Pennsylvania (Mr. MEEHAN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3410, as amended. The question was taken. The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 2 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3410) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to secure critical infrastructure against electromagnetic pulses, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3410

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Critical Infrastructure Protection Act” or “CIPA”.

SEC. 2. EMP PLANNING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND PROTECTION AND PREPAREDNESS.

(a) In General.—The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is amended—

(1) in section 2 (6 U.S.C. 101), by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:

“(6a) EMP.—The term ‘EMP’ means—

“(A) an electromagnetic pulse caused by intentional means, including acts of terrorism; and

“(B) a geomagnetic disturbance caused by solar storms or other naturally occurring phenomena.”;

(2) in section V (6 U.S.C. 311 et seq.), by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 526. NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS AND EDUCATION.

‘The Secretary shall, to the extent practicable—

“(1) include in national planning scenarios the threat of EMP events; and

“(2) conduct outreach to educate owners and operators of critical infrastructure, emergency planners, and emergency responders at all levels of government of the threat of EMP events.”;

(3) in title III (6 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), by adding at the end the following:

“SEC. 318. EMP RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

(a) In General.—In furtherance of domestic preparedness, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and in consultation with other relevant agencies and departments of the Federal Government and relevant owners and operators of critical infrastructure, shall, to the extent practicable, conduct research and development to mitigate the consequences of EMP events.

“(b) Scope.—The scope of the research and development under subsection (a) shall include the following:

“(1) an objective scientific analysis of the risks to critical infrastructures from a range of EMP events.

“(2) Determination of the critical national security assets, critical civilian utilities and infrastructures that are at risk from EMP events.

“(3) An evaluation of emergency planning and response technologies that would address the findings and recommendations of experts, including those of the Commission to Assess the Threat from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack.

“(4) An analysis of technology options that are available to improve the resiliency of critical infrastructure to EMP events.

“(5) The restoration and recovery capabilities of critical infrastructure under differing levels of damage and disruption from various EMP events.

“(6) Biennial updates on the status of the recommended strategy.

“(B) The recommended strategy shall—

“(1) be based on findings of the research and development conducted under section 318;

“(ii) biennial updates on the status of the recommended strategy.

“(3) Conduct an analysis of technology options that are available to improve the resiliency of critical infrastructure to EMP events, including from acts of terrorism; and

“(4) a comprehensive plan required under the amendment made by subsection (a)(4); and

“(5) The restoration and recovery capabilities of critical infrastructure under differing levels of damage and disruption from various EMP events.

“(6) biennial updates on the status of the recommended strategy.

“(B) The recommended strategy shall—

“(1) be based on findings of the research and development conducted under section 318;

“(ii) biennial updates on the status of the recommended strategy.

“SECTION 3. EMP R&D REQUIREMENTS.

This Act may be cited as the “Critical Infrastructure Protection Act” or “CIPA.”

SEC. 4. NO NEW AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

This Act, including the amendments made by this Act, may be carried out only from funds appropriated under other laws.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MEEHAN) offers an amendment from the gentleman from New York (Ms. CLARKE) each will control 20 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous materials on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3410, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, or CIPA.

In 1962, the United States conducted a test known as Starfish Prime, where the military detonated a 1.4-megaton thermonuclear bomb about 25 miles above Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. In space, six American, British, and Soviet satellites suffered damage and, 800 miles away in Hawaii, burglar alarms sounded, streetlights blinked out, and phones, radios, and televisions went dead. While only 1 percent of the existing streetlights were affected, it became clear that electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, could cause significant damage.

EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results from certain types of high-energy explosions or from a suddenly fluctuating magnetic field. An EMP can be generated by nuclear weapons from naturally occurring sources such as solar storms or specialized nonnuclear EMP weapons. An EMP event could result from a small-scale incident, with little or no permanent damage, to a large-scale event, with dire consequences. In fact, a successful large-scale EMP event could damage electrical power systems, electronics, and information systems, and these effects could cascade into other interdependent infrastructures, such as telecommunications, gas, and water.

Repeated studies, including by the Congressional EMP Commission and Lloyd’s of London, have warned that the U.S. electric grid is vulnerable to damage from EMP events, that there is a significant risk, and that we need to be better prepared. H.R. 3410 takes commonsense steps to address the EMP threat. Specifically, this legislation compels the Department of Homeland Security to include EMP events in their national planning scenarios, conduct research to mitigate the consequences of an EMP event, develop a recommended strategy to protect critical infrastructure, and perform outreach to raise awareness of the threat.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MEEHAN) offers an amendment from the gentleman from New York (Ms. CLARKE) each will control 20 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3410, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. CLARKE of New York. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3410, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, of which I am a cosponsor.

Mr. Speaker, recently, there has been increased interest in bolstering the resilience of our Nation’s electrical power distribution and delivery system. In particular, there is growing interest in looking at the damage that could naturally occur to that system through powerful weather storms and geomagnetic disturbances, as well as through intentional and malicious physical and cyber attacks.

Earlier this Congress, the House approved legislation authored by my committee colleague and neighbor, Mr. PAYNE, to broadly research the threats to our electric grid. Today, we have an opportunity to foster progress on low-probability but high-consequence threats to the grid: electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, and geomagnetic disturbances, or GMD.

Today, our Nation’s power system operates at such a high level of reliability that any major outage, either caused by heavy weather storms, operational errors, or sabotage, makes headlines. Our transmission system is the most complex and extensive of any system on the globe, consisting mainly of transformers, switches, transmission towers and lines, control centers, and computer controls.

The main risk for weather-related damage or a terrorist attack is a wide-spread power outage that lasts for an extended period of time. The damage that such an outage could have to the welfare of our citizens and economy is hard to measure, but it would certainly be very significant.

With that in mind, H.R. 3410 seeks to gain ground against this homeland security challenge. It does so by directing the Department of Homeland Security to include EMP and GMD in national planning scenarios; conduct outreach to critical infrastructure owners and operators, emergency planners, and emergency responders on the threats posed; conduct targeted research and development; and address the threats.

I am disappointed that the bill provides no new resources to the Department to carry out these activities, but I am appreciative of the majority’s willingness to work with me to refine the language to provide needed flexibility to the Department in how it carries out these activities.

That said, since H.R. 3410 had to bypass regular order to be considered here today, we did not have the time to include key amendments. Specifically, the definitions in this bill for electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, and geomagnetic, or GMD, would benefit from further fine-tuning down the line so risk of these two distinct events being conflated is avoided.

An EMP is an electromagnetic pulse caused by intentional means, such as an act of war or terrorism. A GMD is a geomagnetically induced current caused by solar storms or other naturally occurring phenomena. While some have gotten in the habit of calling them both EMPs, they are not the same, thus requiring differing mitigation and resiliency responses.

Like my colleagues Mr. MEEHAN and Mr. FRANKS, I am very concerned about the potential impact and the types of threats posed by EMPs and GMDs. However, I think we should take care to make clear the distinct differences between the two.

We also know that public-private partnerships are essential to addressing the challenge of fully understanding the threats caused by EMPs and GMDs, especially because the ownership and management of our electric grid is privately held by large investor-owned utilities, or is part of the rural electric cooperatives systems or members of the American Public Power network that represents not-for-profit, community-owned electric cooperatives systems or members of the American Public Power network that represents not-for-profit, community-owned electric power plants and for electric plants and for community-owned electric utilities.

Additionally, the Department’s science and technology directorate has cosponsored with private utilities an exercise in a fast-turnaround transformer replacement project. This effort is known as the Recovery Transformer Project, and it hopes to increase the resiliency of the transmission power grid through the use of more mobile and modular assets.

Again, I want to thank Chairman McCaul and Chairman MEEHAN for working with me. I also thank Representative FRANKS, who has been a tireless and relentless proponent of this legislative measure to protect our Nation’s electrical infrastructure. He is internationally known for his unwavering pursuit of this critical concern, and over the past few years has been viewed as a go-to legislator on protecting our Nation’s infrastructure. It has been a real pleasure to engage in a moment of bipartisan interaction, particularly on a matter of such great import nationally and internationally, and I thank the gentleman.

As we enter the waning days of the 113th Congress, I sincerely hope this measure gets enacted into law. But in the event that it does not, I look forward to working with the majority on advancing this bill through regular order next Congress to ensure a more robust examination of the bill’s impact on the Department and on industry.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. FRANKS), the sponsor of this legislation.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman MIKE CONGREGATIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

Mr. Speaker, recently, there has been increased interest in bolstering the resiliency of our Nation’s electrical power distribution and delivery system on the globe, consisting mainly of ionized particles with the potential to profoundly impact our civilization. As we enter the waning days of the majority’s willingness to work with me to refine the language to provide needed flexibility to the Department in how it carries out these activities.

That said, since H.R. 3410 had to bypass regular order to be considered here today, we did not have the time to include key amendments. Specifically, the definitions in this bill for electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, and geomagnetic, or GMD, would benefit from further fine-tuning down the line so risk of these two distinct events being conflated is avoided.

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We also know that public-private partnerships are essential to addressing the challenge of fully understanding the threats caused by EMPs and GMDs, especially because the ownership and management of our electric grid is privately held by large investor-owned utilities, or is part of the rural electric cooperatives systems or members of the American Public Power network that represents not-for-profit, community-owned electric power plants and for electric plants and for community-owned electric utilities.

Additionally, the Department’s science and technology directorate has cosponsored with private utilities an exercise in a fast-turnaround transformer replacement project. This effort is known as the Recovery Transformer Project, and it hopes to increase the resiliency of the transmission power grid through the use of more mobile and modular assets.

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As we enter the waning days of the 113th Congress, I sincerely hope this measure gets enacted into law. But in the event that it does not, I look forward to working with the majority on advancing this bill through regular order next Congress to ensure a more robust examination of the bill’s impact on the Department and on industry.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. FRANKS), the sponsor of this legislation.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Chairman MIKE MEHAN, and, of course, Ranking Member YVETTE CLARKE for their principled and unwavering leadership in bringing this legislation to the floor. I was touched by the gentlelady’s words as well. I would also especially like to personally thank Chairman PETE SESSIONS, the sole original cosponsor of this bill, for being a tireless champion of protecting our Nation’s critical infrastructure against EMP.

Mr. Speaker, back in August of 2003, a large section of our electric grid was knocked out across the Eastern United States. Fifty million people were affected after 21 power plants shut down in just 3 minutes. Office workers streamed into parking lots, and many key government and military installations were stripped of their computers. In a matter of moments, those things that make up our critical infrastructure, from the electric grid to water pumps to cell phone service to computer systems, were disrupted. Life suddenly changed for New York, Mr. Speaker, as well as in Cleveland, Detroit, and all the way into Canada. In New York City alone, this short blackout was estimated to cost more than a half-billion dollars.

I am grateful and proud to have been a co-sponsor of this bill to preserve natural or manmade electromagnetic pulse—EMP—event represents a dangerous threat that could have a prolonged catastrophic impact on our electric grid—our most critical and our most interdependent infrastructure.

There are at least 11 major government reports and studies describing our vulnerabilities to electromagnetic pulses. Our Defense Department has wisely hardened many of our most critical infrastructure assets including our strategic nuclear triad and our missile defense systems. However, our civilian grid remains fundamentally unprotected against severe EMP.

Whether catalyzed by non-nuclear intentional electromagnetic interference, a major solar storm, or a high-altitude nuclear blast, EMP is an invisible force that could overwhelm and destroy our present electrical power grids, which would profoundly impact our civilization.

The National Intelligence University of the United States recently translated an Iranian military doctrine called “Passive Defense” which referenced the use of nuclear EMP as a weapon more than 20 times. This doctrine stresses that electrical grids are vital to national existence. It includes a formula for calculating the value of our electric grid, and for prioritizing the targeting of electric grid components and other infrastructural elements.

Mr. Speaker, we know all too well the Obama administration has just extended talks with the world’s leading
Finally, I will include your letter and this response in the Congressional Record during consideration of this bill on the House floor. I appreciate your cooperation regarding this legislation, and I look forward to working with the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and the bill moves through the legislative process.

Sincerely,

Michael T. McCaul
Chairman.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. As the past 10 years have demonstrated, the United States has seen an unprecedented expansion of electronic communication and commerce that boosts our economy and facilitates entrepreneurship. However, this technology is also susceptible to new types of potential threats, such as Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP), that could dramatically disrupt electronic activity or severely damage our electrical grids.

Due to the potential of an EMP threat, I joined Congressman T. Trent Franks in introducing H.R. 3410—the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. This legislation directs the Department of Homeland Security to enhance our nation’s threat assessments of EMPs and to plan how to best protect and recover after an EMP occurs. The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act takes the first step towards getting the U.S. closer to protecting ourselves from a potentially catastrophic nationwide blackout. It is my hope that this legislation will promote a national dialogue about the threat of EMPs and ensure that we are adequately prepared to protect our nation’s critical infrastructure.

I want to thank Chairman McCaul for his important work on this legislation, as well as my dear friend, Congressman T. Trent Franks, for his leadership. Additionally, I want to thank Frank Gaffney, the Founder and President of the Center for Security Policy, for his policy expertise and much needed efforts to educate and spread awareness regarding the potential threats posed by an Electromagnetic Pulse. I strongly support the passage of this important legislation.

Mr. Speaker, the question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MEEHAN) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 3410, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL LABORATORIES MEAN NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Mrs. BROOKS of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 3438) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize use of grants under the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant Program to work in conjunction with a Department of Energy national laboratory.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 3438

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,