[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 155 (Tuesday, December 16, 2014)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6922-S6923]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LEVIN:
  S. 3019. A bill to amend the War Powers Resolution to provide for the 
use of military force against non-state actors; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, when the War Powers Resolution was passed 
over a Presidential veto in 1973, its supporters expected that the War 
Powers Resolution would ensure that a national dialogue takes place 
before the employment of the U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities. The 
President--then President Nixon--was concerned that the War Powers 
Resolution's termination of certain authorities after 60 days unless 
extended by Congress would create unpredictably in U.S. foreign policy.
  The War Powers Resolution, as a practical matter, has not been 
effective. Every subsequent President since

[[Page S6923]]

President Nixon has viewed the War Powers Resolution as an 
unconstitutional impingement on the President's powers as Commander in 
Chief. So the 60-day trigger in the act has never been used to 
terminate hostilities, and the national dialogue envisioned by the 
authors of the resolution has failed to come about.
  I have a proposal to amend the War Powers Act in those instances 
where nonstate actors are the target. We are the target of them. They 
must become and should become the target for us to try to deter and 
respond to them when they attack us and try to terrorize us.
  I have introduced a bill today with a suggested amendment to the War 
Powers Act. When the War Powers Resolution was passed over a 
Presidential veto in 1973, its supporters expected that the War Powers 
Resolution would ensure that a national dialogue takes place before the 
employment of the U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities.

  The President, on the other hand, argued that the enactment of the 
legislation ``would seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act 
decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis.'' In his 
veto message, President Nixon argued that: ``As a result, the 
confidence of our allies in our ability to assist them could be 
diminished and the respect of our adversaries for our deterrent posture 
could decline. A permanent and substantial element of unpredictability 
would be injected into the world's assessment of American behavior, 
further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and war.''
  The President was particularly concerned that the War Powers 
Resolution's termination of certain authorities after 60 days unless 
extended by Congress would create unpredictability in U.S. foreign 
policy. The War Powers Resolution requires the President to consult 
``in every possible instance'' prior to introducing U.S. Armed Forces 
into hostilities and to report to Congress within 48 hours when, absent 
a declaration of war, U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into 
``hostilities or . . . situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'' After this 
report is submitted, the resolution requires that U.S. troops be 
withdrawn at the end of 60 days, unless Congress authorizes continued 
involvement by passing a declaration of war or some other specific 
authorization for continued U.S. involvement in such hostilities.
  Every subsequent President has viewed the War Powers Resolution as an 
unconstitutional impingement on the President's powers as Commander in 
Chief. As a result, the 60-day trigger in the Act has never been used 
to terminate hostilities, and the national dialogue envisioned by the 
authors of the Resolution has failed to come about.
  At this very moment, our troops have been engaged in hostilities in 
Iraq and Syria for more than 60 days, without the enactment of an 
authorizing resolution by Congress. Some believe that the continuing 
hostilities are a violation of the War Powers Resolution. Others argue 
that the War Powers Resolution has not been triggered, because our 
military actions can be justified under earlier authorizations. Either 
way, it is clear that the 60-day limitation in the resolution has had 
no more force and effect in the case of the battle against ISIS than it 
did in earlier actions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere.
  I believe that the War Powers Resolution needs to be modernized to 
make it more relevant to the situations our military is likely to face 
in the 21st century--in particular, the ongoing struggle against new 
and evolving terrorist groups.
  Today, I filed a bill that would amend the War Powers Resolution to 
authorize the President to act against non-state actors like ISIS, 
where he judges it necessary to address a continuing and imminent 
threat to the United States, subject to a resolution of disapproval by 
Congress under the War Powers Resolution. This approach would allow the 
President to take decisive action to address imminent terrorist 
threats, while reserving a clear role for Congress through a resolution 
of disapproval. I believe that this approach would provide for a 
national dialogue on the use of military force with respect to non-
state actors like ISIS, while avoiding the dead end provided unworkable 
requirement of the current War Powers Resolution, under which 
congressional inaction could require U.S. troops to suddenly disengage 
from the enemy while in harm's way.
  My amendment would provide that the authority to use U.S. Armed 
Forces against non-state actors would terminate after 60 days unless 
either: 1, the President's actions are based on a law providing for the 
use of military force against a non-state actor; or 2, the President 
notifies Congress that continued use of military force is necessary 
because the non-state actor poses a ``continuing and imminent threat'' 
to the United States or U.S. persons, and Congress does not enact a 
joint resolution of disapproval under expedited procedures.
  Expedited procedures under the War Powers Resolution would ensure 
that Congress considers the issue. Under these procedures, if a 
resolution of disapproval is filed in a timely manner by any Senator, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would have 15 calendar days to 
report the resolution or be discharged. The Senate would then have 3 
days to consider the Resolution, with time equally divided between 
proponents and opponents of the measure. As with any joint resolution, 
the measure could be vetoed, and such a veto would be subject to an 
override vote in Congress.
  I believe this approach would provide greater clarity for the 
Executive and Legislative branches and I hope a future Senate will 
consider it.
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