[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 74 (Thursday, May 14, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H2972-H2983]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     PROTECTING VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS AND EMERGENCY RESPONDERS ACT

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the 
Senate amendments to the bill (H.R. 1191) to amend the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 to ensure that emergency services volunteers are not taken 
into account as employees under the shared responsibility requirements 
contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:
  Senate amendments:

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Agreement 
     Review Act of 2015''.

     SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH 
                   IRAN RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.

       The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 134 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 135. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS 
                   WITH IRAN.

       ``(a) Transmission to Congress of Nuclear Agreements With 
     Iran and Verification Assessment With Respect to Such 
     Agreements.--
       ``(1) Transmission of agreements.--Not later than 5 
     calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating 
     to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit 
     to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership--
       ``(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1), 
     including all related materials and annexes;
       ``(B) a verification assessment report of the Secretary of 
     State prepared under paragraph (2) with respect to the 
     agreement; and
       ``(C) a certification that--
       ``(i) the agreement includes the appropriate terms, 
     conditions, and duration of the agreement's requirements with 
     respect to Iran's nuclear activities and provisions 
     describing any

[[Page H2973]]

     sanctions to be waived, suspended, or otherwise reduced by 
     the United States, and any other nation or entity, including 
     the United Nations; and
       ``(ii) the President determines the agreement meets United 
     States non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the 
     common defense and security, provides an adequate framework 
     to ensure that Iran's nuclear activities permitted thereunder 
     will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to 
     the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran's 
     nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be used to 
     further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive 
     purpose, including for any research on or development of any 
     nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related 
     military purpose.
       ``(2) Verification assessment report.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall prepare, 
     with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), a 
     report assessing--
       ``(i) the extent to which the Secretary will be able to 
     verify that Iran is complying with its obligations and 
     commitments under the agreement;
       ``(ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and other control 
     mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement 
     with respect to Iran's nuclear program to ensure Iran's 
     activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further 
     any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose, 
     including for any research on or development of any nuclear 
     explosive device or any other nuclear-related military 
     purpose; and
       ``(iii) the capacity and capability of the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency to effectively implement the 
     verification regime required by or related to the agreement, 
     including whether the International Atomic Energy Agency will 
     have sufficient access to investigate suspicious sites or 
     allegations of covert nuclear-related activities and whether 
     it has the required funding, manpower, and authority to 
     undertake the verification regime required by or related to 
     the agreement.
       ``(B) Assumptions.--In preparing a report under 
     subparagraph (A) with respect to an agreement described in 
     paragraph (1), the Secretary shall assume that Iran could--
       ``(i) use all measures not expressly prohibited by the 
     agreement to conceal activities that violate its obligations 
     and commitments under the agreement; and
       ``(ii) alter or deviate from standard practices in order to 
     impede efforts to verify that Iran is complying with those 
     obligations and commitments.
       ``(C) Classified annex.--A report under subparagraph (A) 
     shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but shall include 
     a classified annex prepared in consultation with the Director 
     of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified 
     information.
       ``(3) Exception.--
       ``(A) In general.--Neither the requirements of 
     subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1), nor subsections 
     (b) through (g) of this section, shall apply to an agreement 
     described in subsection (h)(5) or to the EU-Iran Joint 
     Statement made on April 2, 2015.
       ``(B) Additional requirement.--Notwithstanding subparagraph 
     (A), any agreement as defined in subsection (h)(1) and any 
     related materials, whether concluded before or after the date 
     of the enactment of this section, shall not be subject to the 
     exception in subparagraph (A).
       ``(b) Period for Review by Congress of Nuclear Agreements 
     With Iran.--
       ``(1) In general.--During the 30-calendar day period 
     following transmittal by the President of an agreement 
     pursuant to subsection (a), the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
     of the House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold 
     hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in 
     order to fully review such agreement.
       ``(2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under 
     paragraph (1) shall be 60 calendar days if an agreement, 
     including all materials required to be transmitted to 
     Congress pursuant to subsection (a)(1), is transmitted 
     pursuant to subsection (a) between July 10, 2015, and 
     September 7, 2015.
       ``(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional 
     review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     except as provided in paragraph (6), prior to and during the 
     period for transmission of an agreement in subsection (a)(1) 
     and during the period for congressional review provided in 
     paragraph (1), including any additional period as applicable 
     under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President 
     may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or 
     otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with 
     respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from 
     applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement 
     described in subsection (a).
       ``(4) Limitation on actions during presidential 
     consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as 
     provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of 
     disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both 
     Houses of Congress, the President may not waive, suspend, 
     reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the 
     application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under 
     any provision of law or refrain from applying any such 
     sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection 
     (a) for a period of 12 calendar days following the date of 
     such passage.
       ``(5) Limitation on actions during congressional 
     reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as 
     provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of 
     disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both 
     Houses of Congress, and the President vetoes such joint 
     resolution, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, 
     provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of 
     statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision 
     of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant 
     to an agreement described in subsection (a) for a period of 
     10 calendar days following the date of the President's veto.
       ``(6) Exception.--The prohibitions under paragraphs (3) 
     through (5) do not apply to any new deferral, waiver, or 
     other suspension of statutory sanctions pursuant to the Joint 
     Plan of Action if that deferral, waiver, or other suspension 
     is made--
       ``(A) consistent with the law in effect on the date of the 
     enactment of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015; 
     and
       ``(B) not later than 45 calendar days before the 
     transmission by the President of an agreement, assessment 
     report, and certification under subsection (a).
       ``(7) Definition.--In the House of Representatives, for 
     purposes of this subsection, the terms `transmittal,' 
     `transmitted,' and `transmission' mean transmittal, 
     transmitted, and transmission, respectively, to the Speaker 
     of the House of Representatives.
       ``(c) Effect of Congressional Action With Respect to 
     Nuclear Agreements With Iran.--
       ``(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that--
       ``(A) the sanctions regime imposed on Iran by Congress is 
     primarily responsible for bringing Iran to the table to 
     negotiate on its nuclear program;
       ``(B) these negotiations are a critically important matter 
     of national security and foreign policy for the United States 
     and its closest allies;
       ``(C) this section does not require a vote by Congress for 
     the agreement to commence;
       ``(D) this section provides for congressional review, 
     including, as appropriate, for approval, disapproval, or no 
     action on statutory sanctions relief under an agreement; and
       ``(E) even though the agreement may commence, because the 
     sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress 
     can permanently modify or eliminate that regime, it is 
     critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in 
     an orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as 
     appropriate, take action affecting the statutory sanctions 
     regime imposed by Congress.
       ``(2) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, action involving any measure of statutory sanctions 
     relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement subject 
     to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action--
       ``(A) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory 
     requirements for such action, if, during the period for 
     review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint 
     resolution stating in substance that the Congress does favor 
     the agreement;
       ``(B) may not be taken if, during the period for review 
     provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint 
     resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not 
     favor the agreement; or
       ``(C) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory 
     requirements for such action, if, following the period for 
     review provided in subsection (b), there is not enacted any 
     such joint resolution.
       ``(3) Definition.--For the purposes of this subsection, the 
     phrase `action involving any measure of statutory sanctions 
     relief by the United States' shall include waiver, 
     suspension, reduction, or other effort to provide relief 
     from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory 
     sanctions with respect to, Iran under any provision of law or 
     any other effort to refrain from applying any such sanctions.
       ``(d) Congressional Oversight of Iranian Compliance With 
     Nuclear Agreements.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall keep the appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership fully and currently 
     informed of all aspects of Iranian compliance with respect to 
     an agreement subject to subsection (a).
       ``(2) Potentially significant breaches and compliance 
     incidents.--The President shall, within 10 calendar days of 
     receiving credible and accurate information relating to a 
     potentially significant breach or compliance incident by Iran 
     with respect to an agreement subject to subsection (a), 
     submit such information to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership.
       ``(3) Material breach report.--Not later than 30 calendar 
     days after submitting information about a potentially 
     significant breach or compliance incident pursuant to 
     paragraph (2), the President shall make a determination 
     whether such potentially significant breach or compliance 
     issue constitutes a material breach and, if there is such a 
     material breach, whether Iran has cured such material breach, 
     and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
     and leadership such determination, accompanied by, as 
     appropriate, a report on the action or failure to act by Iran 
     that led to the material breach, actions necessary for Iran 
     to cure the breach, and the status of Iran's efforts to cure 
     the breach.
       ``(4) Semi-annual report.--Not later than 180 calendar days 
     after entering into an agreement described in subsection (a), 
     and not less frequently than once every 180 calendar days 
     thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees and leadership a report on Iran's 
     nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the agreement 
     during the period covered by the report, including the 
     following elements:
       ``(A) Any action or failure to act by Iran that breached 
     the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of the 
     agreement.
       ``(B) Any delay by Iran of more than one week in providing 
     inspectors access to facilities, people, and documents in 
     Iran as required by the agreement.
       ``(C) Any progress made by Iran to resolve concerns by the 
     International Atomic Energy

[[Page H2974]]

     Agency about possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear 
     program.
       ``(D) Any procurement by Iran of materials in violation of 
     the agreement or which could otherwise significantly advance 
     Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.
       ``(E) Any centrifuge research and development conducted by 
     Iran that--
       ``(i) is not in compliance with the agreement; or
       ``(ii) may substantially reduce the breakout time of 
     acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran, if deployed.
       ``(F) Any diversion by Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or 
     other materials for use in Iran's nuclear program in 
     violation of the agreement.
       ``(G) Any covert nuclear activities undertaken by Iran, 
     including any covert nuclear weapons-related or covert 
     fissile material activities or research and development.
       ``(H) An assessment of whether any Iranian financial 
     institutions are engaged in money laundering or terrorist 
     finance activities, including names of specific financial 
     institutions if applicable.
       ``(I) Iran's advances in its ballistic missile program, 
     including developments related to its long-range and inter-
     continental ballistic missile programs.
       ``(J) An assessment of--
       ``(i) whether Iran directly supported, financed, planned, 
     or carried out an act of terrorism against the United States 
     or a United States person anywhere in the world;
       ``(ii) whether, and the extent to which, Iran supported 
     acts of terrorism, including acts of terrorism against the 
     United States or a United States person anywhere in the 
     world;
       ``(iii) all actions, including in international fora, being 
     taken by the United States to stop, counter, and condemn acts 
     by Iran to directly or indirectly carry out acts of terrorism 
     against the United States and United States persons;
       ``(iv) the impact on the national security of the United 
     States and the safety of United States citizens as a result 
     of any Iranian actions reported under this paragraph; and
       ``(v) all of the sanctions relief provided to Iran, 
     pursuant to the agreement, and a description of the 
     relationship between each sanction waived, suspended, or 
     deferred and Iran's nuclear weapon's program.
       ``(K) An assessment of whether violations of 
     internationally recognized human rights in Iran have changed, 
     increased, or decreased, as compared to the prior 180-day 
     period.
       ``(5) Additional reports and information.--
       ``(A) Agency reports.--Following submission of an agreement 
     pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership, the Department of State, the 
     Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense shall, 
     upon the request of any of those committees or leadership, 
     promptly furnish to those committees or leadership their 
     views as to whether the safeguards and other controls 
     contained in the agreement with respect to Iran's nuclear 
     program provide an adequate framework to ensure that Iran's 
     activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or 
     constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and 
     security.
       ``(B) Provision of information on nuclear initiatives with 
     iran.--The President shall keep the appropriate congressional 
     committees and leadership fully and currently informed of any 
     initiative or negotiations with Iran relating to Iran's 
     nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement.
       ``(6) Compliance certification.--After the review period 
     provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less 
     than every 90 calendar days--
       ``(A) determine whether the President is able to certify 
     that--
       ``(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully 
     implementing the agreement, including all related technical 
     or additional agreements;
       ``(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with 
     respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material 
     breach, Iran has cured the material breach;
       ``(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert 
     activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear 
     weapons program; and
       ``(iv) suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to 
     the agreement is--

       ``(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and 
     verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating 
     its illicit nuclear program; and
       ``(II) vital to the national security interests of the 
     United States; and

       ``(B) if the President determines he is able to make the 
     certification described in subparagraph (A), make such 
     certification to the appropriate congressional committees and 
     leadership.
       ``(7) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that--
       ``(A) United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human 
     rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place 
     under an agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1);
       ``(B) issues not addressed by an agreement on the nuclear 
     program of Iran, including fair and appropriate compensation 
     for Americans who were terrorized and subjected to torture 
     while held in captivity for 444 days after the seizure of the 
     United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and their 
     families, the freedom of Americans held in Iran, the human 
     rights abuses of the Government of Iran against its own 
     people, and the continued support of terrorism worldwide by 
     the Government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure 
     justice and the national security of the United States, and 
     should be expeditiously addressed;
       ``(C) the President should determine the agreement in no 
     way compromises the commitment of the United States to 
     Israel's security, nor its support for Israel's right to 
     exist; and
       ``(D) in order to responsibly implement any long-term 
     agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is 
     critically important that Congress have the opportunity to 
     review any agreement and, as necessary, take action to modify 
     the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.
       ``(e) Expedited Consideration of Legislation.--
       ``(1) Initiation.--
       ``(A) In general.--In the event the President does not 
     submit a certification pursuant to subsection (d)(6) during 
     each 90-day period following the review period provided in 
     subsection (b), or submits a determination pursuant to 
     subsection (d)(3) that Iran has materially breached an 
     agreement subject to subsection (a) and the material breach 
     has not been cured, qualifying legislation introduced within 
     60 calendar days of such event shall be entitled to expedited 
     consideration pursuant to this subsection.
       ``(B) Definition.--In the House of Representatives, for 
     purposes of this paragraph, the terms `submit' and `submits' 
     mean submit and submits, respectively, to the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(2) Qualifying legislation defined.--For purposes of this 
     subsection, the term `qualifying legislation' means only a 
     bill of either House of Congress--
       ``(A) the title of which is as follows: `A bill reinstating 
     statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran.'; and
       ``(B) the matter after the enacting clause of which is: 
     `Any statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran 
     pursuant to ______ that were waived, suspended, reduced, or 
     otherwise relieved pursuant to an agreement submitted 
     pursuant to section 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
     are hereby reinstated and any action by the United States 
     Government to facilitate the release of funds or assets to 
     Iran pursuant to such agreement, or provide any further 
     waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief pursuant to 
     such agreement is hereby prohibited.', with the blank space 
     being filled in with the law or laws under which sanctions 
     are to be reinstated.
       ``(3) Introduction.--During the 60-calendar day period 
     provided for in paragraph (1), qualifying legislation may be 
     introduced--
       ``(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority 
     leader or the minority leader; and
       ``(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the 
     majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the 
     minority leader's designee).
       ``(4) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--
       ``(A) Reporting and discharge.--If a committee of the House 
     to which qualifying legislation has been referred has not 
     reported such qualifying legislation within 10 legislative 
     days after the date of referral, that committee shall be 
     discharged from further consideration thereof.
       ``(B) Proceeding to consideration.--Beginning on the third 
     legislative day after each committee to which qualifying 
     legislation has been referred reports it to the House or has 
     been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall 
     be in order to move to proceed to consider the qualifying 
     legislation in the House. All points of order against the 
     motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after 
     the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the 
     qualifying legislation with regard to the same agreement. The 
     previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
     motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion 
     shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by 
     which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
       ``(C) Consideration.--The qualifying legislation shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against the 
     qualifying legislation and against its consideration are 
     waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered 
     on the qualifying legislation to final passage without 
     intervening motion except two hours of debate equally divided 
     and controlled by the sponsor of the qualifying legislation 
     (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the 
     vote on passage of the qualifying legislation shall not be in 
     order.
       ``(5) Consideration in the senate.--
       ``(A) Committee referral.--Qualifying legislation 
     introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations.
       ``(B) Reporting and discharge.--If the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations has not reported such qualifying legislation within 
     10 session days after the date of referral of such 
     legislation, that committee shall be discharged from further 
     consideration of such legislation and the qualifying 
     legislation shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       ``(C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule 
     XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at 
     any time after the committee authorized to consider 
     qualifying legislation reports it to the Senate or has been 
     discharged from its consideration (even though a previous 
     motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to 
     proceed to the consideration of qualifying legislation, and 
     all points of order against qualifying legislation (and 
     against consideration of the qualifying legislation) are 
     waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is 
     not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider 
     the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to 
     shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the 
     consideration of the qualifying legislation is agreed to, the 
     qualifying legislation shall remain the unfinished business 
     until disposed of.
       ``(D) Debate.--Debate on qualifying legislation, and on all 
     debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall 
     be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided 
     equally between the majority and minority leaders or their 
     designees. A motion to further limit debate is in order and 
     not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a 
     motion to

[[Page H2975]]

     proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion 
     to recommit the qualifying legislation is not in order.
       ``(E) Vote on passage.--The vote on passage shall occur 
     immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the 
     qualifying legislation and a single quorum call at the 
     conclusion of the debate, if requested in accordance with the 
     rules of the Senate.
       ``(F) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the 
     decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the 
     rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure 
     relating to qualifying legislation shall be decided without 
     debate.
       ``(G) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate 
     of any veto message with respect to qualifying legislation, 
     including all debatable motions and appeals in connection 
     with such qualifying legislation, shall be limited to 10 
     hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the 
     majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
       ``(6) Rules relating to senate and house of 
     representatives.--
       ``(A) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before 
     the passage by one House of qualifying legislation of that 
     House, that House receives qualifying legislation from the 
     other House, then the following procedures shall apply:
       ``(i) The qualifying legislation of the other House shall 
     not be referred to a committee.
       ``(ii) With respect to qualifying legislation of the House 
     receiving the legislation--

       ``(I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if 
     no qualifying legislation had been received from the other 
     House; but
       ``(II) the vote on passage shall be on the qualifying 
     legislation of the other House.

       ``(B) Treatment of a bill of other house.--If one House 
     fails to introduce qualifying legislation under this section, 
     the qualifying legislation of the other House shall be 
     entitled to expedited floor procedures under this section.
       ``(C) Treatment of companion measures.--If, following 
     passage of the qualifying legislation in the Senate, the 
     Senate then receives a companion measure from the House of 
     Representatives, the companion measure shall not be 
     debatable.
       ``(D) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of 
     this paragraph shall not apply in the House of 
     Representatives to qualifying legislation which is a revenue 
     measure.
       ``(f) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
     Subsection (e) is enacted by Congress--
       ``(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate 
     and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such 
     are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, 
     but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be 
     followed in that House in the case of legislation described 
     in those sections, and supersede other rules only to the 
     extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and
       ``(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
     procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and 
     to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that 
     House.
       ``(g) Rules of Construction.--Nothing in the section shall 
     be construed as--
       ``(1) modifying, or having any other impact on, the 
     President's authority to negotiate, enter into, or implement 
     appropriate executive agreements, other than the restrictions 
     on implementation of the agreements specifically covered by 
     this section;
       ``(2) allowing any new waiver, suspension, reduction, or 
     other relief from statutory sanctions with respect to Iran 
     under any provision of law, or allowing the President to 
     refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an 
     agreement described in subsection (a) during the period for 
     review provided in subsection (b);
       ``(3) revoking or terminating any statutory sanctions 
     imposed on Iran; or
       ``(4) authorizing the use of military force against Iran.
       ``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Agreement.--The term `agreement' means an agreement 
     related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the 
     United States, commits the United States to take action, or 
     pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise 
     agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes, 
     whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless 
     of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint 
     comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between 
     Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials 
     related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils, 
     side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and 
     guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related 
     agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the 
     agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.
       ``(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on 
     Finance, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial 
     Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives.
       ``(3) Appropriate congressional committees and 
     leadership.--The term `appropriate congressional committees 
     and leadership' means the Committee on Finance, the Committee 
     on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, and 
     the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial 
     Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
     the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, Majority 
     Leader, and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
       ``(4) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian 
     financial institution' has the meaning given the term in 
     section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513b(d)).
       ``(5) Joint plan of action.--The term `Joint Plan of 
     Action' means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at Geneva 
     November 24, 2013, by Iran and by France, Germany, the 
     Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the 
     United Kingdom, and the United States, and all implementing 
     materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action, 
     including the technical understandings reached on January 12, 
     2014, the extension thereto agreed to on July 18, 2014, the 
     extension agreed to on November 24, 2014, and any materially 
     identical extension that is agreed to on or after the date of 
     the enactment of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 
     2015.
       ``(6) EU-iran joint statement.--The term `EU-Iran Joint 
     Statement' means only the Joint Statement by EU High 
     Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign 
     Minister Javad Zarif made on April 2, 2015, at Lausanne, 
     Switzerland.
       ``(7) Material breach.--The term `material breach' means, 
     with respect to an agreement described in subsection (a), any 
     breach of the agreement, or in the case of non-binding 
     commitments, any failure to perform those commitments, that 
     substantially--
       ``(A) benefits Iran's nuclear program;
       ``(B) decreases the amount of time required by Iran to 
     achieve a nuclear weapon; or
       ``(C) deviates from or undermines the purposes of such 
     agreement.
       ``(8) Noncompliance defined.--The term `noncompliance' 
     means any departure from the terms of an agreement described 
     in subsection (a) that is not a material breach.
       ``(9) P5+1 countries.--The term `P5+1 countries' means the 
     United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's 
     Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
       ``(10) United states person.--The term `United States 
     person' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511).''.
       Amend the title so as to read: ``A bill to provide for 
     congressional review and oversight of agreements relating to 
     Iran's nuclear program, and for other purposes.''.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of May 
13, 2015, the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman 
from New York (Mr. Engel) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to claim the time in genuine 
opposition to H.R. 1191.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New York in favor of 
the motion?
  Mr. ENGEL. I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. On that basis, pursuant to the rule, the 
gentleman from Minnesota will control 30 minutes in opposition.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York (Mr. Engel) and ask unanimous consent that he control that 
time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Minnesota?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes of my time to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), my ranking member, and ask 
unanimous consent that he be allowed to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members of 
this body have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks 
and to include any extraneous materials on this measure.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation to ensure 
that Congress is positioned to effectively and decisively judge and to 
constrain President Obama's nuclear deal with Iran should a bad deal be 
struck. I commend Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin for 
bringing this measure before their body. This bill received near 
unanimous support in the other body. I appreciate, as always, Ranking 
Member Engel's cooperation in bringing this to the floor.
  With today's vote, this legislation will go to the President for his 
signature. The Foreign Affairs Committee

[[Page H2976]]

has held a series of hearings on the administration's nuclear 
negotiations with Iran, a radical state sponsor of terrorism, which is 
creating turmoil in a strategically vital region. It is fair to say 
that there are deep, bipartisan concerns about where these negotiations 
are heading. I fear that the agreement that is coming will be too 
short, sanctions relief will be too rapid, inspectors will be too 
restricted, and Iran's missile program will be plain ignored.
  Of course, we all hope that Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon can 
be diplomatically stopped. This legislation should strengthen the 
administration's hand at the negotiating table. But Secretary Kerry 
must put its added leverage to use immediately so that the U.S. can 
gain much-needed ground in the negotiations over the next 2 months.
  Mr. Speaker, much of the pressure that brought the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the negotiating table was put in place by Congress over the 
objections of the White House and over the objections of both 
Republican and Democratic Presidents, and this is unfortunate. We would 
have had more pressure on Iran today if the Obama administration hadn't 
pressured the Senate to sit on the Royce-Engel sanctions bill that the 
Foreign Affairs Committee produced and that this House passed by a 
margin of 400-20.
  Let's be clear. The administration has come around to support the 
legislation we are debating here today, but not with any enthusiasm. 
Having followed these negotiations since they began in November of 
2013, I can tell you that the President would like nothing more than to 
have no such bill, to have Congress sit on the sideline and watch him 
negotiate an agreement, whether good or bad, and I fear bad.
  Today, without this legislation in place, what is Congress' position 
if the President reaches a deal with Iran? Currently, there is no 
limitation on the President's use of waivers to suspend the sanctions 
Congress put in place, no requirement that Congress receive full 
details of any agreement with Iran, no review period for Congress to 
examine and weigh in on the agreement, no requirement that the 
President certify that Iran is complying, and no way for Congress to 
rapidly reimpose sanctions should Iran cheat.
  Today, the President can sign a bad deal, and we, the United States 
Congress, are left to read about it in the paper. But with the passage 
of this bill, all that changes. Sanctions relief is frozen until 
Congress receives the agreement and then holds a referendum on its 
merits. Again, I believe that this gives the administration a better 
chance to get to a lasting and meaningful agreement.
  Consider the outstanding and critical issue of verification. The ink 
wasn't even dry on the framework announcement and the chants of ``death 
to America'' led by the Supreme Leader were still fresh when the leader 
asserted--when the Ayatollah asserted--that Iran wouldn't allow 
international inspectors access to its military facilities. The deputy 
head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps seconded that. He said: 
``They will not even be permitted to inspect the most normal military 
site in their dreams.''
  When it comes to negotiating this inspections regime over the next 2 
months, U.S. negotiators must know that these critical issues will 
determine Congress' assessment of any final deal.

                              {time}  1245

  Once this legislation is signed, when Secretary Kerry sits across 
from the Iranians, he will now have on his mind: I have got to take 
this to Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, that prospect can only improve these negotiations. I 
just hope it is not too late and that we aren't too deep into a bad 
deal.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in support of this legislation.
  Our negotiators continue to hammer out the details of an agreement 
with Iran that will hopefully foreclose all pathways to a nuclear 
weapon. As I have said again and again, if a deal is struck, Congress 
must have a proper role in assessing that deal. That is what we are 
doing now. That is the purpose of this legislation before us today. 
This legislation passed the other body by a vote of 98-1.
  If a deal is reached, what are the things I will be looking for? 
First, what will sanctions really look like? Will it be a step-by-step 
process, so that Iran is forced to comply with the agreement? How will 
we ensure that this financial windfall for Iran won't just be used to 
fund terrorism around the world?
  Second, will a deal compel Iran to come clean on its weaponization 
work?
  Third, will Iran's leaders agree to a verification and inspection 
regime that will allow for snap inspections of nuclear sites? Snap 
inspections mean that the inspectors can go all over Iran. They don't 
need special permission. We have not been hearing such positive things 
from the Iranian leadership who say that they will never allow 
inspectors on their military grounds.
  We need answers to these questions. We need time to take a hard look 
at any deal and make sure there are no loopholes that Iran's leaders 
might be able to exploit. The bill we are debating today will give us 
that time.
  My frustrations with these negotiations have stemmed from the fact 
that Iran was not required to cease its uranium enrichment while 
negotiating. When we sat down with Iran at the very beginning, more 
than a year ago, to negotiate with them, we should have said, While we 
are talking, you stop enriching. We didn't say that. I think that was a 
mistake.
  Additionally, we negotiate as Iran continues its nefarious behavior 
around the world--in Syria, in Yemen, against Israel, support for 
terrorism. There is no sign that this agreement will lead to Iran 
stopping its support for terrorism or human rights violations; yet 
massive sanctions relief is on the table.
  The fact of the matter is it is very frustrating that we are talking 
with Iran only about their nuclear weapons; we are not talking about 
the fact that they are a leading sponsor of terrorism or they are 
making trouble in Syria, where so many hundreds of thousands of 
innocents have died, or making trouble in Yemen or supporting 
Hezbollah, supporting Hamas.
  It really is frustrating that we are talking about one aspect--their 
nuclear program--and meanwhile, they are free, apparently, to do 
whatever else they want. This really should not stand.
  Perhaps the biggest question I have is whether Iran's leaders will 
ultimately be able to make the tough choices necessary to show the 
world that they are serious about living up to their commitments. This 
is a high bar to clear, and Iran's leaders, unfortunately, have given 
us no reason to trust them.
  I remain concerned that the messages we are hearing from Iran 
directly contradict what the administration has told us. Iran's leaders 
have said that sanctions will be lifted immediately upon the signing of 
an agreement and that Iran will never accept inspections of their 
military sites.
  This begs the question: Is Iran serious about these negotiations? We 
are told that any kind of sanctions relief will be incremental as Iran 
complies. The Iranian leaders are telling their public differently. We 
obviously have to settle this glaring discrepancy.
  That is why this bill also includes provisions in case Iran reneges 
on its commitments. If Iran cheats, it would trigger immediate 
consideration of legislation that puts sanctions back in place, but 
let's hope it doesn't come to that.
  The best way to avoid another war in the Middle East is a negotiated 
solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. I wish our negotiators success. 
I hope this legislation sends a clear message that Congress is taking 
its role seriously, that we aren't playing politics with this issue and 
that we want these negotiations to result in a strong, verifiable deal 
that keeps a nuclear bomb out of Iran's hands.
  I agree with Secretary Kerry when he says that no deal is better than 
a bad deal. The question is we want to make sure a bad deal isn't sold 
as a good deal. That is why it is important for Congress to be engaged.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Smith), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on 
Africa, Global Health, Global Human

[[Page H2977]]

Rights, and International Organizations.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will suspend.
  Mr. ELLISON. I don't object to the gentleman taking the 2 minutes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman is 
recognized for 2 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by 
thanking Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel and Senators Corker, 
Cardin, and Menendez for doing their level best in the face of an 
administration which, throughout this process, has ignored and sought 
to exclude the legislature from its constitutional role in ratifying 
what is, in essence, a treaty--it is called an executive agreement, but 
it is a treaty--with the vicious, rights-abusing regime in Tehran, to 
salvage what we all can from an egregiously flawed framework and 
process.
  It is clear, from the trajectory of negotiations to date, that the 
administration has squandered the leverage gained through sanctions, 
and there has been slippage--or, rather, retreat--from the strong 
position staked out in a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions, 
including resolution 1929 agreed to in 2010. Resolution 1929 demanded 
that Iran: one, suspend all uranium enrichment; two, cooperate fully 
with the IAEA ensuring unfettered on-site inspection; and, three, 
refrain from any activity related to ballistic missiles.
  Iran is now closer to achieving access to nuclear weapons and to the 
missiles to carry them to targets, including cities in the United 
States, while being relieved of sanctions.
  From what we know now of the proposed framework, over 5,000 
centrifuges will be allowed. Furthermore, it is Iran's understanding 
that military sites will be off limits--what?--off limits to inspection 
and that ballistic missiles, the delivery systems for nuclear bombs, 
are not part of the framework.
  As a prerequisite to sitting down with the regime in Tehran, I and 
others have argued that the administration should have insisted that 
all Americans held or missing in Iran, including Christian pastor Saeed 
Abedini be released.
  I am concerned, Mr. Speaker, that an agreement under these terms--
terms which, underscore that, we have backtracked in these 
negotiations--will give new meaning to the phrase ``Pyrrhic victory.''
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for the time.
  Also, I just want to acknowledge to my colleagues that we are here to 
talk about the best way to make sure that Iran does not acquire a 
nuclear weapon. I am convinced that what we do here today is not the 
best way to do that.
  I am convinced that the best way to make sure that Iran does not have 
a nuclear weapon is to allow the Commander in Chief, Chief Executive of 
this country, to negotiate a deal, and then Congress will be asked to 
relieve any sanctions, if that is warranted, and we will be able to 
weigh in at that time, which is the proper time. We will be able to 
have oversight hearings without regard to this legislation or any 
other, at any time we choose.
  This piece of legislation, I believe, improperly, in an unhelpful 
manner, restrains the President by tying his hands, significantly 
delaying the implementation of a peace agreement, weakens our 
negotiating position by strengthening Iranian hard-liners--who will 
argue that the U.S. will not repeal sanctions even if Iran complies 
with the final deal--and sends a signal to the international community 
that the U.S. Congress is setting the stage to vote down a final 
agreement, compromising our relationships with NATO allies and 
international partners that have implemented the sanctions regime and 
that brought about Iran to the negotiating table.
  It is very important that we acknowledge it was not the U.S. 
sanctions alone that has brought Iran to the negotiating table. It has 
been the international community and the cooperation we have enjoyed 
with the international community that has brought them to the 
negotiating table.
  If we start operating as if we are going to change the deal, we 
signal to our partners that we are operating in less than good faith, 
which could collapse the whole sanctions regime internationally. This 
is not U.S.-Iran negotiating; this is the P5+1, and we must keep that 
in due regard.
  Congress has an important role to play in this agreement with Iran 
repealing statutory sanctions. The deal cannot be implemented without 
congressional action. There is no reason for us to act right now. The 
only thing that acting now will achieve is to undermine the chance of 
an agreement.
  Now, I believe Congress must have oversight, but I don't believe we 
should make this deal stillborn in the crib before it is even allowed 
to emerge. We don't want to abort the deal before it is born.
  The deal should be allowed to come forward and the President should 
be allowed to make peace with a hostile nation before we start talking 
about what is wrong with it. We are anticipating what is wrong with it, 
and I don't think that is a helpful thing.
  We are certainly not under any illusions about human rights, about 
exporting conflict from Iran. We know these things are the case.
  What do you do when you want to deescalate the prospect of war? You 
negotiate. That is what the President is doing.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the Democratic whip.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  First, let me say that I agree with my friend who is, I think, one of 
our very responsible and able leaders in this Congress, Mr. Ellison. I 
appreciate his comments.
  I presume that everybody on this floor, whatever their perspective 
is, thinks that the objective that the United States seeks and the 
objective that our P5 partners seek and the objective that the United 
Nations seeks--and that is a non-nuclear-armed Iran--is best achieved 
through agreement.
  I think all of us would agree on that. The question is, however, for 
us to make it very clear the objective of that agreement and how it is 
achieved and how we are assured that that objective is, in fact, 
achieved.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate Senator Cardin, my dear friend, 
the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, for his hard 
work to reach this compromise with Chairman Corker. I want to 
congratulate Mr. Royce and Mr. Engel for bringing it to the floor for 
quick consideration.
  This compromise bill allows Congress to look carefully at the final 
agreement. For something of such consequence, that is essential. Not 
only is it desirable, it is essential that we do so. It will help 
ensure that our common goal is achieved, a non-nuclear-armed Iran.
  I will say to my friend from Minnesota, my presumption is the 
Iranians want to get to this. They say they are not looking for nuclear 
arms; they want to have relief of the sanctions. It seems to me this is 
in their best interest, so they ought to be trying to accommodate this. 
I think, in fact, this can help, not hurt, our negotiating position.
  I believe this bill reflects the consensus among Members of both the 
House and Senate that Congress, which authored the sanctions that 
brought Iran to the negotiating table--I would say, again, to my friend 
from Minnesota, the reason the sanctions were effective in bringing the 
Iranians to the table is because our European allies joined in them. I 
think he is absolutely right.
  Unilaterally, we couldn't have done that because we don't do that 
much business with Iran; the Europeans do. He is absolutely right that 
it was in partnership that we brought the Iranians to the table.
  I want to also thank, Mr. Speaker, our negotiating team for their 
tireless efforts to reach a framework agreement.
  A letter was recently signed by 150. I didn't sign the letter, but I 
absolutely agreed with the substance of the letter, which said the best 
way to get there is through agreement, and we ought to support our 
negotiators who are pursuing that end.

[[Page H2978]]

  As I have said before, any final agreement must prevent Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon and include the most intrusive inspections 
and access regime we have ever seen in order to verify Iran's 
compliance. There is no reason for us to trust Iran.

                              {time}  1300

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
  Mr. HOYER. It must address potentially military dimensions of Iran's 
nuclear program and bring about Iran's full cooperation with the U.N. 
Security Council resolutions.
  The United States must never permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, 
and we will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel in 
defense of its security, which is very tied to our own security. That 
means ensuring Israel maintains its Qualitative Military Edge, 
including through robust support for antimissile systems and 
antitunneling defense programs. It also means supporting our gulf 
partners from Iran's destabilizing activities.
  Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is directly in 
America's national security interest. A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat 
to us all. This bill will ensure that Congress can review any final 
nuclear agreement with Iran to make certain that it meets the goals we 
and the President share and which he has articulated emphatically and 
repeatedly. I encourage my colleagues to support this bipartisan 
legislation.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Doggett).
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, there is probably no more critical issue on 
our national agenda today than this matter with Iran. 151 Members of 
the House have joined together to encourage the President to ``exhaust 
every avenue toward a verifiable, enforceable, diplomatic solution in 
order to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.''
  Mr. Speaker, I would ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record 
this communication.

                                Congress of the United States,

                                       Washington DC, May 7, 2015.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: As negotiations over Iran's nuclear 
     program continue, we urge you to stay on course, building on 
     the recently announced political framework and continuing to 
     work toward a strong and verifiable agreement between the 
     P5+1 countries and Iran that will prevent Iran from having a 
     nuclear weapon. We commend you and your negotiating team, as 
     well as our coalition partners, for the significant progress 
     made thus far.
       This issue is above politics. The stakes are too great, and 
     the alternatives are too dire. We must exhaust every avenue 
     toward a verifiable, enforceable, diplomatic solution in 
     order to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. If the United States 
     were to abandon negotiations or cause their collapse, not 
     only would we fail to peacefully prevent a nuclear-armed 
     Iran, we would make that outcome more likely. The 
     multilateral sanctions regime that brought Iran to the table 
     would likely collapse, and the Iranian regime would likely 
     decide to accelerate its nuclear program, unrestricted and 
     unmonitored. Such developments could lead us to war.
       War itself will not make us safe. A U.S. or Israeli 
     military strike may set back Iranian nuclear development by 
     two or three years at best--a significantly shorter timespan 
     than that covered by a P5+1 negotiated agreement. We must 
     pursue diplomatic means to their fullest and allow the 
     negotiations to run their course--especially now that the 
     parties have announced a strong framework--and continue 
     working to craft a robust and verifiable Joint Comprehensive 
     Plan of Action by June 30.
       We must allow our negotiating team the space and time 
     necessary to build on the progress made in the political 
     framework and turn it into a long-term, verifiable agreement. 
     If we do not succeed, Congress will remain at-the-ready to 
     act and present you with additional options to ensure that 
     Iran is prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
       Thank you for your resolve in preventing a nuclear-armed 
     Iran. We look forward to continuing our shared work on this 
     important matter.
           Sincerely,
     Jan Schakowsky,
       Member of Congress.
     Lloyd Doggett,
       Member of Congress.
     David E. Price,
       Member of Congress.
       Alma S. Adams, Pete Aguilar, Brad Ashford, Karen Bass, 
     Joyce Beatty, Xavier Becerra, Ami Bera, Donald S. Beyer, Jr., 
     Sanford D. Bishop, Earl Blumenauer, Suzanne Bonamici, 
     Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Robert A. Brady, Corrine Brown, Julia 
     Brownley, Cheri Bustos, G. K. Butterfield, Lois Capps, 
     Michael E. Capuano, Tony Cardenas.
       John C. Carney, Jr., Andre Carson, Matt Cartwright, Kathy 
     Castor, Joaquin Castro, Judy Chu, David N. Cicilline, 
     Katherine M. Clark, Yvette D. Clarke, Wm. Lacy Clay, Emanuel 
     Cleaver, James E. Clyburn, Steve Cohen, Gerald E. Connolly, 
     John Conyers, Jr., Joe Courtney, Elijah E. Cummings, Danny K. 
     Davis, Susan A. Davis, Peter A. DeFazio.
       Diana DeGette, Rosa L. DeLauro, Suzan K. DelBene, Mark 
     DeSaulnier, Debbie Dingell, Lloyd Doggett, Michael F. Doyle, 
     Tammy Duckworth, Donna F. Edwards, Keith Ellison, Anna G. 
     Eshoo, Elizabeth H. Esty, Sam Farr, Chaka Fattah, Bill 
     Foster, Marcia L. Fudge, Ruben Gallego, John Garamendi, Al 
     Green, Raul M. Grijalva.
       Luis V. Gutierrez, Janice Hahn, Denny Heck, Brian Higgins, 
     Ruben Hinojosa, Michael M. Honda, Jared Huffman, Sheila 
     Jackson Lee, Hakeem S. Jeffries, Eddie Bernice Johnson, 
     Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Marcy Kaptur, William R. 
     Keating, Robin L. Kelly, Daniel T. Kildee, Ron Kind, 
     Joseph P. Kennedy, III, Ann M. Kuster, James R. Langevin, 
     Rick Larsen.
       John B. Larson, Brenda L. Lawrence, Barbara Lee, John 
     Lewis, Ted Lieu, David Loebsack, Zoe Lofgren, Alan S. 
     Lowenthal, Ben Ray Lujan, Michelle Lujan Grisham, Stephen F. 
     Lynch, Sean Patrick Maloney, Doris O. Matsui, Betty McCollum, 
     Jim McDermott, James P. McGovern, Jerry McNerney, Gregory W. 
     Meeks, Gwen Moore, Seth Moulton.
       Grace F. Napolitano, Richard E. Neal, Richard M. Nolan, 
     Eleanor Holmes Norton, Beto O'Rourke, Donald M. Payne, Jr., 
     Nancy Pelosi, Ed Perlmutter, Pedro R. Pierluisi, Chellie 
     Pingree, Stacey E. Plaskett, Mark Pocan, Jared Polis, David 
     E. Price, Charles B. Rangel, Cedric L. Richmond, Lucille 
     Roybal-Allard, Raul Ruiz, C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Bobby L. 
     Rush.
       Tim Ryan, Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, Linda T. Sanchez, 
     Loretta Sanchez, Janice D. Schakowsky, Robert C. ``Bobby'' 
     Scott, David Scott, Jose E. Serrano, Terri A. Sewell, Louise 
     McIntosh Slaughter, Adam Smith, Jackie Speier, Eric Swalwell, 
     Mark Takai, Mark Takano, Bennie G. Thompson, Mike Thompson, 
     Paul Tonko, Norma J. Torres, Niki Tsongas.
       Chris Van Hollen, Marc A. Veasey, Nydia M. Velazquez, Peter 
     J. Visclosky, Timothy J. Walz, Maxine Waters, Bonnie Watson 
     Coleman, Peter Welch, Frederica S. Wilson, John A. Yarmuth.

  Mr. DOGGETT. While not signing this particular call for diplomacy, 
additional colleagues have made clear that they intend to prevent any 
attempted congressional veto of a strong, verifiable agreement. An 
agreement not based on trust, not based on liking Iran, but an 
agreement based on strong verification and intrusive verification.
  Unfortunately, others here in this body who have embraced the 
wrongheaded advice of former President Bush's U.N. Ambassador John 
Bolton, who said that, ``To stop Iran's bomb, bomb Iran.'' These are 
some of the same Members who rejected the interim nuclear Joint Plan of 
Action before they had even read it. They are some of the same Members 
who were so eager to launch an unnecessary war in Iraq that only 
strengthened Iran and who seem to have learned very little from their 
previous failure, and they forget that Iran is bigger than Afghanistan 
and Iraq put together.
  Another war will not make us safe. Bombing may set back Iranian 
nuclear development by two or three years at best--a significantly 
shorter time than that covered by a P5+1 negotiated agreement--but it 
will make an Iranian nuclear weapon more likely. Bombing will enflame 
sectarian and regional tensions. It will threaten the security of 
Israel and of our other allies and ultimately, it will jeopardize the 
safety of every American family.
  That does not mean that any agreement with Iran is an acceptable 
agreement. Iranian hard-liners, like hard-liners elsewhere, may, 
ultimately, prevent an adequate verification in this agreement, but we 
must use every diplomatic means available, especially now with the 
announcement of this strong framework, and continue to work and craft a 
robust Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To do otherwise--to 
withdraw, to fail to support such an agreement--would likely collapse 
the multilateral sanctions among our allies and some that are not our 
allies but have joined with us in this regime that brought Iran to the 
table in the first place and would only accelerate an Iranian nuclear 
program that would then be unrestricted and unmonitored. Final 
sanctions--certainly sanctions which I have personally voted on a 
number of occasions in favor of--cannot be lifted without a vote of 
Congress, but that would not

[[Page H2979]]

occur until we have conclusive evidence of Iranian compliance.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. DOGGETT. All of us who do not trust war as the answer must 
continue working together to support a peaceful resolution and overcome 
the bellicose voices whose only alternative is the perilous course of 
war. We want a strong, verifiable arms accord. I favor and will vote 
for oversight and review today, but President Obama should know that he 
has the support in this House to fulfill our obligations under a 
verifiable agreement for a safer world and to avoid war.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. McCaul), the chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and a 
member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act.
  While far from perfect, the passage of this bill will ensure that 
Congress has a final say on the Obama administration's naive 
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program.
  Last week, in Israel, I met with Israeli Prime Minister Bibi 
Netanyahu, where I heard, once again, from our top ally in the region 
about the deep concern his country has over the dangerous agreement 
currently being hammered out by President Obama and the Ayatollah.
  For years, my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee have worked 
to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran through the toughest and most 
comprehensive sanctions ever devised. The sanctions passed in Congress 
brought Iran to the negotiating table. Last Congress, our committee, 
once again, passed another robust sanctions bill to give President 
Obama even more leverage over Tehran; but rather than accept our help, 
the President and his allies in the Senate opted, instead, to relieve 
Iran of the sanctions we had worked so hard to build.
  And for what, Mr. Speaker?--for an agreement that allows the world's 
leading state sponsor of terror to maintain a vast nuclear 
infrastructure whose centrifuges will never stop spinning and, 
according to President Rouhani, for an agreement that does nothing to 
address the military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, such as the 
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which the Ayatollah 
says it should mass produce, or for an agreement that frees up billions 
of dollars that Iran can use to fund terror around the world.
  Mr. Speaker, Congress must have a say in any final agreement with 
Iran, and this bill will do just that. I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey), the ranking member on the 
Appropriations Committee.
  Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act, which will ensure Congress a role in evaluating 
any final deal reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran.
  As the author of the crippling sanctions that brought Iran to the 
negotiating table, Congress' continued oversight role is critical. 
Serious concerns remain about the proposed framework, particularly of 
the enforcement and verifiability of any deal, and whether it will, 
indeed, close all possible pathways to a bomb.
  Any deal must include full and unfettered inspections by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency of any facility, military or 
otherwise--including Parchin, Fordow, Natanz--and Iran must account for 
the possible military dimensions of its past activities. Given Iran's 
history of deception, sanctions should remain in place until Iran has 
taken major nuclear-related steps that demonstrate their sincerity.
  We all want a diplomatic solution, but as long as Iran's leaders 
continue to refer to Israel as the ``barbaric'' Jewish state that ``has 
no cure but to be annihilated,'' we must approach any deal with the 
utmost scrutiny. That is why I urge the immediate passage of this 
important legislation.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington State (Mr. McDermott).
  (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, none of us want nuclear weapons in Iran; 
and while the White House may regard this bill as the least harmful 
option offered by a persistently intractable Congress--a Congress that 
has sought to derail all of his efforts in the past--I cannot and will 
not support this particular piece of legislation.
  Of all of President Obama's foreign policy objectives, this is the 
boldest and the one that could have a meaningful impact on regional and 
global stability. The option of war or of increasing the sanctions 
simply has run its course. The time has come for diplomacy. The 
framework that the administration has presented to us is fair and 
smart. It is a good deal, one that guarantees a world safe from the 
threat of Iranian nuclear weapons.
  We all await the details. All of this argument out here is about 
people who are sure of what the details are going to be. That is why 
this is not the time to be passing this legislation. President Obama, 
Secretary Kerry, and our partners--and don't forget that this is an 
historic thing in that we have partners of the P5+1. They deserve 
immense credit in their determination and commitment to a diplomatic 
solution to, arguably, the most dangerous and complex foreign policy 
challenge of our time.
  We need to give the President and the negotiators the time they need. 
The time for us to make decisions about what happens about the 
sanctions will come to this floor. There is no question about it. We 
don't need to pass a bill saying we don't like what the President is 
doing. We ought to be grateful for the tenacity with which he has 
persisted in this diplomatic effort.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I very much thank the chairman for his leadership 
on our committee.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill serves as a reminder of the unanswered 
questions surrounding the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
  We know Iran can't be trusted. Everything we have seen from Iran 
since 1979 shows that the regime is willing to lie, to cheat, to 
obfuscate to achieve its agenda, and part of that agenda is to attack 
and to undermine the United States and our regional interests.
  Can we verify Iran's compliance?
  No, because Iran controls the access of the IAEA to its sites. Iran 
hasn't even come clean on its possible military dimension of its 
nuclear program yet. The regime is also likely to get a $50 billion 
signing bonus, when a deal is signed, in exchange for nothing.
  What will Iran do with that money, Mr. Speaker?
  It will continue to support terror around the globe, stoke sectarian 
violence as we have seen all over the Middle East, repress its own 
citizens, and, just today, five Iranian boats fired shots across the 
bow of a Singapore-flagged cargo vessel in the gulf.
  Can we have snapback sanctions? Oh, please, the idea is laughable at 
best.
  According to reports, China and Russia have stated that there will 
not be any automatic snapback sanctions whatsoever to reimpose on Iran 
even if the regime is caught in violation.
  Once again, the Obama administration is playing a game of smoke and 
mirrors to get this deal finalized and to cement a legacy that the 
President has been seeking since he entered office. The deal is 
dangerous and will only jeopardize our national security.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Deutch), the ranking member on the 
Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee and a very valued member of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee.

                              {time}  1315

  Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act. When it comes to the security of our Nation and our 
partners around the world, the American people deserve a voice, but 
when Congress is unable to review or respond to policies of great 
consequence, like a potential nuclear

[[Page H2980]]

deal with Iran, the American people have no voice.
  In recent days, we have heard another debate about another major 
international agreement also negotiated in secret, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. Why do I bring that up in this context? Well, some of my 
colleagues who oppose this critical legislation have serious concerns 
about TPA and TPP. I share those concerns. I oppose fast-tracking TPP 
without the details on protecting jobs and workers and the environment 
and consumers and without any chance at making changes.
  Likewise, today, I ask my colleagues to acknowledge and respect my 
concerns about approving a deal today with Iran when too many questions 
remain unanswered. On matters of national and international security, 
bullet points in a framework just won't do. Before Iran gains access to 
billions of dollars in frozen assets, I want the details. I want 
details on conditions for sanctions relief and access to military sites 
and unannounced inspections, and you should, too. No one here knows 
what a final deal would look like or even if we will get one, but I 
know you agree that, if we do, Congress should get to review the terms.
  On behalf of our constituents, Congress must have a say. I urge my 
colleagues to support this important legislation.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. I thank the gentleman for yielding and also for his 
tremendous leadership on this very important issue. Also, I want to 
thank our ranking member, Mr. Engel, and Chairman Royce for their 
leadership on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and for all of the 
bipartisan work that you have done over the years together.
  The poison pills have been taken out of this bill by the other body, 
and I still have concerns about the timing and effect of considering 
this legislation, but the President believes that this legislation, as 
written, will not undermine the administration's efforts. All of us 
have the same goal, and that is to prevent Iran from acquiring a 
nuclear weapon.
  As negotiations over Iran's nuclear program enter a critical phase, 
Congress must give the President and our negotiators the space they 
need to succeed, and with the announcement of a framework agreement 
last month, we are closer to a strong and verifiable agreement between 
the P5+1 countries and Iran.
  H.R. 1191 would require that Congress be given an opportunity to 
review any final agreement on Iran's nuclear program before the 
President can waive or suspend any sanctions. Supporters of this bill 
argue that they simply want to ensure congressional oversight of any 
final international agreement, and of course we all believe that there 
is a role for that, but we know that since negotiations began, there 
have been countless initiatives by Congress to purposely and 
deliberately thwart the success of a final deal.
  Any efforts to undermine the negotiations or a final deal with Iran 
over its nuclear program will not make us safer, and it will not stop 
Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. In fact, it will do just the 
opposite.
  Negotiations with Iran have already led to a first-step agreement 
that has significantly reduced Iran's nuclear stockpile and their 
ability to create a nuclear weapon. Without these negotiations and the 
current framework agreement, Iran's nuclear program would be 
unmonitored and unrestrained. Continued negotiations remain the best 
route to ensuring national and regional security while preventing us 
from going back on the path to a confrontation with Iran.
  A deal with Iran has the support of the majority of the American 
people. An April ABC-Washington Post poll found that Americans by a 
nearly 2-1 margin support striking a deal with Iran that restricts the 
nation's nuclear program in exchange for loosening sanctions. We simply 
cannot afford the alternative to the negotiations, and the alternative 
to the negotiations, I believe, is war with Iran.
  Instead of taking actions to undermine our President and 
international negotiators as they work to secure a final deal, Congress 
should be working to ensure their success. Now, let's hope that this 
bill does that. I hope that this Congress does not use passage of this 
bill as a cynical ploy to set up a vote against any final deal should 
there be a deal, one that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon. Simply put, diplomacy is the best way to cut off any potential 
pathway to an Iranian nuclear weapon.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Holding). The time of the gentlewoman 
has expired.
  Mr. ELLISON. May I ask how much time I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Minnesota has 8 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. ELLISON. I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from 
California.
  Ms. LEE. I will conclude by just saying in 2013 I introduced 
legislation calling for an end to the no contact policy with Iran and 
calling for a diplomatic initiative. I am convinced that that is the 
only way to ensure regional stability. Let's hope that the President's 
legacy does include preventing a war with Iran. What a great legacy to 
leave for the world.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York (Mr. Zeldin), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. I 
want to thank Mr. Royce from California for his leadership on this 
issue as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as Mr. 
Engel from New York for his leadership as the ranking member.
  Americans want to know what is in an Iran nuclear deal. They want 
their Representatives in Congress to debate it. If facts come out that 
it turns out that this is a bad deal, which many are concerned we are 
on that pace for, they want Congress to reject it. I have had 
colleagues just now listening to those speaking in opposition talking 
about a nuclear framework agreement that was announced last month, 
people saying it is a good deal. There is no framework agreement.
  The President released a fact sheet, and within 24 hours the Iranian 
Foreign Minister went on his Twitter feed saying it was just spin, the 
Ayatollah chanting ``death to America'' on the streets of Iran, saying 
that that fact sheet was just spin.
  In order to have a deal to reach an agreement, both sides need to 
agree. The message to the colleagues today, I mean, this vote matters, 
but the work is not over. The tough work, the tough votes are still 
ahead.
  Let's talk about what is not even part of the negotiations: Iran's 
state sponsorship of terrorism, work to overthrow foreign governments, 
development of ICBMs, pledging to wipe Israel off the map, chanting 
``death to America'' on the streets, unjustly imprisoning United States 
citizens. That is not even part of the deal. That is not even part of 
the negotiations.

  I want to read it. My constituents want to read a deal in English. 
They want to know that it is accurately translated, and the Iranians 
are reading their deal the same way that we are. If there is no 
agreement on specific terms, is there broad, vague language being used 
so that both sides can spin whatever they want to interpret this deal 
is for whatever best serves their own domestic politics?
  We are elected to represent our constituents, and they are concerned 
about the direction of this deal. I have grave concerns. I feel like it 
is on pace to trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. I urge a 
``yes'' vote. I thank the chairman, again, for his effort on this.
  Mr. ENGEL. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. 
Frankel), a very respected member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Ms. FRANKEL of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the 
bipartisan Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and I want to remind 
everyone why it is so important that we prevent Iran from becoming a 
nuclear state. Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism 
supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and the brutal crackdown in Syria. Iran's 
efforts to expand its influence is destabilizing Iraq, Lebanon, and now 
Yemen.
  The Iran regime systematically violates its own citizens' basic 
rights and, as terrifying, has the potential for nuclear proliferation. 
If Iran becomes a

[[Page H2981]]

nuclear state, we will see a regional race for the bomb spreading the 
world's most dangerous weapons through the world's most unstable 
region.
  Mr. Speaker, Congress played a critical role in bringing Iran to the 
negotiating table. Iran cannot be trusted, and Congress must continue 
to be vigilant.
  Mr. ROYCE. I reserve the balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I thank my colleague from Minnesota and 
rise today in cautious support of this legislation.
  Our nuclear negotiators, with the cooperation of a fragile coalition 
of longstanding allies and new partners, have made historic progress 
toward preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, a critical 
foreign policy imperative for our country.
  We must continue to give diplomacy a chance and allow our negotiators 
to build on the framework agreement they negotiated earlier this 
spring.
  Many of our colleagues in the House of Representatives agree, Mr. 
Speaker. Just last week, Congresswoman Schakowsky, Congressman Doggett, 
and I sent a letter to the President urging persistence in 
negotiations, a letter that was signed by 148 of our colleagues.
  Diplomacy isn't just the best way of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran; 
it is the only way. Opponents of the President's efforts have yet to 
provide a single viable alternative to diplomacy short of military 
action, and military action, defense experts tell us, would only delay 
nuclear development for a few years.
  While I can understand why some Members of the House and Senate 
insisted upon congressional review of a final deal with such historic 
implications, I have strongly refused to support legislation or other 
congressional intervention that was likely to drive Iran from the 
negotiating table or to alienate our international partners. We must 
not set impossible goals for these negotiations or insist that every 
outstanding issue our country has with Iran be resolved before the core 
nuclear issue can be addressed.
  The bill before us, which is a product of a thoughtful compromise 
between Senator Corker and Senator Cardin, Republicans and Democrats, 
does none of these harmful things. It is free of riders designed to 
undermine the negotiations, and it provides a reasonable path forward 
that allows for Congress to weigh in on a final deal without setting it 
up for failure.
  So I rise in cautious support of this bill because I believe it 
clears the way for the President's negotiators to do their job, to work 
with our international partners to secure a comprehensive, verifiable 
nuclear agreement that will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear 
weapon and thereby will make the world a safer place.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Dold), a member of the Committee on Financial Services.
  Mr. DOLD. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Royce for his 
leadership and Ranking Member Engel for his leadership as well.
  Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Speaker, I believe the greatest threat we 
have to our own national security here is a nuclear-armed Iran, an 
entity that has said time and again that they want to wipe Israel off 
the face of the map, that they want to drive them into the sea, that 
they are the Little Satan, which naturally begs the question, Mr. 
Speaker, as to who is the Big Satan, and it is the United States of 
America.
  This is a framework, the framework that has been announced, the one 
that Iran basically said, We didn't think that was the framework. The 
chants of ``death to America.'' What they said is that they have to 
take all the sanctions off immediately upon the signature of a deal and 
that the IAEA will not be granted access to inspect facilities that are 
military facilities. Well, frankly, that is not a deal. I recognize 
that is a framework.
  What we are debating today is really talking about Congress having 
the ability to say: Is this a deal that we can live with or is it not? 
Because, frankly, leaving Iran as a nuclear threshold state is not 
going to be a deal. What we are going to be debating today is, in 
essence, just allowing us to be able to take the next vote. That is the 
important one.
  Madam Speaker, this is not left versus right. This isn't about 
Republicans and Democrats. This is about right versus wrong. This is 
about making sure that we do this right. If we don't do this right, if 
Iran is set for a path to a nuclear weapon, it is going to set an arms 
race in a dangerous neighborhood that will be devastating for peace and 
security around the globe. This is one where we are going to join hands 
together as a nation to make sure that the safety and security of the 
world is what we are going to put first and foremost.
  Madam Speaker, I just got back from Israel. I had the opportunity to 
speak with people on multiple sides. To the person, they are all united 
behind the idea that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable and that this 
will be a bad deal.
  So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this piece of legislation 
to allow us to have the opportunity to take a look at this deal to move 
forward. With that, I sincerely hope that this is a bipartisan effort.

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking member of the 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Speaker, I will yield to Chairman Royce for a 
colloquy, and I will ask him the following questions.
  As I read this bill, if Congress does not enact a Joint Resolution of 
Disapproval, that failure to enact a Resolution of Disapproval cannot 
be read as Congress approving an agreement.
  As I read the bill, if Congress does not enact a Resolution of 
Disapproval, the sole effect of that is to continue current statutes so 
that the President would retain his authority to provide sanctions 
relief.
  Do you agree?
  Mr. ROYCE. That is correct, Mr. Sherman. I see no way that a failure 
to override a Presidential veto or otherwise enact a joint resolution 
of disapproval would be construed as Congress approving a bad Iran 
deal. It would be that the Congress didn't have a supermajority of 
votes to stop the President from exercising the considerable leeway he 
has for the sanctions that are in place.
  I would also remind the gentleman that this bill gives us the chance 
to have that vote. Otherwise, the President could act to waive 
sanctions the day after a deal is struck.
  And if people are really worried about congressional intent being 
misconstrued, we always have the ability to make our intent crystal 
clear by passing a resolution or concurrent resolution, which are not 
subject to Presidential presentment or veto.
  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for his clarification.
  If this deal is signed, I do not think that Congress will enact a 
Resolution of Disapproval over the President's veto--maybe not even 
vote for it on the floor. It is even less likely that Congress will 
enact a Resolution of Approval.
  So we will be in a situation where Congress will not have acted, and 
as the chairman points out, Congress would not have approved this 
agreement.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Black). The time of the gentleman has 
expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman from California an additional 1 
minute.
  Mr. SHERMAN. If the President signs an agreement, Iran will get 
certain benefits and certain funds will be made available to them. At 
the same time, Iran will ship its stockpiles out of the country--or a 
substantial portion of them--decommission some centrifuges, and thereby 
delay its effort to get a nuclear weapon.
  That means in 2017, and every year thereafter, future Congresses and 
future Presidents will have to determine what American policy is. We 
would be free to demand a renegotiation of the agreement, or to simply 
continue it in force. A President could reactivate sanctions, or 
continue to waive them. Congress could enact new sanctions, or repeal 
existing sanctions.
  All options will be on the table in the years to come. And the only 
thing I am certain of is that we will be on this

[[Page H2982]]

floor debating Iran and its nuclear program for many years to come.
  Mr. ELLISON. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  The measure we are debating today is much better, through the hard 
work of Senators Corker and Cardin, and I appreciate their efforts to 
deescalate the conversation. I fear it is the wrong message at the 
wrong time. There are no good alternatives to letting negotiators 
prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
  Now, Congress seldom advances diplomacy. Usually, we politicize 
issues, playing to the bleachers. Our judgment is often suspect: the 
record from ignoring the lead up to World War II; misjudgments on 
Vietnam; the reckless rush into the war in Iraq; even maintaining a 
foolish policy regarding Cuba, until the President exercised leadership 
lately.
  There is no good reason to interfere now with what the P5+1 have 
done, making unprecedented progress--progress we wouldn't have imagined 
2 or 3 years ago. They did so using a unified force with these six 
countries, using the tools of the sanctions that we could not have 
imposed unilaterally. And we don't want to lose the leverage of those 
allies.
  Now, I am painfully aware of the issues with Iran. It is troubling, a 
number of their activities. It is also ironic that our interests are 
aligned in some areas. And I will never forget on 9/11 there were 
demonstrations of support for America in Tehran. The Iranian people 
actually like Americans, their leaders do not--and that is why working 
forward to make this historic agreement a reality could be an important 
pivot point for the troubled relationships between our countries.
  Make no mistake, there are hard-liners in Iran, just as there are 
hard-liners in the United States, who want to blow this agreement up. 
But I have been impressed, taking advantage of offers from the White 
House for numerous briefings on this issue, reviewing the materials, 
that we have made tremendous progress. We shouldn't complicate it.
  As my friends have referenced here, there is no good alternative to a 
negotiated agreement with Iran. It is the only way we can prevent them 
from getting nuclear weapons.
  A reckless rush to war, which some people hinted at, others would 
welcome, would not stop their ultimate acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
It is very likely to accelerate it. And to imagine going back into that 
area, fighting a country with a population that is larger than Iraq and 
Afghanistan combined--over a huge area--would be devastating.
  Let's stay the course. Let's be patient. Let's try to constrain 
congressional interference.
  Mr. ROYCE. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  In closing, let me first say I appreciate the thoughtfulness that I 
have heard during this debate from all sides. And I think that is 
really Congress at its best. I am proud to be a Member of Congress when 
I hear debates like this.
  This legislation was negotiated very carefully to ensure that Iran 
would hear a unified and bipartisan message from Congress. Why is this 
important? It was Congress' work with the layers and layers of 
sanctions. And Mr. Royce has been my partner from day one. We have 
worked together so hard on sanctions and speaking with a unified voice 
in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and we have tried so hard to make the 
Foreign Affairs Committee the most bipartisan committee of Congress 
because foreign policy should be bipartisan. And what I have heard 
today from all across the aisle here is bipartisanship. And it is a 
good feeling. But it was Congress' work--the layers and layers of 
sanctions--that brought Iran to its knees and compelled Iran to come to 
the negotiating table.
  I believe that it will be the threat of congressional action that 
will compel Iran to make the tough choices in these negotiations. But 
this congressional action must be bipartisan. Iran must not be able to 
dismiss a bill as a partisan stunt.
  Congress must speak with a unified voice. We are stronger when we are 
unified. We are stronger when we act in a bipartisan manner. The 
international community followed our lead on Iran when we were unified. 
Iran came to the negotiating table when we were unified. And this vote 
should be no different: no poison pills, no extraneous messaging items 
that could torpedo this carefully crafted bill. Let's get this bill to 
the President's desk with a single voice.
  Again, I want to repeat some of my trepidation. The fact that Iran 
was allowed to enrich uranium all these months and months of talking I 
think was a mistake. The fact that we are talking only with Iran about 
their nuclear program, not about their support for terrorism, not about 
Americans held in Iranian prisons, not about their ballistic weapons, 
not about their mischief in Iran, not about their support for 
international terrorism, not about their support for Hezbollah and 
Hamas, not about their threats of death to Israel and death to America, 
I think is a mistake.
  But I do think negotiations are important, so I urge my colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle to vote for this very, very sensible bipartisan 
piece of legislation. Let's get this bill to the President's desk with 
a single voice.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ELLISON. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  In closing, I want to thank the ranking member and the chairman for 
this considered debate. I will say that I do believe that this is a big 
deal. It is important that we debate this. I respect the position that 
I have heard here today, but ultimately I don't think what we are doing 
is necessary, and I don't believe it will help enhance peace for the 
United States or the world.
  I think the things that we need are already in place, which is our 
right to have hearings on anything we want, the role we will have to 
play to remove any sanctions if we are satisfied, and the fact that we 
don't have to if we are not. We have the cards. We do not have to choke 
this deal in the crib, which is what I think this particular bill 
threatens.
  Now, let me say there is nothing new, Madam Speaker, about what the 
President is doing here. I have a list of examples that very closely 
correlate to the President's effort to negotiate a nuclear deal with 
Iran: the Helsinki Act in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975, 
and the Australia Group in 1985. I don't have time to go into what all 
these things are, but I can say there are a number of situations where 
Presidents, Republican and Democrat, have used their authority to 
negotiate agreements with other countries in which Congress did not 
have to try to intervene.
  Let me also point out that this situation that we are in, where we 
have had the framework agreement and now we are hoping to get a full 
agreement, I am hopeful and optimistic it will be something that is 
good and meaningful. So far, so good, in my opinion.
  But I just want to remind everybody that the framework deal that has 
been struck already between the P5+1 in Iran would destroy about 14,000 
centrifuges. That is what we are talking about here. Iran would destroy 
97 percent of its uranium. That is 97 percent. Iran will have zero 
military nuclear capability.
  We are at a historic moment that one keeps Iran from getting a 
nuclear weapon, and we need to support this effort. I intend to vote 
``no,'' and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  As we have heard today, Iran's rush to a nuclear weapon is a mortal 
threat to the United States and to our allies. And when I say it is a 
threat, consider for a minute the fact that Iran has, with its Quds 
forces, forces right now in Lebanon. It has forces in Syria. It has 
forces in Iraq. Its forces have just helped lead a militia to topple 
the government in Yemen, a government that was our ally. So that is the 
type of regime that we are talking about.
  Just weeks ago, it was reported that Iran was passing tens of 
millions of dollars to Hamas. But they gave a reason. It was to rebuild 
the three dozen or so tunnels that were built underneath Israel so that 
Hamas could conduct attacks to try to capture hostages and take them 
back into Gaza.

[[Page H2983]]

                              {time}  1345

  The reason for the strategy is pretty clear. That kind of strategy 
would ensure that our ally Israel would have to fight block by block by 
block to get captives back. The one that I was in with Mr. Engel was 
not far from where it came up close to a nursery school.
  This is the reality of the type of regime we are dealing with. It is 
not just transferring the money. It is also transferring the new 
rockets and the new missiles to Hamas.
  Why were they doing that? Because they said the inventory is low 
because of the rockets fired off--this is the reality of the types of 
intentions that this regime has. Many times, they telegraph those 
intentions. When they are yelling, ``Death to the Great Satan, death to 
the little Satan,'' it is not as though they are not telling us the 
Ayatollah's intent. He is, after all, the Supreme Leader here.
  Iran's support of terrorism and destabilization in the region will be 
far more intense, frankly, if it possesses a nuclear weapon or, indeed, 
if it had undetectable nuclear breakout capability.
  The stakes could not be higher. That is why we need a good agreement, 
and I hope that all the Members support this legislation. It may not be 
a perfect bill, but it is a good bill. It is an important and 
responsible response to an administration that otherwise would shut out 
Congress.
  I am sorry it took the White House so long to embrace it. Weeks ago, 
the White House was issuing veto threats and pushing back hard. Were it 
to pass, it would be the end of diplomacy as we know it, they said at 
the time. Now, they are on board, and it is good that they are on 
board.
  With this legislation in place--and this is the great upside--
Congress will be in a much better position to judge any final agreement 
that the President strikes with Iran, and I believe that our diplomacy 
will have a better shot because of it.
  Instead of Iranian negotiators knowing that they can wear down the 
administration, this now injects Congress as an important backstop. It 
gives us leverage to address these issues like what we discussed today, 
to address the issue of: Will our inspectors, the international 
inspectors, have the right to go on military bases?
  Let me tell you, I was part of the 1994 framework agreement, and the 
consequences of not getting the ability of weapons inspectors, 
international inspectors, to go on to military bases, not having that 
right to go anywhere, anytime, had profound consequences. It is why we 
are dealing with North Korea having the weapon today that they possess.
  We should not repeat that error. U.S. diplomats should now head to 
the negotiating table with a stronger hand. They should work for a 
credible deal, a verifiable deal, and then present it to Congress to be 
judged. That is only appropriate, given the incredible consequences for 
the region, for our allies, and for the national security of the United 
States.
  I urge the passage of this legislation.
  Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules 
and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill, H.R. 1191.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

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