December 10, 2014

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H8951

you our thanks from the largest city on the U.S.-Mexico border.

I support this bill because I do represent more than 2,500 agents in El Paso. In addition, for the more than 21,000 agents on our northerm and southern borders, this is an important bill that provides a consistent and reliable pay system that addresses problems in administratively uncontrollable overtime and provides more predictable work schedules for our Border Patrol agents.

We thank these brave men and women to put their lives on the line to do what I think is the toughest job in Federal employment, but so far we have failed to provide financial certainty both to those agents and to their families.

I want to remind my colleagues that El Paso, Texas, the community I have the honor of representing, which is conjoined with Ciudad Juarez to form the largest truly binational community in the world, is the safest city in the United States, and that is not an anomaly. It has been the safest city in America 4 years running, and we have, in large part, to thank the Border Patrol agents who help to secure that. Not only do they keep our communities and our country secure, they do it in a very professional way. In 2013, there were exactly zero complaints filed against the Border Patrol in the El Paso sector. So I want to thank them for the great job that they do.

This bill creates a reliable pay system that responsibly secures our border. Supporting our agents, which this bill does, is the key to keeping our border communities and our country safe.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I want to thank Mr. O’ROURKE for his passion on this issue. He is a fine gentleman to work with on these types of issues, and Federal workers in general.

This truly is a win-win situation. We make better for Border Patrol agents and their families. We give more certainty to them and their families to help them with their mortgage payments. We also happen to save money for the American taxpayer. I appreciate the creativity and good work to get to this point.

I also thank ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON for her personal commitment to these issues, and Federal workers in general.

The legislation I introduced sought to address a number of the task force’s key recommendations, as does this bill, S. 1691. Cybersecurity is a complex mission for the Department and requires the Secretary of the Department desperately needs a more flexible hiring process with incentives to secure topnotch cyber recruits. The Department desperately needs a more flexible hiring process with incentives to secure topnotch cyber recruits. The Department asked the Homeland Security Advisory Committee to assemble a task force on the Department’s role in helping protect both the dot.gov and dot-com domains.

Importantly, the bill also directs the Comptroller General to analyze, monitor, and report on the implementation of DHS cybersecurity workforce measures.

Today, many of the Department’s top cyber positions are filled by nonpermanent contractors, and DHS reports having difficulty competing with other executive branch agencies and the private sector for talent. In an effort to address DHS’s cyber workforce challenges, the Department asked the Homeland Security Advisory Committee to assemble a task force on cybersecurity to provide recommendations on the best ways DHS can foster the development of a national cybersecurity workforce and DHS can improve its capability to recruit and retain cybersecurity talent.

The legislation I introduced sought to address a number of the task force’s key recommendations, as does this bill, S. 1691. Cybersecurity is a complex mission for the Department and requires a wide range of talent at all levels. Given the urgent nature of the DHS’ recruitment efforts, it is essential the Department have at its disposal certain hiring authorities and training procedures in place.

Before I close, I would like to acknowledge that there is a lot of interest on our side of the aisle to make progress on cybersecurity. Hopefully, in the coming days, old jurisdictional squabbles can be laid aside for the betterment of our country, as was done on this bill, and again, the Oversight Committee can work with the Homeland Security Committee to bring forth critical cybersecurity legislation. We need to put in place legislation to advance the bill with respect to protecting Federal civilian networks and codifying DHS’ role.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, I re- serve the balance of my time.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

I want to speak to the importance of this bill, the bipartisan way in which this bill has been handled in the House and the Senate, and look forward to more bipartisanship to come, Mr. CHAFFETZ.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

In conclusion, I thank the gentlewoman from Washington, D.C. I look forward to working with her on a host of issues as we serve on the same committee. I can only hope that as many of these can be as bipartisan as possible. We both have a tenacious nature to fight to represent the constituencies which we represent, and do so in the spirit of making this country better. Really, that is the reason that this bill has come here today with good, broad bipartisan support.

I yield back.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) themotion to pass the bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The Clerk read the title of the bill.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015”. 
TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2015 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.

(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of Justice.
(11) The Department of Energy.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2015, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, shall be specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—
(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3064(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2015 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element.

(b) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN PERSONNEL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.

(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2015 the sum of $507,400,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence are authorized 794 positions as of September 30, 2015. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—
(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2015 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2015, there are authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Account for fiscal year 2015 the sum of $314,000,000.
TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Subtitle A—General Matters

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary to increase such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution of the United States.

SEC. 303. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

(a) In General.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104 the following:

"SEC. 108A. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

"(a) In General.—Beginning in 2017, and once every 4 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the President a comprehensive national intelligence strategy to meet national security objectives for the following 4-year period, or a longer period, if appropriate.

"(b) REQUIREMENTS.—Each national intelligence strategy required by subsection (a) shall—

"(1) delineate a national intelligence strategy consistent with—
"(A) the most recent national security strategy report submitted pursuant to section 108;
"(B) the strategic plans of other relevant departments and agencies of the United States; and
"(C) other relevant national-level plans;

"(2) address matters related to national and military intelligence, including counterintelligence and cyberintelligence;

"(3) identify the major national security missions identified in paragraph (3);

"(4) describe how the intelligence community will utilize personnel, technology, partnerships, and other capabilities to pursue the major national security missions identified in paragraph (3);

"(5) assess current, emerging, and future threats to the intelligence community, including threats to foreign intelligence and security services and insider threats;

"(6) outline the organizational roles and missions of the elements of the intelligence community and of other United States departments and agencies involved in intelligence activities by former intelligence officers and employees; and

"(7) identify sources of strategic, institutional, programmatic, fiscal, and technological risk; and

"(8) analyze factors that may affect the intelligence community’s performance in pursuing the major national security missions identified in paragraph (3) during the following 10-year period;

"(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on each national intelligence strategy required by subsection (a) not later than 45 days after the date of the completion of such strategy;

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENTS.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108 the following new item:

"Sec. 108A. National intelligence strategy.".

SEC. 304. SOFTWARE LICENSING.

Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021a) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking "usage;" and inserting "usage, including—

"(A) increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses;

"(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;

"(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and

"(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training and;";

(2) in subsection (b)—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ""; and"" and inserting a semicolon;

(B) in paragraph (2), by striking "usage." and inserting "usage, including—

"(A) increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses;

"(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;

"(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and

"(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training and;"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

"(d) on the basis of the assessment required under paragraph (2), make such recommendations with regard to software licenses management to the Director of National Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers appropriate; and

"(e) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning in 2017, and once every 4 years thereafter, each national intelligence strategy shall, to the extent practicable, provide guidance to the intelligence community on software procurement and usage based on such recommendations.

"SEC. 305. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

(a) Restriction.—Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 305 the following new section:

"SEC. 304. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

"(a) in General.—The head of each element of the intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring each employee of such element occupying a covered position to sign a written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered employment to the head of such element occupying a covered position.

"(b) AGREEMENT ELEMENTS.—The regulations required under subsection (a) shall provide that an agreement contain provisions requiring each employee occupying a covered position to, during the two-year period beginning on the date on which such employee ceases to occupy such covered position—

"(1) report covered employment to the head of the element of the intelligence community that employed such employee in such covered position upon accepting such covered employment; and

"(2) annually (or more frequently if the head of such element considers it appropriate) report covered employment to the head of such element occupying a covered position.

"(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

"(1) COVERED EMPLOYMENT.—The term ‘covered employment’ means direct employment by, the head of or any person whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any government of a foreign country.

"(2) GOVERNMENT OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY.—The term ‘government of a foreign country’ has the meaning given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).

"(3) REGULATIONS AND CERTIFICATION.—(1) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the头 of each element of the intelligence community shall issue the regulations required under section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section; or

"(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ''usage.'' and inserting "usage, including—

"(A) increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses;

"(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;

"(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and

"(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training and;"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(3) on the basis of the assessment required under paragraph (2), make such recommendations with regard to software licenses management to the Director of National Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers appropriate; and

"(4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning in 2017, and once every 4 years thereafter, each national intelligence strategy shall, to the extent practicable, provide guidance to the intelligence community on software procurement and usage based on such recommendations.

"SEC. 306. INCLUSION OF PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTIONS IN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.

Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3224) is amended—

(1) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting "and Predominantly Black Institutions" after "universities;" and

(2) in subsection (g)—

(A) by redesigning paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:

"(4) PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The term "Predominantly Black Institution" has the meaning given the term in section 318 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1092c)."

SEC. 307. MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community that carry out financial intelligence activities shall prepare a plan for management of the elements of the intelligence community that carry out financial intelligence activities.

(b) CONTENTS OF PLAN.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall—

(1) establish a governance framework, procedures for sharing and harmonizing the acquisition and use of financial analytical tools, standards for quality of analytic products, and procedures for evaluation of resource allocations associated with the joint development of information sharing efforts
and tools, and an education and training model for elements of the intelligence community that carry out financial intelligence activities.

(c) BRIEFING TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on the actions the Director proposes to implement by subsection (b) of this section.

SEC. 308. ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR COUNCILING INSIDER THREATS.

(a) ANALYSIS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the National Counterintelligence Executive, through the congressional intelligence committees an analysis of private sector policies and procedures for countering insider threats.

(b) CONTENT.—The analysis required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a review of whether and how the intelligence community could utilize private sector hiring and human resources best practices to screen, vet, and validate the credentials, capabilities, and character of applicants for positions involving trusted access to sensitive information;

(2) an analysis of private sector policies for holding supervisors and subordinates accountable for violations of established security protocols and possible intelligence community best practices for adoption.

(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence completes the feasibility study required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report that summarizes the feasibility study, including the information required under subsection (b).

SEC. 311. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON CONSOLIDATING CLASSIFIED DATABASES OF CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND MALICIOUS SAMPLES IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) ELEMENTS.—The feasibility study required by subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) An inventory of classified databases of cyber threat indicators and malicious samples in the intelligence community.

(2) An assessment of actions that could be carried out to consolidate these databases to allow the greatest possible information sharing within the intelligence community and cost savings for the Federal Government.

(3) An assessment of any impediments to such consolidation.

(b) TIMING.—The feasibility study required by subsection (a) shall be completed not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence completes the feasibility study required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report that summarizes the feasibility study, including the information required under subsection (b).

SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY THREAT AND CYBERCRIME COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) cooperation between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and Ukraine should be increased to improve cybersecurity policies between these two countries;

(2) the United States and Ukraine should pursue improved extradition procedures among the Governments of the United States, Ukraine, and other countries from which cybercriminals target United States citizens and entities;

(3) the President should—

(A) initiate a round of formal United States-Ukraine bilateral talks on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation, with additional multilateral talks that include other law enforcement partners such as Europol and Interpol; and

(B) work to obtain a commitment from the Government of Ukraine to end cybercrime directed at persons outside Ukraine and to work with the United States and other allies to deter and convict known cybercriminals.

(4) the President should establish a capacity building program with the Government of Ukraine, which could include—

(A) a joint effort between cyber capacity building, including intelligence and law enforcement services in Ukraine;

(B) sending United States law enforcement agents to aid law enforcement agencies in Ukraine in investigating cybercrimes;

(C) agreements to improve communications networks to enhance law enforcement cooperation, such as a hotline between United States and Ukraine law enforcement agencies in the United States and Ukraine; and

(D) the President should establish and maintain an intelligence and law enforcement cooperation scorecard with metrics designed to measure the number of instances that intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United States request assistance from intelligence and law enforcement agencies in Ukraine and the number and type of responses received to such requests.

SEC. 313. REPLACEMENT OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF SERVING AT UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) EMPLOYMENT.—The Secretary of State shall ensure that, not later than one year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, every supervisory position at a United States diplomatic facility in the Russian Federation shall be occupied by a citizen of the United States who has passed, or shall be subject to, a thorough background check.

(2) EXTENSION.—The Secretary of State may extend the deadline under paragraph (1) for up to one hundred eighty days for the advance written justification and justification of such extension to the appropriate congressional committees.

(3) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on progress made toward meeting the employment requirements under paragraph (1).

(b) PLAN FOR REDUCED USE OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other appropriate government agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to further reduce the reliance on locally employed staff in United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation. The plan shall, at a minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and numbers of employees to be replaced.

(c) APPOINTMENT OF DIPLOMATIC STAFF.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the appropriate appropriations committees, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 321. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION PROCESS.

Subtitle B—Reporting

SEC. 321. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION PROCESS.

Not later than December 31, 2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing—

(1) proposals to improve the declassification process throughout the intelligence community; and

(2) steps the intelligence community could take, or legislation that may be necessary, to enable the National Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by Executive Order No. 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707).

SEC. 322. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENT SPENDING TARGETS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 2016, and April 1, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative costs for the intelligence community during the preceding year.

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include for each element of the intelligence community the following:

(1) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce costs related to the intelligence community's activities, including the workforce, technology equipment, software, or services.

(2) A description of the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce intelligence community administrative costs as the Director may specify for purposes of this section.

SEC. 323. ANNNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 31, 2015, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on violations of national security law or executive order.

(b) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2016, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce the number of violations of national security law or executive order.

SEC. 324. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year and along with the budget materials submitted in support of the budget of the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the Department shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report for each fiscal year on each intelligence activity of each intelligence component of the Department of Homeland Security that is directed by the Under Secretary, that includes the following:

(1) The amount of funding requested for each such intelligence activity.

(2) The number of full-time employees funded to perform each such intelligence activity.

(3) The number of full-time contractor employees (or the equivalent of full-time in the case of part-time contractor employees) funded to perform or in support of each such intelligence activity.

(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal investigations, include a description of each inspection taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order (including Executive Order No. 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) relating to intelligence activities by personnel of an element of the intelligence community that were identified during the previous calendar year.

(c) REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Director of National Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce the number of violations of national security law or executive order.

(d) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal investigations, include a description of each inspection taken in response to, an act of sabotage or terrorism, or any other violation of law or executive order, relating to intelligence activities by personnel of an element of the intelligence community in the course of the employment of such personnel that, during the previous calendar year, was—

(1) determined by the director, head, or general counsel of any element of the intelligence community to have occurred;

(2) referred to the Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution;

(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any element of the intelligence community; or

(4) referred to the Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution.

(e) INITIAL REPORT.—The first report required under section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(f) GUIDELINES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall—

(1) issue guidelines to carry out section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a); and

(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.

SEC. 325. TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of sections in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding after the item relating to section 510 the following new item:

“Sec. 511. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.”.
MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING

SEC. 329. REPORT ON FOREIGN MAN-MADE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE WEAPONS.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a comprehensive report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.

(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 330. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTER- TERRORISM STRATEGY TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT AL- QAEDA AND ITS AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED GROUPS.

(a) REPORT.—In general—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.

(b) COORDINATION.—The report required by paragraph (a) shall be coordinated with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other department or agency of the Government that has responsibility for activities directed at combating al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriative committees of Congress’ means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;

(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations;

(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 331. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON RETRAINING VETERANS IN CYBERSECURITY.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to Congress a feasibility study on retraining veterans and retired members of the intelligence community in cybersecurity.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPTERSBERGER) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan. General Leave

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4681.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the RECORD at the end of my remarks the Joint Explanatory Statement and a report prepared by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.

Mr. Speaker, when Mr. RUPTERSBERGER and I assumed the helm of the committee, we committed to return to the practice of passing the annual Intelligence Authorization bill, recognizing that it is one of the most critical tools that Congress has to control the intelligence activities of the
United States Government. I am proud today that we are bringing the fifth such authorization bill to the floor since Mr. RUPPERSBERGER assumed the role of ranking member and I assumed the role of chairman 4 years ago.

As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of the committee’s direction is found in the classified annex to the bill, which is very similar to the version passed by the House earlier this year.

At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex increases the President's budget request by less than 1 percent and is consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key committee funding initiatives, vital to national security, are preserved in this bill. These funding initiatives are offset by reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies.

The bill’s modest net increase reflects the committee’s concern that the President does not provide a budget that will fund a number of important initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls when it comes to the matters of national security. The bill also provides substantial intelligence resources to help defeat Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the Levant.

Earlier this year, the House passed its version of this bill with overwhelming bipartisan support. This bill contains all of the provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the fiscal year 2014 bill, along with provisions added by the Senate. None of these provisions are considered controversial, and we have worked through and vetted to make sure that is accurate with both Republican and Democrat staff and Members.

Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history. ISIL is attempting to build a state across the Middle East, from Lebanon to Iraq, including Jordan and Syria.

The group already controls a swath of land across Iraq and Syria about the size of the State of Indiana, and it is growing. The goal of our counterterrorism strategy is to deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks against the United States and/or our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIL from establishing such a safe haven, and, as a result, we face a growing threat from that region.

At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex increases the President’s budget request by less than one percent and is consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key committee funding initiatives, vital to national security, are preserved in this bill. These funding initiatives are offset by reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies. The bill's modest increase reflects the Committee's concern that the President's request does not provide a budget that will fund a number of important initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls. The bill also provides substantial intelligence resources to help defeat ISIL.

Earlier this year, the House passed its version of this bill by an overwhelming bipartisan vote. This bill contains all of those provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the FY 14 bill, along with provisions added by the Senate.

In the haze of what seems to be self-loathing, it is easy to, at some point, go back and point fingers at what we believe may or may not have happened in the work of keeping America safe. It is realisti
cally and holistically unfair that we would do that to these very brave souls who risk their lives today.

But here is the good news for Americans. These folks that work in the shadows understand that they have accepted these dangerous and quiet roles, and they will get up this morning, like these men and women of our intelligence community, and understand it is between them and the United States when it comes to any terrorist attack, or worse, bigger, broader conflict somewhere in the world.

They will do their job; they will do their duty; they will do their mission. They will read the papers and fold them and put them on their desk and go about their work, their important work. But it is wrong that years later after these people have to believe that they might have to get a lawyer to do their job.

The next time that America asks them to do something hard and difficult in defense of the United States, they shouldn’t be giving them lawyers and subpoenas and the United Nations condemning their actions and looking for prosecutions in their effort to tear the United States down one more level.

We ought to be giving them ticker tape parades when they come home from this mission, so thank you for your sacrifice, and thank you for your family’s sacrifice. We can sleep better at night knowing that you have had the courage to stand where no other American was willing to stand in defense of the United States.

I hope they take this as certainly my final bill on this particular floor to encourage them to do their good work, to let the American people know that their kids and putting them on the bus this morning understand that it takes their efforts to keep this country safe, that somebody that shows up for work and is engaged in international commerce understands that it takes their effort. We should be proud of our intelligence community have the funding and authorities and support that they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.

I take this moment, Mr. Speaker, at a time when certainly voices both around the country and around the world are seeming very very courageous men and women who show up in the intelligence business to provide the information to keep America safe. They are silent warriors. They are faithful patriots. They don’t ask for recognition. They don’t ask for time. You don’t see their names in the front pages of the paper or on TV. They really don’t seek that recognition.

But they seek the very purpose of being the first to be able to develop that one piece of information that might prevent further conflict, it might prevent a terrorist attack, it might prevent a nuclear launch, it might prevent one Nation from attacking another.

In the haze of what seems to be self-loathing these days, by targeting that against these very courageous men and women who cannot defend themselves in public, we are doing a disservice to their courage and their commitment to keep America safe. We find that it is easy to, at some point, go back and point fingers at what we believe may or may not have happened in the work of keeping America safe. It is realistically and holistically unfair that we would do that to these very brave souls who risk their lives today.

But here is the good news for Americans. These folks that work in the shadows understand that they have accepted these dangerous and quiet roles, and they will get up this morning, like these men and women of our intelligence community, and understand it is between them and the United States when it comes to any terrorist attack, or worse, bigger, broader conflict somewhere in the world.

So they will do their job; they will do their duty; they will do their mission. They will read the papers and fold them and put them on their desk and go about their work, their important work. But it is wrong that years later after these people have to believe that they might have to get a lawyer to do their job.

The next time that America asks them to do something hard and difficult in defense of the United States, they shouldn’t be giving them lawyers and subpoenas and the United Nations condemning their actions and looking for prosecutions in their effort to tear the United States down one more level.

We ought to be giving them ticker tape parades when they come home from this mission, so thank you for your sacrifice, and thank you for your family’s sacrifice. We can sleep better at night knowing that you have had
build a state across the Middle East—from Lebanon to Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The group already controls a swath of land across Iraq and Syria. The goal of our counterterrorism strategy is to deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks against America and our allies. Unfortunately, we have not prevented ISIL from establishing such a safe haven, and as a result we face a growing threat from the region.

At the same time, state actors like Russia and China view this time as an opportunity to expand their reach and influence. Unequivocally, we have not prevented ISIL from establishing such a safe haven, and as a result we face a growing threat from the region.

We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policy makers with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal American jobs. We ask them to track developments in missile threats. And we demand that they tell it—every time.

This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our Intelligence Community have the funding and authorities—and support—they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.

Before closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women of this country who serve in our Intelligence Community today. It has been a distinct honor to get to know so many of them, and I am proud to have played a role in contributing to their success.

I would also like to extend thanks to all of my dedicated staff on the Committee who worked hard over the years to get us back on track in passing the annual Authorization bill and in our daily oversight of the Intelligence Community.

Thank you to my current committee staff: Darren Dick, Katie Wheelbarger, Sarah Geffroy, Andy Keiser, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry, Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael Ellis, Chelsey Campbell, Genf Kahn, Brooke Eisele, Randy Smith, Jim Hildebrand, Shannon Stuart, Rachel Wilson, Lisa Major, Diane Rinaldo. Thank you, as well as to those who are no longer with the staff but played an influential role on committee activities.

I want to extend my gratitude to former Select Committee on Intelligence to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Personal ceiling adjustments

Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2015 in excess of the number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may do so only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2015.

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of $514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2015 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

Section 305 requires the heads of each element of the IC to issue regulations that re-
believed to constitute evidence of a crime and are retained by a law enforcement agency, and communications that are encrypted or reasonably believed to have a secret meaning.

Because it may be necessary in certain instances for IC elements to retain communications covered by this section for a period in excess of five years, the Attorney General, in the absence of such a determination, Section 309 is intended to establish a default rule for intelligence collection activities, not otherwise authorized by legal process, that requires agencies to delete communications covered by this section after five years, unless a determination is made that the communications constitute foreign intelligence collection activities that were identified during the previous calendar year. Under the National Security Act, the President is required to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States government. Nonetheless, this annual reporting requirement is not necessary to inform the intelligence oversight committees on matters not otherwise subject to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Section 310 makes a technical amendment to Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to clarify that the policies and procedures prescribed by section 3001(c) (to permit a determination to apprise adverse security clearance or access determinations) are only required to apply to adverse security clearance or access determinations alleged to be in reprim or having made a protected whistleblower disclosure.

Section 311, Feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat indicators in United States.

Section 307 requires the DNI to conduct a feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples in the IC and to provide a report to the congressional intelligence committees summarizing the feasibility study.

Section 312, Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation with Ukraine

Section 312 expresses the sense of Congress concerning cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation between the United States and Ukraine.

Section 313, Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation

Section 313 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that every supervisory position at a U.S. diplomatic facility in the Russian Federation is occupied by a citizen of the United States who has passed a background check and to provide Congress with a plan to further reduce reliance on locally employed staff.

Section 314, Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation and adjacent countries

Section 314 requires that each U.S. diplomatic facility that is constructed in, or undergoes a construction upgrade in, the Russian Federation, any country that shares a land border with the Russian Federation, or any country that is a former member of the Soviet Union, shall be constructed to include a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. The Secretary of State may waive the requirement for an SSI facility if he or she determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States.

Section 312. Report on declassification process

Section 321 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress describing proposals to improve the declassification process and steps that may be necessary, to enable the National Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by Executive Order 13526.

Section 322, Report on intelligence community efficient spending targets

Section 322 requires the DNI to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees on the status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative costs for the IC during the preceding year.

Section 323, Annual report on violations of law or executive order

Section 323 requires the DNI to report annually to the congressional intelligence committees on violations of law or executive order by personnel of an element of the IC that were identified during the previous calendar year. The President is required to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the criminal activities of the United States government. Nonetheless, this annual reporting requirement is not necessary to inform the intelligence oversight committees on matters not otherwise subject to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Section 324, Annual report on intelligence activities of the Department of Homeland Security

Section 324 requires the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis of the DHS to provide the congressional intelligence committees with a report on each intelligence activity of each intelligence component of the Department that includes, among other things, the amount of funding requested, the number of full-time employees, and the number of full-time contractor employees. In addition, Section 324 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that examines the feasibility and advisability of consolidating the planning, programming, and resourcing activities within the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP).

The HSIP budget was established to fund those intelligence activities that principally support missions of the DHS separately from those of the NIP. To date, however, this mechanism has only been used to supplement the budget for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. It has not been used to fund the activities of the non-IC components in the DHS that perform intelligence-related activities. As a result, there is no comprehensive reporting to Congress regarding the overall resources and personnel required in support of the Department’s intelligence activities.

Section 325, Report on political prison camps in North Korea

Section 325 requires the DNI to submit a report on political prison camps in North Korea to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 326, Assessment of security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure

Section 326 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to conduct an intelligence assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure.

Section 327. Enhanced contractor level assessments for the intelligence community

Section 327 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to require that the annual personnel level assessments for the IC, required by section 506b of the Act, include a separate estimate of the number of intelligence collectors and analysts contracted by each agency and an assessment of the functions performed by such contractors.

Section 328, Assessment of the efficacy of memorandum of understanding to facilitate intelligence-sharing

Section 328 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis to provide appropriate congressional committees with an assessment of the efficacy of the memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. This study should help identify any obstacles to intelligence sharing between agencies, particularly any obstacles that might have impeded intelligence sharing in the wake of the April 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon, and find improvements to existing intelligence sharing relationships.

Section 329, Report on foreign man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons

Section 329 requires the DNI to provide appropriate congressional committees with a report on the threat posed by manmade electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States interests through 2025.

Section 330, Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups

Section 330 requires the DNI to provide appropriate congressional committees with a report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.

Section 331, Feasibility study on retraining veterans in cybersecurity

Section 331 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a feasibility study on retraining veterans and retired members of elements of the IC in cybersecurity.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Chairman ROGERS, this is my last opportunity on the floor to thank you again for your leadership. It has, once again, produced a strong, bipartisan, and bicameral Intelligence Authorization Act.

Our committee believes that our Nation’s security is too important to be a political football. We have had different views, we argue, but we work it out for the good of American people. Mr. Chairman, I hope that your legacy of bipartisanship, hard work, rigorous oversight, and problem-solving continues and spreads throughout the Congress. It is amazing what we can accomplish when we work together to solve problems.

I also want to thank our counterparts in the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senators FEINSTEIN and BLUMENTHAL, for working very closely with us and each member of our committee. On the Democratic side, I want to acknowledge all the hard work of Mr. THOMPSON—who is sitting here to my left—Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. LANGEVIN,
Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. GUTIÉRREZ, Mr. PAS- 
TOR, Mr. Himes, and Ms. Sewell. And I 
want to thank our staff and the dedi- 
cated men and women of the intel-
ligence community who work every 
day and all night throughout the world 
to protect the American people. And 
the chair-
man’s statements about those men and 
women throughout the world who are 
out there protecting us and putting 
their lives on the line.

Now, today, we look beyond this Con-
gress. We come together to set the stage 
for the continuing oversight of intelli-
gence programs, personnel, and 
dollars. By doing so, we reinforce to 
the American people, and to the world, 
that there are checks and balances. We 
reinforce that the tools we authorize 
are for the sole purpose of keeping us, 
our allies, and our partners safe.

In May, the House passed the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for fiscal 
years 2014 and 2015 by 396 votes to 19. 
The Senate took up each bill sepa-
rate year separately. Over the summer, this 
House passed the FY14 bill, which the 
President signed.

So, we now take up the FY15 bill, 
which includes amendments and sent 
back to us. This amended bill largely 
mirrors the relevant portions of the 
House-passed combined bill.

Passing a detailed Intelligence Au-
thorization Act ensures that our intel-
ligence agencies spend money only on 
programs Congress is informed of, ap-
proves, and can continuously oversee.

Oversight is extremely important. It 
helps to make sure that everything our 
intelligence agencies do follows the 
Constitution and the laws of the United 
States and maximizes the civil 
liberties and privacy of Americans. At 
the same time, the intelligence agen-
cies need the clear authorization, di-
rection, and guidance from Congress to 
do their vital work to protect and de-
fend America, its allies, and its part-
ners.

The Intelligence Authorization Act is 
split into four parts: the unclassified 
legislative text; the unclassified re-
port; the classified annex, which ex-
plains our intent for the classified as-
pects of the bill; and the classified 
schedule of authorizations.

While we have made cuts to certain 
areas and added money in others to 
produce a responsible, well thought 
out, and fiscally prudent budget, the 
budget for fiscal year 2015 slightly 
exceeds the President’s request.

While over the last 4 years we have 
reduced the intelligence community's 
budget by over a billion dollars, this 
year’s bill acknowledges the need to 
maintain, in recognition of the drastic 
cuts of sequestration and the Budget Con-
trol Act.

Additionally, this bill acknowledges 
the need to step up our intelligence ef-
forts to counter evolving threats such as ISIL. It is a dangerous world out 
there, and our bill accounts for that.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of 
my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. 
Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.

I thought I would take a moment to 
extend my thanks to all the dedicated 
staff on the committee, certainly from 
the Republican side and to the Demo-
crats as well, who worked hard over 
the years to get us back on track in 
passing this annual authorization bill in 
our daily oversight of the intel-
ligence community.

If you will indulge me, Mr. Speaker, 
thank you to my current committee 
staff: Darren Dick, Katie Wheelbarger, 
Andy Kester, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry, 
Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael Ellis, 
Chelsea Campbell, Geof Kahn, Brooke Eisele, 
Randi Smith, Jim Hildebrand, Shanno 
Stuart, Rachel Wilson, Lisa Major, 
and Diane Rinaldo.

Thank you as well to staff who have 
played an influential role in the com-
mittee activities during my tenure as 
chairman in reengaging this as a force 
for oversight in the Intelligence Com-
mittee: Michael Allen, Chris Doneson, 
Jamil Jaffer, Nathan Hauser, Todd 
Jones, Frank Garcia, George Pappas, 
Will Koella, Leah Scott, Fred Fliezt, 
and Stephanie Pelton.

Finally, a big thank you to our dedi-
cated security and information tech-
nology staff, by the way, who have 
done well to beat back the hordes of 
our nation state actors who, for some 
reason, Mr. Speaker, took a good inter-
etest in we warfare in the classified 
space, and they keep running every single day: Brandon 
Smith, Kristin Jepson, and Kevin 
Klein.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of 
my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair-
man, I yield 2 minutes to the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. Thomp-
son), a great member of our committee 
who specialized in infrastructure and 
also worked very hard to make sure that 
our Embassies have the intel-
ligence information they need to pro-
tect themselves.

Mr. THOMPSON of California. I 
thank the gentleman for yielding and 
for all the good work you did on the 
committee as the ranking member. I 
also want to thank Chairman ROGERS 
for the good work that he did as the 
chairman.

Working together, he was very ac-
commodating and allowed all of us to 
be able to address specific issues that 
were of concern to us and regarding the 
security of our great Nation. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. We are going to 
miss you.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong 
support of the passage of this bill. This 
bill will provide greater national secu-
ritiy for our country and the people 
that we all represent.

The bill contains two important pro-
visions that I authored that protect 
our communities at home and diplo-
matic facilities abroad.

My district is home to several oil re-
fineries, employing thousands of peo-
ple, providing well-paying, good, mid-
dle class jobs, and are a key part of our 
regional economy.

As domestic oil production continues 
to increase in the nation, I have heard 
from several of my constituents and 
my local governments about their 
growing concern regarding the security 
of the shipment and storage of crude 
oil and subsequent refined products. I 
believe we have the responsibility to 
protect our workers, our domestic re-
fineries, and our communities from po-
tential threats.

Included in this bill is a provision that 
directs the Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to conduct an assessment of 
the security of our Nation’s oil refin-
eries and related rail transportation in-
frastructure. It directs the office to 
makes recommendations on how to im-
prove intelligence collection and shar-
ing of information to better protect 
those facilities in the surrounding com-
unities from any harm.

Additionally, studies conducted in re-
sponse to the terrible 2012 attack on 
Benghazi identified the need for secu-
ritv personnel at U.S. diplomatic posts 
to receive threat information in a more 
timely manner.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, again, I want to thank my friends on the other side of the aisle, from Dutch to Heather, and the whole entire team for putting this product together by putting our country first. It is very important.

I challenge every Member to read this material next year when it is announced that you can review the classified annex. Review the classified annex. I think they will have a better perspective at the huge number of challenges facing the United States when it comes to real threats developing around the world.

Mr. Speaker, I would again say thanks to all, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the Intelligence Authorization Act. As a member of the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, I know these Authorization bills provide the necessary accountability, direction, and resources for those who keep our nation safe.

Today’s bill reflects the continuation of the Committee’s bipartisan and bicameral work, and I want to thank Chairman ROGERS and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER for their strong and consistent leadership on these critical issues.

Today I want to highlight two areas of specific interest to me.

First, this legislation strikes a careful balance between ensuring that our nation’s secrets are kept safe and providing appropriate transparency with the American people. There are lawful ways to raise concerns of wrongdoing and procedures to declassify information appropriately. In the past, Congress has strengthened these avenues, including by enhancing whistleblower protections and the role of Inspectors General.

As it has each year, this bill adds to the mission of counterintelligence to ensure that information is protected and that the tools utilized by security professionals are handled lawfully and with full consideration for the privacy and civil liberties of our intelligence professionals. This bill continues this important direction, asking the DNI to establish appropriate guidelines to govern how publicly available information can be utilized.

Second, this bill continues to support the work of the men and women at the front lines of cybersecurity. It helps cybersecurity professionals at NSA, FBI, and DHS to hone their tools and skills to protect us, while supporting initiatives to grow the next-generation cyber workforce.

Finally, once again, let me just say thank you to my good friend, Mr. Chairman, and to the members of the committee, to our colleagues in the Senate, and to the men and women of the intelligence community. It has been my honor and privilege to work with you under your great leadership during the 113th Congress.

I also want to thank the Republican and Democratic staffs for working together. That is what makes it work. You are only as good as your team and your staff.

I also would like to acknowledge the Democratic staff: Staff Director Heath Molino, Amanda Rogers-Thorpe, Bob Minehart, Linda Cohen, Carly Blake, Allison Getty, Deb Haynie, and Michael Bahar.

I also thank staff members who were with us but have retired: Mike Shank, Janet Fisher, and Khizer Sayed.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
RULES AND CONCUR IN THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO THE BILL, H.R. 4681.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. AMASH, Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

H.Res. 775

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (S. 2244) to extend the termination date of the Terrorism Insurance Program established under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, and for other purposes.

All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived. The amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution shall be considered as adopted.

The bill, as amended, shall be considered as read. All points of order against provisions in the bill, as amended, are waived.

The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any further amendment thereto, to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Financial Services, and (2) one motion to commit with or without instructions.

SEC. 2. It shall be in order at any time on the legislative day of December 11, 2014, for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House suspend the rules as though under clause 1 of rule XV. The Speaker or his designee shall consult with the Minority Leader or his designee on the designation of any matter for consideration pursuant to this section.

SEC. 3. On any legislative day of the second session of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress after December 11, 2014:

(a) the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day shall be considered as approved; and

(b) the Chair may at any time declare the House adjourned to meet at a date and time, within the limits of clause 4, section 5, article I of the Constitution, to be announced by the Chair in declaring the adjournment.

SEC. 6. Each day during the period addressed by section 3 of this resolution shall constitute a calendar day for purposes of section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546).

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. HASTINGS), my dear friend, pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks.

Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, today the House of Representatives is considering a resolution of disapproval of a bill to reauthorize the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, or a program known as TRIA. Without this bill, TRIA is set to expire on December 31, meaning that the House and the Senate must now act or the program will end at the end of this year.

Since TRIA was signed into law in 2002, it has served as an effective means of dealing with the problem of availability of terrorism insurance. TRIA has enabled the private insurance market to provide an essential type of coverage that otherwise may not exist.

However, like many other government programs, TRIA needs to be looked at and reformed in order to serve its original purpose, and that is why we are here today, Mr. Speaker.

Thanks to the leadership of Chairman Jeb HENSARLING and Vice Chairman RANDY NEUGEBAUER of the Financial Services Committee, S. 2244 provides for many of those necessary reforms that will protect taxpayers, promote market stability, and provide for economic security for the American people, all in one, brand-new package.

What we are doing here today is important and essential for many people, but it is also to maintain the stability of a marketplace.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take us back to 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. None of us will ever forget where we were when we first heard and saw of the terrorist attacks that attacked our homeland in New York City, at the Pentagon, and in a field in Pennsylvania. The accompanying stories of heroism and the deeds by Americans and others were simply heroism at its finest at a time of chaos.

What some might not remember, though, is the remarkable amount of economic uncertainty and damage that was caused to America and in the following weeks and months after 9/11. While we mourned the loss of many loved ones, our economy was shaken to its core.

Those attacks created and caused $200 billion in losses, and approximately $20 billion of which were incurred by insurance companies. A second similar attack would have left the U.S. insurance economy insolvent, which in turn, being insolvent, would have undermined our entire economic structure of the free enterprise system is why TRIA was pressed into law, to provide a Federal backstop to avoid an immediate terrorism risk insurance crisis.

Sadly, terrorism has continued to be an ongoing threat to our Nation and, for the foreseeable future, I think that we need to remain vigilant and prepared for those consequences. So the cost of terrorism still looms large, and acts of terrorism are uninsurable risks that could sink our insurance markets without this new, updated program.

In this way, TRIA is a vital economic piece of our Nation’s comprehensive security strategy because it allows for the American economy to recover more quickly in the event of an attack. I believe it does more than just put in place building blocks for us to understand responsibility, economic security, and how we would build back based upon rule of law and understanding about what would happen at a time of chaos.

TRIA provides certainty, certainty to our marketplace, by giving policyholders and insurers the tools that they need to understand and to develop a market-based solution to the economic threat that could be posed by terrorism. It gives policyholders and insurance providers the opportunity to model risk and to diversify their exposure with an understanding of what the law would provide.

I am encouraged by the reforms championed by, yesterday, up in the Rules Committee, Chairman Jeb HENSARLING from the Fifth Congressional District of Texas, who has placed many of these new items directly into the bill as a result of hard negotiation.

These are called reforms, Mr. Speaker, and three reforms stand out to me as being particularly important.

First, section 102. It would decrease the Federal share of losses under the program from 80 percent to 60 percent, which would make the Federal share of losses under the program from 80 percent to 60 percent. That means that the Federal taxpayers will not be responsible for less of the initial costs incurred after a terrorist attack than under the current law.

Second, section 103. It would increase the program trigger to $200 million in $20 million increments over 5 years. This means that TRIA would not kick in, the government program would not kick in until there was $200 million in insurance losses following an attack. Ensuring that the government would not only get involved if an attack had a massive impact, but we would know the rules ahead of time.