Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, switching gears to the intelligence re-authorization measure, every Member of the House takes seriously our responsibility to preserve individual liberty and freedoms under the Constitution.

We also have a constitutional obligation to provide for the common defense, because without a strong national defense, which includes the indispensable work of the defense intelligence agencies, personal freedoms and also at risk. The question is achieving and maintaining a balance in deciding how to best preserve inalienable constitutional rights against possible incursions by technologists, whether inadvertent or intentional, as our Nation deals with the very real threats both at home and abroad.

Technology gives us wonderful tools, but it can also be a fertile ground for abuse of privacy. We have a responsibility as Members of Congress to exercise oversight in U.S. intelligence agencies, and that can be difficult since much cannot be debated in open forums with any degree of specificity without bringing great harm to the nation. That is why we have the expertise of standing committees. Not only do they understand these issues, it saves time by allocating the proper amount of time to the discussion of these issues in advance. And from the testimony received in the Rules Committee, I believe that Chairman ROGERS and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER have demonstrated a strong bipartisan commitment on this issue.

Provisions of this bill are aimed at bolstering personal and individual privacy. Passage of H.R. 4681, when you combine it with the passage last week of the U.S. FREEDOM Act, is a good step in protecting our U.S. intelligence capability as well as congressional oversight on these issues.

It is a good bill. It is a fair rule. I urge its adoption.

Mr. JACOBSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak on the Rule for H.R. 4681, the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014,” and H.R. 4745, the “Transportation, Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2014.”

H.R. 4681 is a bill authorizing appropriations for our nation’s intelligence agencies for Fiscal Year 2014 through Fiscal Year 2015. The bill provides funds for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

H.R. 4745 makes appropriations for the Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2015.

Our nation is long past due for a Transportation and Housing and Urban Development Appropriations bill. This bill is about jobs—jobs—jobs. Unfortunately, H.R. 4745, which is $17.1 billion in discretionary appropriations for the Department of Transportation for fiscal year 2015, is $727.3 million below the funding for fiscal year 2014.

Included in the legislation is $15.7 billion in total budgetary resources for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is $7.3 million below the fiscal year 2014 enacted level and $446 million above the request.

This will provide full funding for all air traffic control personnel, including 14,800 air traffic controllers, 7,300 safety inspectors, and operational support personnel.

The bill also fully funds the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation Systems (NextGen) at $852.4 million, and funds Contract Towers at $140 million.

These investments will help ease future congestion and help reduce delays for travelers in U.S. airspace.

The Bush Intercontinental Airport and William P. Hobby Airport will benefit from funding provided under this bill: nearly 40 million passengers traveled through Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) and an additional 10 million through William P. Hobby (HOU); more than 650 daily departures occur at IAH; IAH is the 11th busiest airport in the U.S. for total passenger traffic; IAH has 12 all-cargo airlines handles more than 419,205 metric tons of cargo in 2012.

The funds being sent back to states will repair critical transportation infrastructure that is vital to local, state and the national economy. Further, the bill provides for funding for our Nation’s housing and urban development programs that fund block grants, special housing programs that serve our Nation’s elderly, young, disabled, and veterans.

The legislation includes a total of $40.3 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, a decrease of $769 million below the fiscal year 2014 enacted level and $2 billion below the Administration’s request.

The bill does not contain funding for any new, unauthorized “sustainable,” “livable,” or “green” community development programs. Affordable safe housing is vital to the well-being of elderly, low-wage workers, the unemployed, under-employed, disabled persons and our Nation’s veterans.

In 2012, Texas ranked second among the 50 states among states with workers earning at or below the federal minimum wage. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, of the 6.1 million workers paid hourly rates in Texas in 2012, 282,000 earned exactly the prevailing federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, while 170,000 earned less.

In the State of Texas the percentage of persons living in poverty makes the funds provided for housing and mass transit systems including light rail critical: 34% of children live in poverty; 21% of adults (19-64) live in poverty; and 17% of elderly live in poverty.

The funds provided will make it possible for low wage workers to have affordable options for travel as well as support access to affordable housing.

Mr. BISHOP of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

Amendment when it comes before the House for consideration under the rule for H.R. 4681, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BISHOP of Utah). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 604 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union under the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4681.

The Chair appoints the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) to preside over the Committee of the Whole.
May 30, 2014

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

H5035

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. POE of Texas in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the first time.

The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERSBERGER) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I can't tell you how much I enjoy myself such time as I might consume.

The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence efforts. The bill sets the priorities for our critical intelligence efforts and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those efforts.

Since the ranking member and I have assumed the leadership of this committee, we passed three intelligence authorization bills in a bipartisan fashion, and we hope to continue the tradition and trend with H.R. 4681. Passing a yearly intelligence authorization bill is the primary method by which Congressexerts its budgetary and oversight authority over the intelligence community.

As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified programs, the bulk of this committee's recommendations on funding are found in the classified annex to the bill which have been available for Members to review. Among other initiatives, the bill increases funding to address insider threats and improve personnel security programs.

At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year 2014 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget request level. Its funding levels are in line with the levels appropriated by the enacted appropriations act for the National Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act for the Military Intelligence Program.

For fiscal year 2015, the bill increases the President's budget request by less than 1 percent and stays within the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. The modest increase reflects the committee's concern that the President's request does not properly fund a number of important initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls.

The legislative provisions that the committee and Congress consider each year are comprised of changes to statutes.

We both, made cuts to certain areas and added money in other areas in a responsible, well thought-out way, and a fiscally prudent way.

Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history. Al Qaeda has been joined by two potentially dangerous affiliates, safe havens have emerged in Syria, parts of Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and the tribal areas of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is also regaining a foothold in northeast Afghanistan just as the President announced a complete withdrawal of US forces and the counterterrorism capability that comes with it by the end of 2016.

Uneven leadership in recent years has emboldened adversaries like Russia and China, who are increasing their military and intelligence spending and working to change the international order, as we speak, to the detriment of U.S. interests. Russia occupies 20 percent of the nation of Georgia, invaded and occupied Crimea, threatens invasion of Ukraine, is bullying its neighbors and expanding claims in the South and East China Seas through which 40 percent of world trade travels.

At the same time, North Korea continues its belligerent behavior, and Iran is maneuvering to preserve its capability to develop a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran would threaten Israel with annihilation and send the Middle East into a dangerous nuclear arms race.

We must have oversight. Remember, we have been able to pass FISA, and hopefully we will be able to pass these bills today.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your comments. I also have the same comments for you.

When we took the leadership of this committee, we knew that the stakes were so high and that we had to work together on behalf of the people of the United States of America. We came together with Republicans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives, moderates, all realizing that we had to come together. Because of your leadership, because of your membership, I think that we have been able to pass FISA, and hopefully we will be able to pass these bills today.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Chairman ROGERS, I thank you for your comments. I also have the same comments for you.

The budget for fiscal year 2014 is less than 1 percent above the President's budget request. The intelligence community and Congress consider each year are comprised of changes to statutes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I urge Member support of H.R. 4681, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman ROGERS, I thank you for your comments. I also have the same comments for you.

We are going to miss you, but you will always be there as my friend, and I will always respect you as a great American who cares about the United States. Thank you.

Now, we need to pass this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability over all U.S. intelligence agencies and all U.S. intelligence activities. This is so important.

We cannot go back to the days when we give the intelligence agencies a blank check to spend as they see fit. We must have oversight. Remember, Congress specifically amended the National Security Act of 1947 to replace our intelligence agencies.

We need to pass this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 in four parts: the unclassified legislative text; the unclassified report; the classified annex, which explains our intent for the classified aspects of the bill; and the classified schedule of authorizations for both fiscal years. We have been encouraging all Members to review all parts of the bill, and I am pleased to say that they have come to the Intelligence Committee's SCIF, classified spaces, to do so.

The budget for fiscal year 2014 is slightly below the President's budget request, while the budget for fiscal year 2015 is less than 1 percent above the President's budget request.
Since Chairman Rogers and I assumed leadership of the committee, we reduced the Intelligence Committee's budget by 20 percent, but this year's bill acknowledges the need to right the ship after the storm of sequestration. The bill also recognizes some specifics. The bill continues to emphasize the value of our satellites; scales back the intelligence community's use of contractors; pushes for further improvements in the continuous evaluation of insider threats; provides critical forward-looking funding for Navy airborne intelligence surveillance reconnaissance to maintain military intelligence capabilities during the transition to newer, more capable aircraft; and focuses on the recruitment and retention of the best and the brightest for our cyber workforce, particularly within the FBI. Our younger generation, we must educate them and have them work in this area.

We have spent months poring over this bill and its specific authorizations in great detail—in our committee spaces, at the agencies, and in the remotest corners of the Earth where our intelligence professionals operate—and then I can say this is a very good bill, and I am proud to support it.

Many of the amendments on the floor today also promise to make a great bill even better.

For the sake of keeping the country and its allies safe, and for the sake of rigorously overseeing even the most classified intelligence programs, I urge my colleagues to pass this bill today.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlelady from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).

Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Rogers for this opportunity to speak. I just really want to commend you for your exceptional leadership as a Member of this body and for your service on behalf of the security of our Nation.

Over the past year, it has really been a privilege to get to know you and work with you on several initiatives. I am just grateful for the way that you handle the people's business, look forward to working with you more, and also congratulate you on your future endeavors.

The legislation before us today provides the intelligence community the authorization needed to protect and defend our countries and support critical national security programs, such as those protecting Americans against terrorism and cyber attacks.

As Members of Congress, we took an oath to the Constitution, which sets forth our duty to provide for the defense of the United States.

Passing the yearly Intelligence Authorization Act is a critical component of living up to our constitutional obligations, ensuring America's intelligence agencies have the resources necessary to keep Americans safe.

Passing the intelligence authorization is also vital to our important responsibility of providing oversight to the current intelligence community. This legislation ensures Congress, and not the executive branch, is controlling how taxpayer money is being spent on intelligence activities and doing so in the most efficient and effective way possible.

We must remember that we have not defeated the threat of terrorism. The terrorists we face today are not a backyard gang; they are sophisticated and have access to the most modern of technologies.

Over the last 2 years, we have seen the number of worldwide deaths from terrorism attacks double from 10,000 in 2012 to 20,000 in 2013.

The men and women in America are able to sleep soundly at night is a credit to the men and women who serve our country selflessly. We must continue to provide these brave men and women every tool possible as they continue to provide for our safety.

That is why I am proud to see all my colleagues join me in supporting this legislation.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from Illinois, Jan Schakowsky, a member of our good friend, the ranking member of our committee, who has been very thoughtful and has allowed us to do the things that we needed to do.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding.

I want to begin by saying that I really appreciate the way in which our committee operates and has come to present this authorization bill to the floor, but I do want to raise some concerns.

One of the most controversial issues surrounding our national security is the use of the drone program. A number of us tried to introduce some amendments that would be considered on the floor of the House so that we, along with the American people, could have a conversation about that. These amendments were not made in order. And I want to express what my amendment would have done.

It would have provided limited elements of the intelligence community from engaging in so-called signature strikes. That is, lethal strikes in which the target is not specifically identified but whose so-called pattern of life fits the profile, or signature, of a terrorist. In these situations, we don't know the identity of the target. Instead, we draw conclusions from surveillance about whether someone is affiliated with a terrorist organization, or engaged in terrorist conduct. The stakes are high, and inevitably mistakes will be made. There are reports from human rights organizations in past years that we have already made several grave errors, and innocent lives have been lost as a result.

We need to recognize that each mistake we make in these situations killing innocent people spawns more numerous and more determined adversaries, undermining our mission there in the first place.

How we are perceived abroad matters. Even if some of the strikes reported as mistakes are not mistaken, the fact is that the rest of the world perceives our activities as killing innocent civilians and painting all adult male Muslims in these regions as our enemies.

I understand the targeted use, but I think that we cannot kill our way out of this problem and our way to victory.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank the gentlelady from Illinois for her comments. I take some of the things she takes on some of the counterterrorism strategy issues that are very well debated and certainly well discussed and well overseen in the spaces where appropriate and under the appropriate form and function that because their significance. There is not a respect of that counterterrorism strategy that isn't reviewed both in policy leading up to the daily and monthly counter-strategy meetings that happen in the appropriate agencies and departments and wanted oversight of these particular programs.

But I do think it is important to understand something: that all of the focus seems to be on the type of a weapon system that we have used or decided to use or may be using to fight what is a large and growing threat to the United States of America.

I think it was interesting that in the Boko Haram case of the 300 girls, it caught the world's attention, that you could have a group that would be so diabolical that they would kidnap 300 girls and sell them into slavery or force them into marriage and do other unspeakable things. Yes, that is right, that is who these groups are. This is the same group that has threatened the United States of America with terrorist attacks. It is an al Qaeda affiliate. We have watched them cut off the heads of other human beings for the purposes of intimidation, we have watched them cut off the arms. We have watched them shoot little girls who get innocent lives have been lost.

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spent hours and months in preparation for any counterterrorism strategy that we engage in, and do it in a way that is so responsible—I think Americans would be so proud if they had the opportunity to sit down and talk with these people about how they get to where they are.

But I will tell you, aspects of that counterterrorism strategy—some have been referenced—are the most impactful, disruptive activity we have been trying to stop attacks against the United States and our allies overseas.

So I just again caution in this vacuum of safety and relative security that so many have given us, we should be cautious about what we are asking changes to do—and what that would mean for exposure of, say, U.S. pilots or U.S. Special Forces—that we have not had to do for some length of time and still accomplish the mission. By the way, I say that any reference to some mass civilian casualties or collateral damage is absolutely false, it is false, it is a false narrative for those who seek to stop an effort that we work. In fact, is degrading the ability for attacks against the United States. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.


This bill provides the resources and support the intelligence community needs to accomplish their mission while enhancing oversight in several important respects. I want to commend the bipartisan leadership of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger on this bill. I congratulate them on, again, advancing an Intelligence Authorization Act. I also want to acknowledge my colleague from Nevada, Dr. Heck, for his work with me on the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee. Chairman Heck did a fabulous job supporting investments in technology and capacity that will pay dividends in years to come.

In addition to funding our intelligence priorities, the bill includes important new provisions to improve greater oversight of the NSA and other IC elements. It creates an independent inspector general within the NSA who will be fully empowered to investigate abuse, waste, and fraud. The bill also requires an annual report to the Intelligence Committees on violations of law and executive order, including Executive Order 12333. This provision fixes a blind spot under current law and leverages the Intelligence Committee's capacity for oversight.

While I support the bill, I was disappointed that an amendment I proposed with my colleague Walter Jones was not made in order. This amendment would have required an annual public report on the total number of civilian and combatant casualties caused by drone strikes. By publicly reporting on the use of drones, we would provide additional Transparency and transparency, helping to ensure the legitimacy of the actions that we take overseas. The report would also provide a counterpoint to the inflated estimates of civilian casualties frequently seen in the news, in part due to active efforts of our enemies to mislead.

I plan to continue working with my colleagues on the committee to provide greater transparency, but this is a very simple method of doing so. In sum, it would simply require that there be an annual accounting of how many combatants are killed and how many non-combatants are killed. It would also have required that the administration or the DNI define those terms so we understand what the term defined as a combatant or noncombatant.

The President has set a high standard for the use of drones, that they not be used unless there is a near certainty there will be no civilian casualties. This is a way of holding us accountable to meet that very high standard. It is also, I think, all the more important when we consider that, while we may be the first Nation to use drones in this capacity, we will not be the last, and the standard that we set or fail to set will be one that will be emulated by others around the world.

I support this bill. I wish we had the opportunity on the floor to vote on this amendment, but I look forward to working with the committee in the years that follow to incorporate this provision and others to improve transparency and accountability.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. KELLY), a great Member of Congress.

Ms. KELLY of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman and ranking member for their hard work on this important legislation.

Every day, America faces threats to our national security. Some threats are evolving, like cyber attacks on our infrastructure. Some are emerging, like the radicals of Boko Haram. And some are right in front of us demanding direct action.

Because we face a diverse array of threats, our security depends on an intelligence community that is equally diverse. In a 2011 address to Morehouse College graduates, Leon Panetta stated that we need an intelligence community with a workforce that reflects the world it engages.

My amendment helps the intelligence community meet its strategic diversity goals by providing grants to predominantly black institutions that educate future generations of intelligence experts through advanced language training, study abroad, and cultural immersion programs.

To remain globally secure, we must have human assets on the ground who can blend in easily abroad, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Overcoming cultural, language, and educational barriers is critical to achieving this goal. I ask that my colleagues support this commonsense amendment.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee, a great Member of Congress.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the ranking member for yielding and, as well, the chairperson, and let me collectively add my appreciation for the two leaders of this committee. They have committed themselves, without question, to the security of this Nation. I thank them for their collaboration.

Mr. Rogers, I thank you for the work that you have done for the Nation and, certainly, for the commitment that you have made to the very important business of this committee.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER, let me thank you for your friendship as well and for the continued collaboration on an issue of great concern to me, but I will speak generally about this legislation, and will, again, acknowledge some of the things that you have looked at and considered and have even included in this legislation as it comes forward.

Mr. Chairman, I agree that detecting and disrupting and preventing a national security crisis is paramount responsibility for this committee and many others, including the committee that I serve on, the Committee on Homeland Security. For that reason, I have interfaced with this committee on a number of issues.

I am very glad to note, in particular, that the issue of dealing with the expansive use that has been used, which I will talk about in the en bloc amendment, is clearly something that we should have considered, and in this bill, it did.

It got its hand around the enormous use of outside contractors in the intelligence business, and it emphasized recruitment and training. That is positive there are persons who I know are willing to serve their country, and this legislation has committed itself to doing that.

Now, particularly with this legislation, I also want to appreciate the collaboration between the Committee and this committee on the USA FREEDOM Act, and I want to say to America that we have corralled the megadata collection. We have done it in a bipartisan manner, and we will do more and do better.

So it is with appreciation for this legislation and in thanking the committee for working with my staff on
my amendment that I ask my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. Chair, I rise to speak on H.R. 4681, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014. I want to thank the Permanent Select Committee for including my amendment in an en bloc.

My amendment to H.R. 4681 is simple and will be an important addition to the legislation, which I believe can be supported by every member of this Committee.

My amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people who the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work required of the Intelligence Community.

The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on contractors to support Government objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.

The amendment would seek information on the skills necessary to perform intelligence related work and whether Federal employees had these skills. The amendment would also seek statistics on contractors performing intelligence related work for agencies under the purview of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Something is very wrong when the process for screening and vetting government contractors does not identify someone who would have access to—as well as the ability to collect and remove sensitive information from government computers and publicly disclose that information.

If each person working in an intelligence role within the government decided to act on their own thoughts for their own purposes on whether they would or would not keep their oath to defend and protect our Nation's secrets then there would be chaos.

Our Nation suffers harm in ways we can see, as well as ways that we cannot see when unauthorized disclosures regarding intelligence resources occur. If our ability to work with other nations who rely on our ability to keep secret the information they share with our Nation's intelligence agencies. If our global assets and allies cease to trust our ability to keep their work with our intelligence, national defense or diplomatic agencies secret then they will not cooperate with us in our efforts to defend our Nation and our interest around the world.

Reckless disclosures make us vulnerable to our Nation's enemies who could make changes to our databases and hide information because the disclosure of national secrets reveals means and methods.

The world is a dangerous place—we have seen within the last 18 months—a bombing during the Boston Marathon, the rise in sectarian violence in Syria that included incidents involving the use of nerve gas; and Boko Haram which kidnapped nearly 300 girls from their school in northern Nigeria.

According to the United States Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2013, published in April of this year indicates that there are 53 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

Designation of FTOs is important to our Nation's fight against terrorism and is effective in cutting off support for those groups so designated.

In 2013, Ansar al-Dine, Boko Haram, and Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Bi Biladis-Sudan were added to the list of FTOs.

FTOs are legally defined under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states the group must be; a foreign organization; engage in terrorist activity or retain the capacity and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and participating in terrorist activity or terrorism that threatens the security of the United States or its citizens.

United States security encompasses national defense, foreign relations, or economic interest.

The unauthorized intelligence disclosures last year impacted U.S. national security. The intelligence breach came as a result of a government contractor making public sensitive information is still resonating both internationally and within the United States, where an important debate on privacy and civil liberties is still ongoing.

But also across the world the consequences of the unauthorized release of international activity by intelligence agencies is still playing out.

The timing of the release of information on the non-U.S. activity of our intelligence agencies caused tremendous tension in our relationship with our closest allies, the United States was working to form a global response to the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria.

In addition to frustrating our efforts to form a strong global response to the use of chemical weapons, it also caused economic harm to U.S. companies internationally.

Congress is not able to fully investigate the circumstances that resulted in last year’s intelligence breach because the person with many of the answers to questions many of us have is now living in Russia.

However, we can look prospectively on how the work of the Intelligence Community under the direction of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence should fill positions that require security clearances.

The intelligence work by contractors and Federal employees is critical to the protection of the United States and our interest both domestically and around the world. We should approach the work of the intelligence community as we do when considering the work of the Department of Defense.

The work that our Intelligence professionals perform is critical, and a defense in depth approach is necessary to assure that no matter the challenge or the circumstances there will be well trained professionals in place to do for classification what must be done to defend and protect the nation.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations states that on October 1, 2013 the Nation had 37,382 Federal agency employees working for the: Office of the Director of National Intelligence Scattered Castles; Department of Defense; Joint Personnel Adjudication System; Office of Personnel Management; and Central Verification System (CVS).

In order to survey these agencies a special data call was made to each intelligence community agencies with delegated authority to conduct investigations or adjudications to fulfill specific reporting requirements directed by the fiscal year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. These agencies were the: Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; and Department of State.

In 2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or Top Secret security clearance totaled 5,105,379 individuals—of this number 37,382 were government agency personnel, 1,056,309 were contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.

Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security clearances approved—152,490 were government agency employees and 131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.

Congress must have the ability to make decisions regarding how intelligence agencies fill positions that require security clearances because it has implications for the appropriations process.

The Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives 2012 Report to the President focuses on the classification practices of intelligence agencies.

The report addresses the power of “original classification authorities” also called “original classifiers,” which are individuals designated with Top Secret original classification authority to classify information.

Only original classifiers are authorized to determine what information, if disclosed without authorization, would be expected to cause damage to national security.

The original classification authority process covers all other aspects of the security classification system. In 2004, the total number of original classifications was 351,150 and in 2012 the number was 74,477.

The cost of government security classification in 2005 was $7.66 billion and in 2011 the total was $11.36 billion.

The amount expended in 2011 included: 5.65 billion for protection maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and planning; 50.51 million for professional education, training and awareness; 352.4 million for miscellaneous management; and 52.76 million for declassification.

These costs cited are not all encompassing, but were generated by 41 executive branch agencies including the Department of Defense.

The funds expended do not include activity by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director for National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency.

The focus on training is critical in the work of the Intelligence Community and it is important that this is a high priority for the agencies represented in the National Archive report.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I have remaining?

The CHAIR. The gentleman from Vermont may yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont.

Mr. WELCH. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I thank the ranking member for his work.

Let the American public understand what happens. There are so many aspects thrown to the members who serve on the Intelligence and on other committees who must do their work in secret, and certainly, the staff fights through and works through all of these difficult issues.

One is the question of oversight happening. It might not be on the front page of the newspaper. We call that “disaster day” in the business of trying to protect American secrets.

When the ranking member and I first took over the committee, we re-instituted all of the regular oversight patterns: counterintelligence matters, covert action matters, regular counter-terrorism strategy updates, and reviews.

Again, every piece of that strategy that is implemented is reviewed by the committee, and it is certainly read and reviewed by me, personally, and I know, by others on the committee as well.

There is a tremendous amount of effort and energy applied to trying to get this right, to make sure that two things happen—one, that they are comporting with the law. They want to do it. They want Congress’ support for what they are doing, and they want the American people’s support for what they are doing—because it is so difficult and so hard to come to the right conclusions in a very murky and dangerous world—so that oversight does happen. It happens regularly.

I want to thank all of the members of both parties for rigorous debate behind these closed doors. There is no lovefest when those doors close and a “let’s just do what we have to do to get to tomorrow.”

The debates are real and vigorous, and we have different philosophies on how we move forward on some of these intelligence matters and collection matters and on how we balance privacy and civil liberties and security. All of that happens.

Sometimes, we find members who just don’t agree, but what we do in that space is understanding and try to get and have made sure that we have a support the resources and all of the policies and all of the authorities our intelligence services need to be impactful to save the
United States and to, yes, maybe even save 300 girls or to, yes, maybe even allow for girls in a place like Afghan-

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of H.R. 4681, the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015.”

As Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, I understand the importance of this legislation. H.R. 4681 enhances the national security of the United States and is a vital tool for Congressional oversight of the activities of the Intelligence Community. It is critical that our intelligence agencies have all of the resources and authorities they need to accomplish the important responsibility of keeping Americans safe. I commend Chairman ROGERS and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER for their tireless work on these issues and the exhaustive process of drafting a bipartisan authorization.

H.R. 4681 authorizes Federal intelligence, intelligence-related, and information sharing activities, including those of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). I&A is an element of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as well as an intelligence agency. The I&A assists with the primary mission of the DHS, which is to support missions that are part of the Intelligence Community. In that role, I&A supports and collaborates with State and local partners through the National Network of Fusion Centers, and provides analytic support to the DHS components.

Consistent with our jurisdiction, the Committee on Homeland Security has conducted extensive oversight over these programs and missions, to include the July 2013 release of a report on “The National Network of Fusion Centers.”

While I support the overall purpose of the bill, I am concerned that the effort includes provisions that seek to limit the support I&A provides to DHS, its component agencies and to the 78 fusion centers around the nation. I believe this risks depriving the Homeland Security Enterprise of valuable information and expertise at a time when we know the threats to the homeland persist.

As the bill moves through the process and negotiations begin with the Senate, I will continue to work to ensure that these issues are addressed and that State and local law enforcement, and other first responders, receive the support they need from the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chair, I urge all Members to strongly support this bill. Give them the tools, give Congress the oversight, and give America the ability to sleep well at night, knowing that very brave men and women will do the work that so many would not be interested in doing.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
My commonsense amendment simply ensures that when those assessments are carried out, the CIIs will examine leading software license management practices.

By adopting Connolly #12, Congress will ensure that when the IC examines potential actions to enhance software license management, it understands all the leading practices that will be included in the analysis.


GAO consulted with software license management experts from the public and private sectors, prior to concluding that Federal agencies are generally not following best practices that could achieve significant cost-savings.

These best practices include increasing the centralization of the management of software licenses; increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics; analyzing software license data to inform investment decisions; and providing appropriate personnel with sufficient software licenses management training.

I urge all my colleagues to support my straightforward amendment that will enhance the IC’s ability to spend taxpayer dollars in the most effective and efficient manner possible when procuring and managing software licenses.

The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule.

In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 113–45. That amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 113–45 is in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 113–45.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015,” and may be referred to as the “Intelligence Act of 2015.”

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(1) FISCAL YEAR 2014.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2014, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for fiscal year 2014 prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 6811 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.

(2) FISCAL YEAR 2015.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2015, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for fiscal year 2015 prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 6811 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or any portion of such Schedule except:

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3903(a));

(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or

(C) as otherwise required by law.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.  
(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized under the ceiling for fiscal year 2014 or authorized under the classified Schedules of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to carry out important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel authorized in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under the Schedule for such element during the fiscal year covered by such Schedule.  
(b) PERSONNEL.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment under the personnel ceilings established under section 102(a), including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment in—  
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;  
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or  
(3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.  
(c) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).  

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.  

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—  
(1) FISCAL YEAR 2014.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2014 the sum of $528,229,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.  
(2) FISCAL YEAR 2015.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2015 the sum of $565,476,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.  
(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 are authorized 855 positions as of September 30, 2014, and 777 positions as of September 30, 2015. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.  

c) AUTHORIZED AUTHORIZATIONS.—  
(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—  
(A) FISCAL YEAR 2014.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2014 such additional amount as is specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.  
(B) FISCAL YEAR 2015.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2015 such additional amount as is specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.  

SEC. 105. FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.  
(A) FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS AUTHORIZED.—  
(1) TITLE I OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACT.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103I the following new section:  

"SEC. 103J. FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.  
(‘‘a) FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS AUTHORIZED.—The Director of National Intelligence may establish the intelligence community one or more positions of manager of an intelligence function. Any position so established may be known as the ‘Functional Manager’ of the intelligence function.  
(b) PERSONNEL.—The Director shall designate individuals to serve as manager of intelligence functions established under subsection (a) from among officers and employees of elements of the intelligence community.  
(c) DUTIES.—Each manager of an intelligence function established under subsection (a) shall have the duties as follows:  
(1) To act as principal advisor to the Director on the intelligence function.  
(2) To carry out such responsibilities with respect to the intelligence function as the Director may specify for purposes of this section."

(TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103I the following new item:  
"SEC. 103J. FUNCTIONAL managers for the intelligence community.")  

SEC. 306. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERFORMANCE BY FUNCTION.  
(a) ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS REQUIRED.—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 5061 the following new section:  

"SEC. 506J. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERFORMANCE BY FUNCTION.  
(‘‘a) In general.—Not later than April 1, 2014, and each year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Functional Managers, submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on covered intelligence functions during the preceding fiscal year.  
(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include for each covered intelligence function for the year covered by such report the following:  
(1) An identification of the capabilities, programs, and activities of such intelligence function, regardless of the element of the intelligence community that carried out such capabilities, programs, and activities.  
(2) A description of the investment and allocation of resources for such intelligence function, including an analysis of the allocation of resources within the context of the National Intelligence Strategy, priorities for recipients of resources, and areas of risk.  
(3) A description and assessment of the performance of such intelligence function.  
(4) An identification and description of technology funded and developed, related to the application of technical interoperability standards in the capabilities, programs, and activities of such intelligence function.  
(5) An identification of the operational overlap or need for de-confliction, if any, within such intelligence function.  
(6) A description of any efforts to integrate such intelligence function with other intelligence disciplines as part of an integrated intelligence enterprise.  
(7) A description of any efforts to establish consistency in tradecraft and training within such intelligence function.  
(8) A description and assessment of development of technology that bears on the future of such intelligence function.  
(9) Such other matters relating to such intelligence function as the Director may specify for purposes of this section."

(DEFINITIONS.—In this section:  
(1) The term ‘covered intelligence functions’ means each intelligence function for which a Functional Manager has been established under section 103I during the year covered by a report under this section.  
(2) The term ‘Functional Manager’ means the manager of an intelligence function established under section 103J.")
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506 the following new item: "Sec. 506J. Annual assessment of intelligence community performance by function.".

SEC. 307. SOFTWARE LICENSING. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108 the following new section: "Sec. 109. Software licensing. 
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR INVENTORIES OF SOFTWARE LICENSES.—The Chief Information Officer of each element of the intelligence community, in consultation with the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall biennially—
"(1) conduct an inventory of all existing software licenses of such element, including utilized and unutilized licenses; 
"(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by such element to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and associated cost savings in software procurement and usage; and 
"(3) submit to the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community each inventory required by paragraph (1) and each assessment required by paragraph (2).

(b) INVENTORIES BY THE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, based on the inventories and assessments required by subsection (a), shall biennially—
"(1) compile an inventory of all existing software licenses of the intelligence community, including utilized and unutilized licenses; and 
"(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by the intelligence community to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and associated cost savings in software procurement and usage.

"(c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of each inventory compiled under subsection (a).

(b) INITIAL INVENTORY.—
(1) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of each element of the intelligence community shall complete the initial inventory, assessment, and submission required under section 109(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section.

(B) BASIS.—The initial inventory conducted for each element of the intelligence community under section 109(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be based on the inventory of software and software-related personnel pursuant to section 365 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–277; 126 Stat. 2472) for such element.

(2) CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall complete the initial compilation and assessment required under section 109(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).

(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended—
"(1) by striking the second item relating to section 104 (relating to annual national security strategy report); and 
"(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 108 the following new item:

"(b) make publicly available any information declassified as a result of the declassification review required under paragraph (1); and 
"(c) report to the congressional intelligence committees—
"(1) the results of the declassification review required under paragraph (1); and 
"(2) a justification for not declassifying any information required to be subject to the declassification review that remains classified.

SEC. 312. MERGER OF THE FOREIGN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND THE GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM. 

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of National Intelligence shall carry out the merger of the Foreign Counterintelligence Program into the General Defense Intelligence Program as directed in the classified annex to this Act. The merger shall go into effect no earlier than 30 days after written notification of the merger is provided to the congressional intelligence committees.

Subtitle B—Reporting

SEC. 321. ANNUAL REPORTS ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 309, is further amended by inserting after section 509 the following new section: "Sec. 509. Auditability of certain elements of the intelligence community. 
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL AUDITS.—The head of each covered entity shall ensure that there is a full financial audit of such covered entity each year beginning with fiscal year 2014. Such audits may be conducted by an internal or external independent accounting or auditing organization.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR UNQUALIFIED OPINION.—Beginning as early as practicable, but no earlier than fiscal year 2015, each covered entity shall take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure that each audit required under subsection (a) shall be conducted by an organization issuing an unqualified opinion on the financial statements of such covered entity for the fiscal year covered by such audit.

(c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—The chief financial officer of each covered entity shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees an annual audit report from an accounting or auditing organization on each audit of the covered entity conducted pursuant to subsection (a).

(d) COVERED ENTITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘covered entity’ means the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

"(b) INITIAL REPORT.—The first report required under section 310 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted no later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

"(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 308 the following new item:

"(e) ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the National Intelligence Community shall annually submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on violations of law or executive order by personnel of an element of the intelligence community that were identified during the previous calendar year.

"(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of, and any action taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order (including Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) by personnel of an element of the intelligence community in the course of such employment that, during the previous calendar year, was determined by the director, head, general counsel, or inspector general of any element of the intelligence community to have occurred.

"(b) INITIAL REPORT.—The first report required under section 310 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be submitted no later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

"(c) TABLE OF CONTENTS AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 309 of this Act, is further amended by adding after the section relating to section 309, as added by such section 309, the following new item:

"(f) ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Whenever the head of a applicable agency submits a plan to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with section 124 of Office of Management and Budget Circular A–11, pertaining to agency operations in the absence of appropriations, or any successor circular of the Office that requires the head of the applicable agency to submit to the Director a plan for an orderly shutdown in the event of the absence of appropriations, such head shall submit a copy of such plan to the following:

(1) The congressional intelligence committees. 
(2) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

(b) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF PLANS FOR ORDERLY SHUTDOWN IN EVENT OF ABSENCE OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Whenever the applicable agency submits a plan to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with section 124 of Office of Management and Budget Circular A–11, pertaining to agency operations in the absence of appropriations, or any successor circular of the Office that requires the head of the applicable agency to submit to the Director a plan for an orderly shutdown in the event of the absence of appropriations, such head shall submit a copy of such plan to the following:

(1) The congressional intelligence committees. 
(2) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
In the case of a plan for an element of the intelligence community that is within the Department of Defense, to—
(a) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
(b) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 323. REPORTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA.

(a) In GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the Syrian chemical weapons program.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:
(1) A comprehensive assessment of chemical weapons related to the Syrian chemical weapons program.
(2) An assessment of undeclared chemical weapons development facilities.
(3) An assessment of the Syrian regime related to the Syrian chemical weapons program.

SEC. 324. REPORTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON PENETRATIONS OF NETWORKS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS OF CERTAIN CONTRACTORS.

(a) PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING PENETRATIONS.—The Director of National Intelligence shall establish procedures that require each cleared intelligence contractor to report to an element of the intelligence community designated pursuant to subsection (a) of each successful penetration of a network or information system of such contractor that meets the criteria established pursuant to subsection (b) is successfully penetrated.

(b) NETWORKS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO REPORTING.—The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with appropriate officials, establish criteria and such cleared networks to be subject to the procedures for reporting system penetrations under subsection (a).

(c) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS.—
(1) RAPID REPORTING.—The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall require each cleared intelligence contractor to rapidly report to an element of the intelligence community designated pursuant to subsection (a) of each successful penetration of the network or information system of such contractor that meet the criteria established pursuant to subsection (b). Each such report shall include the following:
(A) A description of the technique or method used in such penetration.
(B) A sample of the malicious software, if discovered and isolated by the contractor, involved in such penetration.
(C) A summary of information created by or for such element in connection with any program of such element that has been potentially compromised due to such penetration.

(2) ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL.—The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall—
(A) include mechanisms for intelligence community personnel to, upon request, obtain access to equipment or information of a cleared intelligence contractor necessary to conduct forensic analysis in addition to any analysis conducted by such contractor;
(B) provide that a cleared intelligence contractor is only required to provide access to equipment or information as described in subparagraph (A) if the information or system created by or for an element of the intelligence community in connection with any intelligence community program was successfully exfiltrated from a cleared intelligence contractor; and, if so, what information was exfiltrated; and
(C) provide for the reasonable protection of trade secrets, commercial or financial information, and information that can be used to identify a specific person (other than the name of the suspected perpetrator of the penetration).

(3) LIMITATION OF ACCESS TO SPECIFIC INFORMATION.—The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall prohibit the dissemination outside the intelligence community of information that was successfully exfiltrated through such procedures that is not created by or for the intelligence community except—
(A) with the approval of the contractor providing such information;
(B) to the congressional intelligence committees or the Subcommittees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate for such committees and such Subcommittees to perform oversight; or
(C) to law enforcement agencies to investigate a penetration reported under this section.

(d) ISSUANCE OF PROCEDURES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF CRITERIA.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish the procedures required under subsection (a) and the criteria required under subsection (b).

(2) APPLICABILITY DATE.—The requirements of this section shall apply on the date on which the Director of National Intelligence establishes the procedures required under subsection (a) and the criteria required under subsection (b).

(e) COORDINATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO PREVENT DUPLICATE REPORTING.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall establish procedures to permit a contractor that is a cleared intelligence contractor and a cleared defense contractor under section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–289; 10 U.S.C. 2221 note) to submit a single report that satisfies the requirements of this section and section 941 for an incident of penetration of network or information system.

(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) CLEARED INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTOR.—The term ‘‘cleared intelligence contractor’’ means a private entity granted clearance by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of an element of the intelligence community to access, receive, or store classified information for the purpose of bidding for a contract or conducting activities in support of any program of an element of the intelligence community.

(2) COVERED NETWORK.—The term ‘‘covered network’’ means a network or information system of a cleared intelligence contractor that contains or processes information created by or for an element of the intelligence community with respect to which such contractor is required to report under subsection (a).

(g) SAVINGS CLAUSES.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or limit any otherwise authorized access by government personnel to networks or information systems owned or operated by a contractor that processes or stores government data.

SEC. 325. REPORT ON ELECTRONIC WASTE.

(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing the anticipated hiring needs of the intelligence community in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, including cybersecurity and computer literacy, and the report shall—
(1) describe the extent to which competitions, challenges, or internships at elements of the intelligence community or at institutions of higher education for purposes of offering internships at elements of the intelligence community.

(b) CONSIDERATION OF EXISTING PROGRAMS.—In issuing the report required under subsection (a), the Director shall take into consideration existing programs of the intelligence community, including the education programs of the National Security Agency and the Information Assurance Scholarship Program of the Department of Defense, as appropriate.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) HIGH SCHOOL.—The term ‘‘high school’’ means a school at which an individual has received a secondary school diploma.

(2) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—The term ‘‘institution of higher education’’ has the meaning given the term in section 1001(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).

(3) SECONDARY SCHOOL.—The term ‘‘secondary school’’ has the meaning given the term in section 9101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).
SEC. 327. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OF DOMESTIC OIL REFINERIES AND RELATED RAIL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) ASSESSMENT.—The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall conduct an intelligence assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure.

(b) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—

(1) the results of the assessment required under subsection (a); and

(2) any recommendations with respect to intelligence sharing or intelligence collection to improve protection of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure to protect the communities surrounding such refineries or such infrastructure from potential harm that the Under Secretary considers appropriate.

SEC. 328. REPEAL OR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) THREAT OF ATTACK ON THE UNITS STATES USING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3020) is amended by striking subsection (b).


(b) MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEES.—Section 410(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 3309) is amended by striking subsection (b).

(2) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING.—Section 410(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 U.S.C. 3309) is amended by striking subsection (b).

(3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM STRUCTURE.— TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEVATION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL STANDING COMMITTEE.—The Director of National Intelligence or the Director of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Security Agency under section 3(a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), may appoint an Independent Counsel to serve as staff of the General Counsel to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency, to assist the Inspector General in the performance of the duties of such office.

SEC. 401. GIFTS, DEVISES, AND BEQUESTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

(a) GIFTS, DEVISES, AND BEQUESTS.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in the table of contents in the first section, by striking the section heading and inserting “section 411”;

(2) in subsection (a), by striking “clauses (i) and (ii) as redesignated, by striking “subsection (a)’’; and

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3010 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in the table of contents in the first section, by striking the section heading and inserting “section 114”;

(2) in section 114 (50 U.S.C. 3050), by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: “Annual Report on Hiring and Retention of Minority Employees.”

(c) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION.—Section 506D(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3100(j)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking “quarterly” and inserting “semianually.”

(d) ACTIVITIES OF PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.—Section 1062(g)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3162(g)(1)) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking “2014” and inserting “2015”.

(e) AMENDMENTS.—The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in the table of contents in the first section, by striking the section heading and inserting “section 114”;

(2) in section 114 (50 U.S.C. 3050), by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: “Annual Report on Hiring and Retention of Minority Employees.”

(b) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows: “(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely manner, report to Congress—

(2) any recommendations with respect to intelligence sharing or intelligence collection to improve protection of domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure to protect the communities surrounding such refineries or such infrastructure from potential harm that the Under Secretary considers appropriate.

(c) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BUSINESS SYSTEM STRUCTURE.— TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEVATION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL STANDING COMMITTEE.—The Director of National Intelligence or the Director of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Security Agency under section 3(a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), may appoint an Independent Counsel to serve as staff of the General Counsel to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency, to assist the Inspector General in the performance of the duties of such office.

SEC. 402. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

(a) ELEVATION OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.—The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended—

(1) in section 4(a)(1), by striking “the Federal Emergency Management Agency,”;

(2) in paragraph (1), by inserting “the National Security Agency,” after “the Federal Emergency Management Agency,”;

(3) in paragraph (2), by inserting “the National Security Agency,” after “the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,”;

(b) DATE OF APPOINTMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall nominate a person for appointment, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as Inspector General of the National Security Agency under section 3(a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), consistent with the amendments made by subsection (a).

(c) TRANSITION RULE.—An individual serving as Inspector General of the National Security Agency on the date of the enactment of this Act pursuant to an appointment made under section 80 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)—

(1) may continue so serving until the President makes an appointment under section 3(a) of such Act with respect to the National Security Agency;

(2) shall, while serving under paragraph (1), remain subject to the provisions of section 8G of such Act that, immediately before the date of the enactment of this Act, applied with respect to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency and suffer no reduction in pay.

(d) SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.—The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by inserting after section 81 the following new section:

SEC. 8K. SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

(a) GENERAL COUNSEL TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—There is a General Counsel to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the Inspector General of the National Security Agency.

(b) DUTIES.—The General Counsel to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall—

(1) serve as the chief legal officer of the Office of the Inspector General of the National Security Agency;

(2) provide legal services only to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency;

(3) prescribe professional rules of ethics and responsibilities for employees and officers of, and contractors to, the National Security Agency;

(4) perform such functions as the Inspector General may prescribe; and

(5) serve at the discretion of the Inspector General.

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.—There is an Office of the General Counsel to the Inspector General of the National Security Agency. The Inspector General may appoint to the Office of the General Counsel such legal counsel as the Inspector General considers appropriate.
"(b) TESTIMONY.—

(1) AUTHORITY TO COMPEL.—The Inspector General of the National Security Agency is authorized to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of an individual or to require the appearance and testimony of the individual or employee by a foreign governmental entity or other American governmental entity. The Secretary of the National Security Agency or contractors, former contractors, or former detailed employees to the National Security Agency as necessary in the performance of duties assigned to the Inspector General by this Act.

(2) REFUSAL TO OBEY.—A subpoena issued under this subsection, in the case of continuity or refusal to obey, shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate United States district court.

(3) NOTIFICATION.—The Inspector General shall notify the Attorney General 7 days before issuing a subpoena under this subsection.

(c) PROHIBITIONS ON INVESTIGATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS.—

(1) EVALUATIONS OF PROHIBITIONS.—Not later than 7 days after the date on which the Inspector General of the National Security Agency receives notice or a statement under section 801(d)(2)(C) of the reasons the Secretary of Defense is prohibiting the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, the Inspector General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate an evaluation of such statement.

(2) INCLUSION IN SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT.—The Inspector General shall include in the semiannual report prepared by the Inspector General in accordance with section 6(a) a description of the instances in which the Secretary of Defense prohibited the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation during the period covered by such report.

TITLE V—SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM

SEC. 501. CONTINUOUS EVALUATION AND SHARING OF PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

Section 102(a)(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(a)) is amended—

(1) in the heading, by striking "SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION" and inserting "CLASSIFIED INFORMATION";

(2) in paragraph (2), by striking "and" and inserting a semicolon;

(3) in paragraph (4), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and

(4) by striking at the end the following new paragraph:

"(5) ensure that the background of each employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community to a contractor or to an element of the intelligence community, and each individual employee of such a contractor who has been determined to be eligible for access to classified information is monitored on a continual basis under standards developed by the Director, including with respect to the frequency of evaluation, during the period of eligibility, to determine if such an individual employee to a contractor or to an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, or such individual employee to such a contractor to determine whether such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, and such individual employee of such a contractor continues to meet the requirements for eligibility for access to classified information; and

(6) develop procedures to require information sharing between elements of the intelligence community concerning potentially derogatory security issues involving an employee or officer of an element of the intelligence community, a contractor to an element of the intelligence community, or an individual employee of such an individual employee to an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, or such individual employee of such a contractor for a security clearance.".

SEC. 502. REQUIREMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

(a) REQUIREMENTS.—Not later than 7 days after the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(c) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.—The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each department of the Federal Government with access to classified information, shall—

(1) ensure that—

(A) any contractor to an element of the intelligence community with access to a classified network or other classified information develops and operates a security plan that is consistent with standards established by the Director of National Intelligence for intelligence community networks; and

(B) each contract awarded by an element of the intelligence community includes provisions requiring the contractor comply with such plan and such standards;

(2) conduct periodic assessments of each element of the intelligence community in accordance with subparagraph (1)(A) to ensure such security plan complies with the requirements of such paragraph; and

(3) ensure that the inspector threat detection capabilities and risk policies of the intelligence community apply to facilities of contractors with access to a classified network.

(b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply with respect to contracts entered into or renewed after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 503. TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS TO SECURE ELECTRONIC COLLECTION OF SECURITY CLEARANCES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall—

(1) analyze performance of the Intelligence Community in achieving an operational security clearance process, including—

(A) the clearance application process;

(B) case management;

(C) adjudication management;

(D) investigation methods for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of personnel security information, including the use of government-developed and commercial technologies to facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of data, to enhance the speed, accuracy, and timeliness, and reduce costs, of investigations with a program of continuous evaluation as a means of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures for conducting periodic reinvestigations consistent with a continuous evaluation program;

(E) records management for access and eligibility determinations;

(F) the use of databases and data sources that cannot be accessed and processed automatically electronically, or modification of such databases and data sources, to enable electronic access and processing;

(G) the use of government-developed and commercial technology for continuous monitoring and evaluation of cleared personnel and commercial data sources that can identify and flag information pertinent to adjudication guidelines and eligibility determinations;

(2) an analysis of how many personnel with access to classified information are cleared on an annual basis for each component of the Federal Government with employees with security clearances;

(3) a determination of how many risk-based and ad hoc periodic reinvestigations are necessary on an annual basis for each component of the Federal Government with employees with security clearances;

(4) an analysis of the potential benefits of expanding the Government’s use of continuous evaluation tools as a means of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures for confirming the eligibility of personnel for continued access to classified information; and

(b) CONTENTS.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include—

(1) an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with conducting periodic reinvestigations; the results of the analysis of the costs and benefits associated with replacing some or all periodic reinvestigations with a program of continuous evaluation;

(2) a determination of how many risk-based and ad hoc periodic reinvestigations are necessary on an annual basis for each component of the Federal Government with employees with security clearances;

(3) a determination of how many personnel with access to classified information are cleared on an annual basis for each component of the Federal Government with employees with security clearances; and

(4) an analysis of the potential benefits of expanding the Government’s use of continuous evaluation tools as a means of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of procedures for confirming the eligibility of personnel for continued access to classified information.

(c) R EPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the analysis required by such section.
Title: Technical Amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.

Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3521) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(1)(D), by striking “section (a)” and inserting “subsection (a)”; and

(2) in subsection (c)(2)(B), by striking “provider,” and inserting “provider”.

Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking the semicolon and inserting “; and”;

(2) by striking paragraphs (6) and (7); and

(3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (6); and

(4) by redesigning, by striking “the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board,”.

Section 103 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3523) is amended—

(1) by striking “Section 606(5)” and inserting “paragraph (5)” of section 605; and

(2) by striking “(a)(4)(B) of this Act” and inserting “as redesignated by section 310(a)(4)(B) of this Act”.

Section 102 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3522) is amended—

(1) by striking “Section 606(5)” and inserting “paragraph (5)” of section 605; and

(2) by striking “(a)(4)(B) of this Act” and inserting “as redesignated by section 310(a)(4)(B) of this Act”.

Section 104 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3524) is amended—

(1) by striking “Section 606(5)” and inserting “paragraph (5)” of section 605; and

(2) by striking “(a)(4)(B) of this Act” and inserting “as redesignated by section 310(a)(4)(B) of this Act”.

Section 105 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3525) is amended—

(1) by striking “Section 606(5)” and inserting “paragraph (5)” of section 605; and

(2) by striking “(a)(4)(B) of this Act” and inserting “as redesignated by section 310(a)(4)(B) of this Act”.

Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 305 the following new section:

Section 310. Restrictions on certain former intelligence officers and employees.

(a) Restriction.—Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 305 the following new section:

Section 304. Restrictions on certain former intelligence officers and employees.

(a) Negotiations.—A covered employee shall notify the element of the intelligence community employing such employee of any negotiation for future employment or compensation between such covered employee and any covered entity.

(b) Separation.—A covered employee may not commence employment with or be contracted by a covered entity until after the date of separation of the covered employee from the intelligence community.

(c) Annual Reporting.—The Director of National Intelligence shall annually report in writing to the element of the intelligence community that most recently employed such covered employee such report, and submit a report under paragraph (2), make such recommendations with respect to software procurement and usage to the Director of National Intelligence concerning the extent to which the Chief Information Officer considers appropriate.

Page 9, line 17, strike “2014” and insert “2015.”

Page 9, after line 23, insert the following:

“(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.”

Page 24, after line 13, insert the following:

“(c) Guidelines.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Act to submit a report under section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, the Inspector General of the National Security Agency shall, to the extent practicable, issue guidelines for the intelligence community on software procurement and usage based on such recommendations.”.

Page 17, line 19, strike “:;” and insert a semicolon.

Page 17, line 23, strike the period and insert “; and”.

Page 17, after line 23, insert the following:

“(d) Implementation of Recommendations.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community to have occurred;”

Page 17, line 23, strike “:;” and insert “;”.

Page 17, line 23, strike the quotation mark and insert “,”.

Page 18, line 2, strike the quotation mark and insert “,”.

Page 18, after line 2, insert the following:

“(d) Implementation of Recommendations.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community regarding the extent to which the Chief Information Officer considers appropriate.”

Page 19, line 2, strike the quotation mark and insert “,”.

Page 19, after line 2, insert the following:

“(d) Implementation of Recommendations.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community to have occurred;”

Page 19, line 2, strike the quotation mark and insert “,”.

Page 19, after line 2, insert the following:

“(d) Implementation of Recommendations.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community to have occurred;”

Page 20, line 17, strike “2015”.

Page 20, after line 17, insert the following:

“(e) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter any requirement existing on the date of enactment of this Act to submit a report under any provision of law.”

Page 24, after line 13, insert the following:

“(c) Guidelines.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element of the intelligence community, shall—

(1) issue guidelines to carry out section 510(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section; and

(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.”

Page 24, line 14, redesignate subsection (c) as subsection (d).

Page 24, before line 20 insert the following:

“(e) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter any requirement existing on the date of enactment of this Act to submit a report under any provision of law.”

Page 24, after line 13, insert the following:

“(c) Guidelines.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the National Security Act of 1947 (as added by subsection (a) of this section); and

(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.”

Page 24, after line 13, insert the following:

“(c) Guidelines.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act to submit a report under any provision of law.”

Page 24, after line 20 insert the following:

“(e) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter any requirement existing on the date of enactment of this Act to submit a report under any provision of law.”

Page 24, after line 20 insert the following:

“(e) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter any requirement existing on the date of enactment of this Act to submit a report under any provision of law.”
“(1) determine which foreign governments pose a significant counterintelligence threat to the United States; and
“(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a list of such foreign governments.

“(e) Definitions.—In this section:
“(1) COVERED ENTITY.—The term ‘covered entity’ means—
“(A) an employee of an element of the intelligence community with access to sensitive compartmented information occupying a position—
“(i) classified at GS-15 of the General Schedule (chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code); or
“(ii) as a senior civilian officer of the intelligence community (as defined in Intelligence Community Directive No. 610 or any successor directive); and
“(B) a person who during the preceding 12-month period was an officer or employee of the Congress (as defined in section 109(13) of the Reorganization Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.)) with access to sensitive compartmented information.

“(2) COVERED EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘covered employee’ means—
“(A) any person acting on behalf or under the supervision of a designated foreign government;
“(B) any entity owned or controlled by a designated foreign government.

“(3) DESIGNATED FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.—The term ‘designated foreign government means a government that the Director of National Intelligence determines poses a significant counterintelligence threat to the United States under subsection (d).’

“(b) EFFECTIVE DATE OF NRO DATAPORTS PERIOD NOTICE.—The requirement under section 304(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

“(c) EFFECTIVE DATE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SEPARATION PERIOD.—The requirement under section 304(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall not apply to a covered employee that has entered into an employment agreement on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.

“(d) FIRST REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—The first report required to be submitted by each covered employee under section 304(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

“(e) FIRST SEPARATION REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the initial list of foreign governments under section 304(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

“(f) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended—
“(1) by striking the second item relating to section 302 (Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries) and the items relating to sections 304, 305, and 306; and
“(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the following new item:

“Sec. 304. Restrictions on certain former intelligence officers and employees of the Federal Government

AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MR. KEATING OF ILLINOIS

At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following new section:

“Sec. 304. Restrictions on certain former intelligence officers and employees of the Federal Government

Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3224) is amended—

“(1) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ‘and Predominantly Black Institutions’ after ‘universities’; and
“(2) in subsection (g)—
“(A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
“(B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph:

“(4) Predominantly Black Institution.—The term ‘Predominantly Black Institution’ has the meaning given the term in section 18 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1009).

AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. CARNEY OF DELAWARE

At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following new section:

“Sec. 304. Restrictions on certain former intelligence officers and employees of the Federal Government

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing—

“(1) how to improve the declassification process across the intelligence community; and
“(2) what steps the intelligence community can take, or what legislation may be necessary, to enable the National Declassification Review Center to better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by Executive Order 13526.

AMENDMENT NO. 9 OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON-OWENS OF TEXAS

At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following new section:

“Sec. 305. Relationship of Predominantly Black Institutions to the Intelligence Community

“Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Program Manager of the Information Technology Environment, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate an assessment of the efficacy of the memoranda of understanding between the National Intelligence Program, Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Such assessment shall include—

“(1) any language within such memoranda of understanding that prohibited or may be construed to prohibit intelligence-sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies; and
“(2) any recommendations for memoranda of understanding to better facilitate intelligence-sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.

“Sec. 306. Assessing the Efficacy of the Intelligence Community Software Library

Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Program Manager of the Information Technology Environment, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate an assessment of the efficacy of the memoranda of understanding between the National Intelligence Program, Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Such assessment shall include—

“(1) any language within such memoranda of understanding that provided for the confidentiality of the American people in the amount of documents. Increased transparency through an improved declassification process will help rebuild the confidence of the American people in their intelligence agencies.

Mr. CONNOLLY has an amendment that would provide the Congress with a useful report on ways to improve the declassification process across the intelligence community. The intelligence community has declassified a massive amount of documents. Increased transparency through an improved declassification process will help rebuild the confidence of the American people in their intelligence agencies.

Mr. KEATING has an amendment that would add several best practices to the assessment of intelligence community software licenses. This amendment is all the more important in light of current efforts to improve the intelligence community’s software license systems. Wise management of software licenses can help save the taxpayers’ dollars while making sure our intelligence officers have the tools they need to do their job.

Mr. JACKSON-LEE has an amendment that would help us identify ways to improve the support contractors offer to the intelligence community. It may help us find ways to make the most of scarce resources, all the while ensuring that our contractors perform their inherently governmental functions.

Mr. KEATING has an amendment concerning intelligence sharing between
Federal, State, and local entities, which has been a critical tool to prevent terrorist attacks on American soil. Joint terrorism task forces pool talent, skills, and knowledge from across the law enforcement and intelligence communities into a single entity that can respond with the flexibility and speed to stop impending threats.

Even so, we must always look for ways to improve intelligence-sharing relationships. This amendment requires a study of the efficiency of the memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies. The study will help identify any obstacles to intelligence sharing between agencies and find improvements to existing intelligence-sharing relationships.

Ms. KELLY has an amendment to expand a grant program by the Director of National Intelligence to include predominantly black institutions. To succeed in their mission, the intelligence agencies need our Nation’s top talent, and that means they must make full use of our Nation’s diverse population. These grants will help provide study programs in foreign languages such as Farsi, Pashto, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African dialects. Foreign language skills are critical for intelligence officers, as we all know.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER has an amendment that will require the intelligence community Chief Information Officer to make recommendations to the Director of National Intelligence based on the software licensing assessment required by section 307 of the bill. It will also require the DNI to issue guidelines to implement those recommendations. These recommendations and guidelines will help the IC implement the results of the important assessment that this bill will require regarding software licensing.

I will, therefore, support the amendment.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I ask Members to support the bloc amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I support all these amendments.

I agree with Chairman ROGERS that it is very troubling when senior U.S. officials who know our most sensitive secrets leave the Federal Government and immediately go to work for a company that is owned by a foreign country trying to gain significant counterintelligence threat to us.

I do have some concerns that this restriction might be seen as singling out our intelligence professionals, since it does not apply to every senior official in the government with a top secret clearance. I would be in favor of a waiver procedure for when the risks are low. For example, for someone who wants to teach English at a State-funded university in his or her retirement. But on the whole, I agree with Mr. ROGERS and support this provision.

I also agree with Mr. CONNOLLY and Mr. KILMER that we need to find efficiencies in the intelligence community’s use of software. In fact, we just don’t need to find them, we need to fix them. Finding and fixing inefficiencies translates into saving taxpayer dollars, which is something we must always strive to do.

I agree with Ms. ROBIN KELLY that we need to increase the diversity of our intelligence workforce by adding predominantly black institutions to ongoing intelligence community programs currently designed for Historically Black Colleges. Diversity is a good thing in its own right, and it will create even greater opportunities for intelligence collection.

I agree with Mr. CARNEY that we must reduce our declassification backlog. As The New York Times reported just this week, even material that should be automatically declassified isn’t. So we need the Director of National Intelligence to look across the intelligence community and figure out how to improve the classification process so that more national security information can be made available to the American people now.

I also agree with Ms. SHEILA JACKSON LEE that we need to get a handle on how we are employing our contractors. We need to know whether they are doing the type of work that should be done by U.S. Government employees. Let me be clear, however, that contractors perform a very valuable service, and our companies are among the very best in the world. But there needs to be a clear line between what we expect from our employees, who owe 100 percent of their loyalty to the government, and what we expect from our contractors, whose patriotism is without question, but whose loyalty is also to the company that employs them.

Finally, I agree with Mr. KEATING, Mr. ROONEY, and Mr. HANNA that we need to take a close look at the memorandum of agreement between the Federal Government and the State, local, tribal, and territorial governments to make sure they are written clearly enough and well enough to ensure the free flow of intelligence, while still making sure to protect sources and methods.

Intelligence is critical, particularly in the midst of a domestic crisis. And for it to be useful, it must get to those who need it.

In addition to the manager’s amendment, which makes technical and clarifying changes to the bill, I support all these amendments.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON LEE).

Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chair, let me again thank the ranking member and the chairman. Let me also acknowledge the men and women that work in our intelligence community in the United States and around the world.

I would like to thank the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for their efforts to include the Jackson Lee amendment in the en bloc amendments and thank them for working with my staff in a very cooperative manner.

The Jackson Lee amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for the intelligence community.

The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on contractors to support government objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.

This complements the underlying bill, because the underlying bill has determined to assess the utilization and reduce the number of private contractors.

In a Time article dated Monday, July 19, 2010, a comment says:

Explosions of contractors in the intelligence community.

And that has been the case. It is important that we recognize that contractors can be useful. But like the President stated publicly on August 26, 2013:

It is important that we have so many extraordinary capable folks in our military and our government who can do this—and probably do it cheaper.

Well, I agree with the President and this committee.

I also take note of an article that cites NSA contractors using LinkedIn profiles to cash in on national security.

I believe that with the work that we are doing here in this legislation, along with my amendment, we will get our hands around the idea of outsourcing our intelligence work and develop a process of excellence, as we have in the past.

We will utilize our veterans, we will utilize military personnel, we will utilize young persons who are interested in this as a career, and we will have the finest intelligence staffing that we have ever had, as we have had in the past.

I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I again thank the chairman and ranking member for including it in the en bloc amendments. I think we are on a pathway of greater success in securing this Nation.

Mr. Chair, I support H.R. 4681, the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014,” a bill Authorizing appropriations for our nation’s intelligence agencies for Fiscal Year 2014 through Fiscal Year 2015. The bill provides funds for the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

My thanks to the House Rules Committee for making my amendment in order under the rule for H.R. 4681.

I appreciate the work of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence efforts to include the Jackson Lee Amendment in the En Bloc.
My amendment is simple and makes an important contribution to the bill.

The Jackson Lee Amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people the nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for the Intelligence Community.

The Jackson Lee Amendment requires the Director of the Office of National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on contractors to support Government objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysts.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations said that on October 1, 2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or Top Secret security clearance totaled 5,150,379 individual.

According to the ODNI, 3,738,026 were government agency personnel, 1,056,309 were contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.

Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security clearances approved—152,490 were government agency employees and 131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.

The cost of government security classification in 2005 was $7.66 billion and in 2010 the total was $12.36 billion.

The amount expended included: 5.65 billion for protection maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and planning; 502.51 million for professional education, training and awareness; and 352.4 million for classification management; 52.76 million for declassification.

The assessment provided for through the Jackson Lee amendment would shed light on the work that our federal agency Intelligence professionals and the role contractors play in protecting our nation.

President Obama stated publicly on August 6, 2013 that it is important that we have so many ‘extraordinarily capable folks in our military and our government who can do this, and probably do it cheaper.’

I agree.

That is why I introduced H.R. 4110, the HERO Transition from Battlespace to Workforce Act of 2014.

This legislation addresses the problem of underemployed veterans in obtaining positions that take maximum advantage of their skills and experience.

For some time I have worked to make sure that transparency, accountability and oversight were firmly established to guide the work of intelligence agencies, including introducing legislation such as H.R. 2434.

I thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their hard work in bringing this bill before the full House for consideration.

I ask my Colleagues in the House to vote for this en bloc.

[From Time, Jul. 19, 2010]

TIME TO TAME WASHINGTON’S INTELLIGENCE BEAST

(By Robert Baer)

I asked a former colleague who retired from the CIA not long ago what he thought about the Washington Post article Monday, July 19, on the explosion of contractors in the intelligence community. ‘It’s a horror,’ he said, ‘my tax money blowing around Washington like confetti.’ But he reserved his angriest comments for the contractor-driven bureaucracy that allowed a Nigerian would-be suicide bomber—as alleged by a resulting federal indictment—to board a Northwest flight from Atlanta to Detroit in December. In spite of the billions and billions of dollars we’ve showered on contractors, consultants and corporate contractors since 9/11, no one managed to disseminate a warning from the Nigerian’s father that his son had reportedly become a terrorist.

The raw numbers tell the story. Since 9/11, America’s intelligence budget has more than doubled, to $75 billion. The number of people working at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has increased from 7,700 to 16,500. The FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces have trebled in number, rising from 35 to 106. Personnel at the National Security Agency has nearly doubled. There are 85,000 people with top-secret security clearances, including contractors—almost 1/3 the population of Washington. It shouldn’t come as a surprise, then, that the Nigerian slipped through the cracks: there are so many more cracks now. But we shouldn’t reduce the problem to our having become a country saddled with a bureaucratic and insatiable timeservers and people cashing in on 9/11. Recently I’ve been giving talks at government agencies working on counterterrorism. With almost no exceptions I’ve found my audiences, including contractors, better informed, more dedicated and better educated than the generation I served with in the CIA. (As I’ve said before, I feel as if I’ve been sent to the CIA today. I wonder whether I’d make it in.)

The problem is that I came away from these talks with the impression that the post-9/11 workforce is bored and even adrift—at least in the sense that there are too many people chasing too little hard intelligence.

It’s a tooth-to-tail problem. CIA Director Leon Panetta has gone on the record as saying there are only a couple hundred al-Qaeda dead-enders in the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan, most of whom are dormant, hiding in caves. With a prey so small and elusive and a bureaucracy so Washington-bound, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that we’re tripping over ourselves. Nor should it come as a surprise that more money and more contractors aren’t a problem of diminishing returns but rather one of adding to the risk.

It would be considerably different if we could put this new workforce in the field—for instance, in Afghanistan, a country that demands on-the-ground experience for a young American intelligence officer to understand it. But our bases there are already overflowing with combat forces, and anyhow, it’s too dangerous for Americans to get outside the wire to meet Afghans. Not unlike in Washington, they’re stuck behind desks and forced to look at the country from a distance.

No one intended to create a monster bureaucracy after 9/11—Washington has always thrown money and people at a problem rather than good ideas. But now someone has to seriously calculate the damage the outsourcing of intelligence is causing. The story I keep hearing over and over is that the bright young people who came to Washington to fight terrorism—civil servants and contractors alike—have become disillusioned, and they will soon turn away from idealism and begin to transform their jobs into comfortable careers. In the case of the contractors, it means more contracts and more contractors. It’s because there are now contractors writing their own contracts.

For Washington to retake control of intelligence, it needs to remember that intelligence is a governmental function, no different from the courts, the police or legislation. I wish Washington good luck in taking back ground from the contractors, and I hope it can move faster than the next would-be suicide bomber.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. (Mr. WAMACK.)

The question is on the amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS).

The en bloc amendments were agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 6 OFFERED BY MR. FRANKS OF ARIZONA

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 113-465.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following new section:

(a) Report.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the threat posed by mamade electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States interests through 2025, including threats from foreign countries and foreign non-state actors.

(b) Report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. FRANKS) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Rogers. I believe he has exhibited the best of the House of Representatives and has rendered this country magnificent service, both to our national security and to the stability of this Nation. I thank him deeply for it, and also for the time to speak on this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2015 is a critical milestone toward protecting Americans at home and those who serve our interests and Nation overseas.

However, it does not currently address one of the critical concerns, and that is the threat of a manmade nuclear electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, weapon.

My amendment would task the Director of National Intelligence to report to the Congress on the threat posed by manmade electromagnetic pulse weapons. It would authorize the United States interests through 2025, including those threats from foreign countries and foreign nonstate actors.
Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that my amendment does not task another Federal agency with the responsibility of determining our vulnerabilities to EMP and GMD and the potential dangers these threats represent to our national security.

These studies have already been finalized, and their conclusions provide our Nation’s leaders and industry officials with the clarity they need to move forward toward protecting our grid.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, there have now been nearly a dozen Federal Government reports and studies on the dangers, threats, and vulnerabilities the U.S. electric grid faces from EMP and GMD, including reports from the EMP Commission, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the National Academy of Sciences, and the U.S. national laboratories. All of them paint a clear conclusion: The U.S. electric grid is dangerously vulnerable to EMP and GMD.

Further, many warn that, given the Nation’s current lack of preparedness, a nuclear or natural EMP event is potentially a catastrophic threat that would be a top national priority for our national security and homeland security.

In 2008, the congressionally authorized EMP Commission stated that Russian scientists had proliferated knowledge of a specifically designed EMP weapon to North Korea. There may also exist a form of mobile EMP devices that can take out our electric substations.

As The Wall Street Journal reported recently, taking out just a few of these substations simultaneously could potentially cause a nationwide blackout.

Our military understands this threat very well, Mr. Chairman, and has protected us from our critical defense assets. We, as a Nation, have spent billions of dollars, in fact, over the years, hardening our nuclear triad, our missile defense capabilities and numerous other critical elements of our national security apparatus against the effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type of electromagnetic pulse that might be generated against us by an enemy.

However, our civilian grid, which the Department of Energy relies upon for nearly 99 percent of its electricity needs, is completely vulnerable to the same kind of danger.

This constitutes, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, an invitation on the part of certain of our enemies to use the asymmetric capability of an EMP weapon against us, and there is now evidence that such strategy is being considered by certain of those enemies.

Mr. Chairman, the time is right for this action, and our efforts today may gain us no note in the annals of history, but my hope is that they will ultimately lead to a time when this country mitigates this threat and disinvites our enemies to try to exploit it against us. I pray it happens just that way.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. FRANKS, a leader in the bipartisan House Electromagnetic Pulse Caucus, has brought attention to the serious threats posed by electromagnetic pulses, whether from a solar storm or a nuclear-armed enemy that could harm our critical infrastructure.

Given what we know about our Nation’s critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, I support this amendment’s purpose, to gain even more information that can better protect our utilities, financial systems, medical facilities, networks, and other infrastructure.

Therefore, I support this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. LANGEVIN), one of the key members of our committee and one of the experts in the area of cybersecurity.

(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4681, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015.

I am going to keep my remarks brief, but I first wanted to thank Chairman ROGERS and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER for bringing this bill to the floor in a bipartisan way. The bill before us really is indicative of how the committee is run in a bipartisan way under Chairman Rogers’ leadership.

In particular, I do want to commend Chairman Rogers for his years of service on the Intelligence Committee and wish him the best in his retirement at the end of this year. He clearly made a difference.

Mr. Chairman, this is a balanced measure and really critical to protecting our Nation’s security. I have been pleased to work with the chairman and ranking member on several provisions included in the bill.

This bill makes critical investments in technical and tactical intelligence, as well as in our human capabilities.

In particular, in order to support and develop the long-term health of our most important intelligence resource—human talent—this bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to create a plan to promote cybersecurity and computer literacy among high school and college students.

As cyber threats grow in quantity and sophistication, we must do more to train and recruit into the noble calling of government service young people with the interest and aptitude for cybersecurity.

The bill authorizes provisions to reduce the risk of information leaks, as well, and unauthorized disclosures of classified information by insiders, while maintaining appropriate levels of trust in our personnel. We cannot afford a repeat of last year’s breach of classified information.

Mr. Chairman, continued focus is needed to ensure that we, of course, are supporting the efforts of those patriotic Americans who proudly serve our Nation in the intelligence community, while properly safeguarding the privacy and civil liberties that our citizens hold dear.

To that end, we must fully absorb the lessons learned over the past decade after passage of the landmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and the changes it brought to the IC.

The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I certainly look forward to working with my committee colleagues to continue this tradition of rigorous, responsible, and bipartisan oversight. The work that we do is critical to our national security.

Again, I thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger, as well as my colleagues on the committee, and in particular, I want to thank the staff for the hard work that they have done in bringing this bill to the floor on both sides of the aisle. Their work is critical as well.

I thank my colleagues.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. FRANKS).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MR. POE OF TEXAS

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 113-465.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:


(a) Report.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.

The bill authorizes provisions to reduce the risk of information leaks, as well, and unauthorized disclosures of classified information by insiders, while maintaining appropriate levels of trust in our personnel. We cannot afford a repeat of last year’s breach of classified information.

Mr. Chairman, continued focus is needed to ensure that we, of course, are supporting the efforts of those patriotic Americans who proudly serve our Nation in the intelligence community, while properly safeguarding the privacy and civil liberties that our citizens hold dear.

To that end, we must fully absorb the lessons learned over the past decade after passage of the landmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and the changes it brought to the IC.

The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I certainly look forward to working with my committee colleagues to continue this tradition of rigorous, responsible, and bipartisan oversight. The work that we do is critical to our national security.

Again, I thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member RUPPERSBERGER, as well as my colleagues on the committee; and in particular, I want to thank the staff for the hard work that they have done in bringing this bill to the floor on both sides of the aisle. Their work is critical as well.

I thank my colleagues.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. FRANKS).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 7 OFFERED BY MR. POE OF TEXAS

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 113-465.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:


(a) Report.—

(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a comprehensive report on the United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.
(2) COORDINATION.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other department or agency of the United States Government that has responsibility for activities directed at combating al-Qaeda affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.

(3) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:

(A) A definition of—

(i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;

(ii) an affiliated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an affiliated group of al-Qaeda;

(iii) an associated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an associated group of al-Qaeda;

(iv) an adherent of al-Qaeda, including a list of which known groups constitute an adherent of al-Qaeda; and

(v) a group aligned with al-Qaeda, including a description of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that qualify it as a group aligned with al-Qaeda.

(B) The text of the relationship between all identified al-Qaeda affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents with al-Qaeda core.

(C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, from January 1, 2015, to the present, including a description of the metrics that are used to assess strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such entities.

(D) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

(E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of an al-Qaeda affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.

(F) A definition of defeat of core al-Qaeda.

(G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, and control between core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, and whether such operations have had a sustained impact on the capability and effectiveness of core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.

(H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations against core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents, and whether such operations have had a sustained impact on the capability and effectiveness of core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.

(4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate committees of Congress" means—

(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; and

(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. Poe of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Chairman Rogers for supporting this amendment but, more importantly, for his work on the Intelligence Committee for so many years and, prior to that, your work with the FBI.

As a former judge, I got to see a lot of FBI agents come and testify in Texas, and they have a wonderful reputation. You also have that reputation, and thank you for your service in law enforcement and in the House.

I also want to thank the ranking member for his support, generally, for this amendment.

This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with relevant agencies, to produce a strategy to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates.

The amendment requires that the President clearly define groups like core al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliates and other terms the administration uses to define this enemy of America.

Al Qaeda continues to threaten the security of the United States and our allies, both here at home and abroad. Our intelligence services and our military have scored some real gains against al Qaeda, but al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is still able to provide technical, tactical, and strategic direction to its affiliates throughout the world.

Al Qaeda has gone from the verge of strategic defeat to a serious and growing threat, depending on who you ask in our intelligence services or even the administration. Today, al Qaeda controls more territory than it ever has. The fight against al Qaeda is far from over, and it will continue to grow.

As chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, I have held over a dozen bipartisan hearings focusing on this very topic. Once again, I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for including this TNT Subcommittee in some of the work we have been working together on the very issue of intelligence.

During these 12 hearings in our subcommittee, we have yet to find a witness who can articulate or even agree with the administration's counterterrorism strategy or what it is or describe how the administration really views al Qaeda and its threat. This seems to be a problem. This needs to be clarified, so that all of us know exactly what our strategy is nationwide and worldwide.

So this amendment is necessary, so we can all get on the same page in the hymnal with a clear strategy to defeat al Qaeda, so we understand what al Qaeda is really doing today in 2014. This is a constantly changing movement, and al Qaeda today isn't the same as the al Qaeda in 2001.

We need to have a clear understanding of who we are fighting and how we are going to defeat the al Qaeda terrorists. Drone strikes and targeted killings are not a strategy; they are tactics. Therefore, I support this amendment, and I urge support by the committee and the whole House.

And that's just the way it is.

Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Ruppersberger. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, although I am not opposed to the amendment.

The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is recognized for 5 minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. Ruppersberger. I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

I support this amendment because the time is right to step back and take stock of where we are and how we are going in our fight against terrorism. The threat is not going away, but it is rapidly changing.

The Director of the FBI, Jim Comey, recently said that the terrorism threat is very much alive and growing in new and more dangerous places around the world. It even surprised him when he started, just how virulent and dispersed the terrorist threat had become.

From Pakistan to Yemen, Afghanistan to Syria, north Africa to Iraq, the threat from al Qaeda is growing in some areas, but growing in others. Unless we approach this dangerous problem holistically and precisely, we risk just squeezing the balloon, suppressing terrorism in one area, only to see it grow in another.

So I think it is a good idea to sit down and take a comprehensive look at the problem today, to make sure that we are confronting it in the precisely right way, to make sure that we are measuring our effectiveness correctly, and to make sure that we have the right and most current legal authorities.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 9 OFFERED BY MR. GALLEGO.

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in House Report 113–465.

Mr. Gallego. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.

The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following section:

SEC. 503. REPORT ON RETRAINING VETERANS IN CYBERSECURITY.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to Congress recommendations for retraining veterans and retired members of elements of the intelligence community in cybersecurity.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gallego) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking Chairman Rogers and the ranking member for an opportunity to work on this issue with them, and I certainly wish Chairman Rogers well in his future endeavors.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment helps us find ways to ensure that our veterans and other former public servants can continue their service to our country on cybersecurity, a critical national security need that will only grow in importance over the next several years.

While Congress is well aware of the challenges that we face in cybersecurity, it is important to understand that cyber attacks are not only aimed at the government, where they challenge our national security and endanger our troops, but these attacks also target our Nation’s economic advantages, our core advantages, when they steal proprietary information and intellectual property from American firms that lead the Nation and lead the world in innovation.

In fact, for the private sector, it is important to know that an IP theft in the U.S. costs companies upwards of $250 billion a year, and global cyber crime costs $338 billion. And when you factor in downtime, either way, that is a lot of money. And we spent up to—no kidding—$1 trillion fixing these problems.

These highlight an important point, that if these attacks on American companies are so bad, just use your imagination to figure the threat of foreign based cyber attacks on the Department of Defense or other critical intelligence agencies. And there is no better group of people than our veterans and our retired intelligence agencies who have provided the work of our numerous intelligence professionals—to be our next generation of cyber defenders. We call them cyber warriors.

This amendment allows us to do everything we can to support our veterans who are looking for jobs along with those retired members of the intelligence community who have already demonstrated their commitment to public service.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to its veterans and to the retired members of the intelligence community. We should look for as many ways as possible to help them succeed in the job market. And I want to thank the gentleman for offering the amendment for promoting this. The amendment does, again, highlight the sheer level of threat we face from cyber crime, cyber terrorists, cyber espionage. We are being threatened on all sides.

When you look at China, Russia, Iran, and now organized crime groups who are approaching nation-state capability, it is as bad as I have ever seen it. And, again, 85 percent of the networks across America are not protected at all because they are private sector networks. The government, itself, is about 15 percent of those networks.

We need to find a pathway, A, to attract the talent that the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GALLEGO) is talking about; and, B, we need to allow these private sector folks to protect themselves by gaining information, sharing information the government has that could protect those networks from cyber catastrophe.

It is happening each and every day. The next generation of cyber warriors are there. And I think this amendment will go a long way to recruit the right talent in the right place to help us meet this growing threat of the future—prosperity, safety, and the security of the United States.

With that, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. RUPPERSBERGER).

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

As I said in the opening hearing on worldwide threats, “education is the keystone of security and prosperity in the 21st century.”

The cyber threats we face are grave, and we need to train the best, the brightest, and the most dedicated—like our veterans and our retired intelligence professionals—to be our next generation of cyber defenders. We call them cyber warriors.

Every day, we hear about cyber attacks in the news. Early last year, for example, our financial sector suffered a wide-scale network denial of service attack that proved difficult and very costly to mitigate. The retail giant, Target, is another recent example of our vulnerability to cyber attacks. And today, The Washington Post stated that Iranian hackers are targeting U.S.A. officials through social networks.

We need to pass cybersecurity legislation like CISPA, and we need to do far more to expand our bench of cyber professionals and innovators. We need to invest in early education in science, technology, engineering, and math. And we equally need to leverage the experience and wisdom of our veterans and former intelligence professionals. Our adversaries are making heavy investments in cyber education. We must do the same. For this reason, I support this amendment.

I thank my colleague from Texas (Mr. GALLEGO) for his amendment. He represents the area of Texas that is close to the border. He understands the threat and why we need intelligence to deal with national security.

Mr. GALLEGO, Mr. Chairman, many of our servicemembers have made the ultimate sacrifice. There are 4,423 that have died in Operation Iraqi Freedom; 66 in Operation New Dawn; and, as of yesterday, 2,220 have died in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where I just returned from this week.

But many of the thousands upon thousands of our troops who did make it home to see their mothers, fathers, spouses, and kids are alive today because actionable intelligence helped them achieve their missions more safely.

While there has been a lot of criticism about intelligence collection—and we have had a very robust debate on these issues—I think it is important that we concentrate on the fact that intelligence is so critical to the lives of our men and women in uniform. And it really does help them come back home today safe with their families because of the work of our numerous intelligence agencies who have provided the information they need to stay alive.

Mr. Chairman, I also want to do a shout-out to the Air Force ISR Agency in San Antonio, in Bexar County. I know that they do critical work to protect and defend our liberty each and every day.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GALLEGO).

The amendment was agreed to.

The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. WOMACK, Acting Chair of the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, reported the bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 604, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment reported from the Committee of the Whole?

If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT
Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. BISHOP of New York. In its current form, I am.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. Bishop of New York moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 4681, to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith with the following amendment.

At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following new section:

SEC. 3. PROTECTING UNITED STATES MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS FROM CHINESE AND OTHER STATE-SPONSORED COMPUTER THEFT.

The head of each element of the intelligence community shall—

(1) prioritize efforts to uncover and foil attempts to steal United States military technology, and the intellectual property of United States corporations, by State-sponsored computer hackers from China and other foreign countries;

(2) consistent with existing law, immediately inform corporations and internet providers of any computer breaches and the steps necessary to combat further intrusion;

(3) coordinate with other Federal agencies to protect critical United States infrastructure, including the electrical grid, nuclear power plants, oil and gas pipelines, financial services, and air traffic safety, from repeated computer hacking attacks; and

(4) assist the Department of Justice and other Federal law enforcement agencies, including by supporting the international efforts of United States allies, in efforts to punish and sanction individuals and governments that perpetrate economic espionage and identity theft.

Mr. BISHOP of New York (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to dispense with the reading.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

Mr. BISHOP of New York (during the reading). The motion to recommit has been agreed to.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his amendment. This way, it just exposes, again, the need for this amendment. The amendment requires the heads of the intelligence agencies to prioritize efforts to uncover, stop, and prevent future attempts to steal United States military technology and intellectual property.

The intelligence agencies are also required to notify businesses and Internet providers when network breaches occur, collaborate with Federal agencies to protect critical infrastructure, and assist law enforcement, as well as our international partners in apprehending, halting, and punishing those who infiltrate our systems.

The need for this amendment is clear. Growing evidence reveals expansive activity on the part of the People's Liberation Army to conduct cyber, economic, and industrial espionage. Their hacking knows no bounds in the pursuit of state and trade secrets alike.

We have uncovered the traces and telltale signs of hacking into Federal systems and U.S. corporations, like Alcoa, U.S. Steel, energy companies like SolarPowerAG, and even nuclear power providers like Westinghouse Electric Company.

This month, the Justice Department indicted five members of the Chinese military for stealing trade secrets in order to prosper from American ingenuity and innovation to undercut our global competitiveness.

These are not isolated incidents. The frequency of these attacks has increased over time, costing our economy thousands of jobs and up to $100 billion annually. Not only are the Chinese and their partners refusing to acknowledge evidence we have uncovered, but they refuse to negotiate steps both of our nations could pursue to end this threat.

No single action will stop the Chinese from trying to infiltrate American computer networks, but collaboration between our intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the private sector can strengthen our defenses, deter cyber espionage from being launched on our networks, and protect our jobs.

My amendment is not the only step we can take, but it is an important addition to this bill. The United States deserves better for supporting the rights of nations like China to trade in the global marketplace, to be treated with respect, and to participate in the community of nations. We must send the message to China and our rivals that this Congress stands ready to defend our national security and our economy, and we must send a message to American taxpayers and Americans that protecting jobs here at home will always be our priority and that our economic might is more important than our military might. Our national security and position as a global leader in innovation and competitiveness depends on it.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his interest. This is exciting news.

The bill is not crafted correctly, and it opens us up to exposing classified information to corporations that may be foreign-owned and operated by the very counterintelligence threat we seek to push back on. But thank you for this effort.

We should reject this. We should include resounding support for the CISPA bill that carefully drafted language to make it clear that there is a cyber-sharing relationship, both between the government when it comes to malicious code and the private sector who, remember, is all by itself out there getting attacked by nation-states and large organized crime groups trying to steal their information.

If you think about even the last month or so that General Alexander was the Director of the National Security Agency, just in that last bit of time he was there, the military sites, the government sites were hit 41 million times by people trying to cause destruction or break in and steal something. Again, this is as serious a problem as you can imagine, Mr. Speaker, that we are not prepared to handle.

So that CISPA bill that I think you tried to get here—I mean, part of this bill is the redundancy department of redundancy. The second part is just not drafted correctly, and we would love to help you get to the right place.

Mr. Speaker, I think this bill, I think it will do more harm than I think you realized without carefully considering how you construct a cyber-sharing malicious code relationship between the government and the private sector. It needs to happen. This way, it just exposes, again, the information to counterintelligence groups that we don’t want to have it.

So I would strongly urge the rejection of the motion to recommit. But I want to thank the gentleman. I look forward to working in the next few months with the gentleman to make sure that we put in place a fighting chance, a fighting chance for the 85 percent of those private sector networks that are getting absolutely ravaged every single day by cyber attackers, by people who are trying to disrupt activities.

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There are public reports that Iran is probing our financial institutions. Think about the idea if they were able or successful to go in and take down a financial institution that has trillions
of dollars every single day in global transactions, destroy data, manipulate data, and you don't know who owes whom what. Imagine the economic catastrophe that happens.

Well, guess what? This is not Orwellian. It is not next year. It is not 6 months from now and it is not 10 years from now. It is happening today, and every nation on the face of the Earth is trying to get this capability—including al Qaeda. They are advertising to try to find the right people to develop a capability for a cyberattack to disrupt, to destroy, and to cause chaos.

This is as important an issue as I can think of, Mr. Speaker, that I hope we find some resolution on. Again, I have to strongly oppose this motion to recommit for the drafting errors I find in the bill. But I look forward to working with the gentleman on the CISPA bill that is in the Senate and passed by this House in a huge bipartisan way so that it is in the Senate and passed by this House in a way that I can support.

Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays and agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal, if ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 183, nays 220, not voting 28, as follows:

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<th>Yeas: 183</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nays: 220</td>
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**RECORDED VOTE**

<table>
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<th>AYE—345</th>
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**NOT VOTING—28**

**MESSRS. GRIFFITH of Virginia and McHENRY changed their vote from “aye” to “nay.”**

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes had appeared to have it.

**RECORDED VOTE**

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—aye 345, nay 99, not voting 27, as follows:

| AYEs—345 |

**NOT VOTING—28**

**MESSRS. GRIFFITH of Virginia and McHENRY changed their vote from “aye” to “nay.”**

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes had appeared to have it.

**RECORDED VOTE**

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—aye 345, nay 99, not voting 27, as follows:

| AYEs—345 |

**NOT VOTING—28**

**MESSRS. GRIFFITH of Virginia and McHENRY changed their vote from “aye” to “nay.”**

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York changed her vote from "aye" to "no."

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Stated for:

Mr. WALTER B. JUDY of Oklahoma, Mr. Speaker, today I missed the following votes:

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. SIMPSON) asked and was given permission to address the House.

Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, it is time to take action. This is why the American Dental Association last year launched Action for Dental Health: Dentists Making a Difference, a nationwide, community-based movement focused on delivering care now to people already suffering from dental disease, strengthening and growing the public-private safety net to provide more care for more Americans, and bringing dental health education and disease prevention into underserved communities.

I urge all of my colleagues to read the Action for Dental Health One Year Report to Congress to learn more about this movement and its progress.

HONORING REBECCA MARTIN

(Mr. BARROW of Georgia asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BARROW of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor Rebecca Martin, the principal of Screven County Elementary School, who is retiring after more than 30 years as an educator.

Educators are the unsung heros in the fight for a better life for all of us. Ms. Martin started her teaching career in 1981 and then went on to teach 18 years in the Screven County School System. Since becoming a principal in 1999, she has overseen a school system that has taught thousands of students who have received too many awards to be mentioned here, all as a direct result of her leadership and dedication to our children.

While I know the students and teachers of Screven County Elementary School will miss Ms. Martin’s spirit and dedication and she will miss seeing them as much as she is used to, she can be sure that her teaching and leadership have had a profound impact upon her students and her fellow teachers wherever they go.

I congratulate Ms. Martin on her retirement. I wish her; her husband, Dr. Charles Martin; their two children; and their six grandchildren all the good things to come in the next step of their journey together.