.
       (ii) A review of the actions taken by Federal entities as a 
     result of the receipt of such cyber threat indicators.
       (iii) A list of Federal entities receiving such cyber 
     threat indicators.
       (iv) A review of the sharing of such cyber threat 
     indicators among Federal entities to identify inappropriate 
     barriers to sharing information.
       (3) Recommendations.--Each report submitted under this 
     subsection may include such recommendations as the Privacy 
     and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, with respect to a report 
     submitted under paragraph (1), or the Inspectors General 
     referred to in paragraph (2)(A), with respect to a report 
     submitted under paragraph (2), may have for improvements or 
     modifications to the authorities under this title.
       (4) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 1708. CONSTRUCTION AND PREEMPTION.

       (a) Otherwise Lawful Disclosures.--Nothing in this title 
     shall be construed--
       (1) to limit or prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures of 
     communications, records, or other information, including 
     reporting of known or suspected criminal activity, by an 
     entity to any other entity or the Federal Government under 
     this title; or
       (2) to limit or prohibit otherwise lawful use of such 
     disclosures by any Federal entity, even when such otherwise 
     lawful disclosures duplicate or replicate disclosures made 
     under this title.
       (b) Whistle Blower Protections.--Nothing in this title 
     shall be construed to prohibit or limit the disclosure of 
     information protected under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, 
     United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality, 
     waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats), 
     section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing 
     disclosures to Congress), section 1034 of title 10, United 
     States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of 
     the military), section 1104 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) (governing disclosure by employees of 
     elements of the intelligence community), or any similar 
     provision of Federal or State law.
       (c) Protection of Sources and Methods.--Nothing in this 
     title shall be construed--
       (1) as creating any immunity against, or otherwise 
     affecting, any action brought by the Federal Government, or 
     any agency or department thereof, to enforce any law, 
     executive order, or procedure governing the appropriate 
     handling, disclosure, or use of classified information;
       (2) to affect the conduct of authorized law enforcement or 
     intelligence activities; or
       (3) to modify the authority of a department or agency of 
     the Federal Government to protect classified information and 
     sources and methods and the national security of the United 
     States.
       (d) Relationship to Other Laws.--Nothing in this title 
     shall be construed to affect any requirement under any other 
     provision of law for an entity to provide information to the 
     Federal Government.
       (e) Prohibited Conduct.--Nothing in this title shall be 
     construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between 
     competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a 
     market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost 
     information, customer lists, or information regarding future 
     competitive planning.
       (f) Information Sharing Relationships.--Nothing in this 
     title shall be construed--
       (1) to limit or modify an existing information sharing 
     relationship;
       (2) to prohibit a new information sharing relationship;
       (3) to require a new information sharing relationship 
     between any entity and the Federal Government; or
       (4) to require the use of the capability and process within 
     the Department of Homeland Security developed under section 
     1705(c).
       (g) Preservation of Contractual Obligations and Rights.--
     Nothing in this title shall be construed--
       (1) to amend, repeal, or supersede any current or future 
     contractual agreement, terms of service agreement, or other 
     contractual relationship between any entities, or between any 
     entity and a Federal entity; or
       (2) to abrogate trade secret or intellectual property 
     rights of any entity or Federal entity.
       (h) Anti-Tasking Restriction.--Nothing in this title shall 
     be construed to permit the Federal Government--
       (1) to require an entity to provide information to the 
     Federal Government;
       (2) to condition the sharing of cyber threat indicators 
     with an entity on such entity's provision of cyber threat 
     indicators to the Federal Government; or
       (3) to condition the award of any Federal grant, contract, 
     or purchase on the provision of a cyber threat indicator to a 
     Federal entity.
       (i) No Liability for Non-Participation.--Nothing in this 
     title shall be construed to subject any entity to liability 
     for choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities 
     authorized in this title.
       (j) Use and Retention of Information.--Nothing in this 
     title shall be construed to authorize, or to modify any 
     existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal 
     Government to retain or use any information shared under this 
     title for any use other than permitted in this title.
       (k) Federal Preemption.--
       (1) In general.--This title supersedes any statute or other 
     provision of law of a State or political subdivision of a 
     State that restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an 
     activity authorized under this title.
       (2) State law enforcement.--Nothing in this title shall be 
     construed to supersede any statute or other provision of law 
     of a State or political subdivision of a State concerning the 
     use of authorized law enforcement practices and procedures.
       (l) Regulatory Authority.--Nothing in this title shall be 
     construed--
       (1) to authorize the promulgation of any regulations not 
     specifically authorized by this title;
       (2) to establish or limit any regulatory authority not 
     specifically established or limited under this title; or
       (3) to authorize regulatory actions that would duplicate or 
     conflict with regulatory requirements, mandatory standards, 
     or related processes under another provision of Federal law.

[[Page S3992]]

       (m) Authority of Secretary of Defense To Respond to Cyber 
     Attacks.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit 
     the authority of the Secretary of Defense to develop, 
     prepare, coordinate, or, when authorized by the President to 
     do so, conduct a military cyber operation in response to a 
     malicious cyber activity carried out against the United 
     States or a United States person by a foreign government or 
     an organization sponsored by a foreign government or a 
     terrorist organization.

     SEC. 1709. REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY THREATS.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this title, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of other 
     appropriate elements of the intelligence community, shall 
     submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives a report on cybersecurity threats, 
     including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.
       (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
     include the following:
       (1) An assessment of the current intelligence sharing and 
     cooperation relationships of the United States with other 
     countries regarding cybersecurity threats, including cyber 
     attacks, theft, and data breaches, directed against the 
     United States and which threaten the United States national 
     security interests and economy and intellectual property, 
     specifically identifying the relative utility of such 
     relationships, which elements of the intelligence community 
     participate in such relationships, and whether and how such 
     relationships could be improved.
       (2) A list and an assessment of the countries and nonstate 
     actors that are the primary threats of carrying out a 
     cybersecurity threat, including a cyber attack, theft, or 
     data breach, against the United States and which threaten the 
     United States national security, economy, and intellectual 
     property.
       (3) A description of the extent to which the capabilities 
     of the United States Government to respond to or prevent 
     cybersecurity threats, including cyber attacks, theft, or 
     data breaches, directed against the United States private 
     sector are degraded by a delay in the prompt notification by 
     private entities of such threats or cyber attacks, theft, and 
     breaches.
       (4) An assessment of additional technologies or 
     capabilities that would enhance the ability of the United 
     States to prevent and to respond to cybersecurity threats, 
     including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.
       (5) An assessment of any technologies or practices utilized 
     by the private sector that could be rapidly fielded to assist 
     the intelligence community in preventing and responding to 
     cybersecurity threats.
       (c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall be made available in classified and unclassified forms.
       (d) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the 
     term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3003).

     SEC. 1710. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Public Information.--Section 552(b) of title 5, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (9), by striking ``wells.'' and inserting 
     ``wells; or''; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
       ``(10) information shared with or provided to the Federal 
     Government pursuant to the Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
     Act of 2015.''.
       (b) Modification of Limitation on Dissemination of Certain 
     Information Concerning Penetrations of Defense Contractor 
     Networks.--Section 941(c)(3) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 
     10 U.S.C. 2224 note) is amended by inserting at the end the 
     following: ``The Secretary may share such information with 
     other Federal entities if such information consists of cyber 
     threat indicators and defensive measures and such information 
     is shared consistent with the policies and procedures 
     promulgated by the Attorney General under section 1705 of the 
     Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.''.

     SEC. 1711. CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS OF EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                   MILITARY CHILD CARE SYSTEM AND PROVIDERS OF 
                   CHILD CARE SERVICES AND YOUTH PROGRAM SERVICES 
                   FOR MILITARY DEPENDENTS.

       (a) Employees of Military Child Care System.--Section 1792 
     of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
     subsection (d):
       ``(d) Criminal Background Check.--The criminal background 
     check of child care employees under this section that is 
     required pursuant to section 231 of the Crime Control Act of 
     1990 (42 U.S.C. 13041) shall be conducted pursuant to 
     regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense in 
     accordance with the provisions of section 658H of the Child 
     Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
     9858f).''.
       (b) Providers of Child Care Services and Youth Program 
     Services.--Section 1798 of such title is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection (c):
       ``(c) Criminal Background Check.--A provider of child care 
     services or youth program services may not provide such 
     services under this section unless such provider complies 
     with the requirements for criminal background checks under 
     section 658H of the Child Care and Development Block Grant 
     Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 9858f) for the State in which such 
     services are provided.''.
       (c) Funding.--Amounts for activities required by reason of 
     the amendments made by this section during fiscal year 2016 
     shall be derived from amounts otherwise authorized to be 
     appropriated for fiscal year 2016 by section 301 and 
     available for operation and maintenance for the Yellow Ribbon 
     Reintegration Program as specified in the funding tables in 
     section 4301.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 1921 is rendered moot.
  The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. REED addressed the Chair.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, regular order.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, turning to the underlying legislation that 
we are debating, the Defense authorization bill, I can't think of 
anything more basic or fundamental to the Federal Government's 
responsibility than national security and defense and to make sure we 
provide our men and women in uniform with the resources they need in 
order to do the job they volunteered to do on our behalf. Of course, 
many of us have commented time and again on this floor and elsewhere 
about the increasing complexity of the threats facing our national 
security and the security and peace of the world.
  This legislation enables our troops to get the funding and the 
resources and the authorities they need in order to have success on the 
battlefield. As we consider the current state of the world, it is clear 
why this bill is vital. We live in a world marked by constant dynamic 
threats to our way of life. For example, parts of the Middle East and 
North Africa have been overrun by the Islamic State, and the region 
continues to be a hotbed of failed states and ungoverned places. If we 
have learned anything from 9/11, it is that ungoverned spaces are a 
threat to our national security, because that is where our adversaries 
will organize and train and then export those threats to our homeland.
  Despite ongoing negotiations, Iran remains an enemy of the United 
States and continues its campaign to achieve regional domination and 
become a threshold nuclear State, threatening our most trusted allies 
and partners in the region. In Europe and in Asia, Russia and China 
continue to threaten our allies in their respective neighborhoods, 
using a growing array of soft-power and hard-power tactics to twist 
arms and to coerce our friends and allies. These new dynamic threats 
include cyber attacks, which have been much in the news today, 
including espionage and just outright theft of our intellectual 
property in seed corn created from the brains and ingenuity of American 
entrepreneurs and creators. Today, our courageous men and women in 
uniform are tasked with the challenge of facing these many threats and 
many others in regions all around the world.
  So it is astounding to me that the Democratic leader, in the face of 
these threats and in the face of our grave responsibilities to meet 
these challenges, would come to the floor and suggest that debating 
this bill would be what he called a ``waste of time'' and go further to 
say that the Democratic minority would consider filibustering this 
legislation. It is just unbelievable.
  This blatant disregard for our responsibilities and for our troops is 
very troubling, particularly because this bill has historically been 
one that has enjoyed broad bipartisan support. In fact, as our 
colleague, the senior Senator from Arizona, pointed out in an op-ed he 
wrote yesterday, Congress has passed a Defense authorization bill for 
53 consecutive years--53 consecutive years--because it is a national 
priority. It should be, and it is. Up to now, this bill has been marked 
by strong bipartisan backing in the committee. The bill sailed through 
the Senate Armed Services Committee with a bipartisan vote of 22 to 4. 
We don't get much more bipartisan in today's Senate than that.

[[Page S3993]]

Yet, with all of the support from both sides of the aisle and even with 
such a clearly demonstrated need as the funding and well-being of our 
troops and their families, the President himself--the Commander in 
Chief--has threatened to veto this bill--a bill that actually provides 
the full funding levels he himself requested.
  It is important to note--because some of our colleagues on the other 
side have said that the problem with this bill is that it doesn't spend 
enough money or that we ought to reallocate our nondefense 
discretionary spending to increase that, as well--that this bill 
includes the exact same level of funding that President Obama himself 
requested in his budget. So why in the world would the President 
threaten to veto a bill that meets the funding levels that he himself 
identified in his budget?
  For some reason, instead of focusing on our most fundamental 
responsibilities of funding the brave men and women in our Armed Forces 
and making sure they have the resources they need to keep our country 
safe, our Commander in Chief and the minority leader are threatening to 
hold this bill hostage to extract more government spending for 
nondefense discretionary spending for organizations and agencies such 
as the Internal Revenue Service. So why in the world would we hold 
national security spending hostage so we can spend more money on the 
IRS? It is just a complete upside-down view of our priorities.
  So the President's lack of strategic depth or his understanding of 
our Nation's most fundamental duties is really astounding. I am 
troubled to say this, but I think it is actually true: I think the 
President understands our Nation's fundamental duties very clearly. The 
problem is that this threat to hold this bill hostage is just cynical. 
It just uses a political tool to try to gain advantage when it comes to 
raising the caps on nondefense discretionary spending. For a President 
who admits that he doesn't have a complete strategy to defeat the 
Islamic State, I find his comments to be irresponsible. He is 
threatening to veto this bill to satisfy the far leftwing of his party, 
which doesn't believe government could ever spend too much money and 
that government is ever big enough. The government is never big enough 
or spends enough for some of our colleagues across the aisle and some 
of the political base in the President's party.
  Just this morning, the Washington Post reported that Senate Democrats 
have now come up with a brand-new political strategy, and this time 
they are going further--to threaten to block all funding bills for the 
rest of the summer, including the Defense appropriations bill, which I 
know the majority leader is scheduling to be debated and voted on right 
after we complete our work on this legislation. As a matter of fact, 
the Democratic leader said this morning: ``We're headed for another 
shutdown.'' Senator Reid said: ``They did it once, they're going to do 
it again. . . . They want to wait until the fiscal year ends and then 
close up government.''
  It is bad enough that Democrats are threatening to filibuster the 
defense spending bill, but now they are claiming that it is really the 
Republicans' fault. In other words, they are saying: We are not for 
stopping the Defense authorization bill.
  We are for funding our national responsibilities when it comes to 
national security. But because our Democratic friends wish to hold the 
Defense authorization bill and the Defense appropriations bill hostage, 
they somehow now are claiming that we are the ones responsible. Because 
we won't accede to their insatiable demand for bigger government and 
more government spending, and we won't allow them to hold our troops 
and their families and our national security hostage, we are the ones 
at fault.
  But, today, as we know, thanks to the Washington Post, the 
filibustering of this and other bills is just part of a political 
strategy.
  One point I have to acknowledge is the candor of our colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle. If we want to know what they are planning 
to do, all we have to do is read the newspaper, because they are more 
than happy to tell us exactly what they are going to do and what their 
plans are.
  This is all part of a cynical political strategy to keep the Senate 
from working and to deny funding to our Armed Forces while bulking up 
Federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
IRS. This is shameless, and it is hypothetical, and the American people 
will not be fooled by it.
  I wish to remind our colleagues across the aisle that stifling debate 
and blocking votes is a pretty lousy political strategy, as well. It is 
what lost them control of this Chamber last November. It is a losing 
strategy, it is bad policy, it is cynical politics, and the American 
people understand that. It is simply shameful that they are trying to 
use our troops, who protect this great Nation, as some sort of leverage 
in some sort of political game.
  I don't have to remind the Presiding Officer, who continues to serve 
honorably in our military services, that we live in a very dangerous 
world. Somehow, we don't pay enough attention to that until something 
reaches out and bites us or injures someone we love. Our Armed Forces 
face new and growing threats on a daily basis. Our troops deserve our 
full attention and every resource they need as they serve and defend 
our country around the world.
  So that is why I have come to the floor, to say: Why in the world, 
after 53 consecutive Defense authorization bills, would the Democratic 
leader--and indeed with the complicity of the President of the United 
States himself--say they are going to hold this Defense bill hostage 
until they get what they want when it comes to spending more money?
  This bipartisan bill, which focuses squarely on the needs of our 
warfighters and authorizes funding at the same level the President 
himself suggested, should not be held hostage to political 
gamesmanship. So I would encourage the more sensible Members across the 
aisle to focus on the troops and their families, not on the partisan 
agenda of their leadership, and pass this legislation to provide the 
funding our troops need to continue to do their courageous work of 
keeping our country safe.
  One way my colleagues could play a constructive role and move this 
legislation forward, instead of threatening to filibuster, is to work 
with us on commonsense amendments, such as the one I have filed that is 
pending on the underlying bill.
  Under current law, the President has discretion to allow energy 
exports to vulnerable allies, our partners in Europe, and around the 
world when it is deemed to be in our national interest. The amendment I 
have offered in the underlying bill simply reaffirms the existing 
authority of the President of the United States but encourages the 
President not to allow our adversaries, such as Vladimir Putin, to use 
energy supplies for vulnerable countries in Europe as a weapon. It 
would also commission a report that would allow us to get an accurate 
assessment of just how dependent our allies in the region are on those 
who would wield their energy supply as a weapon.
  This amendment is a commonsense measure that serves as a first step 
to addressing the requests--the pleas in some cases--of our allies and 
partners in an increasingly unpredictable world, and it doesn't change 
the existing authority the President already has.
  I would urge our colleagues to put down the political playbook and 
work with us in a constructive way on the underlying legislation. This 
has been the great tradition of the Defense authorization bill and one 
that is being threatened by the political gamesmanship that we see 
threatened by the Democratic leader and, indeed, even with the 
complicity and the fingerprints of the President of the United States.
  We owe it and so much more to our troops, who are relying on us to 
act today. Even more than that, we have a duty to the country to make 
sure we maintain the security of the American people.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page S3994]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, last week we learned of the latest in 
the string of massive breaches of private information from cyber 
penetrations, this time of government personnel records held by the 
Office of Personnel Management.
  In its annual worldwide threat assessment, the intelligence community 
this year ranked cyber intrusions and attacks as the No. 1 threat to 
our Nation's security. Cyber attacks and threats are also a major drag 
on our economy, with the theft of billions and billions of dollars of 
intellectual property and actual money from our Nation's businesses. 
Quite simply, cyber attacks are a major and growing threat to every 
aspect of our life.
  It is with that background that Senator Burr and I began working 
early this year on a new cyber security information-sharing bill. It is 
a first-step bill, in that for sharing company to company or sharing 
cyber threat information directly with the government, a company would 
receive liability protection and therefore feel free to have this kind 
of constructive interchange.
  The Senate Select Intelligence Committee produced the bill in the 
last Congress, but it didn't receive a vote. Chairman Burr and I have 
been determined not only to get a vote but to get a bill signed into 
law. It should be evident to everybody that the only way we will get 
this done is if it is bipartisan.
  With significant compromises on both sides, we put together the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, a bill approved in March by our 
Intelligence Committee by an overwhelming 14-to-1 vote. That bill has 
been ready for Senate consideration for nearly 3 months but has not yet 
been brought to the floor.
  Last week's attack underscores why such legislation is necessary.
  The Democratic leader told me many weeks ago that this issue is too 
important for political wrangling, that he would not seek to block or 
slow down consideration of the bill and would work to move the bill 
quickly. So the bill is ready for floor consideration.
  Now, a number of my colleagues would like to propose amendments--as 
is their right--and I expect I would support some of them and would 
oppose some of them. The Senate should have an opportunity to fully 
consider the bill and to receive the input of other committees with 
jurisdiction in this area. Unless we do this, we won't have a 
bipartisan vote, I believe, because, like it or not, no matter how 
simple--and I have been through two bills now--this was not an easy 
bill to draft because there are conflicts on both sides.
  Filing the cyber security bill as an amendment to the Defense 
authorization bill prompted a lot of legitimate and understandable 
concern from both sides of the aisle. People want debate on the 
legislation, and they want an opportunity to offer relevant amendments. 
To do this as an amendment--when Senator Burr discussed it with me, I 
indicated I did not want to go on and make that proposal--I think is a 
mistake.
  I very much hope that the majority leader will reconsider this path, 
and that once we have finished with the Defense authorization bill, the 
Senate can take up, consider, and hopefully approve the cyber security 
legislation. I think if we do it any other way, we are in for real 
trouble, and this is the product of experience. So I very much hope 
that there can be a change in procedure and that this bill--I know our 
leader will agree--could come up directly following the Defense 
authorization bill.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The clerk will continue to call the roll.
  The legislative clerk continued with the call of the roll.
  Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I speak today about Cotton amendment No. 
1605, addressing funding for the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, the administration that safeguards our nuclear 
stockpile for the country. The Obama administration, in its budget 
earlier this year, requested approximately $50 million per year for the 
next 5 years for the administration to be able to dismantle old or 
obsolete warheads. My amendment would simply codify President Obama's 
own budget request, limiting the administration to spend $50 million 
per year for the next 5 years on nuclear dismantlement.
  My amendment also includes a waiver that would allow the President to 
increase the amount of spending under certain limited conditions. This 
amendment has been approved not only by the majority but also the 
minority of the Armed Services Committee.
  I offer this amendment because of troubling statements from the Obama 
administration about their intent to accelerate nuclear disarmament, 
however. Last month, Secretary of State Kerry announced at the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Review Conference that the United States would 
accelerate its dismantlement of nuclear warheads by 20 percent. Beyond 
obsolete or outdated warheads, I do not believe that is a priority. 
Nuclear modernization is a priority.
  We should not be accelerating our nuclear disarmament by up to 20 
percent because it would send the exact wrong message to Russia, other 
adversaries, and our allies. Russia is making overt nuclear threats to 
the United States and our allies, and we are going to accelerate our 
unilateral nuclear disarmament? That defies logic.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending 
amendment in order to call up Cotton amendment No. 1605.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Ernst). Is there objection?
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, reserving the right to object. I am 
very concerned about this. It unnecessarily limits the National Nuclear 
Security Administration's ability to dismantle the retired nuclear 
weapons that no longer have any role in our national defense.
  The President's budget proposed $48 million for dismantlement, and 
this amendment would freeze funding at that level and at specific 
funding levels for the next 5 years. However, the Appropriations 
Committee, just last month, provided an additional $4 million for 
dismantlement in the Energy and Water bill.
  I am ranking member on that committee. It was approved on a 
bipartisan basis, 26 to 4. This funding is appropriate and it is 
justified. The fact is, there are currently approximately 2,400 retired 
warheads awaiting dismantlement. The rate at which we dismantle these 
warheads does not have anything to do with the 4,800 warheads that 
remain in the stockpile, consistent with the New START treaty.
  This is a treaty, not an agreement. The administration has committed 
accelerating dismantlement and we should support its goals of 
eliminating redundant nuclear weapons. I see no reason to imply 
congressional disapproval for this effort and to micromanage NNSA's 
weapons activity. Modernization and dismantlement go hand in hand. NNSA 
routinely shifts employees from weapons stockpile stewardship and 
modernization work to dismantlement to keep the workforce fully and 
usefully engaged. It is completely unnecessary to complicate this 
process. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. COTTON. Madam President, I understand that the Senator from 
California objects to my amendment. But this is the Senate. This is an 
important issue. We should be debating the matter. If the Senator from 
California wishes to defeat my amendment, we should call it up and make 
it pending and have a vote on it, not object to an amendment simply 
being brought to the floor to be debated.

[[Page S3995]]

  Is there a reason to manage our nuclear policy? Yes, I would say 
there is a strong reason. On many issues, the administration has shown 
itself less than forthcoming in dealing with Congress, in particular on 
nuclear policy. As we now know, the administration minimized reports of 
Russia's activities under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty at a 
time they were trying to pass the New START treaty in 2010.
  I would further say this amendment simply codifies the President's 
budget request. The Senator from California said $48 million for this 
year. For the next 4 years after that, it is $48.3 million, $50 
million, $52.4 million, $51.8 million. I will concede that, in sum, 
that is $50.1 million per year, on average. So I am giving the 
administration a haircut of $100,000 per year. If that is 
objectionable, I would be happy to modify my amendment to put it at 
$50.1 million per year.
  But this Congress should not give the President a blank check to 
engage in further unilateral nuclear disarmament at a time when 
Vladimir Putin is making nuclear threats against the United States, 
invading sovereign countries, and his missiles are shooting civilian 
aircraft out of the sky in the heart of Europe.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I rise to speak on my amendment No. 
1706. This amendment addresses the contributions of the member states 
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in relation to their 
commitment towards their defense budgets within their economy.
  At the 2006 NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, which I was honored to be 
able to attend, NATO member countries committed to spend a minimum of 2 
percent of their national income, GDP, on defense. Furthermore, at the 
2014 NATO summit in Wales, NATO member countries agreed again that 
``allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2 
percent of their gross domestic product on defense will aim to continue 
to do so''.
  They went on to state that ``allies whose current proportion of GDP 
spent on defense is below this level will: halt any decline in defense 
expenditure; aim to increase defense expenditure in real terms as GDP 
grows; aim to move towards the 2 percent guideline within a decade with 
a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO's 
capability shortfall.''
  Well, I suggest that is a pretty weak commitment, but it remains a 
commitment. It certainly can be stretched out, and they are already 
failing too often to meet those commitments.
  So, in 2015, only 4 this year--only 4 out of the 28 NATO-member 
countries, including the United States, meet the 2-percent target. That 
is 4 out of the 28.
  Regrettably, European NATO allies averaged just 1.33 percent of their 
GDP on defense, even though NATO countries have made numerous, 
unbinding, unfulfilled agreements to spend 2 percent. The United States 
currently spends 3.8 percent of its GDP on defense--a large portion of 
it defending Europe.
  So, in contrast, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development data shows that European-NATO allies averaged 24 percent of 
their GDP on social welfare programs, contrasting to 19 percent in the 
United States. So they spend more in-country on their programs while we 
are spending more to defend them.
  Unfortunately, reductions in military spending are a common theme 
across Europe. Just 5 years ago, according to the NATO figures, 
France's military budget amounted to 2.4 percent of GDP. This past 
year, it stood at 1.9 percent, and France's budget law orders no 
increases before 2019. As for Germany, Europe's economic powerhouse, it 
spends only 1.3 percent of its GDP on defense. By the way, the European 
economy, as a whole, is as large or slightly larger than the U.S. 
economy as a whole.
  So in 1990, NATO's European member states spent, on average, about 
2.3 percent GDP on defense--well above today's average of 1.3. 
America's share of NATO military expenditures--get this, colleagues--is 
75 percent. The U.S. share of the NATO military expenditures is 75 
percent and has grown an additional 5 percent since 2007. This is a 
rather dramatic figure.
  I had the privilege to be able to travel to Eastern Europe recently, 
and it was raised to us, by individuals in those countries, that they 
were somewhat embarrassed about this. But the reality is, they are 
taking no substantial steps to deal with it.
  Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates--who is one of the most wise 
people in the world, I believe, in terms of U.S. policy and 
international policy, served in multiple administrations over the years 
in the White House and as Secretary of Defense under President Obama 
and President Bush--in his last speech as Secretary of Defense had the 
following to say on this matter:

       Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European 
     defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. 
     political leaders--those for whom the Cold War was not the 
     formative experience that it was for me--may not consider the 
     return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost.
       What I've sketched out is the real possibility for a dim, 
     if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance. Such a 
     future is possible, but it is not inevitable. The good news 
     is that the members of NATO--individually and collectively--
     have it well within their means to halt and reverse these 
     trends, and instead produce a very different future.

  This was his last speech. He made a speech on a subject he considered 
to be extraordinarily important. It is a statement he has made 
previously at other times, but it reflected, I think, something akin to 
Washington's Farewell Address as he raised and discussed one of the 
most important problems facing the world today; that is, the developed 
world, other than the United States, is not conducting itself 
financially in an effective way to defend themselves.
  Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for decades one of the 
world's wisest world leaders and commentators, has repeatedly 
questioned Europe's will. It gets down to that level: To what extent is 
Europe willing to pay a modest price to maintain their security?
  There was a book out a number of years ago, referred to as ``Of 
Paradise and Power,'' and Robert Kagan's book notes that the Europeans 
are living in the paradise provided by American power.
  So when the Russians took this aggressive step to invade the Ukraine, 
a nation we have considered for admission into NATO, took Crimea and 
otherwise acted in violation of international law, we announced a 
European reassurance initiative, $1 billion. This $1 billion was to be 
utilized in a way that would reassure our allies and reaffirm our 
commitment to Europe, even in the face of this dangerous and 
provocative action by Russia.
  Well, colleagues, after having been to Europe and Eastern Europe on a 
number of occasions, I would say I am getting to the point where I want 
to be reassured. I want to have confidence in Europe's commitments.
  At this volatile time in world history, this lack of commitment on 
the part of our European allies must end. We need to ensure that NATO 
members are spending at least what is needed and certainly the minimum 
2 percent of GDP they repeatedly committed to spend.
  The dangers in this world are much closer to Europe than they are to 
the United States, and our European allies are right to be concerned. 
They are anxious to have our presence. The requests for more and 
numerous military support, action from the United States, are even 
urgent in some of those countries. They want us there.
  But, great danger arises from Europe living in an unreal comfort 
zone, living in the paradise of American power. Unless the history of 
the world has been dramatically altered, and it has not, threats to 
Europe will remain. Who will resist the dangerous pressures on Europe? 
Will our European partners just rest on American power? That is what 
the reality suggests is, in fact, occurring now.
  Europeans now insist Greece must take painful financial steps for the 
good of the European Union to be a good team player, they say.
  I think it is right and appropriate for the United States to call on 
our NATO

[[Page S3996]]

allies to do their part for this great alliance that has done so much 
for stability, prosperity, and peace for Europe and for the entire 
world.
  This amendment before the Senate has overwhelming support, I believe. 
I think it will be accepted as part of the managers' package. The call 
it makes on NATO members is the absolute minimum, I think, that can be 
expected of them.
  Let's consider the plain facts. The deployment of U.S. military 
forces to any nation in the world, for the purpose of defending that 
nation and a region, is an august thing. Obviously, the military might 
of the United States is unsurpassed. The United States cannot and must 
not take these commitments lightly. The ramifications of our commitment 
to the defense of a foreign nation are significant--grave indeed.
  This Nation has every right and a duty to our citizens to ensure that 
those with whom we partner do their share. The idea that a small nation 
can simply send an email to the United States calling for more forces 
whenever they become nervous--while taking only limited steps to fund 
and defend their own country--suggests a disconnect with reality.
  This Senate, by this amendment, is sending a clear call for NATO to 
do more. It is not too late to maintain this alliance as the force for 
good it has always been. But everyone on both sides of the Atlantic who 
understands these issues realizes we are in a precarious situation if a 
miscalculation occurs, and miscalculations can lead to violence and 
war.
  So it is time to make clear the strength of our commitment to each 
other and to ensure there is no miscalculation. To do that, more is 
required of our NATO allies.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. VITTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1473

  Mr. VITTER. Madam President, I rise to speak about amendment No. 1473 
that is pending. I will be modifying it, not now but later today, in a 
technical way. The majority and the minority have been notified of this 
modification, so I will be making that later, and I am going to talk 
about the substance of the amendment.
  This amendment is very significant in terms of our Army force 
structure. It would limit any additional reductions the Army can make 
to Army BCTs, which have already been drastically reduced from 48 
brigade combat teams in 2008 to 45 in 2013, to now 33 in 2015--so in 
just 7 years, from 48 to 33. Obviously, it was a dramatic reduction.
  This is important because brigade combat teams are a very significant 
element of Army force structure, and many experts all across the 
spectrum would acknowledge that and would acknowledge that further 
significant reductions would be very dangerous.
  To clarify, my amendment would require the Army to trim its force 
structure. It doesn't stop that trend, but it also offers protections 
for that primary core unit of the brigade combat team without mandating 
additional money, additional requirements, et cetera. There is a 
serious and urgent need for Congress to act quickly so the Defense 
Department has the authority and support it needs to defend our Nation.
  This specific amendment protecting those core, required brigade 
combat teams is supported by the National Guard Association of the 
United States and the Association of the United States Army, the two 
key national groups that support the direct Army and the National 
Guard.
  Some Members may argue that we don't want to micromanage the Army and 
how it deals with force structure. I certainly agree with that 
generally, but this is certainly not getting into the fine weeds. This 
is a major issue, and brigade combat teams are a major tool of their 
force structure. Furthermore, exactly this sort of limitation has been 
done in this bill, in the underlying bill, both with regard to the Air 
Force and with regard to the Navy.
  The bill, as it stands on the floor coming out of committee, includes 
numerous provisions to block the elimination of certain weapons 
systems, such as the Air Force fighter inventory, the A-10, EC-130 
Compass Call aircraft. So it is very similar on the Air Force side to 
justify blocking these eliminations. The chairman's report states:

       The committee believes further reductions in fighter force 
     capacity, in light of ongoing and anticipated operations in 
     Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, 
     coupled with a potential delay of force withdrawals from 
     Afghanistan, poses excessive risk to the Air Force's ability 
     to execute the National Defense Strategy, causes remaining 
     fighter squadrons to deploy more frequently, and drives even 
     lower readiness rates across the combat air forces.

  Exactly that same sort of rationale which is in the bill with regard 
to limitations of what the Air Force can do also applies to the Army 
and brigade combat teams.
  In addition, the same sort of thing is already in this underlying 
bill with regard to the Navy. There is specific language blocking 
certain further reductions of aircraft carriers--again, a major element 
of force structure; again, Congress saying: No, don't go below this 
number. That is not justified. That will weaken our overall capability, 
and that will weaken force structure.
  So again on the Navy side on this bill the chairman and the committee 
have done exactly the same thing. My amendment would simply do 
something very similar and equally as important and justified on the 
Army side with regard to brigade combat teams.
  Because of the significance of brigade combat teams to Army readiness 
and operations, because of the enormous cuts that have already been 
made in those numbers in the last 7 years--from 48 to 33--I urge all of 
my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans, to support this commonsense 
amendment.
  Again, Madam President, to underscore, I will be returning to the 
floor sometime today to modify my amendment in a technical way. 
Everyone--certainly including the majority and minority leaders on this 
bill--has been given those modifications. They are not controversial. I 
will simply wait for them to be on the floor to make that modification, 
which is within my right and purview and does not require unanimous 
consent, and then I am very hopeful this amendment will be teed up in 
the next group of votes, perhaps around 3:30.
  Madam President, with that, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1921

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I want to say a few words about the Burr 
amendment, No. 1921, which has now been made pending. I am thankful for 
the leadership of Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein.
  The language of this amendment, of which I am an original cosponsor, 
was overwhelmingly approved by a 14-to-1 vote in the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence in March.
  Implementing legislation to address a long list of cyber threats that 
have become all too common is among my highest priorities. Earlier this 
month, it was the Office of Personnel Management and the Army. A few 
weeks before that, it was the Pentagon network, the White House, and 
the State Department. Before that, it was Anthem and Sony. That is just 
to name a few.
  I am pleased we are able to consider this amendment on the National 
Defense Authorization Act. This voluntary information sharing is 
critical to addressing these threats and ensuring that mechanisms are 
in place to identify those responsible for costly and crippling cyber 
attacks and ultimately deterring future attacks.
  Our current defenses are inadequate, and our overall cyber strategy 
has failed to deter cyber adversaries from continued attacks of 
intellectual property theft and cyber espionage against the U.S. 
Government and American companies. This failure to develop a meaningful 
cyber deterrent strategy has increased the resolve of our adversaries 
and will continue to do so at a growing risk to our national security

[[Page S3997]]

until we demonstrate that the consequences of exploiting the United 
States through cyber greatly outweigh any perceived benefit.
  This amendment is a crucial piece of that overall deterrent strategy, 
and it is long past time that Congress move forward on information-
sharing legislation. This legislation--again, 14 to 1 from the Select 
Committee on Intelligence--complements a number of critical cyber 
provisions which are already in the bill which will ensure that the 
Department of Defense has the capabilities it needs to deter 
aggression, defend our national security interests, and, when called 
upon, defeat our adversaries in cyber space.
  The bill authorizes the Secretary of Defense to develop, prepare, 
coordinate, and, when authorized by the President, conduct a military 
cyber operation in response to malicious cyber activity carried out 
against the United States or a U.S. person by a foreign power.
  The bill includes a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to 
conduct biennial exercises on responding to cyber attacks against 
critical infrastructure. It limits $10 million in funds available to 
the Department of Defense to provide support services to the Executive 
Office of the President until the President submits the integrated 
policy to deter adversaries in cyber space, which was required by the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
  It authorizes $200 million for a directed evaluation by the Secretary 
of Defense of the cyber vulnerabilities of every major DOD weapons 
system by not later than December 31, 2019.
  It requires an independent panel on DOD war games to assess the 
ability of the national mission forces of the U.S. Cyber Command to 
reliably prevent or block large-scale attacks on the United States by 
foreign powers with capabilities comparable to those expected of China, 
Iran, North Korea, and Russia in years 2020 and 2025.
  It establishes a $75 million cyber operations procurement fund for 
the commander of U.S. Cyber Command to exercise limited acquisition 
authorities.
  It directs the Secretary of Defense to designate Department of 
Defense entities to be responsible for the acquisition of critical 
cyber capabilities.
  The cyber security bill was passed through the Select Committee on 
Intelligence because that is clearly, in many respects, among the 
responsibilities of the Select Committee on Intelligence. But I think 
it is obvious to anyone that the Department of Defense is a major 
player. I just outlined a number of the provisions of the bill which 
are directly overseen and related to the Department of Defense.
  So my friends on the other side of the aisle seem to be all torqued-
up about the fact that this cyber bill should be divorced from the 
Department of Defense. I know that my colleagues on the other side of 
the aisle are very aware that just in the last few days, 4 million 
Americans--4 million Americans--had their privacy compromised by a 
cyber attack. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that 
we are ahead in every aspect of a potential adversary except for one, 
and that is cyber. There are great threats that are now literally to 
America's supremacy in space and to many other aspects of technology 
that have been developed throughout the world and are now part of our 
daily lives.
  So I am not quite sure why my friends on the other side of the aisle 
should take such exception to legislation that addresses our national 
security and the threats to it, which literally every expert in America 
has agreed is a major threat to our ability to defend the Nation.
  So I think there are colleagues who are not on the Intelligence 
Committee and are not familiar with the provisions of this bill. It 
clearly is not only Department of Defense-related, but it is Department 
of Defense-centric, with funds available to DOD to provide services to 
the Executive Office of the President, $200 million, cyber 
vulnerabilities of major DOD weapons system, an independent panel on 
DOD war games, and on and on. It is Department of Defense-related, and 
it is the whole purpose of the Defense authorization bill, which is to 
defend the Nation. To leave cyber security out of that--yes, there are 
some provisions in the underlying bill, but this hones and refines the 
requirements that we are badly in need of and gives the President of 
the United States and Secretary of Defense tools to try to limit the 
damage that is occurring as we speak.
  I want to repeat--and to my colleague from Indiana who is a member of 
that committee, I would ask him--4 million Americans recently were 
compromised by cyber attack.
  Mr. COATS. In response to my friend from Arizona----
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to engage in a 
colloquy with the Senator from Indiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, this is a serious breach, and there is 
more to the story to be told. It shows the extreme position that we are 
in here as Americans, as there are those who want to take this country 
down, those who want to invade privacy of Americans and have the 
capabilities of breaching this. The legislation before us, and the 
reason why it is brought here now and, hopefully, will be attached to 
the Defense bill is that this needs to be done now and not later. How 
many breaches do we have to hear about--whether it is the private 
sector or whether it is the government sector--before this Congress and 
this Senate will stand up and say we have the capability of preventing 
some of these things from happening, but we need the legislative 
authority to do it. To delay and not even allow us to go forward with 
this puts more and more millions of Americans at risk, whether they 
work for the government or are in private industry.
  Mr. McCAIN. And isn't it true, I would ask my colleague from Indiana, 
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently stated that in 
the potential of our adversaries to threaten our security, we have a 
definite superiority in all areas except for one, which is in the issue 
of cyber security; is that correct?
  Mr. COATS. I think that is obvious, because, clearly, while we have 
the capability to address some of these issues, we are not allowed to 
use the capability. This legislation gives us the opportunity to have a 
cooperative effort. Some of those who resist the use of this because 
they think it is potentially a breach of privacy now understand that 
breaches are occurring from outside and into the United States, by 
those who are enemies of the state, those who are criminal groups, 
those who are terrorist groups. While we may have the capacity to deal 
with this, without this legislative authority we are not allowed to use 
it.
  So what an irony--what an irony that some are saying: We can't trust 
the government on this to help us. This is defense. This is like saying 
we can't trust the Department of Defense, we can't trust the Army or 
the Navy to protect us from attack because it is government-run. Now, 
they are saying there are some operations in government here that are 
part of our defenses that can't be used until we have authority. The 
irony is that people's privacies are being breached by all of these 
attempts, and we are denying the opportunity to put the tools in place 
to stop that from happening.
  Mr. McCAIN. Could I ask my colleague again: The 4 million people 
whose privacy was just breached--4 million Americans--what potential 
damage is that to those individual Americans?
  Mr. COATS. Well, we are just learning what damage this is and how it 
can be misused in any number of ways. Some of this information is 
classified. But I can say to my colleague from Arizona, the chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee, that this puts some of our people and 
some of our systems in great peril. It is something that needs to be 
addressed now and not pushed down the line.
  Mr. McCAIN. So it seems to me that to those 4 million Americans, we 
owe them and it is our responsibility--in fact, our urgent 
responsibility--to try to prevent that same kind of breach from being 
perpetrated on 4 million or 8 million or 10 million more Americans. If 
they are capable of doing it once to 4 million Americans, what is to 
keep them from doing the same thing to millions of Americans more, if 
we sit here idly by and do nothing on the grounds that the objection is 
that it is not part of the Department of Defense

[[Page S3998]]

bill, which seems to me almost ludicrous?
  Mr. COATS. Well, since the Department of Defense is one of those 
agencies being attacked, I would certainly think this is the 
appropriate attachment to a bill for which, hopefully, we will be given 
the opportunity by our friends across the aisle. Hopefully, we will be 
able to pass it in the Senate, move it on to the House, and get it to 
the President so that these authorities can be in place.
  The Senator mentioned 4 million. A company whose headquarters is in 
the State of Indiana, Anthem insurance company, was breached--and this 
is public information--of 80 million people on their roles. That is 
almost one-third of all Americans who have had their private 
information breached by a cyber attack--not to mention the threat that 
comes from cyber attack on our critical infrastructure.
  What if they take down the financial system of one of our major banks 
or several banks? What if they take down the financial transactions 
that they place on Wall Street every day? What if they shut down an 
electric power grid in the middle of February when the temperatures in 
the Northeast are in minus-Fahrenheit temperatures or when it is 110 
degrees in Phoenix and you lose your power and can't turn on air 
conditioning? People will die. People will be severely impacted by 
this. To not go forward and give authorization to use the tools to try 
to better protect American safety is not only unreasonable but is a 
very serious thing.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleague from Indiana for his outstanding 
work on a very difficult issue that poses a threat to every American 
and citizens throughout the world.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tillis). The Senator from Louisiana.


                           Amendment No. 1473

  Mr. CASSIDY. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Vitter's 
amendment No. 1473, which requires the Army to maintain no fewer than 
32 brigade combat teams, which are also referred to as BCTs.
  I support this amendment because cutting the brigade combat teams is 
cutting the core of the Army's structure and their ability to perform 
their mission. This amendment requires the Army to maintain a brigade 
combat team level of 32. Currently, the Army is planning on cutting 
these to 30 and to continue cutting to a point where we will have a 
hollow force. This is a short-sighted approach to a bigger problem.
  First, what the amendment says is that the Secretary shall give 
priority under this paragraph to be carried out as funding or 
appropriations become available.
  Secondly, nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede the 
Army's manning of brigade combat teams at designated levels, and it 
requires congressional defense committees to have a report on the 
current manning of each brigade combat team of the Army. It also 
ensures that the Army National Guard brigade combat teams are 
maintained at 26, and this accounts for the deactivation of two Air 
National Guard brigade combat teams previously agreed to.
  You may ask, Why do we need 32 brigade combat teams? At the height of 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, we had 48 brigade combat teams. If we 
have noticed, in the Middle East, it is getting worse, not better. This 
is not to say that we will commit these troops, but it will be to say 
that we shall maintain our readiness.
  Next, the Army's key weapon system is the brigade combat team. This 
amendment protects that key weapon from those cuts.
  Lastly, reducing brigade combat teams does not--I emphasize, does 
not--make existing brigade combat teams more ready. It wears them out. 
If you have fewer teams, they are deployed more often in whatever 
activity they are deployed to, and that stretches that manpower and 
womanpower potentially to the break.
  Under this, with the higher level of force, there is less stress upon 
those who are there maintaining their readiness. In total, this 
amendment requires the Army to take a closer look at their strategy and 
risk, forcing the Army to think long term instead of just cutting the 
most crucial part of our force, which is the people, the human capital, 
our fellow citizens.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to support the underlying 
bill we are talking about on the floor, which is the Defense 
authorization bill.
  At a time of a rapidly deteriorating security environment around the 
world, we need to modify our policies. From the violence in Iraq and 
Syria to China's aggressive land reclamation in the South China Sea to 
Russia's activities on the eastern border of Ukraine as we speak here 
today--all of this is going on. We live in a world that is a lot less 
safe and less friendly to U.S. interests. Every day we see more of 
this. Frankly, it is time for us here in the Senate to help by changing 
some of our policy approaches to address this changing and more 
dangerous situation we see around the world.
  I would hope we can do this on a bipartisan basis. Our differences 
with regard to other issues tend to be more pronounced, but with regard 
to national security, normally we come together. I am concerned with 
what I am hearing, at least from some of the debate I have heard on the 
floor, where it sounds as though some of our colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle would like to actually shut down this debate and not 
have a debate on some of these amendments and not have some votes on 
some of these amendments and not have a vote on this bill to try to 
adjust our national security posture so that we can address these new 
challenges around the world. It doesn't mean that everything that this 
side of the aisle wants to do would be accepted. Democrats would have 
the chance to offer their ideas, and we would have a good debate on it, 
and they would have a say in it. We need Democrat support to get the 
legislation done. But let's have that debate and that discussion.
  So I hope that what I am hearing is not accurate. I hope we will be 
able to come together and continue this discussion and be able to have 
votes on amendments and on the final bill and then be able to help, to 
the extent we can in the Senate, to adjust our foreign policy and our 
national security policy to address these very real threats we see 
emerging all over the world.
  I will give an example of one that I will offer today. This is an 
amendment that has to do with Ukraine. As some of my colleagues know, 
the situation in Ukraine has deteriorated significantly in the last 
year or so, and it has done so because Russia not only invaded Crimea 
and took that part of Ukraine but they are also now continuing their 
aggression on the border of Ukraine. This is a situation that affects 
us as Americans because Ukraine is our ally. Ukraine is a country that 
has decided to stand with us. It is time for us and the other NATO 
countries to stand with them.
  Our policy toward Ukraine, in my view, has been not just insufficient 
but it has been kind of piecemeal. We haven't had a strategy to deal 
with this issue. So what this amendment attempts to do is to take the 
language that is in the underlying legislation--already in the bill the 
committee put together--and improve it so that, indeed, we do have a 
more comprehensive strategy toward Ukraine. This is incredibly 
important not just for Ukraine but for the international order, for our 
national security, and for our ability to help stop this aggression in 
Europe--the first, really, since World War II, where we have seen that 
a country is going across another country's boundaries and actually 
violating territorial integrity.
  I visited Ukraine a couple of months ago in April. I got to see some 
of the conflict consequences firsthand. For those who have been to 
Ukraine--a number of my colleagues have, including Senator Durbin, who 
just got back from Ukraine--I think they would all agree with me that 
Ukraine is in a state of war and it is under siege. That makes it much 
more difficult for Ukraine to do what they know they need to do, which 
is to improve their

[[Page S3999]]

economy, to deal with corruption, to have more transparency, to become 
more like those countries they want to emulate--the European countries 
and the United States of America. They are attempting to do that, but 
it is difficult when they have this conflict on their border where 
troops are being killed and civilians are being killed and where they 
have to devote enormous amounts of time and resources.
  Just this week I had the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister 
of Ukraine and the Finance Minister, both of whom are in town. In fact, 
we met with them yesterday as part of the Ukrainian Caucus, which I 
cofounded with Senator Durbin. I will tell my colleagues that talking 
to them, it is very troubling to hear what is happening in their 
country right now.
  As some of my colleagues know, there is supposed to be a cease-fire 
in place. It came from the second of what is called the Minsk 
agreement. Whatever semblance of credibility this Minsk cease-fire had 
left--I don't think it had much--it has now totally crumbled. Just last 
week, combined Russian-separatist forces launched a major assault to 
the north and southwest of the Province of Donetsk. Donetsk is one of 
those areas also known as an oblast or a province, where there is a lot 
of Russian and Russian-separatist activity. They were focused on this 
strategic town of Maryinka. We probably saw some of this on TV. It is 
very troubling that once again it looks as of these separatist forces, 
backed by Russia and Russian equipment, which are directly involved in 
this, are beginning to push back into Ukraine again.
  The casualty reports are still coming in, but it appears that dozens 
have been killed or wounded in this assault, according BBC. These 
independent news organizations are following this, and I hope all of us 
are focused on this. The U.S. intelligence in the area is not what it 
ought to be, frankly, in my view, so we do need to rely on some of 
these media sources.
  It is very clear that in terms of this assault, they were using tanks 
and heavy multiple-launch rocket systems and over 1,000 men were 
involved. So clearly, this is something that is not only a serious 
military exercise, but it is one that is backed by Russia, using 
Russian equipment. We have seen just how committed the Russian 
Government is to this--to promoting instability in that region of the 
world. They are committed.
  The question is whether we are committed to step up and support the 
people of Ukraine. This is something that, in my view, the NATO forces 
and the United States should have done a long time ago--not by us 
getting involved directly, which, frankly, that is not what they are 
asking for. They are asking for assistance and aid to be able to defend 
themselves. They are asking for us to help them to be able to stop this 
assault by giving them just the basic weaponry they need to stop tanks, 
potentially to stop aircraft if aircraft get involved, and to be able 
to stop the invasion and to protect the territorial integrity of the 
country of Ukraine.
  The President and some of his top advisers continue to stand in the 
way of meaningful U.S. and NATO action. They have told me they fear 
that it would provoke Russia, as if deadly clashes such as the one we 
saw last week and, in fact, yesterday--and we will continue to see 
today, probably, this steady stream of Russian tanks, artillery pieces, 
and soldiers into Ukraine--aren't evidence enough that NATO and 
American restraint has not deescalated this conflict. In fact, I think, 
in a way, it has emboldened the Russians, and it has inflamed them. 
Again, we are not talking about U.S. troops. What we are talking about 
is helping this country that is our ally that has turned to us through 
NATO, and we want them to be able to defend themselves.
  The President continues to enforce this de facto embargo on any kind 
of significant weapon that Ukraine has said it needs to defend itself. 
He does that despite an overwhelming bipartisan consensus here in this 
body and in the House that it is time to increase this help. That would 
include lethal and nonlethal assistance to Ukraine. Congress has voted 
repeatedly to do just that, most notably in the Ukrainian Freedom 
Support Act, which was signed into law by President Obama in December. 
It also provided the President a national security waiver so he didn't 
have to do what we think he should do, which is to help them to defend 
themselves. The administration continues to withhold these arms, and it 
is time for that to end.
  There is really very little disagreement on the capabilities that 
Ukraine needs. My amendment, which is amendment No. 1850, modifies and 
builds on the great work that Senator McCain and Senator Reed and 
others have already done in the bill. If we look at section 1251 of the 
bill, we will see that there is already assistance being provided to 
Ukraine, about $300 million. Our amendment directs the Secretary of 
Defense to spend this money in a way that all of us know is the 
appropriate way to ensure that we get the most bang for the buck and 
that we are giving them the assistance they really need.
  It requires the Secretary of Defense to spend this money on a number 
of critical capabilities they need to defend themselves, including 
real-time intelligence, medium-range and long-range counter-artillery 
radars, defensive lethal assistance such as antitank weapons, UAVs, 
secure communications, and training to develop key combat, planning, 
and support capabilities at both the small unit level and at the 
brigade level. So it provides, frankly, less wiggle room for the 
administration by laying out exactly what is needed, what is being 
asked for by the Ukrainian military, and what, in this Chamber and 
having done a lot of work in this area through our Ukrainian Caucus and 
through other sources, we know is necessary.
  Half of this $300 million under our amendment would be fenced off 
until at least $60 million of it is spent on the important capabilities 
the Ukrainians really need and have requested. That is the real-time 
intelligence, defensive lethal assistance, and counter-artillery 
batteries. If the administration fails to use this money for the 
purposes specified, then they have to use it to support other nations 
facing an increased risk of Russian aggression--countries such as 
Georgia and Moldova.
  The amendment also requires DOD to report on the quantity and the 
type of security assistance being provided to Ukraine and how it 
complies with the purposes that are established in the legislation.
  So the amendment helps to ensure that U.S. military assistance 
provides the assistance that will truly have a meaningful impact on the 
ground, and it gives Ukraine the tools it needs to defend itself.
  It will also finally increase the cost of Russia's aggression. At no 
point has President Putin's decision to escalate this war been costly 
enough to force President Putin and the Russians to fundamentally 
reconsider their strategy. The annexation of Crimea, the campaign to 
destabilize and then invade eastern Ukraine last summer and fall, and 
the recent offensive have all happened despite a flurry of Western 
attempts to force a negotiated settlement. In fact, each temporary 
cease-fire in some senses has merely legitimized what the Russians have 
done. When there is this flurry of diplomatic activity, it tends to 
happen after the Russians have made gains on the ground and then it 
accepts those gains on the ground as the basis for negotiations, 
granting the separatists and their Russian supporters moral and, I 
would say, some legal equivalency that they simply don't deserve.
  There is a pattern here. They seize the land, they preserve their 
gains through an internationally mediated cease-fire, and then they 
break that cease-fire, as they are doing right now, to seize more land 
and then use a new cease-fire to secure acceptance of their new gains. 
This has to stop.
  The Obama administration and some EU members have been so fixated on 
ensuring that the successful implementation of the February cease-fire 
is a goal in and of itself that they have lost sight of this broader 
policy objective that a cease-fire should be working to achieve, which 
should be the defense of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and support for the economic and political reforms that 
Ukraine needs. Let me underscore that. It is very difficult for them to 
undertake the economic and political reforms they need with this siege 
going on, and that is what we need. We need them to make those reforms 
so they cannot

[[Page S4000]]

just keep their territorial integrity but also so they become a stable, 
democratic, and prosperous country.

  The Russian aggression in Ukraine is not going to go away or resolve 
itself simply because we wish it to. It will take a comprehensive 
strategy, which is laid out in this amendment, and coordinated 
political, military, and economic actions to change the current 
dynamic. Sanctions and economic assistance for Ukraine are important, 
but they are tools, not a strategy. Russian military action has been 
successful in threatening Ukraine's stability where other attempts to 
use economic or political means have failed. So what the Russians and 
separatists have found is that they have tried to disrupt through 
economic means and political means, and they haven't been successful 
there. In fact, the Ukrainians have rejected that, including by a 
recent election. It is no accident that their most successful tactic, 
the military tactic, is the one the United States and the West has done 
the least to address.
  I have argued for months that this piecemeal, reactionary response to 
intimidation from Moscow is a recipe for failure. Instead, we have to 
have a comprehensive, proactive strategy that strengthens NATO, deters 
Russian aggression, and gives Ukraine the political, economic, and 
military support it needs to maintain its independence. We need a 
strategy that seeks to shape the outcomes, rather than one that is 
shaped by them. Much of that leadership must come from us and the 
administration here in the United States. Of course, this body has an 
important role to play, and that is what this amendment is all about.
  Let's include funding for Ukrainian military assistance, not just in 
this authorization bill where we are setting the policy for it, but 
let's be sure in the spending bills that follow that we provide the 
Ukrainians what they need.
  We should pass this legislation--the underlying bill--which Chairman 
McCain has correctly noted is critical to helping us deal with so many 
challenges in the dangerous world we face. We should pass, again, the 
defense spending bill that doesn't leave the men and women in uniform 
without the means to carry out their incredibly important mission.
  Importantly, for today's purposes, we have to be clear about what the 
stakes are in Ukraine. Events in Ukraine are a direct and deliberate 
challenge to the credibility of NATO itself, to the U.S.-led 
international order. President Putin's actions upend decades of 
established international norms and threaten the very foundation of 
this system order. Confidence in America and our European allies' unity 
and commitment to upholding this system deters bad actors. It 
incentivizes other countries to play by the rules. That is what we 
want. We want to help ensure peace, stability, and prosperity. If the 
credibility of our commitment is in doubt, the risk of economic 
collapse, more violence, and more instability increases. Into a void, 
chaos ensues. The Ukrainians understand this. They understand the 
importance of this conflict well beyond their borders. I hope in the 
United States of America we understand it. I hope we act in a way to 
help the Ukrainians be able to defend themselves and counter these 
activities on the eastern border of Ukraine.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate be in a period 
of debate only until 3 p.m.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. BOXER. Thank you so much.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning 
business until I conclude.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. President.


                              Highway Bill

  I come to talk about something different than the pending 
legislation--I have a number of things to say about that, a number of 
amendments I am supporting, many of them bipartisan.
  At this point, I want to talk about the crisis we are facing in terms 
of our highway bill. We now have 51 days until the highway trust fund 
is empty. For all of us, this is a terrible prospect because a lot of 
our States rely on the Federal Government for up to 85 to 90 percent of 
their funding. Some States rely on less. My State relies on about 50 
percent, but it is still huge. When this trust fund goes under, we are 
going to be in a lot of trouble.
  What we have seen in this particular Senate since our Republican 
friends took over--and they are my friends--are a number of self-
inflicted crises. Lord knows we have enough of them coming our way, we 
don't have to invent them--but we have seen several. In the first 
crisis we had, we were headed toward a partial shutdown of the 
Department of Homeland Security over an unrelated immigration issue. 
That was ridiculous. There was a lot of angst and finally it was 
resolved.
  The second self-inflicted crisis ended last week, and it was brought 
about because the Republican leader didn't like the USA FREEDOM Act the 
House had passed overwhelmingly. As a result of his opposition, he, for 
several days, turned away from 57, 58, and more Senators who actually 
supported that bill, and he brought the surveillance of terrorists to a 
screeching halt. That wasn't what he wanted to do, but as a result of 
that self-inflicted crisis, we had a couple of moments there where we 
were dark. That problem luckily ended after a couple of days.
  And now we are headed for another self-inflicted crisis, although I 
must say, from conversations I have had, I have some hope we can avert 
this crisis.
  We have known about this since last December, when Democrats said: 
Let's stay in until we solve the highway trust fund. And Republicans 
said: Oh, no, let's just take care of it in May. Then, in May, the 
Republicans said: Let's just take care of it in July. That is no way to 
run a country. It is no way to run a transportation system. It is 
ridiculous, and our States, as I will point out later, are starting to 
cut way back on transportation projects--highways, bridges, and transit 
systems--because they are scared we are not going to reach agreement. 
So, 51 days, and I am here today to talk about it.
  I want to show you a photograph of a bridge collapse in Minneapolis, 
MN, that happened in August of 2007. This bridge collapsed because 
there was a design flaw. It went undetected because there were not 
enough inspections made of the bridge because there wasn't enough being 
spent on ensuring that our bridges are safe.
  To me, as I look at this, it is a metaphor for the current status of 
the highway trust fund, which supports thousands of businesses and 
millions of jobs and is on the verge of bankruptcy. You can see on this 
photograph the chaos, the danger, the disaster. Even though there are 
no people you can see, you can imagine the shock that occurred from 
this collapse.
  Now, you might think this is an isolated incident, but I want to tell 
you we have 61,300 bridges in the United States which have been cited 
as being structurally deficient by engineers. The fact that we don't 
have a multiyear plan in place to fix these bridges is a shame upon our 
Nation. It is a shame upon our Nation. If you had your loved one in one 
of these cars, you would know this is unacceptable.
  My message today to both sides of the aisle and to the House and the 
Senate is simple: We cannot afford to pass yet another short-term 
extension because that doesn't give us the certainty or the funds to 
fix bridges such as these--the 61,300 bridges that need repair. The 
continued inaction by Congress to enact a long-term bill is a disgrace 
and we need to meet this challenge head-on.
  Now, I have heard rumors that we are making progress, and I know we 
are in the Environment and Public Works Committee. I serve on that 
committee with my friend Senator Inhofe. He and I have agreed we will 
go forward with a multiyear bill. This is wonderful. It is a little 
late in the day--we should have done it a long time ago--but I am proud 
he and I have agreed this is a priority. We have a date set of June 24 
to mark up the bill. That is only about 35 days before the collapse of 
the trust

[[Page S4001]]

fund, but if all the other committees did their job as our committee 
did, we would be OK. So, yes, I am encouraged, but there are three 
other committees that haven't set up dates to mark up anything, as far 
as I know. Unless a miracle occurs, I believe my Republican friends are 
going to ask us for yet another short-term extension.
  Now, if you went out on the street and stopped anybody--Republican, 
Democrat, whatever age--if you asked: Is it controversial for the 
Federal Government to fund transportation projects? They would say no.
  Maintaining and improving our roads, bridges, and transit systems is 
a necessity. It is a necessary investment in our future that was 
recognized at our country's founding in the Constitution. That is why 
Senator Inhofe, who is one of the leading conservatives in the Senate, 
and myself, a very strong progressive Member, agree. Article I, section 
8 of the Constitution gave Congress the authority ``to establish Post 
Offices and post Roads,'' and that has continued throughout our 
Nation's history.
  Legislation authorizing Federal investment in our highways dates back 
100 years to the passage of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 and the 
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921.
  I quote one of my favorite Presidents, Dwight Eisenhower. In 1956, he 
established the highway trust fund to serve as the major source of 
funding for our Nation's highway systems. This was significant because 
it was a large increase of Federal infrastructure investment. President 
Eisenhower knew we needed modern, efficient transportation systems to 
ensure our security. I say ``security'' because this is what President-
elect Eisenhower said, a general and a hero from World War II: ``A 
network of modern roads is as necessary to defense as it is to our 
national economy and personal safety.''
  He viewed a network of modern roads as a necessity to our defense. 
And I would add the word ``bridges,'' because you can have a convoy 
going over our bridges, too. So General Eisenhower and then President 
Eisenhower knew how important an efficient system of roads is to our 
military and national defense.
  While serving in the Army way back in 1919, he joined a convoy of 
approximately 80 trucks and other military vehicles to cross from 
Washington, DC, to San Francisco to test the military's motor vehicles. 
This trip took 2 months, averaging 6 miles an hour. From this 
experience, plus his countless other experiences with the military, 
both home and abroad, he understood how important a reliable 
transportation system is to a First World nation.
  Again, he said, ``A network of modern roads is as necessary to 
defense as it is to our national economy and our personal safety.''
  Today, our economy still relies on interconnected transportation 
systems to move goods out of major ports of entry. I want to talk about 
my own State because at the Port of Los Angeles, we take in about 40 
percent of the Nation's imports. We know they go straight out onto 
those roads and they deliver goods all over our great Nation.
  We know there is a universal understanding that we have to maintain 
that road system so we can move people and goods efficiently. These 
surface transportation systems, which used to be the envy of the world, 
remain the foundation of a strong U.S. economy and enable us to compete 
in the global marketplace.
  I hope you heard that I said our transportation system used to be the 
envy of the world because it is no longer the envy of the world. It is 
our fault. This has to be a priority. The United States lags behind its 
overseas competitors in infrastructure investment. According to the 
most recent World Economic Forum ranking within the past decade, the 
United States has fallen from 7th to 16th in the quality of our roads. 
We are behind countries such as China, Portugal, and Oman. This is 
ridiculous. The greatest Nation in the world--that is what we are--but 
we are falling behind on our infrastructure because we do not have the 
guts to face the fact that we have to fund the highway system.
  Why are we behind? We only spend 2 percent of our gross domestic 
product on infrastructure, and that is a 50-percent decline from 1960. 
So we spend 2 percent of our gross domestic product while Europe spends 
5 percent and China spends 9 percent.
  The Federal Government does provide, as I said, over 50 percent of 
the capital expenditures for State highway projects nationwide, which 
means that all of our States and all of our local governments rely 
heavily on Federal funding to maintain and to improve their 
transportation. However, this is just a national average.
  (Mr. SCOTT assumed the Chair.)
  I see my colleagues have changed places here. For South Carolina, 
South Carolina depends on the Federal Government for 80 percent of 
their highway funds and their bridge repair--80 percent. California is 
50 percent. North Dakota is 80 percent. Montana is 87 percent.
  So what I am saying to my colleagues who I hope are somewhere 
listening is that if we do not act to fill the highway trust fund and 
to meet this looming made-up crisis--check out your State and how much 
you rely on Federal funds.
  I already showed the picture of the Minnesota bridge collapse. I 
would like to put that up again because I think the Minnesota bridge 
collapse is a metaphor for where we are. Our whole thing is 
discombobulated. Our whole thing is disrupted because we do not have 
the courage to fund the highway trust fund, which, as President 
Eisenhower said all of those areas ago, is critical to our national 
security.
  I am going keep this picture up here for a minute. I want to talk 
about our States and the bridges that are in disrepair. I hope people 
who may be listening across the country--if you live in one of these 
States, give a call to your Senator and ask him or her: What are you 
doing to fill the highway trust fund?
  For example, in Kentucky there are over 1,100 structurally deficient 
bridges--bridges that could look like this. Pennsylvania has more than 
5,000 structurally deficient bridges, which accounts for over 20 
percent of all the bridges in their State.
  In addition to the dangerously poor conditions of our bridges, 50 
percent of our Nation's roads are in less than good condition. These 
roads and bridges that are no longer in good working condition span 
across the country.
  So I am going to show a chart that I don't think we have ever talked 
about here. These are examples of deficient highway bridges in need of 
repair: Alabama, I-65 bridge over U.S. 11 in Jefferson County; Arizona, 
I-17 bridge over 19th Avenue in Maricopa County; Arkansas, I-30 bridge 
over the UP Railroad in Pulaski County; California, the Golden Gate 
Bridge, for goodness' sake; Colorado, the I-70 bridge in Denver; 
Connecticut, the West River Bridge in New Haven; District of Columbia, 
the Memorial Bridge. There was a press conference right near the 
Memorial Bridge by one of my colleagues a couple of weeks ago.
  People are getting really scared about this. The point of this is not 
to scare anybody; the point of this is to say to my colleagues that we 
are responsible.
  You know, maybe it is me. When I was growing up, my mother and father 
said: If you know there is a problem, do something about it. You don't 
have a right to turn your back and walk away.
  I remember once when I was a county supervisor I found out that the 
county building we were in was earthquake-prone. Nobody talked about 
it. As soon as I found out it could collapse in an earthquake, I 
brought it to my colleagues. I said: Colleagues, we need to do 
something.
  Do you know what they said, one or two of them? Don't bring it up. We 
don't have the money.
  Excuse me. You have to have the money if you know the building you 
are in could collapse in an earthquake. You have to have some money if 
you know all of these bridges are in disrepair.
  So let's continue. Florida, the Pensacola Bay Bridge; Georgia, a 
bridge in Fulton County; Hawaii, Halona Street Bridge in Honolulu; 
Illinois, Poplar Street Bridge; Indiana, the bridge over the CSX 
Railroad; Iowa, the Centennial Bridge; Kentucky--another one--the Brent 
Spence Bridge; Louisiana, another bridge there; Maine, the Piscataqua 
River Bridge; Maryland, the Chesapeake Bay Bridge; Massachusetts, the 
I-95 bridge in Middlesex; Michigan, the I-75 Rogue River Bridge.

[[Page S4002]]

  Remember, if you are hearing my voice and you are hearing your State 
mentioned, give a call to your Senator and ask him or her, whether they 
are a Democrat or Republican, what they are doing about the highway 
trust fund because in 51 days it will go bust.
  In Minnesota--did I mention that--the I-35 East Bridge over 
Pennsylvania Avenue; Mississippi, the Vicksburg Bridge; Missouri, the 
East Bridge over Conway Road; Nevada, the Virginia Street Bridge in 
Reno; New Hampshire, the I-293 bridge in Hillsborough; New Jersey, the 
Garden State Parkway in Union County; New Mexico, the Main Street 
Bridge; New York, the Brooklyn Bridge.
  If you did not read the book ``The Great Bridge,'' you should read 
that book by David McCullough. It is an incredible book. That bridge 
was built so long ago. We don't want to lose the Brooklyn Bridge.
  In North Carolina, the Greensboro Bridge; Ohio, the John Roebling 
Suspension Bridge; Oklahoma, the I-40 bridge over Crooked Oak Creek; 
Oregon, the Columbia River Crossing; Pennsylvania, the Benjamin 
Franklin Bridge; Rhode Island, the viaduct in Providence; South 
Carolina, the I-85 bridge in Greenville; Texas, the I-45 bridge over 
White Oak Bayou; Utah, the I-15 bridge over SR-93 in Davis County; 
Washington, the Evergreen Point Floating Bridge; Wisconsin, the U.S. 41 
bridge over a river.
  I just have to ask my friends on both sides of the aisle, if the roof 
on your house is about to cave in with your children inside and you 
know about it, would you find a way to pay for that repair or would you 
let it collapse on your kids? The answer is obvious. Of course you are 
going to fix the roof on your house. You have to keep infrastructure in 
good repair. The roof is caving in on our roads and our bridges. Lord 
help us if we do not act and someone else goes down in a crisis.
  We can look at the details surrounding the I-35 bridge collapse in 
Minneapolis, MN, shown in that picture. On August 1, 2007, this eight-
lane bridge, which is Minnesota's second busiest bridge, carrying 
140,000 vehicles every day, suddenly collapsed during rush hour, 
killing 13 people and injuring 145 people.
  It is critical that our Nation continue investing in our aging 
infrastructure. Everybody knows it. Everybody knows it--Congress, 
States, businesses, American workers. Republicans say they are for 
infrastructure investment, but they have not acted. Happily, we are 
having a markup--I am excited about it--in our EPW Committee. Not one 
other committee has marked up a long-term bill.
  The highway trust fund is an integral part of how the Federal 
Government provides predictable, multiyear funding to States so that 
States can plan and construct long-term highway, bridge, and transit 
projects; therefore, the highway trust fund should be our No. 1 
priority. In 51 days, the fund will go bust. It will be gone. We will 
not be able to pay all of our bills. So we have to move quickly because 
otherwise we will face a transportation shutdown.
  The law that currently authorizes our transportation program is set 
to expire on July 31, and the highway trust fund will go bankrupt 
shortly thereafter. The clock is ticking, and failure is not an option. 
So let's put up that 51-day ticking time bomb, if you will. The highway 
trust fund is in serious trouble, and much needed transportation 
projects are in peril.
  The short fund creates uncertainty, and uncertainty is terrible for 
business, it is terrible for workers, and it is terrible for the 
economy. Billions of dollars will be delayed to our States. Many 
States, including Utah, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Wyoming, have 
already delayed or cancelled construction projects due to the 
uncertainty in the funding.
  We are facing a crisis, and everybody knows it. If we do not act and 
act quickly, we will see a domino effect that will be felt throughout 
our economy.
  I don't think I have to remind people that we came out of the worst 
recession since the Great Depression. I was here when we saw that 
happen at the end of George W. Bush's term. We were losing 700,000 jobs 
a month. I remember standing here on the floor of the Senate feeling 
that the whole world was collapsing around us.
  The recovery is taking a long time, and thank God it is moving 
forward now. Our economy, though, is still recovering, and we must have 
a strong, modern, efficient transportation system to move goods and 
people. There are some people who absolutely need transportation to get 
to work. This is not a game. Either they need their cars or they need 
to hop on a bus or a subway. And we have 51 days until the highway 
trust fund will be empty.
  The amount of money we need just to keep up with the demand right now 
to fix our roads and our bridges--that amount is $123 billion just to 
catch up on the nightmare we are facing. So we not only need a 6-year 
bill, but we need one that is robust so we can start spending some 
money on these repairs. Millions of jobs and thousands of businesses 
are at stake here.
  You know, it is 51 days. And I have stood in several press 
conferences with business leaders, the chamber of commerce, the AFL-
CIO, construction workers, the concrete people, the tar people, the 
granite people--you name it. They are united as one America in favor of 
a 6-year solution. I will show you just some of the people whom I have 
stood with over time in recent days: The AFL-CIO; the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce--it is hard to get them on the same page, but they are on the 
same page and they want this fix; the U.S. Conference of Mayors; the 
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials; the 
American Council of Engineering Companies; the American Highway Users 
Alliance; the American Public Transportation Association; the American 
Road and Transportation Builders Association; the American Society of 
Civil Engineers; and the American Trucking Association.

  The truckers have said to me: Senator, we are willing to pay more in 
our gas tax because we cannot continue to ride on these roads that are 
falling apart.
  When was the last time someone came up to you and said ``Raise my gas 
tax''? It is rare. But the truckers have asked us to do it as long as 
we use the money to fix the road. The chamber of commerce has asked us 
to raise the gas tax 6 cents to 8 cents. I mean, this is unusual, and I 
know there is very little support for that.
  I have proposed numerous ways to pay for the trust fund, including a 
refundable gas tax increase. So if you earn $100,000 or less in your 
family, you get back the tax increase, which is about $40 a year. So I 
think it is worth $40 a year to know that the bridge you drive on is 
safe, but we would make it refundable so that you would get that back 
if you are in the middle class or below.
  I will tell you, facing a shutdown--and we are already seeing a 
shutdown in five, six, or seven States--is painful for businesses. I 
have had business people come before me with their heads in their hands 
because they do this work. They build the highways. They fix the 
bridges. They build the transit systems. And they know we have not come 
together yet. It is a recipe for disaster.
  What planet are we living on? All of America wants this.
  I will continue with some more of these names. I just read some of 
them; I will read some more: the Associated General Contractors; the 
Association of Equipment Manufacturers; the Association of Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations; the International Union of Operating Engineers; 
the Laborers' International Union of North America; the National 
Asphalt Pavement Association; the National Association of Counties; the 
National Association of Manufacturers.
  The National Association of Manufacturers, the Associated General 
Contractors, the International Union of Operating Engineers, the 
Laborers' International Union of North America--this is all of America. 
This isn't red. This isn't blue. This is everybody. Everybody wants us 
to fix the roads. Everybody wants us to fix the bridges.
  We have the National Association of Truck Stop Operators; the 
National Governors Association--the Governors are Republicans and 
Democrats, and they are begging us to get our act in gear and get this 
done; the National League of Cities, and finally, the National Ready 
Mixed Concrete Association; the National Stone, Sand, and Gravel 
Association; the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association;

[[Page S4003]]

the Portland Cement Association; and the Retail Industry Leaders 
Association.
  The list I read is a partial list. The list that I read, frankly, is 
mostly Republican-leaning organizations.
  Why have we not done our job? Why don't we already have a long-term 
transportation bill before us before the fund goes bust in 51 days? 
Why?
  It is Congress's responsibility to act quickly to address our 
Nation's infrastructure needs. Every day that the Republicans fail to 
move forward with a bill, they are putting people at risk. This isn't 
about philosophy. This is about bread and butter. This is about getting 
to work safely. This is about driving with your family and not being 
fearful that the bridge you are on is going to fail.
  I am always asked: Well, Senator, that is all well and good, but how 
are you going to pay for this?
  Well, I have a lot of ideas, and I will lay them out. There are many 
ways to pay, and I will give just a sampling of ideas, and I will 
embrace these ideas. I will work with any Democrat or Republican on any 
one of these ideas.
  Replace existing gas and diesel fuel fees with a user fee charged at 
the refinery based on the fuel price. In other words, do away with the 
gas tax and replace it with a refinery-based fuel fee. They did that in 
Virginia, and I think it is working well.
  Increase existing gas and diesel fuel fees by indexing those fees to 
inflation, along with a refundable tax credit for low- and middle-
income families to offset those costs. So we can have a modest increase 
of 6 cents, 7 cents, 8 cents on the gas tax and make it refundable to 
families earning $100,000 or less.
  Assess a user fee on the sale of new and used vehicles. That is 
another idea.
  Use revenue generated from repatriation of corporate earnings 
currently held overseas. That is international tax reform. We have a 
lot of money sitting abroad from corporations that have parked it 
there. They don't like the rate of their taxes. If you lower their tax, 
that money can come home, and we can use the taxes we collect to fund 
the highway trust fund. I have a bill on that with Senator Paul. It is 
bipartisan. Join us. Join us and let's fix the problem.
  How about this: Borrow money from the general fund, to be paid back 
from the stimulative effect of transportation infrastructure 
investments on the economy. When we make these investments, they 
generate so much employment and so much business that people will pay 
income taxes because they are working. These are millions of jobs, 
thousands of businesses.
  Another way to pay for it: Apply a new, honor-based user fee on the 
number of miles each individual drives each year. So when you fill out 
a form to get your car registered, just tell me how many miles you 
traveled last year, there will be a modest fee, and we can help the 
trust fund.
  By the way, I notice my friends want to use savings from reducing the 
overseas contingency operations account. They want to use that money. 
They used it for the military; why not use it for saving the trust 
fund? And how about the savings of uncollected revenues owed to the 
Federal Government? If we just collected one-third of those, we would 
meet the shortfall.
  So, as I count these ideas, there are eight ideas that I have, and I 
am sure everybody has their own ideas. There is not a shortage of 
ideas. There is a bit of shortage of courage to come out and say the 
obvious. If your roof is about to collapse on your home, it will cost 
you something to fix it. Admit it upfront. No one is going to do it for 
free. No one is going to fix these 60,000-plus bridges for free. No one 
is going to build new highways for free. No one is going to build new 
transit systems for free. Grow up and pay for it. This is ridiculous.
  I am speaking for myself. I will support any of these eight ideas or 
any combination of them. We know our country is in danger. Our people 
are in danger every day because of these structurally deficient 
bridges. If we don't do anything about it, we will be liable--maybe not 
in a court of law, but in my mind it is a moral responsibility. So I 
can support any of these ideas. Some of them are conservative ideas, 
and some of them are liberal ideas. I don't care. I want to pay for the 
highway trust fund.
  The bottom line is that the only solution is a consensus-based, 
bipartisan 6-year transportation bill that will provide States and 
local communities with the funding and the certainty they need to build 
these multiyear projects and modernize our infrastructure.
  This isn't rocket science. Choose one of the options. Add one of your 
own. Do a combination of these options. Let's have the courage and the 
moral fortitude to do what is our responsibility. We know our Nation's 
infrastructure is deteriorating. We are responsible for it. This is one 
Nation under God, and we have to act to protect our people. It is our 
job.
  I think the clearest message was from President Eisenhower on this 
front, and President Reagan, who stepped up to the plate. President 
Reagan signed into law an increase in the gas tax. He was so proud. He 
said: I am proud to do this. We have to do this. Let me read his quote. 
He signed the surface transportation bill, which did increase the gas 
tax, and he said:

       Because of the prompt and bipartisan action of Congress, we 
     can now ensure for our children a special part of their 
     heritage--a network of highways and mass transit that has 
     enabled our commerce to thrive, our country to grow, and our 
     people to roam freely and easily to every corner of our land.

  President Ronald Reagan. I was elected the same year he said this. I 
mean, I am giving away my age, but I was proud that my President 
understood this. I didn't agree with Ronald Reagan on a bunch of 
things. He said once: ``If you have seen one tree, you have seen them 
all.'' I never agreed with that.
  But setting all of that aside, I agree with what he said. This is 
magnificent. Listen to this:

       Because of the prompt and bipartisan action of Congress, we 
     can now ensure for our children a special part of their 
     heritage--a network of highways and mass transit that has 
     enabled our commerce to thrive, our country to grow, and our 
     people to roam freely and easily to every corner of our land.

  Another person whom I really admire on this subject is Senator 
Inhofe, my friend from Oklahoma, my chairman. I was his chairman for a 
few years--I think 8--and unfortunately for me I am no longer chairman, 
I am the ranking member. But I will tell you why we will do hand-to-
hand combat on the environment--and we did that today. When it comes to 
infrastructure, we are very close. Do you know what he said? ``The 
conservative thing is to pass a bill instead of having the 
extensions.''
  Anthony Foxx, our Transportation Secretary, and 11 of his 
predecessors offered an open letter to Congress expressing their 
support for passage of a long-term bill. Remember, this was signed by 
people who worked for--follow me--President Johnson, President Ford, 
President Reagan, President George Herbert Walker Bush, President 
Clinton, President George W. Bush, and President Obama. They offered an 
open letter and said this about the current situation:

       Never in our nation's history has America's transportation 
     system been on a more unsustainable course. . . . So, what 
     America needs is to break this cycle of governing crisis-to-
     crisis, only to enact a stopgap measure at the last moment. 
     We need to make a commitment to the American people and the 
     American economy.

  That is four Republican Presidents and three Democratic Presidents--
people from those administrations. My goodness, there is bipartisanship 
everywhere but here in this room.
  I read the list of everybody who wants this bill, and it is very 
impressive: labor, business--small business, large business. It is 
extraordinary.
  A survey by the National Association of Manufacturers of its 
members--one of our more conservative organizations--found that 65 
percent don't believe our infrastructure is sufficient. We know from 
the Texas Institute study that traffic congestion in 2011 was $121 
billion. We are wasting so much time in traffic. The cost to truck 
goods moving on our highway system--$27 billion in wasted time and 
diesel fuel.
  So I hear a lot of talk about passing a long-term bill. I am pleased 
I am hearing that talk. I say to my colleagues, I hadn't heard of that, 
and now I am starting to hear my Republican friends say maybe we can do 
it. I think we need to do it. We still have 1.4 million fewer 
construction jobs than we had before the recession.

[[Page S4004]]

  The clock is ticking. Failure is not an option. Let's get going. 
Let's come together and do the right thing. Pass the highway bill.
  Thank you.
  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, are we in a quorum call?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is not in a quorum call.


                           Export-Import Bank

  Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I have come to the floor today following on 
the speech just delivered by Senator Boxer, who highlighted her concern 
about a manufactured crisis--the impending expiration of the highway 
bill, which must be reauthorized by July 31. I come to speak to another 
manufactured crisis. We have to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank by 
June 30 or face the loss of its support for vital jobs in our economy 
that will happen with its expiration.
  I am a big advocate for manufacturing here in the Senate and in my 
home State of Delaware, but I am not a big fan of manufactured crises. 
Both of these are unneeded, self-inflicted wounds that will create 
further drag on our economic recovery. I think we can and should find 
ways to work together across the aisle to reauthorize the Export-Import 
Bank.
  For more than 80 years, the Export-Import Bank, commonly known as Ex-
Im, has served as a vital tool to help American companies sell their 
goods around the world. By making loan guarantees and providing risk 
insurance and other financial products to American firms at market 
prices, the Bank has helped to ensure that American companies and their 
workers can compete anywhere in the world and at no cost to the 
American taxpayer. I will say that again: at no cost to the American 
taxpayer.
  The Bank not only pays for itself, but it actually often runs a 
surplus. Last year alone, it returned $700 million to the U.S. 
Treasury. Today, the Ex-Im Bank helps American businesses sell nearly 
$30 billion in goods every single year and supports more than 150,000 
American jobs.
  The Bank is a government agency, however, and even though it costs 
taxpayers nothing and has an undeniably positive impact on our economy 
and on job creation, it remains unclear if this Congress will be able 
to come together to reauthorize it by June 30 and keep it running.
  Unfortunately, some of my colleagues would like to close the Bank, 
and they are using arguments I think are unfounded and misguided to do 
so.
  First, I have heard the Ex-Im Bank is somehow a government giveaway 
to large politically connected corporations. But the truth is the Bank 
helps companies of many different sizes, large and small.
  In my home State of Delaware, for instance, the Ex-Im Bank has helped 
a company I know well--Voigt and Schweitzer, a hot-dip zinc galvanizing 
company. It has helped them to sell their products abroad. Voigt & 
Schweitzer has a few facilities around the United States, in addition 
to the one in New Castle, DE. At its Delaware location it provides 
galvanizing services for a range of steel products for export. V&S 
isn't a huge corporation. It has just a few dozen employees in 
Delaware. It is because of Ex-Im's support that it has been able to 
compete with other companies around the globe.
  In fact, Ex-Im's support helped the firm's Delaware location earn the 
business to galvanize literally hundreds of bridges that were 
manufactured in Pennsylvania and being exported and sold to Africa--
business that would have likely gone to competitors overseas without 
Ex-Im's help.
  Now, Ex-Im does also help large corporations export their goods to 
countries around the world, but that support also benefits small and 
medium- sized businesses. For example, Boeing often receives 
significant support from the Ex-Im Bank, which helps it compete with 
international airplane manufacturers such as Airbus. I have heard 
Senators criticize this support, but the reality is it isn't just 
Boeing that benefits. This is an important point about how modern 
manufacturing and the integration of the supply chain work.
  When Boeing manufactures a finished airplane, it doesn't make all of 
the plane's parts with its own factories and its own workforce. It, in 
fact, buys the vast majority of the component parts from much smaller 
manufacturers spread throughout the United States. From the brakes on 
the landing gear to the in-flight entertainment system, other companies 
make those parts and sell them to Boeing for the finished product. So 
when Ex-Im helps Boeing export a 747, it helps sustain tens of 
thousands of jobs for American workers at other smaller companies.
  I have seen this myself in Delaware. Although Boeing directly employs 
in Delaware just 16 people, the company supports 1,300 jobs with 52 
different Delaware companies. Let me give one example. A smallish 
company, Polymer Technologies, manufactures and sells thermal and 
acoustic insulation to Boeing for inclusion in their planes, which are 
then exported through the help of Ex-Im.
  So when Ex-Im's opponents in this Chamber argue that this is all 
about a few big companies, that just isn't true. It also is vital to 
sustaining and supporting smaller manufacturers that are vital to our 
communities.
  The next misplaced argument I have heard is that government shouldn't 
be supporting private companies, period. They should not be, as it 
were, picking winners and losers. But even to a supporter of the free 
market, the point of government is to step in where the private market 
fails to do so, and that is exactly what Ex-Im does.
  When the Bank makes a loan to a business, it isn't replacing capital 
that would otherwise have come from a private bank. It supplements 
private capital or makes a private bank more inclined to put at risk 
its own capital through provision of political risk insurance. Much of 
the time Ex-Im serves as a lender of last resort and provides a loan 
where a private bank can't or won't.
  So the Export-Import Bank isn't doing something the private sector 
should be doing. It is picking up where the market leaves off, and in 
doing so it helps to level the global playing field on which American 
companies compete.
  The reality is that every single one of our trading partners provides 
the same type of support for their exports as the Ex-Im Bank does for 
ours. So they are picking winners. They are picking American winners on 
the global playing field.
  For example, as Ex-Im's chairman, Fred Hochberg, has written, ``Ex-Im 
has given $590 billion in loans, guarantees, and insurance over its 
entire history but Chinese institutions''--Chinese export-financing 
institutions--``have provided an estimated $670 billion in just the 
past 2 years.''
  In other words, China has done more in just 2 years to support the 
financing of their exporters than our Export-Import Bank has done in 
its entire 80-year history and at no cost to the taxpayer.
  The bottom line is that American jobs are at stake in this debate, 
and if we fail to keep the doors open to the Export-Import Bank, we 
will fail a lot of American workers. Every year, Ex-Im supports 
hundreds of thousands of jobs, and shuttering it will put them at risk.

  In fact, as the Wall Street Journal reported just this morning, 
American companies worry that global competition is ``so cutthroat,'' 
that they would ``be forced to move manufacturing overseas'' and to 
ship American manufacturing jobs out of the United States ``if the Ex-
Im Bank isn't open.''
  At a time when our economy is continuing to gain steam and Americans 
are going back to work--at a clip of 280,000 new jobs announced just 
last month--we need to continue to help American companies compete in 
markets around the world. The Ex-Im Bank is central to our 
competitiveness and our continued strength at home and abroad. It is 
critical that we act together to reauthorize it before the end of June. 
So I urge my colleagues to join this effort to help support American 
jobs, American manufacturing, and the American middle class.
  Mr. President, for more than 20 years, the State Partnership 
Program--or SPP--has helped the United States to build closer sustained 
relationships with militaries and nations around the world. Although I 
will not call it up and make it pending at this moment, I want to take 
a few minutes to speak on the floor today about my amendment No. 1474 
to the NDAA, an amendment that would significantly strengthen the State 
Partnership Program.

[[Page S4005]]

  First established after the fall of the Soviet Union, the State 
Partnership Program was created to help countries transition their 
militaries from the Soviet model and enshrine the idea of civilian 
control of the military through professional and personal exchanges 
with our State National Guard units.
  The SPP facilitates cooperation across all aspects of civil military 
affairs and, besides military relationships, encourages people-to-
people ties at the State level. I have personally seen the benefits of 
this program through the participation of my home State National Guard 
in their State partnership with Trinidad and Tobago and the civilian 
control that it reinforces.
  I have also seen it in farflung parts of the globe, from Liberia to 
Senegal to Tunisia on the African continent, where three different 
State Partnership Programs are actively at work providing training and 
support and resources for the military of those three nations.
  The California National Guard, for example, currently has units that 
are helping Ukraine to push back against Russian aggression in eastern 
Ukraine, leveraging a deep and trusting relationship first established 
back in 1993.
  Since its creation, the SPP has grown substantially. Today, it 
consists of 68 partnerships between U.S. National Guard units and 
foreign countries, with the 69th, between Kentucky's National Guard and 
the African nation of Djibouti, having just been signed. Djibouti is a 
nation that is actually the site of our only substantial military 
presence on the continent of Africa, and that State Partnership Program 
will help to strengthen, sustain, and reinforce our ongoing and vital 
security partnership with Djibouti, a nation that is sandwiched between 
Somalia and Yemen, countries currently in chaos and facing significant 
threats from Islamic terrorism.
  That is just one example of how the State Partnership Program helps 
leverage the resources of our National Guard.
  Traditionally, the program has needed to be reauthorized every 2 
years, so I am happy this year that both the House and Senate have 
recognized its value and have decided to work together to permanently 
reauthorize it in their respective National Defense Authorization Act. 
However, there are a few changes we can make that would add to making 
the SPP more transparent, more efficient, and more effective, and that 
is what my amendment would do.
  First, it would allow the Secretary of Defense to consolidate the 
various funding streams for the SPP, which right now come from over a 
half dozen different accounts scattered across DOD, which makes it more 
difficult to provide meaningful congressional sight. This amendment 
would allow the Defense Secretary to combine these funding sources into 
one National Guard fund to pay for personnel, training, operations, and 
equipment.
  Second, my amendment would allow the National Guard to determine its 
core competencies and to help combatant commanders determine how best 
to leverage the National Guard to serve the needs of a partner country.
  Last, my amendment would establish clear and enhanced reporting 
requirements so we can better track the annual performance of our units 
and make modifications where needed to enhance the program's 
effectiveness.
  Critically, this amendment would not increase the program's costs at 
all. This amendment, which is based on the State Partnership Program 
Enhancement Act and currently has 9 Republican and 12 Democratic 
Senators, including myself, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, 
Senator Pat Leahy of Vermont, and Senator Joni Ernst of Iowa, enjoys 
broad bipartisan support from a wide range of States whose National 
Guards have participated and benefited from the State Partnership 
Program.
  The amendment is enthusiastically supported by the National Guard 
Association of the United States, the National Guard Bureau, and the 
Adjutants General. It would take important steps to strengthening a 
program that is essential to many of our international partnerships, 
and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  With that, I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my Virginia colleague Senator Tim 
Kaine in expressing concern over the chairman's measure to cut $1.7 
billion in funding from specific operations and maintenance accounts in 
an effort to streamline defense headquarters functions.
  The Department of Defense is in the midst of implementing a 20 
percent headquarters reduction that defense officials have planned over 
time to ensure that consequences of the reductions are known and 
managed. Like my colleague, I am concerned that the chairman's proposed 
legislation would require additional headquarters reductions, the 
results of which have not been properly considered.
  While I support continued efficiency gains within the Department of 
Defense, including--where merited--reducing headquarters functions, I 
believe that before such cuts are taken, the Department must conduct a 
thorough analysis of the best methods to streamline their organizations 
for the most efficient staffing solutions while remaining viable and 
effective.
  At a time when department officials are managing through enormous 
budget pressure in an increasingly complex national security 
environment, I fear the Department will be forced to reduce funding to 
critical programs.
  Finally, the men and women who will likely bear the brunt of these 
cuts are performing the very work that Congress charged the Department 
of Defense to conduct. Even this authorization includes additional 
reports, studies, and demands for improvement in areas like program 
management, personnel planning, acquisition, and sexual assault. These 
programs require a professional cadre to conduct the required analysis 
and propose recommendations for improvement.
  I look forward to passing a defense authorization that adequately 
supports the Department that has been at war for nearly 15 years.
  Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I am pleased the Senate is debating the 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016. Senators 
McCain and Reed, with help from my colleagues and me on the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, have worked tirelessly throughout the spring 
on these important military issues. Our committee prides itself on 
taking a bipartisan and measured approach to reforming and providing 
oversight to the Department of Defense. I believe we largely succeeded 
in this endeavor, but I remain gravely concerned about the chairman's 
proposals to streamline Department of Defense Headquarters by cutting 
funding to specific operations and maintenance, O&M, accounts.
  The Department of Defense already implemented a 20 percent reduction 
of headquarters, which began this year and continues through 2019. 
Planning for the reduction began several years ago, affording the 
Department adequate time to ensure compliance with various directives, 
including requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that established 
the division in roles among the service chiefs and combatant 
commanders. I am concerned the chairman's proposed legislation this 
year, requiring additional headquarters reductions, will force the 
Department of Defense to find efficiencies that will blur the lines 
between service and warfighting functions, undermining the bedrock 
reforms established by Goldwater-Nichols.
  I support reducing the magnitude of these cuts, while allowing the 
Department to conduct a thorough analysis of the best methods to 
streamline organizations for the most efficient staffing solutions 
while remaining viable and effective.
  The chairman's specific proposed reductions are not supported by any 
report or study. Instead, they are based on a perception of unnecessary 
growth based on anecdotal evidence and nebulous data-sets fueled a $1.7 
billion cut to several operations and maintenance accounts.
  To the chairman's point, there has undoubtedly been a growth in 
headquarters over the past decade. Areas that saw significant increases 
include cyber warfare and special operations. USCYBERCOM did not exist 
a decade ago, but now has almost 6,000 employees. Special Operations 
Command is forecasted to swell to over 70,000 by 2017, but both 
headquarters are excluded from consideration for reduction, against the 
requests of the DOD

[[Page S4006]]

to leave everything on the table if forced to act on this provision.
  The timing and magnitude of these cuts are so severe that I fear the 
Department will be forced to reduce funding to critical programs 
associated with the targeted accounts. Some key programs associated 
with these accounts include military burial honors, suicide prevention, 
radioactive waste disposal, nuclear command and control networks, 
acquisition support, veteran hiring programs, and installation fire 
departments. Many of these programs are tied to our Nation's commitment 
to our servicemembers and veterans and should not be subjected to such 
drastic cuts without due consideration of the downstream effects.
  Finally, the men and women who will likely bear the brunt of these 
cuts are performing the very work that Congress charged the Department 
of Defense to conduct. Even this authorization includes additional 
reports, studies, and demands for improvement in areas like program 
management, acquisition, and sexual assault. These programs require a 
professional cadre to conduct the required analysis and propose 
recommendations for improvement. Asking our workforce to bear 
additional oversight and program management functions while cutting 
their funding is illogical and wrong.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.


                 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act

  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I wish to speak this afternoon about a 
controversial proposal, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 
otherwise known as CISA, which was filed yesterday as an amendment to 
the Defense authorization bill.
  I want to begin by saying to the Senate that I believe tacking this 
legislation onto the Defense bill would, in my view, be a significant 
mistake. I expect our colleagues are going to have a wide range of 
views about this legislation, and I hope the Senate can agree that 
bills as controversial as this one ought to be subject to public debate 
and an open-ended process, not stapled onto unrelated legislation with 
only a modest amount of discussion.
  This is particularly true given the issue of cyber security, which is 
going to have a significant impact on the security and the well-being 
of the American people and obviously the consumer rights and the 
privacy of law-abiding Americans. Because it is designed to increase 
government collection of information from private companies, I am of 
the view that for the Senate to have this expansion of collecting so 
much information about the people of the United States, for it to have 
real legitimacy in the eyes of the public, it is important to have open 
debate, with votes on amendments from Senators who have a wide variety 
of opinions on the issue of cyber security. Trying to rush this bill 
through the Senate, in my view, is not going to increase public 
confidence.
  So let me be clear about the process and talk a bit about the 
substance of the legislation as well. I believe tacking it onto the 
Defense bill is a flawed process. But I think there are also 
significant flaws with the substance of the legislation as well. Dozens 
of independent experts agree this legislation will have serious 
consequences and do little to make our Nation more secure at a time 
when cyber threats are very real. The issue of cyber threats requires 
more than a placebo, and this legislation is a bandaid on a gaping 
wound. I believe the Senate, having the time for adequate reflection 
and amendment, can do better.
  In beginning, I would like the Senate to know just how much 
controversy and concern this legislation has generated among those who 
are considered independent experts on cyber security. Shortly before 
the Intelligence Committee, which I have been honored to serve on for 
more than 14 years--shortly before the committee marked up this 
legislation, a coalition of nearly 50 organizations and security 
experts wrote to the members of the Intelligence Committee expressing 
serious concerns about the legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in 
the Record.

  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
     Re Cyber Threat Information Sharing Bills

                                                   April 16, 2015.
     Senator Dianne Feinstein,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Congressman Adam Schiff,
     Rayburn House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Congressman Michael McCaul,
     Cannon House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Senator Richard Burr,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
     Congressman Devin Nunes,
     Longworth House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Burr, Senator Feinstein, and Representatives 
     Nunes, Schiff, and McCaul: We are writing you today as 
     technologists, academics, and computer and network security 
     professionals who research, report on, and defend against 
     Internet security threats. Among us are antivirus and threat 
     signature developers, security researchers and analysts, and 
     system administrators charged with securing networks. We have 
     devoted our careers to building security technologies, and to 
     protecting networks, computers, and critical infrastructure 
     against a wide variety of even highly sophisticated attacks.
       We do not need new legal authorities to share information 
     that helps us protect our systems from future attacks. When a 
     system is attacked, the compromise will leave a trail, and 
     investigators can collect these bread crumbs. Some of that 
     data empowers other system operators to check and see if 
     they, too, have been attacked, and also to guard against 
     being similarly attacked in the future. Generally speaking, 
     security practitioners can and do share this information with 
     each other and with the federal government while still 
     complying with our obligations under federal privacy law.
       Significantly, threat data that security professionals use 
     to protect networks from future attacks is a far more narrow 
     category of information than those included in the bills 
     being considered by Congress, and will only rarely contain 
     private information. In those rare cases, we generally scrub 
     the data without losing the effectiveness of the threat 
     signature.
       These are some common categories of data that we share to 
     figure out if systems have been compromised (indicators of 
     compromise, or IoCs) and to mitigate future threats:
       Malware file names, code, and hashes
       Objects (code) that communicate with malware
       Compile times: data about the conversion of source code to 
     binary code
       File size
       File path location: where on the computer system malware 
     files are stored
       Registry keys: configuration settings for low-level 
     operating system and applications
       Memory process or running service information
       Attached to this letter is an actual example of a threat 
     signature containing data that helps system administrators 
     secure their networks. You'll see that the information does 
     not contain users' private information.
       Waiving privacy rights will not make security sharing 
     better. The more narrowly security practitioners can define 
     these IoCs and the less personal information that is in them, 
     the better. Private information about individual users is 
     often a detriment in developing threat signatures because we 
     need to be able to identify an attack no matter where it 
     comes from and no matter who the target is. Any bill that 
     allows for and results in significant sharing of personal 
     information could decrease the signal-to-noise ratio and make 
     IoCs less actionable.
       Further, sharing users' private information creates new 
     security risks. Here are just three examples: First, any IoC 
     that contains personal information exacerbates the danger of 
     false-positives, that innocent behavior will erroneously be 
     classified as a threat. Second, distribution of private data 
     like passwords could expose our users to unauthorized access, 
     since, unfortunately, many people use the same password 
     across multiple sites. Third, private data contained in 
     personal emails or other messages can be abused by criminals 
     developing targeted phishing attacks in which they masquerade 
     as known and trusted correspondents.
       For these reasons, we do not support any of the three 
     information sharing bills currently under consideration--the 
     Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), the Protecting 
     Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), or the National Cybersecurity 
     Protection Advancement Act of 2015. These bills permit 
     overbroad sharing far beyond the IoCs described above that 
     are necessary to respond to an attack, including all 
     ``harms'' of an attack. This excess sharing will not aid 
     cybersecurity, but would significantly harm privacy and could 
     actually undermine our ability to effectively respond to 
     threats.
       As a general rule, when we do need to share addressing 
     information, we are sharing the addresses of servers which 
     are used to host malware, or to which a compromised computer 
     will connect for the exfiltration of data. In these cases, 
     this addressing information helps potential victims block 
     malicious incoming connections. These addresses do not belong 
     to subscribers or customers of the victims of a security 
     breach or of our clients whose systems we are helping to 
     secure. Sharing this kind of addressing is a common current 
     practice. We do not see the need for new authorities to 
     enable this sharing.

[[Page S4007]]

       Before any information sharing bill moves further, it 
     should be improved to contain at least the following three 
     features:
       1. Narrowly define the categories of information to be 
     shared as only those needed for securing systems against 
     future attacks;
       2. Require firms to effectively scrub all personally 
     identifying information and other private data not necessary 
     to identify or respond to a threat; and
       3. Not allow the shared information to be used for anything 
     other than securing systems.
       We appreciate your interest in making our networks more 
     secure, but the legislation proposed does not materially 
     further that goal, and at the same time it puts our users' 
     privacy at risk. These bills weaken privacy law without 
     promoting security. We urge you to reject them.
           Sincerely,
       Ben Adida; Jacob Appelbaum, Security and privacy 
     researcher, The Tor Project; Sergey Bratus, Research 
     Associate Professor, Computer Science Department, Dartmouth 
     College; Eric Brunner-Williams, CTO, Wampumpeag; Dominique 
     Brezinski, Principal Security Engineer, Amazon.com; Jon 
     Callas; Katherine Carpenter, Independent Consultant; Antonios 
     A. Chariton, Security Researcher, Institute of Computer 
     Science, Foundation of Research and Technology--Hellas; 
     Stephen Checkoway, Assistant Research Professor, Johns 
     Hopkins University; Gordon Cook, Technologist, writer, editor 
     and publisher of ``COOK report on Internet Protocol'' since 
     1992; Shaun Cooley, Distinguished Engineer, Cisco; John 
     Covici, Systems Administrator, Covici Computer Systems; Tom 
     Cross, CTO, Drawbridge Networks; David L. Dill, Professor of 
     Computer Science, Stanford University; A. Riley Eller, Chief 
     Technology Officer, CoCo Communications Corp; Rik Farrow, 
     USENIX.
       Robert G. Ferrell, Special Agent (retired), U.S. Dept of 
     Defense; Kevin Finisterre, Owner, DigitalMunition; Bryan 
     Ford, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Yale 
     University; Dr. Richard Forno, Affiliate, Stanford Center for 
     Internet and Society; Paul Ferguson, Vice President, Threat 
     Intelligence; Jim Fruchterman, Benetech; Kevin Gennuso, 
     Information Security Professional; Dan Gillmor. Teacher and 
     technology writer; Sharon Goldberg, assistant professor, 
     Computer Science Department, Boston University; Joe Grand, 
     Principal Engineer, Grand Idea Studio, Inc.; Thaddeus T 
     Grugq, independent security researcher; J. Alex Halderman, 
     Morris Wellman Faculty Development Assistant Professor of 
     Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan, 
     Director, University of Michigan Center for Computer Security 
     and Society; Professor Carl Hewitt, Emeritus EECS MIT; Gary 
     Knott, PhD (Stanford CS, 1975), CEO, Civilized Software; Rich 
     Kulawiec, Senior Internet Security Architect, Fire on the 
     Mountain, LLC; Ryan Lackey; Product, CloudFlare, Inc.
       Ronald L. Larsen, Dean and Professor, School of Information 
     Sciences, University of Pittsburgh; Christopher Liljenstolpe, 
     Chief architect for AS3561 (at the time about 30% of the 
     Internet backbone by traffic) and AS1221 (Australia's main 
     Internet infrastructure); Ralph Logan, Partner, Logan Haile, 
     LP; Robert J. Lupo, Senior Security Engineer ``sales team'', 
     IBM inc.; Marc Maiffret, Former CTO BeyondTrust; Steve 
     Manzuik, Director of Security Research, Duo Security; Ryan 
     Maple. Information security professional; Brian Martin, 
     President Open Security Foundation (OSF); Morgan Marquis-
     Boire; Aaron Massey, Postdoctoral Fellow, School of 
     Interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology; 
     Andrew McConachie. Network engineer with experience working 
     on Internet infrastructure; Daniel L. McDonald, RTI Advocate 
     and Security Point-of-Contact, illumos Project; Alexander 
     McMillen, Mission critical datacenter and cloud services 
     expert; Charlie Miller, Security Engineer at Twitter; HD 
     Moore, Chief Research Officer, Rapid7.
       Joseph ``Jay'' Moran, Vice President of Cimpress Technology 
     Operations; Peter G. Neumann, Senior Principal Scientist, SRI 
     International Moderator of the ACM Risks Forum (risks.org); 
     Jesus Oquendo, Information Security Researcher, E-Fensive 
     Security Strategies; Ken Pfeil, CISO, Pioneer investments; 
     Benjamin C. Pierce, Professor of Computer and Information 
     Science, University of Pennsylvania; Ryan Rawdon, Network and 
     Security Engineer; Bruce Schneier, security researcher and 
     cryptographer, published seminal works on applied 
     cryptography; Sid Stamm, Ph.D., Principal Engineer, Security 
     and Privacy, Mozilla; Visiting Assistant Professor of 
     Computer Science, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology; 
     Armando Stettner, Technology Consultant; Matt Suiche, Staff 
     Engineer, VMware.
       C. Thomas (Space Rogue), Security Strategist Tenable 
     Network Security; Arrigo Triulzi, independent security 
     consultant; Doug Turner, Sr. Director--Privacy, Security, 
     Networking, Mozilla Corporation; Daniel Paul Veditz, 
     Principal Security Engineer, Mozilla, Co-chair Web 
     Application Security Working Group, W3C; David Wagner, 
     Professor of Computer Science, University of California, 
     Berkeley; Dan S. Wallach, Professor, Department of Computer 
     Science and Rice Scholar, Baker Institute for Public Policy, 
     Rice University; Jonathan Weinberg, Professor of Law, Wayne 
     State University; Stephen Wilson, Managing Director and 
     Founder, Lockstep Technologies; Chris Wysopal, CTO and co-
     founder Veracode, Inc.; Stefano Zanero, Board of Governors 
     member, IEEE Computer Society.

  Mr. WYDEN. The signers of the letter expressed very serious concerns 
about the legislation and were particularly concerned it would 
``significantly undermine privacy and civil liberties.'' Unfortunately, 
as the signers of the legislation will report, these concerns were not 
adequately addressed in the committee markup.
  Shortly after the committee markup, a group of 65 technologists and 
cyber security professionals wrote to Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman 
Feinstein expressing their opposition to this legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in 
the Record as well.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                    March 2, 2015.
     Chairman Richard Burr,
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.
     Vice Chairman, Dianne Feinstein,
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.
       Dear Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Feinstein, and Members of 
     the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: We the 
     undersigned civil society organizations, security experts, 
     and academics write to explain how the Cybersecurity 
     Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), would significantly 
     undermine privacy and civil liberties. We now know that the 
     National Security Agency (NSA) has secretly collected the 
     personal information of millions of users, and the revelation 
     of these programs has created a strong need to rein in, 
     rather than expand, government surveillance. CISA disregards 
     the fact that information sharing can--and to be truly 
     effective, must--offer both security and robust privacy 
     protections. The legislation fails to achieve these critical 
     objectives by including:
       Automatic NSA access to personal information shared with a 
     governmental entity;
       Inadequate protections prior to sharing;
       Dangerous authorization for countermeasures; and
       Overbroad authorization for law enforcement use.
       For the following reasons, we urge rejection of CISA in its 
     current form:
       Automatic NSA Access to Personal Information and 
     Communications: Since the summer of 2013, NSA surveillance 
     activities, such as the telephony metadata bulk collection 
     program and the PRISM program, have raised nationwide alarm. 
     CISA ignores these objections, and requires real time 
     dissemination to military and intelligence agencies, 
     including the NSA. Congress should be working to limit the 
     NSA's overbroad authorities to conduct surveillance, rather 
     than passing a bill that would increase the NSA's access to 
     personal information and private communications.
       Automatic sharing with NSA risks not only privacy, but also 
     effectiveness. During a recent House Intelligence Committee 
     hearing, NSA Director Admiral Mike Rogers stated that sharing 
     threat indicators without filtering out personal data would 
     slow operations and negatively impact NSA's cyber defense 
     activities. Further, in the wake of revelations regarding the 
     PRISM program, major tech companies stated that they would 
     not voluntarily share users' information with the NSA. 
     Automated NSA access could thus disincentivize sharing, 
     undercutting the key goal of the legislation.
       Inadequate Protections Prior to Sharing: CISA does not 
     effectively require private entities to strip out information 
     that identifies a specific person prior to sharing cyber 
     threat indicators with the government, a fundamental and 
     important privacy protection. While the bill requires that 
     companies ``review'' cyber threat indicators for information 
     that identifies a specific person and sometimes remove it, 
     the bill contains no standard to ensure that this review 
     effort is--at a minimum--reasonable.
       Further, the bill requires companies to remove that 
     information only for individuals that it knows are ``not 
     directly related to a cybersecurity threat.'' This could 
     encourage companies to retain data by default, unnecessarily 
     exposing the information of innocent bystanders and victims 
     to the government, and making it available to law enforcement 
     for a myriad of investigative uses. Legislation should 
     instead require that prior to sharing, companies make at 
     least a reasonable effort to identify all personally 
     identifiable information and, unless it is necessary to 
     counter the cyber threat before sharing any indicators with 
     the government, remove it. The default should be to preserve 
     privacy, rather than to sacrifice it.
       Dangerous Authorization for Countermeasures: CISA 
     authorizes countermeasures ``notwithstanding any law,'' 
     including the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. As 
     amended by CISA, federal law would permit companies to 
     retaliate against a perceived threat in a manner that may 
     cause significant harm, and undermine cybersecurity. CISA 
     provides that countermeasures must be ``operated on'' one's 
     own information systems, but may have off-networks effects--
     including harmful effects to external systems--so long as the 
     countermeasures do not ``intentionally'' destroy other 
     entities' systems. Given the risks of misattribution and

[[Page S4008]]

     escalation posed by offensive cyber activities--as well as 
     the potential for misappropriation--this is highly 
     inadvisable. CISA permits companies to recklessly deploy 
     countermeasures that damage networks belonging to innocent 
     bystanders, such as a hospital or emergency responders that 
     attackers use as proxies to hide behind, so long as the 
     deploying company does not intend that the countermeasure 
     result in harm. CISA's authorization would not only 
     inadvisably wipe away the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's 
     current prohibition against these activities, it would be 
     dangerous to internet security.
       Overbroad Law Enforcement Use: Law enforcement use of 
     information shared for cybersecurity purposes should be 
     limited to prosecuting specific cyber crimes identified in 
     the bill and preventing imminent loss of life or serious 
     bodily harm. CISA goes far beyond this, and permits law 
     enforcement to use information it receives for investigations 
     and prosecutions of a wide range of crimes involving any 
     level of physical force, including those that involve no 
     threat of death or significant bodily harm, as well as for 
     terrorism investigations, which have served as the basis for 
     overbroad collection programs, and any alleged violations of 
     various provisions of the Espionage Act. The lack of use 
     limitations creates yet another loophole for law enforcement 
     to conduct backdoor searches on Americans--including searches 
     of digital communications that would otherwise require law 
     enforcement to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. This 
     undermines Fourth Amendment protections and constitutional 
     principles.
       Cybersecurity legislation should be designed to increase 
     digital hygiene and identify and remediate advanced threats, 
     not create surveillance authorities that would compromise 
     essential privacy rights, and undermine security. 
     Accordingly, we urge that the Committee not approve this bill 
     without addressing these concerns.
       Thank you for your consideration,
       Civil Society Organizations--Access; American-Arab Anti-
     Discrimination Committee; American Library Association; 
     Advocacy for Principled Action in Government; American Civil 
     Liberties Union; Association of Research Libraries; Bill of 
     Rights Defense Committee; Brennan Center for Justice; Center 
     for Democracy & Technology; Center for National Security 
     Studies; Competitive Enterprise Institute; Constitutional 
     Alliance; The Constitution Project; Council on American 
     Islamic Relations; Cyber Policy Project; Defending Dissent 
     Foundation; Demand Progress; Electronic Frontier Foundation 
     Free Press Action Fund FreedomWorks; Liberty Coalition; 
     National Association of Criminal Defense; Lawyers; New 
     America's Open Technology Institute; Project on Government 
     Oversight; R Street Institute; Sunlight Foundation.
       Security Experts and Academics--Ben Adida, Cryptographer; 
     Jacob Appelbaum, The Tor Project; Alvaro Bedoya, Center on 
     Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law; Brian Behlendorf; 
     David J Farber, University of Pennsylvania; J. Alex 
     Halderman, University of Michigan; Joan Feigenbaum, Yale 
     University; Bryan Ford, Yale University; Matthew D. Green, 
     Johns Hopkins University; Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Technologist; 
     Susan Landau, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; Sascha 
     Meinrath, X-Lab; Peter G, Neumann, SRI International; Ronald 
     L. Rivest, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Phillip 
     Rogaway, University of California, Davis; Bruce Schneier, 
     Cryptographer and Security Specialist; Christopher Soghoian, 
     Technologist; Gene Spafford, Purdue University; Micah Sherr, 
     Georgetown University; Adam Shostack; Dan S. Wallach, Rice 
     University; Nicholas Weaver, University of California at 
     Berkeley.

  Mr. WYDEN. This is a particularly important letter. We have some of 
the most distinguished independent experts from across the country--
whether Amazon or Sysco, Stanford University, Dartmouth, some of the 
leading experts in the private sector and academia--expressing real 
concerns about this legislation and its House companion.
  From their letter:

       We appreciate your interest in making our networks more 
     secure, but the legislation proposed does not materially 
     further that goal, and at the same time it puts our users' 
     privacy at risk. These bills weaken privacy law without 
     promoting security. We urge you to reject them.

  The reason I want our colleagues to be aware that these distinguished 
scientists in Silicon Valley, and literally every corner of the 
country, are so concerned is that the American people want both 
security and liberty--and they understand the two are not mutually 
exclusive. What this distinguished group of experts has just said is 
this ``weaken[s] privacy law without promoting security.'' I hope the 
Senate will review what these experts are saying.
  Along the same lines, I note that the Christian Science Monitor 
recently polled a group of more than 78 high-profile security and 
privacy experts from across government, think tanks, and the private 
sector. With these experts, they asked if legislation along the lines 
of this bill--this bill which has been attached to the Defense 
authorization. These experts were asked if this legislation would 
significantly reduce security breaches, and 87 percent said it would 
not. Many of them noted--a concern I have noted in opposing the 
legislation--that incentivizing private companies to share information 
about security threats is a very worthwhile proposition, a worthwhile 
thing to do. But they go on to say that bills like this are going to 
have limited value in that area and would have significant negative 
consequences.
  Now, many of my colleagues may have some disagreement with some of 
the dozens and dozens of independent experts I have just mentioned. 
Some of them may agree with the 13 percent of those experts who said 
this bill will do a lot to reduce security breaches. That is their 
right, and that is what a good Senate debate would be all about. But 
what the Senate should not do is pretend that this legislation is 
uncontroversial and try to rush it through without substantial 
revisions and the chance for Senators on both sides of the aisle to be 
heard.
  Now, I think we all understand why some in the Senate would feel we 
have to move immediately on this issue and in effect be tempted to rush 
to action here. We have all understood there have been a number of 
recent high-profile hacks that have drawn attention to the need to 
improve our Nation's cyber security--and I don't disagree with the 
importance of that at all.
  For example, a major company in Oregon was hacked by the Chinese 
simply because they were trying to enforce their rights under trade 
law.
  So this is not some abstract issue for the people I represent. We 
have seen it in my home State.
  So these high-profile hacks, like the one we saw here recently, is 
obviously drawing attention to the need to improve cyber security. The 
recent compromise of a very large amount of Office of Personnel 
Management data is obviously the latest of these, but it is certainly 
not going to be the last.
  Every single time I read about these kind of hacks, what I do is--and 
I have a very talented staff from the Intelligence Committee and my own 
office to assist me--I try to reach out and talk to experts in the 
field about ways to improve cyber security. But that doesn't mean every 
single piece of legislation with the word ``cyber security'' in it is 
automatically a good idea that ought to be blessed without revision in 
the Senate.
  The fact is, this particular cyber security bill is largely focused 
on trying to make it more difficult for individuals to be able to take 
on corporations. I understand why the U.S. Chamber of Commerce likes it 
so much. They have always been concerned about the rights of the large 
corporations. Sometimes the inevitable is, well, we are concerned about 
the large corporations, let's make it harder for individuals to be able 
to get a fair shake in the marketplace. But in my judgment, the actual 
cyber security value of this bill would be very limited, and the 
consequences for those individuals who are trying to get a fair shake 
would be quite serious.
  I am going to turn in a moment to the substance of the CISA bill to 
explain why I consider it so problematic and why it needs a major 
revision. But first I am going to take just a few minutes to discuss 
proposals that I believe would actually make a difference in terms of 
improving American cyber security.
  First, the most effective way to improve cyber security is to ensure 
that network owners take responsibility for the security of their 
networks and effectively implement good security practices. This 
proposal was the centerpiece of a 2012 bill called the Lieberman-
Collins cyber security bill, and in my view that legislation was just a 
few changes away from being good cyber security law. Unfortunately, the 
notion of having the government create even voluntary standards for 
private companies was strongly opposed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
and the Congress has not revisited it since.
  Beyond ensuring that network owners take responsibility and implement 
good security practices, it is also important to ensure that government 
agencies do not deliberately weaken security standards.
  I know the Presiding Officer in the Senate has a great interest, as I 
do, in

[[Page S4009]]

innovation and American competitiveness. It is pretty hard--when we say 
the words: The American Government is actually thinking, as the FBI 
Director has talked about, about requiring companies to build 
weaknesses into their products--it is pretty hard to get your arms 
around this theory, not the least of which is the reason that once the 
good guys have the keys, the bad guys will also have the keys, which 
will facilitate cyber hacking.

  I have been skeptical of these statements from senior FBI officials 
suggesting that U.S. hardware and software companies should be 
required, as I would characterize it, to weaken the security of their 
products because encryption and other advanced security measures are a 
key part, a key compound of actually improving cyber security.
  I was pleased to see that in the other body, just last week, a new 
amendment from Representatives Massie and Lofgren to prevent the 
government from deliberately weakening encryption standards was voted 
on, and I am very hopeful the Senate will eventually follow suit. In 
fact, I offered that concept in the Intelligence Committee, and 
regrettably it did not pass.
  With regard to government-held data, it is absolutely imperative that 
Federal agencies receive the funding and expertise they need to develop 
and implement strong network security programs and to ensure that they 
have the technical and administrative controls in place to combat a 
wide range of cyber security threats.
  I also believe our government needs to be in a stronger position to 
recruit and retain a capable Federal cyber security workforce by 
ensuring that cyber security professionals can find opportunities in 
government that are as rewarding as those in the private sector. In 
order to ensure that there are enough professionals to fill positions 
in both the private sector and the government, it is obvious that there 
is going to need to be an investment in the education of the next 
generation of cyber security leaders.
  As we talk about responsible approaches to deal with these cyber 
issues, I would like to note that I consider the Consumer Privacy 
Protection Act--a piece of legislation initiated by Senator Leahy--to 
be another step in the right direction. This legislation creates a 
comprehensive approach to data security by requiring companies to build 
a cyber security program that can defend against cyber attacks and 
prevent data breaches. It also protects a wide range of personal 
information, not just name or financial account information but also 
online user names and passwords, information about a person's 
geolocation, and access to private digital photographs and videos.
  Unlike CISA, this legislation would, in my view, provide real tools 
to address the kinds of recent cyber attacks we have seen in the news, 
such as the celebrity photo hack. Unlike CISA, it would also empower 
individuals by requiring companies to notify consumers if their 
information has been lost and would protect the rights offered under 
some State laws for consumers to sue in the event of a privacy 
incident. The Consumer Privacy Protection Act is the right kind of 
responsible, thoughtful approach to cyber security, which is 
legislation that will help us get an added measure of security and 
public protection, while at the same time protecting the individual 
liberties and the privacy of our people.
  Finally, in my judgment, our country needs to be willing to impose 
consequences on foreign entities that attempt to hack into American 
networks and steal large quantities of valuable data. These hacks are 
undermining our national security, our economic competitiveness, and 
the personal privacy of huge numbers of Americans. These consequences 
should draw on the full range of American power, depending on the 
nature of the hack and the entity responsible.
  It would be a failure of American imagination to say that the only 
way to respond to foreign hacking is to have our military and 
intelligence agencies ``hack back,'' as the concept has been known, at 
the parties responsible. We are the most powerful country in the world, 
and our government has a wide variety of tools at its disposal, 
including economic sanctions, law enforcement, and multilateral 
diplomacy. And building a multifaceted strategy to deter foreign 
hacking is going to require all of those kinds of tools I have 
mentioned by way of articulating responsible steps to deal with cyber 
security, steps that protect both our security and liberty. All of 
those tools are ones we will have to draw on.
  Having laid out ways that the Senate on a bipartisan basis can 
improve cyber security, I want to turn to the proposal in detail that 
is now in front of the Senate. As I have said, I believe it makes sense 
to encourage private companies to share information about cyber 
security threats. Cyber is a problem. Sharing information can be 
useful, but it is also vital that information sharing not be bereft of 
privacy protections for law-abiding Americans.
  Cyber security is a problem. Information sharing is a plus. But let's 
make no mistake about it--an information-sharing bill that lacks 
privacy protections really is not a cyber security bill; it is a 
surveillance bill. That is what has been one of my major concerns about 
this legislation, that the legislation in front of the Senate--we 
talked about the flaws in the process, but substantively, if you have 
an information-sharing bill that lacks adequate privacy protections, it 
is a surveillance bill by another name.
  When the Senate Intelligence Committee voted on the CISA bill, I 
opposed it. I opposed it because I believe its insufficient privacy 
protections will lead to large volumes of Americans' personal 
information, personal information from law-abiding Americans who have 
done nothing wrong--that they will be faced with the prospect that 
their information is shared with the government even when that 
information is not needed for cyber security. When I say ``personal 
information,'' I am talking about the contents of emails, financial 
information, and what amounts to any data at all that is stored 
electronically.

  Some of my colleagues have stressed that companies will have a choice 
about whether to participate in this information-sharing part of the 
legislation. That is true, but while corporations will have a choice 
about whether to participate, they will be able to do so without the 
knowledge or consent of their customers, and they will receive broad 
liability protections when they do so. The CISA bill as written trumps 
all Federal privacy laws.
  Furthermore, once this information is shared with the government, 
government agencies will be permitted to use it for a wide variety of 
purposes unrelated to cyber security. The bill creates what I consider 
to be a double standard--really a bizarre double standard in that 
private information that is shared about individuals can be used for a 
variety of non-cyber security purposes, including law enforcement 
action against these individuals, but information about the companies 
supplying that information generally may not be used to police those 
companies.
  I will tell you, I think that will be pretty hard to explain at a 
townhall meeting in virtually any corner of America because I believe 
it is wrong to say that the privacy rights of corporations matter more 
than the privacy rights of individual Americans.
  I expect that some colleagues will say that it is not their intent to 
authorize this excessively broad collection. The argument will be that 
this is legislation to encourage companies to share information about 
actual cyber security threats, such as lines of malicious code and 
signatures of hostile cyber actors. Again, I would say to colleagues 
that I am all for encouraging companies to share information about 
genuine security threats, but if you read the language that is now 
before the Senate in the cyber security bill, the language of that bill 
is much broader than just sharing information about genuine security 
threats.
  If Senators want to pass a bill that is focused on real cyber 
security threats and includes real protection for Americans' privacy, 
then the Senate should add language specifying that companies should 
only provide the government with individuals' personal information if 
it is necessary to describe a cyber security threat. That does not seem 
to me to be an unreasonable protection for the privacy of Americans, 
that the Senate would adopt language specifying that the companies 
provide the government with individuals' personal information if it is 
necessary to

[[Page S4010]]

describe a cyber threat. That is pretty obvious.
  We can explain that, I would say to the distinguished President of 
the Senate, at a townhall meeting, that if it is related to a cyber 
security threat, then the companies would provide individuals' personal 
information. But this would discourage companies from unnecessarily 
sharing large amounts of their customers' private information with the 
government.
  Unfortunately, the cyber security bill in front of the Senate now 
takes the opposite approach. It only requires companies to withhold 
information that is known at the time of sharing to be personal 
information unrelated to cyber security. This approach will clearly 
discourage companies from closely reviewing the information that they 
share and will lead to a much greater amount of Americans' personal 
information being transferred needlessly to government agencies.
  I hope that here in the Senate there will be an opportunity to 
carefully consider the potential consequences of this legislation 
before voting to rush it through by an expedited process.
  I have said here several times that cyber security is a real problem, 
and policymakers are going to have to deal with it. In fact, I will go 
so far as to say that the issue of cyber security is going to be an 
ongoing and enduring challenge of the digital age. It is my view that 
every Senator who serves in this body today can expect to deal with 
cyber security questions for the rest of their career in public 
service. Voting to rush a bill through, however, is not going to make 
these problems somehow go away, and it will have real consequences for 
our constituents for years to come, and in particular, it will not make 
us safer and will jeopardize the rights of individual Americans.
  Before I wrap up, I believe it is important and I have an obligation 
to draw my colleagues' attention to one final issue. As of this 
afternoon, there is a secret Justice Department legal opinion that is 
of clear relevance to this debate that continues to be withheld from 
the public. This opinion remains classified. The Senate rules prohibit 
me from describing it in detail. But I can say that it interprets 
common commercial service agreements and that in my judgment is 
inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law.
  So this gets back to a question I have talked about on the floor 
often, which is secret law, when the public reads one thing and there 
is a secret interpretation that goes in another direction and it 
contributes to the public's cynicism about Washington.
  As always, I certainly see it as my job to say that colleagues can 
decide whether to take my counsel, but I believe any Senator who votes 
for this legislation, without reading this secret Justice Department 
legal opinion I have referred to, is voting without a full 
understanding of the relevant legal landscape. If Senators do not 
understand how these common commercial service agreements have been 
interpreted by the executive branch, then it will be harder for the 
Senate to have a fully informed debate on the cyber security 
legislation, whether it is considered now or later.
  I would also like to note for the record that I have repeatedly asked 
the Justice Department to withdraw this opinion and to make it public 
so anyone who is party to one of these commercial service agreements 
can decide whether their agreement ought to be revised. The Justice 
Department has chosen not to take my advice on either of my 
suggestions.
  In public testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the 
deputy head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel told me 
she personally would not rely on this opinion today, and I appreciate 
her view on that matter. Yet, until the opinion is withdrawn, I believe 
Senators should be concerned about other government officials choosing 
to rely on it at any time. In my judgment, that is a very clear 
instance of the government developing what is essentially secret law--
law that is at variance with what you read if you are in a coffee shop 
in Arkansas or Utah or anywhere else.
  The reality is, as I have said often on the floor, operations always 
have to be secret, as do the sources and methods. Chairman Hatch 
remembers this from his service on the Intelligence Committee. 
Operations always have to be secret, but the law ought to be public 
because that is how the American people have confidence in how we make 
decisions in our Republic.
  I will close by saying it is quite obvious at this point that I have 
significant reservations about the cyber security bill. I believe a 
number of Senators are going to share these concerns. I will let them 
speak for themselves, although I believe Senator Leahy's strong 
statement yesterday was certainly on point. Yet I will also say, even 
to my colleagues who are inclined to vote for this bill, that I hope 
all Senators will think about whether this is an appropriate process 
for this sort of legislation.
  I have already said I believe Senators are going to be dealing with 
cyber security questions for the rest of their time in public service, 
because in the digital age, I think we are going to see a constant 
evolution in this field with respect to these threats and both the 
technical and political concerns that are raised by them.
  Should the Senate be rushing a bill like this through by tacking it 
onto an unrelated defense measure? Is this the best way to show the 
American people, once again, that security and liberty are not mutually 
exclusive and that it is possible to do both?
  If Senators share the concerns I have raised, I hope they will oppose 
the cyber security amendment if it is brought up for a vote on the 
Defense bill. I hope Senators will support this issue, which has been 
brought to the floor under a different process--a process that involves 
regular order, so every Senator on both sides of the aisle will have an 
opportunity to make the revisions I believe it needs and to offer their 
own ideas.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Boozman). The Senator from Utah.


                       Trade Promotion Authority

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as the House of Representatives moves 
closer to a vote on the Senate-passed legislation to renew trade 
promotion authority, I wish to take a few minutes to talk about the 
links between our Nation's trade policy, foreign policy, and national 
security. Whether it is Russia's aggression toward the Ukraine, civil 
wars in the Middle East or ongoing efforts to prevent nuclear 
proliferation, the world faces a number of challenges that are 
impacting the future geopolitical landscape.
  In all of this, the question we have to consider is: Going forward, 
what role will the United States play? Are we going to lead or are we 
going to follow?
  Make no mistake, the path we take on international trade will say a 
lot about how we plan to answer those questions.
  Consider a few facts. In the next few years, China will likely pass 
the United States as the world's largest economy. It is already the 
world's largest exporting country. China is continually seeking to 
expand its influence in order to dictate the terms of international 
trade, particularly in places like Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, 
and Latin America.
  In other words, when we are talking about trade and the possibility 
of the United States retreating from the international marketplace, 
China is the proverbial 800-pound gorilla in the room. Indeed, any 
ground we cede in leading the world on trade is, more likely than not, 
ground ceded to China.
  I have heard many people--including Members of Congress--express 
their concerns about China, both strategically and economically, and 
rightfully so. After all, when it comes to trade, China has constantly 
shown a disregard for international norms and standards. However, oddly 
enough, many of those same people who talk the most about the threat 
posed by China have expressed opposition to TPA, the trade promotion 
authority bill, and to the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP. This is 
puzzling and reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Senate TPA 
bill and free trade in general.
  If we are serious about keeping China and its growing economic and 
political influence in check, getting a strong TPP agreement that 
advances U.S. interests should be a top priority. In addition, if we 
want to eventually convince China to change their harmful practices, a 
high-standard TPP agreement would naturally be a big step in the right 
direction.

[[Page S4011]]

  Free-trade agreements like TPP, if done correctly, should provide new 
rules for trade in the 21st century. They should set modern standards 
for economic liberalization and integration, including the protection 
of foreign investments and intellectual property rights and the 
marginalization of state-owned enterprises.
  We need to be setting the standards and writing the rules on trade so 
our workers, innovators, researchers, and job creators can fairly 
compete in the global market. If we don't lead, if we sit on the 
sidelines, Americans will be competing on an imbalanced playing field, 
with rules designed specifically to disadvantage us. Given that TPP 
countries comprise 40 percent of the world economy, it is vital we 
improve our ability to compete in that region.

  Moreover, if TPP fails, we will lose influence in one of the most 
economically dynamic and strategic regions of the world, and any 
leadership vacuum left by the United States will almost certainly be 
filled by someone else and, in this case, most likely China.
  But don't just take my word for it. Congress recently received a 
letter from 17 former Secretaries of Defense and retired military 
leaders, including Colin Powell, Leon Panetta, William Perry, and 
Donald Rumsfeld.
  In that letter, these leaders said:

       We write to express our strongest possible support for 
     enactment of Trade Promotion Authority legislation, which is 
     critical to the successful conclusion of two vital 
     agreements: the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
     Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
     Indeed, TPP in particular will shape an economic dynamic over 
     the next several decades that will link the United States 
     with one of the world's most vibrant and dynamic regions. If, 
     however, we fail to move forward with TPP, Asian economies 
     will almost certainly develop along a China-centric model. In 
     fact, China is already pursuing an alternative regional free 
     trade initiative. TPP, combined with TTIP, would allow the 
     United States and our closest allies to help shape the rules 
     and standards for global trade.

  The concerns outlined in this letter went beyond China.
  The letter continues:

       The stakes are clear. There are tremendous strategic 
     benefits to TPP and TTIP, and there would be harmful 
     strategic consequences if we fail to secure these agreements. 
     In both the Asia-Pacific and the Atlantic, our allies and 
     partners would question our commitments, doubt our resolve, 
     and inevitably look to other partners. America's prestige, 
     influence, and leadership are on the line. With TPP 
     originating in the Bush administration, these agreements are 
     fundamentally bipartisan in nature and squarely in our 
     national security interest. It is vitally important that we 
     seize the new strategic opportunities these agreements offer 
     our nation.

  When 17 former Secretaries of Defense, admirals, and generals who 
served under both Republican and Democratic administrations have joined 
together with such a strong message, they probably have a point, and 
Congress had better listen closely.
  Many people, including a number of our colleagues in Congress, 
continually argue that one of the best uses of American power would be 
to better promote human rights and democracy in developing countries 
and increase our efforts at alleviating poverty. I don't necessarily 
disagree with that sentiment.
  Indeed, while there are different opinions about how we can best 
accomplish these goals, I think most of us in Congress, in both the 
Senate and the House, agree with the basic premise that we should 
continually be working to expand our influence and advance our values, 
particularly in the developing world.
  History has demonstrated that the best way to accomplish these 
objectives is to increase U.S. trade with these countries. Indeed, if 
we want to export the benefits of American exceptionalism, capitalism, 
work ethic, and democracy, a freer, expanded exchange of goods is 
absolutely the best way to do it.
  Trade is an effective exercise of America's economic power and 
influence, trade is how you spread capitalism and encourage other 
countries to open their economies, trade is how you export American 
values in the developing world, and, most importantly, trade is how you 
counter the growing influence of countries like China in the world 
economy.
  The stakes are high. The importance of TPP and other trade agreements 
to our strategic and security interests is obvious, and given that 
reality, the importance of TPA should be just as obvious.
  Put simply, without TPA, there is no TPP. That is just a fact. Sure, 
technically speaking, TPA is not required for the administration to 
complete negotiations and send the agreement to Congress, but 
technicalities aside, that route is unlikely to yield a desirable 
result, both in terms of the substance and process.
  Japan and Canada, two of our largest trading partners in the TPP 
negotiations, have each stated they are reluctant to bring their final 
offers to the table until Congress provides the administration with 
TPA. Trade promotion authority assures our trading partners that if 
they reach an agreement, it will not be unraveled when it is sent to 
Congress for approval. This allows our negotiators to get the best deal 
possible.
  TPA also ensures that Congress has a meaningful role in crafting the 
specifics of the agreement by setting objectives, mandating 
transparency, and requiring periodic updates. Under the Senate-passed 
bill, Congress will have more authority than ever to review and respond 
to the administration on individual trade agreements.
  Long story short, TPA is absolutely necessary for advancing U.S. 
interests abroad and protecting the opportunities for millions of 
Americans to earn and compete for a livelihood in an increasingly 
global trade environment.
  With the House TPA vote set to take place in a matter of days, I hope 
our colleagues in the other Chamber will recognize the strategic and 
economic realities we face as a country and be willing to advance our 
Nation's interests and security. I am confident that most of them will 
make the right choice, and it will be good for America as well as them.


                       Child Support Enforcement

  Mr. President, I wish to take a few minutes to speak about another 
matter of great importance not just to me but to everybody.
  Last year, after the midterm elections, the Obama administration 
quietly and without much fanfare proposed a massive, far-reaching rule 
that would overturn a number of bedrock principles of child support 
enforcement and welfare reform, chief among them being the principle 
that parents should be financially responsible for their children.
  This was just the latest attempt on the part of the Obama 
administration to bypass Congress and work to enact policies through 
executive fiat. Sadly, it wasn't even the first time this 
administration tried to gut welfare reform. Indeed, we all remember a 
few years back when the administration granted itself the unprecedented 
authority to waive critical welfare work requirements.
  Put simply, this latest rule would make it easier for noncustodial 
parents to evade paying child support. It would undermine a key feature 
of welfare reform, which is that single mothers can avoid welfare if 
fathers comply with child support orders.
  I am fundamentally opposed to policies that allow parents to abdicate 
their responsibilities, which, in return, results in more families 
having to go on welfare. I think most Americans would agree with me. 
That is why I, joined by Senator Cornyn and House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, have introduced legislation that would 
prevent the Obama administration from bypassing Congress in yet another 
attempt to subvert key features of welfare reform. I regret that we 
must take this action.
  In the past, Members of Congress have generally been able to find 
common ground and work on a bipartisan basis to address issues relating 
to child support. In fact, Congress recently passed, and the President 
recently signed legislation, that made improvements to child support 
enforcement policies.
  In 2013, the Senate Finance Committee reported a series of ambitious 
proposals related to child support enforcement. At that time, we 
requested input on these proposals from the Obama administration. At no 
time did administration officials indicate that the Department of 
Health and Human Services was quietly working to advance a massive 
overhaul of child support enforcement, much less that it was planning 
on doing so without the help or input of Congress.
  It is important to note that this secretive preparation only came to 
light

[[Page S4012]]

after the recent elections. That suggests to me that the administration 
does not have faith that its proposal can withstand public scrutiny and 
that they have no interest in making a full and transparent 
justification for the policies they are trying to ram through.
  Truth be told, Chairman Ryan and I have introduced our legislation 
more out of sorrow than anger. For many months, our offices attempted 
to work out an equitable arrangement with the Obama administration. We 
tried to convince HHS to withdraw the problematic features of the rule, 
and in exchange we would agree to engage in a substantive, productive 
discussion on how to move forward with improvements to child support 
enforcement.
  I firmly believe there is room for common ground. In fact, there are 
a number of features of the administration's proposed rule that could 
generate bipartisan support. But any workable solution would have to 
include the full participation and ultimate consent of the legislative 
branch. Any changes to the law would have to go through Congress and 
not simply be dictated by the administration.
  So Chairman Ryan and I will do all we can to get our bill through 
Congress and present it to the President. If we are successful, I hope 
he will sign it and commit to working with us in the future to advance 
reforms to child support enforcement. I stand ready to work with the 
administration and any of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and 
both sides of the Capitol to achieve this goal.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1986

   (Purpose: To reauthorize and reform the Export-Import Bank of the 
                             United States)

  Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Kirk, I send an 
amendment to the desk to the text proposed to be stricken by amendment 
No. 1463.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Ms. Ayotte], for Mr. Kirk, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 1986 to the language proposed 
     to be stricken by amendment No. 1463.

  Ms. AYOTTE. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of 
Amendments.'')
  Ms. AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I rise today to talk about an important amendment that was offered by 
Senator Kirk, which I cosponsor, and that is the reauthorization of the 
Export-Import Bank.
  I can tell you that in my home State of New Hampshire, on Monday, I 
was at a roundtable at GE Aviation. GE Aviation has over 700 jobs in 
the State of New Hampshire. They are building a new facility there. The 
Export-Import Bank provides a company like GE Aviation the opportunity 
to obtain financing to export its products that are manufactured in the 
United States of America, in New Hampshire, to other countries 
overseas, increasing the opportunity for American manufacturing jobs.
  At that company, on Monday, they invited a lot of their suppliers and 
small businesses who also have either used Ex-Im financing or are 
suppliers for the larger companies that use Ex-Im financing.
  One of those companies that were around the table that had used Ex-Im 
financing in New Hampshire was Boyle Energy in Concord. In fact, Mike 
Boyle, who is the CEO of Boyle Energy, has been able to use Ex-Im 
financing to grow New Hampshire jobs. He has a vision for a new plant 
in Merrimack, NH, that he is ready to expand. If he can get this 
financing, he is going to be selling more of his great products 
overseas, creating more jobs in New Hampshire.
  Yet, this Bank expires at the end of June. This is a very important 
tool for American businesses. This program--and I wish I had this 
problem with every program in Washington--actually returns money to the 
Treasury, and it creates American jobs.
  The reason this type of financing is available is because of the risk 
that is often taken in exporting products and there aren't commercial 
loans always available. The Ex-Im Bank has the ability to allow 
financing for our businesses in America. In fact, other countries 
around the world have programs such as this, and that are much more 
extensive. So without the Ex-Im Bank, it is not a level playing field 
for our American companies that want to manufacture in the United 
States of America. The Ex-Im Bank will allow access to financing that 
will enable businesses to create American jobs.
  Also around that table on Monday at GE Aviation was Goss 
International. They manufacture great printing presses in New 
Hampshire. We are very proud of them. They have also been able to use 
Ex-Im financing. If that financing doesn't go through, we heard from a 
representative of Goss that, in fact, they could lose up to 40 jobs in 
my home State of New Hampshire. So it is important that we reauthorize 
this Bank.
  I want to thank the Senator from Illinois for offering this amendment 
to reauthorize the Ex-Im Bank so that our companies here in the United 
States of America can manufacture here, sell to consumers around the 
world, and have access to this financing. In fact, in New Hampshire 
there have been about 36 companies--many of them small companies--that 
were able over the last several years to use Ex-Im financing to create 
New Hampshire jobs.
  This is about jobs in the United States of America. This is about 
competing. We recently had the TPA--trade promotion authority--on the 
floor to expand opportunities for trade. This goes hand in hand with 
that legislation so that companies have opportunities to get financing 
to create jobs here and return money to the Treasury. I wish I could 
say that about every program--that it returns money to the Treasury. 
The default rate at Ex-Im Bank is lower than with commercial loans.
  I hope that Senator Kirk's amendment will get a vote on the Senate 
floor, that we can get this reauthorized before the expiration date at 
the end of this month, and that we can continue to allow this financing 
for American businesses to continue to build and create products to 
sell overseas and to create American jobs. This is what this financing 
allows these businesses to do. This is very important in making sure 
that we remain competitive and that we have more jobs here and that we 
continue to sell our great products built here in the United States of 
America around the world.
  So I am very honored to support this amendment. I hope we will get a 
vote on this amendment on the Defense authorization bill or get a vote 
and make sure that we have this passed before the end of this month 
when this Bank expires so that we could have continuity in this 
important financing mechanism for our businesses here in this country.
  In addition to the businesses I previously mentioned that were around 
the table on Monday, I also want to mention GKN Aerospace from 
Charleston, which is a larger business with a smaller footprint in New 
Hampshire that has been able to export and create jobs in New Hampshire 
and across the country. In addition to that, we were so glad to hear 
from other businesses in New Hampshire that were able to rely on this 
important financing mechanism.
  I am very glad to support Senator Kirk's amendment.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.


                           Space Program Cut

  Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I just learned that the CJS subcommittee 
of the Appropriations Committee reported a bill out that made a 
substantial cut in the request for commercial crew in order for us to 
be able to have Americans flying on American rockets to and from the 
International Space Station, instead of having to rely on the Russian 
Soyuz, which we buy and have been buying those ever since we shut down 
the space shuttle at something like $60 million to $70 million per

[[Page S4013]]

passenger going up to the space station.
  Now, the whole idea was that since we cooperated with the Russians in 
building this space station, we would both have the means of 
transportation to get up there. We do have the means of transportation 
of getting cargo to and from the space station, since we shut down the 
space shuttle, but we are in the process of a competition between 
several companies--especially those that have been selected in the 
competition by NASA, Boeing and SpaceX. Each of them has been granted 
money to develop all of the redundancies and safety and escape systems 
in their spacecraft capsule in order to make it safe for Americans to 
go to and from the International Space Station.
  Now, I can tell you that for the average American on the street, 
their image of our space program is one that since the space shuttle 
shut down in 2011, they think the space program is over, when, in fact, 
it is really just beginning, and we are going to Mars in the decade of 
the 2030s. Well, that is the whole point of our being able to rely on 
our own spacecraft and on our own rockets, instead of relying on the 
Russians.
  If this cut is sustained--and this is a cut from a request of $1.24 
billion for this competition for making American rockets safe and 
creating the spacecraft to take Americans to the space station--it will 
have been cut to $900 million. If that cut in the subcommittee is 
sustained in the full committee and ultimately in the final 
appropriations bill, it is going to delay us from being able to launch 
Americans on American rockets.
  Instead of 2017--just 2 years from now--it will delay us another 4 
years. That is 4 more years of relying on the Russians. Now, I know 
there are a bunch of Senators around here that do not like the fact of 
the aggressiveness of Vladimir Putin. Well, this is one way to wean 
ourselves from having to depend on them.
  The final comment on this subject is that the money that supposedly 
is being cut, which is just a little over $300 million, we would lose 
in still paying that money to the Russians to fly an additional 2 
years. We need to wake up to what is happening. Senator Mikulski will 
be offering an amendment to the full Appropriations Committee to 
restore that cut. I hope Senators will understand all the nuances and 
support Senator Mikulski.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). The Senator from Illinois.


                           Amendment No. 1986

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I seek to speak on my amendment on behalf of 
the Export-Import Bank. I would like to say the Export-Import Bank is 
set to expire this year on June 30. It allows thousands of American 
companies to advance their technology overseas. Without these loans, 
many American jobs would be ceded to China or Europe.
  Now, 200,000 American workers depend on Ex-Im, plus 46,000 in my home 
State of Illinois. They work for these companies that depend on Ex-Im's 
backing to make exports happen. Some people are interested in killing 
this agency because it may be a government handout agency. It is not. 
It actually makes the taxpayer $1 billion a year. In the last 3 years, 
it has earned the U.S. Treasury over $3 billion.
  I will be offering the Kirk-Heitkamp amendment to keep this Bank 
alive. I want to thank Senators Blunt, Cantwell, and Manchin for 
defending these American jobs.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about the National Defense 
Authorization Act. This is legislation we are currently considering 
that we need to pass. It is important for our military, and it is 
important for the American people. I have offered a number of 
amendments, and I rise to speak about three of those amendments at this 
point.
  The first is amendment No. 1483, which involves RPA flight training. 
Essentially, amendment No. 1483 would instruct the Air Force to 
consider allowing private contractors to provide the Air Force with 
training for remotely piloted aircraft or RPAs. These are the vehicles 
used in unmanned aerial systems, commonly called UAS.
  Currently, the Air Force is training pilots for RPAs, remotely 
piloted aircraft, within the service itself. But there are some very 
skilled private contractors. In fact, the people who make unmanned 
aircraft could be doing high-quality training for them as well, 
particularly in concert with our universities that provide aviation 
training.
  Right now the Air Force faces a real challenge in training a 
sufficient number of unmanned aircraft pilots to meet operational 
demands. Specifically, this amendment directs the Air Force to evaluate 
the use of private contractor facilities, equipment, and trainers to 
increase the number of qualified pilots for our RPA missions. It 
requires the Air Force to detail various aspects of their shortfall in 
manning RPAs, the authorized number of personnel assigned to the 
missions, and the identification and assessment of actions to address 
that shortfall.
  In this rapidly growing era of unmanned aerial systems technology, it 
just makes sense for the military to partner with companies and 
universities that have the expertise to provide the critical training 
the military needs. It is cost effective. It is efficient. It is good 
for the military and our country. Right now the demand for unmanned 
aerial systems is so strong worldwide that the Air Force has all of its 
pilots flying the missions. That does not give them the resources, the 
pilots to train more pilots to fly unmanned aerial systems.
  So this is a way that we can help the Air Force train these new 
pilots with the very contractors that make things such as Global Hawk, 
Predator and with our universities that provide aviation training. I 
think it would be of great benefit and assistance to the Air Force.
  The second amendment that I want to talk about is amendment No. 1484. 
This one seeks to give the Air National Guard units a larger role in 
the Global Hawk unmanned aerial systems mission. Specifically, this 
measure directs the Air Force to determine the feasibility of 
partnering the Air National Guard with Active-Duty Air Force to operate 
and maintain the Global Hawk. The RQ-4 Global Hawks, including the 
Block 20, Block 30, and Block 40 variants, are the Air Force's high-
altitude, long-endurance aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance.
  They are currently operated and maintained only by Active-Duty 
forces. But the Air National Guard could be providing a valuable 
adjunct to the Air Force's regular personnel if we allow them to do 
that. The North Dakota Air National Guard, for example, already 
operates and maintains the armed MQ-1 Predator, and does it 
exceptionally well. They and units like them are clearly capable of 
taking on part of the Global Hawk mission, in association with their 
Active-Duty counterparts.
  This amendment would further the joint operations which have been a 
major initiative of all of the armed services, the Guard, and the 
Reserves in recent years, and they have done a tremendous job on 
jointness. It has made our military stronger, more effective, and more 
responsive. We need to continue to build on that joint operation. That 
is exactly what this amendment does.
  The third amendment that I would like to discuss is amendment No. 
1485. It regards the Nuclear Force Improvement Program. This amendment 
seeks to fortify the Nuclear Force Improvement Program, or NFIP, which 
I believe is crucial to our national security both now and well into 
the future. The reality is that we are facing an increasingly 
nuclearized future. Nations such as Iran, North Korea, and others have 
or are developing nuclear weapons.
  That means we must maintain a credible, decisive nuclear deterrent. 
That is what the Nuclear Force Improvement Program is all about. In 
2014, the Air Force initiated the program to bolster and enhance its 
nuclear missions, including the intercontinental ballistic missile, 
ICBM, and nuclear-capable bomber missions. The program involves a wide 
range of efforts to improve morale, update facilities and equipment, 
and reinvigorate the nuclear-related career fields in the Air Force.
  We need to continue to invest in and build this program. 
Specifically, my amendment provides that the nuclear mission should be 
a top priority for the

[[Page S4014]]

Department of Defense and the Air Force; that Congress should support 
investments which sustain progress made under the Nuclear Force 
Improvement Program; that the Air Force should regularly inform 
Congress on the program's progress and any additional requirements it 
may identify; and that future Air Force budgets should reflect the 
importance of the nuclear mission and the need to support personnel 
performing the nuclear mission.
  The bottom line is that the men and women assigned to the nuclear 
mission in the U.S. Air Force are doing incredibly important work every 
day for the security of our country. We need to do all we can to 
support them. We need to provide them with the support they deserve so 
they can continue to do the job we ask them to do and do it at the 
level that our security requires.
  The Nuclear Force Improvement Program is a success, and the Air Force 
needs to extend it into the future and continue to shore up the 
foundations of our nuclear deterrent, which is, itself, at the 
foundation of national security.
  In conclusion, let me say that working on legislation as essential as 
the defense of our Nation is and should be a bipartisan effort. The 
Senate Armed Services Committee passed this bill out of committee with 
a bipartisan vote of 22 to 4. Let's come together and do this for the 
American people and the men, women, and families who have undertaken 
the great and noble effort to protect our country.
  I want to thank both the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and 
the ranking member for their hard work, for their bipartisanship, and, 
again, offer my support as we work to pass this vitally important 
legislation for our military and for this great country.
  I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. President, I wish to tell you a little bit about 
Gregg Keesling, a dad and small business owner from Indianapolis. I 
have gotten to know Gregg over the past few years because Gregg and his 
wife Jannett lost their son Chancellor to suicide while Chancellor was 
serving in Iraq in 2009, joining a club he often says he doesn't want 
anyone else to join.
  On the poster, this is Gregg and this is Chancellor. This is 
Chancellor again, on duty. This is the memorial they had for 
Chancellor.
  Gregg recently said that he sees the invisible wounds borne by our 
men and women in uniform as ``one of the greatest challenges that our 
country faces.'' And he noted that ``we're going to face this challenge 
for many years to come.'' Gregg is right. We have lost more troops to 
suicide than in combat each of the past 3 years. We lost more than 400 
Active-Duty, Guard, and Reserve servicemembers last year alone. It is 
also estimated that we lose 22 veterans to suicide every single day. 
These are preventable deaths.
  We must do more to get these men and women the mental health care 
they have earned. We need to remind our troops and veterans, along with 
our friends and family, that it is OK to share the burden of their 
personal struggles. It is a sign of strength to seek help. Our 
servicemembers, veterans, and their families sacrifice for us, so we 
must do everything possible to support them.
  Last year we passed and the President signed into law the Jacob 
Sexton Military Suicide Prevention Act, which for the first time 
requires an annual, in-person mental health assessment for all 
servicemembers, whether they are Active, Guard, or Reserve. Just like 
physical health, mental health is an essential piece of military 
readiness. We need to have an attitude of all-in toward providing 
support for mental health challenges and also for the day-to-day 
struggles we know contribute to suicide risk, such as financial 
problems, relationship issues--things that are never made easier by 
military life.
  The Sexton act was named for a member of the Indiana National Guard 
who took his own life while home on leave from Afghanistan in 2009. 
Jeff and Barb Sexton, Jacob's parents, have been incredible partners in 
this work. Jeff recently spoke about the decision he and his wife made 
to speak out about military suicide.
  This is SPC Jake Sexton. Here he is in his Humvee, and here he is 
serving as well. His parents, Jeff and Barb--actually, it was Jeff in 
particular, his dad, who said:

       I had three choices: I could crawl in a corner, I could 
     crawl in a bottle or I could stand up and fight. It's not 
     been an easy job, but it's something I feel me and my wife 
     have to do.

  The Keeslings and the Sextons are courageously telling their stories 
to help prevent any more families from going through this nightmare. 
Congress needs to continue to answer their call. This is an issue we 
cannot let up on because there is so much more important work to do.
  This year, we are taking the next step in the continuum of care and 
focusing on improving the quality of and access to mental health care 
through Department of Defense providers, VA providers, and private 
community providers.
  This year, we introduced the servicemember and veteran mental health 
care package--three bills. Each improves access to quality mental 
health care for servicemembers and veterans. The care package aims to 
improve mental health care by focusing on direct care providers at DOD 
and VA, community providers in their own towns, and the training of 
physician assistants as mental health providers.
  I thank Chairman McCain and Senator Reed for working with me to 
include elements of the care package in the national defense bill, 
specifically those elements which deal with DOD and care for 
servicemembers.
  I wish to go through the care package provisions in the NDAA briefly 
and offer two amendments to ensure that these provisions support not 
only servicemembers but also veterans.
  First, section 716 is based on the first of our care package bills, 
the Community Provider Readiness Recognition Act. It is cosponsored by 
my friend, Senator Joni Ernst, and it creates a special military-
friendly designation for providers who choose to receive training in 
military culture and the unique needs of servicemembers and military 
families. Providers who receive this designation would be listed in a 
regularly updated online registry, allowing servicemembers to search 
for designated providers in their area.
  This bill is inspired by the Star Behavioral Health Provider Network, 
which is a program that the Military Family Research Institute at 
Purdue University built in Indiana to train providers to better 
understand military culture and medical treatments. Designating a 
provider as part of the Star Behavioral Health Provider Network helps 
servicemembers and their families make informed choices about where to 
seek care. This can easily be translated on a national scale so that 
servicemembers, veterans, and their families know which private mental 
health care providers are well-suited and trained to treat them.
  Mr. President, second, section 713 of the NDAA is drawn from another 
care package bill, the Military and Veterans Mental Health Provider 
Assessment Act, cosponsored by my friend Senator Roger Wicker of 
Mississippi.
  This legislation requires that all of DOD primary care and mental 
health providers have received evidence-based training on suicide risk 
recognition and management and that their training be updated to keep 
pace with changes in mental health care best practices.
  It also requires DOD to report to Congress on the military's current 
mental health workforce, the long-term mental health needs of 
servicemembers and military families, and how we ensure DOD meets those 
needs.
  Finally, it requires the Department of Defense to bring us a plan to 
assess mental health outcomes in DOD care, variations in outcomes 
across different DOD health care facilities, and barriers to DOD mental 
health providers implementing the best clinical practice guidelines and 
other evidence-based treatments.
  Finally, by including elements from the Frontline Mental Health 
Provider Training Act, cosponsored by my friend Senator John Boozman 
from Arkansas, the NDAA calls on the Department of

[[Page S4015]]

Defense to train physician assistants to specialize in psychiatric care 
in order to help meet the increasing demand for mental health services 
among servicemembers and their families. We are also working to extend 
the same spectrum of care to our veterans, and we are working toward a 
hearing on the corresponding veterans bills for this mental health care 
package in the months ahead. These are smart, bipartisan provisions 
that address one of the most serious challenges facing our military, 
our veterans and our country.
  We must improve the mental health care at the Department of Defense 
and the Veterans' Administration and at private community providers 
from Ellsworth, ME, to Evansville, IN, to the shores of California so 
they are better able to serve our servicemembers, veterans, and their 
families. It is absolutely essential that we have coordination and 
continuity for servicemembers and their families as they transition to 
veteran status.
  I will leave you with a couple of brief thoughts from two brave 
Hoosiers I have the privilege to know and have gotten to know well. 
Jeff Sexton, Jacob's dad, put it this way: ``It is one thing to lose 
someone you love in the war. It is a whole other thing to lose them to 
the war.'' And Gregg Keesling, Chancellor's dad, concluded this: ``The 
bottom line is I don't want anybody to go through what we've gone 
through.''
  We must act and we must act now before any more families have to 
experience this loss from suicide. I urge all of my colleagues to 
support the care package provisions for servicemembers and to later 
extend them to our veterans who need our help and who need us to stand 
up for them.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I am coming to the floor to speak on 
behalf of an amendment I am offering, along with Senators Schatz, 
Udall, Blumenthal, Heinrich, Tester, Merkley, and Baldwin.
  Today, it was announced that President Obama is going to be sending 
another 450 troops to Iraq to help assist in the fight against ISIL. 
That will mean we now have 3,500 troops in position throughout Iraq 
assisting in the battle against ISIL within those borders. This marks 
also nearly a year since we have reengaged in military activities in 
Iraq and in Syria, both with support forces for the Iraqis, with 
training for those who are fighting in Syria, and major air operations 
targeting ISIL.
  I think there is broad bipartisan consensus here that the United 
States needs to take the fight to this enemy--an enemy that is seeking 
to occupy an enormous amount of territory in a very dangerous region 
from which it can plot attacks against the United States. But I also 
think there is bipartisan agreement that we should do our 
constitutional duty; that we should authorize this war against ISIL. My 
hope is the Foreign Relations Committee--of which I am a member, of 
which the Presiding Officer is a member--will have that debate in the 
upcoming months.
  But given that we are authorizing hundreds of millions of dollars in 
this bill in order to take the fight to ISIL, I think it makes sense to 
have some commonsense limitations on the use of that money that are in 
keeping with the very public promises the President has made.
  President Obama has stated very clearly that he does not think it is 
a wise strategy to reinsert major combat troop operations into the 
Middle East. I agree with him. I think many of us agree with him. There 
is nothing about the last 10 years of American occupation in Iraq that 
tells us that U.S. troops inside Iraq can have the effect of killing 
more terrorists than are created, in part, through the recruitment 
benefit of major U.S. combat operations.
  So the amendment we are offering today is a fairly simple one. It 
would prohibit the use of major combat--of large numbers of combat 
troops in the fight against ISIL, with certain commonsense exceptions: 
an exception for rescue operations, an exception for intelligence-
gathering exercises, and an exception for special operations in and 
throughout the region; special operations like the one we used to kill 
a high-ranking ISIS commander just within the last several weeks.
  We think it is important that Congress weigh in and state what we 
believe to be the desire and imperative of our constituents; that we 
learn from the mistakes of the Iraq war; that we don't repeat them by 
inserting thousands of American ground troops back into Iraq or perhaps 
Syria.
  ISIS was created, first and foremost, primarily by a political vacuum 
inside Iraq, not a military vacuum. We need to acknowledge that any 
strategy to ultimately defeat ISIL, as we are all committed to, has to 
first and foremost have a realistic political strategy on the ground to 
divorce Sunni populations from this death cult that is ISIL.
  Sunni grievances grew throughout Nouri al-Maliki's reign. They were 
denied an equitable share of oil revenues. They were excluded from 
government jobs. There were real atrocities committed against Sunni 
communities--mass incarcerations, torture, extrajudicial killings. If 
we don't have an Iraq Government that is committed to being inclusive 
of Sunni populations, there is no amount of American troops on the 
ground that can heal those divisions. In fact, what we know about the 
Iraq war is that major American combat operations on the ground in Iraq 
have an effect of exacerbating those divisions rather than healing 
them. They give space for people like Maliki to try to marginalize 
these populations. They increase suffering on the ground, especially 
for these populations that aren't represented effectively within the 
reigning Shiite government in Baghdad.
  So if we really want to learn lessons from the past, then let's take 
President Obama at his word. Let's include in the NDAA a commonsense 
limitation, with exceptions, with respect to the deployment of major 
ground operations inside Iraq.
  Now, there are some people who will say this isn't the role of 
Congress. I would just state for the record that there are a litany of 
examples in the past in which Congress has placed commonsense 
limitations on our authorizations for military force. In fact, the 
President, in submitting a proposed AUMF to the Foreign Relations 
Committee several months ago, in fact, included in that authorization 
of military force a limitation on ground forces. So this would be 
entirely consistent with the history of this body but also with the 
proposal the President has made.
  I know, from having visited our troops in Iraq and in Afghanistan, 
that it is easy for us to believe there is no mission that U.S. 
soldiers can't take on; that their capability, that their bravery, that 
their courage, that their adaptability knows no bounds. They have done 
admirable work inside Iraq over the course of the last 10 years, but 
what we know is that those troops inside Iraq also made Iraq what our 
own intelligence community called the cause celebre for the 
international terrorist movement, drawing in thousands of would-be 
terrorists to fight the Americans.
  What we know is that the ISIS we are fighting today is a follow-on 
organization from Al Qaeda in Iraq, which was created because of the 
American invasion and occupation--maybe not in whole but certainly as 
the primary influence.
  So we hope to be able to have a full debate on an authorization of 
military force. But with the inability to move that piece of 
legislation through the Foreign Relations Committee, we think it is 
proper on the NDAA to hold the President at his word, place a 
commonsense limitation on the use of ground troops and learn from the 
mistakes of the last 10 years inside Iraq.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.


                           Amendment No. 1986

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I urge this Chamber to reject the motion to 
table my amendment, which put forward reforms to the Export-Import 
Bank. I would say to Members that this is going to be a key scored vote 
by the

[[Page S4016]]

U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers; 
that, without my amendment, we would not have the reforms to make sure 
Ex-Im works at least 25 percent of its portfolio with small businesses.
  I urge Members to vote no on the motion to table my amendment by Mr. 
Shelby that I understand is coming up. This is a key test vote, Export-
Import Bank. With a good bipartisan vote, I would think we would have 
people supporting the Kirk-Heitkamp-Blunt-Graham reform legislation for 
Ex-Im.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, very briefly. Senators Ayotte and Kirk's 
amendment is coming up. There will be a motion to table. What we are 
trying to do is basically show support for the Ex-Im Bank, which is due 
to expire in June. We are trying to find a vehicle, a must-pass piece 
of legislation, to keep the Bank afloat. I think it is very important 
to the American economy that American manufacturers not be 
disadvantaged. The Ex-Im Bank makes money for the American taxpayer. 
China's Ex-Im Bank is larger than France, Germany, the United States, 
and England's combined.
  What does this mean to the average person? When a product is made in 
the United States and sold into the developing world without the Ex-Im 
financing mechanism available to American manufacturers, we are going 
to lose market share to other countries like China, France, Germany 
that produce wide-body jets and other products. Eighty-nine percent of 
the people who get help from the Ex-Im Bank are small businesses.
  This is an attempt to show the investor community and those who are 
watching this issue that the Senate is in support of the Bank. So I am 
urging a ``no'' vote on tabling. We had to do this procedurally. So 
this will be a signal to the markets that the Senate is in support of 
the Bank. I urge everyone who believes the Bank is vital to American 
exports and not against unilateral surrendering of market share to the 
Chinese and other competitors to vote no. There will be another vote of 
our choosing on a vehicle that will have to get to the President's 
desk. This is not the last vote we will take on Ex-Im Bank.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. MORAN. Mr. President, I understand we have a vote scheduled at 5 
o'clock, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak for about 60 
seconds.


                           Amendment No. 1473

  I came to the floor today to speak in favor of an amendment described 
earlier in the afternoon by Senator Vitter. This is an amendment, of 
course, to the National Defense Authorization Act that makes certain 
our U.S. Army is able to maintain the current number of brigade combat 
teams.
  Sequestration is creating significant problems in many arenas but no 
more important than in the area of our Army and defense. The concern is 
that in the process of downsizing the Army as a result of sequestration 
and other reductions in available funding, brigade combat teams would 
be eliminated. Senator Vitter's amendment, which I support and am a 
cosponsor of, would eliminate that as an option.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lee). The Senator from Alabama.


                           Amendment No. 1986

  Mr. SHELBY. What is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is the Ayotte-Kirk amendment.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the 
amendment, which is a long-term reauthorization of the Export-Import 
Bank. In my opinion, after evaluating this issue during a series of 
hearings in the Senate banking committee, there is no compelling case 
to reauthorize the bank.
  After years of efforts to reform the Export-Import Bank, it has 
become clear to me that its problems are beyond repair and that the 
Bank's expiration is in the best interest of American taxpayers. Nearly 
99 percent of all American exports--over $2 trillion--are financed 
without the Export-Import Bank's help, which demonstrates that the 
subsidies are more about corporate welfare than advancing our economy.
  I believe the Export-Import Bank has outlived its usefulness and 
should be allowed to expire.
  At this point, I move to table the Kirk amendment No. 1986 and ask 
for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. CORNYN. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the 
Senator from Florida (Mr. Rubio) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
Toomey).
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Merkley) and 
the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Reid) are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. -Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 31, nays 65, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 206 Leg.]

                                YEAS--31

     Barrasso
     Boozman
     Capito
     Cassidy
     Corker
     Cornyn
     Cotton
     Crapo
     Cruz
     Daines
     Enzi
     Fischer
     Flake
     Gardner
     Grassley
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Lankford
     Lee
     McConnell
     Paul
     Perdue
     Risch
     Sanders
     Sasse
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Sullivan
     Thune
     Tillis
     Vitter

                                NAYS--65

     Alexander
     Ayotte
     Baldwin
     Bennet
     Blumenthal
     Blunt
     Booker
     Boxer
     Brown
     Burr
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Coons
     Donnelly
     Durbin
     Ernst
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Graham
     Hatch
     Heinrich
     Heitkamp
     Heller
     Hirono
     Hoeven
     Johnson
     Kaine
     King
     Kirk
     Klobuchar
     Leahy
     Manchin
     Markey
     McCain
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Mikulski
     Moran
     Murkowski
     Murphy
     Murray
     Nelson
     Peters
     Portman
     Reed
     Roberts
     Rounds
     Schatz
     Schumer
     Scott
     Shaheen
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall
     Warner
     Warren
     Whitehouse
     Wicker
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Merkley
     Reid
     Rubio
     Toomey
  The motion was rejected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.


                      amendment no. 1986 withdrawn

  Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Kirk, I withdraw 
amendment No. 1986.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is 
withdrawn.


                             cloture motion

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk for 
amendment No. 1569, as modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under 
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     do hereby move to bring to a close debate on amendment No. 
     1569, as modified, to the McCain amendment No. 1463 to H.R. 
     1735, an act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016 
     for military activities of the Department of Defense, for 
     military construction, and for defense activities of the 
     Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel 
     strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
         Mitch McConnell, Lamar Alexander, John Cornyn, Orrin G. 
           Hatch, David Perdue, Bob Corker, Michael B. Enzi, Susan 
           M. Collins, Jeff Flake, Mike Rounds, Richard Burr, 
           David Vitter, James M. Inhofe, Daniel Coats, John 
           McCain, Deb Fischer, Tom Cotton.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum 
required under rule XXII be waived.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from North Dakota.

[[Page S4017]]

  Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
  Ms. HEITKAMP. Sure.

                          ____________________