Congressional Record, Volume 161 Issue 74 (Thursday, May 14, 2015)

[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 74 (Thursday, May 14, 2015)]
[House]
[Pages H2972-H2983]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

PROTECTING VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS AND EMERGENCY RESPONDERS ACT

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the
Senate amendments to the bill (H.R. 1191) to amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 to ensure that emergency services volunteers are not taken
into account as employees under the shared responsibility requirements
contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the Senate amendments is as follows:
Senate amendments:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH
IRAN RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 134 the following new
section:

``SEC. 135. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS
WITH IRAN.

``(a) Transmission to Congress of Nuclear Agreements With
Iran and Verification Assessment With Respect to Such
Agreements.--
``(1) Transmission of agreements.--Not later than 5
calendar days after reaching an agreement with Iran relating
to the nuclear program of Iran, the President shall transmit
to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership--
``(A) the agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1),
including all related materials and annexes;
``(B) a verification assessment report of the Secretary of
State prepared under paragraph (2) with respect to the
agreement; and
``(C) a certification that--
``(i) the agreement includes the appropriate terms,
conditions, and duration of the agreement's requirements with
respect to Iran's nuclear activities and provisions
describing any

[[Page H2973]]

sanctions to be waived, suspended, or otherwise reduced by
the United States, and any other nation or entity, including
the United Nations; and
``(ii) the President determines the agreement meets United
States non-proliferation objectives, does not jeopardize the
common defense and security, provides an adequate framework
to ensure that Iran's nuclear activities permitted thereunder
will not be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to
the common defense and security, and ensures that Iran's
nuclear activities permitted thereunder will not be used to
further any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive
purpose, including for any research on or development of any
nuclear explosive device or any other nuclear-related
military purpose.
``(2) Verification assessment report.--
``(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall prepare,
with respect to an agreement described in paragraph (1), a
report assessing--
``(i) the extent to which the Secretary will be able to
verify that Iran is complying with its obligations and
commitments under the agreement;
``(ii) the adequacy of the safeguards and other control
mechanisms and other assurances contained in the agreement
with respect to Iran's nuclear program to ensure Iran's
activities permitted thereunder will not be used to further
any nuclear-related military or nuclear explosive purpose,
including for any research on or development of any nuclear
explosive device or any other nuclear-related military
purpose; and
``(iii) the capacity and capability of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to effectively implement the
verification regime required by or related to the agreement,
including whether the International Atomic Energy Agency will
have sufficient access to investigate suspicious sites or
allegations of covert nuclear-related activities and whether
it has the required funding, manpower, and authority to
undertake the verification regime required by or related to
the agreement.
``(B) Assumptions.--In preparing a report under
subparagraph (A) with respect to an agreement described in
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall assume that Iran could--
``(i) use all measures not expressly prohibited by the
agreement to conceal activities that violate its obligations
and commitments under the agreement; and
``(ii) alter or deviate from standard practices in order to
impede efforts to verify that Iran is complying with those
obligations and commitments.
``(C) Classified annex.--A report under subparagraph (A)
shall be transmitted in unclassified form, but shall include
a classified annex prepared in consultation with the Director
of National Intelligence, summarizing relevant classified
information.
``(3) Exception.--
``(A) In general.--Neither the requirements of
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1), nor subsections
(b) through (g) of this section, shall apply to an agreement
described in subsection (h)(5) or to the EU-Iran Joint
Statement made on April 2, 2015.
``(B) Additional requirement.--Notwithstanding subparagraph
(A), any agreement as defined in subsection (h)(1) and any
related materials, whether concluded before or after the date
of the enactment of this section, shall not be subject to the
exception in subparagraph (A).
``(b) Period for Review by Congress of Nuclear Agreements
With Iran.--
``(1) In general.--During the 30-calendar day period
following transmittal by the President of an agreement
pursuant to subsection (a), the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold
hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in
order to fully review such agreement.
``(2) Exception.--The period for congressional review under
paragraph (1) shall be 60 calendar days if an agreement,
including all materials required to be transmitted to
Congress pursuant to subsection (a)(1), is transmitted
pursuant to subsection (a) between July 10, 2015, and
September 7, 2015.
``(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional
review period.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
except as provided in paragraph (6), prior to and during the
period for transmission of an agreement in subsection (a)(1)
and during the period for congressional review provided in
paragraph (1), including any additional period as applicable
under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President
may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or
otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with
respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from
applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement
described in subsection (a).
``(4) Limitation on actions during presidential
consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as
provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of
disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both
Houses of Congress, the President may not waive, suspend,
reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the
application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under
any provision of law or refrain from applying any such
sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection
(a) for a period of 12 calendar days following the date of
such passage.
``(5) Limitation on actions during congressional
reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as
provided in paragraph (6), if a joint resolution of
disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both
Houses of Congress, and the President vetoes such joint
resolution, the President may not waive, suspend, reduce,
provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of
statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision
of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant
to an agreement described in subsection (a) for a period of
10 calendar days following the date of the President's veto.
``(6) Exception.--The prohibitions under paragraphs (3)
through (5) do not apply to any new deferral, waiver, or
other suspension of statutory sanctions pursuant to the Joint
Plan of Action if that deferral, waiver, or other suspension
is made--
``(A) consistent with the law in effect on the date of the
enactment of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015;
and
``(B) not later than 45 calendar days before the
transmission by the President of an agreement, assessment
report, and certification under subsection (a).
``(7) Definition.--In the House of Representatives, for
purposes of this subsection, the terms `transmittal,'
`transmitted,' and `transmission' mean transmittal,
transmitted, and transmission, respectively, to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
``(c) Effect of Congressional Action With Respect to
Nuclear Agreements With Iran.--
``(1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
``(A) the sanctions regime imposed on Iran by Congress is
primarily responsible for bringing Iran to the table to
negotiate on its nuclear program;
``(B) these negotiations are a critically important matter
of national security and foreign policy for the United States
and its closest allies;
``(C) this section does not require a vote by Congress for
the agreement to commence;
``(D) this section provides for congressional review,
including, as appropriate, for approval, disapproval, or no
action on statutory sanctions relief under an agreement; and
``(E) even though the agreement may commence, because the
sanctions regime was imposed by Congress and only Congress
can permanently modify or eliminate that regime, it is
critically important that Congress have the opportunity, in
an orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as
appropriate, take action affecting the statutory sanctions
regime imposed by Congress.
``(2) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, action involving any measure of statutory sanctions
relief by the United States pursuant to an agreement subject
to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action--
``(A) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory
requirements for such action, if, during the period for
review provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint
resolution stating in substance that the Congress does favor
the agreement;
``(B) may not be taken if, during the period for review
provided in subsection (b), there is enacted a joint
resolution stating in substance that the Congress does not
favor the agreement; or
``(C) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory
requirements for such action, if, following the period for
review provided in subsection (b), there is not enacted any
such joint resolution.
``(3) Definition.--For the purposes of this subsection, the
phrase `action involving any measure of statutory sanctions
relief by the United States' shall include waiver,
suspension, reduction, or other effort to provide relief
from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory
sanctions with respect to, Iran under any provision of law or
any other effort to refrain from applying any such sanctions.
``(d) Congressional Oversight of Iranian Compliance With
Nuclear Agreements.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall keep the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership fully and currently
informed of all aspects of Iranian compliance with respect to
an agreement subject to subsection (a).
``(2) Potentially significant breaches and compliance
incidents.--The President shall, within 10 calendar days of
receiving credible and accurate information relating to a
potentially significant breach or compliance incident by Iran
with respect to an agreement subject to subsection (a),
submit such information to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership.
``(3) Material breach report.--Not later than 30 calendar
days after submitting information about a potentially
significant breach or compliance incident pursuant to
paragraph (2), the President shall make a determination
whether such potentially significant breach or compliance
issue constitutes a material breach and, if there is such a
material breach, whether Iran has cured such material breach,
and shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
and leadership such determination, accompanied by, as
appropriate, a report on the action or failure to act by Iran
that led to the material breach, actions necessary for Iran
to cure the breach, and the status of Iran's efforts to cure
the breach.
``(4) Semi-annual report.--Not later than 180 calendar days
after entering into an agreement described in subsection (a),
and not less frequently than once every 180 calendar days
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership a report on Iran's
nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the agreement
during the period covered by the report, including the
following elements:
``(A) Any action or failure to act by Iran that breached
the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms of the
agreement.
``(B) Any delay by Iran of more than one week in providing
inspectors access to facilities, people, and documents in
Iran as required by the agreement.
``(C) Any progress made by Iran to resolve concerns by the
International Atomic Energy

[[Page H2974]]

Agency about possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear
program.
``(D) Any procurement by Iran of materials in violation of
the agreement or which could otherwise significantly advance
Iran's ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.
``(E) Any centrifuge research and development conducted by
Iran that--
``(i) is not in compliance with the agreement; or
``(ii) may substantially reduce the breakout time of
acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran, if deployed.
``(F) Any diversion by Iran of uranium, carbon-fiber, or
other materials for use in Iran's nuclear program in
violation of the agreement.
``(G) Any covert nuclear activities undertaken by Iran,
including any covert nuclear weapons-related or covert
fissile material activities or research and development.
``(H) An assessment of whether any Iranian financial
institutions are engaged in money laundering or terrorist
finance activities, including names of specific financial
institutions if applicable.
``(I) Iran's advances in its ballistic missile program,
including developments related to its long-range and inter-
continental ballistic missile programs.
``(J) An assessment of--
``(i) whether Iran directly supported, financed, planned,
or carried out an act of terrorism against the United States
or a United States person anywhere in the world;
``(ii) whether, and the extent to which, Iran supported
acts of terrorism, including acts of terrorism against the
United States or a United States person anywhere in the
world;
``(iii) all actions, including in international fora, being
taken by the United States to stop, counter, and condemn acts
by Iran to directly or indirectly carry out acts of terrorism
against the United States and United States persons;
``(iv) the impact on the national security of the United
States and the safety of United States citizens as a result
of any Iranian actions reported under this paragraph; and
``(v) all of the sanctions relief provided to Iran,
pursuant to the agreement, and a description of the
relationship between each sanction waived, suspended, or
deferred and Iran's nuclear weapon's program.
``(K) An assessment of whether violations of
internationally recognized human rights in Iran have changed,
increased, or decreased, as compared to the prior 180-day
period.
``(5) Additional reports and information.--
``(A) Agency reports.--Following submission of an agreement
pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership, the Department of State, the
Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense shall,
upon the request of any of those committees or leadership,
promptly furnish to those committees or leadership their
views as to whether the safeguards and other controls
contained in the agreement with respect to Iran's nuclear
program provide an adequate framework to ensure that Iran's
activities permitted thereunder will not be inimical to or
constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and
security.
``(B) Provision of information on nuclear initiatives with
iran.--The President shall keep the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership fully and currently informed of any
initiative or negotiations with Iran relating to Iran's
nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement.
``(6) Compliance certification.--After the review period
provided in subsection (b), the President shall, not less
than every 90 calendar days--
``(A) determine whether the President is able to certify
that--
``(i) Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully
implementing the agreement, including all related technical
or additional agreements;
``(ii) Iran has not committed a material breach with
respect to the agreement or, if Iran has committed a material
breach, Iran has cured the material breach;
``(iii) Iran has not taken any action, including covert
activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear
weapons program; and
``(iv) suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to
the agreement is--

``(I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and
verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating
its illicit nuclear program; and
``(II) vital to the national security interests of the
United States; and

``(B) if the President determines he is able to make the
certification described in subparagraph (A), make such
certification to the appropriate congressional committees and
leadership.
``(7) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
``(A) United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human
rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place
under an agreement, as defined in subsection (h)(1);
``(B) issues not addressed by an agreement on the nuclear
program of Iran, including fair and appropriate compensation
for Americans who were terrorized and subjected to torture
while held in captivity for 444 days after the seizure of the
United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, in 1979 and their
families, the freedom of Americans held in Iran, the human
rights abuses of the Government of Iran against its own
people, and the continued support of terrorism worldwide by
the Government of Iran, are matters critical to ensure
justice and the national security of the United States, and
should be expeditiously addressed;
``(C) the President should determine the agreement in no
way compromises the commitment of the United States to
Israel's security, nor its support for Israel's right to
exist; and
``(D) in order to responsibly implement any long-term
agreement reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran, it is
critically important that Congress have the opportunity to
review any agreement and, as necessary, take action to modify
the statutory sanctions regime imposed by Congress.
``(e) Expedited Consideration of Legislation.--
``(1) Initiation.--
``(A) In general.--In the event the President does not
submit a certification pursuant to subsection (d)(6) during
each 90-day period following the review period provided in
subsection (b), or submits a determination pursuant to
subsection (d)(3) that Iran has materially breached an
agreement subject to subsection (a) and the material breach
has not been cured, qualifying legislation introduced within
60 calendar days of such event shall be entitled to expedited
consideration pursuant to this subsection.
``(B) Definition.--In the House of Representatives, for
purposes of this paragraph, the terms `submit' and `submits'
mean submit and submits, respectively, to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
``(2) Qualifying legislation defined.--For purposes of this
subsection, the term `qualifying legislation' means only a
bill of either House of Congress--
``(A) the title of which is as follows: `A bill reinstating
statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran.'; and
``(B) the matter after the enacting clause of which is:
`Any statutory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran
pursuant to ______ that were waived, suspended, reduced, or
otherwise relieved pursuant to an agreement submitted
pursuant to section 135(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
are hereby reinstated and any action by the United States
Government to facilitate the release of funds or assets to
Iran pursuant to such agreement, or provide any further
waiver, suspension, reduction, or other relief pursuant to
such agreement is hereby prohibited.', with the blank space
being filled in with the law or laws under which sanctions
are to be reinstated.
``(3) Introduction.--During the 60-calendar day period
provided for in paragraph (1), qualifying legislation may be
introduced--
``(A) in the House of Representatives, by the majority
leader or the minority leader; and
``(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the
majority leader's designee) or the minority leader (or the
minority leader's designee).
``(4) Floor consideration in house of representatives.--
``(A) Reporting and discharge.--If a committee of the House
to which qualifying legislation has been referred has not
reported such qualifying legislation within 10 legislative
days after the date of referral, that committee shall be
discharged from further consideration thereof.
``(B) Proceeding to consideration.--Beginning on the third
legislative day after each committee to which qualifying
legislation has been referred reports it to the House or has
been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall
be in order to move to proceed to consider the qualifying
legislation in the House. All points of order against the
motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after
the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the
qualifying legislation with regard to the same agreement. The
previous question shall be considered as ordered on the
motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion
shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by
which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
``(C) Consideration.--The qualifying legislation shall be
considered as read. All points of order against the
qualifying legislation and against its consideration are
waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered
on the qualifying legislation to final passage without
intervening motion except two hours of debate equally divided
and controlled by the sponsor of the qualifying legislation
(or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the
vote on passage of the qualifying legislation shall not be in
order.
``(5) Consideration in the senate.--
``(A) Committee referral.--Qualifying legislation
introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations.
``(B) Reporting and discharge.--If the Committee on Foreign
Relations has not reported such qualifying legislation within
10 session days after the date of referral of such
legislation, that committee shall be discharged from further
consideration of such legislation and the qualifying
legislation shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
``(C) Proceeding to consideration.--Notwithstanding Rule
XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at
any time after the committee authorized to consider
qualifying legislation reports it to the Senate or has been
discharged from its consideration (even though a previous
motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to
proceed to the consideration of qualifying legislation, and
all points of order against qualifying legislation (and
against consideration of the qualifying legislation) are
waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is
not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider
the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to
shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the
consideration of the qualifying legislation is agreed to, the
qualifying legislation shall remain the unfinished business
until disposed of.
``(D) Debate.--Debate on qualifying legislation, and on all
debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall
be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided
equally between the majority and minority leaders or their
designees. A motion to further limit debate is in order and
not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or a
motion to

[[Page H2975]]

proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion
to recommit the qualifying legislation is not in order.
``(E) Vote on passage.--The vote on passage shall occur
immediately following the conclusion of the debate on the
qualifying legislation and a single quorum call at the
conclusion of the debate, if requested in accordance with the
rules of the Senate.
``(F) Rulings of the chair on procedure.--Appeals from the
decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the
rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure
relating to qualifying legislation shall be decided without
debate.
``(G) Consideration of veto messages.--Debate in the Senate
of any veto message with respect to qualifying legislation,
including all debatable motions and appeals in connection
with such qualifying legislation, shall be limited to 10
hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the
majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
``(6) Rules relating to senate and house of
representatives.--
``(A) Coordination with action by other house.--If, before
the passage by one House of qualifying legislation of that
House, that House receives qualifying legislation from the
other House, then the following procedures shall apply:
``(i) The qualifying legislation of the other House shall
not be referred to a committee.
``(ii) With respect to qualifying legislation of the House
receiving the legislation--

``(I) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if
no qualifying legislation had been received from the other
House; but
``(II) the vote on passage shall be on the qualifying
legislation of the other House.

``(B) Treatment of a bill of other house.--If one House
fails to introduce qualifying legislation under this section,
the qualifying legislation of the other House shall be
entitled to expedited floor procedures under this section.
``(C) Treatment of companion measures.--If, following
passage of the qualifying legislation in the Senate, the
Senate then receives a companion measure from the House of
Representatives, the companion measure shall not be
debatable.
``(D) Application to revenue measures.--The provisions of
this paragraph shall not apply in the House of
Representatives to qualifying legislation which is a revenue
measure.
``(f) Rules of House of Representatives and Senate.--
Subsection (e) is enacted by Congress--
``(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such
are deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively,
but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be
followed in that House in the case of legislation described
in those sections, and supersede other rules only to the
extent that they are inconsistent with such rules; and
``(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the
procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and
to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that
House.
``(g) Rules of Construction.--Nothing in the section shall
be construed as--
``(1) modifying, or having any other impact on, the
President's authority to negotiate, enter into, or implement
appropriate executive agreements, other than the restrictions
on implementation of the agreements specifically covered by
this section;
``(2) allowing any new waiver, suspension, reduction, or
other relief from statutory sanctions with respect to Iran
under any provision of law, or allowing the President to
refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an
agreement described in subsection (a) during the period for
review provided in subsection (b);
``(3) revoking or terminating any statutory sanctions
imposed on Iran; or
``(4) authorizing the use of military force against Iran.
``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Agreement.--The term `agreement' means an agreement
related to the nuclear program of Iran that includes the
United States, commits the United States to take action, or
pursuant to which the United States commits or otherwise
agrees to take action, regardless of the form it takes,
whether a political commitment or otherwise, and regardless
of whether it is legally binding or not, including any joint
comprehensive plan of action entered into or made between
Iran and any other parties, and any additional materials
related thereto, including annexes, appendices, codicils,
side agreements, implementing materials, documents, and
guidance, technical or other understandings, and any related
agreements, whether entered into or implemented prior to the
agreement or to be entered into or implemented in the future.
``(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on
Finance, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial
Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
``(3) Appropriate congressional committees and
leadership.--The term `appropriate congressional committees
and leadership' means the Committee on Finance, the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Select Committee
on Intelligence, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, and
the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate and the
Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial
Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Speaker, Majority
Leader, and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
``(4) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian
financial institution' has the meaning given the term in
section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8513b(d)).
``(5) Joint plan of action.--The term `Joint Plan of
Action' means the Joint Plan of Action, signed at Geneva
November 24, 2013, by Iran and by France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, and all implementing
materials and agreements related to the Joint Plan of Action,
including the technical understandings reached on January 12,
2014, the extension thereto agreed to on July 18, 2014, the
extension agreed to on November 24, 2014, and any materially
identical extension that is agreed to on or after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of
2015.
``(6) EU-iran joint statement.--The term `EU-Iran Joint
Statement' means only the Joint Statement by EU High
Representative Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif made on April 2, 2015, at Lausanne,
Switzerland.
``(7) Material breach.--The term `material breach' means,
with respect to an agreement described in subsection (a), any
breach of the agreement, or in the case of non-binding
commitments, any failure to perform those commitments, that
substantially--
``(A) benefits Iran's nuclear program;
``(B) decreases the amount of time required by Iran to
achieve a nuclear weapon; or
``(C) deviates from or undermines the purposes of such
agreement.
``(8) Noncompliance defined.--The term `noncompliance'
means any departure from the terms of an agreement described
in subsection (a) that is not a material breach.
``(9) P5+1 countries.--The term `P5+1 countries' means the
United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
``(10) United states person.--The term `United States
person' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511).''.
Amend the title so as to read: ``A bill to provide for
congressional review and oversight of agreements relating to
Iran's nuclear program, and for other purposes.''.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of May
13, 2015, the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Engel) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to claim the time in genuine
opposition to H.R. 1191.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New York in favor of
the motion?
Mr. ENGEL. I am.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. On that basis, pursuant to the rule, the
gentleman from Minnesota will control 30 minutes in opposition.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Engel) and ask unanimous consent that he control that
time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Minnesota?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes of my time to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), my ranking member, and ask
unanimous consent that he be allowed to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.

General Leave

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members of
this body have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks
and to include any extraneous materials on this measure.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation to ensure
that Congress is positioned to effectively and decisively judge and to
constrain President Obama's nuclear deal with Iran should a bad deal be
struck. I commend Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin for
bringing this measure before their body. This bill received near
unanimous support in the other body. I appreciate, as always, Ranking
Member Engel's cooperation in bringing this to the floor.
With today's vote, this legislation will go to the President for his
signature. The Foreign Affairs Committee

[[Page H2976]]

has held a series of hearings on the administration's nuclear
negotiations with Iran, a radical state sponsor of terrorism, which is
creating turmoil in a strategically vital region. It is fair to say
that there are deep, bipartisan concerns about where these negotiations
are heading. I fear that the agreement that is coming will be too
short, sanctions relief will be too rapid, inspectors will be too
restricted, and Iran's missile program will be plain ignored.
Of course, we all hope that Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon can
be diplomatically stopped. This legislation should strengthen the
administration's hand at the negotiating table. But Secretary Kerry
must put its added leverage to use immediately so that the U.S. can
gain much-needed ground in the negotiations over the next 2 months.
Mr. Speaker, much of the pressure that brought the Islamic Republic
of Iran to the negotiating table was put in place by Congress over the
objections of the White House and over the objections of both
Republican and Democratic Presidents, and this is unfortunate. We would
have had more pressure on Iran today if the Obama administration hadn't
pressured the Senate to sit on the Royce-Engel sanctions bill that the
Foreign Affairs Committee produced and that this House passed by a
margin of 400-20.
Let's be clear. The administration has come around to support the
legislation we are debating here today, but not with any enthusiasm.
Having followed these negotiations since they began in November of
2013, I can tell you that the President would like nothing more than to
have no such bill, to have Congress sit on the sideline and watch him
negotiate an agreement, whether good or bad, and I fear bad.
Today, without this legislation in place, what is Congress' position
if the President reaches a deal with Iran? Currently, there is no
limitation on the President's use of waivers to suspend the sanctions
Congress put in place, no requirement that Congress receive full
details of any agreement with Iran, no review period for Congress to
examine and weigh in on the agreement, no requirement that the
President certify that Iran is complying, and no way for Congress to
rapidly reimpose sanctions should Iran cheat.
Today, the President can sign a bad deal, and we, the United States
Congress, are left to read about it in the paper. But with the passage
of this bill, all that changes. Sanctions relief is frozen until
Congress receives the agreement and then holds a referendum on its
merits. Again, I believe that this gives the administration a better
chance to get to a lasting and meaningful agreement.
Consider the outstanding and critical issue of verification. The ink
wasn't even dry on the framework announcement and the chants of ``death
to America'' led by the Supreme Leader were still fresh when the leader
asserted--when the Ayatollah asserted--that Iran wouldn't allow
international inspectors access to its military facilities. The deputy
head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps seconded that. He said:
``They will not even be permitted to inspect the most normal military
site in their dreams.''
When it comes to negotiating this inspections regime over the next 2
months, U.S. negotiators must know that these critical issues will
determine Congress' assessment of any final deal.

{time} 1245

Once this legislation is signed, when Secretary Kerry sits across
from the Iranians, he will now have on his mind: I have got to take
this to Congress.
Mr. Speaker, that prospect can only improve these negotiations. I
just hope it is not too late and that we aren't too deep into a bad
deal.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of this legislation.
Our negotiators continue to hammer out the details of an agreement
with Iran that will hopefully foreclose all pathways to a nuclear
weapon. As I have said again and again, if a deal is struck, Congress
must have a proper role in assessing that deal. That is what we are
doing now. That is the purpose of this legislation before us today.
This legislation passed the other body by a vote of 98-1.
If a deal is reached, what are the things I will be looking for?
First, what will sanctions really look like? Will it be a step-by-step
process, so that Iran is forced to comply with the agreement? How will
we ensure that this financial windfall for Iran won't just be used to
fund terrorism around the world?
Second, will a deal compel Iran to come clean on its weaponization
work?
Third, will Iran's leaders agree to a verification and inspection
regime that will allow for snap inspections of nuclear sites? Snap
inspections mean that the inspectors can go all over Iran. They don't
need special permission. We have not been hearing such positive things
from the Iranian leadership who say that they will never allow
inspectors on their military grounds.
We need answers to these questions. We need time to take a hard look
at any deal and make sure there are no loopholes that Iran's leaders
might be able to exploit. The bill we are debating today will give us
that time.
My frustrations with these negotiations have stemmed from the fact
that Iran was not required to cease its uranium enrichment while
negotiating. When we sat down with Iran at the very beginning, more
than a year ago, to negotiate with them, we should have said, While we
are talking, you stop enriching. We didn't say that. I think that was a
mistake.
Additionally, we negotiate as Iran continues its nefarious behavior
around the world--in Syria, in Yemen, against Israel, support for
terrorism. There is no sign that this agreement will lead to Iran
stopping its support for terrorism or human rights violations; yet
massive sanctions relief is on the table.
The fact of the matter is it is very frustrating that we are talking
with Iran only about their nuclear weapons; we are not talking about
the fact that they are a leading sponsor of terrorism or they are
making trouble in Syria, where so many hundreds of thousands of
innocents have died, or making trouble in Yemen or supporting
Hezbollah, supporting Hamas.
It really is frustrating that we are talking about one aspect--their
nuclear program--and meanwhile, they are free, apparently, to do
whatever else they want. This really should not stand.
Perhaps the biggest question I have is whether Iran's leaders will
ultimately be able to make the tough choices necessary to show the
world that they are serious about living up to their commitments. This
is a high bar to clear, and Iran's leaders, unfortunately, have given
us no reason to trust them.
I remain concerned that the messages we are hearing from Iran
directly contradict what the administration has told us. Iran's leaders
have said that sanctions will be lifted immediately upon the signing of
an agreement and that Iran will never accept inspections of their
military sites.
This begs the question: Is Iran serious about these negotiations? We
are told that any kind of sanctions relief will be incremental as Iran
complies. The Iranian leaders are telling their public differently. We
obviously have to settle this glaring discrepancy.
That is why this bill also includes provisions in case Iran reneges
on its commitments. If Iran cheats, it would trigger immediate
consideration of legislation that puts sanctions back in place, but
let's hope it doesn't come to that.
The best way to avoid another war in the Middle East is a negotiated
solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. I wish our negotiators success.
I hope this legislation sends a clear message that Congress is taking
its role seriously, that we aren't playing politics with this issue and
that we want these negotiations to result in a strong, verifiable deal
that keeps a nuclear bomb out of Iran's hands.
I agree with Secretary Kerry when he says that no deal is better than
a bad deal. The question is we want to make sure a bad deal isn't sold
as a good deal. That is why it is important for Congress to be engaged.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human

[[Page H2977]]

Rights, and International Organizations.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will suspend.
Mr. ELLISON. I don't object to the gentleman taking the 2 minutes.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman is
recognized for 2 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by
thanking Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel and Senators Corker,
Cardin, and Menendez for doing their level best in the face of an
administration which, throughout this process, has ignored and sought
to exclude the legislature from its constitutional role in ratifying
what is, in essence, a treaty--it is called an executive agreement, but
it is a treaty--with the vicious, rights-abusing regime in Tehran, to
salvage what we all can from an egregiously flawed framework and
process.
It is clear, from the trajectory of negotiations to date, that the
administration has squandered the leverage gained through sanctions,
and there has been slippage--or, rather, retreat--from the strong
position staked out in a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions,
including resolution 1929 agreed to in 2010. Resolution 1929 demanded
that Iran: one, suspend all uranium enrichment; two, cooperate fully
with the IAEA ensuring unfettered on-site inspection; and, three,
refrain from any activity related to ballistic missiles.
Iran is now closer to achieving access to nuclear weapons and to the
missiles to carry them to targets, including cities in the United
States, while being relieved of sanctions.
From what we know now of the proposed framework, over 5,000
centrifuges will be allowed. Furthermore, it is Iran's understanding
that military sites will be off limits--what?--off limits to inspection
and that ballistic missiles, the delivery systems for nuclear bombs,
are not part of the framework.
As a prerequisite to sitting down with the regime in Tehran, I and
others have argued that the administration should have insisted that
all Americans held or missing in Iran, including Christian pastor Saeed
Abedini be released.
I am concerned, Mr. Speaker, that an agreement under these terms--
terms which, underscore that, we have backtracked in these
negotiations--will give new meaning to the phrase ``Pyrrhic victory.''
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for the time.
Also, I just want to acknowledge to my colleagues that we are here to
talk about the best way to make sure that Iran does not acquire a
nuclear weapon. I am convinced that what we do here today is not the
best way to do that.
I am convinced that the best way to make sure that Iran does not have
a nuclear weapon is to allow the Commander in Chief, Chief Executive of
this country, to negotiate a deal, and then Congress will be asked to
relieve any sanctions, if that is warranted, and we will be able to
weigh in at that time, which is the proper time. We will be able to
have oversight hearings without regard to this legislation or any
other, at any time we choose.
This piece of legislation, I believe, improperly, in an unhelpful
manner, restrains the President by tying his hands, significantly
delaying the implementation of a peace agreement, weakens our
negotiating position by strengthening Iranian hard-liners--who will
argue that the U.S. will not repeal sanctions even if Iran complies
with the final deal--and sends a signal to the international community
that the U.S. Congress is setting the stage to vote down a final
agreement, compromising our relationships with NATO allies and
international partners that have implemented the sanctions regime and
that brought about Iran to the negotiating table.
It is very important that we acknowledge it was not the U.S.
sanctions alone that has brought Iran to the negotiating table. It has
been the international community and the cooperation we have enjoyed
with the international community that has brought them to the
negotiating table.
If we start operating as if we are going to change the deal, we
signal to our partners that we are operating in less than good faith,
which could collapse the whole sanctions regime internationally. This
is not U.S.-Iran negotiating; this is the P5+1, and we must keep that
in due regard.
Congress has an important role to play in this agreement with Iran
repealing statutory sanctions. The deal cannot be implemented without
congressional action. There is no reason for us to act right now. The
only thing that acting now will achieve is to undermine the chance of
an agreement.
Now, I believe Congress must have oversight, but I don't believe we
should make this deal stillborn in the crib before it is even allowed
to emerge. We don't want to abort the deal before it is born.
The deal should be allowed to come forward and the President should
be allowed to make peace with a hostile nation before we start talking
about what is wrong with it. We are anticipating what is wrong with it,
and I don't think that is a helpful thing.
We are certainly not under any illusions about human rights, about
exporting conflict from Iran. We know these things are the case.
What do you do when you want to deescalate the prospect of war? You
negotiate. That is what the President is doing.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), the Democratic whip.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
First, let me say that I agree with my friend who is, I think, one of
our very responsible and able leaders in this Congress, Mr. Ellison. I
appreciate his comments.
I presume that everybody on this floor, whatever their perspective
is, thinks that the objective that the United States seeks and the
objective that our P5 partners seek and the objective that the United
Nations seeks--and that is a non-nuclear-armed Iran--is best achieved
through agreement.
I think all of us would agree on that. The question is, however, for
us to make it very clear the objective of that agreement and how it is
achieved and how we are assured that that objective is, in fact,
achieved.
Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate Senator Cardin, my dear friend,
the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, for his hard
work to reach this compromise with Chairman Corker. I want to
congratulate Mr. Royce and Mr. Engel for bringing it to the floor for
quick consideration.
This compromise bill allows Congress to look carefully at the final
agreement. For something of such consequence, that is essential. Not
only is it desirable, it is essential that we do so. It will help
ensure that our common goal is achieved, a non-nuclear-armed Iran.
I will say to my friend from Minnesota, my presumption is the
Iranians want to get to this. They say they are not looking for nuclear
arms; they want to have relief of the sanctions. It seems to me this is
in their best interest, so they ought to be trying to accommodate this.
I think, in fact, this can help, not hurt, our negotiating position.
I believe this bill reflects the consensus among Members of both the
House and Senate that Congress, which authored the sanctions that
brought Iran to the negotiating table--I would say, again, to my friend
from Minnesota, the reason the sanctions were effective in bringing the
Iranians to the table is because our European allies joined in them. I
think he is absolutely right.
Unilaterally, we couldn't have done that because we don't do that
much business with Iran; the Europeans do. He is absolutely right that
it was in partnership that we brought the Iranians to the table.
I want to also thank, Mr. Speaker, our negotiating team for their
tireless efforts to reach a framework agreement.
A letter was recently signed by 150. I didn't sign the letter, but I
absolutely agreed with the substance of the letter, which said the best
way to get there is through agreement, and we ought to support our
negotiators who are pursuing that end.

[[Page H2978]]

As I have said before, any final agreement must prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon and include the most intrusive inspections
and access regime we have ever seen in order to verify Iran's
compliance. There is no reason for us to trust Iran.

{time} 1300

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
Mr. HOYER. It must address potentially military dimensions of Iran's
nuclear program and bring about Iran's full cooperation with the U.N.
Security Council resolutions.
The United States must never permit Iran to develop a nuclear weapon,
and we will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel in
defense of its security, which is very tied to our own security. That
means ensuring Israel maintains its Qualitative Military Edge,
including through robust support for antimissile systems and
antitunneling defense programs. It also means supporting our gulf
partners from Iran's destabilizing activities.
Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon is directly in
America's national security interest. A nuclear-armed Iran is a threat
to us all. This bill will ensure that Congress can review any final
nuclear agreement with Iran to make certain that it meets the goals we
and the President share and which he has articulated emphatically and
repeatedly. I encourage my colleagues to support this bipartisan
legislation.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Doggett).
Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, there is probably no more critical issue on
our national agenda today than this matter with Iran. 151 Members of
the House have joined together to encourage the President to ``exhaust
every avenue toward a verifiable, enforceable, diplomatic solution in
order to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.''
Mr. Speaker, I would ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record
this communication.

Congress of the United States,

Washington DC, May 7, 2015.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: As negotiations over Iran's nuclear
program continue, we urge you to stay on course, building on
the recently announced political framework and continuing to
work toward a strong and verifiable agreement between the
P5+1 countries and Iran that will prevent Iran from having a
nuclear weapon. We commend you and your negotiating team, as
well as our coalition partners, for the significant progress
made thus far.
This issue is above politics. The stakes are too great, and
the alternatives are too dire. We must exhaust every avenue
toward a verifiable, enforceable, diplomatic solution in
order to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. If the United States
were to abandon negotiations or cause their collapse, not
only would we fail to peacefully prevent a nuclear-armed
Iran, we would make that outcome more likely. The
multilateral sanctions regime that brought Iran to the table
would likely collapse, and the Iranian regime would likely
decide to accelerate its nuclear program, unrestricted and
unmonitored. Such developments could lead us to war.
War itself will not make us safe. A U.S. or Israeli
military strike may set back Iranian nuclear development by
two or three years at best--a significantly shorter timespan
than that covered by a P5+1 negotiated agreement. We must
pursue diplomatic means to their fullest and allow the
negotiations to run their course--especially now that the
parties have announced a strong framework--and continue
working to craft a robust and verifiable Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action by June 30.
We must allow our negotiating team the space and time
necessary to build on the progress made in the political
framework and turn it into a long-term, verifiable agreement.
If we do not succeed, Congress will remain at-the-ready to
act and present you with additional options to ensure that
Iran is prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Thank you for your resolve in preventing a nuclear-armed
Iran. We look forward to continuing our shared work on this
important matter.
Sincerely,
Jan Schakowsky,
Member of Congress.
Lloyd Doggett,
Member of Congress.
David E. Price,
Member of Congress.
Alma S. Adams, Pete Aguilar, Brad Ashford, Karen Bass,
Joyce Beatty, Xavier Becerra, Ami Bera, Donald S. Beyer, Jr.,
Sanford D. Bishop, Earl Blumenauer, Suzanne Bonamici,
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Robert A. Brady, Corrine Brown, Julia
Brownley, Cheri Bustos, G. K. Butterfield, Lois Capps,
Michael E. Capuano, Tony Cardenas.
John C. Carney, Jr., Andre Carson, Matt Cartwright, Kathy
Castor, Joaquin Castro, Judy Chu, David N. Cicilline,
Katherine M. Clark, Yvette D. Clarke, Wm. Lacy Clay, Emanuel
Cleaver, James E. Clyburn, Steve Cohen, Gerald E. Connolly,
John Conyers, Jr., Joe Courtney, Elijah E. Cummings, Danny K.
Davis, Susan A. Davis, Peter A. DeFazio.
Diana DeGette, Rosa L. DeLauro, Suzan K. DelBene, Mark
DeSaulnier, Debbie Dingell, Lloyd Doggett, Michael F. Doyle,
Tammy Duckworth, Donna F. Edwards, Keith Ellison, Anna G.
Eshoo, Elizabeth H. Esty, Sam Farr, Chaka Fattah, Bill
Foster, Marcia L. Fudge, Ruben Gallego, John Garamendi, Al
Green, Raul M. Grijalva.
Luis V. Gutierrez, Janice Hahn, Denny Heck, Brian Higgins,
Ruben Hinojosa, Michael M. Honda, Jared Huffman, Sheila
Jackson Lee, Hakeem S. Jeffries, Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Marcy Kaptur, William R.
Keating, Robin L. Kelly, Daniel T. Kildee, Ron Kind,
Joseph P. Kennedy, III, Ann M. Kuster, James R. Langevin,
Rick Larsen.
John B. Larson, Brenda L. Lawrence, Barbara Lee, John
Lewis, Ted Lieu, David Loebsack, Zoe Lofgren, Alan S.
Lowenthal, Ben Ray Lujan, Michelle Lujan Grisham, Stephen F.
Lynch, Sean Patrick Maloney, Doris O. Matsui, Betty McCollum,
Jim McDermott, James P. McGovern, Jerry McNerney, Gregory W.
Meeks, Gwen Moore, Seth Moulton.
Grace F. Napolitano, Richard E. Neal, Richard M. Nolan,
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Beto O'Rourke, Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
Nancy Pelosi, Ed Perlmutter, Pedro R. Pierluisi, Chellie
Pingree, Stacey E. Plaskett, Mark Pocan, Jared Polis, David
E. Price, Charles B. Rangel, Cedric L. Richmond, Lucille
Roybal-Allard, Raul Ruiz, C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Bobby L.
Rush.
Tim Ryan, Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, Linda T. Sanchez,
Loretta Sanchez, Janice D. Schakowsky, Robert C. ``Bobby''
Scott, David Scott, Jose E. Serrano, Terri A. Sewell, Louise
McIntosh Slaughter, Adam Smith, Jackie Speier, Eric Swalwell,
Mark Takai, Mark Takano, Bennie G. Thompson, Mike Thompson,
Paul Tonko, Norma J. Torres, Niki Tsongas.
Chris Van Hollen, Marc A. Veasey, Nydia M. Velazquez, Peter
J. Visclosky, Timothy J. Walz, Maxine Waters, Bonnie Watson
Coleman, Peter Welch, Frederica S. Wilson, John A. Yarmuth.

Mr. DOGGETT. While not signing this particular call for diplomacy,
additional colleagues have made clear that they intend to prevent any
attempted congressional veto of a strong, verifiable agreement. An
agreement not based on trust, not based on liking Iran, but an
agreement based on strong verification and intrusive verification.
Unfortunately, others here in this body who have embraced the
wrongheaded advice of former President Bush's U.N. Ambassador John
Bolton, who said that, ``To stop Iran's bomb, bomb Iran.'' These are
some of the same Members who rejected the interim nuclear Joint Plan of
Action before they had even read it. They are some of the same Members
who were so eager to launch an unnecessary war in Iraq that only
strengthened Iran and who seem to have learned very little from their
previous failure, and they forget that Iran is bigger than Afghanistan
and Iraq put together.
Another war will not make us safe. Bombing may set back Iranian
nuclear development by two or three years at best--a significantly
shorter time than that covered by a P5+1 negotiated agreement--but it
will make an Iranian nuclear weapon more likely. Bombing will enflame
sectarian and regional tensions. It will threaten the security of
Israel and of our other allies and ultimately, it will jeopardize the
safety of every American family.
That does not mean that any agreement with Iran is an acceptable
agreement. Iranian hard-liners, like hard-liners elsewhere, may,
ultimately, prevent an adequate verification in this agreement, but we
must use every diplomatic means available, especially now with the
announcement of this strong framework, and continue to work and craft a
robust Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. To do otherwise--to
withdraw, to fail to support such an agreement--would likely collapse
the multilateral sanctions among our allies and some that are not our
allies but have joined with us in this regime that brought Iran to the
table in the first place and would only accelerate an Iranian nuclear
program that would then be unrestricted and unmonitored. Final
sanctions--certainly sanctions which I have personally voted on a
number of occasions in favor of--cannot be lifted without a vote of
Congress, but that would not

[[Page H2979]]

occur until we have conclusive evidence of Iranian compliance.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. DOGGETT. All of us who do not trust war as the answer must
continue working together to support a peaceful resolution and overcome
the bellicose voices whose only alternative is the perilous course of
war. We want a strong, verifiable arms accord. I favor and will vote
for oversight and review today, but President Obama should know that he
has the support in this House to fulfill our obligations under a
verifiable agreement for a safer world and to avoid war.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. McCaul), the chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and a
member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act.
While far from perfect, the passage of this bill will ensure that
Congress has a final say on the Obama administration's naive
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program.
Last week, in Israel, I met with Israeli Prime Minister Bibi
Netanyahu, where I heard, once again, from our top ally in the region
about the deep concern his country has over the dangerous agreement
currently being hammered out by President Obama and the Ayatollah.
For years, my colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee have worked
to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran through the toughest and most
comprehensive sanctions ever devised. The sanctions passed in Congress
brought Iran to the negotiating table. Last Congress, our committee,
once again, passed another robust sanctions bill to give President
Obama even more leverage over Tehran; but rather than accept our help,
the President and his allies in the Senate opted, instead, to relieve
Iran of the sanctions we had worked so hard to build.
And for what, Mr. Speaker?--for an agreement that allows the world's
leading state sponsor of terror to maintain a vast nuclear
infrastructure whose centrifuges will never stop spinning and,
according to President Rouhani, for an agreement that does nothing to
address the military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, such as the
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which the Ayatollah
says it should mass produce, or for an agreement that frees up billions
of dollars that Iran can use to fund terror around the world.
Mr. Speaker, Congress must have a say in any final agreement with
Iran, and this bill will do just that. I urge a ``yes'' vote.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey), the ranking member on the
Appropriations Committee.
Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act, which will ensure Congress a role in evaluating
any final deal reached between the P5+1 countries and Iran.
As the author of the crippling sanctions that brought Iran to the
negotiating table, Congress' continued oversight role is critical.
Serious concerns remain about the proposed framework, particularly of
the enforcement and verifiability of any deal, and whether it will,
indeed, close all possible pathways to a bomb.
Any deal must include full and unfettered inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency of any facility, military or
otherwise--including Parchin, Fordow, Natanz--and Iran must account for
the possible military dimensions of its past activities. Given Iran's
history of deception, sanctions should remain in place until Iran has
taken major nuclear-related steps that demonstrate their sincerity.
We all want a diplomatic solution, but as long as Iran's leaders
continue to refer to Israel as the ``barbaric'' Jewish state that ``has
no cure but to be annihilated,'' we must approach any deal with the
utmost scrutiny. That is why I urge the immediate passage of this
important legislation.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington State (Mr. McDermott).
(Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, none of us want nuclear weapons in Iran;
and while the White House may regard this bill as the least harmful
option offered by a persistently intractable Congress--a Congress that
has sought to derail all of his efforts in the past--I cannot and will
not support this particular piece of legislation.
Of all of President Obama's foreign policy objectives, this is the
boldest and the one that could have a meaningful impact on regional and
global stability. The option of war or of increasing the sanctions
simply has run its course. The time has come for diplomacy. The
framework that the administration has presented to us is fair and
smart. It is a good deal, one that guarantees a world safe from the
threat of Iranian nuclear weapons.
We all await the details. All of this argument out here is about
people who are sure of what the details are going to be. That is why
this is not the time to be passing this legislation. President Obama,
Secretary Kerry, and our partners--and don't forget that this is an
historic thing in that we have partners of the P5+1. They deserve
immense credit in their determination and commitment to a diplomatic
solution to, arguably, the most dangerous and complex foreign policy
challenge of our time.
We need to give the President and the negotiators the time they need.
The time for us to make decisions about what happens about the
sanctions will come to this floor. There is no question about it. We
don't need to pass a bill saying we don't like what the President is
doing. We ought to be grateful for the tenacity with which he has
persisted in this diplomatic effort.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I very much thank the chairman for his leadership
on our committee.
Mr. Speaker, this bill serves as a reminder of the unanswered
questions surrounding the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
We know Iran can't be trusted. Everything we have seen from Iran
since 1979 shows that the regime is willing to lie, to cheat, to
obfuscate to achieve its agenda, and part of that agenda is to attack
and to undermine the United States and our regional interests.
Can we verify Iran's compliance?
No, because Iran controls the access of the IAEA to its sites. Iran
hasn't even come clean on its possible military dimension of its
nuclear program yet. The regime is also likely to get a $50 billion
signing bonus, when a deal is signed, in exchange for nothing.
What will Iran do with that money, Mr. Speaker?
It will continue to support terror around the globe, stoke sectarian
violence as we have seen all over the Middle East, repress its own
citizens, and, just today, five Iranian boats fired shots across the
bow of a Singapore-flagged cargo vessel in the gulf.
Can we have snapback sanctions? Oh, please, the idea is laughable at
best.
According to reports, China and Russia have stated that there will
not be any automatic snapback sanctions whatsoever to reimpose on Iran
even if the regime is caught in violation.
Once again, the Obama administration is playing a game of smoke and
mirrors to get this deal finalized and to cement a legacy that the
President has been seeking since he entered office. The deal is
dangerous and will only jeopardize our national security.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Deutch), the ranking member on the
Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee and a very valued member of
the Foreign Affairs Committee.

{time} 1315

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act. When it comes to the security of our Nation and our
partners around the world, the American people deserve a voice, but
when Congress is unable to review or respond to policies of great
consequence, like a potential nuclear

[[Page H2980]]

deal with Iran, the American people have no voice.
In recent days, we have heard another debate about another major
international agreement also negotiated in secret, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership. Why do I bring that up in this context? Well, some of my
colleagues who oppose this critical legislation have serious concerns
about TPA and TPP. I share those concerns. I oppose fast-tracking TPP
without the details on protecting jobs and workers and the environment
and consumers and without any chance at making changes.
Likewise, today, I ask my colleagues to acknowledge and respect my
concerns about approving a deal today with Iran when too many questions
remain unanswered. On matters of national and international security,
bullet points in a framework just won't do. Before Iran gains access to
billions of dollars in frozen assets, I want the details. I want
details on conditions for sanctions relief and access to military sites
and unannounced inspections, and you should, too. No one here knows
what a final deal would look like or even if we will get one, but I
know you agree that, if we do, Congress should get to review the terms.
On behalf of our constituents, Congress must have a say. I urge my
colleagues to support this important legislation.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. I thank the gentleman for yielding and also for his
tremendous leadership on this very important issue. Also, I want to
thank our ranking member, Mr. Engel, and Chairman Royce for their
leadership on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and for all of the
bipartisan work that you have done over the years together.
The poison pills have been taken out of this bill by the other body,
and I still have concerns about the timing and effect of considering
this legislation, but the President believes that this legislation, as
written, will not undermine the administration's efforts. All of us
have the same goal, and that is to prevent Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon.
As negotiations over Iran's nuclear program enter a critical phase,
Congress must give the President and our negotiators the space they
need to succeed, and with the announcement of a framework agreement
last month, we are closer to a strong and verifiable agreement between
the P5+1 countries and Iran.
H.R. 1191 would require that Congress be given an opportunity to
review any final agreement on Iran's nuclear program before the
President can waive or suspend any sanctions. Supporters of this bill
argue that they simply want to ensure congressional oversight of any
final international agreement, and of course we all believe that there
is a role for that, but we know that since negotiations began, there
have been countless initiatives by Congress to purposely and
deliberately thwart the success of a final deal.
Any efforts to undermine the negotiations or a final deal with Iran
over its nuclear program will not make us safer, and it will not stop
Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. In fact, it will do just the
opposite.
Negotiations with Iran have already led to a first-step agreement
that has significantly reduced Iran's nuclear stockpile and their
ability to create a nuclear weapon. Without these negotiations and the
current framework agreement, Iran's nuclear program would be
unmonitored and unrestrained. Continued negotiations remain the best
route to ensuring national and regional security while preventing us
from going back on the path to a confrontation with Iran.
A deal with Iran has the support of the majority of the American
people. An April ABC-Washington Post poll found that Americans by a
nearly 2-1 margin support striking a deal with Iran that restricts the
nation's nuclear program in exchange for loosening sanctions. We simply
cannot afford the alternative to the negotiations, and the alternative
to the negotiations, I believe, is war with Iran.
Instead of taking actions to undermine our President and
international negotiators as they work to secure a final deal, Congress
should be working to ensure their success. Now, let's hope that this
bill does that. I hope that this Congress does not use passage of this
bill as a cynical ploy to set up a vote against any final deal should
there be a deal, one that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon. Simply put, diplomacy is the best way to cut off any potential
pathway to an Iranian nuclear weapon.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Holding). The time of the gentlewoman
has expired.
Mr. ELLISON. May I ask how much time I have remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Minnesota has 8 minutes
remaining.
Mr. ELLISON. I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from
California.
Ms. LEE. I will conclude by just saying in 2013 I introduced
legislation calling for an end to the no contact policy with Iran and
calling for a diplomatic initiative. I am convinced that that is the
only way to ensure regional stability. Let's hope that the President's
legacy does include preventing a war with Iran. What a great legacy to
leave for the world.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Zeldin), a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. ZELDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation. I
want to thank Mr. Royce from California for his leadership on this
issue as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as Mr.
Engel from New York for his leadership as the ranking member.
Americans want to know what is in an Iran nuclear deal. They want
their Representatives in Congress to debate it. If facts come out that
it turns out that this is a bad deal, which many are concerned we are
on that pace for, they want Congress to reject it. I have had
colleagues just now listening to those speaking in opposition talking
about a nuclear framework agreement that was announced last month,
people saying it is a good deal. There is no framework agreement.
The President released a fact sheet, and within 24 hours the Iranian
Foreign Minister went on his Twitter feed saying it was just spin, the
Ayatollah chanting ``death to America'' on the streets of Iran, saying
that that fact sheet was just spin.
In order to have a deal to reach an agreement, both sides need to
agree. The message to the colleagues today, I mean, this vote matters,
but the work is not over. The tough work, the tough votes are still
ahead.
Let's talk about what is not even part of the negotiations: Iran's
state sponsorship of terrorism, work to overthrow foreign governments,
development of ICBMs, pledging to wipe Israel off the map, chanting
``death to America'' on the streets, unjustly imprisoning United States
citizens. That is not even part of the deal. That is not even part of
the negotiations.

I want to read it. My constituents want to read a deal in English.
They want to know that it is accurately translated, and the Iranians
are reading their deal the same way that we are. If there is no
agreement on specific terms, is there broad, vague language being used
so that both sides can spin whatever they want to interpret this deal
is for whatever best serves their own domestic politics?
We are elected to represent our constituents, and they are concerned
about the direction of this deal. I have grave concerns. I feel like it
is on pace to trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. I urge a
``yes'' vote. I thank the chairman, again, for his effort on this.
Mr. ENGEL. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms.
Frankel), a very respected member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Ms. FRANKEL of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the
bipartisan Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and I want to remind
everyone why it is so important that we prevent Iran from becoming a
nuclear state. Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism
supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and the brutal crackdown in Syria. Iran's
efforts to expand its influence is destabilizing Iraq, Lebanon, and now
Yemen.
The Iran regime systematically violates its own citizens' basic
rights and, as terrifying, has the potential for nuclear proliferation.
If Iran becomes a

[[Page H2981]]

nuclear state, we will see a regional race for the bomb spreading the
world's most dangerous weapons through the world's most unstable
region.
Mr. Speaker, Congress played a critical role in bringing Iran to the
negotiating table. Iran cannot be trusted, and Congress must continue
to be vigilant.
Mr. ROYCE. I reserve the balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, at this time I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I thank my colleague from Minnesota and
rise today in cautious support of this legislation.
Our nuclear negotiators, with the cooperation of a fragile coalition
of longstanding allies and new partners, have made historic progress
toward preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, a critical
foreign policy imperative for our country.
We must continue to give diplomacy a chance and allow our negotiators
to build on the framework agreement they negotiated earlier this
spring.
Many of our colleagues in the House of Representatives agree, Mr.
Speaker. Just last week, Congresswoman Schakowsky, Congressman Doggett,
and I sent a letter to the President urging persistence in
negotiations, a letter that was signed by 148 of our colleagues.
Diplomacy isn't just the best way of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran;
it is the only way. Opponents of the President's efforts have yet to
provide a single viable alternative to diplomacy short of military
action, and military action, defense experts tell us, would only delay
nuclear development for a few years.
While I can understand why some Members of the House and Senate
insisted upon congressional review of a final deal with such historic
implications, I have strongly refused to support legislation or other
congressional intervention that was likely to drive Iran from the
negotiating table or to alienate our international partners. We must
not set impossible goals for these negotiations or insist that every
outstanding issue our country has with Iran be resolved before the core
nuclear issue can be addressed.
The bill before us, which is a product of a thoughtful compromise
between Senator Corker and Senator Cardin, Republicans and Democrats,
does none of these harmful things. It is free of riders designed to
undermine the negotiations, and it provides a reasonable path forward
that allows for Congress to weigh in on a final deal without setting it
up for failure.
So I rise in cautious support of this bill because I believe it
clears the way for the President's negotiators to do their job, to work
with our international partners to secure a comprehensive, verifiable
nuclear agreement that will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon and thereby will make the world a safer place.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Dold), a member of the Committee on Financial Services.
Mr. DOLD. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman Royce for his
leadership and Ranking Member Engel for his leadership as well.
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Speaker, I believe the greatest threat we
have to our own national security here is a nuclear-armed Iran, an
entity that has said time and again that they want to wipe Israel off
the face of the map, that they want to drive them into the sea, that
they are the Little Satan, which naturally begs the question, Mr.
Speaker, as to who is the Big Satan, and it is the United States of
America.
This is a framework, the framework that has been announced, the one
that Iran basically said, We didn't think that was the framework. The
chants of ``death to America.'' What they said is that they have to
take all the sanctions off immediately upon the signature of a deal and
that the IAEA will not be granted access to inspect facilities that are
military facilities. Well, frankly, that is not a deal. I recognize
that is a framework.
What we are debating today is really talking about Congress having
the ability to say: Is this a deal that we can live with or is it not?
Because, frankly, leaving Iran as a nuclear threshold state is not
going to be a deal. What we are going to be debating today is, in
essence, just allowing us to be able to take the next vote. That is the
important one.
Madam Speaker, this is not left versus right. This isn't about
Republicans and Democrats. This is about right versus wrong. This is
about making sure that we do this right. If we don't do this right, if
Iran is set for a path to a nuclear weapon, it is going to set an arms
race in a dangerous neighborhood that will be devastating for peace and
security around the globe. This is one where we are going to join hands
together as a nation to make sure that the safety and security of the
world is what we are going to put first and foremost.
Madam Speaker, I just got back from Israel. I had the opportunity to
speak with people on multiple sides. To the person, they are all united
behind the idea that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable and that this
will be a bad deal.
So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this piece of legislation
to allow us to have the opportunity to take a look at this deal to move
forward. With that, I sincerely hope that this is a bipartisan effort.

{time} 1330

Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Speaker, I will yield to Chairman Royce for a
colloquy, and I will ask him the following questions.
As I read this bill, if Congress does not enact a Joint Resolution of
Disapproval, that failure to enact a Resolution of Disapproval cannot
be read as Congress approving an agreement.
As I read the bill, if Congress does not enact a Resolution of
Disapproval, the sole effect of that is to continue current statutes so
that the President would retain his authority to provide sanctions
relief.
Do you agree?
Mr. ROYCE. That is correct, Mr. Sherman. I see no way that a failure
to override a Presidential veto or otherwise enact a joint resolution
of disapproval would be construed as Congress approving a bad Iran
deal. It would be that the Congress didn't have a supermajority of
votes to stop the President from exercising the considerable leeway he
has for the sanctions that are in place.
I would also remind the gentleman that this bill gives us the chance
to have that vote. Otherwise, the President could act to waive
sanctions the day after a deal is struck.
And if people are really worried about congressional intent being
misconstrued, we always have the ability to make our intent crystal
clear by passing a resolution or concurrent resolution, which are not
subject to Presidential presentment or veto.
Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for his clarification.
If this deal is signed, I do not think that Congress will enact a
Resolution of Disapproval over the President's veto--maybe not even
vote for it on the floor. It is even less likely that Congress will
enact a Resolution of Approval.
So we will be in a situation where Congress will not have acted, and
as the chairman points out, Congress would not have approved this
agreement.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Black). The time of the gentleman has
expired.
Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman from California an additional 1
minute.
Mr. SHERMAN. If the President signs an agreement, Iran will get
certain benefits and certain funds will be made available to them. At
the same time, Iran will ship its stockpiles out of the country--or a
substantial portion of them--decommission some centrifuges, and thereby
delay its effort to get a nuclear weapon.
That means in 2017, and every year thereafter, future Congresses and
future Presidents will have to determine what American policy is. We
would be free to demand a renegotiation of the agreement, or to simply
continue it in force. A President could reactivate sanctions, or
continue to waive them. Congress could enact new sanctions, or repeal
existing sanctions.
All options will be on the table in the years to come. And the only
thing I am certain of is that we will be on this

[[Page H2982]]

floor debating Iran and its nuclear program for many years to come.
Mr. ELLISON. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
The measure we are debating today is much better, through the hard
work of Senators Corker and Cardin, and I appreciate their efforts to
deescalate the conversation. I fear it is the wrong message at the
wrong time. There are no good alternatives to letting negotiators
prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
Now, Congress seldom advances diplomacy. Usually, we politicize
issues, playing to the bleachers. Our judgment is often suspect: the
record from ignoring the lead up to World War II; misjudgments on
Vietnam; the reckless rush into the war in Iraq; even maintaining a
foolish policy regarding Cuba, until the President exercised leadership
lately.
There is no good reason to interfere now with what the P5+1 have
done, making unprecedented progress--progress we wouldn't have imagined
2 or 3 years ago. They did so using a unified force with these six
countries, using the tools of the sanctions that we could not have
imposed unilaterally. And we don't want to lose the leverage of those
allies.
Now, I am painfully aware of the issues with Iran. It is troubling, a
number of their activities. It is also ironic that our interests are
aligned in some areas. And I will never forget on 9/11 there were
demonstrations of support for America in Tehran. The Iranian people
actually like Americans, their leaders do not--and that is why working
forward to make this historic agreement a reality could be an important
pivot point for the troubled relationships between our countries.
Make no mistake, there are hard-liners in Iran, just as there are
hard-liners in the United States, who want to blow this agreement up.
But I have been impressed, taking advantage of offers from the White
House for numerous briefings on this issue, reviewing the materials,
that we have made tremendous progress. We shouldn't complicate it.
As my friends have referenced here, there is no good alternative to a
negotiated agreement with Iran. It is the only way we can prevent them
from getting nuclear weapons.
A reckless rush to war, which some people hinted at, others would
welcome, would not stop their ultimate acquisition of nuclear weapons.
It is very likely to accelerate it. And to imagine going back into that
area, fighting a country with a population that is larger than Iraq and
Afghanistan combined--over a huge area--would be devastating.
Let's stay the course. Let's be patient. Let's try to constrain
congressional interference.
Mr. ROYCE. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ENGEL. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
In closing, let me first say I appreciate the thoughtfulness that I
have heard during this debate from all sides. And I think that is
really Congress at its best. I am proud to be a Member of Congress when
I hear debates like this.
This legislation was negotiated very carefully to ensure that Iran
would hear a unified and bipartisan message from Congress. Why is this
important? It was Congress' work with the layers and layers of
sanctions. And Mr. Royce has been my partner from day one. We have
worked together so hard on sanctions and speaking with a unified voice
in the Foreign Affairs Committee, and we have tried so hard to make the
Foreign Affairs Committee the most bipartisan committee of Congress
because foreign policy should be bipartisan. And what I have heard
today from all across the aisle here is bipartisanship. And it is a
good feeling. But it was Congress' work--the layers and layers of
sanctions--that brought Iran to its knees and compelled Iran to come to
the negotiating table.
I believe that it will be the threat of congressional action that
will compel Iran to make the tough choices in these negotiations. But
this congressional action must be bipartisan. Iran must not be able to
dismiss a bill as a partisan stunt.
Congress must speak with a unified voice. We are stronger when we are
unified. We are stronger when we act in a bipartisan manner. The
international community followed our lead on Iran when we were unified.
Iran came to the negotiating table when we were unified. And this vote
should be no different: no poison pills, no extraneous messaging items
that could torpedo this carefully crafted bill. Let's get this bill to
the President's desk with a single voice.
Again, I want to repeat some of my trepidation. The fact that Iran
was allowed to enrich uranium all these months and months of talking I
think was a mistake. The fact that we are talking only with Iran about
their nuclear program, not about their support for terrorism, not about
Americans held in Iranian prisons, not about their ballistic weapons,
not about their mischief in Iran, not about their support for
international terrorism, not about their support for Hezbollah and
Hamas, not about their threats of death to Israel and death to America,
I think is a mistake.
But I do think negotiations are important, so I urge my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle to vote for this very, very sensible bipartisan
piece of legislation. Let's get this bill to the President's desk with
a single voice.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ELLISON. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
In closing, I want to thank the ranking member and the chairman for
this considered debate. I will say that I do believe that this is a big
deal. It is important that we debate this. I respect the position that
I have heard here today, but ultimately I don't think what we are doing
is necessary, and I don't believe it will help enhance peace for the
United States or the world.
I think the things that we need are already in place, which is our
right to have hearings on anything we want, the role we will have to
play to remove any sanctions if we are satisfied, and the fact that we
don't have to if we are not. We have the cards. We do not have to choke
this deal in the crib, which is what I think this particular bill
threatens.
Now, let me say there is nothing new, Madam Speaker, about what the
President is doing here. I have a list of examples that very closely
correlate to the President's effort to negotiate a nuclear deal with
Iran: the Helsinki Act in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975,
and the Australia Group in 1985. I don't have time to go into what all
these things are, but I can say there are a number of situations where
Presidents, Republican and Democrat, have used their authority to
negotiate agreements with other countries in which Congress did not
have to try to intervene.
Let me also point out that this situation that we are in, where we
have had the framework agreement and now we are hoping to get a full
agreement, I am hopeful and optimistic it will be something that is
good and meaningful. So far, so good, in my opinion.
But I just want to remind everybody that the framework deal that has
been struck already between the P5+1 in Iran would destroy about 14,000
centrifuges. That is what we are talking about here. Iran would destroy
97 percent of its uranium. That is 97 percent. Iran will have zero
military nuclear capability.
We are at a historic moment that one keeps Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon, and we need to support this effort. I intend to vote
``no,'' and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
As we have heard today, Iran's rush to a nuclear weapon is a mortal
threat to the United States and to our allies. And when I say it is a
threat, consider for a minute the fact that Iran has, with its Quds
forces, forces right now in Lebanon. It has forces in Syria. It has
forces in Iraq. Its forces have just helped lead a militia to topple
the government in Yemen, a government that was our ally. So that is the
type of regime that we are talking about.
Just weeks ago, it was reported that Iran was passing tens of
millions of dollars to Hamas. But they gave a reason. It was to rebuild
the three dozen or so tunnels that were built underneath Israel so that
Hamas could conduct attacks to try to capture hostages and take them
back into Gaza.

[[Page H2983]]

{time} 1345

The reason for the strategy is pretty clear. That kind of strategy
would ensure that our ally Israel would have to fight block by block by
block to get captives back. The one that I was in with Mr. Engel was
not far from where it came up close to a nursery school.
This is the reality of the type of regime we are dealing with. It is
not just transferring the money. It is also transferring the new
rockets and the new missiles to Hamas.
Why were they doing that? Because they said the inventory is low
because of the rockets fired off--this is the reality of the types of
intentions that this regime has. Many times, they telegraph those
intentions. When they are yelling, ``Death to the Great Satan, death to
the little Satan,'' it is not as though they are not telling us the
Ayatollah's intent. He is, after all, the Supreme Leader here.
Iran's support of terrorism and destabilization in the region will be
far more intense, frankly, if it possesses a nuclear weapon or, indeed,
if it had undetectable nuclear breakout capability.
The stakes could not be higher. That is why we need a good agreement,
and I hope that all the Members support this legislation. It may not be
a perfect bill, but it is a good bill. It is an important and
responsible response to an administration that otherwise would shut out
Congress.
I am sorry it took the White House so long to embrace it. Weeks ago,
the White House was issuing veto threats and pushing back hard. Were it
to pass, it would be the end of diplomacy as we know it, they said at
the time. Now, they are on board, and it is good that they are on
board.
With this legislation in place--and this is the great upside--
Congress will be in a much better position to judge any final agreement
that the President strikes with Iran, and I believe that our diplomacy
will have a better shot because of it.
Instead of Iranian negotiators knowing that they can wear down the
administration, this now injects Congress as an important backstop. It
gives us leverage to address these issues like what we discussed today,
to address the issue of: Will our inspectors, the international
inspectors, have the right to go on military bases?
Let me tell you, I was part of the 1994 framework agreement, and the
consequences of not getting the ability of weapons inspectors,
international inspectors, to go on to military bases, not having that
right to go anywhere, anytime, had profound consequences. It is why we
are dealing with North Korea having the weapon today that they possess.
We should not repeat that error. U.S. diplomats should now head to
the negotiating table with a stronger hand. They should work for a
credible deal, a verifiable deal, and then present it to Congress to be
judged. That is only appropriate, given the incredible consequences for
the region, for our allies, and for the national security of the United
States.
I urge the passage of this legislation.
Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules
and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill, H.R. 1191.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

____________________