[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 150 (Wednesday, December 10, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H8951-H8962]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and 
concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:
  Senate amendment:

       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015''.

[[Page H8952]]

       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Budgetary effects.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                      Subtitle A--General Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. National intelligence strategy.
Sec. 304. Software licensing.
Sec. 305. Reporting of certain employment activities by former 
              intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 306. Inclusion of Predominantly Black Institutions in intelligence 
              officer training program.
Sec. 307. Management and oversight of financial intelligence.
Sec. 308. Analysis of private sector policies and procedures for 
              countering insider threats.
Sec. 309. Procedures for the retention of incidentally acquired 
              communications.
Sec. 310. Clarification of limitation of review to retaliatory security 
              clearance or access determinations.
Sec. 311. Feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of 
              cyber threat indicators and malware samples.
Sec. 312. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime 
              cooperation with Ukraine.
Sec. 313. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United 
              States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 314. Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities 
              in United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian 
              Federation and adjacent countries.

                         Subtitle B--Reporting

Sec. 321. Report on declassification process.
Sec. 322. Report on intelligence community efficient spending targets.
Sec. 323. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.
Sec. 324. Annual report on intelligence activities of the Department of 
              Homeland Security.
Sec. 325. Report on political prison camps in North Korea.
Sec. 326. Assessment of security of domestic oil refineries and related 
              rail transportation infrastructure.
Sec. 327. Enhanced contractor level assessments for the intelligence 
              community.
Sec. 328. Assessment of the efficacy of memoranda of understanding to 
              facilitate intelligence-sharing.
Sec. 329. Report on foreign man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons.
Sec. 330. Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, 
              dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or 
              associated groups.
Sec. 331. Feasibility study on retraining veterans in cybersecurity.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).

     SEC. 3. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.

       The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of 
     complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall 
     be determined by reference to the latest statement titled 
     ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act, 
     submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the 
     Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such 
     statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2015 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as 
     of September 30, 2015, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill 
     H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate 
     portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedule except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel 
     in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2015 by 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2015 the sum of $507,400,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 794 positions as of 
     September 30, 2015. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2015 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2016.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2015, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2015 the sum of $514,000,000.

[[Page H8953]]

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                      Subtitle A--General Matters

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 108 the following:

     ``SEC. 108A. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.

       ``(a) In General.--Beginning in 2017, and once every 4 
     years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
     develop a comprehensive national intelligence strategy to 
     meet national security objectives for the following 4-year 
     period, or a longer period, if appropriate.
       ``(b) Requirements.--Each national intelligence strategy 
     required by subsection (a) shall--
       ``(1) delineate a national intelligence strategy consistent 
     with--
       ``(A) the most recent national security strategy report 
     submitted pursuant to section 108;
       ``(B) the strategic plans of other relevant departments and 
     agencies of the United States; and
       ``(C) other relevant national-level plans;
       ``(2) address matters related to national and military 
     intelligence, including counterintelligence;
       ``(3) identify the major national security missions that 
     the intelligence community is currently pursuing and will 
     pursue in the future to meet the anticipated security 
     environment;
       ``(4) describe how the intelligence community will utilize 
     personnel, technology, partnerships, and other capabilities 
     to pursue the major national security missions identified in 
     paragraph (3);
       ``(5) assess current, emerging, and future threats to the 
     intelligence community, including threats from foreign 
     intelligence and security services and insider threats;
       ``(6) outline the organizational roles and missions of the 
     elements of the intelligence community as part of an 
     integrated enterprise to meet customer demands for 
     intelligence products, services, and support;
       ``(7) identify sources of strategic, institutional, 
     programmatic, fiscal, and technological risk; and
       ``(8) analyze factors that may affect the intelligence 
     community's performance in pursuing the major national 
     security missions identified in paragraph (3) during the 
     following 10-year period.
       ``(c) Submission to Congress.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report on each national intelligence strategy 
     required by subsection (a) not later than 45 days after the 
     date of the completion of such strategy.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 108A. National intelligence strategy.''.

     SEC. 304. SOFTWARE LICENSING.

       Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3044) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``usage; and'' and 
     inserting ``usage, including--
       ``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of 
     software licenses;
       ``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of 
     comprehensive inventories of software licenses using 
     automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
       ``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment 
     decisions; and
       ``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient 
     software licenses management training; and'';
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``usage.'' and inserting 
     ``usage, including--
       ``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of 
     software licenses;
       ``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of 
     comprehensive inventories of software licenses using 
     automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
       ``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment 
     decisions; and
       ``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient 
     software licenses management training; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) based on the assessment required under paragraph (2), 
     make such recommendations with respect to software 
     procurement and usage to the Director of National 
     Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers 
     appropriate.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Implementation of Recommendations.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date on which the Director of National 
     Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief 
     Information Officer of the Intelligence Community in 
     accordance with subsection (b)(3), the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, issue 
     guidelines for the intelligence community on software 
     procurement and usage based on such recommendations.''.

     SEC. 305. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY 
                   FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

       (a) Restriction.--Title III of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 303 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 304. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY 
                   FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

       ``(a) In General.--The head of each element of the 
     intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring each 
     employee of such element occupying a covered position to sign 
     a written agreement requiring the regular reporting of 
     covered employment to the head of such element.
       ``(b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations required under 
     subsection (a) shall provide that an agreement contain 
     provisions requiring each employee occupying a covered 
     position to, during the two-year period beginning on the date 
     on which such employee ceases to occupy such covered 
     position--
       ``(1) report covered employment to the head of the element 
     of the intelligence community that employed such employee in 
     such covered position upon accepting such covered employment; 
     and
       ``(2) annually (or more frequently if the head of such 
     element considers it appropriate) report covered employment 
     to the head of such element.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered employment.--The term `covered employment' 
     means direct employment by, representation of, or the 
     provision of advice relating to national security to the 
     government of a foreign country or any person whose 
     activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, 
     controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major 
     part, by any government of a foreign country.
       ``(2) Covered position.--The term `covered position' means 
     a position within an element of the intelligence community 
     that, based on the level of access of a person occupying such 
     position to information regarding sensitive intelligence 
     sources or methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, 
     the head of such element determines should be subject to the 
     requirements of this section.
       ``(3) Government of a foreign country.--The term 
     `government of a foreign country' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
     of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).''.
       (b) Regulations and Certification.--
       (1) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the 
     intelligence community shall issue the regulations required 
     under section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     added by subsection (a) of this section.
       (2) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees--
       (A) a certification that each head of an element of the 
     intelligence community has prescribed the regulations 
     required under section 304 of the National Security Act of 
     1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section; or
       (B) if the Director is unable to submit the certification 
     described under subparagraph (A), an explanation as to why 
     the Director is unable to submit such certification, 
     including a designation of which heads of an element of the 
     intelligence community have prescribed the regulations 
     required under such section 304 and which have not.
       (c) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking the second item relating to section 302 
     (Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries) and the items 
     relating to sections 304, 305, and 306; and
       (2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 304. Reporting of certain employment activities by former 
              intelligence officers and employees.''.

     SEC. 306. INCLUSION OF PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTIONS IN 
                   INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.

       Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3224) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``and Predominantly 
     Black Institutions'' after ``universities''; and
       (2) in subsection (g)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) Predominantly black institution.--The term 
     `Predominantly Black Institution' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 318 of the Higher education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1059e).''.

     SEC. 307. MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Requirement for Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall prepare a plan for management of the 
     elements of the intelligence community that carry out 
     financial intelligence activities.
       (b) Contents of Plan.--The plan required by subsection (a) 
     shall establish a governance framework, procedures for 
     sharing and harmonizing the acquisition and use of financial 
     analytic tools, standards for quality of analytic products, 
     procedures for oversight and evaluation of resource 
     allocations associated with the joint development of 
     information sharing efforts

[[Page H8954]]

     and tools, and an education and training model for elements 
     of the intelligence community that carry out financial 
     intelligence activities.
       (c) Briefing to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall brief the congressional 
     intelligence committees on the actions the Director proposes 
     to implement the plan required by subsection (a).

     SEC. 308. ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
                   FOR COUNTERING INSIDER THREATS.

       (a) Analysis.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the National 
     Counterintelligence Executive, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees an analysis of private 
     sector policies and procedures for countering insider 
     threats.
       (b) Content.--The analysis required by subsection (a) shall 
     include--
       (1) a review of whether and how the intelligence community 
     could utilize private sector hiring and human resources best 
     practices to screen, vet, and validate the credentials, 
     capabilities, and character of applicants for positions 
     involving trusted access to sensitive information;
       (2) an analysis of private sector policies for holding 
     supervisors and subordinates accountable for violations of 
     established security protocols and whether the intelligence 
     community should adopt similar policies for positions of 
     trusted access to sensitive information;
       (3) an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of 
     applying mandatory leave policies, similar to those endorsed 
     by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the 
     Securities and Exchange Commission to identify fraud in the 
     financial services industry, to certain positions within the 
     intelligence community; and
       (4) recommendations for how the intelligence community 
     could utilize private sector risk indices, such as credit 
     risk scores, to make determinations about employee access to 
     sensitive information.

     SEC. 309. PROCEDURES FOR THE RETENTION OF INCIDENTALLY 
                   ACQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS.

       (a) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered communication.--The term ``covered 
     communication'' means any nonpublic telephone or electronic 
     communication acquired without the consent of a person who is 
     a party to the communication, including communications in 
     electronic storage.
       (2) Head of an element of the intelligence community.--The 
     term ``head of an element of the intelligence community'' 
     means, as appropriate--
       (A) the head of an element of the intelligence community; 
     or
       (B) the head of the department or agency containing such 
     element.
       (3) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1801).
       (b) Procedures for Covered Communications.--
       (1) Requirement to adopt.--Not later than 2 years after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act each head of an element of 
     the intelligence community shall adopt procedures approved by 
     the Attorney General for such element that ensure compliance 
     with the requirements of paragraph (3).
       (2) Coordination and approval.--The procedures required by 
     paragraph (1) shall be--
       (A) prepared in coordination with the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       (B) approved by the Attorney General prior to issuance.
       (3) Procedures.--
       (A) Application.--The procedures required by paragraph (1) 
     shall apply to any intelligence collection activity not 
     otherwise authorized by court order (including an order or 
     certification issued by a court established under subsection 
     (a) or (b) of section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803)), subpoena, or 
     similar legal process that is reasonably anticipated to 
     result in the acquisition of a covered communication to or 
     from a United States person and shall permit the acquisition, 
     retention, and dissemination of covered communications 
     subject to the limitation in subparagraph (B).
       (B) Limitation on retention.--A covered communication shall 
     not be retained in excess of 5 years, unless--
       (i) the communication has been affirmatively determined, in 
     whole or in part, to constitute foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence or is necessary to understand or assess 
     foreign intelligence or counterintelligence;
       (ii) the communication is reasonably believed to constitute 
     evidence of a crime and is retained by a law enforcement 
     agency;
       (iii) the communication is enciphered or reasonably 
     believed to have a secret meaning;
       (iv) all parties to the communication are reasonably 
     believed to be non-United States persons;
       (v) retention is necessary to protect against an imminent 
     threat to human life, in which case both the nature of the 
     threat and the information to be retained shall be reported 
     to the congressional intelligence committees not later than 
     30 days after the date such retention is extended under this 
     clause;
       (vi) retention is necessary for technical assurance or 
     compliance purposes, including a court order or discovery 
     obligation, in which case access to information retained for 
     technical assurance or compliance purposes shall be reported 
     to the congressional intelligence committees on an annual 
     basis; or
       (vii) retention for a period in excess of 5 years is 
     approved by the head of the element of the intelligence 
     community responsible for such retention, based on a 
     determination that retention is necessary to protect the 
     national security of the United States, in which case the 
     head of such element shall provide to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a written certification describing--

       (I) the reasons extended retention is necessary to protect 
     the national security of the United States;
       (II) the duration for which the head of the element is 
     authorizing retention;
       (III) the particular information to be retained; and
       (IV) the measures the element of the intelligence community 
     is taking to protect the privacy interests of United States 
     persons or persons located inside the United States.

     SEC. 310. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION OF REVIEW TO 
                   RETALIATORY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS 
                   DETERMINATIONS.

       Section 3001(b)(7) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(b)(7)) is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``2014--'' and inserting ``2014, and consistent with 
     subsection (j)--'';
       (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``to appeal a 
     determination to suspend or revoke a security clearance or 
     access to classified information'' and inserting ``alleging 
     reprisal for having made a protected disclosure (provided the 
     individual does not disclose classified information or other 
     information contrary to law) to appeal any action affecting 
     an employee's access to classified information''; and
       (3) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``information,'' 
     inserting ``information following a protected disclosure,''.

     SEC. 311. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON CONSOLIDATING CLASSIFIED 
                   DATABASES OF CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND 
                   MALWARE SAMPLES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 
     Security, the Director of the National Security Agency, the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall conduct a 
     feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of 
     cyber threat indicators and malware samples in the 
     intelligence community.
       (b) Elements.--The feasibility study required by subsection 
     (a) shall include the following:
       (1) An inventory of classified databases of cyber threat 
     indicators and malware samples in the intelligence community.
       (2) An assessment of actions that could be carried out to 
     consolidate such databases to achieve the greatest possible 
     information sharing within the intelligence community and 
     cost savings for the Federal Government.
       (3) An assessment of any impediments to such consolidation.
       (4) An assessment of whether the Intelligence Community 
     Information Technology Enterprise can support such 
     consolidation.
       (c) Report to Congress.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     date on which the Director of National Intelligence completes 
     the feasibility study required by subsection (a), the 
     Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a written report that summarizes the feasibility 
     study, including the information required under subsection 
     (b).

     SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY THREAT AND 
                   CYBERCRIME COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) cooperation between the intelligence and law 
     enforcement agencies of the United States and Ukraine should 
     be increased to improve cybersecurity policies between these 
     two countries;
       (2) the United States should pursue improved extradition 
     procedures among the Governments of the United States, 
     Ukraine, and other countries from which cybercriminals target 
     United States citizens and entities;
       (3) the President should--
       (A) initiate a round of formal United States-Ukraine 
     bilateral talks on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime 
     cooperation, with additional multilateral talks that include 
     other law enforcement partners such as Europol and Interpol; 
     and
       (B) work to obtain a commitment from the Government of 
     Ukraine to end cybercrime directed at persons outside Ukraine 
     and to work with the United States and other allies to deter 
     and convict known cybercriminals;
       (4) the President should establish a capacity building 
     program with the Government of Ukraine, which could include--
       (A) a joint effort to improve cyber capacity building, 
     including intelligence and law enforcement services in 
     Ukraine;
       (B) sending United States law enforcement agents to aid law 
     enforcement agencies in Ukraine in investigating cybercrimes; 
     and
       (C) agreements to improve communications networks to 
     enhance law enforcement cooperation, such as a hotline 
     directly connecting law enforcement agencies in the United 
     States and Ukraine; and
       (5) the President should establish and maintain an 
     intelligence and law enforcement cooperation scorecard with 
     metrics designed to measure the number of instances that 
     intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United 
     States request assistance from intelligence and law 
     enforcement agencies in Ukraine and the number and type of 
     responses received to such requests.

     SEC. 313. REPLACEMENT OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF SERVING AT 
                   UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN THE 
                   RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

       (a) Employment Requirement.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall ensure that, 
     not later than one year after the

[[Page H8955]]

     date of the enactment of this Act, every supervisory position 
     at a United States diplomatic facility in the Russian 
     Federation shall be occupied by a citizen of the United 
     States who has passed, and shall be subject to, a thorough 
     background check.
       (2) Extension.--The Secretary of State may extend the 
     deadline under paragraph (1) for up to one year by providing 
     advance written notification and justification of such 
     extension to the appropriate congressional committees.
       (3) Progress report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     report on progress made toward meeting the employment 
     requirement under paragraph (1).
       (b) Plan for Reduced Use of Locally Employed Staff.--Not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other 
     appropriate government agencies, shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a plan to further reduce 
     the reliance on locally employed staff in United States 
     diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation. The plan 
     shall, at a minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and 
     numbers of employees to be replaced.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to infringe on the power of the President, by and 
     with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint 
     ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.''

     SEC. 314. INCLUSION OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION 
                   FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC 
                   FACILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND 
                   ADJACENT COUNTRIES.

       (a) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
     Requirement.--Each United States diplomatic facility that, 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, is constructed 
     in, or undergoes a construction upgrade in, the Russian 
     Federation, any country that shares a land border with the 
     Russian Federation, or any country that is a former member of 
     the Soviet Union shall be constructed to include a Sensitive 
     Compartmented Information Facility.
       (b) National Security Waiver.--The Secretary of State may 
     waive the requirement under subsection (a) if the Secretary 
     determines that such waiver is in the national security 
     interest of the United States and submits a written 
     justification to the appropriate congressional committees not 
     later than 180 days before exercising such waiver.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     House of Representatives.

                         Subtitle B--Reporting

     SEC. 321. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION PROCESS.

       Not later than December 31, 2016, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing--
       (1) proposals to improve the declassification process 
     throughout the intelligence community; and
       (2) steps the intelligence community could take, or 
     legislation that may be necessary, to enable the National 
     Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions 
     assigned to the Center by Executive Order No. 13526 (75 Fed. 
     Reg. 707).

     SEC. 322. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENT SPENDING 
                   TARGETS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than April 1, 2016, and April 1, 
     2017, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
     status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative 
     costs for the intelligence community during the preceding 
     year.
       (b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
     include for each element of the intelligence community the 
     following:
       (1) A description of the status and effectiveness of 
     efforts to devise alternatives to government travel and 
     promote efficient travel spending, such as teleconferencing 
     and video conferencing.
       (2) A description of the status and effectiveness of 
     efforts to limit costs related to hosting and attending 
     conferences.
       (3) A description of the status and effectiveness of 
     efforts to assess information technology inventories and 
     usage, and establish controls, to reduce costs related to 
     underutilized information technology equipment, software, or 
     services.
       (4) A description of the status and effectiveness of 
     efforts to limit the publication and printing of hard copy 
     documents.
       (5) A description of the status and effectiveness of 
     efforts to improve the performance of Federal fleet motor 
     vehicles and limit executive transportation.
       (6) A description of the status and effectiveness of 
     efforts to limit the purchase of extraneous promotional 
     items, such as plaques, clothing, and commemorative items.
       (7) A description of the status and effectiveness of 
     efforts to consolidate and streamline workforce training 
     programs to focus on the highest priority workforce and 
     mission needs.
       (8) Such other matters relating to efforts to reduce 
     intelligence community administrative costs as the Director 
     may specify for purposes of this section.

     SEC. 323. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE 
                   ORDER.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``SEC. 511. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE 
                   ORDER.

       ``(a) Annual Reports Required.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on violations of law or 
     executive order relating to intelligence activities by 
     personnel of an element of the intelligence community that 
     were identified during the previous calendar year.
       ``(b) Elements.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
     shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal 
     investigations, include a description of, and any action 
     taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order 
     (including Executive Order No. 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) 
     relating to intelligence activities committed by personnel of 
     an element of the intelligence community in the course of the 
     employment of such personnel that, during the previous 
     calendar year, was--
       ``(1) determined by the director, head, or general counsel 
     of any element of the intelligence community to have 
     occurred;
       ``(2) referred to the Department of Justice for possible 
     criminal prosecution; or
       ``(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any element 
     of the intelligence community.''.
       (b) Initial Report.--The first report required under 
     section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
     subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Guidelines.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element 
     of the intelligence community, shall--
       (1) issue guidelines to carry out section 511 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a); 
     and
       (2) submit such guidelines to the congressional 
     intelligence committees.
       (d) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of sections in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by adding after the item relating to section 510 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 511. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.''.
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the 
     amendments made by this section shall be construed to alter 
     any requirement existing on the date of the enactment of this 
     Act to submit a report under any provision of law.

     SEC. 324. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

       (a) In General.--For each fiscal year and along with the 
     budget materials submitted in support of the budget of the 
     Department of Homeland Security pursuant to section 1105(a) 
     of title 31, United States Code, the Under Secretary for 
     Intelligence and Analysis of the Department shall submit to 
     the congressional intelligence committees a report for such 
     fiscal year on each intelligence activity of each 
     intelligence component of the Department, as designated by 
     the Under Secretary, that includes the following:
       (1) The amount of funding requested for each such 
     intelligence activity.
       (2) The number of full-time employees funded to perform 
     each such intelligence activity.
       (3) The number of full-time contractor employees (or the 
     equivalent of full-time in the case of part-time contractor 
     employees) funded to perform or in support of each such 
     intelligence activity.
       (4) A determination as to whether each such intelligence 
     activity is predominantly in support of national intelligence 
     or departmental missions.
       (5) The total number of analysts of the Intelligence 
     Enterprise of the Department that perform--
       (A) strategic analysis; or
       (B) operational analysis.
       (b) Feasibility and Advisability Report.--Not later than 
     120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report that--
       (1) examines the feasibility and advisability of including 
     the budget request for all intelligence activities of each 
     intelligence component of the Department that predominantly 
     support departmental missions, as designated by the Under 
     Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in the Homeland 
     Security Intelligence Program; and
       (2) includes a plan to enhance the coordination of 
     department-wide intelligence activities to achieve greater 
     efficiencies in the performance of the Department of Homeland 
     Security intelligence functions.
       (c) Intelligence Component of the Department.--In this 
     section, the term ``intelligence component of the 
     Department'' has the meaning given that term in section 2 of 
     the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).

     SEC. 325. REPORT ON POLITICAL PRISON CAMPS IN NORTH KOREA.

       (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign 
     Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on political 
     prison camps in North Korea.

[[Page H8956]]

       (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) 
     shall--
       (1) describe the actions the United States is taking to 
     support implementation of the recommendations of the United 
     Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the 
     Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the eventual 
     establishment of a tribunal to hold individuals accountable 
     for abuses; and
       (2) include, with respect to each political prison camp in 
     North Korea to the extent information is available--
       (A) the estimated prisoner population of each such camp;
       (B) the geographical coordinates of each such camp;
       (C) the reasons for confinement of the prisoners at each 
     such camp;
       (D) a description of the primary industries and products 
     made at each such camp, and the end users of any goods 
     produced in such camp;
       (E) information regarding involvement of any non-North 
     Korean entity or individual involved in the operations of 
     each such camp, including as an end user or source of any 
     good or products used in, or produced by, in such camp;
       (F) information identifying individuals and agencies 
     responsible for conditions in each such camp at all levels of 
     the Government of North Korea;
       (G) a description of the conditions under which prisoners 
     are confined, with respect to the adequacy of food, shelter, 
     medical care, working conditions, and reports of ill-
     treatment of prisoners, at each such camp; and
       (H) unclassified imagery, including satellite imagery, of 
     each such camp.
       (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
     submitted in an unclassified form and may include a 
     classified annex if necessary.

     SEC. 326. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OF DOMESTIC OIL REFINERIES 
                   AND RELATED RAIL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE.

       (a) Assessment.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis shall conduct an intelligence 
     assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and 
     related rail transportation infrastructure.
       (b) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees--
       (1) the results of the assessment required under subsection 
     (a); and
       (2) any recommendations with respect to intelligence 
     sharing or intelligence collection to improve the security of 
     domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation 
     infrastructure to protect the communities surrounding such 
     refineries or such infrastructure from potential harm that 
     the Under Secretary considers appropriate.

     SEC. 327. ENHANCED CONTRACTOR LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 506B(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3098(c)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (11), by striking ``or contracted'';
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (12) as paragraph (13); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (11) the following:
       ``(12) The best estimate of the number of intelligence 
     collectors and analysts contracted by each element of the 
     intelligence community and a description of the functions 
     performed by such contractors.''.

     SEC. 328. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF MEMORANDA OF 
                   UNDERSTANDING TO FACILITATE INTELLIGENCE-
                   SHARING.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Program 
     Manager of the Information Sharing Environment, shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee 
     on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
     Representatives, the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
     Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives an assessment of the efficacy of the 
     memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State, 
     local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate 
     intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint 
     Terrorism Task Force. Such assessment shall include--
       (1) any language within such memoranda of understanding 
     that prohibited or may be construed to prohibit intelligence-
     sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and 
     territorial agencies; and
       (2) any recommendations for memoranda of understanding to 
     better facilitate intelligence-sharing between Federal, 
     State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.

     SEC. 329. REPORT ON FOREIGN MAN-MADE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE 
                   WEAPONS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
     the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a 
     report on the threat posed by man-made electromagnetic pulse 
     weapons to United States interests through 2025, including 
     threats from foreign countries and foreign non-State actors.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

     SEC. 330. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
                   TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT AL-QAEDA AND 
                   ITS AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED GROUPS.

       (a) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a comprehensive report on the United States 
     counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 
     al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.
       (2) Coordination.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of 
     State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, 
     and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other 
     department or agency of the United States Government that has 
     responsibility for activities directed at combating al-Qaeda 
     and its affiliated or associated groups.
       (3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) A definition of--
       (i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known 
     individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;
       (ii) an affiliated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of 
     which known groups constitute an affiliate group of al-Qaeda;
       (iii) an associated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of 
     which known groups constitute an associated group of al-
     Qaeda; and
       (iv) a group aligned with al-Qaeda, including a description 
     of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that 
     qualify it as a group aligned with al-Qaeda.
       (B) A list of any other group, including the organization 
     that calls itself the Islamic State (also known as ``ISIS'' 
     or ``ISIL''), that adheres to the core mission of al-Qaeda, 
     or who espouses the same violent jihad ideology as al-Qaeda.
       (C) An assessment of the relationship between al-Qaeda core 
     and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B).
       (D) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of al-
     Qaeda and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B) from 
     January 1, 2010, to the present, including a description of 
     the metrics that are used to assess strengthening or 
     weakening and an assessment of the relative increase or 
     decrease in violent attacks attributed to such entities.
       (E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a 
     member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in 
     Afghanistan or Pakistan.
       (F) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a 
     member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of a group 
     referred to in subparagraph (B).
       (G) A definition of defeat of core al-Qaeda.
       (H) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, 
     and control between core al-Qaeda and the groups referred to 
     in subparagraph (B), specifically addressing each such group.
       (I) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
     operations against core al-Qaeda and the groups referred to 
     in subparagraph (B), and whether such operations have had a 
     sustained impact on the capabilities and effectiveness of 
     core al-Qaeda and such groups.
       (4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

     SEC. 331. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON RETRAINING VETERANS IN 
                   CYBERSECURITY.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
     Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     shall submit to Congress a feasibility study on retraining 
     veterans and retired members of elements of the intelligence 
     community in cybersecurity.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Ruppersberger) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks 
and to include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4681.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record at the end of my remarks 
the Joint Explanatory Statement prepared by the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees.
  Mr. Speaker, when Mr. Ruppersberger and I assumed the helm of the 
committee, we committed to return to the practice of passing the annual 
intelligence authorization bill, recognizing that it is one of the most 
critical tools that Congress has to control the intelligence activities 
of the

[[Page H8957]]

United States Government. I am proud today that we are bringing the 
fifth such authorization bill to the floor since Mr. Ruppersberger 
assumed the role of ranking member and I assumed the role of chairman 4 
years ago.
  As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of the committee's direction is found in the 
classified annex to the bill, which is very similar to the version 
passed by the House earlier this year.
  At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex 
increases the President's budget request by less than 1 percent and is 
consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key committee 
funding initiatives, vital to national security, are preserved in this 
bill. These funding initiatives are offset by reductions to unnecessary 
programs and increased efficiencies.
  The bill's modest net increase reflects the committee's concern that 
the President's request does not properly fund a number of important 
initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls when it comes to 
the matters of national security. The bill also provides substantial 
intelligence resources to help defeat Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant.
  Earlier this year, the House passed its version of this bill with 
overwhelming bipartisan support. This bill contains all of the 
provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the fiscal year 
2014 bill, along with provisions added by the Senate. None of these 
provisions are considered controversial, and we have worked through and 
vetted to make sure that is accurate with both Republican and Democrat 
staff and Members.
  Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history. 
ISIL is attempting to build a state across the Middle East, from 
Lebanon to Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The group already 
controls a swath of land across Iraq and Syria about the size of the 
State of Indiana, and it is growing. The goal of our counterterrorism 
strategy is to deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks 
against the United States and/or our allies. Regrettably, we have not 
prevented ISIL from establishing such a safe haven, and, as a result, 
we face a growing threat from that region.
  At the same time, state actors like Russia and China view this time 
as an opportunity to expand their reach and expand their influence. 
Uneven leadership in recent years has emboldened these adversaries to 
change the international order, at the expense of U.S. interests.
  We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers 
with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we 
face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and 
fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal 
American jobs through theft of intellectual property. We ask them to 
track nuclear and missile threats. We demand they get it right every 
time.
  This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our 
intelligence community have the funding and authorities and support 
that they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.
  I take this moment, Mr. Speaker, at a time when certainly voices both 
around the country and around the world are seeking to condemn the very 
courageous men and women who show up in the intelligence business to 
provide the information to keep America safe. They are silent warriors. 
They are faithful patriots. They don't ask for recognition. They don't 
ask for time. You don't see their names in the front pages of the paper 
or on TV. They really don't seek that recognition.
  But they seek the very purpose of being the first to be able to 
develop that one piece of information that might prevent further 
conflict, it might prevent a terrorist attack, it might prevent a 
nuclear launch, it might prevent one Nation from attacking another.
  In the haze of what seems to be self-loathing these days, by 
targeting that against these very courageous men and women who cannot 
defend themselves in public, we are doing a disservice to their courage 
and their commitment to keep America safe. We find that it is easy to, 
at some point, go back and point fingers at what we believe may or may 
not have happened in the work of keeping America safe. It is 
realistically and holistically unfair that we would do that to these 
very brave souls who risk their lives today.
  But here is the good news for Americans. These folks that work in the 
shadows understand that they have accepted these dangerous and quiet 
roles, and they will get up this morning, like they have every other 
morning, and understand it is between them and the United States when 
it comes to any terrorist attack, or worse, bigger, broader conflict 
somewhere in the world.
  So they will do their job; they will do their duty; they will do 
their mission. They will read the papers and fold them and put them on 
their desk and go about their work, their important work. But it is 
wrong that years later we ask these people to have to believe that they 
might have to get a lawyer to do their job.
  The next time that America asks them to do something hard and 
difficult in defense of the United States, we shouldn't be giving them 
lawyers and subpoenas and the United Nations condemning their actions 
and looking for prosecutions in their effort to tear the United States 
down one more level. We ought to be giving them ticker tape parades 
when they come home from these places and say: Thank you for your 
sacrifice, and thank you for your family's sacrifice. We can sleep 
better at night knowing that you have had the courage to stand where no 
other American was willing to stand in defense of the United States.
  I hope they take this as certainly my final bill on this particular 
floor to encourage them to do their good work, to know that Americans 
who are kissing their kids and putting them on the bus this morning 
understand that it takes their efforts to keep this country safe, that 
somebody that shows up for work and is engaged in international 
commerce understands that it takes their work to keep America safe. 
Believe me, outside of this town, people across America understand the 
value and importance and really the essential work that these people do 
for the defense of America. We should not condemn them, we should be 
proud of their work, and we should stand behind them. This bill I think 
represents the work in a bipartisan way that allows them to continue 
that work, to do the work that protects America.
  I would be remiss if I didn't thank my good friend Dutch 
Ruppersberger. Over the last 4 years, these five budgets could not have 
happened without your work and your staff's work in making sure that we 
had the best product available to make sure that the intelligence 
community had the resources that they need, the policies that they 
need, the support that they need, and, yes, every once in a while, the 
kick in the can that they needed.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, when Dutch and I assumed the helm of the Committee, we 
committed to return to the practice of passing the annual intelligence 
authorization bill, recognizing that it is one of the most critical 
tools Congress has to control the intelligence activities of the U.S. 
Government. I am proud today that we are bringing the fifth such 
authorization bill to the floor since I assumed the Chairmanship four 
years ago.
  As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of the Committee's direction is found in the 
classified annex to the bill, which is very similar to the version 
passed by the House earlier this year.
  At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex 
increases the President's budget request by less than one percent and 
is consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key 
Committee funding initiatives, vital to national security, are 
preserved in this bill. These funding initiatives are offset by 
reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies. The 
bill's modest net increase reflects the Committee's concern that the 
President's request does not properly fund a number of important 
initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls. The bill also 
provides substantial intelligence resources to help defeat ISIL.
  Earlier this year the House passed its version of this bill by an 
overwhelming bipartisan vote. This bill contains all of those 
provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the FY 14 bill, 
along with provisions added by the Senate. None of those provisions are 
considered controversial.
  Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history. 
ISIL is attempting to

[[Page H8958]]

build a state across the Middle East--from Lebanon to Iraq, including 
Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The group already controls a swath of land 
across Iraq and Syria. The goal of our counterterrorism strategy is to 
deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks against the 
United States and our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIL 
from establishing such a safe haven, and as a result we face a growing 
threat from the region.
  At the same time, state actors like Russia and China view this time 
as an opportunity to expand their reach and influence. Uneven 
leadership in recent years has emboldened these adversaries to change 
the international order--at the expense of U.S. interests.
  We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policy 
makers with the best and most timely information possible on the 
threats we face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, 
plan, and fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that 
steal American jobs. We ask them to track nuclear and missile threats. 
And we demand they get it right--every time.
  This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our 
Intelligence Community have the funding and authorities--and support--
they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.
  Before closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women of 
this country who serve in our Intelligence Community today. It has been 
a distinct honor to get to know so many of them, and I am proud to have 
played a role in contributing to their success.
  I would also like to extend thanks to all of my dedicated staff on 
the Committee who worked hard over the years to get us back on track in 
passing the annual Authorization bill and in our daily oversight of the 
Intelligence Community.
  Thank you to my current committee staff: Darren Dick, Katie 
Wheelbarger, Sarah Geffroy, Andy Keiser, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry, 
Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael Ellis, Chelsey Campbell, Geof Kahn, 
Brooke Eisele, Randy Smith, Jim Hildebrand, Shannon Stuart, Rachel 
Wilson, Lisa Major, Diane Rinaldo. Thank you, as well as to those who 
are no longer with the staff but played an influential role in 
committee activities during my tenure as Chairman: Michael Allen, Chris 
Donesa, Jamil Jaffer, Nathan Hauser, Todd Jones, Frank Garcia, George 
Pappas, Will Koella, Leah Scott, Fred Fleitz, and Stephanie Pelton.
  Finally, a big thank you to our dedicated Security and Information 
Technology staff who keep us up and running everyday: Brandon Smith, 
Kristin Jepson and Kevin Klein.

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
                        ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015

       The following consists of the explanatory material to 
     accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2015.
       This joint explanatory statement shall have the same effect 
     with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were 
     a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.
       This explanatory statement is accompanied by a classified 
     annex that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. 
     The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by 
     reference in the Act and has the legal status of public law.
       The classified annex and classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations are the result of negotiations between the 
     Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to reconcile 
     differences in their respective versions of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. The congressionally 
     directed actions described in Senate Report No. 113-233, the 
     classified annex that accompanied Senate Report No. 113-233, 
     and the classified annex that accompanied House Report No. 
     113-463 should be carried out to the extent they are not 
     amended, altered, substituted, or otherwise specifically 
     addressed in either this Joint Explanatory Statement or in 
     the classified annex to this Statement.

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

       The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
     explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 2015.

                    Title I--Intelligence Activities

     Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
       Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
     agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
     appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for Fiscal Year 2015.
     Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
       Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
     levels by program for Fiscal Year 2015 are contained in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
     Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives and to the President.
     Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
       Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility 
     to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the 
     Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103 provides that the 
     DNI may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal 
     Year 2015 in excess of the number of authorized positions by 
     an amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit 
     applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may 
     do so only if necessary to the performance of important 
     intelligence functions.
     Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
       Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the 
     authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA 
     for Fiscal Year 2015.

 Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

     Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
       Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
     $514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2015 for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

                     Title III--General Provisions


                      Subtitle A--General Matters

     Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits 
         authorized by law
       Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
     appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and 
     other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
     additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
     increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
     Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence 
         activities
       Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
     appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
     authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that 
     is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of 
     the United States.
     Section 303. National intelligence strategy
       Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     require the DNI to develop a comprehensive national 
     intelligence strategy every four years beginning in 2017.
     Section 304. Software licensing
       Section 304 amends Section 109 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947, which requires chief information officers within the 
     IC to prepare biennial inventories and assessments concerning 
     the use and procurement of software licenses, to make certain 
     enhancements to the biennial assessments required under 
     Section 109.
     Section 305. Reporting of certain employment activities by 
         former intelligence officers and employees
       Section 305 requires the head of each element of the IC to 
     issue regulations that require an employee occupying 
     positions with access to particularly sensitive information 
     within such element to sign a written agreement that requires 
     the regular reporting of any employment by, representation 
     of, or the provision of advice relating to national security 
     to the government of a foreign country, or any person whose 
     activities are supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or 
     subsidized by any government of a foreign country, for a two-
     year period after the employee ceases employment with the IC 
     element.
     Section 306. Inclusion of Predominantly Black Institutions in 
         intelligence officer training program
       Section 306 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     include predominantly black institutions in the intelligence 
     officer training programs established under Section 1024 of 
     the Act.
     Section 307. Management and oversight of financial 
         intelligence
       Section 307 requires the DNI to prepare a plan for 
     management of the elements of the IC that carry out financial 
     intelligence activities.
     Section 308. Analysis of private sector policies and 
         procedures for countering insider threats
       Section 308 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees an analysis of private sector 
     policies and procedures for countering insider threats.
     Section 309. Procedures for the retention of incidentally 
         acquired communications
       Section 309 requires the head of each element of the IC to 
     adopt Attorney General-approved procedures that govern the 
     retention of nonpublic telephone or electronic communications 
     acquired without consent of a person who is a party to the 
     communications, including communications in electronic 
     storage.
       The procedures required under this section shall apply to 
     any intelligence activity that is reasonably anticipated to 
     result in the acquisition of such telephone or electronic 
     communications to or from a United States person not 
     otherwise authorized by court order, subpoena, or similar 
     legal process, regardless of the location where the 
     collection occurs. The procedures shall prohibit the 
     retention of such telephone or electronic communications for 
     a period in excess of five years, unless the communications 
     are determined to fall within one of several categories, 
     enumerated in subsection (b)(3)(B), for which retention in 
     excess of five years is authorized, to include communications 
     that have been affirmatively determined to constitute foreign 
     intelligence or counterintelligence, communications that are 
     reasonably

[[Page H8959]]

     believed to constitute evidence of a crime and are retained 
     by a law enforcement agency, and communications that are 
     enciphered or reasonably believed to have a secret meaning.
       Because it may be necessary in certain instances for IC 
     elements to retain communications covered by this section for 
     a period in excess of five years that do not fall into the 
     categories specifically enumerated in subsection (b)(3)(B), 
     subsection (b)(3)(B)(vii) provides flexibility for the head 
     of each element of the intelligence community to authorize 
     such extended retention where the head of the element 
     determines that it is necessary to protect the national 
     security of the United States. In the absence of such a 
     determination, Section 309 is intended to establish a default 
     rule for intelligence collection activities, not otherwise 
     authorized by legal process, that requires agencies to delete 
     communications covered by this section after five years, 
     unless a determination is made that the communications 
     constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or 
     otherwise meet the retention requirements set forth in this 
     section.
     Section 310. Clarification of limitation of review to 
         retaliatory security clearance or access determinations
       Section 310 makes a technical amendment to Section 
     3001(b)(7) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 to clarify that the policies and 
     procedures prescribed by that section (to permit individuals 
     to appeal adverse security clearance or access 
     determinations) are only required to apply to adverse 
     security clearance or access determinations alleged to be in 
     reprisal for having made a protected whistleblower 
     disclosure.
     Section 311. Feasibility study on consolidating classified 
         databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples
       Section 307 requires the DNI to conduct a feasibility study 
     on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat 
     indicators and malware samples in the IC and to provide a 
     report to the congressional intelligence committees 
     summarizing the feasibility study.
     Section 312. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and 
         cybercrime cooperation with Ukraine
       Section 312 expresses the sense of Congress concerning 
     cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation between the 
     United States and Ukraine.
     Section 313. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at 
         United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian 
         Federation
       Section 313 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that 
     every supervisory position at a U.S. diplomatic facility in 
     the Russian Federation is occupied by a citizen of the United 
     States who has passed a background check and to provide 
     Congress with a plan to further reduce reliance on locally 
     employed staff.
     Section 314. Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information 
         Facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in the 
         Russian Federation and adjacent countries
       Section 314 requires that each U.S. diplomatic facility 
     that is constructed in, or undergoes a construction upgrade 
     in, the Russian Federation, any country that shares a land 
     border with the Russian Federation, or any country that is a 
     former member of the Soviet Union, shall be constructed to 
     include a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. The 
     Secretary of State may waive the requirements of this section 
     upon a determination that it is in the national security 
     interest of the United States.


                         Subtitle B--Reporting

     Section 321. Report on declassification process
       Section 321 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress 
     describing proposals to improve the declassification process 
     and steps the IC could take or legislation that may be 
     necessary, to enable the National Declassification Center to 
     better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by 
     Executive Order 13526.
     Section 322. Report on intelligence community efficient 
         spending targets
       Section 322 requires the DNI to submit a report to the 
     congressional intelligence committees on the status and 
     effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative costs for 
     the IC during the preceding year.
     Section 323. Annual report on violations of law or executive 
         order
       Section 323 requires the DNI to report annually to the 
     congressional intelligence committees on violations of law or 
     executive order by personnel of an element of the IC that 
     were identified during the previous calendar year. Under the 
     National Security Act, the President is required to keep the 
     congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
     informed of the intelligence activities of the United States 
     government. Nonetheless, this annual reporting requirement is 
     necessary to ensure that the intelligence oversight 
     committees of the House and Senate are made fully aware of 
     violations of law or executive order, including, in 
     particular, violations of Executive order 12333 for 
     activities not otherwise subject to the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act.
     Section 324. Annual report on intelligence activities of the 
         Department of Homeland Security
       Section 324 requires the Under Secretary for Intelligence 
     and Analysis of the DHS to provide the congressional 
     intelligence committees with a report on each intelligence 
     activity of each intelligence component of the Department 
     that includes, among other things, the amount of funding 
     requested, the number of full-time employees, and the number 
     of full-time contractor employees. In addition, Section 324 
     requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report that examines 
     the feasibility and advisability of consolidating the 
     planning, programming, and resourcing of such activities 
     within the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP).
       The HSIP budget was established to fund those intelligence 
     activities that principally support missions of the DHS 
     separately from those of the NIP. To date, however, this 
     mechanism has only been used to supplement the budget for the 
     office of Intelligence and Analysis. It has not been used to 
     fund the activities of the non-IC components in the DHS that 
     conduct intelligence-related activities. As a result, there 
     is no comprehensive reporting to Congress regarding the 
     overall resources and personnel required in support of the 
     Department's intelligence activities.
     Section 325. Report on political prison camps in North Korea
       Section 325 requires the DNI to submit a report on 
     political prison camps in North Korea to the congressional 
     intelligence committees.
     Section 326. Assessment of security of domestic oil 
         refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure
       Section 326 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis to conduct an 
     intelligence assessment of the security of domestic oil 
     refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure.
     Section 327. Enhanced contractor level assessments for the 
         intelligence community
       Section 327 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
     require that the annual personnel level assessments for the 
     IC, required under Section 506B of the Act, include a 
     separate estimate of the number of intelligence collectors 
     and analysts contracted by each element of the IC and a 
     description of the functions performed by such contractors.
     Section 328. Assessment of the efficacy of memoranda of 
         understanding to facilitate intelligence-sharing
       Section 328 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis to provide appropriate 
     congressional committees with an assessment of the efficacy 
     of the memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, 
     State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate 
     intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint 
     Terrorism Task Force. This study should help identify any 
     obstacles to intelligence sharing between agencies, 
     particularly any obstacles that might have impeded 
     intelligence sharing in the wake of the April 2013 bombing of 
     the Boston Marathon, and find improvements to existing 
     intelligence sharing relationships.
     Section 329. Report on foreign man-made electromagnetic pulse 
         weapons
       Section 329 requires the DNI to provide appropriate 
     congressional committees with a report on the threat posed by 
     manmade electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States 
     interests through 2025.
     Section 330. Report on United States counterterrorism 
         strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and 
         its affiliated or associated groups
       Section 330 requires the DNI to provide appropriate 
     congressional committees with a report on the United States 
     counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 
     al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.
     Section 331. Feasibility study on retraining veterans in 
         cybersecurity
       Section 331 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a 
     feasibility study on retraining veterans and retired members 
     of elements of the IC in cybersecurity.

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Chairman Rogers, this is my last opportunity on the floor to thank 
you again for your leadership. It has, once again, produced a strong, 
bipartisan, and bicameral Intelligence Authorization Act.
  Our committee believes that our Nation's security is too important to 
be a political football. We have had different views, we argue, but we 
work it out for the good of American people.
  Mr. Chairman, I hope that your legacy of bipartisanship, hard work, 
rigorous oversight, and problem-solving continues and spreads 
throughout the Congress. It is amazing what we can accomplish when we 
work together to solve problems.
  I also want to thank our counterparts in the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, Senators Feinstein and Chambliss, for working very closely 
with us and each member of our committee. On the Democratic side, I 
want to acknowledge all the hard work of Mr. Thompson--who is sitting 
here to my left--Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin,

[[Page H8960]]

Mr. Schiff, Mr. Gutierrez, Mr. Pastor, Mr. Himes, and Ms. Sewell. And I 
want to thank our staff and the dedicated men and women of the 
intelligence community who work every day and all night throughout the 
world to protect us. I do agree with the chairman's statements about 
those men and women throughout the world who are out there protecting 
us and putting their lives on the line.
  Now, today, we look beyond this Congress. We come together to set the 
stage for the continuing oversight of intelligence programs, personnel, 
and dollars. By doing so, we reinforce to the American people, and to 
the world, that there are checks and balances. We reinforce that the 
tools we authorize are for the sole purpose of keeping us, our allies, 
and our partners safe.
  In May, the House passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
fiscal years 2014 and 2015 by 345 votes to 19. The Senate, however, 
took up each year separately. Over the summer, this House passed the 
FY14 bill, which the President signed.
  So, we now take up the FY15 bill, which the Senate amended and sent 
back to us. This amended bill largely mirrors the relevant portions of 
the House-passed combined bill.
  Passing a detailed Intelligence Authorization Act ensures that our 
intelligence agencies spend money only on programs Congress is informed 
of, approves, and can continuously oversee.

                              {time}  1300

  Oversight is extremely important. It helps to make sure that 
everything our intelligence agencies do follows the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States and maximizes the civil liberties and 
privacy of Americans. At the same time, the intelligence agencies need 
the clear authorization, direction, and guidance from Congress to do 
their vital work to protect and defend America, its allies, and its 
partners.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act is split into four parts: the 
unclassified legislative text; the unclassified report; the classified 
annex, which explains our intent for the classified aspects of the 
bill; and the classified schedule of authorizations.
  While we have made cuts to certain areas and added money in others to 
produce a responsible, well thought out, and fiscally prudent budget, 
the budget for fiscal year 2015 slightly exceeds the President's 
request.
  While over the last 4 years we have reduced the intelligence 
community's budget by over a billion dollars, this year's bill 
acknowledges the need to make corrections after the drastic cuts of 
sequestration and the Budget Control Act.
  Additionally, this bill acknowledges the need to step up our 
intelligence efforts to counter evolving threats such as ISIL. It is a 
dangerous world out there, and our bill accounts for that.
  Let me also mention some specifics in the bill. First, it continues 
to emphasize the value of our space programs and endorses aggressive 
action to decrease our reliance on Russian-made engines to launch our 
national security satellites.
  Two, it makes investments into research and development to defend 
against next generation threats and to stay ahead of countries like 
China and Russia. Three, it further improves the continuous evaluation 
of insider threats while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties.
  Next, it enables better intelligence and information sharing to 
prevent foreign fighters coming in and out of Syria. It also enables 
cutting-edge Defense Intelligence Agency technology. We must stay ahead 
of the curve in technology.
  The bill also further refines the Department of Defense human 
intelligence capabilities while supporting communitywide human 
intelligence efforts to better understand the enemies' plans and 
intentions. It also establishes increased accountability measures for 
our most sensitive programs.
  The committee has worked with the intelligence community and the 
Senate to produce this solid, bipartisan bill. This bill also 
incorporates the valuable floor amendments the House passed in May. It 
represents a culmination of our committee's work through extensive 
hearings and briefings, travel, and in-depth studies. The bill is 
strong, and I am proud to support it.
  For the sake of keeping the country, its allies, and partners safe 
and for the sake of thoroughly overseeing even the most classified 
intelligence programs, I urge my colleagues to pass the bill today.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  I thought I would take a moment to extend my thanks to all the 
dedicated staff on the committee, certainly from the Republican side 
and to the Democrats as well, who worked hard over the years to get us 
back on track in passing this annual authorization bill in our daily 
oversight of the intelligence community.
  If you will indulge me, Mr. Speaker, thank you to my current 
committee staff: Darren Dick, Katie Wheelbarger, Sarah Geffroy, Andy 
Keiser, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry, Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael 
Ellis, Chelsey Campbell, Geof Kahn, Brooke Eisele, Randy Smith, Jim 
Hildebrand, Shannon Stuart, Rachel Wilson, Lisa Major, and Diane 
Rinaldo.
  Thank you as well to staff who have played an influential role in the 
committee activities during my tenure as chairman in reengaging this as 
a force for oversight in the Intelligence Committee: Michael Allen, 
Chris Donesa, Jamil Jaffer, Nathan Hauser, Todd Jones, Frank Garcia, 
George Pappas, Will Koella, Leah Scott, Fred Fleitz, and Stephanie 
Pelton.
  Finally, a big thank you to our dedicated security and information 
technology staff, by the way, who have done well to beat back the 
hordes of our nation state actors who, for some reason, Mr. Speaker, 
took a good interest in what we were doing in that classified space, 
and they kept us up and running every single day: Brandon Smith, 
Kristin Jepson, and Kevin Klein.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Thompson), a great member of our committee who 
specialized in infrastructure and also worked very hard to make sure 
that our Embassies have the intelligence information they need to 
protect themselves.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding and 
for all the good work you did on the committee as the ranking member. I 
also want to thank Chairman Rogers for the good work that he did as the 
chairman.
  Working together, he was very accommodating and allowed all of us to 
be able to address specific issues that were of concern to us and 
regarding the security of our great Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We 
are going to miss you.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the passage of this 
bill. This bill will provide greater national security for our country 
and the people that we all represent.
  The bill contains two important provisions that I authored that 
protect our communities at home and diplomatic facilities abroad.
  My district is home to several oil refineries, employing thousands of 
people, providing well-paying, good, middle class jobs, and are a key 
part of our regional economy.
  As domestic oil production continues to increase in the region, I 
have heard from several of my constituents and my local governments 
about their growing concern regarding the security of the shipment and 
storage of crude oil and subsequent refined products. I believe we have 
the responsibility to protect our workers, our domestic refineries, and 
our communities from potential threats.
  Included in this bill is a provision that directs the Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis to conduct an 
assessment of the security of our Nation's oil refineries and related 
rail transportation infrastructure. It directs the office to make 
recommendations on how to improve intelligence collection and sharing 
of information to better protect those facilities in the surrounding 
communities from any harm.
  Additionally, studies conducted in response to the terrible 2012 
attack on Benghazi identified the need for security personnel at U.S. 
diplomatic posts to receive threat information in a more timely manner.

[[Page H8961]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional 
30 seconds.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. In response to this need, this bill 
requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide an assessment 
of the status of threat information sharing between the intelligence 
community and diplomatic security personnel and to propose actions to 
help make sure security personnel at U.S. Embassies are better able to 
request and receive security enhancements in a timely manner.

  By making sure our intelligence community is taking concerns 
seriously and sharing the necessary information, we can better assess 
and mitigate threats and increase security at home and abroad and make 
our country safer.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in passing this good piece of 
legislation.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from California, Mr. Adam Schiff, a great member of our committee with 
a tremendous work ethic. He reads almost every piece of intelligence 
information and comes to quality and informed conclusions.
  He also has focused a lot and specialized in working with legislation 
involving transparency and accountability and has spent a lot of time 
on an area that is very important to our Intelligence Committee, the 
space program.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
want to join my colleagues in urging the House to support the 2015 
Intelligence Authorization Act which has now returned to us from the 
Senate, but before I address the substance of the bill, I would like to 
congratulate Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their 
extraordinary efforts to get this bill passed and to the President.
  As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I know how hard they and 
the staff have worked to make this happen, and I would especially like 
to congratulate Chairman Rogers and wish him well as he prepares to 
leave the House at the end of the year. It has been a great pleasure 
working with you, and I wish you all the very best.
  These are challenging days for America's intelligence officers and 
analysts. As ISIS continues to threaten the Middle East; as Russia's 
``little green men'' continue to coordinate attacks on the Ukrainian 
Government; as North Korea's young, isolated, and often dangerously 
erratic leader continues his behavior; and as the international 
community continues its efforts to secure Iran's agreement to dismantle 
its nuclear weapons program and infrastructure, our intelligence 
professionals play a vital role in keeping us safe and secure.
  Developing and maintaining actionable intelligence on ISIS is of 
particular urgency. While the intelligence community has been following 
ISIS' growth for some time, the group's takeover of a large swath of 
Syria and Iraq has made it a top intelligence priority.
  If we are to be effective in partnering with regional allies to 
degrade and destroy ISIS, we need to be able to develop the very best 
intelligence and accurate ground truth. That takes time, and it takes 
assets--on the ground, in the air, in space--to collect information. It 
also takes the world class analysts of our intelligence community to 
turn that information into recommendations for policymakers.
  We must also remain focused on Russian efforts to destabilize its 
neighbors, particularly Ukraine, but also the Baltic States. Our 
intelligence community has given us insight into Russian involvement in 
these efforts and into the events that led to the tragic downing of the 
Malaysian airliner last summer.
  The bill also prioritizes vital efforts at nonproliferation and will 
help give us the tools that we need to assess events on the ground in 
North Korea and Iran and wherever there is a threat of WMD.
  These are but a few of the important matters covered in the 
Intelligence Authorization bill. As a member of the committee who has 
been proud to work closely with both the chair and ranking member, I am 
confident it supports our intelligence professionals while providing 
oversight that is so critical to the proper functioning of our 
intelligence agencies.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, in closing, I urge my colleagues to vote for this 
important bipartisan and bicameral bill. It is the single most 
effective oversight tool we have, and it ensures that our intelligence 
community has what it needs to keep us and our allies safe. 
Intelligence is often the first line of defense against a dangerous 
world. Without it, we are in the dark, and we are vulnerable.
  Finally, once again, let me just say thank you to my good friend, Mr. 
Chairman, and to the members of the committee, to our colleagues in the 
Senate, and to the men and women of the intelligence community. It has 
been my honor and privilege to work with you under your great 
leadership during the 113th Congress.
  I also want to thank the Republican and Democratic staffs for working 
together. That is what makes it work. You are only as good as your team 
and your staff.
  I also would like to acknowledge the Democratic staff: Staff Director 
Heather Molino, Amanda Rogers-Thorpe, Bob Minehart, Linda Cohen, Carly 
Blake, Allison Getty, Deb Haynie, and Michael Bahar.
  I also thank staff members who were with us but have retired: Mike 
Shank, Janet Fisher, and Khizer Sayed.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, again, I want to thank my friends on the other side of 
the aisle, from Dutch to Heather, and the whole entire team for putting 
this product together by putting our country first. It is very 
important.
  I challenge every Member to read this material next year when it is 
announced that you can review the classified annex. Review the 
classified annex. I think they will have a better perspective at the 
huge number of challenges facing the United States when it comes to 
real threats developing around the world.
  Mr. Speaker, I would again say thanks to all, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the Intelligence 
Authorization Act. As a member of the Armed Services and Intelligence 
Committees, I know these Authorization bills provide the necessary 
accountability, direction, and resources for those who keep our nation 
safe.
  Today's bill reflects the continuation of the Committee's bipartisan 
and bicameral work, and I want to thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking 
Member Ruppersberger for their strong and consistent leadership on 
these critical issues.
  Today I want to highlight two areas of specific interest to me.
  First, this legislation strikes a careful balance between ensuring 
that our nation's secrets are kept safe and providing appropriate 
transparency with the American people. There are lawful ways to raise 
concerns of wrongdoing and procedures to declassify information when 
appropriate. In the past, Congress has strengthened these avenues, 
including by enhancing whistleblower protections and the role of 
Inspectors General.
  As it has each year, this bill adds to the mission of 
counterintelligence to ensure that information is protected and that 
the tools utilized by security professionals are handled lawfully and 
with full consideration for the privacy and civil liberties of our 
intelligence professionals. This bill continues this important 
direction, asking the DNI to establish appropriate guidelines to govern 
how publicly available information can be utilized.
  Second, this bill continues to support the work of the men and women 
at the front lines of cybersecurity. It helps cyber professionals at 
NSA, FBI, and DHS to hone their tools and skills to protect us, while 
supporting initiatives to grow the next-generation cyber workforce. And 
it will further aid the Intelligence Community in understanding and 
defending certain networks from cyber threats.
  Mr. Speaker, I am proud of our work on this bill, and I urge its 
passage.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) that the House suspend the

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rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 4681.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

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