[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 107 (Thursday, July 10, 2014)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4436-S4442]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
LAWFUL USES OF ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME DOMAINS
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate proceed
to immediate consideration of Calendar No. 380, S. Res. 412.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report the resolution by title.
The bill clerk read as follows:
A resolution (S. Res. 412) reaffirming the strong support
of the United States Government for freedom of navigation and
other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the
Asia-Pacific region, and for the peaceful diplomatic
resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims and
disputes.
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the
resolution, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign
Relations, with amendments and an amendment to the preamble.
(The part of the resolution intended to be stricken is shown in
boldface brackets and the part of the resolution intended to be
inserted is shown in italic.)
(The part of the preamble to be inserted is shown in italic.)
S. Res. 412
Whereas Asia-Pacific's maritime domains, which include both
the sea and airspace above the domains, are critical to the
region's prosperity, stability, and security, including
global commerce;
Whereas the United States is a longstanding Asia-Pacific
power and has a national interest in maintaining freedom of
operations in international waters and airspace both in the
Asia-Pacific region and around the world;
Whereas, for over 60 years, the United States Government,
alongside United States allies and partners, has played an
instrumental role in maintaining stability in the Asia-
Pacific, including safeguarding the prosperity and economic
growth and development of the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the United States, from the earliest days of the
Republic, has had a deep and abiding national security
interest in freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas,
respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce,
including in the East China and South China Seas;
Whereas the United States alliance relationships in the
region, including with Japan, Korea, Australia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, are at the heart of United States
policy and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and share a
common approach to supporting the maintenance of peace and
stability, freedom of navigation, and other
[[Page S4437]]
internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-
Pacific region;
Whereas territorial and maritime claims must be derived
from land features and otherwise comport with international
law;
Whereas the United States Government has a clear interest
in encouraging and supporting the nations of the region to
work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes
and is firmly opposed to coercion, intimidation, threats, or
the use of force;
Whereas the South China Sea contains great natural
resources, and their stewardship and responsible use offers
immense potential benefit for generations to come;
Whereas the United States is not a claimant party in either
the East China or South China Seas, but does have an interest
in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputed claims in
accordance with international law, in freedom of operations,
and in the free-flow of commerce free of coercion,
intimidation, or the use of force;
Whereas the United States supports the obligation of all
members of the United Nations to seek to resolve disputes by
peaceful means;
Whereas freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of sea
and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region are embodied in
international law, not granted by certain states to others;
Whereas, on November 23, 2013, the People's Republic of
China unilaterally and without prior consultations with the
United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea or other nations
of the Asia-Pacific region, declared an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, also
announcing that all aircraft entering the PRC's self-declared
ADIZ, even if they do not intend to enter Chinese territorial
airspace, would have to submit flight plans, maintain radio
contact, and follow directions from the Chinese Ministry of
National Defense or face ``emergency defensive measures'';
Whereas the ``rules of engagement'' declared by China,
including the ``emergency defensive measures'', are in
violation of the concept of ``due regard for the safety of
civil aviation'' under the Chicago Convention of the
International Civil Aviation Organization's Chicago
Convention and thereby are a departure from accepted
practice;
Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil
Aviation Organization distinguishes between civilian aircraft
and state aircraft and provides for the specific obligations
of state parties, consistent with customary law, to ``refrain
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft
in flight and . . . in case of interception, the lives of
persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be
endangered'';
Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by
international agreements, including standards and regulations
set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and
regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection;
Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent
passage, the United States does not recognize the right of a
coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does
the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
Whereas the United States Government expressed profound
concerns with China's unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and
destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the
potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by
aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace;
Whereas the People's Republic of China's declaration of an
ADIZ in the East China Sea will not alter how the United
States Government conducts operations in the region or the
unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern
about the People's Republic of China's declaration of such a
zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the
freedom of flight in international airspace and to change the
status quo that could escalate tensions and potentially cause
unintentional consequences in the East China Sea;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has
expressed concern over China's declared ADIZ, and on December
9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air
Defense Identification Zone, which does not encompass
territory administered by another country, and did so only
after undertaking a deliberate process of consultations with
the United States, Japan, and China;
Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that
China's declared ADIZ seeks to transfer an entire air zone
into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of
flight in international airspace, and compromises the safety
of civil aviation and the national security of affected
states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do
not jeopardize regional security and stability;
Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia
made clear in a statement its opposition to any coercive or
unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China
Sea;
Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government
and the Government of Japan jointly submitted a letter to the
ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight
by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective
management of civil air traffic within allocated Flight
Information Regions (FIR);
Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a
hearing before the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs
on February 18, 2014, stated, ``We have firmly told China we
will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone
if it is adopted in the South China Sea. And the signal we
have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a
similar Zone in the South China Sea.'';
Whereas over half the world's merchant tonnage flows
through the South China Sea, and over 15,000,000 barrels of
oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic
growth and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of
patrols and competing regulations over disputed territory and
maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the
East China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk
of confrontation;
Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without
settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with
China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea that committed all parties to those
territorial disputes to ``reaffirm their respect for and
commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight
above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally
recognized principles of international law'' and to ``resolve
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force'';
Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an
effective Code of Conduct when they adopted the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet
negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
Whereas, in recent years, there have been numerous
dangerous and destabilizing incidents in waters near the
coasts of the Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned
about unilateral actions by any claimant seeking to change
the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or
military force, including the continued restrictions on
access to Scarborough Reef and pressure on long-standing
Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the
People's Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent
any other state from exercising its sovereign rights to the
resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf by making claims to those areas that have
no support in international law; declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested areas in
the South China Sea; and the imposition of new fishing
regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised
tensions in the region;
Whereas international law is important to safeguard the
rights and freedoms of all states in the Asia-Pacific region,
and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law
by claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can
create uncertainty, insecurity, and instability;
Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of
intimidation, coercion, or force to assert a territorial
claim in the South China Sea;
Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with
international law, and those that are not derived from land
features are fundamentally flawed;
Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South
China Sea on July 20, 2012, whereby ASEAN's Foreign Ministers
reiterated and reaffirmed ``the commitment of ASEAN Member
States to: . . . 1. the full implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(2002); . . . 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(2011); . . . 3. the early conclusion of a Regional Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea; . . . 4. the full respect of
the universally recognized principles of International Law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS); . . . 5. the continued exercise of self-
restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and . . . 6.
the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with
universally recognized principles of International Law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).'';
Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly
exercised its rights to peaceful settlement mechanisms with
the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex
VII of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to
achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute, and
the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute
ultimately abide by the rulings of internationally recognized
dispute-settlement bodies;
Whereas China and Japan are the world's second and third
largest economies, and have a shared interest in preserving
stable maritime domains to continue to support economic
growth;
Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in
dangerous activities by Chinese maritime agencies in areas
near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of
the Government of China intruding into the Japanese
territorial sea each month since September 2012, between 26
and 124 ships entering the ``contiguous zone'' in the same
time period, and 9 ships intruding into the territorial sea
and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in February
2014;
[[Page S4438]]
Whereas, although the United States Government does not
take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they
are under the administration of Japan and opposes any
unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such
administration;
Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed
that the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect
the United States acknowledgment of the administration of
Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
Whereas the United States remains committed under the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to respond to any
armed attack in the territories under the administration of
Japan, has urged all parties to take steps to prevent
incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means,
and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained
approach in this regard;
Whereas both the United States and the People's Republic of
China are parties to and are obligated to observe the rules
of the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs);
Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully
operating in international waters in the South China Sea when
a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly crossed its
bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the
water, forcing the USS Cowpens to take evasive action to
avoid a collision;
Whereas the reported actions taken by the People's
Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS Cowpens' incident, as
publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal
obligations of the People's Republic of China under COLREGs;
Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People's Republic of China's
state-owned energy company, CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-
submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981),
accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120
nautical miles off Vietnam's coastline;
Whereas, from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese
vessels escorting HD-981 increased to more than 80, including
seven military ships, which aggressively patrolled and
intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard ships in violation of
COLREGS, reportedly intentionally rammed multiple Vietnamese
vessels, and used helicopters and water cannons to obstruct
others;
Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety
Administration of China (MSAC) established an exclusion zone
with a radius of three nautical miles around HD-981, which
undermines maritime safety in the area and is in violation of
universally recognized principles of International Law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS);
Whereas China's territorial claims and associated maritime
actions in support of the drilling activity that HD-981
commenced on May 1, 2014, have not been clarified under
international law, including as defined by the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, constitute a
unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force, and
appear to be in violation of the 2002 Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea;
Whereas, on January 19, 1998, the United States and
People's Republic of China signed the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement, creating a mechanism for consultation
and coordination on operational safety issues in the maritime
domain between the United States and the People's Republic of
China;
Whereas the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, inaugurated in
1988 and comprising the navies of Australia, Brunei,
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the People's Republic of
China, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Russian
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States,
and Vietnam, whose countries all border the Pacific Ocean
region, provides a forum where leaders of regional navies can
meet to discuss cooperative initiatives, discuss regional and
global maritime issues, and undertake exercises to strengthen
norms and practices that contribute to operational safety,
including protocols for unexpected encounters at sea, common
ways of communication, common ways of operating, and common
ways of engagement;
Whereas, Japan and the People's Republic of China sought to
negotiate a Maritime Communications Mechanism between the
defense authorities and a Maritime Search and Rescue
Agreement and agreed in principle to these agreements to
address operational safety on the maritime domains but failed
to sign them;
Whereas the Changi Command and Control Center in Singapore
provides a platform for all the countries of the Western
Pacific to share information on what kind of contact at sea
and to provide a common operational picture for the region;
Whereas 2014 commemorates the 35th anniversary of
normalization of diplomatic relations between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, and the United
States welcomes the development of a peaceful and prosperous
China that becomes a responsible international stakeholder,
the government of which respects international norms,
international laws, international institutions, and
international rules; enhances security and peace; and seeks
to advance relations between the United States and China; and
Whereas ASEAN plays an important role, in partnership with
others in the regional and international community, in
addressing maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific
region and the Indian Ocean, including open access to the
maritime domain of Asia; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE.
The Senate--
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of
force to impede freedom of operations in international
airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the
status quo or to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region;
(2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China
to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is contrary to
freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to
refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in
the Asia-Pacific region[; and];
(3) commends the Governments of Japan and of the Republic
of Korea for their restraint, and commends the Government of
the Republic of Korea for engaging in a deliberate process of
consultations with the United States, Japan and China prior
to announcing its adjustment of its Air Defense
Identification Zone on December 9, 2013, and for its
commitment to implement this adjusted Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in a manner consistent with
international practice and respect for the freedom of
overflight and other internationally lawful uses of
international airspace; and
(4) calls on the Government of the People's Republic of
China to withdraw its HD-981 drilling rig and associated
maritime forces from their current positions, to refrain from
maritime maneuvers contrary to COLREGS, and to return
immediately to the status quo as it existed before May 1,
2014.
SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for
allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including
longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the
United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and that
Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty
applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and
lawful use of the sea that belong to all nations;
(3) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or
efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed
claims;
(4) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation,
coercion, or force;
(5) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in
accordance with international law;
(6) support efforts by ASEAN and the People's Republic of
China to develop an effective Code of Conduct, including the
``early harvest'' of agreed-upon elements in the Code of
Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
(7) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules
and guidelines, including the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation
between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of
other countries, including the People's Republic of China;
(8) support the development of regional institutions and
bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense
Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the
expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation
in the region and reinforce the role of international law;
(9) encourage the adoption of mechanisms such as hotlines
or emergency procedures for preventing incidents in sensitive
areas, managing them if they occur, and preventing disputes
from escalating;
(10) fully support the rights of claimants to exercise
rights they may have to avail themselves of peaceful dispute
settlement mechanisms;
(11) encourage claimants not to undertake new unilateral
attempts to change the status quo since the signing of the
2002 Declaration of Conduct, including not asserting
administrative measures or controls in disputed areas in the
South China Sea;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other
countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and
capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States
Government to explore the development of appropriate
multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in
the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid
destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous
activities; and
(13) assure the continuity of operations by the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region, including, when
appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to
reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in
international waters and airspace in accordance with
established principles and practices of international law.
Mr. REID. I further ask that the committee-reported amendments to the
resolution be agreed to; the Menendez amendment to the resolution,
which is at the desk, be agreed to; the Paul amendment, which is at the
desk, be agreed to; the resolution, as amended, be agreed to; further,
that the committee-reported amendment to the preamble be agreed to; the
Menendez amendment to the preamble, which is
[[Page S4439]]
at the desk, be agreed to; the preamble, as amended, be agreed to; and
finally, the motions to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the
table, with no intervening action or debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The committee-reported amendments were agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3553) was agreed to, as follows:
(Purpose: To make a technical correction)
On page 13, line 24, strike ``HD-981'' and insert ``Hai
Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981)''.
The amendment (No. 3554) was agreed to, as follows:
(Purpose: To clarify that nothing in the resolution shall be construed
as a declaration of war or authorization to use force)
At the end, add the following:
SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as a
declaration of war or authorization to use force.
The resolution (S. Res. 412), as amended, was agreed to.
The committee-reported amendment to the preamble was agreed to.
The amendment (No. 3555) was agreed to, as follows:
(Purpose: To improve the preamble)
Beginning in the thirteenth whereas clause of the preamble,
strike ``Organization's'' and all that follows through ``Law
of the Sea'' in the forty-seventh whereas clause and insert
the following: ``Organization and thereby are a departure
from accepted practice;
Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil
Aviation Organization distinguishes between civilian aircraft
and state aircraft and provides for the specific obligations
of state parties, consistent with customary law, to ``refrain
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft
in flight and . . . in case of interception, the lives of
persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be
endangered'';
Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by
international agreements, including standards and regulations
set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and
regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection;
Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent
passage, the United States does not recognize the right of a
coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does
the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
Whereas the United States Government expressed profound
concerns with China's unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and
destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the
potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by
aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace;
Whereas the People's Republic of China's declaration of an
ADIZ in the East China Sea will not alter how the United
States Government conducts operations in the region or the
unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern
about the People's Republic of China's declaration of such a
zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the
freedom of flight in international airspace and to change the
status quo that could escalate tensions and potentially cause
unintentional consequences in the East China Sea;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has
expressed concern over China's declared ADIZ, and on December
9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air
Defense Identification Zone, which does not encompass
territory administered by another country, and did so only
after undertaking a deliberate process of consultations with
the United States, Japan, and China;
Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that
China's declared ADIZ seeks to transfer an entire air zone
into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of
flight in international airspace, and compromises the safety
of civil aviation and the national security of affected
states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do
not jeopardize regional security and stability;
Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia
made clear in a statement its opposition to any coercive or
unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China
Sea;
Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government
and the Government of Japan jointly submitted a letter to the
ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight
by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective
management of civil air traffic within allocated Flight
Information Regions (FIR);
Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a
hearing before the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs
on February 18, 2014, stated, ``We have firmly told China we
will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone
if it is adopted in the South China Sea. And the signal we
have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a
similar Zone in the South China Sea.'';
Whereas over half the world's merchant tonnage flows
through the South China Sea, and over 15,000,000 barrels of
oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic
growth and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of
patrols and competing regulations over disputed territory and
maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the
East China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk
of confrontation;
Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without
settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with
China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea that committed all parties to those
territorial disputes to ``reaffirm their respect for and
commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight
above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally
recognized principles of international law'' and to ``resolve
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force'';
Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an
effective Code of Conduct when they adopted the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet
negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
Whereas, in recent years, there have been numerous
dangerous and destabilizing incidents in waters near the
coasts of the Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned
about unilateral actions by any claimant seeking to change
the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or
military force, including the continued restrictions on
access to Scarborough Reef and pressure on long-standing
Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the
People's Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent
any other state from exercising its sovereign rights to the
resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf by making claims to those areas that have
no support in international law; declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested areas in
the South China Sea; and the imposition of new fishing
regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised
tensions in the region;
Whereas international law is important to safeguard the
rights and freedoms of all states in the Asia-Pacific region,
and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law
by claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can
create uncertainty, insecurity, and instability;
Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of
intimidation, coercion, or force to assert a territorial
claim in the South China Sea;
Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with
international law, and those that are not derived from land
features are fundamentally flawed;
Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South
China Sea on July 20, 2012, whereby ASEAN's Foreign Ministers
reiterated and reaffirmed ``the commitment of ASEAN Member
States to: . . . 1. the full implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(2002); . . . 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(2011); . . . 3. the early conclusion of a Regional Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea; . . . 4. the full respect of
the universally recognized principles of International Law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS); . . . 5. the continued exercise of self-
restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and . . . 6.
the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with
universally recognized principles of International Law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).'';
Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly
exercised its rights to peaceful settlement mechanisms with
the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex
VII of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to
achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute, and
the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute
ultimately abide by the rulings of internationally recognized
dispute-settlement bodies;
Whereas China and Japan are the world's second and third
largest economies, and have a shared interest in preserving
stable maritime domains to continue to support economic
growth;
Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in
dangerous activities by Chinese maritime agencies in areas
near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of
the Government of China intruding into the Japanese
territorial sea each month since September 2012, between 26
and 124 ships entering the ``contiguous zone'' in the same
time period, and 9 ships intruding into the territorial sea
and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in February
2014;
Whereas, although the United States Government does not
take a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they
are under the administration of Japan and opposes any
unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such
administration;
Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed
that the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect
the United States acknowledgment of the administration of
Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
[[Page S4440]]
Whereas the United States remains committed under the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to respond to any
armed attack in the territories under the administration of
Japan, has urged all parties to take steps to prevent
incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means,
and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained
approach in this regard;
Whereas both the United States and the People's Republic of
China are parties to and are obligated to observe the rules
of the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs);
Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully
operating in international waters in the South China Sea when
a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly crossed its
bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the
water, forcing the USS Cowpens to take evasive action to
avoid a collision;
Whereas the reported actions taken by the People's
Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS Cowpens' incident, as
publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal
obligations of the People's Republic of China under COLREGs;
Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People's Republic of China's
state-owned energy company, CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-
submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981),
accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120
nautical miles off Vietnam's coastline;
Whereas, from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese
vessels escorting Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981) increased to
more than 80, including seven military ships, which
aggressively patrolled and intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard
ships in violation of COLREGS, reportedly intentionally
rammed multiple Vietnamese vessels, and used helicopters and
water cannons to obstruct others;
Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety
Administration of China (MSAC) established an exclusion zone
with a radius of three nautical miles around Hai Yang Shi You
981 (HD-981), which undermines maritime safety in the area
and is in violation of universally recognized principles of
international law;
Whereas China's territorial claims and associated maritime
actions in support of the drilling activity that Hai Yang Shi
You 981 (HD-981) commenced on May 1, 2014, have not been
clarified under international law
The preamble, as amended, was agreed to.
(The Resolution (S. Res. 412), as amended, with its preamble, as
amended, reads as follows:)
S. Res. 412
Whereas Asia-Pacific's maritime domains, which include both
the sea and airspace above the domains, are critical to the
region's prosperity, stability, and security, including
global commerce;
Whereas the United States is a longstanding Asia-Pacific
power and has a national interest in maintaining freedom of
operations in international waters and airspace both in the
Asia-Pacific region and around the world;
Whereas for over 60 years, the United States Government,
alongside United States allies and partners, has played an
instrumental role in maintaining stability in the Asia-
Pacific, including safeguarding the prosperity and economic
growth and development of the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the United States, from the earliest days of the
Republic, has had a deep and abiding national security
interest in freedom of navigation, freedom of the seas,
respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce,
including in the East China and South China Seas;
Whereas the United States alliance relationships in the
region, including with Japan, Korea, Australia, the
Philippines, and Thailand, are at the heart of United States
policy and engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and share a
common approach to supporting the maintenance of peace and
stability, freedom of navigation, and other internationally
lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas territorial and maritime claims must be derived
from land features and otherwise comport with international
law;
Whereas the United States Government has a clear interest
in encouraging and supporting the nations of the region to
work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes
and is firmly opposed to coercion, intimidation, threats, or
the use of force;
Whereas the South China Sea contains great natural
resources, and their stewardship and responsible use offers
immense potential benefit for generations to come;
Whereas the United States is not a claimant party in either
the East China or South China Seas, but does have an interest
in the peaceful diplomatic resolution of disputed claims in
accordance with international law, in freedom of operations,
and in the free-flow of commerce free of coercion,
intimidation, or the use of force;
Whereas the United States supports the obligation of all
members of the United Nations to seek to resolve disputes by
peaceful means;
Whereas freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of sea
and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region are embodied in
international law, not granted by certain states to others;
Whereas, on November 23, 2013, the People's Republic of
China unilaterally and without prior consultations with the
United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea or other nations
of the Asia-Pacific region, declared an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, also
announcing that all aircraft entering the PRC's self-declared
ADIZ, even if they do not intend to enter Chinese territorial
airspace, would have to submit flight plans, maintain radio
contact, and follow directions from the Chinese Ministry of
National Defense or face ``emergency defensive measures'';
Whereas the ``rules of engagement'' declared by China,
including the ``emergency defensive measures'', are in
violation of the concept of ``due regard for the safety of
civil aviation'' under the Chicago Convention of the
International Civil Aviation Organization and thereby are a
departure from accepted practice;
Whereas the Chicago Convention of the International Civil
Aviation Organization distinguishes between civilian aircraft
and state aircraft and provides for the specific obligations
of state parties, consistent with customary law, to ``refrain
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft
in flight and . . . in case of interception, the lives of
persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be
endangered'';
Whereas international civil aviation is regulated by
international agreements, including standards and regulations
set by ICAO for aviation safety, security, efficiency and
regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection;
Whereas, in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent
passage, the United States does not recognize the right of a
coastal nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does
the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state
aircraft not intending to enter United States airspace;
Whereas the United States Government expressed profound
concerns with China's unilateral, provocative, dangerous, and
destabilizing declaration of such a zone, including the
potential for misunderstandings and miscalculations by
aircraft operating lawfully in international airspace;
Whereas the People's Republic of China's declaration of an
ADIZ in the East China Sea will not alter how the United
States Government conducts operations in the region or the
unwavering United States commitment to peace, security and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the Government of Japan expressed deep concern
about the People's Republic of China's declaration of such a
zone, regarding it as an effort to unduly infringe upon the
freedom of flight in international airspace and to change the
status quo that could escalate tensions and potentially cause
unintentional consequences in the East China Sea;
Whereas the Government of the Republic of Korea has
expressed concern over China's declared ADIZ, and on December
9, 2013, announced an adjustment to its longstanding Air
Defense Identification Zone, which does not encompass
territory administered by another country, and did so only
after undertaking a deliberate process of consultations with
the United States, Japan, and China;
Whereas the Government of the Philippines has stressed that
China's declared ADIZ seeks to transfer an entire air zone
into Chinese domestic airspace, infringes on freedom of
flight in international airspace, and compromises the safety
of civil aviation and the national security of affected
states, and has called on China to ensure that its actions do
not jeopardize regional security and stability;
Whereas, on November 26, 2013, the Government of Australia
made clear in a statement its opposition to any coercive or
unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China
Sea;
Whereas, on March 10, 2014, the United States Government
and the Government of Japan jointly submitted a letter to the
ICAO Secretariat regarding the issue of freedom of overflight
by civil aircraft in international airspace and the effective
management of civil air traffic within allocated Flight
Information Regions (FIR);
Whereas Indonesia Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, in a
hearing before the Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs
on February 18, 2014, stated, ``We have firmly told China we
will not accept a similar [Air Defense Identification] Zone
if it is adopted in the South China Sea. And the signal we
have received thus far is, China does not plan to adopt a
similar Zone in the South China Sea.'';
Whereas over half the world's merchant tonnage flows
through the South China Sea, and over 15,000,000 barrels of
oil per day transit the Strait of Malacca, fueling economic
growth and prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region;
Whereas the increasing frequency and assertiveness of
patrols and competing regulations over disputed territory and
maritime areas and airspace in the South China Sea and the
East China Sea are raising tensions and increasing the risk
of confrontation;
Whereas the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without
settling the issue of sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with
China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea that committed all parties to those
territorial disputes to ``reaffirm their respect for and
commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight
above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally
[[Page S4441]]
recognized principles of international law'' and to ``resolve
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force'';
Whereas ASEAN and China committed in 2002 to develop an
effective Code of Conduct when they adopted the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, yet
negotiations are irregular and little progress has been made;
Whereas in recent years, there have been numerous dangerous
and destabilizing incidents in waters near the coasts of the
Philippines, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam;
Whereas the United States Government is deeply concerned
about unilateral actions by any claimant seeking to change
the status quo through the use of coercion, intimidation, or
military force, including the continued restrictions on
access to Scarborough Reef and pressure on long-standing
Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal by the
People's Republic of China; actions by any state to prevent
any other state from exercising its sovereign rights to the
resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
continental shelf by making claims to those areas that have
no support in international law; declarations of
administrative and military districts in contested areas in
the South China Sea; and the imposition of new fishing
regulations covering disputed areas, which have raised
tensions in the region;
Whereas international law is important to safeguard the
rights and freedoms of all states in the Asia-Pacific region,
and the lack of clarity in accordance with international law
by claimants with regard to their South China Sea claims can
create uncertainty, insecurity, and instability;
Whereas the United States Government opposes the use of
intimidation, coercion, or force to assert a territorial
claim in the South China Sea;
Whereas claims in the South China Sea must accord with
international law, and those that are not derived from land
features are fundamentally flawed;
Whereas ASEAN issued Six-Point Principles on the South
China Sea on July 20, 2012, whereby ASEAN's Foreign Ministers
reiterated and reaffirmed ``the commitment of ASEAN Member
States to: . . . 1. the full implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(2002); . . . 2. the Guidelines for the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(2011); . . . 3. the early conclusion of a Regional Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea; . . . 4. the full respect of
the universally recognized principles of International Law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS); . . . 5. the continued exercise of self-
restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and . . . 6.
the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with
universally recognized principles of International Law,
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).'';
Whereas, in 2013, the Republic of the Philippines properly
exercised its rights to peaceful settlement mechanisms with
the filing of arbitration case under Article 287 and Annex
VII of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in order to
achieve a peaceful and durable solution to the dispute, and
the United States hopes that all parties in any dispute
ultimately abide by the rulings of internationally recognized
dispute-settlement bodies;
Whereas China and Japan are the world's second and third
largest economies, and have a shared interest in preserving
stable maritime domains to continue to support economic
growth;
Whereas there has been an unprecedented increase in
dangerous activities by Chinese maritime agencies in areas
near the Senkaku islands, including between 6 and 25 ships of
the Government of China intruding into the Japanese
territorial sea each month since September 2012, between 26
and 124 ships entering the ``contiguous zone'' in the same
time period, and 9 ships intruding into the territorial sea
and 33 ships entering in the contiguous zone in February
2014;
Whereas although the United States Government does not take
a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands, the United States Government acknowledges that they
are under the administration of Japan and opposes any
unilateral actions that would seek to undermine such
administration;
Whereas the United States Senate has previously affirmed
that the unilateral actions of a third party will not affect
the United States acknowledgment of the administration of
Japan over the Senkaku Islands;
Whereas the United States remains committed under the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to respond to any
armed attack in the territories under the administration of
Japan, has urged all parties to take steps to prevent
incidents and manage disagreements through peaceful means,
and commends the Government of Japan for its restrained
approach in this regard;
Whereas both the United States and the People's Republic of
China are parties to and are obligated to observe the rules
of the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs);
Whereas, on December 5, 2013, the USS Cowpens was lawfully
operating in international waters in the South China Sea when
a People's Liberation Army Navy vessel reportedly crossed its
bow at a distance of less than 500 yards and stopped in the
water, forcing the USS Cowpens to take evasive action to
avoid a collision;
Whereas the reported actions taken by the People's
Liberation Army Navy vessel in the USS Cowpens' incident, as
publicly reported, appear contrary to the international legal
obligations of the People's Republic of China under COLREGs;
Whereas, on May 1, 2014, the People's Republic of China's
state-owned energy company, CNOOC, placed its deepwater semi-
submersible drilling rig Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981),
accompanied by over 25 Chinese ships, in Block 143, 120
nautical miles off Vietnam's coastline;
Whereas from May 1 to May 9, 2014, the number of Chinese
vessels escorting Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981) increased to
more than 80, including seven military ships, which
aggressively patrolled and intimidated Vietnamese Coast Guard
ships in violation of COLREGS, reportedly intentionally
rammed multiple Vietnamese vessels, and used helicopters and
water cannons to obstruct others;
Whereas, on May 5, 2014, vessels from the Maritime Safety
Administration of China (MSAC) established an exclusion zone
with a radius of three nautical miles around Hai Yang Shi You
981 (HD-981), which undermines maritime safety in the area
and is in violation of universally recognized principles of
international law;
Whereas China's territorial claims and associated maritime
actions in support of the drilling activity that Hai Yang Shi
You 981 (HD-981) commenced on May 1, 2014, have not been
clarified under international law, constitute a unilateral
attempt to change the status quo by force, and appear to be
in violation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea;
Whereas, on January 19, 1998, the United States and
People's Republic of China signed the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement, creating a mechanism for consultation
and coordination on operational safety issues in the maritime
domain between the United States and the People's Republic of
China;
Whereas the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, inaugurated in
1988 and comprising the navies of Australia, Brunei,
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the People's Republic of
China, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Russian
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the United States,
and Vietnam, whose countries all border the Pacific Ocean
region, provides a forum where leaders of regional navies can
meet to discuss cooperative initiatives, discuss regional and
global maritime issues, and undertake exercises to strengthen
norms and practices that contribute to operational safety,
including protocols for unexpected encounters at sea, common
ways of communication, common ways of operating, and common
ways of engagement;
Whereas Japan and the People's Republic of China sought to
negotiate a Maritime Communications Mechanism between the
defense authorities and a Maritime Search and Rescue
Agreement and agreed in principle to these agreements to
address operational safety on the maritime domains but failed
to sign them;
Whereas the Changi Command and Control Center in Singapore
provides a platform for all the countries of the Western
Pacific to share information on what kind of contact at sea
and to provide a common operational picture for the region;
Whereas 2014 commemorates the 35th anniversary of
normalization of diplomatic relations between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, and the United
States welcomes the development of a peaceful and prosperous
China that becomes a responsible international stakeholder,
the government of which respects international norms,
international laws, international institutions, and
international rules; enhances security and peace; and seeks
to advance relations between the United States and China; and
Whereas ASEAN plays an important role, in partnership with
others in the regional and international community, in
addressing maritime security issues in the Asia-Pacific
region and the Indian Ocean, including open access to the
maritime domain of Asia; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE.
The Senate--
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of
force to impede freedom of operations in international
airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the
status quo or to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region;
(2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China
to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is contrary to
freedom of overflight in international airspace, and to
refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in
the Asia-Pacific region;
(3) commends the Governments of Japan and of the Republic
of Korea for their restraint, and commends the Government of
the Republic of Korea for engaging in a deliberate process of
consultations with the United States, Japan and China prior
to announcing its adjustment of its Air Defense
Identification Zone on December 9, 2013, and for its
commitment to implement this adjusted Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in a manner consistent with
international practice and respect for the freedom of
overflight and other internationally lawful uses of
international airspace; and
[[Page S4442]]
(4) calls on the Government of the People's Republic of
China to withdraw its Hai Yang Shi You 981 (HD-981) drilling
rig and associated maritime forces from their current
positions, to refrain from maritime maneuvers contrary to
COLREGS, and to return immediately to the status quo as it
existed before May 1, 2014.
SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) reaffirm its unwavering commitment and support for
allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, including
longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the
United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and that
Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty
applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and
lawful use of the sea that belong to all nations;
(3) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or
efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed
claims;
(4) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation,
coercion, or force;
(5) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in
accordance with international law;
(6) support efforts by ASEAN and the People's Republic of
China to develop an effective Code of Conduct, including the
``early harvest'' of agreed-upon elements in the Code of
Conduct that can be implemented immediately;
(7) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules
and guidelines, including the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972
(COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation
between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of
other countries, including the People's Republic of China;
(8) support the development of regional institutions and
bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense
Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the
expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation
in the region and reinforce the role of international law;
(9) encourage the adoption of mechanisms such as hotlines
or emergency procedures for preventing incidents in sensitive
areas, managing them if they occur, and preventing disputes
from escalating;
(10) fully support the rights of claimants to exercise
rights they may have to avail themselves of peaceful dispute
settlement mechanisms;
(11) encourage claimants not to undertake new unilateral
attempts to change the status quo since the signing of the
2002 Declaration of Conduct, including not asserting
administrative measures or controls in disputed areas in the
South China Sea;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other
countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and
capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States
Government to explore the development of appropriate
multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in
the South China Sea that would serve to help countries avoid
destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous
activities; and
(13) assure the continuity of operations by the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region, including, when
appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to
reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in
international waters and airspace in accordance with
established principles and practices of international law.
SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as a
declaration of war or authorization to use force.
____________________