Congressional Record, Volume 161 Issue 92 (Wednesday, June 10, 2015)

[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 92 (Wednesday, June 10, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3986-S4017]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of H.R. 1735, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1735) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2016 for military activities of the Department of
Defense, for military construction, and for defense
activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other
purposes.

Pending:

McCain amendment No. 1463, in the nature of a substitute.
McCain amendment No. 1456 (to amendment No. 1463), to
require additional information supporting long-range plans
for construction of naval vessels.
Cornyn amendment No. 1486 (to amendment No. 1463), to
require reporting on energy security issues involving Europe
and the Russian Federation, and to express the sense of
Congress regarding ways the United States could help
vulnerable allies and partners with energy security.
Vitter amendment No. 1473 (to amendment No. 1463), to limit
the retirement of Army combat units.
Markey amendment No. 1645 (to amendment No. 1463), to
express the sense of Congress that exports of crude oil to
United States allies and partners should not be determined to
be consistent with the national interest if those exports
would increase energy prices in the United States for
American consumers or businesses or increase the reliance of
the United States on imported oil.
Reed (for Blumenthal) amendment No. 1564 (to amendment No.
1463), to increase civil penalties for violations of the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.
McCain (for Paul) modified amendment No. 1543 (to amendment
No. 1463), to strengthen employee cost savings suggestions
programs within the Federal Government.
Reed (for Durbin) modified amendment No. 1559 (to amendment
No. 1463), to prohibit the award of Department of Defense
contracts to inverted domestic corporations.
McCain (for Burr) amendment No. 1569 (to amendment No.
1463), to ensure criminal background checks of employees of
the military child care system and providers of child care
services and youth program services for military dependents.
Feinstein (for McCain) amendment No. 1889 (to amendment No.
1463), to reaffirm the prohibition on torture.
Fischer/Booker amendment No. 1825 (to amendment No. 1463),
to authorize appropriations for national security aspects of
the Merchant Marine for fiscal years 2016 and 2017.
Burr/McCain amendment No. 1921 (to amendment No. 1569), to
improve cybersecurity in the United States through enhanced
sharing of information about cybersecurity threats.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I was first going to offer an amendment,
but both the chairman and ranking member of the committee suggested
that I wait until after they have had a chance to review some of the
technical details. So I will speak on an amendment that I will in all
probability offer at a later time.
My amendment really goes to how we make sure we help our troops with
the many stresses that are in their lives. My goal is to add money to
funding our commissaries. This amendment, which I will offer at a later
time, restores $322 million in cuts to commissaries proposed by the
Department of Defense. It would authorize $1.4 billion in funding--the
same level that is in the House National Defense Authorization Act and
in the House Defense appropriations bill. It offsets the $322 million
for commissaries by reducing the Pentagon's budget in failed policies
to buy spare parts. They have a lot of waste there, and we think we can
find the $322 million we need there, and that is the technical issue we
need to work, also known as the offset. But what is not technical is
the fact that we have to make sure our commissaries function at their
current level.
Commissaries represent one of the most significant and lasting
benefits for military members and their families. Commissaries have
been around since 1826, giving military families the ability to shop at
a network of stores. The commissary system is simple. If you are Active
Duty, Reserve, National Guard, or a retired member of the family, you
have access to 246 commissaries worldwide. They are particularly
important to many of our troops overseas, and they give military
families affordable access to healthy foods.
The benefits of commissaries are significant. They feed those people
who are actually members of our military. They help military families
stretch their budgets, and they also help provide jobs to family
members in the military who work in those commissaries.
Our distinguished colleagues on the authorizing committee, Senator
McCain and Senator Jack Reed, are themselves military men. Senator
McCain is a graduate of the Naval Academy and Senator Jack Reed
graduated from West Point. They know that one of the big expenditures
right now for our military is rising health costs. The military itself
is looking at how to make sure they keep our troops healthy not only
while they are doing their job but also how to keep them healthy so
that when they move on, they will be in excellent shape. The
commissaries do those kinds of things. They provide what grocery stores
provide--fresh fruits and vegetables. They provide healthy foods.
Also, for example, my own commissary at Fort Meade, which is part of
the Healthy Base Initiative, has shown people how to stretch their
dollar more so they can get more for their family budget and also has
actual recommendations on how to add nutrition--save money and add
nutrition. If we want to bend the health care cost curve, while we are
looking at important medical research, research shows that good food
leads to good health.
The other thing is this: Military members get a significant savings
from commissaries. The average savings is about 30 percent on a grocery
bill. For a family of four, that comes to over $4,000 a year. Everyone
knows how much military families are stretched, and for our men and
women who are enlisted, this is a really big deal. We need to make this
available for them.
What many people don't realize is that the commissaries not only
create jobs, but 60 percent of commissary workers are spouses of men
who serve in the military. About 100,000 jobs are supported through
commissaries. The other thing the DOD wants to do is cut their hours.
Well, if they cut their hours, that does cut jobs, but it also cuts
opportunity.
When you are in the military, you work around the clock. You are not
on the clock; you work around the clock. So if you are a military
police officer, you could be getting off of duty late at night. If you
are someone who repairs our helicopters or airplanes, you could be
getting off at night.
The commissary at Fort Meade serves agencies such as the National
Security Agency. They essentially work a 36-hour day. They work around
the clock, 24 hours a day. Our commissary isn't open 24 hours a day,
but I can tell you it can't be open from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. and still
meet the needs of our military workforce.
The Department of Defense wants to make the commissaries more self-
sustaining, and we don't argue with that. We can always find
efficiencies and look at new ways to do things. But don't cut $322
million and further cut it close to $1 billion over the next 4 years.
What we want to do is make sure our military families have what they
need. First of all, we want them to have good food. We want them to be
able to go to these commissaries at hours that work for military
families. We also want to look at the long-range effects of bending the
health care curve.
I am going to come back to the commissary at Fort Meade. I am very
proud of the fact that Fort Meade is what we call a compassionate post.
That means if you are in the U.S. Army and you have a special needs
child, one of the highly desirable places to be based is at Fort Meade.
Why? Because Anne Arundel County has one of

[[Page S3987]]

the best programs for special education in the State and in the
country. You also have access to Kennedy Krieger, which is one of the
internationally iconic agencies that address the needs of children with
not only special needs but multiple special needs.
We are very happy that Fort Meade is in Maryland and that it is known
as a compassionate post. But think of those families who have a child
with cerebral palsy or multiple complications that might even require
the child to constantly need a respirator. All of these things go on
along with the stress of being a military family. We can certainly keep
the commissaries open so that they can get the food they need for their
families and have the commissaries open during the hours that work for
them. This is what real life in the military is.
After Desert Storm, I remember when the Appropriations Committee met
under the leadership of Senator Byrd and Senator Ted Steven. They asked
General Schwarzkopf what he needed in an after-action report. He said:
We need better intelligence. And we worked really hard to upgrade to
where we are. He also said: We need better food. We need better food
for our troops, and people need to believe their families are being
taken care of while they are in harm's way.
We ask a lot from our military, and our military families are now
asking us: Don't cut the commissaries. Keep them open. Keep them
affordable. Keep them available. Once we clarify the technicalities of
the offset, which is required, I will come back and offer my amendment,
which I hope will pass the Senate with a 100-to-0 vote.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 1569, as Modified

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I modify my amendment No. 1569 by
accepting the second-degree amendment No. 1921, offered by the Senator
from North Carolina.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is
so modified.
The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

At the end of subtitle F of title V, add the following:

TITLE XVII--CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING

SECTION 1701. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act of 2015''.

SEC. 1702. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given the
term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.
(2) Antitrust laws.--The term ``antitrust laws''--
(A) has the meaning given the term in section 1 of the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12);
(B) includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that section 5 of that Act
applies to unfair methods of competition; and
(C) includes any State law that has the same intent and
effect as the laws under subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(3) Appropriate federal entities.--The term ``appropriate
Federal entities'' means the following:
(A) The Department of Commerce.
(B) The Department of Defense.
(C) The Department of Energy.
(D) The Department of Homeland Security.
(E) The Department of Justice.
(F) The Department of the Treasury.
(G) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(4) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term ``cybersecurity
purpose'' means the purpose of protecting an information
system or information that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system from a cybersecurity threat
or security vulnerability.
(5) Cybersecurity threat.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the term ``cybersecurity threat'' means an action, not
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, on or through an information system that may
result in an unauthorized effort to adversely impact the
security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an
information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system.
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``cybersecurity threat'' does not
include any action that solely involves a violation of a
consumer term of service or a consumer licensing agreement.
(6) Cyber threat indicator.--The term ``cyber threat
indicator'' means information that is necessary to describe
or identify--
(A) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns
of communications that appear to be transmitted for the
purpose of gathering technical information related to a
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability;
(B) a method of defeating a security control or
exploitation of a security vulnerability;
(C) a security vulnerability, including anomalous activity
that appears to indicate the existence of a security
vulnerability;
(D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an
information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system to
unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or
exploitation of a security vulnerability;
(E) malicious cyber command and control;
(F) the actual or potential harm caused by an incident,
including a description of the information exfiltrated as a
result of a particular cybersecurity threat;
(G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if
disclosure of such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by
law; or
(H) any combination thereof.
(7) Defensive measure.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
the term ``defensive measure'' means an action, device,
procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied to
an information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system that
detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``defensive measure'' does not
include a measure that destroys, renders unusable, or
substantially harms an information system or data on an
information system not belonging to--
(i) the private entity operating the measure; or
(ii) another entity or Federal entity that is authorized to
provide consent and has provided consent to that private
entity for operation of such measure.
(8) Entity.--
(A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph, the term ``entity'' means any private entity, non-
Federal government agency or department, or State, tribal, or
local government (including a political subdivision,
department, or component thereof).
(B) Inclusions.--The term ``entity'' includes a government
agency or department of the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other
territory or possession of the United States.
(C) Exclusion.--The term ``entity'' does not include a
foreign power as defined in section 101 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
(9) Federal entity.--The term ``Federal entity'' means a
department or agency of the United States or any component of
such department or agency.
(10) Information system.--The term ``information system''--
(A) has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title
44, United States Code; and
(B) includes industrial control systems, such as
supervisory control and data acquisition systems, distributed
control systems, and programmable logic controllers.
(11) Local government.--The term ``local government'' means
any borough, city, county, parish, town, township, village,
or other political subdivision of a State.
(12) Malicious cyber command and control.--The term
``malicious cyber command and control'' means a method for
unauthorized remote identification of, access to, or use of,
an information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system.
(13) Malicious reconnaissance.--The term ``malicious
reconnaissance'' means a method for actively probing or
passively monitoring an information system for the purpose of
discerning security vulnerabilities of the information
system, if such method is associated with a known or
suspected cybersecurity threat.
(14) Monitor.--The term ``monitor'' means to acquire,
identify, or scan, or to possess, information that is stored
on, processed by, or transiting an information system.
(15) Private entity.--
(A) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph, the term ``private entity'' means any person or
private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership,
trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or
nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent
thereof.
(B) Inclusion.--The term ``private entity'' includes a
State, tribal, or local government performing electric
utility services.
(C) Exclusion.--The term ``private entity'' does not
include a foreign power as defined in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801).
(16) Security control.--The term ``security control'' means
the management, operational, and technical controls used to
protect against an unauthorized effort to adversely affect
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an
information system or its information.
(17) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security
vulnerability'' means any attribute of hardware, software,
process, or procedure that could enable or facilitate the
defeat of a security control.

[[Page S3988]]

(18) Tribal.--The term ``tribal'' has the meaning given the
term ``Indian tribe'' in section 4 of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b).

SEC. 1703. SHARING OF INFORMATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

(a) In General.--Consistent with the protection of
classified information, intelligence sources and methods, and
privacy and civil liberties, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General, in
consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal
entities, shall develop and promulgate procedures to
facilitate and promote--
(1) the timely sharing of classified cyber threat
indicators in the possession of the Federal Government with
cleared representatives of relevant entities;
(2) the timely sharing with relevant entities of cyber
threat indicators or information in the possession of the
Federal Government that may be declassified and shared at an
unclassified level;
(3) the sharing with relevant entities, or the public if
appropriate, of unclassified, including controlled
unclassified, cyber threat indicators in the possession of
the Federal Government; and
(4) the sharing with entities, if appropriate, of
information in the possession of the Federal Government about
cybersecurity threats to such entities to prevent or mitigate
adverse effects from such cybersecurity threats.
(b) Development of Procedures.--
(1) In general.--The procedures developed and promulgated
under subsection (a) shall--
(A) ensure the Federal Government has and maintains the
capability to share cyber threat indicators in real time
consistent with the protection of classified information;
(B) incorporate, to the greatest extent practicable,
existing processes and existing roles and responsibilities of
Federal and non-Federal entities for information sharing by
the Federal Government, including sector specific information
sharing and analysis centers;
(C) include procedures for notifying entities that have
received a cyber threat indicator from a Federal entity under
this title that is known or determined to be in error or in
contravention of the requirements of this title or another
provision of Federal law or policy of such error or
contravention;
(D) include requirements for Federal entities receiving
cyber threat indicators or defensive measures to implement
and utilize security controls to protect against unauthorized
access to or acquisition of such cyber threat indicators or
defensive measures; and
(E) include procedures that require a Federal entity, prior
to the sharing of a cyber threat indicator--
(i) to review such cyber threat indicator to assess whether
such cyber threat indicator contains any information that
such Federal entity knows at the time of sharing to be
personal information of or identifying a specific person not
directly related to a cybersecurity threat and remove such
information; or
(ii) to implement and utilize a technical capability
configured to remove any personal information of or
identifying a specific person not directly related to a
cybersecurity threat.
(2) Coordination.--In developing the procedures required
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Attorney General shall coordinate with appropriate
Federal entities, including the National Laboratories (as
defined in section 1702 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42
U.S.C. 15801)), to ensure that effective protocols are
implemented that will facilitate and promote the sharing of
cyber threat indicators by the Federal Government in a timely
manner.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this title, the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the
appropriate Federal entities, shall submit to Congress the
procedures required by subsection (a).

SEC. 1704. AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PREVENTING, DETECTING,
ANALYZING, AND MITIGATING CYBERSECURITY
THREATS.

(a) Authorization for Monitoring.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a private entity may, for cybersecurity purposes,
monitor--
(A) an information system of such private entity;
(B) an information system of another entity, upon the
authorization and written consent of such other entity;
(C) an information system of a Federal entity, upon the
authorization and written consent of an authorized
representative of the Federal entity; and
(D) information that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system monitored by the private
entity under this paragraph.
(2) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed--
(A) to authorize the monitoring of an information system,
or the use of any information obtained through such
monitoring, other than as provided in this title; or
(B) to limit otherwise lawful activity.
(b) Authorization for Operation of Defensive Measures.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a private entity may, for cybersecurity purposes,
operate a defensive measure that is applied to--
(A) an information system of such private entity in order
to protect the rights or property of the private entity;
(B) an information system of another entity upon written
consent of such entity for operation of such defensive
measure to protect the rights or property of such entity; and
(C) an information system of a Federal entity upon written
consent of an authorized representative of such Federal
entity for operation of such defensive measure to protect the
rights or property of the Federal Government.
(2) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed--
(A) to authorize the use of a defensive measure other than
as provided in this subsection; or
(B) to limit otherwise lawful activity.
(c) Authorization for Sharing or Receiving Cyber Threat
Indicators or Defensive Measures.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2) and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, an entity may,
for the purposes permitted under this title and consistent
with the protection of classified information, share with, or
receive from, any other entity or the Federal Government a
cyber threat indicator or defensive measure.
(2) Lawful restriction.--An entity receiving a cyber threat
indicator or defensive measure from another entity or Federal
entity shall comply with otherwise lawful restrictions placed
on the sharing or use of such cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure by the sharing entity or Federal entity.
(3) Construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed--
(A) to authorize the sharing or receiving of a cyber threat
indicator or defensive measure other than as provided in this
subsection; or
(B) to limit otherwise lawful activity.
(d) Protection and Use of Information.--
(1) Security of information.--An entity monitoring an
information system, operating a defensive measure, or
providing or receiving a cyber threat indicator or defensive
measure under this section shall implement and utilize a
security control to protect against unauthorized access to or
acquisition of such cyber threat indicator or defensive
measure.
(2) Removal of certain personal information.--An entity
sharing a cyber threat indicator pursuant to this title
shall, prior to such sharing--
(A) review such cyber threat indicator to assess whether
such cyber threat indicator contains any information that the
entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal
information of or identifying a specific person not directly
related to a cybersecurity threat and remove such
information; or
(B) implement and utilize a technical capability configured
to remove any information contained within such indicator
that the entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal
information of or identifying a specific person not directly
related to a cybersecurity threat.
(3) Use of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
by entities.--
(A) In general.--Consistent with this title, a cyber threat
indicator or defensive measure shared or received under this
section may, for cybersecurity purposes--
(i) be used by an entity to monitor or operate a defensive
measure on--

(I) an information system of the entity; or
(II) an information system of another entity or a Federal
entity upon the written consent of that other entity or that
Federal entity; and

(ii) be otherwise used, retained, and further shared by an
entity subject to--

(I) an otherwise lawful restriction placed by the sharing
entity or Federal entity on such cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure; or
(II) an otherwise applicable provision of law.

(B) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed to authorize the use of a cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure other than as provided in this section.
(4) Use of cyber threat indicators by state, tribal, or
local government.--
(A) Law enforcement use.--
(i) Prior written consent.--Except as provided in clause
(ii), a cyber threat indicator shared with a State, tribal,
or local government under this section may, with the prior
written consent of the entity sharing such indicator, be used
by a State, tribal, or local government for the purpose of
preventing, investigating, or prosecuting any of the offenses
described in section 1705(d)(5)(A)(vi).
(ii) Oral consent.--If exigent circumstances prevent
obtaining written consent under clause (i), such consent may
be provided orally with subsequent documentation of the
consent.
(B) Exemption from disclosure.--A cyber threat indicator
shared with a State, tribal, or local government under this
section shall be--
(i) deemed voluntarily shared information; and
(ii) exempt from disclosure under any State, tribal, or
local law requiring disclosure of information or records.
(C) State, tribal, and local regulatory authority.--

[[Page S3989]]

(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), a cyber
threat indicator or defensive measure shared with a State,
tribal, or local government under this title shall not be
directly used by any State, tribal, or local government to
regulate, including an enforcement action, the lawful
activity of any entity, including an activity relating to
monitoring, operating a defensive measure, or sharing of a
cyber threat indicator.
(ii) Regulatory authority specifically relating to
prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats.--A cyber
threat indicator or defensive measures shared as described in
clause (i) may, consistent with a State, tribal, or local
government regulatory authority specifically relating to the
prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats to
information systems, inform the development or implementation
of a regulation relating to such information systems.
(e) Antitrust Exemption.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in section 1708(e), it
shall not be considered a violation of any provision of
antitrust laws for 2 or more private entities to exchange or
provide a cyber threat indicator, or assistance relating to
the prevention, investigation, or mitigation of a
cybersecurity threat, for cybersecurity purposes under this
title.
(2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall apply only to
information that is exchanged or assistance provided in order
to assist with--
(A) facilitating the prevention, investigation, or
mitigation of a cybersecurity threat to an information system
or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting
an information system; or
(B) communicating or disclosing a cyber threat indicator to
help prevent, investigate, or mitigate the effect of a
cybersecurity threat to an information system or information
that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information
system.
(f) No Right or Benefit.--The sharing of a cyber threat
indicator with an entity under this title shall not create a
right or benefit to similar information by such entity or any
other entity.

SEC. 1705. SHARING OF CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE
MEASURES WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

(a) Requirement for Policies and Procedures.--
(1) Interim policies and procedures.--Not later than 60
days after the date of the enactment of this title, the
Attorney General, in coordination with the heads of the
appropriate Federal entities, shall develop and submit to
Congress interim policies and procedures relating to the
receipt of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures by
the Federal Government.
(2) Final policies and procedures.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this title, the Attorney
General shall, in coordination with the heads of the
appropriate Federal entities, promulgate final policies and
procedures relating to the receipt of cyber threat indicators
and defensive measures by the Federal Government.
(3) Requirements concerning policies and procedures.--
Consistent with the guidelines required by subsection (b),
the policies and procedures developed and promulgated under
this subsection shall--
(A) ensure that cyber threat indicators are shared with the
Federal Government by any entity pursuant to section 1704(c)
through the real-time process described in subsection (c) of
this section--
(i) are shared in an automated manner with all of the
appropriate Federal entities;
(ii) are not subject to any delay, modification, or any
other action that could impede real-time receipt by all of
the appropriate Federal entities; and
(iii) may be provided to other Federal entities;
(B) ensure that cyber threat indicators shared with the
Federal Government by any entity pursuant to section 1704 in
a manner other than the real-time process described in
subsection (c) of this section--
(i) are shared as quickly as operationally practicable with
all of the appropriate Federal entities;
(ii) are not subject to any unnecessary delay,
interference, or any other action that could impede receipt
by all of the appropriate Federal entities; and
(iii) may be provided to other Federal entities;
(C) consistent with this title, any other applicable
provisions of law, and the fair information practice
principles set forth in appendix A of the document entitled
``National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace''
and published by the President in April 2011, govern the
retention, use, and dissemination by the Federal Government
of cyber threat indicators shared with the Federal Government
under this title, including the extent, if any, to which such
cyber threat indicators may be used by the Federal
Government; and
(D) ensure there is--
(i) an audit capability; and
(ii) appropriate sanctions in place for officers,
employees, or agents of a Federal entity who knowingly and
willfully conduct activities under this title in an
unauthorized manner.
(4) Guidelines for entities sharing cyber threat indicators
with federal government.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this title, the Attorney General shall
develop and make publicly available guidance to assist
entities and promote sharing of cyber threat indicators with
Federal entities under this title.
(B) Contents.--The guidelines developed and made publicly
available under subparagraph (A) shall include guidance on
the following:
(i) Identification of types of information that would
qualify as a cyber threat indicator under this title that
would be unlikely to include personal information of or
identifying a specific person not directly related to a cyber
security threat.
(ii) Identification of types of information protected under
otherwise applicable privacy laws that are unlikely to be
directly related to a cybersecurity threat.
(iii) Such other matters as the Attorney General considers
appropriate for entities sharing cyber threat indicators with
Federal entities under this title.
(b) Privacy and Civil Liberties.--
(1) Guidelines of attorney general.--Not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this title, the Attorney
General shall, in coordination with heads of the appropriate
Federal entities and in consultation with officers designated
under section 1062 of the National Security Intelligence
Reform Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1), develop, submit to
Congress, and make available to the public interim guidelines
relating to privacy and civil liberties which shall govern
the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of cyber
threat indicators by a Federal entity obtained in connection
with activities authorized in this title.
(2) Final guidelines.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this title, the Attorney General shall, in
coordination with heads of the appropriate Federal entities
and in consultation with officers designated under section
1062 of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004
(42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1) and such private entities with industry
expertise as the Attorney General considers relevant,
promulgate final guidelines relating to privacy and civil
liberties which shall govern the receipt, retention, use, and
dissemination of cyber threat indicators by a Federal entity
obtained in connection with activities authorized in this
title.
(B) Periodic review.--The Attorney General shall, in
coordination with heads of the appropriate Federal entities
and in consultation with officers and private entities
described in subparagraph (A), periodically review the
guidelines promulgated under subparagraph (A).
(3) Content.--The guidelines required by paragraphs (1) and
(2) shall, consistent with the need to protect information
systems from cybersecurity threats and mitigate cybersecurity
threats--
(A) limit the impact on privacy and civil liberties of
activities by the Federal Government under this title;
(B) limit the receipt, retention, use, and dissemination of
cyber threat indicators containing personal information of or
identifying specific persons, including by establishing--
(i) a process for the timely destruction of such
information that is known not to be directly related to uses
authorized under this title; and
(ii) specific limitations on the length of any period in
which a cyber threat indicator may be retained;
(C) include requirements to safeguard cyber threat
indicators containing personal information of or identifying
specific persons from unauthorized access or acquisition,
including appropriate sanctions for activities by officers,
employees, or agents of the Federal Government in
contravention of such guidelines;
(D) include procedures for notifying entities and Federal
entities if information received pursuant to this section is
known or determined by a Federal entity receiving such
information not to constitute a cyber threat indicator;
(E) protect the confidentiality of cyber threat indicators
containing personal information of or identifying specific
persons to the greatest extent practicable and require
recipients to be informed that such indicators may only be
used for purposes authorized under this title; and
(F) include steps that may be needed so that dissemination
of cyber threat indicators is consistent with the protection
of classified and other sensitive national security
information.
(c) Capability and Process Within the Department of
Homeland Security.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this title, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the heads of the appropriate
Federal entities, shall develop and implement a capability
and process within the Department of Homeland Security that--
(A) shall accept from any entity in real time cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures, pursuant to this section;
(B) shall, upon submittal of the certification under
paragraph (2) that such capability and process fully and
effectively operates as described in such paragraph, be the
process by which the Federal Government receives cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures under this title that are
shared by a private entity with the Federal Government
through electronic mail or media, an interactive form on an
Internet website, or a real time, automated process between
information systems except--

[[Page S3990]]

(i) communications between a Federal entity and a private
entity regarding a previously shared cyber threat indicator;
and
(ii) communications by a regulated entity with such
entity's Federal regulatory authority regarding a
cybersecurity threat;
(C) ensures that all of the appropriate Federal entities
receive in an automated manner such cyber threat indicators
shared through the real-time process within the Department of
Homeland Security;
(D) is in compliance with the policies, procedures, and
guidelines required by this section; and
(E) does not limit or prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures
of communications, records, or other information, including--
(i) reporting of known or suspected criminal activity, by
an entity to any other entity or a Federal entity;
(ii) voluntary or legally compelled participation in a
Federal investigation; and
(iii) providing cyber threat indicators or defensive
measures as part of a statutory or authorized contractual
requirement.
(2) Certification.--Not later than 10 days prior to the
implementation of the capability and process required by
paragraph (1), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, in
consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal
entities, certify to Congress whether such capability and
process fully and effectively operates--
(A) as the process by which the Federal Government receives
from any entity a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure
under this title; and
(B) in accordance with the policies, procedures, and
guidelines developed under this section.
(3) Public notice and access.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall ensure there is public notice of, and access
to, the capability and process developed and implemented
under paragraph (1) so that--
(A) any entity may share cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures through such process with the Federal
Government; and
(B) all of the appropriate Federal entities receive such
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures in real time
with receipt through the process within the Department of
Homeland Security.
(4) Other federal entities.--The process developed and
implemented under paragraph (1) shall ensure that other
Federal entities receive in a timely manner any cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures shared with the Federal
Government through such process.
(5) Report on development and implementation.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this title, the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall submit to Congress a report on the development
and implementation of the capability and process required by
paragraph (1), including a description of such capability and
process and the public notice of, and access to, such
process.
(B) Classified annex.--The report required by subparagraph
(A) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
a classified annex.
(d) Information Shared With or Provided to the Federal
Government.--
(1) No waiver of privilege or protection.--The provision of
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures to the Federal
Government under this title shall not constitute a waiver of
any applicable privilege or protection provided by law,
including trade secret protection.
(2) Proprietary information.--Consistent with section
1704(c)(2), a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure
provided by an entity to the Federal Government under this
title shall be considered the commercial, financial, and
proprietary information of such entity when so designated by
the originating entity or a third party acting in accordance
with the written authorization of the originating entity.
(3) Exemption from disclosure.--Cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures provided to the Federal Government under
this title shall be--
(A) deemed voluntarily shared information and exempt from
disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code,
and any State, tribal, or local law requiring disclosure of
information or records; and
(B) withheld, without discretion, from the public under
section 552(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United States Code, and any
State, tribal, or local provision of law requiring disclosure
of information or records.
(4) Ex parte communications.--The provision of a cyber
threat indicator or defensive measure to the Federal
Government under this title shall not be subject to a rule of
any Federal agency or department or any judicial doctrine
regarding ex parte communications with a decisionmaking
official.
(5) Disclosure, retention, and use.--
(A) Authorized activities.--Cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures provided to the Federal Government under
this title may be disclosed to, retained by, and used by,
consistent with otherwise applicable provisions of Federal
law, any Federal agency or department, component, officer,
employee, or agent of the Federal Government solely for--
(i) a cybersecurity purpose;
(ii) the purpose of identifying a cybersecurity threat,
including the source of such cybersecurity threat, or a
security vulnerability;
(iii) the purpose of identifying a cybersecurity threat
involving the use of an information system by a foreign
adversary or terrorist;
(iv) the purpose of responding to, or otherwise preventing
or mitigating, an imminent threat of death, serious bodily
harm, or serious economic harm, including a terrorist act or
a use of a weapon of mass destruction;
(v) the purpose of responding to, or otherwise preventing
or mitigating, a serious threat to a minor, including sexual
exploitation and threats to physical safety; or
(vi) the purpose of preventing, investigating, disrupting,
or prosecuting an offense arising out of a threat described
in clause (iv) or any of the offenses listed in--

(I) section 3559(c)(2)(F) of title 18, United States Code
(relating to serious violent felonies);
(II) sections 1028 through 1030 of such title (relating to
fraud and identity theft);
(III) chapter 37 of such title (relating to espionage and
censorship); and
(IV) chapter 90 of such title (relating to protection of
trade secrets).

(B) Prohibited activities.--Cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures provided to the Federal Government under
this title shall not be disclosed to, retained by, or used by
any Federal agency or department for any use not permitted
under subparagraph (A).
(C) Privacy and civil liberties.--Cyber threat indicators
and defensive measures provided to the Federal Government
under this title shall be retained, used, and disseminated by
the Federal Government--
(i) in accordance with the policies, procedures, and
guidelines required by subsections (a) and (b);
(ii) in a manner that protects from unauthorized use or
disclosure any cyber threat indicators that may contain
personal information of or identifying specific persons; and
(iii) in a manner that protects the confidentiality of
cyber threat indicators containing personal information of or
identifying a specific person.
(D) Federal regulatory authority.--
(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures provided to the
Federal Government under this title shall not be directly
used by any Federal, State, tribal, or local government to
regulate, including an enforcement action, the lawful
activities of any entity, including activities relating to
monitoring, operating defensive measures, or sharing cyber
threat indicators.
(ii) Exceptions.--

(I) Regulatory authority specifically relating to
prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats.--Cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures provided to the
Federal Government under this title may, consistent with
Federal or State regulatory authority specifically relating
to the prevention or mitigation of cybersecurity threats to
information systems, inform the development or implementation
of regulations relating to such information systems.
(II) Procedures developed and implemented under this
title.--Clause (i) shall not apply to procedures developed
and implemented under this title.

SEC. 1706. PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY.

(a) Monitoring of Information Systems.--No cause of action
shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private
entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the
monitoring of information systems and information under
section 1704(a) that is conducted in accordance with this
title.
(b) Sharing or Receipt of Cyber Threat Indicators.--No
cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court
against any entity, and such action shall be promptly
dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of cyber threat
indicators or defensive measures under section 1704(c) if--
(1) such sharing or receipt is conducted in accordance with
this title; and
(2) in a case in which a cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure is shared with the Federal Government, the
cyber threat indicator or defensive measure is shared in a
manner that is consistent with section 1705(c)(1)(B) and the
sharing or receipt, as the case may be, occurs after the
earlier of--
(A) the date on which the interim policies and procedures
are submitted to Congress under section 1705(a)(1); or
(B) the date that is 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this title.
(c) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed--
(1) to require dismissal of a cause of action against an
entity that has engaged in gross negligence or willful
misconduct in the course of conducting activities authorized
by this title; or
(2) to undermine or limit the availability of otherwise
applicable common law or statutory defenses.

SEC. 1707. OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.

(a) Biennial Report on Implementation.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this title, and not less frequently than
once every 2 years thereafter, the heads of the appropriate
Federal entities shall jointly submit and the Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, the Inspector General
of the Department of Justice, the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, and the Inspector General of the
Department of Energy, in consultation with the Council of
Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, shall jointly
submit to Congress a

[[Page S3991]]

detailed report concerning the implementation of this title.
(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) An assessment of the sufficiency of the policies,
procedures, and guidelines required by section 1705 in
ensuring that cyber threat indicators are shared effectively
and responsibly within the Federal Government.
(B) An evaluation of the effectiveness of real-time
information sharing through the capability and process
developed under section 1705(c), including any impediments to
such real-time sharing.
(C) An assessment of the sufficiency of the procedures
developed under section 1703 in ensuring that cyber threat
indicators in the possession of the Federal Government are
shared in a timely and adequate manner with appropriate
entities, or, if appropriate, are made publicly available.
(D) An assessment of whether cyber threat indicators have
been properly classified and an accounting of the number of
security clearances authorized by the Federal Government for
the purposes of this title.
(E) A review of the type of cyber threat indicators shared
with the Federal Government under this title, including the
following:
(i) The degree to which such information may impact the
privacy and civil liberties of specific persons.
(ii) A quantitative and qualitative assessment of the
impact of the sharing of such cyber threat indicators with
the Federal Government on privacy and civil liberties of
specific persons.
(iii) The adequacy of any steps taken by the Federal
Government to reduce such impact.
(F) A review of actions taken by the Federal Government
based on cyber threat indicators shared with the Federal
Government under this title, including the appropriateness of
any subsequent use or dissemination of such cyber threat
indicators by a Federal entity under section 1705.
(G) A description of any significant violations of the
requirements of this title by the Federal Government.
(H) A summary of the number and type of entities that
received classified cyber threat indicators from the Federal
Government under this title and an evaluation of the risks
and benefits of sharing such cyber threat indicators.
(3) Recommendations.--Each report submitted under paragraph
(1) may include recommendations for improvements or
modifications to the authorities and processes under this
title.
(4) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(b) Reports on Privacy and Civil Liberties.--
(1) Biennial report from privacy and civil liberties
oversight board.--Not later than 2 years after the date of
the enactment of this title and not less frequently than once
every 2 years thereafter, the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board shall submit to Congress and the President a
report providing--
(A) an assessment of the effect on privacy and civil
liberties by the type of activities carried out under this
title; and
(B) an assessment of the sufficiency of the policies,
procedures, and guidelines established pursuant to section
1705 in addressing concerns relating to privacy and civil
liberties.
(2) Biennial report of inspectors general.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 2 years after the date of
the enactment of this title and not less frequently than once
every 2 years thereafter, the Inspector General of the
Department of Homeland Security, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice, the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, and the Inspector General of the
Department of Energy shall, in consultation with the Council
of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, jointly submit
to Congress a report on the receipt, use, and dissemination
of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures that have
been shared with Federal entities under this title.
(B) Contents.--Each report submitted under subparagraph (A)
shall include the following:
(i) A review of the types of cyber threat indicators shared
with Federal entities.
(ii) A review of the actions taken by Federal entities as a
result of the receipt of such cyber threat indicators.
(iii) A list of Federal entities receiving such cyber
threat indicators.
(iv) A review of the sharing of such cyber threat
indicators among Federal entities to identify inappropriate
barriers to sharing information.
(3) Recommendations.--Each report submitted under this
subsection may include such recommendations as the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, with respect to a report
submitted under paragraph (1), or the Inspectors General
referred to in paragraph (2)(A), with respect to a report
submitted under paragraph (2), may have for improvements or
modifications to the authorities under this title.
(4) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.

SEC. 1708. CONSTRUCTION AND PREEMPTION.

(a) Otherwise Lawful Disclosures.--Nothing in this title
shall be construed--
(1) to limit or prohibit otherwise lawful disclosures of
communications, records, or other information, including
reporting of known or suspected criminal activity, by an
entity to any other entity or the Federal Government under
this title; or
(2) to limit or prohibit otherwise lawful use of such
disclosures by any Federal entity, even when such otherwise
lawful disclosures duplicate or replicate disclosures made
under this title.
(b) Whistle Blower Protections.--Nothing in this title
shall be construed to prohibit or limit the disclosure of
information protected under section 2302(b)(8) of title 5,
United States Code (governing disclosures of illegality,
waste, fraud, abuse, or public health or safety threats),
section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing
disclosures to Congress), section 1034 of title 10, United
States Code (governing disclosure to Congress by members of
the military), section 1104 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) (governing disclosure by employees of
elements of the intelligence community), or any similar
provision of Federal or State law.
(c) Protection of Sources and Methods.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed--
(1) as creating any immunity against, or otherwise
affecting, any action brought by the Federal Government, or
any agency or department thereof, to enforce any law,
executive order, or procedure governing the appropriate
handling, disclosure, or use of classified information;
(2) to affect the conduct of authorized law enforcement or
intelligence activities; or
(3) to modify the authority of a department or agency of
the Federal Government to protect classified information and
sources and methods and the national security of the United
States.
(d) Relationship to Other Laws.--Nothing in this title
shall be construed to affect any requirement under any other
provision of law for an entity to provide information to the
Federal Government.
(e) Prohibited Conduct.--Nothing in this title shall be
construed to permit price-fixing, allocating a market between
competitors, monopolizing or attempting to monopolize a
market, boycotting, or exchanges of price or cost
information, customer lists, or information regarding future
competitive planning.
(f) Information Sharing Relationships.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed--
(1) to limit or modify an existing information sharing
relationship;
(2) to prohibit a new information sharing relationship;
(3) to require a new information sharing relationship
between any entity and the Federal Government; or
(4) to require the use of the capability and process within
the Department of Homeland Security developed under section
1705(c).
(g) Preservation of Contractual Obligations and Rights.--
Nothing in this title shall be construed--
(1) to amend, repeal, or supersede any current or future
contractual agreement, terms of service agreement, or other
contractual relationship between any entities, or between any
entity and a Federal entity; or
(2) to abrogate trade secret or intellectual property
rights of any entity or Federal entity.
(h) Anti-Tasking Restriction.--Nothing in this title shall
be construed to permit the Federal Government--
(1) to require an entity to provide information to the
Federal Government;
(2) to condition the sharing of cyber threat indicators
with an entity on such entity's provision of cyber threat
indicators to the Federal Government; or
(3) to condition the award of any Federal grant, contract,
or purchase on the provision of a cyber threat indicator to a
Federal entity.
(i) No Liability for Non-Participation.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed to subject any entity to liability
for choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities
authorized in this title.
(j) Use and Retention of Information.--Nothing in this
title shall be construed to authorize, or to modify any
existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal
Government to retain or use any information shared under this
title for any use other than permitted in this title.
(k) Federal Preemption.--
(1) In general.--This title supersedes any statute or other
provision of law of a State or political subdivision of a
State that restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an
activity authorized under this title.
(2) State law enforcement.--Nothing in this title shall be
construed to supersede any statute or other provision of law
of a State or political subdivision of a State concerning the
use of authorized law enforcement practices and procedures.
(l) Regulatory Authority.--Nothing in this title shall be
construed--
(1) to authorize the promulgation of any regulations not
specifically authorized by this title;
(2) to establish or limit any regulatory authority not
specifically established or limited under this title; or
(3) to authorize regulatory actions that would duplicate or
conflict with regulatory requirements, mandatory standards,
or related processes under another provision of Federal law.

[[Page S3992]]

(m) Authority of Secretary of Defense To Respond to Cyber
Attacks.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit
the authority of the Secretary of Defense to develop,
prepare, coordinate, or, when authorized by the President to
do so, conduct a military cyber operation in response to a
malicious cyber activity carried out against the United
States or a United States person by a foreign government or
an organization sponsored by a foreign government or a
terrorist organization.

SEC. 1709. REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY THREATS.

(a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this title, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of other
appropriate elements of the intelligence community, shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives a report on cybersecurity threats,
including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An assessment of the current intelligence sharing and
cooperation relationships of the United States with other
countries regarding cybersecurity threats, including cyber
attacks, theft, and data breaches, directed against the
United States and which threaten the United States national
security interests and economy and intellectual property,
specifically identifying the relative utility of such
relationships, which elements of the intelligence community
participate in such relationships, and whether and how such
relationships could be improved.
(2) A list and an assessment of the countries and nonstate
actors that are the primary threats of carrying out a
cybersecurity threat, including a cyber attack, theft, or
data breach, against the United States and which threaten the
United States national security, economy, and intellectual
property.
(3) A description of the extent to which the capabilities
of the United States Government to respond to or prevent
cybersecurity threats, including cyber attacks, theft, or
data breaches, directed against the United States private
sector are degraded by a delay in the prompt notification by
private entities of such threats or cyber attacks, theft, and
breaches.
(4) An assessment of additional technologies or
capabilities that would enhance the ability of the United
States to prevent and to respond to cybersecurity threats,
including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.
(5) An assessment of any technologies or practices utilized
by the private sector that could be rapidly fielded to assist
the intelligence community in preventing and responding to
cybersecurity threats.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall be made available in classified and unclassified forms.
(d) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the
term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that
term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).

SEC. 1710. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Public Information.--Section 552(b) of title 5, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking ``wells.'' and inserting
``wells; or''; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
``(10) information shared with or provided to the Federal
Government pursuant to the Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Act of 2015.''.
(b) Modification of Limitation on Dissemination of Certain
Information Concerning Penetrations of Defense Contractor
Networks.--Section 941(c)(3) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239;
10 U.S.C. 2224 note) is amended by inserting at the end the
following: ``The Secretary may share such information with
other Federal entities if such information consists of cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures and such information
is shared consistent with the policies and procedures
promulgated by the Attorney General under section 1705 of the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.''.

SEC. 1711. CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS OF EMPLOYEES OF THE
MILITARY CHILD CARE SYSTEM AND PROVIDERS OF
CHILD CARE SERVICES AND YOUTH PROGRAM SERVICES
FOR MILITARY DEPENDENTS.

(a) Employees of Military Child Care System.--Section 1792
of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection (d):
``(d) Criminal Background Check.--The criminal background
check of child care employees under this section that is
required pursuant to section 231 of the Crime Control Act of
1990 (42 U.S.C. 13041) shall be conducted pursuant to
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense in
accordance with the provisions of section 658H of the Child
Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
9858f).''.
(b) Providers of Child Care Services and Youth Program
Services.--Section 1798 of such title is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection (c):
``(c) Criminal Background Check.--A provider of child care
services or youth program services may not provide such
services under this section unless such provider complies
with the requirements for criminal background checks under
section 658H of the Child Care and Development Block Grant
Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 9858f) for the State in which such
services are provided.''.
(c) Funding.--Amounts for activities required by reason of
the amendments made by this section during fiscal year 2016
shall be derived from amounts otherwise authorized to be
appropriated for fiscal year 2016 by section 301 and
available for operation and maintenance for the Yellow Ribbon
Reintegration Program as specified in the funding tables in
section 4301.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 1921 is rendered moot.
The Senator from Texas.
Mr. REED addressed the Chair.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, regular order.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, turning to the underlying legislation that
we are debating, the Defense authorization bill, I can't think of
anything more basic or fundamental to the Federal Government's
responsibility than national security and defense and to make sure we
provide our men and women in uniform with the resources they need in
order to do the job they volunteered to do on our behalf. Of course,
many of us have commented time and again on this floor and elsewhere
about the increasing complexity of the threats facing our national
security and the security and peace of the world.
This legislation enables our troops to get the funding and the
resources and the authorities they need in order to have success on the
battlefield. As we consider the current state of the world, it is clear
why this bill is vital. We live in a world marked by constant dynamic
threats to our way of life. For example, parts of the Middle East and
North Africa have been overrun by the Islamic State, and the region
continues to be a hotbed of failed states and ungoverned places. If we
have learned anything from 9/11, it is that ungoverned spaces are a
threat to our national security, because that is where our adversaries
will organize and train and then export those threats to our homeland.
Despite ongoing negotiations, Iran remains an enemy of the United
States and continues its campaign to achieve regional domination and
become a threshold nuclear State, threatening our most trusted allies
and partners in the region. In Europe and in Asia, Russia and China
continue to threaten our allies in their respective neighborhoods,
using a growing array of soft-power and hard-power tactics to twist
arms and to coerce our friends and allies. These new dynamic threats
include cyber attacks, which have been much in the news today,
including espionage and just outright theft of our intellectual
property in seed corn created from the brains and ingenuity of American
entrepreneurs and creators. Today, our courageous men and women in
uniform are tasked with the challenge of facing these many threats and
many others in regions all around the world.
So it is astounding to me that the Democratic leader, in the face of
these threats and in the face of our grave responsibilities to meet
these challenges, would come to the floor and suggest that debating
this bill would be what he called a ``waste of time'' and go further to
say that the Democratic minority would consider filibustering this
legislation. It is just unbelievable.
This blatant disregard for our responsibilities and for our troops is
very troubling, particularly because this bill has historically been
one that has enjoyed broad bipartisan support. In fact, as our
colleague, the senior Senator from Arizona, pointed out in an op-ed he
wrote yesterday, Congress has passed a Defense authorization bill for
53 consecutive years--53 consecutive years--because it is a national
priority. It should be, and it is. Up to now, this bill has been marked
by strong bipartisan backing in the committee. The bill sailed through
the Senate Armed Services Committee with a bipartisan vote of 22 to 4.
We don't get much more bipartisan in today's Senate than that.

[[Page S3993]]

Yet, with all of the support from both sides of the aisle and even with
such a clearly demonstrated need as the funding and well-being of our
troops and their families, the President himself--the Commander in
Chief--has threatened to veto this bill--a bill that actually provides
the full funding levels he himself requested.
It is important to note--because some of our colleagues on the other
side have said that the problem with this bill is that it doesn't spend
enough money or that we ought to reallocate our nondefense
discretionary spending to increase that, as well--that this bill
includes the exact same level of funding that President Obama himself
requested in his budget. So why in the world would the President
threaten to veto a bill that meets the funding levels that he himself
identified in his budget?
For some reason, instead of focusing on our most fundamental
responsibilities of funding the brave men and women in our Armed Forces
and making sure they have the resources they need to keep our country
safe, our Commander in Chief and the minority leader are threatening to
hold this bill hostage to extract more government spending for
nondefense discretionary spending for organizations and agencies such
as the Internal Revenue Service. So why in the world would we hold
national security spending hostage so we can spend more money on the
IRS? It is just a complete upside-down view of our priorities.
So the President's lack of strategic depth or his understanding of
our Nation's most fundamental duties is really astounding. I am
troubled to say this, but I think it is actually true: I think the
President understands our Nation's fundamental duties very clearly. The
problem is that this threat to hold this bill hostage is just cynical.
It just uses a political tool to try to gain advantage when it comes to
raising the caps on nondefense discretionary spending. For a President
who admits that he doesn't have a complete strategy to defeat the
Islamic State, I find his comments to be irresponsible. He is
threatening to veto this bill to satisfy the far leftwing of his party,
which doesn't believe government could ever spend too much money and
that government is ever big enough. The government is never big enough
or spends enough for some of our colleagues across the aisle and some
of the political base in the President's party.
Just this morning, the Washington Post reported that Senate Democrats
have now come up with a brand-new political strategy, and this time
they are going further--to threaten to block all funding bills for the
rest of the summer, including the Defense appropriations bill, which I
know the majority leader is scheduling to be debated and voted on right
after we complete our work on this legislation. As a matter of fact,
the Democratic leader said this morning: ``We're headed for another
shutdown.'' Senator Reid said: ``They did it once, they're going to do
it again. . . . They want to wait until the fiscal year ends and then
close up government.''
It is bad enough that Democrats are threatening to filibuster the
defense spending bill, but now they are claiming that it is really the
Republicans' fault. In other words, they are saying: We are not for
stopping the Defense authorization bill.
We are for funding our national responsibilities when it comes to
national security. But because our Democratic friends wish to hold the
Defense authorization bill and the Defense appropriations bill hostage,
they somehow now are claiming that we are the ones responsible. Because
we won't accede to their insatiable demand for bigger government and
more government spending, and we won't allow them to hold our troops
and their families and our national security hostage, we are the ones
at fault.
But, today, as we know, thanks to the Washington Post, the
filibustering of this and other bills is just part of a political
strategy.
One point I have to acknowledge is the candor of our colleagues on
the other side of the aisle. If we want to know what they are planning
to do, all we have to do is read the newspaper, because they are more
than happy to tell us exactly what they are going to do and what their
plans are.
This is all part of a cynical political strategy to keep the Senate
from working and to deny funding to our Armed Forces while bulking up
Federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the
IRS. This is shameless, and it is hypothetical, and the American people
will not be fooled by it.
I wish to remind our colleagues across the aisle that stifling debate
and blocking votes is a pretty lousy political strategy, as well. It is
what lost them control of this Chamber last November. It is a losing
strategy, it is bad policy, it is cynical politics, and the American
people understand that. It is simply shameful that they are trying to
use our troops, who protect this great Nation, as some sort of leverage
in some sort of political game.
I don't have to remind the Presiding Officer, who continues to serve
honorably in our military services, that we live in a very dangerous
world. Somehow, we don't pay enough attention to that until something
reaches out and bites us or injures someone we love. Our Armed Forces
face new and growing threats on a daily basis. Our troops deserve our
full attention and every resource they need as they serve and defend
our country around the world.
So that is why I have come to the floor, to say: Why in the world,
after 53 consecutive Defense authorization bills, would the Democratic
leader--and indeed with the complicity of the President of the United
States himself--say they are going to hold this Defense bill hostage
until they get what they want when it comes to spending more money?
This bipartisan bill, which focuses squarely on the needs of our
warfighters and authorizes funding at the same level the President
himself suggested, should not be held hostage to political
gamesmanship. So I would encourage the more sensible Members across the
aisle to focus on the troops and their families, not on the partisan
agenda of their leadership, and pass this legislation to provide the
funding our troops need to continue to do their courageous work of
keeping our country safe.
One way my colleagues could play a constructive role and move this
legislation forward, instead of threatening to filibuster, is to work
with us on commonsense amendments, such as the one I have filed that is
pending on the underlying bill.
Under current law, the President has discretion to allow energy
exports to vulnerable allies, our partners in Europe, and around the
world when it is deemed to be in our national interest. The amendment I
have offered in the underlying bill simply reaffirms the existing
authority of the President of the United States but encourages the
President not to allow our adversaries, such as Vladimir Putin, to use
energy supplies for vulnerable countries in Europe as a weapon. It
would also commission a report that would allow us to get an accurate
assessment of just how dependent our allies in the region are on those
who would wield their energy supply as a weapon.
This amendment is a commonsense measure that serves as a first step
to addressing the requests--the pleas in some cases--of our allies and
partners in an increasingly unpredictable world, and it doesn't change
the existing authority the President already has.
I would urge our colleagues to put down the political playbook and
work with us in a constructive way on the underlying legislation. This
has been the great tradition of the Defense authorization bill and one
that is being threatened by the political gamesmanship that we see
threatened by the Democratic leader and, indeed, even with the
complicity and the fingerprints of the President of the United States.
We owe it and so much more to our troops, who are relying on us to
act today. Even more than that, we have a duty to the country to make
sure we maintain the security of the American people.
I yield the floor.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.

[[Page S3994]]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, last week we learned of the latest in
the string of massive breaches of private information from cyber
penetrations, this time of government personnel records held by the
Office of Personnel Management.
In its annual worldwide threat assessment, the intelligence community
this year ranked cyber intrusions and attacks as the No. 1 threat to
our Nation's security. Cyber attacks and threats are also a major drag
on our economy, with the theft of billions and billions of dollars of
intellectual property and actual money from our Nation's businesses.
Quite simply, cyber attacks are a major and growing threat to every
aspect of our life.
It is with that background that Senator Burr and I began working
early this year on a new cyber security information-sharing bill. It is
a first-step bill, in that for sharing company to company or sharing
cyber threat information directly with the government, a company would
receive liability protection and therefore feel free to have this kind
of constructive interchange.
The Senate Select Intelligence Committee produced the bill in the
last Congress, but it didn't receive a vote. Chairman Burr and I have
been determined not only to get a vote but to get a bill signed into
law. It should be evident to everybody that the only way we will get
this done is if it is bipartisan.
With significant compromises on both sides, we put together the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, a bill approved in March by our
Intelligence Committee by an overwhelming 14-to-1 vote. That bill has
been ready for Senate consideration for nearly 3 months but has not yet
been brought to the floor.
Last week's attack underscores why such legislation is necessary.
The Democratic leader told me many weeks ago that this issue is too
important for political wrangling, that he would not seek to block or
slow down consideration of the bill and would work to move the bill
quickly. So the bill is ready for floor consideration.
Now, a number of my colleagues would like to propose amendments--as
is their right--and I expect I would support some of them and would
oppose some of them. The Senate should have an opportunity to fully
consider the bill and to receive the input of other committees with
jurisdiction in this area. Unless we do this, we won't have a
bipartisan vote, I believe, because, like it or not, no matter how
simple--and I have been through two bills now--this was not an easy
bill to draft because there are conflicts on both sides.
Filing the cyber security bill as an amendment to the Defense
authorization bill prompted a lot of legitimate and understandable
concern from both sides of the aisle. People want debate on the
legislation, and they want an opportunity to offer relevant amendments.
To do this as an amendment--when Senator Burr discussed it with me, I
indicated I did not want to go on and make that proposal--I think is a
mistake.
I very much hope that the majority leader will reconsider this path,
and that once we have finished with the Defense authorization bill, the
Senate can take up, consider, and hopefully approve the cyber security
legislation. I think if we do it any other way, we are in for real
trouble, and this is the product of experience. So I very much hope
that there can be a change in procedure and that this bill--I know our
leader will agree--could come up directly following the Defense
authorization bill.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The clerk will continue to call the roll.
The legislative clerk continued with the call of the roll.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I speak today about Cotton amendment No.
1605, addressing funding for the National Nuclear Security
Administration, the administration that safeguards our nuclear
stockpile for the country. The Obama administration, in its budget
earlier this year, requested approximately $50 million per year for the
next 5 years for the administration to be able to dismantle old or
obsolete warheads. My amendment would simply codify President Obama's
own budget request, limiting the administration to spend $50 million
per year for the next 5 years on nuclear dismantlement.
My amendment also includes a waiver that would allow the President to
increase the amount of spending under certain limited conditions. This
amendment has been approved not only by the majority but also the
minority of the Armed Services Committee.
I offer this amendment because of troubling statements from the Obama
administration about their intent to accelerate nuclear disarmament,
however. Last month, Secretary of State Kerry announced at the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Review Conference that the United States would
accelerate its dismantlement of nuclear warheads by 20 percent. Beyond
obsolete or outdated warheads, I do not believe that is a priority.
Nuclear modernization is a priority.
We should not be accelerating our nuclear disarmament by up to 20
percent because it would send the exact wrong message to Russia, other
adversaries, and our allies. Russia is making overt nuclear threats to
the United States and our allies, and we are going to accelerate our
unilateral nuclear disarmament? That defies logic.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to set aside the pending
amendment in order to call up Cotton amendment No. 1605.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Ernst). Is there objection?
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, reserving the right to object. I am
very concerned about this. It unnecessarily limits the National Nuclear
Security Administration's ability to dismantle the retired nuclear
weapons that no longer have any role in our national defense.
The President's budget proposed $48 million for dismantlement, and
this amendment would freeze funding at that level and at specific
funding levels for the next 5 years. However, the Appropriations
Committee, just last month, provided an additional $4 million for
dismantlement in the Energy and Water bill.
I am ranking member on that committee. It was approved on a
bipartisan basis, 26 to 4. This funding is appropriate and it is
justified. The fact is, there are currently approximately 2,400 retired
warheads awaiting dismantlement. The rate at which we dismantle these
warheads does not have anything to do with the 4,800 warheads that
remain in the stockpile, consistent with the New START treaty.
This is a treaty, not an agreement. The administration has committed
accelerating dismantlement and we should support its goals of
eliminating redundant nuclear weapons. I see no reason to imply
congressional disapproval for this effort and to micromanage NNSA's
weapons activity. Modernization and dismantlement go hand in hand. NNSA
routinely shifts employees from weapons stockpile stewardship and
modernization work to dismantlement to keep the workforce fully and
usefully engaged. It is completely unnecessary to complicate this
process. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. COTTON. Madam President, I understand that the Senator from
California objects to my amendment. But this is the Senate. This is an
important issue. We should be debating the matter. If the Senator from
California wishes to defeat my amendment, we should call it up and make
it pending and have a vote on it, not object to an amendment simply
being brought to the floor to be debated.

[[Page S3995]]

Is there a reason to manage our nuclear policy? Yes, I would say
there is a strong reason. On many issues, the administration has shown
itself less than forthcoming in dealing with Congress, in particular on
nuclear policy. As we now know, the administration minimized reports of
Russia's activities under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty at a
time they were trying to pass the New START treaty in 2010.
I would further say this amendment simply codifies the President's
budget request. The Senator from California said $48 million for this
year. For the next 4 years after that, it is $48.3 million, $50
million, $52.4 million, $51.8 million. I will concede that, in sum,
that is $50.1 million per year, on average. So I am giving the
administration a haircut of $100,000 per year. If that is
objectionable, I would be happy to modify my amendment to put it at
$50.1 million per year.
But this Congress should not give the President a blank check to
engage in further unilateral nuclear disarmament at a time when
Vladimir Putin is making nuclear threats against the United States,
invading sovereign countries, and his missiles are shooting civilian
aircraft out of the sky in the heart of Europe.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I rise to speak on my amendment No.
1706. This amendment addresses the contributions of the member states
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in relation to their
commitment towards their defense budgets within their economy.
At the 2006 NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, which I was honored to be
able to attend, NATO member countries committed to spend a minimum of 2
percent of their national income, GDP, on defense. Furthermore, at the
2014 NATO summit in Wales, NATO member countries agreed again that
``allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2
percent of their gross domestic product on defense will aim to continue
to do so''.
They went on to state that ``allies whose current proportion of GDP
spent on defense is below this level will: halt any decline in defense
expenditure; aim to increase defense expenditure in real terms as GDP
grows; aim to move towards the 2 percent guideline within a decade with
a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO's
capability shortfall.''
Well, I suggest that is a pretty weak commitment, but it remains a
commitment. It certainly can be stretched out, and they are already
failing too often to meet those commitments.
So, in 2015, only 4 this year--only 4 out of the 28 NATO-member
countries, including the United States, meet the 2-percent target. That
is 4 out of the 28.
Regrettably, European NATO allies averaged just 1.33 percent of their
GDP on defense, even though NATO countries have made numerous,
unbinding, unfulfilled agreements to spend 2 percent. The United States
currently spends 3.8 percent of its GDP on defense--a large portion of
it defending Europe.
So, in contrast, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development data shows that European-NATO allies averaged 24 percent of
their GDP on social welfare programs, contrasting to 19 percent in the
United States. So they spend more in-country on their programs while we
are spending more to defend them.
Unfortunately, reductions in military spending are a common theme
across Europe. Just 5 years ago, according to the NATO figures,
France's military budget amounted to 2.4 percent of GDP. This past
year, it stood at 1.9 percent, and France's budget law orders no
increases before 2019. As for Germany, Europe's economic powerhouse, it
spends only 1.3 percent of its GDP on defense. By the way, the European
economy, as a whole, is as large or slightly larger than the U.S.
economy as a whole.
So in 1990, NATO's European member states spent, on average, about
2.3 percent GDP on defense--well above today's average of 1.3.
America's share of NATO military expenditures--get this, colleagues--is
75 percent. The U.S. share of the NATO military expenditures is 75
percent and has grown an additional 5 percent since 2007. This is a
rather dramatic figure.
I had the privilege to be able to travel to Eastern Europe recently,
and it was raised to us, by individuals in those countries, that they
were somewhat embarrassed about this. But the reality is, they are
taking no substantial steps to deal with it.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates--who is one of the most wise
people in the world, I believe, in terms of U.S. policy and
international policy, served in multiple administrations over the years
in the White House and as Secretary of Defense under President Obama
and President Bush--in his last speech as Secretary of Defense had the
following to say on this matter:

Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European
defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S.
political leaders--those for whom the Cold War was not the
formative experience that it was for me--may not consider the
return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost.
What I've sketched out is the real possibility for a dim,
if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance. Such a
future is possible, but it is not inevitable. The good news
is that the members of NATO--individually and collectively--
have it well within their means to halt and reverse these
trends, and instead produce a very different future.

This was his last speech. He made a speech on a subject he considered
to be extraordinarily important. It is a statement he has made
previously at other times, but it reflected, I think, something akin to
Washington's Farewell Address as he raised and discussed one of the
most important problems facing the world today; that is, the developed
world, other than the United States, is not conducting itself
financially in an effective way to defend themselves.
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for decades one of the
world's wisest world leaders and commentators, has repeatedly
questioned Europe's will. It gets down to that level: To what extent is
Europe willing to pay a modest price to maintain their security?
There was a book out a number of years ago, referred to as ``Of
Paradise and Power,'' and Robert Kagan's book notes that the Europeans
are living in the paradise provided by American power.
So when the Russians took this aggressive step to invade the Ukraine,
a nation we have considered for admission into NATO, took Crimea and
otherwise acted in violation of international law, we announced a
European reassurance initiative, $1 billion. This $1 billion was to be
utilized in a way that would reassure our allies and reaffirm our
commitment to Europe, even in the face of this dangerous and
provocative action by Russia.
Well, colleagues, after having been to Europe and Eastern Europe on a
number of occasions, I would say I am getting to the point where I want
to be reassured. I want to have confidence in Europe's commitments.
At this volatile time in world history, this lack of commitment on
the part of our European allies must end. We need to ensure that NATO
members are spending at least what is needed and certainly the minimum
2 percent of GDP they repeatedly committed to spend.
The dangers in this world are much closer to Europe than they are to
the United States, and our European allies are right to be concerned.
They are anxious to have our presence. The requests for more and
numerous military support, action from the United States, are even
urgent in some of those countries. They want us there.
But, great danger arises from Europe living in an unreal comfort
zone, living in the paradise of American power. Unless the history of
the world has been dramatically altered, and it has not, threats to
Europe will remain. Who will resist the dangerous pressures on Europe?
Will our European partners just rest on American power? That is what
the reality suggests is, in fact, occurring now.
Europeans now insist Greece must take painful financial steps for the
good of the European Union to be a good team player, they say.
I think it is right and appropriate for the United States to call on
our NATO

[[Page S3996]]

allies to do their part for this great alliance that has done so much
for stability, prosperity, and peace for Europe and for the entire
world.
This amendment before the Senate has overwhelming support, I believe.
I think it will be accepted as part of the managers' package. The call
it makes on NATO members is the absolute minimum, I think, that can be
expected of them.
Let's consider the plain facts. The deployment of U.S. military
forces to any nation in the world, for the purpose of defending that
nation and a region, is an august thing. Obviously, the military might
of the United States is unsurpassed. The United States cannot and must
not take these commitments lightly. The ramifications of our commitment
to the defense of a foreign nation are significant--grave indeed.
This Nation has every right and a duty to our citizens to ensure that
those with whom we partner do their share. The idea that a small nation
can simply send an email to the United States calling for more forces
whenever they become nervous--while taking only limited steps to fund
and defend their own country--suggests a disconnect with reality.
This Senate, by this amendment, is sending a clear call for NATO to
do more. It is not too late to maintain this alliance as the force for
good it has always been. But everyone on both sides of the Atlantic who
understands these issues realizes we are in a precarious situation if a
miscalculation occurs, and miscalculations can lead to violence and
war.
So it is time to make clear the strength of our commitment to each
other and to ensure there is no miscalculation. To do that, more is
required of our NATO allies.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. VITTER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 1473

Mr. VITTER. Madam President, I rise to speak about amendment No. 1473
that is pending. I will be modifying it, not now but later today, in a
technical way. The majority and the minority have been notified of this
modification, so I will be making that later, and I am going to talk
about the substance of the amendment.
This amendment is very significant in terms of our Army force
structure. It would limit any additional reductions the Army can make
to Army BCTs, which have already been drastically reduced from 48
brigade combat teams in 2008 to 45 in 2013, to now 33 in 2015--so in
just 7 years, from 48 to 33. Obviously, it was a dramatic reduction.
This is important because brigade combat teams are a very significant
element of Army force structure, and many experts all across the
spectrum would acknowledge that and would acknowledge that further
significant reductions would be very dangerous.
To clarify, my amendment would require the Army to trim its force
structure. It doesn't stop that trend, but it also offers protections
for that primary core unit of the brigade combat team without mandating
additional money, additional requirements, et cetera. There is a
serious and urgent need for Congress to act quickly so the Defense
Department has the authority and support it needs to defend our Nation.
This specific amendment protecting those core, required brigade
combat teams is supported by the National Guard Association of the
United States and the Association of the United States Army, the two
key national groups that support the direct Army and the National
Guard.
Some Members may argue that we don't want to micromanage the Army and
how it deals with force structure. I certainly agree with that
generally, but this is certainly not getting into the fine weeds. This
is a major issue, and brigade combat teams are a major tool of their
force structure. Furthermore, exactly this sort of limitation has been
done in this bill, in the underlying bill, both with regard to the Air
Force and with regard to the Navy.
The bill, as it stands on the floor coming out of committee, includes
numerous provisions to block the elimination of certain weapons
systems, such as the Air Force fighter inventory, the A-10, EC-130
Compass Call aircraft. So it is very similar on the Air Force side to
justify blocking these eliminations. The chairman's report states:

The committee believes further reductions in fighter force
capacity, in light of ongoing and anticipated operations in
Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant,
coupled with a potential delay of force withdrawals from
Afghanistan, poses excessive risk to the Air Force's ability
to execute the National Defense Strategy, causes remaining
fighter squadrons to deploy more frequently, and drives even
lower readiness rates across the combat air forces.

Exactly that same sort of rationale which is in the bill with regard
to limitations of what the Air Force can do also applies to the Army
and brigade combat teams.
In addition, the same sort of thing is already in this underlying
bill with regard to the Navy. There is specific language blocking
certain further reductions of aircraft carriers--again, a major element
of force structure; again, Congress saying: No, don't go below this
number. That is not justified. That will weaken our overall capability,
and that will weaken force structure.
So again on the Navy side on this bill the chairman and the committee
have done exactly the same thing. My amendment would simply do
something very similar and equally as important and justified on the
Army side with regard to brigade combat teams.
Because of the significance of brigade combat teams to Army readiness
and operations, because of the enormous cuts that have already been
made in those numbers in the last 7 years--from 48 to 33--I urge all of
my colleagues, Democrats and Republicans, to support this commonsense
amendment.
Again, Madam President, to underscore, I will be returning to the
floor sometime today to modify my amendment in a technical way.
Everyone--certainly including the majority and minority leaders on this
bill--has been given those modifications. They are not controversial. I
will simply wait for them to be on the floor to make that modification,
which is within my right and purview and does not require unanimous
consent, and then I am very hopeful this amendment will be teed up in
the next group of votes, perhaps around 3:30.
Madam President, with that, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 1921

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I want to say a few words about the Burr
amendment, No. 1921, which has now been made pending. I am thankful for
the leadership of Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein.
The language of this amendment, of which I am an original cosponsor,
was overwhelmingly approved by a 14-to-1 vote in the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in March.
Implementing legislation to address a long list of cyber threats that
have become all too common is among my highest priorities. Earlier this
month, it was the Office of Personnel Management and the Army. A few
weeks before that, it was the Pentagon network, the White House, and
the State Department. Before that, it was Anthem and Sony. That is just
to name a few.
I am pleased we are able to consider this amendment on the National
Defense Authorization Act. This voluntary information sharing is
critical to addressing these threats and ensuring that mechanisms are
in place to identify those responsible for costly and crippling cyber
attacks and ultimately deterring future attacks.
Our current defenses are inadequate, and our overall cyber strategy
has failed to deter cyber adversaries from continued attacks of
intellectual property theft and cyber espionage against the U.S.
Government and American companies. This failure to develop a meaningful
cyber deterrent strategy has increased the resolve of our adversaries
and will continue to do so at a growing risk to our national security

[[Page S3997]]

until we demonstrate that the consequences of exploiting the United
States through cyber greatly outweigh any perceived benefit.
This amendment is a crucial piece of that overall deterrent strategy,
and it is long past time that Congress move forward on information-
sharing legislation. This legislation--again, 14 to 1 from the Select
Committee on Intelligence--complements a number of critical cyber
provisions which are already in the bill which will ensure that the
Department of Defense has the capabilities it needs to deter
aggression, defend our national security interests, and, when called
upon, defeat our adversaries in cyber space.
The bill authorizes the Secretary of Defense to develop, prepare,
coordinate, and, when authorized by the President, conduct a military
cyber operation in response to malicious cyber activity carried out
against the United States or a U.S. person by a foreign power.
The bill includes a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to
conduct biennial exercises on responding to cyber attacks against
critical infrastructure. It limits $10 million in funds available to
the Department of Defense to provide support services to the Executive
Office of the President until the President submits the integrated
policy to deter adversaries in cyber space, which was required by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
It authorizes $200 million for a directed evaluation by the Secretary
of Defense of the cyber vulnerabilities of every major DOD weapons
system by not later than December 31, 2019.
It requires an independent panel on DOD war games to assess the
ability of the national mission forces of the U.S. Cyber Command to
reliably prevent or block large-scale attacks on the United States by
foreign powers with capabilities comparable to those expected of China,
Iran, North Korea, and Russia in years 2020 and 2025.
It establishes a $75 million cyber operations procurement fund for
the commander of U.S. Cyber Command to exercise limited acquisition
authorities.
It directs the Secretary of Defense to designate Department of
Defense entities to be responsible for the acquisition of critical
cyber capabilities.
The cyber security bill was passed through the Select Committee on
Intelligence because that is clearly, in many respects, among the
responsibilities of the Select Committee on Intelligence. But I think
it is obvious to anyone that the Department of Defense is a major
player. I just outlined a number of the provisions of the bill which
are directly overseen and related to the Department of Defense.
So my friends on the other side of the aisle seem to be all torqued-
up about the fact that this cyber bill should be divorced from the
Department of Defense. I know that my colleagues on the other side of
the aisle are very aware that just in the last few days, 4 million
Americans--4 million Americans--had their privacy compromised by a
cyber attack. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that
we are ahead in every aspect of a potential adversary except for one,
and that is cyber. There are great threats that are now literally to
America's supremacy in space and to many other aspects of technology
that have been developed throughout the world and are now part of our
daily lives.
So I am not quite sure why my friends on the other side of the aisle
should take such exception to legislation that addresses our national
security and the threats to it, which literally every expert in America
has agreed is a major threat to our ability to defend the Nation.
So I think there are colleagues who are not on the Intelligence
Committee and are not familiar with the provisions of this bill. It
clearly is not only Department of Defense-related, but it is Department
of Defense-centric, with funds available to DOD to provide services to
the Executive Office of the President, $200 million, cyber
vulnerabilities of major DOD weapons system, an independent panel on
DOD war games, and on and on. It is Department of Defense-related, and
it is the whole purpose of the Defense authorization bill, which is to
defend the Nation. To leave cyber security out of that--yes, there are
some provisions in the underlying bill, but this hones and refines the
requirements that we are badly in need of and gives the President of
the United States and Secretary of Defense tools to try to limit the
damage that is occurring as we speak.
I want to repeat--and to my colleague from Indiana who is a member of
that committee, I would ask him--4 million Americans recently were
compromised by cyber attack.
Mr. COATS. In response to my friend from Arizona----
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to engage in a
colloquy with the Senator from Indiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COATS. Madam President, this is a serious breach, and there is
more to the story to be told. It shows the extreme position that we are
in here as Americans, as there are those who want to take this country
down, those who want to invade privacy of Americans and have the
capabilities of breaching this. The legislation before us, and the
reason why it is brought here now and, hopefully, will be attached to
the Defense bill is that this needs to be done now and not later. How
many breaches do we have to hear about--whether it is the private
sector or whether it is the government sector--before this Congress and
this Senate will stand up and say we have the capability of preventing
some of these things from happening, but we need the legislative
authority to do it. To delay and not even allow us to go forward with
this puts more and more millions of Americans at risk, whether they
work for the government or are in private industry.
Mr. McCAIN. And isn't it true, I would ask my colleague from Indiana,
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently stated that in
the potential of our adversaries to threaten our security, we have a
definite superiority in all areas except for one, which is in the issue
of cyber security; is that correct?
Mr. COATS. I think that is obvious, because, clearly, while we have
the capability to address some of these issues, we are not allowed to
use the capability. This legislation gives us the opportunity to have a
cooperative effort. Some of those who resist the use of this because
they think it is potentially a breach of privacy now understand that
breaches are occurring from outside and into the United States, by
those who are enemies of the state, those who are criminal groups,
those who are terrorist groups. While we may have the capacity to deal
with this, without this legislative authority we are not allowed to use
it.
So what an irony--what an irony that some are saying: We can't trust
the government on this to help us. This is defense. This is like saying
we can't trust the Department of Defense, we can't trust the Army or
the Navy to protect us from attack because it is government-run. Now,
they are saying there are some operations in government here that are
part of our defenses that can't be used until we have authority. The
irony is that people's privacies are being breached by all of these
attempts, and we are denying the opportunity to put the tools in place
to stop that from happening.
Mr. McCAIN. Could I ask my colleague again: The 4 million people
whose privacy was just breached--4 million Americans--what potential
damage is that to those individual Americans?
Mr. COATS. Well, we are just learning what damage this is and how it
can be misused in any number of ways. Some of this information is
classified. But I can say to my colleague from Arizona, the chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, that this puts some of our people and
some of our systems in great peril. It is something that needs to be
addressed now and not pushed down the line.
Mr. McCAIN. So it seems to me that to those 4 million Americans, we
owe them and it is our responsibility--in fact, our urgent
responsibility--to try to prevent that same kind of breach from being
perpetrated on 4 million or 8 million or 10 million more Americans. If
they are capable of doing it once to 4 million Americans, what is to
keep them from doing the same thing to millions of Americans more, if
we sit here idly by and do nothing on the grounds that the objection is
that it is not part of the Department of Defense

[[Page S3998]]

bill, which seems to me almost ludicrous?
Mr. COATS. Well, since the Department of Defense is one of those
agencies being attacked, I would certainly think this is the
appropriate attachment to a bill for which, hopefully, we will be given
the opportunity by our friends across the aisle. Hopefully, we will be
able to pass it in the Senate, move it on to the House, and get it to
the President so that these authorities can be in place.
The Senator mentioned 4 million. A company whose headquarters is in
the State of Indiana, Anthem insurance company, was breached--and this
is public information--of 80 million people on their roles. That is
almost one-third of all Americans who have had their private
information breached by a cyber attack--not to mention the threat that
comes from cyber attack on our critical infrastructure.
What if they take down the financial system of one of our major banks
or several banks? What if they take down the financial transactions
that they place on Wall Street every day? What if they shut down an
electric power grid in the middle of February when the temperatures in
the Northeast are in minus-Fahrenheit temperatures or when it is 110
degrees in Phoenix and you lose your power and can't turn on air
conditioning? People will die. People will be severely impacted by
this. To not go forward and give authorization to use the tools to try
to better protect American safety is not only unreasonable but is a
very serious thing.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleague from Indiana for his outstanding
work on a very difficult issue that poses a threat to every American
and citizens throughout the world.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Tillis). The Senator from Louisiana.

Amendment No. 1473

Mr. CASSIDY. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senator Vitter's
amendment No. 1473, which requires the Army to maintain no fewer than
32 brigade combat teams, which are also referred to as BCTs.
I support this amendment because cutting the brigade combat teams is
cutting the core of the Army's structure and their ability to perform
their mission. This amendment requires the Army to maintain a brigade
combat team level of 32. Currently, the Army is planning on cutting
these to 30 and to continue cutting to a point where we will have a
hollow force. This is a short-sighted approach to a bigger problem.
First, what the amendment says is that the Secretary shall give
priority under this paragraph to be carried out as funding or
appropriations become available.
Secondly, nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede the
Army's manning of brigade combat teams at designated levels, and it
requires congressional defense committees to have a report on the
current manning of each brigade combat team of the Army. It also
ensures that the Army National Guard brigade combat teams are
maintained at 26, and this accounts for the deactivation of two Air
National Guard brigade combat teams previously agreed to.
You may ask, Why do we need 32 brigade combat teams? At the height of
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, we had 48 brigade combat teams. If we
have noticed, in the Middle East, it is getting worse, not better. This
is not to say that we will commit these troops, but it will be to say
that we shall maintain our readiness.
Next, the Army's key weapon system is the brigade combat team. This
amendment protects that key weapon from those cuts.
Lastly, reducing brigade combat teams does not--I emphasize, does
not--make existing brigade combat teams more ready. It wears them out.
If you have fewer teams, they are deployed more often in whatever
activity they are deployed to, and that stretches that manpower and
womanpower potentially to the break.
Under this, with the higher level of force, there is less stress upon
those who are there maintaining their readiness. In total, this
amendment requires the Army to take a closer look at their strategy and
risk, forcing the Army to think long term instead of just cutting the
most crucial part of our force, which is the people, the human capital,
our fellow citizens.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to support the underlying
bill we are talking about on the floor, which is the Defense
authorization bill.
At a time of a rapidly deteriorating security environment around the
world, we need to modify our policies. From the violence in Iraq and
Syria to China's aggressive land reclamation in the South China Sea to
Russia's activities on the eastern border of Ukraine as we speak here
today--all of this is going on. We live in a world that is a lot less
safe and less friendly to U.S. interests. Every day we see more of
this. Frankly, it is time for us here in the Senate to help by changing
some of our policy approaches to address this changing and more
dangerous situation we see around the world.
I would hope we can do this on a bipartisan basis. Our differences
with regard to other issues tend to be more pronounced, but with regard
to national security, normally we come together. I am concerned with
what I am hearing, at least from some of the debate I have heard on the
floor, where it sounds as though some of our colleagues on the other
side of the aisle would like to actually shut down this debate and not
have a debate on some of these amendments and not have some votes on
some of these amendments and not have a vote on this bill to try to
adjust our national security posture so that we can address these new
challenges around the world. It doesn't mean that everything that this
side of the aisle wants to do would be accepted. Democrats would have
the chance to offer their ideas, and we would have a good debate on it,
and they would have a say in it. We need Democrat support to get the
legislation done. But let's have that debate and that discussion.
So I hope that what I am hearing is not accurate. I hope we will be
able to come together and continue this discussion and be able to have
votes on amendments and on the final bill and then be able to help, to
the extent we can in the Senate, to adjust our foreign policy and our
national security policy to address these very real threats we see
emerging all over the world.
I will give an example of one that I will offer today. This is an
amendment that has to do with Ukraine. As some of my colleagues know,
the situation in Ukraine has deteriorated significantly in the last
year or so, and it has done so because Russia not only invaded Crimea
and took that part of Ukraine but they are also now continuing their
aggression on the border of Ukraine. This is a situation that affects
us as Americans because Ukraine is our ally. Ukraine is a country that
has decided to stand with us. It is time for us and the other NATO
countries to stand with them.
Our policy toward Ukraine, in my view, has been not just insufficient
but it has been kind of piecemeal. We haven't had a strategy to deal
with this issue. So what this amendment attempts to do is to take the
language that is in the underlying legislation--already in the bill the
committee put together--and improve it so that, indeed, we do have a
more comprehensive strategy toward Ukraine. This is incredibly
important not just for Ukraine but for the international order, for our
national security, and for our ability to help stop this aggression in
Europe--the first, really, since World War II, where we have seen that
a country is going across another country's boundaries and actually
violating territorial integrity.
I visited Ukraine a couple of months ago in April. I got to see some
of the conflict consequences firsthand. For those who have been to
Ukraine--a number of my colleagues have, including Senator Durbin, who
just got back from Ukraine--I think they would all agree with me that
Ukraine is in a state of war and it is under siege. That makes it much
more difficult for Ukraine to do what they know they need to do, which
is to improve their

[[Page S3999]]

economy, to deal with corruption, to have more transparency, to become
more like those countries they want to emulate--the European countries
and the United States of America. They are attempting to do that, but
it is difficult when they have this conflict on their border where
troops are being killed and civilians are being killed and where they
have to devote enormous amounts of time and resources.
Just this week I had the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister
of Ukraine and the Finance Minister, both of whom are in town. In fact,
we met with them yesterday as part of the Ukrainian Caucus, which I
cofounded with Senator Durbin. I will tell my colleagues that talking
to them, it is very troubling to hear what is happening in their
country right now.
As some of my colleagues know, there is supposed to be a cease-fire
in place. It came from the second of what is called the Minsk
agreement. Whatever semblance of credibility this Minsk cease-fire had
left--I don't think it had much--it has now totally crumbled. Just last
week, combined Russian-separatist forces launched a major assault to
the north and southwest of the Province of Donetsk. Donetsk is one of
those areas also known as an oblast or a province, where there is a lot
of Russian and Russian-separatist activity. They were focused on this
strategic town of Maryinka. We probably saw some of this on TV. It is
very troubling that once again it looks as of these separatist forces,
backed by Russia and Russian equipment, which are directly involved in
this, are beginning to push back into Ukraine again.
The casualty reports are still coming in, but it appears that dozens
have been killed or wounded in this assault, according BBC. These
independent news organizations are following this, and I hope all of us
are focused on this. The U.S. intelligence in the area is not what it
ought to be, frankly, in my view, so we do need to rely on some of
these media sources.
It is very clear that in terms of this assault, they were using tanks
and heavy multiple-launch rocket systems and over 1,000 men were
involved. So clearly, this is something that is not only a serious
military exercise, but it is one that is backed by Russia, using
Russian equipment. We have seen just how committed the Russian
Government is to this--to promoting instability in that region of the
world. They are committed.
The question is whether we are committed to step up and support the
people of Ukraine. This is something that, in my view, the NATO forces
and the United States should have done a long time ago--not by us
getting involved directly, which, frankly, that is not what they are
asking for. They are asking for assistance and aid to be able to defend
themselves. They are asking for us to help them to be able to stop this
assault by giving them just the basic weaponry they need to stop tanks,
potentially to stop aircraft if aircraft get involved, and to be able
to stop the invasion and to protect the territorial integrity of the
country of Ukraine.
The President and some of his top advisers continue to stand in the
way of meaningful U.S. and NATO action. They have told me they fear
that it would provoke Russia, as if deadly clashes such as the one we
saw last week and, in fact, yesterday--and we will continue to see
today, probably, this steady stream of Russian tanks, artillery pieces,
and soldiers into Ukraine--aren't evidence enough that NATO and
American restraint has not deescalated this conflict. In fact, I think,
in a way, it has emboldened the Russians, and it has inflamed them.
Again, we are not talking about U.S. troops. What we are talking about
is helping this country that is our ally that has turned to us through
NATO, and we want them to be able to defend themselves.
The President continues to enforce this de facto embargo on any kind
of significant weapon that Ukraine has said it needs to defend itself.
He does that despite an overwhelming bipartisan consensus here in this
body and in the House that it is time to increase this help. That would
include lethal and nonlethal assistance to Ukraine. Congress has voted
repeatedly to do just that, most notably in the Ukrainian Freedom
Support Act, which was signed into law by President Obama in December.
It also provided the President a national security waiver so he didn't
have to do what we think he should do, which is to help them to defend
themselves. The administration continues to withhold these arms, and it
is time for that to end.
There is really very little disagreement on the capabilities that
Ukraine needs. My amendment, which is amendment No. 1850, modifies and
builds on the great work that Senator McCain and Senator Reed and
others have already done in the bill. If we look at section 1251 of the
bill, we will see that there is already assistance being provided to
Ukraine, about $300 million. Our amendment directs the Secretary of
Defense to spend this money in a way that all of us know is the
appropriate way to ensure that we get the most bang for the buck and
that we are giving them the assistance they really need.
It requires the Secretary of Defense to spend this money on a number
of critical capabilities they need to defend themselves, including
real-time intelligence, medium-range and long-range counter-artillery
radars, defensive lethal assistance such as antitank weapons, UAVs,
secure communications, and training to develop key combat, planning,
and support capabilities at both the small unit level and at the
brigade level. So it provides, frankly, less wiggle room for the
administration by laying out exactly what is needed, what is being
asked for by the Ukrainian military, and what, in this Chamber and
having done a lot of work in this area through our Ukrainian Caucus and
through other sources, we know is necessary.
Half of this $300 million under our amendment would be fenced off
until at least $60 million of it is spent on the important capabilities
the Ukrainians really need and have requested. That is the real-time
intelligence, defensive lethal assistance, and counter-artillery
batteries. If the administration fails to use this money for the
purposes specified, then they have to use it to support other nations
facing an increased risk of Russian aggression--countries such as
Georgia and Moldova.
The amendment also requires DOD to report on the quantity and the
type of security assistance being provided to Ukraine and how it
complies with the purposes that are established in the legislation.
So the amendment helps to ensure that U.S. military assistance
provides the assistance that will truly have a meaningful impact on the
ground, and it gives Ukraine the tools it needs to defend itself.
It will also finally increase the cost of Russia's aggression. At no
point has President Putin's decision to escalate this war been costly
enough to force President Putin and the Russians to fundamentally
reconsider their strategy. The annexation of Crimea, the campaign to
destabilize and then invade eastern Ukraine last summer and fall, and
the recent offensive have all happened despite a flurry of Western
attempts to force a negotiated settlement. In fact, each temporary
cease-fire in some senses has merely legitimized what the Russians have
done. When there is this flurry of diplomatic activity, it tends to
happen after the Russians have made gains on the ground and then it
accepts those gains on the ground as the basis for negotiations,
granting the separatists and their Russian supporters moral and, I
would say, some legal equivalency that they simply don't deserve.
There is a pattern here. They seize the land, they preserve their
gains through an internationally mediated cease-fire, and then they
break that cease-fire, as they are doing right now, to seize more land
and then use a new cease-fire to secure acceptance of their new gains.
This has to stop.
The Obama administration and some EU members have been so fixated on
ensuring that the successful implementation of the February cease-fire
is a goal in and of itself that they have lost sight of this broader
policy objective that a cease-fire should be working to achieve, which
should be the defense of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial
integrity and support for the economic and political reforms that
Ukraine needs. Let me underscore that. It is very difficult for them to
undertake the economic and political reforms they need with this siege
going on, and that is what we need. We need them to make those reforms
so they cannot

[[Page S4000]]

just keep their territorial integrity but also so they become a stable,
democratic, and prosperous country.

The Russian aggression in Ukraine is not going to go away or resolve
itself simply because we wish it to. It will take a comprehensive
strategy, which is laid out in this amendment, and coordinated
political, military, and economic actions to change the current
dynamic. Sanctions and economic assistance for Ukraine are important,
but they are tools, not a strategy. Russian military action has been
successful in threatening Ukraine's stability where other attempts to
use economic or political means have failed. So what the Russians and
separatists have found is that they have tried to disrupt through
economic means and political means, and they haven't been successful
there. In fact, the Ukrainians have rejected that, including by a
recent election. It is no accident that their most successful tactic,
the military tactic, is the one the United States and the West has done
the least to address.
I have argued for months that this piecemeal, reactionary response to
intimidation from Moscow is a recipe for failure. Instead, we have to
have a comprehensive, proactive strategy that strengthens NATO, deters
Russian aggression, and gives Ukraine the political, economic, and
military support it needs to maintain its independence. We need a
strategy that seeks to shape the outcomes, rather than one that is
shaped by them. Much of that leadership must come from us and the
administration here in the United States. Of course, this body has an
important role to play, and that is what this amendment is all about.
Let's include funding for Ukrainian military assistance, not just in
this authorization bill where we are setting the policy for it, but
let's be sure in the spending bills that follow that we provide the
Ukrainians what they need.
We should pass this legislation--the underlying bill--which Chairman
McCain has correctly noted is critical to helping us deal with so many
challenges in the dangerous world we face. We should pass, again, the
defense spending bill that doesn't leave the men and women in uniform
without the means to carry out their incredibly important mission.
Importantly, for today's purposes, we have to be clear about what the
stakes are in Ukraine. Events in Ukraine are a direct and deliberate
challenge to the credibility of NATO itself, to the U.S.-led
international order. President Putin's actions upend decades of
established international norms and threaten the very foundation of
this system order. Confidence in America and our European allies' unity
and commitment to upholding this system deters bad actors. It
incentivizes other countries to play by the rules. That is what we
want. We want to help ensure peace, stability, and prosperity. If the
credibility of our commitment is in doubt, the risk of economic
collapse, more violence, and more instability increases. Into a void,
chaos ensues. The Ukrainians understand this. They understand the
importance of this conflict well beyond their borders. I hope in the
United States of America we understand it. I hope we act in a way to
help the Ukrainians be able to defend themselves and counter these
activities on the eastern border of Ukraine.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate be in a period
of debate only until 3 p.m.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Thank you so much.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning
business until I conclude.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Highway Bill

I come to talk about something different than the pending
legislation--I have a number of things to say about that, a number of
amendments I am supporting, many of them bipartisan.
At this point, I want to talk about the crisis we are facing in terms
of our highway bill. We now have 51 days until the highway trust fund
is empty. For all of us, this is a terrible prospect because a lot of
our States rely on the Federal Government for up to 85 to 90 percent of
their funding. Some States rely on less. My State relies on about 50
percent, but it is still huge. When this trust fund goes under, we are
going to be in a lot of trouble.
What we have seen in this particular Senate since our Republican
friends took over--and they are my friends--are a number of self-
inflicted crises. Lord knows we have enough of them coming our way, we
don't have to invent them--but we have seen several. In the first
crisis we had, we were headed toward a partial shutdown of the
Department of Homeland Security over an unrelated immigration issue.
That was ridiculous. There was a lot of angst and finally it was
resolved.
The second self-inflicted crisis ended last week, and it was brought
about because the Republican leader didn't like the USA FREEDOM Act the
House had passed overwhelmingly. As a result of his opposition, he, for
several days, turned away from 57, 58, and more Senators who actually
supported that bill, and he brought the surveillance of terrorists to a
screeching halt. That wasn't what he wanted to do, but as a result of
that self-inflicted crisis, we had a couple of moments there where we
were dark. That problem luckily ended after a couple of days.
And now we are headed for another self-inflicted crisis, although I
must say, from conversations I have had, I have some hope we can avert
this crisis.
We have known about this since last December, when Democrats said:
Let's stay in until we solve the highway trust fund. And Republicans
said: Oh, no, let's just take care of it in May. Then, in May, the
Republicans said: Let's just take care of it in July. That is no way to
run a country. It is no way to run a transportation system. It is
ridiculous, and our States, as I will point out later, are starting to
cut way back on transportation projects--highways, bridges, and transit
systems--because they are scared we are not going to reach agreement.
So, 51 days, and I am here today to talk about it.
I want to show you a photograph of a bridge collapse in Minneapolis,
MN, that happened in August of 2007. This bridge collapsed because
there was a design flaw. It went undetected because there were not
enough inspections made of the bridge because there wasn't enough being
spent on ensuring that our bridges are safe.
To me, as I look at this, it is a metaphor for the current status of
the highway trust fund, which supports thousands of businesses and
millions of jobs and is on the verge of bankruptcy. You can see on this
photograph the chaos, the danger, the disaster. Even though there are
no people you can see, you can imagine the shock that occurred from
this collapse.
Now, you might think this is an isolated incident, but I want to tell
you we have 61,300 bridges in the United States which have been cited
as being structurally deficient by engineers. The fact that we don't
have a multiyear plan in place to fix these bridges is a shame upon our
Nation. It is a shame upon our Nation. If you had your loved one in one
of these cars, you would know this is unacceptable.
My message today to both sides of the aisle and to the House and the
Senate is simple: We cannot afford to pass yet another short-term
extension because that doesn't give us the certainty or the funds to
fix bridges such as these--the 61,300 bridges that need repair. The
continued inaction by Congress to enact a long-term bill is a disgrace
and we need to meet this challenge head-on.
Now, I have heard rumors that we are making progress, and I know we
are in the Environment and Public Works Committee. I serve on that
committee with my friend Senator Inhofe. He and I have agreed we will
go forward with a multiyear bill. This is wonderful. It is a little
late in the day--we should have done it a long time ago--but I am proud
he and I have agreed this is a priority. We have a date set of June 24
to mark up the bill. That is only about 35 days before the collapse of
the trust

[[Page S4001]]

fund, but if all the other committees did their job as our committee
did, we would be OK. So, yes, I am encouraged, but there are three
other committees that haven't set up dates to mark up anything, as far
as I know. Unless a miracle occurs, I believe my Republican friends are
going to ask us for yet another short-term extension.
Now, if you went out on the street and stopped anybody--Republican,
Democrat, whatever age--if you asked: Is it controversial for the
Federal Government to fund transportation projects? They would say no.
Maintaining and improving our roads, bridges, and transit systems is
a necessity. It is a necessary investment in our future that was
recognized at our country's founding in the Constitution. That is why
Senator Inhofe, who is one of the leading conservatives in the Senate,
and myself, a very strong progressive Member, agree. Article I, section
8 of the Constitution gave Congress the authority ``to establish Post
Offices and post Roads,'' and that has continued throughout our
Nation's history.
Legislation authorizing Federal investment in our highways dates back
100 years to the passage of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 and the
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921.
I quote one of my favorite Presidents, Dwight Eisenhower. In 1956, he
established the highway trust fund to serve as the major source of
funding for our Nation's highway systems. This was significant because
it was a large increase of Federal infrastructure investment. President
Eisenhower knew we needed modern, efficient transportation systems to
ensure our security. I say ``security'' because this is what President-
elect Eisenhower said, a general and a hero from World War II: ``A
network of modern roads is as necessary to defense as it is to our
national economy and personal safety.''
He viewed a network of modern roads as a necessity to our defense.
And I would add the word ``bridges,'' because you can have a convoy
going over our bridges, too. So General Eisenhower and then President
Eisenhower knew how important an efficient system of roads is to our
military and national defense.
While serving in the Army way back in 1919, he joined a convoy of
approximately 80 trucks and other military vehicles to cross from
Washington, DC, to San Francisco to test the military's motor vehicles.
This trip took 2 months, averaging 6 miles an hour. From this
experience, plus his countless other experiences with the military,
both home and abroad, he understood how important a reliable
transportation system is to a First World nation.
Again, he said, ``A network of modern roads is as necessary to
defense as it is to our national economy and our personal safety.''
Today, our economy still relies on interconnected transportation
systems to move goods out of major ports of entry. I want to talk about
my own State because at the Port of Los Angeles, we take in about 40
percent of the Nation's imports. We know they go straight out onto
those roads and they deliver goods all over our great Nation.
We know there is a universal understanding that we have to maintain
that road system so we can move people and goods efficiently. These
surface transportation systems, which used to be the envy of the world,
remain the foundation of a strong U.S. economy and enable us to compete
in the global marketplace.
I hope you heard that I said our transportation system used to be the
envy of the world because it is no longer the envy of the world. It is
our fault. This has to be a priority. The United States lags behind its
overseas competitors in infrastructure investment. According to the
most recent World Economic Forum ranking within the past decade, the
United States has fallen from 7th to 16th in the quality of our roads.
We are behind countries such as China, Portugal, and Oman. This is
ridiculous. The greatest Nation in the world--that is what we are--but
we are falling behind on our infrastructure because we do not have the
guts to face the fact that we have to fund the highway system.
Why are we behind? We only spend 2 percent of our gross domestic
product on infrastructure, and that is a 50-percent decline from 1960.
So we spend 2 percent of our gross domestic product while Europe spends
5 percent and China spends 9 percent.
The Federal Government does provide, as I said, over 50 percent of
the capital expenditures for State highway projects nationwide, which
means that all of our States and all of our local governments rely
heavily on Federal funding to maintain and to improve their
transportation. However, this is just a national average.
(Mr. SCOTT assumed the Chair.)
I see my colleagues have changed places here. For South Carolina,
South Carolina depends on the Federal Government for 80 percent of
their highway funds and their bridge repair--80 percent. California is
50 percent. North Dakota is 80 percent. Montana is 87 percent.
So what I am saying to my colleagues who I hope are somewhere
listening is that if we do not act to fill the highway trust fund and
to meet this looming made-up crisis--check out your State and how much
you rely on Federal funds.
I already showed the picture of the Minnesota bridge collapse. I
would like to put that up again because I think the Minnesota bridge
collapse is a metaphor for where we are. Our whole thing is
discombobulated. Our whole thing is disrupted because we do not have
the courage to fund the highway trust fund, which, as President
Eisenhower said all of those areas ago, is critical to our national
security.
I am going keep this picture up here for a minute. I want to talk
about our States and the bridges that are in disrepair. I hope people
who may be listening across the country--if you live in one of these
States, give a call to your Senator and ask him or her: What are you
doing to fill the highway trust fund?
For example, in Kentucky there are over 1,100 structurally deficient
bridges--bridges that could look like this. Pennsylvania has more than
5,000 structurally deficient bridges, which accounts for over 20
percent of all the bridges in their State.
In addition to the dangerously poor conditions of our bridges, 50
percent of our Nation's roads are in less than good condition. These
roads and bridges that are no longer in good working condition span
across the country.
So I am going to show a chart that I don't think we have ever talked
about here. These are examples of deficient highway bridges in need of
repair: Alabama, I-65 bridge over U.S. 11 in Jefferson County; Arizona,
I-17 bridge over 19th Avenue in Maricopa County; Arkansas, I-30 bridge
over the UP Railroad in Pulaski County; California, the Golden Gate
Bridge, for goodness' sake; Colorado, the I-70 bridge in Denver;
Connecticut, the West River Bridge in New Haven; District of Columbia,
the Memorial Bridge. There was a press conference right near the
Memorial Bridge by one of my colleagues a couple of weeks ago.
People are getting really scared about this. The point of this is not
to scare anybody; the point of this is to say to my colleagues that we
are responsible.
You know, maybe it is me. When I was growing up, my mother and father
said: If you know there is a problem, do something about it. You don't
have a right to turn your back and walk away.
I remember once when I was a county supervisor I found out that the
county building we were in was earthquake-prone. Nobody talked about
it. As soon as I found out it could collapse in an earthquake, I
brought it to my colleagues. I said: Colleagues, we need to do
something.
Do you know what they said, one or two of them? Don't bring it up. We
don't have the money.
Excuse me. You have to have the money if you know the building you
are in could collapse in an earthquake. You have to have some money if
you know all of these bridges are in disrepair.
So let's continue. Florida, the Pensacola Bay Bridge; Georgia, a
bridge in Fulton County; Hawaii, Halona Street Bridge in Honolulu;
Illinois, Poplar Street Bridge; Indiana, the bridge over the CSX
Railroad; Iowa, the Centennial Bridge; Kentucky--another one--the Brent
Spence Bridge; Louisiana, another bridge there; Maine, the Piscataqua
River Bridge; Maryland, the Chesapeake Bay Bridge; Massachusetts, the
I-95 bridge in Middlesex; Michigan, the I-75 Rogue River Bridge.

[[Page S4002]]

Remember, if you are hearing my voice and you are hearing your State
mentioned, give a call to your Senator and ask him or her, whether they
are a Democrat or Republican, what they are doing about the highway
trust fund because in 51 days it will go bust.
In Minnesota--did I mention that--the I-35 East Bridge over
Pennsylvania Avenue; Mississippi, the Vicksburg Bridge; Missouri, the
East Bridge over Conway Road; Nevada, the Virginia Street Bridge in
Reno; New Hampshire, the I-293 bridge in Hillsborough; New Jersey, the
Garden State Parkway in Union County; New Mexico, the Main Street
Bridge; New York, the Brooklyn Bridge.
If you did not read the book ``The Great Bridge,'' you should read
that book by David McCullough. It is an incredible book. That bridge
was built so long ago. We don't want to lose the Brooklyn Bridge.
In North Carolina, the Greensboro Bridge; Ohio, the John Roebling
Suspension Bridge; Oklahoma, the I-40 bridge over Crooked Oak Creek;
Oregon, the Columbia River Crossing; Pennsylvania, the Benjamin
Franklin Bridge; Rhode Island, the viaduct in Providence; South
Carolina, the I-85 bridge in Greenville; Texas, the I-45 bridge over
White Oak Bayou; Utah, the I-15 bridge over SR-93 in Davis County;
Washington, the Evergreen Point Floating Bridge; Wisconsin, the U.S. 41
bridge over a river.
I just have to ask my friends on both sides of the aisle, if the roof
on your house is about to cave in with your children inside and you
know about it, would you find a way to pay for that repair or would you
let it collapse on your kids? The answer is obvious. Of course you are
going to fix the roof on your house. You have to keep infrastructure in
good repair. The roof is caving in on our roads and our bridges. Lord
help us if we do not act and someone else goes down in a crisis.
We can look at the details surrounding the I-35 bridge collapse in
Minneapolis, MN, shown in that picture. On August 1, 2007, this eight-
lane bridge, which is Minnesota's second busiest bridge, carrying
140,000 vehicles every day, suddenly collapsed during rush hour,
killing 13 people and injuring 145 people.
It is critical that our Nation continue investing in our aging
infrastructure. Everybody knows it. Everybody knows it--Congress,
States, businesses, American workers. Republicans say they are for
infrastructure investment, but they have not acted. Happily, we are
having a markup--I am excited about it--in our EPW Committee. Not one
other committee has marked up a long-term bill.
The highway trust fund is an integral part of how the Federal
Government provides predictable, multiyear funding to States so that
States can plan and construct long-term highway, bridge, and transit
projects; therefore, the highway trust fund should be our No. 1
priority. In 51 days, the fund will go bust. It will be gone. We will
not be able to pay all of our bills. So we have to move quickly because
otherwise we will face a transportation shutdown.
The law that currently authorizes our transportation program is set
to expire on July 31, and the highway trust fund will go bankrupt
shortly thereafter. The clock is ticking, and failure is not an option.
So let's put up that 51-day ticking time bomb, if you will. The highway
trust fund is in serious trouble, and much needed transportation
projects are in peril.
The short fund creates uncertainty, and uncertainty is terrible for
business, it is terrible for workers, and it is terrible for the
economy. Billions of dollars will be delayed to our States. Many
States, including Utah, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, and Wyoming, have
already delayed or cancelled construction projects due to the
uncertainty in the funding.
We are facing a crisis, and everybody knows it. If we do not act and
act quickly, we will see a domino effect that will be felt throughout
our economy.
I don't think I have to remind people that we came out of the worst
recession since the Great Depression. I was here when we saw that
happen at the end of George W. Bush's term. We were losing 700,000 jobs
a month. I remember standing here on the floor of the Senate feeling
that the whole world was collapsing around us.
The recovery is taking a long time, and thank God it is moving
forward now. Our economy, though, is still recovering, and we must have
a strong, modern, efficient transportation system to move goods and
people. There are some people who absolutely need transportation to get
to work. This is not a game. Either they need their cars or they need
to hop on a bus or a subway. And we have 51 days until the highway
trust fund will be empty.
The amount of money we need just to keep up with the demand right now
to fix our roads and our bridges--that amount is $123 billion just to
catch up on the nightmare we are facing. So we not only need a 6-year
bill, but we need one that is robust so we can start spending some
money on these repairs. Millions of jobs and thousands of businesses
are at stake here.
You know, it is 51 days. And I have stood in several press
conferences with business leaders, the chamber of commerce, the AFL-
CIO, construction workers, the concrete people, the tar people, the
granite people--you name it. They are united as one America in favor of
a 6-year solution. I will show you just some of the people whom I have
stood with over time in recent days: The AFL-CIO; the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce--it is hard to get them on the same page, but they are on the
same page and they want this fix; the U.S. Conference of Mayors; the
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials; the
American Council of Engineering Companies; the American Highway Users
Alliance; the American Public Transportation Association; the American
Road and Transportation Builders Association; the American Society of
Civil Engineers; and the American Trucking Association.

The truckers have said to me: Senator, we are willing to pay more in
our gas tax because we cannot continue to ride on these roads that are
falling apart.
When was the last time someone came up to you and said ``Raise my gas
tax''? It is rare. But the truckers have asked us to do it as long as
we use the money to fix the road. The chamber of commerce has asked us
to raise the gas tax 6 cents to 8 cents. I mean, this is unusual, and I
know there is very little support for that.
I have proposed numerous ways to pay for the trust fund, including a
refundable gas tax increase. So if you earn $100,000 or less in your
family, you get back the tax increase, which is about $40 a year. So I
think it is worth $40 a year to know that the bridge you drive on is
safe, but we would make it refundable so that you would get that back
if you are in the middle class or below.
I will tell you, facing a shutdown--and we are already seeing a
shutdown in five, six, or seven States--is painful for businesses. I
have had business people come before me with their heads in their hands
because they do this work. They build the highways. They fix the
bridges. They build the transit systems. And they know we have not come
together yet. It is a recipe for disaster.
What planet are we living on? All of America wants this.
I will continue with some more of these names. I just read some of
them; I will read some more: the Associated General Contractors; the
Association of Equipment Manufacturers; the Association of Metropolitan
Planning Organizations; the International Union of Operating Engineers;
the Laborers' International Union of North America; the National
Asphalt Pavement Association; the National Association of Counties; the
National Association of Manufacturers.
The National Association of Manufacturers, the Associated General
Contractors, the International Union of Operating Engineers, the
Laborers' International Union of North America--this is all of America.
This isn't red. This isn't blue. This is everybody. Everybody wants us
to fix the roads. Everybody wants us to fix the bridges.
We have the National Association of Truck Stop Operators; the
National Governors Association--the Governors are Republicans and
Democrats, and they are begging us to get our act in gear and get this
done; the National League of Cities, and finally, the National Ready
Mixed Concrete Association; the National Stone, Sand, and Gravel
Association; the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association;

[[Page S4003]]

the Portland Cement Association; and the Retail Industry Leaders
Association.
The list I read is a partial list. The list that I read, frankly, is
mostly Republican-leaning organizations.
Why have we not done our job? Why don't we already have a long-term
transportation bill before us before the fund goes bust in 51 days?
Why?
It is Congress's responsibility to act quickly to address our
Nation's infrastructure needs. Every day that the Republicans fail to
move forward with a bill, they are putting people at risk. This isn't
about philosophy. This is about bread and butter. This is about getting
to work safely. This is about driving with your family and not being
fearful that the bridge you are on is going to fail.
I am always asked: Well, Senator, that is all well and good, but how
are you going to pay for this?
Well, I have a lot of ideas, and I will lay them out. There are many
ways to pay, and I will give just a sampling of ideas, and I will
embrace these ideas. I will work with any Democrat or Republican on any
one of these ideas.
Replace existing gas and diesel fuel fees with a user fee charged at
the refinery based on the fuel price. In other words, do away with the
gas tax and replace it with a refinery-based fuel fee. They did that in
Virginia, and I think it is working well.
Increase existing gas and diesel fuel fees by indexing those fees to
inflation, along with a refundable tax credit for low- and middle-
income families to offset those costs. So we can have a modest increase
of 6 cents, 7 cents, 8 cents on the gas tax and make it refundable to
families earning $100,000 or less.
Assess a user fee on the sale of new and used vehicles. That is
another idea.
Use revenue generated from repatriation of corporate earnings
currently held overseas. That is international tax reform. We have a
lot of money sitting abroad from corporations that have parked it
there. They don't like the rate of their taxes. If you lower their tax,
that money can come home, and we can use the taxes we collect to fund
the highway trust fund. I have a bill on that with Senator Paul. It is
bipartisan. Join us. Join us and let's fix the problem.
How about this: Borrow money from the general fund, to be paid back
from the stimulative effect of transportation infrastructure
investments on the economy. When we make these investments, they
generate so much employment and so much business that people will pay
income taxes because they are working. These are millions of jobs,
thousands of businesses.
Another way to pay for it: Apply a new, honor-based user fee on the
number of miles each individual drives each year. So when you fill out
a form to get your car registered, just tell me how many miles you
traveled last year, there will be a modest fee, and we can help the
trust fund.
By the way, I notice my friends want to use savings from reducing the
overseas contingency operations account. They want to use that money.
They used it for the military; why not use it for saving the trust
fund? And how about the savings of uncollected revenues owed to the
Federal Government? If we just collected one-third of those, we would
meet the shortfall.
So, as I count these ideas, there are eight ideas that I have, and I
am sure everybody has their own ideas. There is not a shortage of
ideas. There is a bit of shortage of courage to come out and say the
obvious. If your roof is about to collapse on your home, it will cost
you something to fix it. Admit it upfront. No one is going to do it for
free. No one is going to fix these 60,000-plus bridges for free. No one
is going to build new highways for free. No one is going to build new
transit systems for free. Grow up and pay for it. This is ridiculous.
I am speaking for myself. I will support any of these eight ideas or
any combination of them. We know our country is in danger. Our people
are in danger every day because of these structurally deficient
bridges. If we don't do anything about it, we will be liable--maybe not
in a court of law, but in my mind it is a moral responsibility. So I
can support any of these ideas. Some of them are conservative ideas,
and some of them are liberal ideas. I don't care. I want to pay for the
highway trust fund.
The bottom line is that the only solution is a consensus-based,
bipartisan 6-year transportation bill that will provide States and
local communities with the funding and the certainty they need to build
these multiyear projects and modernize our infrastructure.
This isn't rocket science. Choose one of the options. Add one of your
own. Do a combination of these options. Let's have the courage and the
moral fortitude to do what is our responsibility. We know our Nation's
infrastructure is deteriorating. We are responsible for it. This is one
Nation under God, and we have to act to protect our people. It is our
job.
I think the clearest message was from President Eisenhower on this
front, and President Reagan, who stepped up to the plate. President
Reagan signed into law an increase in the gas tax. He was so proud. He
said: I am proud to do this. We have to do this. Let me read his quote.
He signed the surface transportation bill, which did increase the gas
tax, and he said:

Because of the prompt and bipartisan action of Congress, we
can now ensure for our children a special part of their
heritage--a network of highways and mass transit that has
enabled our commerce to thrive, our country to grow, and our
people to roam freely and easily to every corner of our land.

President Ronald Reagan. I was elected the same year he said this. I
mean, I am giving away my age, but I was proud that my President
understood this. I didn't agree with Ronald Reagan on a bunch of
things. He said once: ``If you have seen one tree, you have seen them
all.'' I never agreed with that.
But setting all of that aside, I agree with what he said. This is
magnificent. Listen to this:

Another person whom I really admire on this subject is Senator
Inhofe, my friend from Oklahoma, my chairman. I was his chairman for a
few years--I think 8--and unfortunately for me I am no longer chairman,
I am the ranking member. But I will tell you why we will do hand-to-
hand combat on the environment--and we did that today. When it comes to
infrastructure, we are very close. Do you know what he said? ``The
conservative thing is to pass a bill instead of having the
extensions.''
Anthony Foxx, our Transportation Secretary, and 11 of his
predecessors offered an open letter to Congress expressing their
support for passage of a long-term bill. Remember, this was signed by
people who worked for--follow me--President Johnson, President Ford,
President Reagan, President George Herbert Walker Bush, President
Clinton, President George W. Bush, and President Obama. They offered an
open letter and said this about the current situation:

Never in our nation's history has America's transportation
system been on a more unsustainable course. . . . So, what
America needs is to break this cycle of governing crisis-to-
crisis, only to enact a stopgap measure at the last moment.
We need to make a commitment to the American people and the
American economy.

That is four Republican Presidents and three Democratic Presidents--
people from those administrations. My goodness, there is bipartisanship
everywhere but here in this room.
I read the list of everybody who wants this bill, and it is very
impressive: labor, business--small business, large business. It is
extraordinary.
A survey by the National Association of Manufacturers of its
members--one of our more conservative organizations--found that 65
percent don't believe our infrastructure is sufficient. We know from
the Texas Institute study that traffic congestion in 2011 was $121
billion. We are wasting so much time in traffic. The cost to truck
goods moving on our highway system--$27 billion in wasted time and
diesel fuel.
So I hear a lot of talk about passing a long-term bill. I am pleased
I am hearing that talk. I say to my colleagues, I hadn't heard of that,
and now I am starting to hear my Republican friends say maybe we can do
it. I think we need to do it. We still have 1.4 million fewer
construction jobs than we had before the recession.

[[Page S4004]]

The clock is ticking. Failure is not an option. Let's get going.
Let's come together and do the right thing. Pass the highway bill.
Thank you.
Mr. COONS. Mr. President, are we in a quorum call?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is not in a quorum call.

Export-Import Bank

Mr. COONS. Mr. President, I have come to the floor today following on
the speech just delivered by Senator Boxer, who highlighted her concern
about a manufactured crisis--the impending expiration of the highway
bill, which must be reauthorized by July 31. I come to speak to another
manufactured crisis. We have to reauthorize the Export-Import Bank by
June 30 or face the loss of its support for vital jobs in our economy
that will happen with its expiration.
I am a big advocate for manufacturing here in the Senate and in my
home State of Delaware, but I am not a big fan of manufactured crises.
Both of these are unneeded, self-inflicted wounds that will create
further drag on our economic recovery. I think we can and should find
ways to work together across the aisle to reauthorize the Export-Import
Bank.
For more than 80 years, the Export-Import Bank, commonly known as Ex-
Im, has served as a vital tool to help American companies sell their
goods around the world. By making loan guarantees and providing risk
insurance and other financial products to American firms at market
prices, the Bank has helped to ensure that American companies and their
workers can compete anywhere in the world and at no cost to the
American taxpayer. I will say that again: at no cost to the American
taxpayer.
The Bank not only pays for itself, but it actually often runs a
surplus. Last year alone, it returned $700 million to the U.S.
Treasury. Today, the Ex-Im Bank helps American businesses sell nearly
$30 billion in goods every single year and supports more than 150,000
American jobs.
The Bank is a government agency, however, and even though it costs
taxpayers nothing and has an undeniably positive impact on our economy
and on job creation, it remains unclear if this Congress will be able
to come together to reauthorize it by June 30 and keep it running.
Unfortunately, some of my colleagues would like to close the Bank,
and they are using arguments I think are unfounded and misguided to do
so.
First, I have heard the Ex-Im Bank is somehow a government giveaway
to large politically connected corporations. But the truth is the Bank
helps companies of many different sizes, large and small.
In my home State of Delaware, for instance, the Ex-Im Bank has helped
a company I know well--Voigt and Schweitzer, a hot-dip zinc galvanizing
company. It has helped them to sell their products abroad. Voigt &
Schweitzer has a few facilities around the United States, in addition
to the one in New Castle, DE. At its Delaware location it provides
galvanizing services for a range of steel products for export. V&S
isn't a huge corporation. It has just a few dozen employees in
Delaware. It is because of Ex-Im's support that it has been able to
compete with other companies around the globe.
In fact, Ex-Im's support helped the firm's Delaware location earn the
business to galvanize literally hundreds of bridges that were
manufactured in Pennsylvania and being exported and sold to Africa--
business that would have likely gone to competitors overseas without
Ex-Im's help.
Now, Ex-Im does also help large corporations export their goods to
countries around the world, but that support also benefits small and
medium- sized businesses. For example, Boeing often receives
significant support from the Ex-Im Bank, which helps it compete with
international airplane manufacturers such as Airbus. I have heard
Senators criticize this support, but the reality is it isn't just
Boeing that benefits. This is an important point about how modern
manufacturing and the integration of the supply chain work.
When Boeing manufactures a finished airplane, it doesn't make all of
the plane's parts with its own factories and its own workforce. It, in
fact, buys the vast majority of the component parts from much smaller
manufacturers spread throughout the United States. From the brakes on
the landing gear to the in-flight entertainment system, other companies
make those parts and sell them to Boeing for the finished product. So
when Ex-Im helps Boeing export a 747, it helps sustain tens of
thousands of jobs for American workers at other smaller companies.
I have seen this myself in Delaware. Although Boeing directly employs
in Delaware just 16 people, the company supports 1,300 jobs with 52
different Delaware companies. Let me give one example. A smallish
company, Polymer Technologies, manufactures and sells thermal and
acoustic insulation to Boeing for inclusion in their planes, which are
then exported through the help of Ex-Im.
So when Ex-Im's opponents in this Chamber argue that this is all
about a few big companies, that just isn't true. It also is vital to
sustaining and supporting smaller manufacturers that are vital to our
communities.
The next misplaced argument I have heard is that government shouldn't
be supporting private companies, period. They should not be, as it
were, picking winners and losers. But even to a supporter of the free
market, the point of government is to step in where the private market
fails to do so, and that is exactly what Ex-Im does.
When the Bank makes a loan to a business, it isn't replacing capital
that would otherwise have come from a private bank. It supplements
private capital or makes a private bank more inclined to put at risk
its own capital through provision of political risk insurance. Much of
the time Ex-Im serves as a lender of last resort and provides a loan
where a private bank can't or won't.
So the Export-Import Bank isn't doing something the private sector
should be doing. It is picking up where the market leaves off, and in
doing so it helps to level the global playing field on which American
companies compete.
The reality is that every single one of our trading partners provides
the same type of support for their exports as the Ex-Im Bank does for
ours. So they are picking winners. They are picking American winners on
the global playing field.
For example, as Ex-Im's chairman, Fred Hochberg, has written, ``Ex-Im
has given $590 billion in loans, guarantees, and insurance over its
entire history but Chinese institutions''--Chinese export-financing
institutions--``have provided an estimated $670 billion in just the
past 2 years.''
In other words, China has done more in just 2 years to support the
financing of their exporters than our Export-Import Bank has done in
its entire 80-year history and at no cost to the taxpayer.
The bottom line is that American jobs are at stake in this debate,
and if we fail to keep the doors open to the Export-Import Bank, we
will fail a lot of American workers. Every year, Ex-Im supports
hundreds of thousands of jobs, and shuttering it will put them at risk.

In fact, as the Wall Street Journal reported just this morning,
American companies worry that global competition is ``so cutthroat,''
that they would ``be forced to move manufacturing overseas'' and to
ship American manufacturing jobs out of the United States ``if the Ex-
Im Bank isn't open.''
At a time when our economy is continuing to gain steam and Americans
are going back to work--at a clip of 280,000 new jobs announced just
last month--we need to continue to help American companies compete in
markets around the world. The Ex-Im Bank is central to our
competitiveness and our continued strength at home and abroad. It is
critical that we act together to reauthorize it before the end of June.
So I urge my colleagues to join this effort to help support American
jobs, American manufacturing, and the American middle class.
Mr. President, for more than 20 years, the State Partnership
Program--or SPP--has helped the United States to build closer sustained
relationships with militaries and nations around the world. Although I
will not call it up and make it pending at this moment, I want to take
a few minutes to speak on the floor today about my amendment No. 1474
to the NDAA, an amendment that would significantly strengthen the State
Partnership Program.

[[Page S4005]]

First established after the fall of the Soviet Union, the State
Partnership Program was created to help countries transition their
militaries from the Soviet model and enshrine the idea of civilian
control of the military through professional and personal exchanges
with our State National Guard units.
The SPP facilitates cooperation across all aspects of civil military
affairs and, besides military relationships, encourages people-to-
people ties at the State level. I have personally seen the benefits of
this program through the participation of my home State National Guard
in their State partnership with Trinidad and Tobago and the civilian
control that it reinforces.
I have also seen it in farflung parts of the globe, from Liberia to
Senegal to Tunisia on the African continent, where three different
State Partnership Programs are actively at work providing training and
support and resources for the military of those three nations.
The California National Guard, for example, currently has units that
are helping Ukraine to push back against Russian aggression in eastern
Ukraine, leveraging a deep and trusting relationship first established
back in 1993.
Since its creation, the SPP has grown substantially. Today, it
consists of 68 partnerships between U.S. National Guard units and
foreign countries, with the 69th, between Kentucky's National Guard and
the African nation of Djibouti, having just been signed. Djibouti is a
nation that is actually the site of our only substantial military
presence on the continent of Africa, and that State Partnership Program
will help to strengthen, sustain, and reinforce our ongoing and vital
security partnership with Djibouti, a nation that is sandwiched between
Somalia and Yemen, countries currently in chaos and facing significant
threats from Islamic terrorism.
That is just one example of how the State Partnership Program helps
leverage the resources of our National Guard.
Traditionally, the program has needed to be reauthorized every 2
years, so I am happy this year that both the House and Senate have
recognized its value and have decided to work together to permanently
reauthorize it in their respective National Defense Authorization Act.
However, there are a few changes we can make that would add to making
the SPP more transparent, more efficient, and more effective, and that
is what my amendment would do.
First, it would allow the Secretary of Defense to consolidate the
various funding streams for the SPP, which right now come from over a
half dozen different accounts scattered across DOD, which makes it more
difficult to provide meaningful congressional sight. This amendment
would allow the Defense Secretary to combine these funding sources into
one National Guard fund to pay for personnel, training, operations, and
equipment.
Second, my amendment would allow the National Guard to determine its
core competencies and to help combatant commanders determine how best
to leverage the National Guard to serve the needs of a partner country.
Last, my amendment would establish clear and enhanced reporting
requirements so we can better track the annual performance of our units
and make modifications where needed to enhance the program's
effectiveness.
Critically, this amendment would not increase the program's costs at
all. This amendment, which is based on the State Partnership Program
Enhancement Act and currently has 9 Republican and 12 Democratic
Senators, including myself, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina,
Senator Pat Leahy of Vermont, and Senator Joni Ernst of Iowa, enjoys
broad bipartisan support from a wide range of States whose National
Guards have participated and benefited from the State Partnership
Program.
The amendment is enthusiastically supported by the National Guard
Association of the United States, the National Guard Bureau, and the
Adjutants General. It would take important steps to strengthening a
program that is essential to many of our international partnerships,
and I urge my colleagues to support it.
With that, I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I join my Virginia colleague Senator Tim
Kaine in expressing concern over the chairman's measure to cut $1.7
billion in funding from specific operations and maintenance accounts in
an effort to streamline defense headquarters functions.
The Department of Defense is in the midst of implementing a 20
percent headquarters reduction that defense officials have planned over
time to ensure that consequences of the reductions are known and
managed. Like my colleague, I am concerned that the chairman's proposed
legislation would require additional headquarters reductions, the
results of which have not been properly considered.
While I support continued efficiency gains within the Department of
Defense, including--where merited--reducing headquarters functions, I
believe that before such cuts are taken, the Department must conduct a
thorough analysis of the best methods to streamline their organizations
for the most efficient staffing solutions while remaining viable and
effective.
At a time when department officials are managing through enormous
budget pressure in an increasingly complex national security
environment, I fear the Department will be forced to reduce funding to
critical programs.
Finally, the men and women who will likely bear the brunt of these
cuts are performing the very work that Congress charged the Department
of Defense to conduct. Even this authorization includes additional
reports, studies, and demands for improvement in areas like program
management, personnel planning, acquisition, and sexual assault. These
programs require a professional cadre to conduct the required analysis
and propose recommendations for improvement.
I look forward to passing a defense authorization that adequately
supports the Department that has been at war for nearly 15 years.
Mr. KAINE. Mr. President, I am pleased the Senate is debating the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016. Senators
McCain and Reed, with help from my colleagues and me on the Senate
Armed Services Committee, have worked tirelessly throughout the spring
on these important military issues. Our committee prides itself on
taking a bipartisan and measured approach to reforming and providing
oversight to the Department of Defense. I believe we largely succeeded
in this endeavor, but I remain gravely concerned about the chairman's
proposals to streamline Department of Defense Headquarters by cutting
funding to specific operations and maintenance, O&M, accounts.
The Department of Defense already implemented a 20 percent reduction
of headquarters, which began this year and continues through 2019.
Planning for the reduction began several years ago, affording the
Department adequate time to ensure compliance with various directives,
including requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that established
the division in roles among the service chiefs and combatant
commanders. I am concerned the chairman's proposed legislation this
year, requiring additional headquarters reductions, will force the
Department of Defense to find efficiencies that will blur the lines
between service and warfighting functions, undermining the bedrock
reforms established by Goldwater-Nichols.
I support reducing the magnitude of these cuts, while allowing the
Department to conduct a thorough analysis of the best methods to
streamline organizations for the most efficient staffing solutions
while remaining viable and effective.
The chairman's specific proposed reductions are not supported by any
report or study. Instead, they are based on a perception of unnecessary
growth based on anecdotal evidence and nebulous data-sets fueled a $1.7
billion cut to several operations and maintenance accounts.
To the chairman's point, there has undoubtedly been a growth in
headquarters over the past decade. Areas that saw significant increases
include cyber warfare and special operations. USCYBERCOM did not exist
a decade ago, but now has almost 6,000 employees. Special Operations
Command is forecasted to swell to over 70,000 by 2017, but both
headquarters are excluded from consideration for reduction, against the
requests of the DOD

[[Page S4006]]

to leave everything on the table if forced to act on this provision.
The timing and magnitude of these cuts are so severe that I fear the
Department will be forced to reduce funding to critical programs
associated with the targeted accounts. Some key programs associated
with these accounts include military burial honors, suicide prevention,
radioactive waste disposal, nuclear command and control networks,
acquisition support, veteran hiring programs, and installation fire
departments. Many of these programs are tied to our Nation's commitment
to our servicemembers and veterans and should not be subjected to such
drastic cuts without due consideration of the downstream effects.
Finally, the men and women who will likely bear the brunt of these
cuts are performing the very work that Congress charged the Department
of Defense to conduct. Even this authorization includes additional
reports, studies, and demands for improvement in areas like program
management, acquisition, and sexual assault. These programs require a
professional cadre to conduct the required analysis and propose
recommendations for improvement. Asking our workforce to bear
additional oversight and program management functions while cutting
their funding is illogical and wrong.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.

Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I wish to speak this afternoon about a
controversial proposal, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act,
otherwise known as CISA, which was filed yesterday as an amendment to
the Defense authorization bill.
I want to begin by saying to the Senate that I believe tacking this
legislation onto the Defense bill would, in my view, be a significant
mistake. I expect our colleagues are going to have a wide range of
views about this legislation, and I hope the Senate can agree that
bills as controversial as this one ought to be subject to public debate
and an open-ended process, not stapled onto unrelated legislation with
only a modest amount of discussion.
This is particularly true given the issue of cyber security, which is
going to have a significant impact on the security and the well-being
of the American people and obviously the consumer rights and the
privacy of law-abiding Americans. Because it is designed to increase
government collection of information from private companies, I am of
the view that for the Senate to have this expansion of collecting so
much information about the people of the United States, for it to have
real legitimacy in the eyes of the public, it is important to have open
debate, with votes on amendments from Senators who have a wide variety
of opinions on the issue of cyber security. Trying to rush this bill
through the Senate, in my view, is not going to increase public
confidence.
So let me be clear about the process and talk a bit about the
substance of the legislation as well. I believe tacking it onto the
Defense bill is a flawed process. But I think there are also
significant flaws with the substance of the legislation as well. Dozens
of independent experts agree this legislation will have serious
consequences and do little to make our Nation more secure at a time
when cyber threats are very real. The issue of cyber threats requires
more than a placebo, and this legislation is a bandaid on a gaping
wound. I believe the Senate, having the time for adequate reflection
and amendment, can do better.
In beginning, I would like the Senate to know just how much
controversy and concern this legislation has generated among those who
are considered independent experts on cyber security. Shortly before
the Intelligence Committee, which I have been honored to serve on for
more than 14 years--shortly before the committee marked up this
legislation, a coalition of nearly 50 organizations and security
experts wrote to the members of the Intelligence Committee expressing
serious concerns about the legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in
the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Re Cyber Threat Information Sharing Bills

April 16, 2015.
Senator Dianne Feinstein,
Hart Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Congressman Adam Schiff,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Congressman Michael McCaul,
Cannon House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Senator Richard Burr,
Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Congressman Devin Nunes,
Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Burr, Senator Feinstein, and Representatives
Nunes, Schiff, and McCaul: We are writing you today as
technologists, academics, and computer and network security
professionals who research, report on, and defend against
Internet security threats. Among us are antivirus and threat
signature developers, security researchers and analysts, and
system administrators charged with securing networks. We have
devoted our careers to building security technologies, and to
protecting networks, computers, and critical infrastructure
against a wide variety of even highly sophisticated attacks.
We do not need new legal authorities to share information
that helps us protect our systems from future attacks. When a
system is attacked, the compromise will leave a trail, and
investigators can collect these bread crumbs. Some of that
data empowers other system operators to check and see if
they, too, have been attacked, and also to guard against
being similarly attacked in the future. Generally speaking,
security practitioners can and do share this information with
each other and with the federal government while still
complying with our obligations under federal privacy law.
Significantly, threat data that security professionals use
to protect networks from future attacks is a far more narrow
category of information than those included in the bills
being considered by Congress, and will only rarely contain
private information. In those rare cases, we generally scrub
the data without losing the effectiveness of the threat
signature.
These are some common categories of data that we share to
figure out if systems have been compromised (indicators of
compromise, or IoCs) and to mitigate future threats:
Malware file names, code, and hashes
Objects (code) that communicate with malware
Compile times: data about the conversion of source code to
binary code
File size
File path location: where on the computer system malware
files are stored
Registry keys: configuration settings for low-level
operating system and applications
Memory process or running service information
Attached to this letter is an actual example of a threat
signature containing data that helps system administrators
secure their networks. You'll see that the information does
not contain users' private information.
Waiving privacy rights will not make security sharing
better. The more narrowly security practitioners can define
these IoCs and the less personal information that is in them,
the better. Private information about individual users is
often a detriment in developing threat signatures because we
need to be able to identify an attack no matter where it
comes from and no matter who the target is. Any bill that
allows for and results in significant sharing of personal
information could decrease the signal-to-noise ratio and make
IoCs less actionable.
Further, sharing users' private information creates new
security risks. Here are just three examples: First, any IoC
that contains personal information exacerbates the danger of
false-positives, that innocent behavior will erroneously be
classified as a threat. Second, distribution of private data
like passwords could expose our users to unauthorized access,
since, unfortunately, many people use the same password
across multiple sites. Third, private data contained in
personal emails or other messages can be abused by criminals
developing targeted phishing attacks in which they masquerade
as known and trusted correspondents.
For these reasons, we do not support any of the three
information sharing bills currently under consideration--the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), the Protecting
Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), or the National Cybersecurity
Protection Advancement Act of 2015. These bills permit
overbroad sharing far beyond the IoCs described above that
are necessary to respond to an attack, including all
``harms'' of an attack. This excess sharing will not aid
cybersecurity, but would significantly harm privacy and could
actually undermine our ability to effectively respond to
threats.
As a general rule, when we do need to share addressing
information, we are sharing the addresses of servers which
are used to host malware, or to which a compromised computer
will connect for the exfiltration of data. In these cases,
this addressing information helps potential victims block
malicious incoming connections. These addresses do not belong
to subscribers or customers of the victims of a security
breach or of our clients whose systems we are helping to
secure. Sharing this kind of addressing is a common current
practice. We do not see the need for new authorities to
enable this sharing.

[[Page S4007]]

Before any information sharing bill moves further, it
should be improved to contain at least the following three
features:
1. Narrowly define the categories of information to be
shared as only those needed for securing systems against
future attacks;
2. Require firms to effectively scrub all personally
identifying information and other private data not necessary
to identify or respond to a threat; and
3. Not allow the shared information to be used for anything
other than securing systems.
We appreciate your interest in making our networks more
secure, but the legislation proposed does not materially
further that goal, and at the same time it puts our users'
privacy at risk. These bills weaken privacy law without
promoting security. We urge you to reject them.
Sincerely,
Ben Adida; Jacob Appelbaum, Security and privacy
researcher, The Tor Project; Sergey Bratus, Research
Associate Professor, Computer Science Department, Dartmouth
College; Eric Brunner-Williams, CTO, Wampumpeag; Dominique
Brezinski, Principal Security Engineer, Amazon.com; Jon
Callas; Katherine Carpenter, Independent Consultant; Antonios
A. Chariton, Security Researcher, Institute of Computer
Science, Foundation of Research and Technology--Hellas;
Stephen Checkoway, Assistant Research Professor, Johns
Hopkins University; Gordon Cook, Technologist, writer, editor
and publisher of ``COOK report on Internet Protocol'' since
1992; Shaun Cooley, Distinguished Engineer, Cisco; John
Covici, Systems Administrator, Covici Computer Systems; Tom
Cross, CTO, Drawbridge Networks; David L. Dill, Professor of
Computer Science, Stanford University; A. Riley Eller, Chief
Technology Officer, CoCo Communications Corp; Rik Farrow,
USENIX.
Robert G. Ferrell, Special Agent (retired), U.S. Dept of
Defense; Kevin Finisterre, Owner, DigitalMunition; Bryan
Ford, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Yale
University; Dr. Richard Forno, Affiliate, Stanford Center for
Internet and Society; Paul Ferguson, Vice President, Threat
Intelligence; Jim Fruchterman, Benetech; Kevin Gennuso,
Information Security Professional; Dan Gillmor. Teacher and
technology writer; Sharon Goldberg, assistant professor,
Computer Science Department, Boston University; Joe Grand,
Principal Engineer, Grand Idea Studio, Inc.; Thaddeus T
Grugq, independent security researcher; J. Alex Halderman,
Morris Wellman Faculty Development Assistant Professor of
Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan,
Director, University of Michigan Center for Computer Security
and Society; Professor Carl Hewitt, Emeritus EECS MIT; Gary
Knott, PhD (Stanford CS, 1975), CEO, Civilized Software; Rich
Kulawiec, Senior Internet Security Architect, Fire on the
Mountain, LLC; Ryan Lackey; Product, CloudFlare, Inc.
Ronald L. Larsen, Dean and Professor, School of Information
Sciences, University of Pittsburgh; Christopher Liljenstolpe,
Chief architect for AS3561 (at the time about 30% of the
Internet backbone by traffic) and AS1221 (Australia's main
Internet infrastructure); Ralph Logan, Partner, Logan Haile,
LP; Robert J. Lupo, Senior Security Engineer ``sales team'',
IBM inc.; Marc Maiffret, Former CTO BeyondTrust; Steve
Manzuik, Director of Security Research, Duo Security; Ryan
Maple. Information security professional; Brian Martin,
President Open Security Foundation (OSF); Morgan Marquis-
Boire; Aaron Massey, Postdoctoral Fellow, School of
Interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology;
Andrew McConachie. Network engineer with experience working
on Internet infrastructure; Daniel L. McDonald, RTI Advocate
and Security Point-of-Contact, illumos Project; Alexander
McMillen, Mission critical datacenter and cloud services
expert; Charlie Miller, Security Engineer at Twitter; HD
Moore, Chief Research Officer, Rapid7.
Joseph ``Jay'' Moran, Vice President of Cimpress Technology
Operations; Peter G. Neumann, Senior Principal Scientist, SRI
International Moderator of the ACM Risks Forum (risks.org);
Jesus Oquendo, Information Security Researcher, E-Fensive
Security Strategies; Ken Pfeil, CISO, Pioneer investments;
Benjamin C. Pierce, Professor of Computer and Information
Science, University of Pennsylvania; Ryan Rawdon, Network and
Security Engineer; Bruce Schneier, security researcher and
cryptographer, published seminal works on applied
cryptography; Sid Stamm, Ph.D., Principal Engineer, Security
and Privacy, Mozilla; Visiting Assistant Professor of
Computer Science, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology;
Armando Stettner, Technology Consultant; Matt Suiche, Staff
Engineer, VMware.
C. Thomas (Space Rogue), Security Strategist Tenable
Network Security; Arrigo Triulzi, independent security
consultant; Doug Turner, Sr. Director--Privacy, Security,
Networking, Mozilla Corporation; Daniel Paul Veditz,
Principal Security Engineer, Mozilla, Co-chair Web
Application Security Working Group, W3C; David Wagner,
Professor of Computer Science, University of California,
Berkeley; Dan S. Wallach, Professor, Department of Computer
Science and Rice Scholar, Baker Institute for Public Policy,
Rice University; Jonathan Weinberg, Professor of Law, Wayne
State University; Stephen Wilson, Managing Director and
Founder, Lockstep Technologies; Chris Wysopal, CTO and co-
founder Veracode, Inc.; Stefano Zanero, Board of Governors
member, IEEE Computer Society.

Mr. WYDEN. The signers of the letter expressed very serious concerns
about the legislation and were particularly concerned it would
``significantly undermine privacy and civil liberties.'' Unfortunately,
as the signers of the legislation will report, these concerns were not
adequately addressed in the committee markup.
Shortly after the committee markup, a group of 65 technologists and
cyber security professionals wrote to Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman
Feinstein expressing their opposition to this legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in
the Record as well.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
March 2, 2015.
Chairman Richard Burr,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.
Vice Chairman, Dianne Feinstein,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.
Dear Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Feinstein, and Members of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: We the
undersigned civil society organizations, security experts,
and academics write to explain how the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA), would significantly
undermine privacy and civil liberties. We now know that the
National Security Agency (NSA) has secretly collected the
personal information of millions of users, and the revelation
of these programs has created a strong need to rein in,
rather than expand, government surveillance. CISA disregards
the fact that information sharing can--and to be truly
effective, must--offer both security and robust privacy
protections. The legislation fails to achieve these critical
objectives by including:
Automatic NSA access to personal information shared with a
governmental entity;
Inadequate protections prior to sharing;
Dangerous authorization for countermeasures; and
Overbroad authorization for law enforcement use.
For the following reasons, we urge rejection of CISA in its
current form:
Automatic NSA Access to Personal Information and
Communications: Since the summer of 2013, NSA surveillance
activities, such as the telephony metadata bulk collection
program and the PRISM program, have raised nationwide alarm.
CISA ignores these objections, and requires real time
dissemination to military and intelligence agencies,
including the NSA. Congress should be working to limit the
NSA's overbroad authorities to conduct surveillance, rather
than passing a bill that would increase the NSA's access to
personal information and private communications.
Automatic sharing with NSA risks not only privacy, but also
effectiveness. During a recent House Intelligence Committee
hearing, NSA Director Admiral Mike Rogers stated that sharing
threat indicators without filtering out personal data would
slow operations and negatively impact NSA's cyber defense
activities. Further, in the wake of revelations regarding the
PRISM program, major tech companies stated that they would
not voluntarily share users' information with the NSA.
Automated NSA access could thus disincentivize sharing,
undercutting the key goal of the legislation.
Inadequate Protections Prior to Sharing: CISA does not
effectively require private entities to strip out information
that identifies a specific person prior to sharing cyber
threat indicators with the government, a fundamental and
important privacy protection. While the bill requires that
companies ``review'' cyber threat indicators for information
that identifies a specific person and sometimes remove it,
the bill contains no standard to ensure that this review
effort is--at a minimum--reasonable.
Further, the bill requires companies to remove that
information only for individuals that it knows are ``not
directly related to a cybersecurity threat.'' This could
encourage companies to retain data by default, unnecessarily
exposing the information of innocent bystanders and victims
to the government, and making it available to law enforcement
for a myriad of investigative uses. Legislation should
instead require that prior to sharing, companies make at
least a reasonable effort to identify all personally
identifiable information and, unless it is necessary to
counter the cyber threat before sharing any indicators with
the government, remove it. The default should be to preserve
privacy, rather than to sacrifice it.
Dangerous Authorization for Countermeasures: CISA
authorizes countermeasures ``notwithstanding any law,''
including the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. As
amended by CISA, federal law would permit companies to
retaliate against a perceived threat in a manner that may
cause significant harm, and undermine cybersecurity. CISA
provides that countermeasures must be ``operated on'' one's
own information systems, but may have off-networks effects--
including harmful effects to external systems--so long as the
countermeasures do not ``intentionally'' destroy other
entities' systems. Given the risks of misattribution and

[[Page S4008]]

escalation posed by offensive cyber activities--as well as
the potential for misappropriation--this is highly
inadvisable. CISA permits companies to recklessly deploy
countermeasures that damage networks belonging to innocent
bystanders, such as a hospital or emergency responders that
attackers use as proxies to hide behind, so long as the
deploying company does not intend that the countermeasure
result in harm. CISA's authorization would not only
inadvisably wipe away the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's
current prohibition against these activities, it would be
dangerous to internet security.
Overbroad Law Enforcement Use: Law enforcement use of
information shared for cybersecurity purposes should be
limited to prosecuting specific cyber crimes identified in
the bill and preventing imminent loss of life or serious
bodily harm. CISA goes far beyond this, and permits law
enforcement to use information it receives for investigations
and prosecutions of a wide range of crimes involving any
level of physical force, including those that involve no
threat of death or significant bodily harm, as well as for
terrorism investigations, which have served as the basis for
overbroad collection programs, and any alleged violations of
various provisions of the Espionage Act. The lack of use
limitations creates yet another loophole for law enforcement
to conduct backdoor searches on Americans--including searches
of digital communications that would otherwise require law
enforcement to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. This
undermines Fourth Amendment protections and constitutional
principles.
Cybersecurity legislation should be designed to increase
digital hygiene and identify and remediate advanced threats,
not create surveillance authorities that would compromise
essential privacy rights, and undermine security.
Accordingly, we urge that the Committee not approve this bill
without addressing these concerns.
Thank you for your consideration,
Civil Society Organizations--Access; American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee; American Library Association;
Advocacy for Principled Action in Government; American Civil
Liberties Union; Association of Research Libraries; Bill of
Rights Defense Committee; Brennan Center for Justice; Center
for Democracy & Technology; Center for National Security
Studies; Competitive Enterprise Institute; Constitutional
Alliance; The Constitution Project; Council on American
Islamic Relations; Cyber Policy Project; Defending Dissent
Foundation; Demand Progress; Electronic Frontier Foundation
Free Press Action Fund FreedomWorks; Liberty Coalition;
National Association of Criminal Defense; Lawyers; New
America's Open Technology Institute; Project on Government
Oversight; R Street Institute; Sunlight Foundation.
Security Experts and Academics--Ben Adida, Cryptographer;
Jacob Appelbaum, The Tor Project; Alvaro Bedoya, Center on
Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law; Brian Behlendorf;
David J Farber, University of Pennsylvania; J. Alex
Halderman, University of Michigan; Joan Feigenbaum, Yale
University; Bryan Ford, Yale University; Matthew D. Green,
Johns Hopkins University; Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Technologist;
Susan Landau, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; Sascha
Meinrath, X-Lab; Peter G, Neumann, SRI International; Ronald
L. Rivest, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Phillip
Rogaway, University of California, Davis; Bruce Schneier,
Cryptographer and Security Specialist; Christopher Soghoian,
Technologist; Gene Spafford, Purdue University; Micah Sherr,
Georgetown University; Adam Shostack; Dan S. Wallach, Rice
University; Nicholas Weaver, University of California at
Berkeley.

Mr. WYDEN. This is a particularly important letter. We have some of
the most distinguished independent experts from across the country--
whether Amazon or Sysco, Stanford University, Dartmouth, some of the
leading experts in the private sector and academia--expressing real
concerns about this legislation and its House companion.
From their letter:

We appreciate your interest in making our networks more
secure, but the legislation proposed does not materially
further that goal, and at the same time it puts our users'
privacy at risk. These bills weaken privacy law without
promoting security. We urge you to reject them.

The reason I want our colleagues to be aware that these distinguished
scientists in Silicon Valley, and literally every corner of the
country, are so concerned is that the American people want both
security and liberty--and they understand the two are not mutually
exclusive. What this distinguished group of experts has just said is
this ``weaken[s] privacy law without promoting security.'' I hope the
Senate will review what these experts are saying.
Along the same lines, I note that the Christian Science Monitor
recently polled a group of more than 78 high-profile security and
privacy experts from across government, think tanks, and the private
sector. With these experts, they asked if legislation along the lines
of this bill--this bill which has been attached to the Defense
authorization. These experts were asked if this legislation would
significantly reduce security breaches, and 87 percent said it would
not. Many of them noted--a concern I have noted in opposing the
legislation--that incentivizing private companies to share information
about security threats is a very worthwhile proposition, a worthwhile
thing to do. But they go on to say that bills like this are going to
have limited value in that area and would have significant negative
consequences.
Now, many of my colleagues may have some disagreement with some of
the dozens and dozens of independent experts I have just mentioned.
Some of them may agree with the 13 percent of those experts who said
this bill will do a lot to reduce security breaches. That is their
right, and that is what a good Senate debate would be all about. But
what the Senate should not do is pretend that this legislation is
uncontroversial and try to rush it through without substantial
revisions and the chance for Senators on both sides of the aisle to be
heard.
Now, I think we all understand why some in the Senate would feel we
have to move immediately on this issue and in effect be tempted to rush
to action here. We have all understood there have been a number of
recent high-profile hacks that have drawn attention to the need to
improve our Nation's cyber security--and I don't disagree with the
importance of that at all.
For example, a major company in Oregon was hacked by the Chinese
simply because they were trying to enforce their rights under trade
law.
So this is not some abstract issue for the people I represent. We
have seen it in my home State.
So these high-profile hacks, like the one we saw here recently, is
obviously drawing attention to the need to improve cyber security. The
recent compromise of a very large amount of Office of Personnel
Management data is obviously the latest of these, but it is certainly
not going to be the last.
Every single time I read about these kind of hacks, what I do is--and
I have a very talented staff from the Intelligence Committee and my own
office to assist me--I try to reach out and talk to experts in the
field about ways to improve cyber security. But that doesn't mean every
single piece of legislation with the word ``cyber security'' in it is
automatically a good idea that ought to be blessed without revision in
the Senate.
The fact is, this particular cyber security bill is largely focused
on trying to make it more difficult for individuals to be able to take
on corporations. I understand why the U.S. Chamber of Commerce likes it
so much. They have always been concerned about the rights of the large
corporations. Sometimes the inevitable is, well, we are concerned about
the large corporations, let's make it harder for individuals to be able
to get a fair shake in the marketplace. But in my judgment, the actual
cyber security value of this bill would be very limited, and the
consequences for those individuals who are trying to get a fair shake
would be quite serious.
I am going to turn in a moment to the substance of the CISA bill to
explain why I consider it so problematic and why it needs a major
revision. But first I am going to take just a few minutes to discuss
proposals that I believe would actually make a difference in terms of
improving American cyber security.
First, the most effective way to improve cyber security is to ensure
that network owners take responsibility for the security of their
networks and effectively implement good security practices. This
proposal was the centerpiece of a 2012 bill called the Lieberman-
Collins cyber security bill, and in my view that legislation was just a
few changes away from being good cyber security law. Unfortunately, the
notion of having the government create even voluntary standards for
private companies was strongly opposed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and the Congress has not revisited it since.
Beyond ensuring that network owners take responsibility and implement
good security practices, it is also important to ensure that government
agencies do not deliberately weaken security standards.
I know the Presiding Officer in the Senate has a great interest, as I
do, in

[[Page S4009]]

innovation and American competitiveness. It is pretty hard--when we say
the words: The American Government is actually thinking, as the FBI
Director has talked about, about requiring companies to build
weaknesses into their products--it is pretty hard to get your arms
around this theory, not the least of which is the reason that once the
good guys have the keys, the bad guys will also have the keys, which
will facilitate cyber hacking.

I have been skeptical of these statements from senior FBI officials
suggesting that U.S. hardware and software companies should be
required, as I would characterize it, to weaken the security of their
products because encryption and other advanced security measures are a
key part, a key compound of actually improving cyber security.
I was pleased to see that in the other body, just last week, a new
amendment from Representatives Massie and Lofgren to prevent the
government from deliberately weakening encryption standards was voted
on, and I am very hopeful the Senate will eventually follow suit. In
fact, I offered that concept in the Intelligence Committee, and
regrettably it did not pass.
With regard to government-held data, it is absolutely imperative that
Federal agencies receive the funding and expertise they need to develop
and implement strong network security programs and to ensure that they
have the technical and administrative controls in place to combat a
wide range of cyber security threats.
I also believe our government needs to be in a stronger position to
recruit and retain a capable Federal cyber security workforce by
ensuring that cyber security professionals can find opportunities in
government that are as rewarding as those in the private sector. In
order to ensure that there are enough professionals to fill positions
in both the private sector and the government, it is obvious that there
is going to need to be an investment in the education of the next
generation of cyber security leaders.
As we talk about responsible approaches to deal with these cyber
issues, I would like to note that I consider the Consumer Privacy
Protection Act--a piece of legislation initiated by Senator Leahy--to
be another step in the right direction. This legislation creates a
comprehensive approach to data security by requiring companies to build
a cyber security program that can defend against cyber attacks and
prevent data breaches. It also protects a wide range of personal
information, not just name or financial account information but also
online user names and passwords, information about a person's
geolocation, and access to private digital photographs and videos.
Unlike CISA, this legislation would, in my view, provide real tools
to address the kinds of recent cyber attacks we have seen in the news,
such as the celebrity photo hack. Unlike CISA, it would also empower
individuals by requiring companies to notify consumers if their
information has been lost and would protect the rights offered under
some State laws for consumers to sue in the event of a privacy
incident. The Consumer Privacy Protection Act is the right kind of
responsible, thoughtful approach to cyber security, which is
legislation that will help us get an added measure of security and
public protection, while at the same time protecting the individual
liberties and the privacy of our people.
Finally, in my judgment, our country needs to be willing to impose
consequences on foreign entities that attempt to hack into American
networks and steal large quantities of valuable data. These hacks are
undermining our national security, our economic competitiveness, and
the personal privacy of huge numbers of Americans. These consequences
should draw on the full range of American power, depending on the
nature of the hack and the entity responsible.
It would be a failure of American imagination to say that the only
way to respond to foreign hacking is to have our military and
intelligence agencies ``hack back,'' as the concept has been known, at
the parties responsible. We are the most powerful country in the world,
and our government has a wide variety of tools at its disposal,
including economic sanctions, law enforcement, and multilateral
diplomacy. And building a multifaceted strategy to deter foreign
hacking is going to require all of those kinds of tools I have
mentioned by way of articulating responsible steps to deal with cyber
security, steps that protect both our security and liberty. All of
those tools are ones we will have to draw on.
Having laid out ways that the Senate on a bipartisan basis can
improve cyber security, I want to turn to the proposal in detail that
is now in front of the Senate. As I have said, I believe it makes sense
to encourage private companies to share information about cyber
security threats. Cyber is a problem. Sharing information can be
useful, but it is also vital that information sharing not be bereft of
privacy protections for law-abiding Americans.
Cyber security is a problem. Information sharing is a plus. But let's
make no mistake about it--an information-sharing bill that lacks
privacy protections really is not a cyber security bill; it is a
surveillance bill. That is what has been one of my major concerns about
this legislation, that the legislation in front of the Senate--we
talked about the flaws in the process, but substantively, if you have
an information-sharing bill that lacks adequate privacy protections, it
is a surveillance bill by another name.
When the Senate Intelligence Committee voted on the CISA bill, I
opposed it. I opposed it because I believe its insufficient privacy
protections will lead to large volumes of Americans' personal
information, personal information from law-abiding Americans who have
done nothing wrong--that they will be faced with the prospect that
their information is shared with the government even when that
information is not needed for cyber security. When I say ``personal
information,'' I am talking about the contents of emails, financial
information, and what amounts to any data at all that is stored
electronically.

Some of my colleagues have stressed that companies will have a choice
about whether to participate in this information-sharing part of the
legislation. That is true, but while corporations will have a choice
about whether to participate, they will be able to do so without the
knowledge or consent of their customers, and they will receive broad
liability protections when they do so. The CISA bill as written trumps
all Federal privacy laws.
Furthermore, once this information is shared with the government,
government agencies will be permitted to use it for a wide variety of
purposes unrelated to cyber security. The bill creates what I consider
to be a double standard--really a bizarre double standard in that
private information that is shared about individuals can be used for a
variety of non-cyber security purposes, including law enforcement
action against these individuals, but information about the companies
supplying that information generally may not be used to police those
companies.
I will tell you, I think that will be pretty hard to explain at a
townhall meeting in virtually any corner of America because I believe
it is wrong to say that the privacy rights of corporations matter more
than the privacy rights of individual Americans.
I expect that some colleagues will say that it is not their intent to
authorize this excessively broad collection. The argument will be that
this is legislation to encourage companies to share information about
actual cyber security threats, such as lines of malicious code and
signatures of hostile cyber actors. Again, I would say to colleagues
that I am all for encouraging companies to share information about
genuine security threats, but if you read the language that is now
before the Senate in the cyber security bill, the language of that bill
is much broader than just sharing information about genuine security
threats.
If Senators want to pass a bill that is focused on real cyber
security threats and includes real protection for Americans' privacy,
then the Senate should add language specifying that companies should
only provide the government with individuals' personal information if
it is necessary to describe a cyber security threat. That does not seem
to me to be an unreasonable protection for the privacy of Americans,
that the Senate would adopt language specifying that the companies
provide the government with individuals' personal information if it is
necessary to

[[Page S4010]]

describe a cyber threat. That is pretty obvious.
We can explain that, I would say to the distinguished President of
the Senate, at a townhall meeting, that if it is related to a cyber
security threat, then the companies would provide individuals' personal
information. But this would discourage companies from unnecessarily
sharing large amounts of their customers' private information with the
government.
Unfortunately, the cyber security bill in front of the Senate now
takes the opposite approach. It only requires companies to withhold
information that is known at the time of sharing to be personal
information unrelated to cyber security. This approach will clearly
discourage companies from closely reviewing the information that they
share and will lead to a much greater amount of Americans' personal
information being transferred needlessly to government agencies.
I hope that here in the Senate there will be an opportunity to
carefully consider the potential consequences of this legislation
before voting to rush it through by an expedited process.
I have said here several times that cyber security is a real problem,
and policymakers are going to have to deal with it. In fact, I will go
so far as to say that the issue of cyber security is going to be an
ongoing and enduring challenge of the digital age. It is my view that
every Senator who serves in this body today can expect to deal with
cyber security questions for the rest of their career in public
service. Voting to rush a bill through, however, is not going to make
these problems somehow go away, and it will have real consequences for
our constituents for years to come, and in particular, it will not make
us safer and will jeopardize the rights of individual Americans.
Before I wrap up, I believe it is important and I have an obligation
to draw my colleagues' attention to one final issue. As of this
afternoon, there is a secret Justice Department legal opinion that is
of clear relevance to this debate that continues to be withheld from
the public. This opinion remains classified. The Senate rules prohibit
me from describing it in detail. But I can say that it interprets
common commercial service agreements and that in my judgment is
inconsistent with the public's understanding of the law.
So this gets back to a question I have talked about on the floor
often, which is secret law, when the public reads one thing and there
is a secret interpretation that goes in another direction and it
contributes to the public's cynicism about Washington.
As always, I certainly see it as my job to say that colleagues can
decide whether to take my counsel, but I believe any Senator who votes
for this legislation, without reading this secret Justice Department
legal opinion I have referred to, is voting without a full
understanding of the relevant legal landscape. If Senators do not
understand how these common commercial service agreements have been
interpreted by the executive branch, then it will be harder for the
Senate to have a fully informed debate on the cyber security
legislation, whether it is considered now or later.
I would also like to note for the record that I have repeatedly asked
the Justice Department to withdraw this opinion and to make it public
so anyone who is party to one of these commercial service agreements
can decide whether their agreement ought to be revised. The Justice
Department has chosen not to take my advice on either of my
suggestions.
In public testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, the
deputy head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel told me
she personally would not rely on this opinion today, and I appreciate
her view on that matter. Yet, until the opinion is withdrawn, I believe
Senators should be concerned about other government officials choosing
to rely on it at any time. In my judgment, that is a very clear
instance of the government developing what is essentially secret law--
law that is at variance with what you read if you are in a coffee shop
in Arkansas or Utah or anywhere else.
The reality is, as I have said often on the floor, operations always
have to be secret, as do the sources and methods. Chairman Hatch
remembers this from his service on the Intelligence Committee.
Operations always have to be secret, but the law ought to be public
because that is how the American people have confidence in how we make
decisions in our Republic.
I will close by saying it is quite obvious at this point that I have
significant reservations about the cyber security bill. I believe a
number of Senators are going to share these concerns. I will let them
speak for themselves, although I believe Senator Leahy's strong
statement yesterday was certainly on point. Yet I will also say, even
to my colleagues who are inclined to vote for this bill, that I hope
all Senators will think about whether this is an appropriate process
for this sort of legislation.
I have already said I believe Senators are going to be dealing with
cyber security questions for the rest of their time in public service,
because in the digital age, I think we are going to see a constant
evolution in this field with respect to these threats and both the
technical and political concerns that are raised by them.
Should the Senate be rushing a bill like this through by tacking it
onto an unrelated defense measure? Is this the best way to show the
American people, once again, that security and liberty are not mutually
exclusive and that it is possible to do both?
If Senators share the concerns I have raised, I hope they will oppose
the cyber security amendment if it is brought up for a vote on the
Defense bill. I hope Senators will support this issue, which has been
brought to the floor under a different process--a process that involves
regular order, so every Senator on both sides of the aisle will have an
opportunity to make the revisions I believe it needs and to offer their
own ideas.
With that, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Boozman). The Senator from Utah.

Trade Promotion Authority

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as the House of Representatives moves
closer to a vote on the Senate-passed legislation to renew trade
promotion authority, I wish to take a few minutes to talk about the
links between our Nation's trade policy, foreign policy, and national
security. Whether it is Russia's aggression toward the Ukraine, civil
wars in the Middle East or ongoing efforts to prevent nuclear
proliferation, the world faces a number of challenges that are
impacting the future geopolitical landscape.
In all of this, the question we have to consider is: Going forward,
what role will the United States play? Are we going to lead or are we
going to follow?
Make no mistake, the path we take on international trade will say a
lot about how we plan to answer those questions.
Consider a few facts. In the next few years, China will likely pass
the United States as the world's largest economy. It is already the
world's largest exporting country. China is continually seeking to
expand its influence in order to dictate the terms of international
trade, particularly in places like Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
and Latin America.
In other words, when we are talking about trade and the possibility
of the United States retreating from the international marketplace,
China is the proverbial 800-pound gorilla in the room. Indeed, any
ground we cede in leading the world on trade is, more likely than not,
ground ceded to China.
I have heard many people--including Members of Congress--express
their concerns about China, both strategically and economically, and
rightfully so. After all, when it comes to trade, China has constantly
shown a disregard for international norms and standards. However, oddly
enough, many of those same people who talk the most about the threat
posed by China have expressed opposition to TPA, the trade promotion
authority bill, and to the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP. This is
puzzling and reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Senate TPA
bill and free trade in general.
If we are serious about keeping China and its growing economic and
political influence in check, getting a strong TPP agreement that
advances U.S. interests should be a top priority. In addition, if we
want to eventually convince China to change their harmful practices, a
high-standard TPP agreement would naturally be a big step in the right
direction.

[[Page S4011]]

Free-trade agreements like TPP, if done correctly, should provide new
rules for trade in the 21st century. They should set modern standards
for economic liberalization and integration, including the protection
of foreign investments and intellectual property rights and the
marginalization of state-owned enterprises.
We need to be setting the standards and writing the rules on trade so
our workers, innovators, researchers, and job creators can fairly
compete in the global market. If we don't lead, if we sit on the
sidelines, Americans will be competing on an imbalanced playing field,
with rules designed specifically to disadvantage us. Given that TPP
countries comprise 40 percent of the world economy, it is vital we
improve our ability to compete in that region.

Moreover, if TPP fails, we will lose influence in one of the most
economically dynamic and strategic regions of the world, and any
leadership vacuum left by the United States will almost certainly be
filled by someone else and, in this case, most likely China.
But don't just take my word for it. Congress recently received a
letter from 17 former Secretaries of Defense and retired military
leaders, including Colin Powell, Leon Panetta, William Perry, and
Donald Rumsfeld.
In that letter, these leaders said:

We write to express our strongest possible support for
enactment of Trade Promotion Authority legislation, which is
critical to the successful conclusion of two vital
agreements: the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
Indeed, TPP in particular will shape an economic dynamic over
the next several decades that will link the United States
with one of the world's most vibrant and dynamic regions. If,
however, we fail to move forward with TPP, Asian economies
will almost certainly develop along a China-centric model. In
fact, China is already pursuing an alternative regional free
trade initiative. TPP, combined with TTIP, would allow the
United States and our closest allies to help shape the rules
and standards for global trade.

The concerns outlined in this letter went beyond China.
The letter continues:

The stakes are clear. There are tremendous strategic
benefits to TPP and TTIP, and there would be harmful
strategic consequences if we fail to secure these agreements.
In both the Asia-Pacific and the Atlantic, our allies and
partners would question our commitments, doubt our resolve,
and inevitably look to other partners. America's prestige,
influence, and leadership are on the line. With TPP
originating in the Bush administration, these agreements are
fundamentally bipartisan in nature and squarely in our
national security interest. It is vitally important that we
seize the new strategic opportunities these agreements offer
our nation.

When 17 former Secretaries of Defense, admirals, and generals who
served under both Republican and Democratic administrations have joined
together with such a strong message, they probably have a point, and
Congress had better listen closely.
Many people, including a number of our colleagues in Congress,
continually argue that one of the best uses of American power would be
to better promote human rights and democracy in developing countries
and increase our efforts at alleviating poverty. I don't necessarily
disagree with that sentiment.
Indeed, while there are different opinions about how we can best
accomplish these goals, I think most of us in Congress, in both the
Senate and the House, agree with the basic premise that we should
continually be working to expand our influence and advance our values,
particularly in the developing world.
History has demonstrated that the best way to accomplish these
objectives is to increase U.S. trade with these countries. Indeed, if
we want to export the benefits of American exceptionalism, capitalism,
work ethic, and democracy, a freer, expanded exchange of goods is
absolutely the best way to do it.
Trade is an effective exercise of America's economic power and
influence, trade is how you spread capitalism and encourage other
countries to open their economies, trade is how you export American
values in the developing world, and, most importantly, trade is how you
counter the growing influence of countries like China in the world
economy.
The stakes are high. The importance of TPP and other trade agreements
to our strategic and security interests is obvious, and given that
reality, the importance of TPA should be just as obvious.
Put simply, without TPA, there is no TPP. That is just a fact. Sure,
technically speaking, TPA is not required for the administration to
complete negotiations and send the agreement to Congress, but
technicalities aside, that route is unlikely to yield a desirable
result, both in terms of the substance and process.
Japan and Canada, two of our largest trading partners in the TPP
negotiations, have each stated they are reluctant to bring their final
offers to the table until Congress provides the administration with
TPA. Trade promotion authority assures our trading partners that if
they reach an agreement, it will not be unraveled when it is sent to
Congress for approval. This allows our negotiators to get the best deal
possible.
TPA also ensures that Congress has a meaningful role in crafting the
specifics of the agreement by setting objectives, mandating
transparency, and requiring periodic updates. Under the Senate-passed
bill, Congress will have more authority than ever to review and respond
to the administration on individual trade agreements.
Long story short, TPA is absolutely necessary for advancing U.S.
interests abroad and protecting the opportunities for millions of
Americans to earn and compete for a livelihood in an increasingly
global trade environment.
With the House TPA vote set to take place in a matter of days, I hope
our colleagues in the other Chamber will recognize the strategic and
economic realities we face as a country and be willing to advance our
Nation's interests and security. I am confident that most of them will
make the right choice, and it will be good for America as well as them.

Child Support Enforcement

Mr. President, I wish to take a few minutes to speak about another
matter of great importance not just to me but to everybody.
Last year, after the midterm elections, the Obama administration
quietly and without much fanfare proposed a massive, far-reaching rule
that would overturn a number of bedrock principles of child support
enforcement and welfare reform, chief among them being the principle
that parents should be financially responsible for their children.
This was just the latest attempt on the part of the Obama
administration to bypass Congress and work to enact policies through
executive fiat. Sadly, it wasn't even the first time this
administration tried to gut welfare reform. Indeed, we all remember a
few years back when the administration granted itself the unprecedented
authority to waive critical welfare work requirements.
Put simply, this latest rule would make it easier for noncustodial
parents to evade paying child support. It would undermine a key feature
of welfare reform, which is that single mothers can avoid welfare if
fathers comply with child support orders.
I am fundamentally opposed to policies that allow parents to abdicate
their responsibilities, which, in return, results in more families
having to go on welfare. I think most Americans would agree with me.
That is why I, joined by Senator Cornyn and House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, have introduced legislation that would
prevent the Obama administration from bypassing Congress in yet another
attempt to subvert key features of welfare reform. I regret that we
must take this action.
In the past, Members of Congress have generally been able to find
common ground and work on a bipartisan basis to address issues relating
to child support. In fact, Congress recently passed, and the President
recently signed legislation, that made improvements to child support
enforcement policies.
In 2013, the Senate Finance Committee reported a series of ambitious
proposals related to child support enforcement. At that time, we
requested input on these proposals from the Obama administration. At no
time did administration officials indicate that the Department of
Health and Human Services was quietly working to advance a massive
overhaul of child support enforcement, much less that it was planning
on doing so without the help or input of Congress.
It is important to note that this secretive preparation only came to
light

[[Page S4012]]

after the recent elections. That suggests to me that the administration
does not have faith that its proposal can withstand public scrutiny and
that they have no interest in making a full and transparent
justification for the policies they are trying to ram through.
Truth be told, Chairman Ryan and I have introduced our legislation
more out of sorrow than anger. For many months, our offices attempted
to work out an equitable arrangement with the Obama administration. We
tried to convince HHS to withdraw the problematic features of the rule,
and in exchange we would agree to engage in a substantive, productive
discussion on how to move forward with improvements to child support
enforcement.
I firmly believe there is room for common ground. In fact, there are
a number of features of the administration's proposed rule that could
generate bipartisan support. But any workable solution would have to
include the full participation and ultimate consent of the legislative
branch. Any changes to the law would have to go through Congress and
not simply be dictated by the administration.
So Chairman Ryan and I will do all we can to get our bill through
Congress and present it to the President. If we are successful, I hope
he will sign it and commit to working with us in the future to advance
reforms to child support enforcement. I stand ready to work with the
administration and any of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and
both sides of the Capitol to achieve this goal.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Amendment No. 1986

(Purpose: To reauthorize and reform the Export-Import Bank of the
United States)

Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Kirk, I send an
amendment to the desk to the text proposed to be stricken by amendment
No. 1463.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from New Hampshire [Ms. Ayotte], for Mr. Kirk,
proposes an amendment numbered 1986 to the language proposed
to be stricken by amendment No. 1463.

Ms. AYOTTE. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment
be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
Ms. AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. President.
I rise today to talk about an important amendment that was offered by
Senator Kirk, which I cosponsor, and that is the reauthorization of the
Export-Import Bank.
I can tell you that in my home State of New Hampshire, on Monday, I
was at a roundtable at GE Aviation. GE Aviation has over 700 jobs in
the State of New Hampshire. They are building a new facility there. The
Export-Import Bank provides a company like GE Aviation the opportunity
to obtain financing to export its products that are manufactured in the
United States of America, in New Hampshire, to other countries
overseas, increasing the opportunity for American manufacturing jobs.
At that company, on Monday, they invited a lot of their suppliers and
small businesses who also have either used Ex-Im financing or are
suppliers for the larger companies that use Ex-Im financing.
One of those companies that were around the table that had used Ex-Im
financing in New Hampshire was Boyle Energy in Concord. In fact, Mike
Boyle, who is the CEO of Boyle Energy, has been able to use Ex-Im
financing to grow New Hampshire jobs. He has a vision for a new plant
in Merrimack, NH, that he is ready to expand. If he can get this
financing, he is going to be selling more of his great products
overseas, creating more jobs in New Hampshire.
Yet, this Bank expires at the end of June. This is a very important
tool for American businesses. This program--and I wish I had this
problem with every program in Washington--actually returns money to the
Treasury, and it creates American jobs.
The reason this type of financing is available is because of the risk
that is often taken in exporting products and there aren't commercial
loans always available. The Ex-Im Bank has the ability to allow
financing for our businesses in America. In fact, other countries
around the world have programs such as this, and that are much more
extensive. So without the Ex-Im Bank, it is not a level playing field
for our American companies that want to manufacture in the United
States of America. The Ex-Im Bank will allow access to financing that
will enable businesses to create American jobs.
Also around that table on Monday at GE Aviation was Goss
International. They manufacture great printing presses in New
Hampshire. We are very proud of them. They have also been able to use
Ex-Im financing. If that financing doesn't go through, we heard from a
representative of Goss that, in fact, they could lose up to 40 jobs in
my home State of New Hampshire. So it is important that we reauthorize
this Bank.
I want to thank the Senator from Illinois for offering this amendment
to reauthorize the Ex-Im Bank so that our companies here in the United
States of America can manufacture here, sell to consumers around the
world, and have access to this financing. In fact, in New Hampshire
there have been about 36 companies--many of them small companies--that
were able over the last several years to use Ex-Im financing to create
New Hampshire jobs.
This is about jobs in the United States of America. This is about
competing. We recently had the TPA--trade promotion authority--on the
floor to expand opportunities for trade. This goes hand in hand with
that legislation so that companies have opportunities to get financing
to create jobs here and return money to the Treasury. I wish I could
say that about every program--that it returns money to the Treasury.
The default rate at Ex-Im Bank is lower than with commercial loans.
I hope that Senator Kirk's amendment will get a vote on the Senate
floor, that we can get this reauthorized before the expiration date at
the end of this month, and that we can continue to allow this financing
for American businesses to continue to build and create products to
sell overseas and to create American jobs. This is what this financing
allows these businesses to do. This is very important in making sure
that we remain competitive and that we have more jobs here and that we
continue to sell our great products built here in the United States of
America around the world.
So I am very honored to support this amendment. I hope we will get a
vote on this amendment on the Defense authorization bill or get a vote
and make sure that we have this passed before the end of this month
when this Bank expires so that we could have continuity in this
important financing mechanism for our businesses here in this country.
In addition to the businesses I previously mentioned that were around
the table on Monday, I also want to mention GKN Aerospace from
Charleston, which is a larger business with a smaller footprint in New
Hampshire that has been able to export and create jobs in New Hampshire
and across the country. In addition to that, we were so glad to hear
from other businesses in New Hampshire that were able to rely on this
important financing mechanism.
I am very glad to support Senator Kirk's amendment.
With that, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

Space Program Cut

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I just learned that the CJS subcommittee
of the Appropriations Committee reported a bill out that made a
substantial cut in the request for commercial crew in order for us to
be able to have Americans flying on American rockets to and from the
International Space Station, instead of having to rely on the Russian
Soyuz, which we buy and have been buying those ever since we shut down
the space shuttle at something like $60 million to $70 million per

[[Page S4013]]

passenger going up to the space station.
Now, the whole idea was that since we cooperated with the Russians in
building this space station, we would both have the means of
transportation to get up there. We do have the means of transportation
of getting cargo to and from the space station, since we shut down the
space shuttle, but we are in the process of a competition between
several companies--especially those that have been selected in the
competition by NASA, Boeing and SpaceX. Each of them has been granted
money to develop all of the redundancies and safety and escape systems
in their spacecraft capsule in order to make it safe for Americans to
go to and from the International Space Station.
Now, I can tell you that for the average American on the street,
their image of our space program is one that since the space shuttle
shut down in 2011, they think the space program is over, when, in fact,
it is really just beginning, and we are going to Mars in the decade of
the 2030s. Well, that is the whole point of our being able to rely on
our own spacecraft and on our own rockets, instead of relying on the
Russians.
If this cut is sustained--and this is a cut from a request of $1.24
billion for this competition for making American rockets safe and
creating the spacecraft to take Americans to the space station--it will
have been cut to $900 million. If that cut in the subcommittee is
sustained in the full committee and ultimately in the final
appropriations bill, it is going to delay us from being able to launch
Americans on American rockets.
Instead of 2017--just 2 years from now--it will delay us another 4
years. That is 4 more years of relying on the Russians. Now, I know
there are a bunch of Senators around here that do not like the fact of
the aggressiveness of Vladimir Putin. Well, this is one way to wean
ourselves from having to depend on them.
The final comment on this subject is that the money that supposedly
is being cut, which is just a little over $300 million, we would lose
in still paying that money to the Russians to fly an additional 2
years. We need to wake up to what is happening. Senator Mikulski will
be offering an amendment to the full Appropriations Committee to
restore that cut. I hope Senators will understand all the nuances and
support Senator Mikulski.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). The Senator from Illinois.

Amendment No. 1986

Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I seek to speak on my amendment on behalf of
the Export-Import Bank. I would like to say the Export-Import Bank is
set to expire this year on June 30. It allows thousands of American
companies to advance their technology overseas. Without these loans,
many American jobs would be ceded to China or Europe.
Now, 200,000 American workers depend on Ex-Im, plus 46,000 in my home
State of Illinois. They work for these companies that depend on Ex-Im's
backing to make exports happen. Some people are interested in killing
this agency because it may be a government handout agency. It is not.
It actually makes the taxpayer $1 billion a year. In the last 3 years,
it has earned the U.S. Treasury over $3 billion.
I will be offering the Kirk-Heitkamp amendment to keep this Bank
alive. I want to thank Senators Blunt, Cantwell, and Manchin for
defending these American jobs.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about the National Defense
Authorization Act. This is legislation we are currently considering
that we need to pass. It is important for our military, and it is
important for the American people. I have offered a number of
amendments, and I rise to speak about three of those amendments at this
point.
The first is amendment No. 1483, which involves RPA flight training.
Essentially, amendment No. 1483 would instruct the Air Force to
consider allowing private contractors to provide the Air Force with
training for remotely piloted aircraft or RPAs. These are the vehicles
used in unmanned aerial systems, commonly called UAS.
Currently, the Air Force is training pilots for RPAs, remotely
piloted aircraft, within the service itself. But there are some very
skilled private contractors. In fact, the people who make unmanned
aircraft could be doing high-quality training for them as well,
particularly in concert with our universities that provide aviation
training.
Right now the Air Force faces a real challenge in training a
sufficient number of unmanned aircraft pilots to meet operational
demands. Specifically, this amendment directs the Air Force to evaluate
the use of private contractor facilities, equipment, and trainers to
increase the number of qualified pilots for our RPA missions. It
requires the Air Force to detail various aspects of their shortfall in
manning RPAs, the authorized number of personnel assigned to the
missions, and the identification and assessment of actions to address
that shortfall.
In this rapidly growing era of unmanned aerial systems technology, it
just makes sense for the military to partner with companies and
universities that have the expertise to provide the critical training
the military needs. It is cost effective. It is efficient. It is good
for the military and our country. Right now the demand for unmanned
aerial systems is so strong worldwide that the Air Force has all of its
pilots flying the missions. That does not give them the resources, the
pilots to train more pilots to fly unmanned aerial systems.
So this is a way that we can help the Air Force train these new
pilots with the very contractors that make things such as Global Hawk,
Predator and with our universities that provide aviation training. I
think it would be of great benefit and assistance to the Air Force.
The second amendment that I want to talk about is amendment No. 1484.
This one seeks to give the Air National Guard units a larger role in
the Global Hawk unmanned aerial systems mission. Specifically, this
measure directs the Air Force to determine the feasibility of
partnering the Air National Guard with Active-Duty Air Force to operate
and maintain the Global Hawk. The RQ-4 Global Hawks, including the
Block 20, Block 30, and Block 40 variants, are the Air Force's high-
altitude, long-endurance aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
They are currently operated and maintained only by Active-Duty
forces. But the Air National Guard could be providing a valuable
adjunct to the Air Force's regular personnel if we allow them to do
that. The North Dakota Air National Guard, for example, already
operates and maintains the armed MQ-1 Predator, and does it
exceptionally well. They and units like them are clearly capable of
taking on part of the Global Hawk mission, in association with their
Active-Duty counterparts.
This amendment would further the joint operations which have been a
major initiative of all of the armed services, the Guard, and the
Reserves in recent years, and they have done a tremendous job on
jointness. It has made our military stronger, more effective, and more
responsive. We need to continue to build on that joint operation. That
is exactly what this amendment does.
The third amendment that I would like to discuss is amendment No.
1485. It regards the Nuclear Force Improvement Program. This amendment
seeks to fortify the Nuclear Force Improvement Program, or NFIP, which
I believe is crucial to our national security both now and well into
the future. The reality is that we are facing an increasingly
nuclearized future. Nations such as Iran, North Korea, and others have
or are developing nuclear weapons.
That means we must maintain a credible, decisive nuclear deterrent.
That is what the Nuclear Force Improvement Program is all about. In
2014, the Air Force initiated the program to bolster and enhance its
nuclear missions, including the intercontinental ballistic missile,
ICBM, and nuclear-capable bomber missions. The program involves a wide
range of efforts to improve morale, update facilities and equipment,
and reinvigorate the nuclear-related career fields in the Air Force.
We need to continue to invest in and build this program.
Specifically, my amendment provides that the nuclear mission should be
a top priority for the

[[Page S4014]]

Department of Defense and the Air Force; that Congress should support
investments which sustain progress made under the Nuclear Force
Improvement Program; that the Air Force should regularly inform
Congress on the program's progress and any additional requirements it
may identify; and that future Air Force budgets should reflect the
importance of the nuclear mission and the need to support personnel
performing the nuclear mission.
The bottom line is that the men and women assigned to the nuclear
mission in the U.S. Air Force are doing incredibly important work every
day for the security of our country. We need to do all we can to
support them. We need to provide them with the support they deserve so
they can continue to do the job we ask them to do and do it at the
level that our security requires.
The Nuclear Force Improvement Program is a success, and the Air Force
needs to extend it into the future and continue to shore up the
foundations of our nuclear deterrent, which is, itself, at the
foundation of national security.
In conclusion, let me say that working on legislation as essential as
the defense of our Nation is and should be a bipartisan effort. The
Senate Armed Services Committee passed this bill out of committee with
a bipartisan vote of 22 to 4. Let's come together and do this for the
American people and the men, women, and families who have undertaken
the great and noble effort to protect our country.
I want to thank both the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and
the ranking member for their hard work, for their bipartisanship, and,
again, offer my support as we work to pass this vitally important
legislation for our military and for this great country.
I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. President, I wish to tell you a little bit about
Gregg Keesling, a dad and small business owner from Indianapolis. I
have gotten to know Gregg over the past few years because Gregg and his
wife Jannett lost their son Chancellor to suicide while Chancellor was
serving in Iraq in 2009, joining a club he often says he doesn't want
anyone else to join.
On the poster, this is Gregg and this is Chancellor. This is
Chancellor again, on duty. This is the memorial they had for
Chancellor.
Gregg recently said that he sees the invisible wounds borne by our
men and women in uniform as ``one of the greatest challenges that our
country faces.'' And he noted that ``we're going to face this challenge
for many years to come.'' Gregg is right. We have lost more troops to
suicide than in combat each of the past 3 years. We lost more than 400
Active-Duty, Guard, and Reserve servicemembers last year alone. It is
also estimated that we lose 22 veterans to suicide every single day.
These are preventable deaths.
We must do more to get these men and women the mental health care
they have earned. We need to remind our troops and veterans, along with
our friends and family, that it is OK to share the burden of their
personal struggles. It is a sign of strength to seek help. Our
servicemembers, veterans, and their families sacrifice for us, so we
must do everything possible to support them.
Last year we passed and the President signed into law the Jacob
Sexton Military Suicide Prevention Act, which for the first time
requires an annual, in-person mental health assessment for all
servicemembers, whether they are Active, Guard, or Reserve. Just like
physical health, mental health is an essential piece of military
readiness. We need to have an attitude of all-in toward providing
support for mental health challenges and also for the day-to-day
struggles we know contribute to suicide risk, such as financial
problems, relationship issues--things that are never made easier by
military life.
The Sexton act was named for a member of the Indiana National Guard
who took his own life while home on leave from Afghanistan in 2009.
Jeff and Barb Sexton, Jacob's parents, have been incredible partners in
this work. Jeff recently spoke about the decision he and his wife made
to speak out about military suicide.
This is SPC Jake Sexton. Here he is in his Humvee, and here he is
serving as well. His parents, Jeff and Barb--actually, it was Jeff in
particular, his dad, who said:

I had three choices: I could crawl in a corner, I could
crawl in a bottle or I could stand up and fight. It's not
been an easy job, but it's something I feel me and my wife
have to do.

The Keeslings and the Sextons are courageously telling their stories
to help prevent any more families from going through this nightmare.
Congress needs to continue to answer their call. This is an issue we
cannot let up on because there is so much more important work to do.
This year, we are taking the next step in the continuum of care and
focusing on improving the quality of and access to mental health care
through Department of Defense providers, VA providers, and private
community providers.
This year, we introduced the servicemember and veteran mental health
care package--three bills. Each improves access to quality mental
health care for servicemembers and veterans. The care package aims to
improve mental health care by focusing on direct care providers at DOD
and VA, community providers in their own towns, and the training of
physician assistants as mental health providers.
I thank Chairman McCain and Senator Reed for working with me to
include elements of the care package in the national defense bill,
specifically those elements which deal with DOD and care for
servicemembers.
I wish to go through the care package provisions in the NDAA briefly
and offer two amendments to ensure that these provisions support not
only servicemembers but also veterans.
First, section 716 is based on the first of our care package bills,
the Community Provider Readiness Recognition Act. It is cosponsored by
my friend, Senator Joni Ernst, and it creates a special military-
friendly designation for providers who choose to receive training in
military culture and the unique needs of servicemembers and military
families. Providers who receive this designation would be listed in a
regularly updated online registry, allowing servicemembers to search
for designated providers in their area.
This bill is inspired by the Star Behavioral Health Provider Network,
which is a program that the Military Family Research Institute at
Purdue University built in Indiana to train providers to better
understand military culture and medical treatments. Designating a
provider as part of the Star Behavioral Health Provider Network helps
servicemembers and their families make informed choices about where to
seek care. This can easily be translated on a national scale so that
servicemembers, veterans, and their families know which private mental
health care providers are well-suited and trained to treat them.
Mr. President, second, section 713 of the NDAA is drawn from another
care package bill, the Military and Veterans Mental Health Provider
Assessment Act, cosponsored by my friend Senator Roger Wicker of
Mississippi.
This legislation requires that all of DOD primary care and mental
health providers have received evidence-based training on suicide risk
recognition and management and that their training be updated to keep
pace with changes in mental health care best practices.
It also requires DOD to report to Congress on the military's current
mental health workforce, the long-term mental health needs of
servicemembers and military families, and how we ensure DOD meets those
needs.
Finally, it requires the Department of Defense to bring us a plan to
assess mental health outcomes in DOD care, variations in outcomes
across different DOD health care facilities, and barriers to DOD mental
health providers implementing the best clinical practice guidelines and
other evidence-based treatments.
Finally, by including elements from the Frontline Mental Health
Provider Training Act, cosponsored by my friend Senator John Boozman
from Arkansas, the NDAA calls on the Department of

[[Page S4015]]

Defense to train physician assistants to specialize in psychiatric care
in order to help meet the increasing demand for mental health services
among servicemembers and their families. We are also working to extend
the same spectrum of care to our veterans, and we are working toward a
hearing on the corresponding veterans bills for this mental health care
package in the months ahead. These are smart, bipartisan provisions
that address one of the most serious challenges facing our military,
our veterans and our country.
We must improve the mental health care at the Department of Defense
and the Veterans' Administration and at private community providers
from Ellsworth, ME, to Evansville, IN, to the shores of California so
they are better able to serve our servicemembers, veterans, and their
families. It is absolutely essential that we have coordination and
continuity for servicemembers and their families as they transition to
veteran status.
I will leave you with a couple of brief thoughts from two brave
Hoosiers I have the privilege to know and have gotten to know well.
Jeff Sexton, Jacob's dad, put it this way: ``It is one thing to lose
someone you love in the war. It is a whole other thing to lose them to
the war.'' And Gregg Keesling, Chancellor's dad, concluded this: ``The
bottom line is I don't want anybody to go through what we've gone
through.''
We must act and we must act now before any more families have to
experience this loss from suicide. I urge all of my colleagues to
support the care package provisions for servicemembers and to later
extend them to our veterans who need our help and who need us to stand
up for them.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I am coming to the floor to speak on
behalf of an amendment I am offering, along with Senators Schatz,
Udall, Blumenthal, Heinrich, Tester, Merkley, and Baldwin.
Today, it was announced that President Obama is going to be sending
another 450 troops to Iraq to help assist in the fight against ISIL.
That will mean we now have 3,500 troops in position throughout Iraq
assisting in the battle against ISIL within those borders. This marks
also nearly a year since we have reengaged in military activities in
Iraq and in Syria, both with support forces for the Iraqis, with
training for those who are fighting in Syria, and major air operations
targeting ISIL.
I think there is broad bipartisan consensus here that the United
States needs to take the fight to this enemy--an enemy that is seeking
to occupy an enormous amount of territory in a very dangerous region
from which it can plot attacks against the United States. But I also
think there is bipartisan agreement that we should do our
constitutional duty; that we should authorize this war against ISIL. My
hope is the Foreign Relations Committee--of which I am a member, of
which the Presiding Officer is a member--will have that debate in the
upcoming months.
But given that we are authorizing hundreds of millions of dollars in
this bill in order to take the fight to ISIL, I think it makes sense to
have some commonsense limitations on the use of that money that are in
keeping with the very public promises the President has made.
President Obama has stated very clearly that he does not think it is
a wise strategy to reinsert major combat troop operations into the
Middle East. I agree with him. I think many of us agree with him. There
is nothing about the last 10 years of American occupation in Iraq that
tells us that U.S. troops inside Iraq can have the effect of killing
more terrorists than are created, in part, through the recruitment
benefit of major U.S. combat operations.
So the amendment we are offering today is a fairly simple one. It
would prohibit the use of major combat--of large numbers of combat
troops in the fight against ISIL, with certain commonsense exceptions:
an exception for rescue operations, an exception for intelligence-
gathering exercises, and an exception for special operations in and
throughout the region; special operations like the one we used to kill
a high-ranking ISIS commander just within the last several weeks.
We think it is important that Congress weigh in and state what we
believe to be the desire and imperative of our constituents; that we
learn from the mistakes of the Iraq war; that we don't repeat them by
inserting thousands of American ground troops back into Iraq or perhaps
Syria.
ISIS was created, first and foremost, primarily by a political vacuum
inside Iraq, not a military vacuum. We need to acknowledge that any
strategy to ultimately defeat ISIL, as we are all committed to, has to
first and foremost have a realistic political strategy on the ground to
divorce Sunni populations from this death cult that is ISIL.
Sunni grievances grew throughout Nouri al-Maliki's reign. They were
denied an equitable share of oil revenues. They were excluded from
government jobs. There were real atrocities committed against Sunni
communities--mass incarcerations, torture, extrajudicial killings. If
we don't have an Iraq Government that is committed to being inclusive
of Sunni populations, there is no amount of American troops on the
ground that can heal those divisions. In fact, what we know about the
Iraq war is that major American combat operations on the ground in Iraq
have an effect of exacerbating those divisions rather than healing
them. They give space for people like Maliki to try to marginalize
these populations. They increase suffering on the ground, especially
for these populations that aren't represented effectively within the
reigning Shiite government in Baghdad.
So if we really want to learn lessons from the past, then let's take
President Obama at his word. Let's include in the NDAA a commonsense
limitation, with exceptions, with respect to the deployment of major
ground operations inside Iraq.
Now, there are some people who will say this isn't the role of
Congress. I would just state for the record that there are a litany of
examples in the past in which Congress has placed commonsense
limitations on our authorizations for military force. In fact, the
President, in submitting a proposed AUMF to the Foreign Relations
Committee several months ago, in fact, included in that authorization
of military force a limitation on ground forces. So this would be
entirely consistent with the history of this body but also with the
proposal the President has made.
I know, from having visited our troops in Iraq and in Afghanistan,
that it is easy for us to believe there is no mission that U.S.
soldiers can't take on; that their capability, that their bravery, that
their courage, that their adaptability knows no bounds. They have done
admirable work inside Iraq over the course of the last 10 years, but
what we know is that those troops inside Iraq also made Iraq what our
own intelligence community called the cause celebre for the
international terrorist movement, drawing in thousands of would-be
terrorists to fight the Americans.
What we know is that the ISIS we are fighting today is a follow-on
organization from Al Qaeda in Iraq, which was created because of the
American invasion and occupation--maybe not in whole but certainly as
the primary influence.
So we hope to be able to have a full debate on an authorization of
military force. But with the inability to move that piece of
legislation through the Foreign Relations Committee, we think it is
proper on the NDAA to hold the President at his word, place a
commonsense limitation on the use of ground troops and learn from the
mistakes of the last 10 years inside Iraq.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.

Amendment No. 1986

Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I urge this Chamber to reject the motion to
table my amendment, which put forward reforms to the Export-Import
Bank. I would say to Members that this is going to be a key scored vote
by the

[[Page S4016]]

U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers;
that, without my amendment, we would not have the reforms to make sure
Ex-Im works at least 25 percent of its portfolio with small businesses.
I urge Members to vote no on the motion to table my amendment by Mr.
Shelby that I understand is coming up. This is a key test vote, Export-
Import Bank. With a good bipartisan vote, I would think we would have
people supporting the Kirk-Heitkamp-Blunt-Graham reform legislation for
Ex-Im.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, very briefly. Senators Ayotte and Kirk's
amendment is coming up. There will be a motion to table. What we are
trying to do is basically show support for the Ex-Im Bank, which is due
to expire in June. We are trying to find a vehicle, a must-pass piece
of legislation, to keep the Bank afloat. I think it is very important
to the American economy that American manufacturers not be
disadvantaged. The Ex-Im Bank makes money for the American taxpayer.
China's Ex-Im Bank is larger than France, Germany, the United States,
and England's combined.
What does this mean to the average person? When a product is made in
the United States and sold into the developing world without the Ex-Im
financing mechanism available to American manufacturers, we are going
to lose market share to other countries like China, France, Germany
that produce wide-body jets and other products. Eighty-nine percent of
the people who get help from the Ex-Im Bank are small businesses.
This is an attempt to show the investor community and those who are
watching this issue that the Senate is in support of the Bank. So I am
urging a ``no'' vote on tabling. We had to do this procedurally. So
this will be a signal to the markets that the Senate is in support of
the Bank. I urge everyone who believes the Bank is vital to American
exports and not against unilateral surrendering of market share to the
Chinese and other competitors to vote no. There will be another vote of
our choosing on a vehicle that will have to get to the President's
desk. This is not the last vote we will take on Ex-Im Bank.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. President, I understand we have a vote scheduled at 5
o'clock, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak for about 60
seconds.

Amendment No. 1473

I came to the floor today to speak in favor of an amendment described
earlier in the afternoon by Senator Vitter. This is an amendment, of
course, to the National Defense Authorization Act that makes certain
our U.S. Army is able to maintain the current number of brigade combat
teams.
Sequestration is creating significant problems in many arenas but no
more important than in the area of our Army and defense. The concern is
that in the process of downsizing the Army as a result of sequestration
and other reductions in available funding, brigade combat teams would
be eliminated. Senator Vitter's amendment, which I support and am a
cosponsor of, would eliminate that as an option.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lee). The Senator from Alabama.

Amendment No. 1986

Mr. SHELBY. What is the pending business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is the Ayotte-Kirk amendment.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the
amendment, which is a long-term reauthorization of the Export-Import
Bank. In my opinion, after evaluating this issue during a series of
hearings in the Senate banking committee, there is no compelling case
to reauthorize the bank.
After years of efforts to reform the Export-Import Bank, it has
become clear to me that its problems are beyond repair and that the
Bank's expiration is in the best interest of American taxpayers. Nearly
99 percent of all American exports--over $2 trillion--are financed
without the Export-Import Bank's help, which demonstrates that the
subsidies are more about corporate welfare than advancing our economy.
I believe the Export-Import Bank has outlived its usefulness and
should be allowed to expire.
At this point, I move to table the Kirk amendment No. 1986 and ask
for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion.
The clerk will call the roll.
The senior assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. CORNYN. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the
Senator from Florida (Mr. Rubio) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
Toomey).
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Merkley) and
the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Reid) are necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. -Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 31, nays 65, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 206 Leg.]

YEAS--31

Barrasso
Boozman
Capito
Cassidy
Corker
Cornyn
Cotton
Crapo
Cruz
Daines
Enzi
Fischer
Flake
Gardner
Grassley
Inhofe
Isakson
Lankford
Lee
McConnell
Paul
Perdue
Risch
Sanders
Sasse
Sessions
Shelby
Sullivan
Thune
Tillis
Vitter

NAYS--65

Alexander
Ayotte
Baldwin
Bennet
Blumenthal
Blunt
Booker
Boxer
Brown
Burr
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Coons
Donnelly
Durbin
Ernst
Feinstein
Franken
Gillibrand
Graham
Hatch
Heinrich
Heitkamp
Heller
Hirono
Hoeven
Johnson
Kaine
King
Kirk
Klobuchar
Leahy
Manchin
Markey
McCain
McCaskill
Menendez
Mikulski
Moran
Murkowski
Murphy
Murray
Nelson
Peters
Portman
Reed
Roberts
Rounds
Schatz
Schumer
Scott
Shaheen
Stabenow
Tester
Udall
Warner
Warren
Whitehouse
Wicker
Wyden

NOT VOTING--4

Merkley
Reid
Rubio
Toomey
The motion was rejected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.

amendment no. 1986 withdrawn

Ms. AYOTTE. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Kirk, I withdraw
amendment No. 1986.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The amendment is
withdrawn.

cloture motion

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I send a cloture motion to the desk for
amendment No. 1569, as modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cloture motion having been presented under
rule XXII, the Chair directs the clerk to read the motion.
The legislative clerk read as follows:

Cloture Motion

We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the
provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate,
do hereby move to bring to a close debate on amendment No.
1569, as modified, to the McCain amendment No. 1463 to H.R.
1735, an act to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2016
for military activities of the Department of Defense, for
military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel
strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
Mitch McConnell, Lamar Alexander, John Cornyn, Orrin G.
Hatch, David Perdue, Bob Corker, Michael B. Enzi, Susan
M. Collins, Jeff Flake, Mike Rounds, Richard Burr,
David Vitter, James M. Inhofe, Daniel Coats, John
McCain, Deb Fischer, Tom Cotton.

Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent that the mandatory quorum
required under rule XXII be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from North Dakota.

[[Page S4017]]

Mr. COATS. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
Ms. HEITKAMP. Sure.

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