[Congressional Record Volume 161, Number 21 (Monday, February 9, 2015)]
[Senate]
[Pages S851-S852]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
MR. HATCH. Madam President, today I rise with my friend, the senior
Senator from Oklahoma, to discuss some of the most pressing national
security issues the Senate is poised to confront. These matters include
the confirmation of Ashton Carter as Secretary of Defense, whose
nomination I strongly support; and Senator Ayotte's Guantanamo Bay
detainee transfer bill, of which I am a cosponsor. Indeed, I applaud
the expeditious consideration of Senator Ayotte's bill in the Armed
Services Committee under the leadership of Senator McCain.
These moves come at a critically important time as we continue to
witness the spectacles of barbarism perpetrated by the so-called
Islamic State, or ISIS--aid workers and journalists gruesomely
beheaded; Christians tortured and murdered for refusing to convert; and
most recently, a captured coalition pilot burned alive.
These acts are just a glimpse of the undiluted savagery unleashed by
this terrorist organization on the large swath of territory in Iraq and
Syria that it controls. Even beyond its horrific human rights
violations, the Islamic State threatens to destabilize the entire
Middle East and it is attempting to undo all that was accomplished by
our servicemembers in 8 years of blood and sacrifice in Iraq.
Most troubling of all, the Islamic State serves as a safe haven for
terrorist training and planning, similar to Afghanistan prior to the
September 11 attacks. With the Islamic State's stated intention to
``raise the flag of Allah in the White House'' and kill ``hundreds of
millions'' in a worldwide ``religious cleansing,'' there can be no
doubt this organization poses a clear and present danger to the
national security of the United States and to our allies, not only in
the Middle East but throughout the world. Accordingly, we must fight
and defeat this dangerous terrorist organization.
It is therefore incumbent upon us as legislators to ensure we provide
all the tools necessary for defeating the enemy. Personally, I agree
with the Obama administration's previous determination that the
President has ample powers to conduct operations against the Islamic
State under article II of the Constitution as well as the existing
authorizations for the use of military force passed by Congress in 2001
against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 2002 for Iraq. Nevertheless, I
agree with the President that Congress should authorize the use of
force against the Islamic State, not only to put to rest any legal
questions about the President's power to use force, but also to
demonstrate to the world America's resolve in this fight against
terror.
If we are to pass a new authorization for use of military force, it
is critically important to ensure that this new law is properly
crafted. It will define against whom and under what conditions our
Nation may direct its national might.
Therefore, Senator Inhofe and I feel compelled to propose general
principles that we believe should guide this effort, especially since
it appears the President will send his own draft to Congress shortly.
Senator Inhofe and I are offering these thoughts with no intention to
undermine careful consideration of the President's proposal by the
Senate's national security committees.
Furthermore, we do not at all wish to complicate the efforts to reach
consensus by laying down demands. Far from it. Rather, our intent is to
facilitate the legislative process by outlining some of the elements we
believe to be most crucial for ensuring the success of our
servicemembers as they confront this great evil.
First, the authorization should clearly articulate that the executive
branch is authorized to use force--employed in accordance with the law
of armed conflict--against the Islamic State.
Second, the authorization should be flexible enough to be utilized
not only against the Islamic State as it appears today, but also in
whatever form the organization takes going forward. This flexibility
should also include the authority to use force against organizations
that are associated with or materially supporting the Islamic State.
Finally, and most importantly, the authorization should not impose
any artificial and unnecessary limitations--such as those based on
time, geography, and type of force--that could interfere with our
strategic objective of defeating the Islamic State.
Unfortunately, many have suggested including such artificial
limitations on the use of force in a future authorization.
Specifically, many have discussed prohibiting the use of ground forces
as well as providing an expiration date for the authorization. These
are restrictions the Islamic State could use to its advantage. If we
are telling the Islamic State upfront we will not use ground forces,
will they not tailor their strategy around that fact? If we advertise
when the authorization expires at an arbitrary date and time, will they
not hunker down and wait for that date? Why would we not only
unilaterally impose limitations as to which types of tools and tactics
our servicemembers can use, but then also broadcast those limitations
to the enemy?
Indeed, we believe that Congress and the President should heed the
advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin
Dempsey, who stated in an interview on January 23, 2015, that:
I think in the crafting of the AUMF, all options should be
on the table, and then we can debate whether we want to use
them. But the authorization should be there. . . . In
particular, it shouldn't constrain activities geographically,
because ISIL knows no boundaries [and] doesn't recognize any
boundaries--in fact it's their intention to erase all
boundaries to their benefit. . . . Constraints on time, or a
``sunset clause,'' I just don't think it's necessary. I think
the nation should speak of its intent to confront this
radical ideological barbaric group and leave the option until
we can deal with it.
Senators Inhofe and I could not agree more. We hope the Congress will
enact a new authorization based on the principles we are outlining here
today. I want to thank him. I hope our colleagues will take this
seriously and hopefully we can turn this mess around.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gardner). The clerk will call
the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
[[Page S852]]
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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