[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 135 (Friday, September 19, 2014)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1464-E1465]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS RESOLUTION, 2015

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                         HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN

                              of maryland

                    in the house of representatives

                     Wednesday, September 17, 2014

  Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I support the core pillars of the 
President's plan to fight ISIS--the use of American surveillance, 
intelligence assets and air power to support the ground operations of 
the Iraqi army and Kurdish fighters in Iraq, and to strike ISIS 
military equipment, troop concentrations, and command and control in 
Syria. I also believe we should supply weapons to those groups in 
Syria, such as the Syrian Kurds, who have consistently fought ISIS, and 
whose priority is to defeat ISIS. I welcome the opportunity to work 
with my colleagues to revise the existing 2001 Authorization to Use 
Military Force to more clearly support these objectives, but to also 
ensure that U.S. ground forces are not engaged in combat in Iraq or 
Syria.
  My one concern with the Administration's plan relates to the proposal 
to arm the so-called ``moderate'' Syrian opposition. I believe that it 
is a well-intentioned proposal that will have unintended negative 
consequences that will not serve our ultimate goal of defeating ISIS.
  First, the primary objective of these Sunni Islamist fighters is the 
defeat of Assad and his Alawite dominated regime--not the defeat of 
ISIS. Since the start of the war there have been shifting alliances 
among these Sunni Islamist forces that include the al-Qaeda affiliate, 
Jabhat al-Nusra, different elements of the Free Syrian Army, the 
Islamist Front, Ahrar al-Sham and ISIS, among others. Their common 
cause and overriding objective is defeating Assad. Indeed, the 
commander of the Syria Revolutionaries' Front, Jamal Maarouf, one of 
the most militarily proficient commanders of the FSA, recently said 
that, ``It's clear that I'm not fighting against al-Qaeda. This is a 
problem outside of Syria's border, so it's not our problem. I don't 
have a problem with anyone who fights against the regime inside 
Syria.''
  While there is no doubt that Assad is a brutal dictator, he does not 
pose the same threat to the United States as ISIS, and his forces have 
recently been battling ISIS. At this point, arming fighters whose 
primary purpose is to

[[Page E1465]]

weaken Assad has one unintended result--strengthening ISIS. Indeed, I 
fear that the arms we provide to the so-called Syrian opposition are 
more likely to end up in ISIS hands than to be used against ISIS 
terrorists.
  There is one group within Syria that has been battling ISIS from the 
start, and that is the Syrian Kurds. We should provide material support 
to these Kurdish fighters in Syria.
  We should also continue our efforts to get the Sunni tribesmen in 
Iraq and Syria to take up the fight against ISIS. The President and his 
team deserve great credit for helping to push former Prime Minister 
Maliki from power. He ruled Iraq, not as a nationalist Iraqi leader, 
but as a Shia strongman. That sectarian approach alienated the Sunni 
population in Iraq, and made them more open to tolerating the rise of 
ISIS.
  With the emergence of a more inclusive Iraqi government, we must work 
with all parties to assure Sunni tribesman that their interests are 
better served by a united Iraq than by ISIS. That is why the 
President's emphasis on a political component to this strategy is so 
important.

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