[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 83 (Friday, May 30, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H5034-H5056]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4681.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Bishop of Utah). Is there objection to 
the request of the gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 604 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4681.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe) to preside over 
the Committee of the Whole.

[[Page H5035]]

                              {time}  0951


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Poe of Texas in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
might consume.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act is the annual blueprint for the 
work of the intelligence community and America's military intelligence 
efforts. The bill sets the priorities for our critical intelligence 
efforts and the legal framework of guidance and oversight for those 
efforts.
  Since the ranking member and I have assumed the leadership of this 
committee, we passed three intelligence authorization bills in a 
bipartisan fashion and hope to continue the tradition and trend with 
H.R. 4681. Passing a yearly intelligence authorization bill is the 
primary method by which Congress exerts its budgetary and oversight 
authority over the intelligence community.
  As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified 
programs, the bulk of this committee's recommendations each year are 
found in the classified annex to the bill which have been available for 
Members to review. Among other initiatives, the bill increases funding 
to address insider threats and improve personnel security programs.
  At an unclassified level, I can report that the annex for fiscal year 
2014 authorizes funding that is slightly below the President's budget 
request level. Its funding levels are in line with the levels 
appropriated by the enacted appropriations act for the National 
Intelligence Program and with the National Defense Authorization Act 
for the Military Intelligence Program.
  For fiscal year 2015, the bill increases the President's budget 
request by less than 1 percent and stays within the Bipartisan Budget 
Act funding caps. The modest increase reflects the committee's concern 
that the President's request does not properly fund a number of 
important initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls.
  The legislative provisions that the committee and Congress consider 
each year are comprised of changes to statute that better enable the 
community to conduct its important mission and strengthen oversight 
mechanisms where needed.
  Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in 
history. Al Qaeda has metastasized into dangerous affiliates, safe 
havens have emerged in Syria, parts of Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and the 
tribal areas of Pakistan. Al Qaeda is also regaining a foothold in 
northeast Afghanistan just as the President announced a complete 
withdrawal of U.S. military forces and the counterterrorism capability 
that comes with it by the end of 2016.
  Uneven leadership in recent years has emboldened adversaries like 
Russia and China, who are increasing their military and intelligence 
spending and working to change the international order, as we speak, to 
the detriment of U.S. interests. Russia occupies 20 percent of the 
nation of Georgia, invaded and occupied Crimea, threatens invasion of 
eastern Ukraine. China is bullying its neighbors and expanding claims 
in the South and East China Seas through which 40 percent of world 
trade travels.
  At the same time, North Korea continues its belligerent behavior, and 
Iran is maneuvering to preserve its capability to develop a nuclear 
weapon. A nuclear Iran would threaten Israel with annihilation and send 
the Middle East into a dangerous nuclear arms race.
  We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers 
with the best and most timely information possible on all these and 
other threats. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, 
plan, fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that are 
stealing American prosperity and American jobs. We ask them to track 
nuclear and missile threats. And we demand that they get it right every 
time. Now we are asking them do it with fewer resources and with what 
can be described as confusing direction from our Commander in Chief.
  The dedication of men and women of the intelligence community who 
volunteer to serve in some of the most difficult places on Earth are 
some of the finest patriots I have ever had the privilege to meet. And 
within budget constraints and unclear policy guidance from the White 
House, this bill ensures that they have resources and authorities 
necessary to keep our Nation and our people safe and accomplish their 
mission.
  As this is the last authorization act I will advance as chairman of 
the Intelligence Committee, I want to publicly thank my ranking member, 
my friend, Dutch Ruppersberger. I can't tell what you a privilege it 
has been to have a partner like Dutch in working through some very 
difficult issues at a very difficult time in our Nation's history.
  National security policy should not be partisan, and we have done 
everything in our power to ensure that this committee at least takes as 
nonpartisan a view of national security as is humanly possible. It is 
an honor to work with someone who is also interested in governing and 
in making progress on an issue so important to our Nation's future.
  I would like to thank the Chair and urge Member support of H.R. 4681, 
and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Chairman Rogers, I thank you for your comments. I also have the same 
comments for you.
  When we took the leadership of this committee, we knew that the 
stakes were so high and that we had to work together on behalf of the 
people of the United States of America. We came together with 
Republicans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives, moderates, all 
realizing that we had to come together. Because of your leadership, 
because of your focus, we have been able to pass FISA, and hopefully we 
will be able to pass these bills today.
  We are going to miss you, but you will always be there as my friend, 
and I will always respect you as a great American who cares about the 
United States. Thank you.
  Now, we need to pass this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 2014 and 2015 to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability 
over all U.S. intelligence agencies and all U.S. intelligence 
activities. This is so important.
  We cannot go back to the days when we give the intelligence agencies 
a blank check to spend as they see fit. We must have oversight. 
Remember, Congress specifically amended the National Security Act of 
1947 to replace blanket intelligence appropriations with specific 
authorization.
  Why did we do this? To ensure that our intelligence agencies spend 
money only on programs of which Congress is informed and approves. So 
today we need to make sure we maintain this means of critical oversight 
by passing the bill.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act for 2014 and 2015 is in four 
parts: the unclassified legislative text; the unclassified report; the 
classified annex, which explains our intent for the classified aspects 
of the bill; and the classified schedule of authorizations for both 
fiscal years. We have been encouraging all Members to review all parts 
of the bill, and I am pleased to say that they have come to the 
Intelligence Committee's SCIF, classified spaces, to do so.
  The budget for fiscal year 2014 is slightly below the President's 
budget request, while the budget for fiscal year 2015 is less than 1 
percent above the President's budget request.

                              {time}  1000

  We both, we made cuts to certain areas and added money in other areas 
in a responsible, well thought-out way, and a fiscally prudent way.

[[Page H5036]]

  Since Chairman Rogers and I assumed leadership of the committee, we 
reduced the Intelligence Committee's budget by 20 percent, but this 
year's bill acknowledges the need to right the ship after the storm of 
sequestration.
  The bill sets the priorities of our intelligence professionals and 
their agencies, and it allocates resources to critical national 
security programs, including those that detect, prevent, and disrupt 
potential terrorist attacks.
  Let me also mention some specifics. The bill continues to emphasize 
the value of our satellites; scales back the intelligence community's 
use of contractors; pushes for further improvements in the continuous 
evaluation of insider threats; provides critical forward-looking 
funding for Navy airborne intelligence surveillance reconnaissance to 
maintain military intelligence capabilities during the transition to 
newer, more capable aircraft; and invests in both the recruitment and 
retention of the best and the brightest for our cyber workforce, 
particularly within the FBI. Our younger generation, we must educate 
them and have them work in this area.
  We have spent months poring over this bill and its specific 
authorizations in great detail--in our committee spaces, at the 
agencies, and in the remotest corners of the Earth where our 
intelligence professionals operate--and then I can say this is a very 
good bill, and I am proud to support it.
  Many of the amendments on the floor today also promise to make a 
great bill even better.
  For the sake of keeping the country and its allies safe, and for the 
sake of rigorously overseeing even the most classified intelligence 
programs, I urge my colleagues to pass this bill today.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pittenger).
  Mr. PITTENGER. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Rogers for this 
opportunity to speak. I just really want to commend you for your 
exceptional leadership as a Member of this body and for your service on 
behalf of the security of our Nation.
  Over the past year, it has really been a privilege to get to know you 
and work with you on several initiatives. I am just grateful for the 
way that you handle the people's business, look forward to working with 
you more, and also congratulate you on your future endeavors.
  The legislation before us today provides the intelligence community 
the authorization needed to protect and defend the United States and 
supports critical national security programs, such as those protecting 
Americans against terrorism and cyber attacks.
  As Members of Congress, we took an oath to the Constitution, which 
sets forth our duty to provide for the defense of the United States.
  Passing the yearly Intelligence Authorization Act is a critical 
component of living up to our constitutional obligations, ensuring 
America's intelligence agencies have the resources necessary to keep 
Americans safe.
  Passing the intelligence authorization is also vital to our important 
responsibility of providing oversight to the current administration.
  This legislation ensures Congress, and not the executive branch, is 
controlling how taxpayer money is being spent on intelligence 
activities and doing so in the most efficient and effective way 
possible.
  We must remember that we have not defeated the threat of terrorism. 
The terrorists we face today are not a backyard gang; they are 
sophisticated and have access to the most modern of technologies.
  Over the last 2 years, we have seen the number of worldwide deaths 
from terrorism attacks double from 10,000 in 2012 to 20,000 in 2013.
  The fact that we in America are able to sleep soundly at night is a 
credit to the men and women who serve our country selflessly. We must 
continue to provide these brave men and women every tool possible as 
they continue to provide for our safety.
  That is why I encourage all my colleagues to join me in supporting 
this legislation.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Illinois, Jan Schakowsky, my good friend and a member of our 
committee, who has been very thoughtful and has allowed us to do the 
things that we needed to do.
  Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for 
yielding.
  I want to begin by saying that I really appreciate the way in which 
our committee operates and has come to present this authorization bill 
to the floor, but I do want to raise some concerns.
  One of the most controversial issues surrounding our national 
security is the use of the drone program. A number of us tried to 
introduce some amendments that would be considered on the floor of the 
House so that we, along with the American people, could have a 
conversation about that. These amendments were not made in order. And I 
want to express what my amendment would have done.
  It would have prohibited elements of the intelligence community from 
engaging in so-called signature strikes. That is, lethal strikes in 
which the target is not specifically identified but whose so-called 
pattern of life fits the profile, or signature, of a terrorist.
  In these situations, we don't know the identity of the target. 
Instead, we draw conclusions from surveillance about whether someone is 
affiliated with a terrorist organization, or engaged in terrorist 
conduct. The stakes are high, and inevitably mistakes will be made. 
There are reports from human rights organizations in past years that we 
have already made several grave errors, and innocent lives have been 
lost as a result.
  We need to recognize that each mistake we make in these situations 
killing innocent people spawns more numerous and more determined 
adversaries, undermining our mission there in the first place.
  How we are perceived abroad matters. Even if some of the strikes 
reported as mistakes are not mistaken, the fact is that the rest of the 
world perceives our activities as killing innocent civilians and 
painting all adult male Muslims in these regions as our enemies.
  I understand the targeted use, but I think that we cannot kill our 
way out of this problem and our way to victory.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank the gentlelady from Illinois for 
her strong and passionate position that she takes on some of the 
counterterrorism strategy issues that are very well debated and 
certainly well discussed and well overseen in the spaces where 
appropriate and under the appropriate form and function to do that 
because they are significant. There is no aspect of that 
counterterrorism strategy that isn't reviewed both in policy leading up 
to the daily and monthly counterstrategy meetings that happen in the 
appropriate agencies and departments and as a part of regular oversight 
of these particular programs.
  But I do think it is important to understand something: that all of 
the focus seems to be on the type of a weapon system that we have used 
or decided to use or may be using to fight what is a large and growing 
threat to the United States of America.
  I think it was interesting that in the Boko Haram case of the 300 
girls, it caught the world's attention, that you could have a group 
that would be so diabolical that they would kidnap 300 girls and sell 
them into slavery or force them into marriage and do other unspeakable 
things. Yes, that is right, that is who these groups are. This is the 
same group that has threatened the United States of America with 
terrorist attacks. It is an al Qaeda affiliate. We have watched them 
cut off the heads of other human beings for the purposes of 
intimidation, we have watched them cut off hands, we have watched them 
shoot little girls who get on buses to try to go and get an education.
  We need to understand what threat faces the United States of America. 
Because our intelligence services have been so good and so aggressive, 
we haven't had an attack here in the same 9/11 fashion--and some of 
that, by the way, was just sheer luck preparing for the opportunity to 
catch them.

  We need to step back and make sure we are understanding what we are 
trying to accomplish here and how we try to accomplish it. I think 
disparaging the very men and women who I know

[[Page H5037]]

spent hours and months and years in preparation for any 
counterterrorism strategy that we engage in, and do it in a way that is 
so responsible--I think Americans would be so proud if they had the 
opportunity to sit down and talk with these people about how they get 
to where they are.
  But I will tell you, aspects of that counterterrorism strategy--some 
have been referenced--are the most impactful, disruptive activity we 
have been able to do to stop attacks against the United States and our 
allies overseas.
  So I just again caution in this vacuum of safety and relative 
security that so many have given us, we should be cautious about what 
we are asking changes to do--and what that would mean for exposure of, 
say, U.S. pilots or U.S. Special Forces--that we have not had to do for 
some length of time and still accomplish the mission. By the way, I can 
clearly say that any reference to some mass civilian casualties or 
collateral damage is absolutely false, it is false, it is a false 
narrative for those who seek to stop an effort that we know, in fact, 
is degrading the ability for attacks against the United States.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman 
from California, Mr. Adam Schiff, a valued member of our Intelligence 
Committee, who has worked closely with me and our committee on very 
important issues.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I rise in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 2014 and 2015.
  This bill provides the resources and support the intelligence 
community needs to accomplish their mission while enhancing oversight 
in several important respects. I want to commend the bipartisan 
leadership of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger on this 
bill. I congratulate them on, again, advancing an Intelligence 
Authorization Act. I also want to acknowledge my colleague from Nevada, 
Dr. Heck, for his work with me on the Technical and Tactical 
Subcommittee. Chairman Heck did a fabulous job supporting investments 
in technology and capacity that will pay dividends in years to come.
  In addition to funding our intelligence priority, the bill includes 
important new provisions to improve greater oversight of the NSA and 
other IC elements. It creates an independent inspector general within 
the NSA who will be fully empowered to investigate abuse, waste, and 
fraud. The bill also requires an annual report to the Intelligence 
Committees on violations of law and executive order, including 
Executive Order 12333. This provision fixes a blind spot under current 
law and improves the Intelligence Committee's capacity for oversight.
  While I support the bill, I was disappointed that an amendment I 
proposed with my colleague Walter Jones was not made in order. This 
amendment would have required an annual public report on the total 
number of civilian and combatant casualties caused by drone strikes. By 
publicly reporting on the use of drones, we would provide additional 
accountability and transparency, helping to ensure the legitimacy of 
the actions that we take overseas. The report would also provide a 
counterpoint to the inflated estimates of civilian casualties 
frequently seen in the news, in part due to active efforts of our 
enemies to mislead.
  I plan to continue working with my colleagues on the committee to 
provide greater transparency, but this is a very simple method of doing 
so. In sum, it would simply require that there be an annual accounting 
of how many combatants are killed and how many noncombatants are 
killed. It would also have required that the administration or the DNI 
define those terms so we understand who is being defined as a combatant 
or noncombatant.
  The President has set a high standard for the use of drones, that 
they not be used unless there is a near certainty there will be no 
civilian casualties. This is a way of holding us accountable to meet 
that very high standard. It is also, I think, all the more important 
when we consider that, while we may be the first Nation to use drones 
in this capacity, we will not be the last, and the standard that we set 
or fail to set will be one that may be emulated by others around the 
world.
  I support this bill. I wish we had the opportunity on the floor to 
vote on this amendment, but I look forward to working with the 
committee in the years that follow to incorporate this provision and 
others to improve transparency and accountability.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Illinois (Ms. Kelly), a great Member of Congress.
  Ms. KELLY of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman and ranking 
member for their hard work on this important legislation.
  Every day, America faces threats to our national security. Some 
threats are evolving, like cyber attacks on our infrastructure. Some 
are emerging, like the radicals of Boko Haram. And some are right in 
front of us demanding direct action.
  Because we face a diverse array of threats, our security depends on 
an intelligence community that is equally diverse. In a 2011 address to 
Morehouse College, CIA Director Leon Panetta stated that we need an 
intelligence community with a workforce that reflects the world it 
engages.

                              {time}  1015

  My amendment helps the intelligence community meet its strategic 
diversity goals by providing grants to predominantly black institutions 
that educate future generations of intelligence experts through 
advanced language training, study abroad, and cultural immersion 
programs.
  To remain globally secure, we must have human assets on the ground 
who can blend in easily abroad, especially in Africa and the Middle 
East. Overcoming cultural, language, and educational barriers is 
critical to achieving this goal. I ask that my colleagues support this 
commonsense amendment.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady 
from Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee, a great Member of Congress.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the ranking member for yielding and, as 
well, the chairperson, and let me collectively add my appreciation for 
the two leaders of this committee. They have committed themselves, 
without question, to the security of this Nation. I thank them for 
their collaboration.
  Mr. Rogers, I thank you for the work that you have done for the 
Nation and, certainly, for the commitment that you have made to the 
very important business of this committee.
  Mr. Ruppersberger, let me thank you for your friendship as well and 
for the continued collaboration on an issue of great concern to me, but 
I will speak generally about this legislation and will, again, 
acknowledge some of the issues that you have looked at and considered 
and have even included in this legislation as it comes forward.
  Mr. Chairman, I agree that detecting and disrupting and preventing a 
national security crisis is of paramount responsibility for this 
committee and many others, including the committee that I serve on, the 
Committee on Homeland Security. For that reason, I have interfaced with 
this committee on a number of issues.
  I am very glad to note, in particular, that the issue of dealing with 
the expansive use that has been used, which I will talk about in the en 
bloc amendment, is clearly something that we should have considered, 
and in this bill, it did.
  It got its hand around the enormous use of outside contractors in the 
intelligence business, and it emphasized recruitment and training. That 
is positive. There are young, bright persons who I know are willing to 
serve their country, and this legislation has committed itself to doing 
that.
  Now, particularly with this legislation, I also want to appreciate 
the collaboration between the Judiciary Committee and this committee on 
the USA FREEDOM Act, and I want to say to America that we have 
corralled the megadata collection. We have done it in a bipartisan 
manner, and we will do more and do better.
  So it is with appreciation for this legislation and in thanking the 
committee for working with my staff on

[[Page H5038]]

my amendment that I ask my colleagues to support this legislation.
  Mr. Chair, I rise to speak on H.R. 4681, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2014.
  I want to thank the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 
including my amendment in an en bloc.
  My amendment to H.R. 4681 is simple and will be an important addition 
to the legislation, which I believe can be supported by every member of 
this Committee.
  My amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on the people who 
the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work required of the 
Intelligence Community.
  The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of 
National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of 
intelligence activities on contractors to support Government 
objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing 
intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
  The amendment would seek information on the skills necessary to 
perform intelligence related work and whether Federal employees had 
these skills. The amendment would also seek statistics on contractors 
preforming intelligence related work for agencies under the purview of 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
  Something is very wrong when the process for screening and vetting 
government contractors does not identify someone who would have access 
to--as well as the ability to collect and remove sensitive information 
from government computers and publicly disclose that information.
  If each person working in an intelligence role within the government 
decided to act on their own thoughts for their own purposes on whether 
they would or would not keep their oath to defend and protect our 
Nation's secrets then there would be chaos.
  Our Nation suffers harm in ways we can see, as well as ways that we 
cannot see when unauthorized disclosures regarding intelligence 
resources occur.
  It harms our ability to work with other nations who rely on our 
ability to keep secret the information they share with our Nation's 
intelligence agencies.
  If our global assets and allies cease to trust our ability to keep 
their work with our intelligence, national defense or diplomatic 
agencies secret then they will not cooperate with us in our efforts to 
defend our Nation and our interest around the world.
  Reckless disclosures make us vulnerable to our Nation's enemies who 
could make changes to how they hide information because the disclosure 
of national secrets reveals means and methods.
  The world is a dangerous place--we have seen within the last 18 
months--a bombing during the Boston Marathon, the rise in sectarian 
violence in Syria that included incidents involving the use of nerve 
gas; and Boko Haram which kidnapped nearly 300 girls from their school 
in northern Nigeria.
  According to the United States Department of State Country Report on 
Terrorism 2013, published in April of this year indicates that there 
are 53 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
  Designation of FTOs is important to our Nation's fight against 
terrorism and is effective in cutting off support for those groups so 
designated.
  In 2013, Ansar al-Dine, Boko Haram, and Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Bi 
Biladis-Sudan were added to the list of FTOs.
  FTOs are legally defined under Section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, which states the group must be: a foreign 
organization; engage in terrorist activity or retain the capacity and 
intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and participating 
in terrorist activity or terrorism that threatens the security of the 
United States or its citizens.
  United States' National security encompasses national defense, 
foreign relations, or economic interest.
  The unauthorized intelligence disclosures last year impacted U.S. 
national security.
  The intelligence breach came as a result of a government contractor 
making public sensitive information is still resonating both 
internationally and within the United States, where an important debate 
on privacy and civil liberties is still ongoing.
  But also around the world the consequences of the unauthorized 
release of international activity by intelligence agencies is still 
playing out.
  The timing of the release of information on the non-U.S. activity of 
our intelligence agencies caused tremendous tension in our relations 
with allies at a time when the United States was working to form a 
global response to the use of chemical weapons against civilians in 
Syria.
  In addition to frustrating our efforts to form a strong global 
response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria it also caused 
economic harm to U.S. companies internationally.
  Congress is not able to fully investigate the circumstances that 
resulted in last year's intelligence breach because the person with 
many of the answers to questions many of us have is now living in 
Russia.
  However, we can look prospectively on how the work of the 
Intelligence Community under the direction of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence should fill positions that require 
security clearances.
  The intelligence work by contractors and Federal employees is 
critical to the protection of the United States and our interest both 
domestically and around the world. We should approach the work of the 
intelligence community as we do when considering the work of the 
Department of Defense.
  The work that our Intelligence professionals perform is critical, and 
a defense in depth approach is necessary to assure that no matter the 
challenge or the circumstances there will be well trained professionals 
in place to do what must be done to defend and protect the nation.
  The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2013 Report on 
Security Clearance Determinations provides information on the number of 
persons with security clearance levels of Confidential, Secret, or Top 
Secret and had access to classified information as well as those who 
were favorably adjudicated but did not have access to classified 
information.
  I would like to acknowledge the work of the Special Security 
Directorate (SSD) of the Office of the National Counterintelligence 
Executive for compiling and processing the data for this report.
  The 2013 Report on Security Clearance Determinations states that by 
October 1, 2013 the Nation had 3,738,026 Federal agency employees 
working for the: Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
Scattered Castles; Department of Defense; Joint Personnel Adjudication 
System; Office of Personnel Management; and Central Verification System 
(CVS).
  In addition to surveying these agencies a special data call was made 
to the seven intelligence community agencies with delegated authority 
to conduct investigations or adjudications to fulfill specific 
reporting requirements directed by the fiscal year 2010 Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. These agencies were the: 
Central Intelligence Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; 
National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; and 
Department of State.
  In 2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or 
Top Secret security clearance totaled 5,150,379 individuals--of this 
number 3,738,026 were government agency personnel, 1,056,309 were 
contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.
  Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security 
clearances approved--152,490 were government agency employees and 
131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.
  Congress must have the ability to make decisions regarding how 
intelligence agencies fill positions that require security clearances 
because it has implications for the appropriations process.
  The Information Security Oversight Office of the National Archives 
2012 Report to the President focuses on the classification practices of 
intelligence agencies.
  The report addresses the power of ``original classification 
authorities'' also called ``original classifiers,'' which are 
individuals designated with Top Secret original classification 
authority to classify information.
  Only original classifiers are authorized to determine what 
information, if disclosed without authorization, would be expected to 
cause damage to national security.
  The original classification authority process comes before all other 
aspects of the security classification system. In 2004, the total 
number of original classifications was 351,150 and in 2012 the number 
was 74,477.
  The cost of government security classification in 2005 was $7.66 
billion and in 2011 the total was $11.36 billion.
  The amount expended in 2011 included: 5.65 billion for protection 
maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and 
planning; 502.51 million for professional education, training and 
awareness; 352.4 million for classification management; and 52.76 
million for declassification.
  These costs cited are not all encompassing, but were generated by 41 
executive branch agencies including the Department of Defense.
  The funds expended do not include activity by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of the 
Director for National Intelligence, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the 
National Security Agency.
  The focus on training is critical in the work of the Intelligence 
Community and it is important that this is a high priority for the 
agencies represented in the National Archive report.

[[Page H5039]]

  The work by the Intelligence Community to address classification in 
an evenhanded way can help create and maintain a firm basis for 
classification of information that is sustainable can go a long way in 
addressing questions regarding what secrets are critical to our 
nation's national security and what the public has a right to know.
  I thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their hard 
work in bringing this bill before the full House for consideration. I 
ask that members of the Congress vote in favor of this bipartisan en 
bloc amendment to H.R. 4681.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I 
have remaining?
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland has 17 minutes remaining.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Vermont, Mr. Peter Welch, my good friend and a great Member of 
Congress.
  Mr. WELCH. I thank the gentleman. I thank you for your good work.
  Mr. Rogers, I thank you for your good work, and we are going to miss 
you. Your leadership on the Intel Committee has been of great benefit 
to this institution. Thank you.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been working with a number of my colleagues, 
particularly with Cynthia Lummis of Wyoming, on a question that we 
think is quite important to the security status of our country, and 
that is more transparency in the budget.
  This is debated because, by definition, if it is intelligence 
activity, it is ``secret,'' but on the other hand, the whole point of 
having transparency in budgets is so the rules of accountability apply 
across the board. We have 16 different intelligence-gathering agencies, 
and in all cases, the topline budget is absolutely secret.
  The 9/11 Commission that was a bipartisan commission of respected 
national security credentialed people--Lee Hamilton and the Governor of 
New Jersey, Governor Kean--recommended that this topline number in the 
intelligence agency budgets be transparent.
  Why? So that there is a basis for taxpayers and for all of us to 
start to evaluate whether we are getting our money's worth, whether 
there is duplication in efforts, whether one agency is stumbling into 
another, whether there is coordination, whether there is cooperation.
  The same reasons that we would have the food stamp budget subject to 
rigid review and accountability applies as well to our security. In 
fact, it is enormously important that this country be getting its 
money's worth.
  The principle of transparency would not in any way compromise, in the 
view of many respected intelligence leaders like Lee Hamilton, the 
intelligence gathering and the effort and responsibility to keep us 
secure.
  So I was disappointed that we were not allowed to have an amendment 
on that bill, but I do appreciate the willingness of the ranking member 
to work with me and also of the chairman to listen to many of us in 
this body who would like that opportunity to make the case that Lee 
Hamilton made for transparency.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I thank the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Welch) for his diligent work 
in the area of transparency on behalf of the American people.
  As we have seen in this last year, trust in the intelligence 
community by the citizens it serves is incredibly important.
  As the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, we take 
seriously the responsibility to provide to the public as much 
information as possible while protecting sensitive sources and methods.
  When classification permits, the budget of the intelligence community 
has been released. In other cases, the American people rely on our 
committee and on all of their Representatives, like Representative 
Welch, to review the budget of the intelligence community on their 
behalf.
  I look forward to working with Representative Welch to continue to 
find ways to increase the trust of the American people in the 
intelligence community as it relates to transparency.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time for the purpose of closing.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  For the sake of rigorous oversight and accountability over all U.S. 
intelligence agencies and all U.S. intelligence activities, I urge my 
colleagues to vote for this important, bipartisan bill. I also urge my 
colleagues to support this bill for the sake of our brave intelligence 
professionals, who, like our military, work day and night, often in the 
most austere of places, to keep us safe and our allies safe; and for 
the sake of all of us--not just in America, but around the world--who 
benefit from the work of our intelligence agencies, I urge my 
colleagues to vote for this bill. It is a solid bill that we should be 
proud to support.
  Finally, once again, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your 
leadership, our relationship, and your commitment to the people of the 
United States of America. You served in the military, and you served in 
the FBI. We are going to miss you.
  Thank you also to every member on the Intelligence Committee. We have 
had many debates, many hard negotiations, and many tough struggles, but 
at all times, whether or not one member or another agreed or disagreed, 
we respected the fact that another member had another point of view, 
and then we resolved those issues.
  Each of us has worked even harder to find common ground on behalf of 
the American people to protect us from terrorist attacks and other 
issues that are out there that relate to national security.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of 
my time.
  I thank the ranking member for his work.
  Let the American public understand what happens. There are so many 
aspersions thrown at the members who serve on the Intelligence and on 
other committees who must do their work in secret, and certainly, the 
staff fights through and works through all of these difficult issues.
  There is plenty of oversight happening. It might not be on the front 
page of the newspaper. We call that ``disaster day'' in the business of 
trying to protect American secrets.
  When the ranking member and I first took over the committee, we 
reinstituted all of the regular oversight patterns: counterintelligence 
matters, covert action matters, regular counterterrorism strategy 
updates, and reviews.
  Again, every piece of that strategy that is implemented is reviewed 
by the committee, and it is certainly read and reviewed by me, 
personally, and, I know, by others on the committee as well.
  There is a tremendous amount of effort and energy applied to trying 
to get this right, to making sure that two things happen--one, that 
they are comporting with the law. They want to do that despite what you 
might read in the newspaper. They want to do that.
  They, too, have taken an oath to the Constitution of the United 
States of America, and they believe that following the law is the right 
way to do it. They want Congress' support for what they are doing, and 
they want the American people's support for what they are doing--
because it is so difficult and so hard to come to the right conclusions 
in a very murky and dangerous world--so that oversight does happen. It 
happens regularly.
  I want to thank all of the members of both parties for rigorous 
debate behind those closed doors. There is no lovefest when those doors 
close and a ``let's just do what we have to do to get to tomorrow.''

  The debates are real and vigorous, and we have different philosophies 
on how we move forward on some of these intelligence matters and 
collection matters and on how we balance privacy and civil liberties 
and security. All of that happens.
  Sometimes, we find members who just don't agree, but what we do in 
that space is understand and try to get and make sure that we have all 
of the resources and all of the policies and all of the authorities our 
intelligence services need to be impactful to save the

[[Page H5040]]

United States and to, yes, maybe even save 300 girls or to, yes, maybe 
even allow for girls in a place like Afghanistan to get an education. 
That part needs to be right, too.
  Nuclear proliferation--we have a cyber world that is the single 
largest national security threat to this country that we are not 
prepared to handle, and there are a lot of sidebar discussions that 
have nothing to do with the fact that nation-states are stealing our 
intellectual property--nation-states like China.
  You have, according to public reports, countries like Iran that are 
probing financial institutions right here in the United States and are 
trying to do destructive attacks.
  According to public reports, North Korea even attacked a bank in 
South Korea some months ago. You see China rising up in its influence 
in the South and East China Seas. You see potential conflict between 
Vietnam, Japan, and China.
  These are serious, serious matters. Because they are so far away, I 
think sometimes we forget, and we come to talk about things that are 
important--in how we move forward in the intelligence business and how 
we empower them to do the work of the United States.
  At the same time, this recent year of, I think, aspersion to the men 
and women who serve in these capacities is disheartening. This isn't a 
new thing. George Washington used the intelligence business to try to 
win the war against the British.
  Ben Franklin is credited with the first covert action programs by 
trying to influence British and Tory opinion during the first years of 
the war. John Jay created the first counterintelligence unit to try to 
fight back against what the British were doing in spying against the 
Americans.
  Jefferson and Madison had secret funds that they took, by the way, 
which we would no longer approve or support today--secret funds--in 
order to do covert action-type activities in the earliest days of the 
founding of our Nation.
  We need to stop for a minute and think about what is at stake. I 
think the future and safety and security of the United States is at 
stake, and we have somehow, over the last year, decided that our 
intelligence services are the problem.
  No. I have bad news. Actually, I have good news: they are part of the 
solution. If you don't want troops engaged in many countries, then you 
want to support your intelligence services, and you want them to be the 
best in the world.
  If you don't want to have to engage in the withdrawal of certain 
diplomatic and economic and trade arrangements around the world, then 
you want the best intelligence services that you can possibly get. Here 
is the good news: we have them. We just need to stand behind them.
  When they come home from doing hard things, when they lose their 
colleagues--and they do--they are not looking for a ticker tape parade 
in New York City. They know that is not going to happen.
  What they do want to understand is that, when they turn around, the 
American population and the American citizens are standing with them. 
Even though Americans can't give them the ``attaboy,'' we can. Those of 
us who do this work, we can.
  So I will tell them, on this floor today, on behalf of a grateful 
Nation, thank you for your service. Stop reading the newspaper. Keep 
doing your job. It will mean the difference of lives saved around the 
world.
  We have so many challenges, and I only say this--and I wasn't 
planning to say this, Mr. Chairman--that someone came on this floor and 
said: I don't mind the intelligence people, but I don't like their 
culture.

                              {time}  1030

  These are people who are willing to risk their lives for that flag 
that stands in the well of this House. They were willing to give their 
lives for the Constitution they stuck up their hand to support.
  Is that the culture we don't like and appreciate anymore in America?
  There have been some bumps in the road, but we ought to applaud these 
people. We ought to sing their praises. We ought to thank them every 
single day that they are away from their families, in dangerous places, 
and risking their lives to collect that one piece of information that 
maybe saves the girls of Boko Haram or maybe saves the girls who get on 
their bus today in the United States of America.
  I hope we shake ourselves out of this notion that we can just 
continue to beat them and disparage them and call them everything but 
great patriots and expect them to get up every day and do the job that 
they need to do to protect this country.
  This bill, I think, actually does that. We give them clear guidance. 
We invest in technology that we need to make sure that we keep up with 
our adversaries around the world who, by the way, are trying to beat us 
and take advantage of us--places like space, places like cyber, places 
like HUMINT intelligence, and what they believe is a perceived weakness 
to deal with a rising tide of terrorists who want to kill Americans 
here at home.
  This is an important bill because it is bipartisan. A lot of these 
issues that are talked about have been fought in the bowels of this 
House, basically. And we worked through it and we have come to an 
agreement that this is the right direction, in a bipartisan way, that 
will serve to protect the United States.
  So, Mr. Chair, I urge all Members to strongly support this bill. Give 
them the tools, give Congress the oversight, and give America the 
ability to sleep well at night, knowing that very brave men and women 
will do the work that so many would not be interested in doing.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I rise today in support of H.R. 4681, the 
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015''.
  As Chairman of the Committee on Homeland on Security, I understand 
the importance of this legislation. H.R. 4681 enhances the national 
security of the United States and is a vital tool for Congressional 
oversight of the activities of the Intelligence Community. It is 
critical that our intelligence agencies have all of the resources and 
authorities they need to accomplish the important responsibility of 
keeping Americans safe. I commend Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger for their tireless work on these issues and the 
exhaustive process of drafting a bipartisan authorization.
  H.R. 4681 authorizes Federal intelligence, intelligence-related, and 
information sharing activities, including those of the Department of 
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). I&A is 
an element of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as well as the 
Intelligence Community, and its activities support missions in both. As 
such, I&A occupies the unique role as a central conduit for analysis 
and information sharing among stakeholders which include the 
intelligence agencies, components of the DHS, other Federal partners, 
and State, local, tribal, and territorial entities. In this role, I&A 
supports and collaborates with State and local partners through the 
National Network of Fusion Centers, and provides analytic support to 
the DHS components.
  Consistent with our jurisdiction, the Committee on Homeland Security 
has conducted extensive oversight over these programs and missions, to 
include the July 2013 release of a report on ``The National Network of 
Fusion Centers.''
  While I support the overall purpose of the bill, I am concerned that 
the effort includes provisions that seek to limit the support I&A 
provides DHS, its component agencies, and to the 78 fusion centers 
around the nation. I believe this risks depriving the Homeland Security 
Enterprise of valuable information and expertise at a time when we know 
the threats to the homeland persist.
  As the bill moves through the process and negotiations begin with the 
Senate, I will continue to work to ensure that these issues are 
addressed and that State and local law enforcement, and other first 
responders, receive the support they need from the Department of 
Homeland Security.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chair, I rise in support of my amendment to the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015.
  Under Section 307 of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the 
Intelligence Community, along with the respective Chief Information 
Officers of each element that comprise the IC, are required to conduct 
an inventory of all existing software licenses--both used and unused--
and then assess the actions that could be carried out to achieve the 
greatest possible economies of scale and cost-savings in software 
procurement and usage.

[[Page H5041]]

  My commonsense amendment simply ensures that when those assessments 
are carried out, the CIOs will examine leading software license 
management practices.
  By adopting Connolly #12, Congress will ensure that when the IC 
examines potential actions to enhance software license management and 
save taxpayer dollars, four leading practices will be included in the 
analysis.
  The management practices contained in my amendment are derived from a 
recent report issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on 
May 22, 2014, entitled, ``Federal Software Licenses: Better Management 
Needed to Achieve Significant Savings Government-Wide.''
  GAO consulted with software license management experts from the 
public and private sectors, prior to concluding that Federal agencies 
are generally not following best practices that could achieve 
significant cost-savings.
  These best practices include increasing the centralization of the 
management of software licenses; increasing the regular tracking and 
maintaining of comprehensive inventories of software licenses using 
automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics; analyzing software 
license data to inform investment decisions; and providing appropriate 
personnel with sufficient software licenses management training.
  I urge all my colleagues to support my straightforward amendment that 
will enhance the IC's ability to spend taxpayer dollars in the most 
effective and efficient manner possible when procuring and managing 
software licenses.
  The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it 
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee Print 113-45. That 
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H. R. 4681

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 
     2015''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

                      Subtitle A--General Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Specific authorization of funding for High Performance 
              Computing Center 2.
Sec. 304. Clarification of exemption from Freedom of Information Act of 
              identities of employees submitting complaints to the 
              Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 305. Functional managers for the intelligence community.
Sec. 306. Annual assessment of intelligence community performance by 
              function.
Sec. 307. Software licensing.
Sec. 308. Plans to respond to unauthorized public disclosures of covert 
              actions.
Sec. 309. Auditability.
Sec. 310. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 311. Official representation items in support of the Coast Guard 
              Attachee Program.
Sec. 312. Declassification review of certain items collected during the 
              mission that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011.
Sec. 313. Merger of the Foreign Counterintelligence Program and the 
              General Defense Intelligence Program.

                         Subtitle B--Reporting

Sec. 321. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.
Sec. 322. Submittal to Congress by heads of elements of intelligence 
              community of plans for orderly shutdown in event of 
              absence of appropriations.
Sec. 323. Reports on chemical weapons in Syria.
Sec. 324. Reports to the intelligence community on penetrations of 
              networks and information systems of certain contractors.
Sec. 325. Report on electronic waste.
Sec. 326. Promoting STEM education to meet the future workforce needs 
              of the intelligence community.
Sec. 327. Assessment of security of domestic oil refineries and related 
              rail transportation infrastructure.
Sec. 328. Repeal or modification of certain reporting requirements.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 401. Gifts, devises, and bequests to the Central Intelligence 
              Agency.
Sec. 402. Inspector General of the National Security Agency.

                   TITLE V--SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM

Sec. 501. Continuous evaluation and sharing of derogatory information 
              regarding personnel with access to classified 
              information.
Sec. 502. Requirements for intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 503. Technology improvements to security clearance processing.
Sec. 504. Report on reciprocity of security clearances.
Sec. 505. Improving the periodic reinvestigation process.
Sec. 506. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.

                     TITLE VI--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

Sec. 601. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
              of 1949.
Sec. 602. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 
              relating to the past elimination of certain positions.
Sec. 603. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Authorization Act 
              for Fiscal Year 2013.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     years 2014 and 2015 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--
       (1) Fiscal year 2014.--The amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2014, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the 
     elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 
     101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations for fiscal year 2014 prepared to accompany the 
     bill H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.
       (2) Fiscal year 2015.--The amounts authorized to be 
     appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2015, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the 
     elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 
     101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations for fiscal year 2015 prepared to accompany the 
     bill H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability.--The classified Schedules of 
     Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made 
     available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedules of Authorizations, or of appropriate 
     portions of the Schedules, within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
     disclose the classified Schedules of Authorizations or any 
     portion of such Schedules except--
       (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
     Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 
     3306(a));
       (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
       (C) as otherwise required by law.

[[Page H5042]]

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel 
     in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2014 or 
     2015 by the classified Schedules of Authorizations referred 
     to in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under the Schedule for such 
     element during the fiscal year covered by such Schedule.
       (b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern, 
     for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment 
     under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a), 
     including any exemption from such personnel levels, of 
     employment or assignment in--
       (1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
       (2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
       (3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) Fiscal year 2014.--There is authorized to be 
     appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2014 the sum of $528,229,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2015.
       (2) Fiscal year 2015.--There is authorized to be 
     appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2015 the sum of $505,476,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 855 positions as of 
     September 30, 2014, and 777 positions as of September 30, 
     2015. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent 
     employees of the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the 
     United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--
       (A) Fiscal year 2014.--In addition to amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be 
     appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal 
     year 2014 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
     102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2015.
       (B) Fiscal year 2015.--In addition to amounts authorized to 
     be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be 
     appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal 
     year 2014 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
     102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--
       (A) Fiscal year 2014.--In addition to the personnel 
     authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 2014, there 
     are authorized such additional personnel for the Community 
     Management Account as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
     102(a).
       (B) Fiscal year 2015.--In addition to the personnel 
     authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 2015, there 
     are authorized such additional personnel for the Community 
     Management Account as of that date as are specified in the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
     102(a).
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund 
     $514,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014 and 2015.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
                      Subtitle A--General Matters

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR HIGH 
                   PERFORMANCE COMPUTING CENTER 2.

       Funds appropriated for the construction of the High 
     Performance Computing Center 2 (HPCC 2), as described in the 
     table entitled Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) in the 
     classified annex to accompany the Consolidated and Further 
     Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (Public Law 113-6; 127 
     Stat. 198), in excess of the amount specified for such 
     activity in the tables in the classified annex prepared to 
     accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2013 (Public Law 112-277; 126 Stat. 2468) shall be 
     specifically authorized by Congress for the purposes of 
     section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3094).

     SEC. 304. CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM FREEDOM OF 
                   INFORMATION ACT OF IDENTITIES OF EMPLOYEES 
                   SUBMITTING COMPLAINTS TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 
                   OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 103H(g)(3)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)) is amended by striking 
     ``undertaken;'' and inserting ``undertaken, and this 
     provision shall qualify as a withholding statute pursuant to 
     subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of title 5, United States 
     Code (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information Act');''.

     SEC. 305. FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Functional Managers Authorized.--Title I of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 103I the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 103J. FUNCTIONAL MANAGERS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY.

       ``(a) Functional Managers Authorized.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence may establish within the intelligence 
     community one or more positions of manager of an intelligence 
     function. Any position so established may be known as the 
     `Functional Manager' of the intelligence function concerned.
       ``(b) Personnel.--The Director shall designate individuals 
     to serve as manager of intelligence functions established 
     under subsection (a) from among officers and employees of 
     elements of the intelligence community.
       ``(c) Duties.--Each manager of an intelligence function 
     established under subsection (a) shall have the duties as 
     follows:
       ``(1) To act as principal advisor to the Director on the 
     intelligence function.
       ``(2) To carry out such other responsibilities with respect 
     to the intelligence function as the Director may specify for 
     purposes of this section.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103I 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 103J. Functional managers for the intelligence community.''.

     SEC. 306. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   PERFORMANCE BY FUNCTION.

       (a) Annual Assessments Required.--Title V of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by 
     inserting after section 506I the following new section:

     ``SEC. 506J. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   PERFORMANCE BY FUNCTION.

       ``(a) In General.--Not later than April 1, 2016, and each 
     year thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, 
     in consultation with the Functional Managers, submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report on covered 
     intelligence functions during the preceding year.
       ``(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
     include for each covered intelligence function for the year 
     covered by such report the following:
       ``(1) An identification of the capabilities, programs, and 
     activities of such intelligence function, regardless of the 
     element of the intelligence community that carried out such 
     capabilities, programs, and activities.
       ``(2) A description of the investment and allocation of 
     resources for such intelligence function, including an 
     analysis of the allocation of resources within the context of 
     the National Intelligence Strategy, priorities for recipients 
     of resources, and areas of risk.
       ``(3) A description and assessment of the performance of 
     such intelligence function.
       ``(4) An identification of any issues related to the 
     application of technical interoperability standards in the 
     capabilities, programs, and activities of such intelligence 
     function.
       ``(5) An identification of the operational overlap or need 
     for de-confliction, if any, within such intelligence 
     function.
       ``(6) A description of any efforts to integrate such 
     intelligence function with other intelligence disciplines as 
     part of an integrated intelligence enterprise.
       ``(7) A description of any efforts to establish consistency 
     in tradecraft and training within such intelligence function.
       ``(8) A description and assessment of developments in 
     technology that bear on the future of such intelligence 
     function.
       ``(9) Such other matters relating to such intelligence 
     function as the Director may specify for purposes of this 
     section.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `covered intelligence functions' means each 
     intelligence function for which a Functional Manager has been 
     established under section 103J during the year covered by a 
     report under this section.
       ``(2) The term `Functional Manager' means the manager of an 
     intelligence function established under section 103J.''.

[[Page H5043]]

       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506I 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 506J. Annual assessment of intelligence community performance by 
              function.''.

     SEC. 307. SOFTWARE LICENSING.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 108 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 109. SOFTWARE LICENSING.

       ``(a) Requirement for Inventories of Software Licenses.--
     The chief information officer of each element of the 
     intelligence community, in consultation with the Chief 
     Information Officer of the Intelligence Community, shall 
     biennially--
       ``(1) conduct an inventory of all existing software 
     licenses of such element, including utilized and unutilized 
     licenses;
       ``(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by such 
     element to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale 
     and associated cost savings in software procurement and 
     usage; and
       ``(3) submit to the Chief Information Officer of the 
     Intelligence Community each inventory required by paragraph 
     (1) and each assessment required by paragraph (2).
       ``(b) Inventories by the Chief Information Officer of the 
     Intelligence Community.--The Chief Information Officer of the 
     Intelligence Community, based on the inventories and 
     assessments required by subsection (a), shall biennially--
       ``(1) compile an inventory of all existing software 
     licenses of the intelligence community, including utilized 
     and unutilized licenses; and
       ``(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by the 
     intelligence community to achieve the greatest possible 
     economies of scale and associated cost savings in software 
     procurement and usage.
       ``(c) Reports to Congress.--The Chief Information Officer 
     of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a copy of each 
     inventory compiled under subsection (b)(1).''.
       (b) Initial Inventory.--
       (1) Intelligence community elements.--
       (A) Date.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the chief information officer of each 
     element of the intelligence community shall complete the 
     initial inventory, assessment, and submission required under 
     section 109(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added 
     by subsection (a) of this section.
       (B) Basis.--The initial inventory conducted for each 
     element of the intelligence community under section 109(a)(1) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection 
     (a) of this section, shall be based on the inventory of 
     software licenses conducted pursuant to section 305 of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public 
     Law 112-277; 126 Stat. 2472) for such element.
       (2) Chief information officer of the intelligence 
     community.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Chief Information Officer of the 
     Intelligence Community shall complete the initial compilation 
     and assessment required under section 109(b) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
       (c) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking the second item relating to section 104 
     (relating to Annual national security strategy report); and
       (2) by inserting after the item relating to section 108 the 
     following new item:

       ``Sec. 109. Software licensing.''.

     SEC. 308. PLANS TO RESPOND TO UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DISCLOSURES 
                   OF COVERT ACTIONS.

       Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     3093) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(h) For each type of activity undertaken as part of a 
     covert action, the President shall establish in writing a 
     plan to respond to the unauthorized public disclosure of that 
     type of activity.''.

     SEC. 309. AUDITABILITY.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 509. AUDITABILITY OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       ``(a) Requirement for Annual Audits.--The head of each 
     covered entity shall ensure that there is a full financial 
     audit of such covered entity each year beginning with fiscal 
     year 2014. Such audits may be conducted by an internal or 
     external independent accounting or auditing organization.
       ``(b) Requirement for Unqualified Opinion.--Beginning as 
     early as practicable, but in no event later than the audit 
     required under subsection (a) for fiscal year 2016, the head 
     of each covered entity shall take all reasonable steps 
     necessary to ensure that each audit required under subsection 
     (a) contains an unqualified opinion on the financial 
     statements of such covered entity for the fiscal year covered 
     by such audit.
       ``(c) Reports to Congress.--The chief financial officer of 
     each covered entity shall provide to the congressional 
     intelligence committees an annual audit report from an 
     accounting or auditing organization on each audit of the 
     covered entity conducted pursuant to subsection (a).
       ``(d) Covered Entity Defined.--In this section, the term 
     `covered entity' means the Office of the Director of National 
     Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-
     Intelligence Agency.''.
       (b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 508 
     the following new item:

``Sec. 509. Auditability of certain elements of the intelligence 
              community.''.

     SEC. 310. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.

       Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act 
     of 2000 (Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended 
     by striking ``2014.'' and inserting ``2018.''.

     SEC. 311. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION ITEMS IN SUPPORT OF THE 
                   COAST GUARD ATTACHEE PROGRAM.

       Notwithstanding any other limitation on the amount of funds 
     that may be used for official representation items, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security may use funds made available 
     to the Secretary through the National Intelligence Program 
     for necessary expenses for intelligence analysis and 
     operations coordination activities for official 
     representation items in support of the Coast Guard Attachee 
     Program.

     SEC. 312. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF CERTAIN ITEMS COLLECTED 
                   DURING THE MISSION THAT KILLED OSAMA BIN LADEN 
                   ON MAY 1, 2011.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
       (1) in the manner described in the classified annex to this 
     Act--
       (A) complete a declassification review of documents 
     collected in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during the mission that 
     killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011; and
       (B) make publicly available any information declassified as 
     a result of the declassification review required under 
     paragraph (1); and
       (2) report to the congressional intelligence committees--
       (A) the results of the declassification review required 
     under paragraph (1); and
       (B) a justification for not declassifying any information 
     required to be included in such declassification review that 
     remains classified.

     SEC. 313. MERGER OF THE FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 
                   AND THE GENERAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of 
     National Intelligence shall carry out the merger of the 
     Foreign Counterintelligence Program into the General Defense 
     Intelligence Program as directed in the classified annex to 
     this Act. The merger shall go into effect no earlier than 30 
     days after written notification of the merger is provided to 
     the congressional intelligence committees.
                         Subtitle B--Reporting

     SEC. 321. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE 
                   ORDER.

       (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 309, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 510. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE 
                   ORDER.

       ``(a) Annual Reports Required.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report on violations of law or 
     executive order by personnel of an element of the 
     intelligence community that were identified during the 
     previous calendar year.
       ``(b) Elements.--Each report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include a description of, and any action taken in 
     response to, any violation of law or executive order 
     (including Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) by 
     personnel of an element of the intelligence community in the 
     course of such employment that, during the previous calendar 
     year, was determined by the director, head, general counsel, 
     or inspector general of any element of the intelligence 
     community to have occurred.''.
       (b) Initial Report.--The first report required under 
     section 510 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
     subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of sections in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     amended by section 309 of this Act, is further amended by 
     adding after the section relating to section 509, as added by 
     such section 309, the following new item:

``Sec. 510. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.''.

     SEC. 322. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS BY HEADS OF ELEMENTS OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF PLANS FOR ORDERLY 
                   SHUTDOWN IN EVENT OF ABSENCE OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Whenever the head of an applicable agency 
     submits a plan to the Director of the Office of Management 
     and Budget in accordance with section 124 of Office of 
     Management and Budget Circular A-11, pertaining to agency 
     operations in the absence of appropriations, or any successor 
     circular of the Office that requires the head of an 
     applicable agency to submit to the Director a plan for an 
     orderly shutdown in the event of the absence of 
     appropriations, such head shall submit a copy of such plan to 
     the following:
       (1) The congressional intelligence committees.
       (2) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate.
       (3) The Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

[[Page H5044]]

       (4) In the case of a plan for an element of the 
     intelligence community that is within the Department of 
     Defense, to--
       (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
       (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (b) Head of an Applicable Agency Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``head of an applicable agency'' includes the 
     following:
       (1) The Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) Each head of each element of the intelligence community 
     that is within the Department of Defense.

     SEC. 323. REPORTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the Syrian 
     chemical weapons program.
       (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) 
     shall include the following elements:
       (1) A comprehensive assessment of chemical weapon 
     stockpiles in Syria, including names, types, and quantities 
     of chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location 
     and form of storage, production, and research and development 
     facilities.
       (2) A listing of key personnel associated with the Syrian 
     chemical weapons program.
       (3) An assessment of undeclared chemical weapons 
     stockpiles, munitions, and facilities.
       (4) An assessment of how these stockpiles, precursors, and 
     delivery systems were obtained.
       (5) A description of key intelligence gaps related to the 
     Syrian chemical weapons program.
       (6) An assessment of any denial and deception efforts on 
     the part of the Syrian regime related to its chemical weapons 
     program.
       (c) Progress Reports.--Every 90 days until the date that is 
     18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
     progress report providing any material updates to the report 
     required under subsection (a).

     SEC. 324. REPORTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON 
                   PENETRATIONS OF NETWORKS AND INFORMATION 
                   SYSTEMS OF CERTAIN CONTRACTORS.

       (a) Procedures for Reporting Penetrations.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall establish procedures that require 
     each cleared intelligence contractor to report to an element 
     of the intelligence community designated by the Director for 
     purposes of such procedures when a network or information 
     system of such contractor that meets the criteria established 
     pursuant to subsection (b) is successfully penetrated.
       (b) Networks and Information Systems Subject to 
     Reporting.--The Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
     consultation with appropriate officials, establish criteria 
     for covered networks to be subject to the procedures for 
     reporting system penetrations under subsection (a).
       (c) Procedure Requirements.--
       (1) Rapid reporting.--The procedures established pursuant 
     to subsection (a) shall require each cleared intelligence 
     contractor to rapidly report to an element of the 
     intelligence community designated pursuant to subsection (a) 
     of each successful penetration of the network or information 
     systems of such contractor that meet the criteria established 
     pursuant to subsection (b). Each such report shall include 
     the following:
       (A) A description of the technique or method used in such 
     penetration.
       (B) A sample of the malicious software, if discovered and 
     isolated by the contractor, involved in such penetration.
       (C) A summary of information created by or for such element 
     in connection with any program of such element that has been 
     potentially compromised due to such penetration.
       (2) Access to equipment and information by intelligence 
     community personnel.--The procedures established pursuant to 
     subsection (a) shall--
       (A) include mechanisms for intelligence community personnel 
     to, upon request, obtain access to equipment or information 
     of a cleared intelligence contractor necessary to conduct 
     forensic analysis in addition to any analysis conducted by 
     such contractor;
       (B) provide that a cleared intelligence contractor is only 
     required to provide access to equipment or information as 
     described in subparagraph (A) to determine whether 
     information created by or for an element of the intelligence 
     community in connection with any intelligence community 
     program was successfully exfiltrated from a network or 
     information system of such contractor and, if so, what 
     information was exfiltrated; and
       (C) provide for the reasonable protection of trade secrets, 
     commercial or financial information, and information that can 
     be used to identify a specific person (other than the name of 
     the suspected perpetrator of the penetration).
       (3) Limitation on dissemination of certain information.--
     The procedures established pursuant to subsection (a) shall 
     prohibit the dissemination outside the intelligence community 
     of information obtained or derived through such procedures 
     that is not created by or for the intelligence community 
     except--
       (A) with the approval of the contractor providing such 
     information;
       (B) to the congressional intelligence committees or the 
     Subcommittees on Defense of the Committees on Appropriations 
     of the House of Representatives and the Senate for such 
     committees and such Subcommittees to perform oversight; or
       (C) to law enforcement agencies to investigate a 
     penetration reported under this section.
       (d) Issuance of Procedures and Establishment of Criteria.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall establish the procedures required under 
     subsection (a) and the criteria required under subsection 
     (b).
       (2) Applicability date.--The requirements of this section 
     shall apply on the date on which the Director of National 
     Intelligence establishes the procedures required under this 
     section.
       (e) Coordination With the Secretary of Defense To Prevent 
     Duplicate Reporting.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall establish 
     procedures to permit a contractor that is a cleared 
     intelligence contractor and a cleared defense contractor 
     under section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 10 U.S.C. 2224 
     note) to submit a single report that satisfies the 
     requirements of this section and such section 941 for an 
     incident of penetration of network or information system.
       (f) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Cleared intelligence contractor.--The term ``cleared 
     intelligence contractor'' means a private entity granted 
     clearance by the Director of National Intelligence or the 
     head of an element of the intelligence community to access, 
     receive, or store classified information for the purpose of 
     bidding for a contract or conducting activities in support of 
     any program of an element of the intelligence community.
       (2) Covered network.--The term ``covered network'' means a 
     network or information system of a cleared intelligence 
     contractor that contains or processes information created by 
     or for an element of the intelligence community with respect 
     to which such contractor is required to apply enhanced 
     protection.
       (g) Savings Clauses.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed to alter or limit any otherwise authorized access 
     by government personnel to networks or information systems 
     owned or operated by a contractor that processes or stores 
     government data.

     SEC. 325. REPORT ON ELECTRONIC WASTE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report on the extent to which the intelligence community has 
     implemented the recommendations of the Inspector General of 
     the Intelligence Community contained in the report entitled 
     ``Study of Intelligence Community Electronic Waste Disposal 
     Practices'' issued in May 2013. Such report shall include an 
     assessment of the extent to which the policies, standards, 
     and guidelines of the intelligence community governing the 
     proper disposal of electronic waste are applicable to covered 
     commercial electronic waste that may contain classified 
     information.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Covered commercial electronic waste.--The term 
     ``covered commercial electronic waste'' means electronic 
     waste of a commercial entity that contracts with an element 
     of the intelligence community.
       (2) Electronic waste.--The term ``electronic waste'' 
     includes any obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic 
     device, including a television, copier, facsimile machine, 
     tablet, telephone, computer, computer monitor, laptop, 
     printer, scanner, and associated electrical wiring.

     SEC. 326. PROMOTING STEM EDUCATION TO MEET THE FUTURE 
                   WORKFORCE NEEDS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the Secretary of Education and the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report describing the 
     anticipated hiring needs of the intelligence community in the 
     fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, 
     including cybersecurity and computer literacy. The report 
     shall--
       (1) describe the extent to which competitions, challenges, 
     or internships at elements of the intelligence community that 
     do not involve access to classified information may be 
     utilized to promote education in the fields of science, 
     technology, engineering, and mathematics, including 
     cybersecurity and computer literacy, within high schools or 
     institutions of higher education in the United States;
       (2) include cost estimates for carrying out such 
     competitions, challenges, or internships; and
       (3) include strategies for conducting expedited security 
     clearance investigations and adjudications for students at 
     institutions of higher education for purposes of offering 
     internships at elements of the intelligence community.
       (b) Consideration of Existing Programs.--In developing the 
     report under subsection (a), the Director shall take into 
     consideration existing programs of the intelligence 
     community, including the education programs of the National 
     Security Agency and the Information Assurance Scholarship 
     Program of the Department of Defense, as appropriate.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) High school.--The term ``high school'' mean a school 
     that awards a secondary school diploma.
       (2) Institution of higher education.--The term 
     ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 101(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
     (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)).
       (3) Secondary school.--The term ``secondary school'' has 
     the meaning given the term in section 9101 of the Elementary 
     and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 7801).

[[Page H5045]]

     SEC. 327. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OF DOMESTIC OIL REFINERIES 
                   AND RELATED RAIL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE.

       (a) Assessment.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
     for Intelligence and Analysis shall conduct an intelligence 
     assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and 
     related rail transportation infrastructure.
       (b) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland 
     Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to the 
     congressional intelligence committees--
       (1) the results of the assessment required under subsection 
     (a); and
       (2) any recommendations with respect to intelligence 
     sharing or intelligence collection to improve the security of 
     domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation 
     infrastructure to protect the communities surrounding such 
     refineries or such infrastructure from potential harm that 
     the Under Secretary considers appropriate.

     SEC. 328. REPEAL OR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.--
       (1) Threat of attack on the united states using weapons of 
     mass destruction.--Section 114 of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3050) is amended by striking subsection 
     (b).
       (2) Treaty on conventional armed forces in europe.--Section 
     2(5)(E) of the Senate resolution advising and consenting to 
     ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties 
     to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
     November 19, 1990, adopted at Vienna May 31, 1996 (Treaty 
     Doc. 105-5) (commonly referred to as the ``CFE Flank 
     Document''), 105th Congress, agreed to May 14, 1997, is 
     repealed.
       (b) Modification of Reporting Requirements.--
       (1) Intelligence advisory committees.--Section 410(b) of 
     the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (50 
     U.S.C. 3309) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b) Notification of Establishment of Advisory 
     Committee.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each notify 
     the congressional intelligence committees each time each such 
     Director creates an advisory committee. Each notification 
     shall include--
       ``(1) a description of such advisory committee, including 
     the subject matter of such committee;
       ``(2) a list of members of such advisory committee; and
       ``(3) in the case of an advisory committee created by the 
     Director of National Intelligence, the reasons for a 
     determination by the Director under section 4(b)(3) of the 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) that an 
     advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of 
     such Act.''.
       (2) Intelligence information sharing.--Section 102A(g)(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024(g)(4)) 
     is amended to read as follows:
       ``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a 
     timely manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, 
     policy, or practice that the Director believes impedes the 
     ability of the Director to fully and effectively ensure 
     maximum availability of access to intelligence information 
     within the intelligence community consistent with the 
     protection of the national security of the United States.''.
       (3) Intelligence community business system 
     transformation.--Section 506D(j) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3100(j)) is amended in the matter 
     preceding paragraph (1) by striking ``2015'' and inserting 
     ``2014''.
       (4) Activities of privacy and civil liberties officers.--
     Section 1062(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
     Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1(f)(1)) is amended 
     in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking 
     ``quarterly'' and inserting ``semiannually''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--The National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) in the table of contents in the first section, by 
     striking the item relating to section 114 and inserting the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 114. Annual report on hiring and retention of minority 
              employees.'';
       (2) in section 114 (50 U.S.C. 3050)--
       (A) by amending the heading to read as follows: ``annual 
     report on hiring and retention of minority employees'';
       (B) by striking ``(a) Annual Report on Hiring and Retention 
     of Minority Employees.--'';
       (C) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (5) as 
     subsections (a) through (e), respectively;
       (D) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated)--
       (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as 
     paragraphs (1) through (3), respectively; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2) (as so redesignated)--

       (I) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subparagraphs 
     (A) and (B), respectively; and
       (II) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) (as so 
     redesignated), by striking ``clauses (i) and (ii)'' and 
     inserting ``subparagraphs (A) and (B)'';

       (E) in subsection (d) (as redesignated by subparagraph (C) 
     of this paragraph), by striking ``subsection'' and inserting 
     ``section''; and
       (F) in subsection (e) (as redesignated by subparagraph (C) 
     of this paragraph)--
       (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as 
     paragraphs (1) through (3), respectively; and
       (ii) by striking ``subsection,'' and inserting ``section''; 
     and
       (3) in section 507 (50 U.S.C. 3106)--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) by striking ``(1) The date'' and inserting ``The 
     date'';
       (ii) by striking ``subsection (c)(1)(A)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (c)(1)'';
       (iii) by striking paragraph (2); and
       (iv) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (F) as 
     paragraphs (1) through (6), respectively;
       (B) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``(A) Except'' and inserting ``Except''; 
     and
       (ii) by striking subparagraph (B); and
       (C) in subsection (d)(1)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A)--

       (I) by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting 
     ``subsection (a)''; and
       (II) by inserting ``and'' after ``March 1;'';

       (ii) by striking subparagraph (B); and
       (iii) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph 
     (B).
  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. 401. GIFTS, DEVISES, AND BEQUESTS TO THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 3512) is amended--
       (1) by striking the section heading and inserting ``gifts, 
     devises, and bequests'';
       (2) in subsection (a)(2)--
       (A) by inserting ``by the Director as a gift to the 
     Agency'' after ``accepted''; and
       (B) by striking ``this section'' and inserting ``this 
     subsection'';
       (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``this section,'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (a),'';
       (4) in subsection (c), by striking ``this section,'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (a),'';
       (5) in subsection (d), by striking ``this section'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (a)'';
       (6) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
       (7) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
       ``(f)(1) The Director may engage in fundraising in an 
     official capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations 
     that provide support to surviving family members of deceased 
     Agency employees or that otherwise provide support for the 
     welfare, education, or recreation of Agency employees, former 
     Agency employees, or their family members.
       ``(2) In this subsection, the term `fundraising' means the 
     raising of funds through the active participation in the 
     promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed 
     to raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation 
     of money by any other means.''.

     SEC. 402. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

       (a) Elevation of Inspector General Status.--The Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
       (1) in section 8G(a)(2), by striking ``the National 
     Security Agency,''; and
       (2) in section 12--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National Security 
     Agency,'' after ``the Federal Emergency Management Agency,''; 
     and
       (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National Security 
     Agency,'' after ``the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration,''.
       (b) Date of Appointment.--Not later than 90 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
     nominate a person for appointment, by and with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate, as Inspector General of the National 
     Security Agency under section 3(a) of the Inspector General 
     Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) consistent with the amendments 
     made by subsection (a).
       (c) Transition Rule.--An individual serving as Inspector 
     General of the National Security Agency on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act pursuant to an appointment made under 
     section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.)--
       (1) may continue so serving until the President makes an 
     appointment under section 3(a) of such Act with respect to 
     the National Security Agency consistent with the amendments 
     made by subsection (a); and
       (2) shall, while serving under paragraph (1), remain 
     subject to the provisions of section 8G of such Act that, 
     immediately before the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     applied with respect to the Inspector General of the National 
     Security Agency and suffer no reduction in pay.
       (d) Special Provisions Concerning the National Security 
     Agency.--The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
     amended by inserting after section 8J the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 8K. SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY AGENCY.

       ``(a) General Counsel to the Inspector General.--
       ``(1) In general.--There is a General Counsel to the 
     Inspector General of the National Security Agency, who shall 
     be appointed by the Inspector General of the National 
     Security Agency.
       ``(2) Duties.--The General Counsel to the Inspector General 
     of the National Security Agency shall--
       ``(A) serve as the chief legal officer of the Office of the 
     Inspector General of the National Security Agency;
       ``(B) provide legal services only to the Inspector General 
     of the National Security Agency;
       ``(C) prescribe professional rules of ethics and 
     responsibilities for employees and officers of, and 
     contractors to, the National Security Agency;
       ``(D) perform such functions as the Inspector General may 
     prescribe; and
       ``(E) serve at the discretion of the Inspector General.
       ``(3) Office of the general counsel.--There is an Office of 
     the General Counsel to the Inspector General of the National 
     Security Agency. The Inspector General may appoint to the 
     Office to serve as staff of the General Counsel such legal 
     counsel as the Inspector General considers appropriate.

[[Page H5046]]

       ``(b) Testimony.--
       ``(1) Authority to compel.--The Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency is authorized to require by subpoena 
     the attendance and testimony of former employees of the 
     National Security Agency or contractors, former contractors, 
     or former detailees to the National Security Agency as 
     necessary in the performance of functions assigned to the 
     Inspector General by this Act.
       ``(2) Refusal to obey.--A subpoena issued under this 
     subsection, in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey, 
     shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate United 
     States district court.
       ``(3) Notification.--The Inspector General shall notify the 
     Attorney General 7 days before issuing any subpoena under 
     this section.
       ``(c) Prohibitions on Investigations for National Security 
     Reasons.--
       ``(1) Evaluations of prohibitions.--Not later than 7 days 
     after the date on which the Inspector General of the National 
     Security Agency receives notice or a statement under section 
     8G(d)(2)(C) of the reasons the Secretary of Defense is 
     prohibiting the Inspector General from initiating, carrying 
     out, or completing any audit or investigation, the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate an 
     evaluation of such notice or such statement.
       ``(2) Inclusion in semi-annual report.--The Inspector 
     General shall include in the semiannual report prepared by 
     the Inspector General in accordance with section 5(a) a 
     description of the instances in which the Secretary of 
     Defense prohibited the Inspector General from initiating, 
     carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation during 
     the period covered by such report.''.
                   TITLE V--SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM

     SEC. 501. CONTINUOUS EVALUATION AND SHARING OF DEROGATORY 
                   INFORMATION REGARDING PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO 
                   CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       Section 102A(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3024(j)) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``Sensitive Compartmented 
     Information'' and inserting ``Classified Information'';
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (3) in paragraph (4), by striking the period and inserting 
     a semicolon; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(5) ensure that the background of each employee or 
     officer of an element of the intelligence community, each 
     contractor to an element of the intelligence community, and 
     each individual employee of such a contractor who has been 
     determined to be eligible for access to classified 
     information is monitored on a continual basis under standards 
     developed by the Director, including with respect to the 
     frequency of evaluation, during the period of eligibility of 
     such employee or officer of an element of the intelligence 
     community, such contractor, or such individual employee to 
     such a contractor to determine whether such employee or 
     officer of an element of the intelligence community, such 
     contractor, and such individual employee of such a contractor 
     continues to meet the requirements for eligibility for access 
     to classified information; and
       ``(6) develop procedures to require information sharing 
     between elements of the intelligence community concerning 
     potentially derogatory security information regarding an 
     employee or officer of an element of the intelligence 
     community, a contractor to an element of the intelligence 
     community, or an individual employee of such a contractor 
     that may impact the eligibility of such employee or officer 
     of an element of the intelligence community, such contractor, 
     or such individual employee of such a contractor for a 
     security clearance.''.

     SEC. 502. REQUIREMENTS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTORS.

       (a) Requirements.--Section 102A of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(x) Requirements for Intelligence Community 
     Contractors.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the head of each department of the Federal 
     Government that contains an element of the intelligence 
     community and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency, shall--
       ``(1) ensure that--
       ``(A) any contractor to an element of the intelligence 
     community with access to a classified network or classified 
     information develops and operates a security plan that is 
     consistent with standards established by the Director of 
     National Intelligence for intelligence community networks; 
     and
       ``(B) each contract awarded by an element of the 
     intelligence community includes provisions requiring the 
     contractor comply with such plan and such standards;
       ``(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security plan 
     required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such security plan 
     complies with the requirements of such paragraph; and
       ``(3) ensure that the insider threat detection capabilities 
     and insider threat policies of the intelligence community 
     apply to facilities of contractors with access to a 
     classified network.''.
       (b) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply with respect to contracts entered into or renewed 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 503. TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS TO SECURITY CLEARANCE 
                   PROCESSING.

       (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director 
     of the Office of Personnel Management, shall conduct an 
     analysis of the relative costs and benefits of potential 
     improvements to the process for investigating persons who are 
     proposed for access to classified information and 
     adjudicating whether such persons satisfy the criteria for 
     obtaining and retaining access to such information.
       (b) Contents of Analysis.--In conducting the analysis 
     required by subsection (a), the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall evaluate the costs and benefits associated 
     with--
       (1) the elimination of manual processes in security 
     clearance investigations and adjudications, if possible, and 
     automating and integrating the elements of the investigation 
     process, including--
       (A) the clearance application process;
       (B) case management;
       (C) adjudication management;
       (D) investigation methods for the collection, analysis, 
     storage, retrieval, and transfer of data and records; and
       (E) records management for access and eligibility 
     determinations;
       (2) the elimination or reduction, if possible, of the use 
     of databases and information sources that cannot be accessed 
     and processed automatically electronically, or modification 
     of such databases and information sources, to enable 
     electronic access and processing;
       (3) the use of government-developed and commercial 
     technology for continuous monitoring and evaluation of 
     government and commercial data sources that can identify and 
     flag information pertinent to adjudication guidelines and 
     eligibility determinations;
       (4) the standardization of forms used for routine reporting 
     required of cleared personnel (such as travel, foreign 
     contacts, and financial disclosures) and use of continuous 
     monitoring technology to access databases containing such 
     reportable information to independently obtain and analyze 
     reportable data and events;
       (5) the establishment of an authoritative central 
     repository of personnel security information that is 
     accessible electronically at multiple levels of 
     classification and eliminates technical barriers to rapid 
     access to information necessary for eligibility 
     determinations and reciprocal recognition thereof;
       (6) using digitally processed fingerprints, as a substitute 
     for ink or paper prints, to reduce error rates and improve 
     portability of data;
       (7) expanding the use of technology to improve an 
     applicant's ability to discover the status of a pending 
     security clearance application or reinvestigation; and
       (8) using government and publicly available commercial data 
     sources, including social media, that provide independent 
     information pertinent to adjudication guidelines to improve 
     quality and timeliness, and reduce costs, of investigations 
     and reinvestigations.
       (c) Report to Congress.--Not later than 6 months after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report on the analysis required by subsection (a).

     SEC. 504. REPORT ON RECIPROCITY OF SECURITY CLEARANCES.

       The head of the entity selected pursuant to section 3001(b) 
     of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(b)) shall submit to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress a report each year through 2017 that 
     describes for the preceding year--
       (1) the periods of time required by authorized adjudicative 
     agencies for accepting background investigations and 
     determinations completed by an authorized investigative 
     entity or authorized adjudicative agency;
       (2) the total number of cases in which a background 
     investigation or determination completed by an authorized 
     investigative entity or authorized adjudicative agency is 
     accepted by another agency;
       (3) the total number of cases in which a background 
     investigation or determination completed by an authorized 
     investigative entity or authorized adjudicative agency is not 
     accepted by another agency; and
       (4) such other information or recommendations as the head 
     of the entity selected pursuant to such section 3001(b) 
     considers appropriate.

     SEC. 505. IMPROVING THE PERIODIC REINVESTIGATION PROCESS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until 
     December 31, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director 
     of the Office of Personnel Management, shall transmit to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress a strategic plan for 
     updating the process for periodic reinvestigations consistent 
     with a continuous evaluation program.
       (b) Contents.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall 
     include--
       (1) an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with 
     conducting periodic reinvestigations;
       (2) an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with 
     replacing some or all periodic reinvestigations with a 
     program of continuous evaluation;
       (3) a determination of how many risk-based and ad hoc 
     periodic reinvestigations are necessary on an annual basis 
     for each component of the Federal Government with employees 
     with security clearances;
       (4) an analysis of the potential benefits of expanding the 
     Government's use of continuous evaluation tools as a means of 
     improving the effectiveness and efficiency of procedures for 
     confirming the eligibility of personnel for continued access 
     to classified information; and
       (5) an analysis of how many personnel with out-of-scope 
     background investigations are employed by, or contracted or 
     detailed to, each element of the intelligence community.

[[Page H5047]]

       (c) Periodic Reinvestigations Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``periodic reinvestigations'' has the meaning given 
     that term in section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and 
     Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)).

     SEC. 506. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

       In this title, the term ``appropriate committees of 
     Congress'' means--
       (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
       (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
       (3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
                     TITLE VI--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

     SEC. 601. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCY ACT OF 1949.

       Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 3521) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(1)(D), by striking ``section (a)'' 
     and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
       (2) in subsection (c)(2)(E), by striking ``provider.'' and 
     inserting ``provider''.

     SEC. 602. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
                   OF 1947 RELATING TO THE PAST ELIMINATION OF 
                   CERTAIN POSITIONS.

       Section 101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3021(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (5), by striking the semicolon and 
     inserting ``; and'';
       (2) by striking paragraphs (6) and (7);
       (3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (6); and
       (4) in paragraph (6) (as so redesignated), by striking 
     ``the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of 
     the Research and Development Board,''.

     SEC. 603. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013.

       (a) Amendments.--Section 506 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-277; 
     126 Stat. 2478) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Section 606(5)'' and inserting 
     ``Paragraph (5) of section 605''; and
       (2) by inserting ``, as redesignated by section 
     310(a)(4)(B) of this Act,'' before ``is amended''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect as if included in the enactment of the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public 
     Law 112-277).

  The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute made in order as original text shall be in order except 
those printed in House Report 113-465 and amendments en bloc described 
in section 2(f) of House Resolution 604.
  Each amendment shall be considered only in the order printed in the 
report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall 
be considered read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the 
report equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, 
shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand 
for division of the question.


       Amendments En Bloc No. 1 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to House Resolution 
604, I offer amendments en bloc.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendments en bloc.
  Amendments en bloc No. 1 consisting of amendment Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
8, 10, and 11 printed in part A of House Report No. 113-465, offered by 
Mr. McKeon of California:


           AMENDMENT NO. 1 OFFERED BY MR. ROGERS OF MICHIGAN

       Page 9, line 17, strike ``2014'' and insert ``2015''.
       Page 24, strike lines 1 through 9 and insert the following:
       ``(b) Elements.--Each report required under subsection (a) 
     shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal 
     investigations, include a description of, and any action 
     taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order 
     (including Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note)) 
     relating to intelligence activities committed by personnel of 
     an element of the intelligence community in the course of the 
     employment of such personnel that, during the previous 
     calendar year, was--
       ``(1) determined by the director, head, or general counsel 
     of any element of the intelligence community to have 
     occurred;
       ``(2) referred to the Department of Justice for possible 
     criminal prosecution; or
       ``(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any element 
     of the intelligence community.''.
       Page 24, after line 13, insert the following:
       (c) Guidelines.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element 
     of the intelligence community, shall--
       (1) issue guidelines to carry out section 510 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of 
     this section; and
       (2) submit such guidelines to the congressional 
     intelligence committees.
       Page 24, line 14, redesignate subsection (c) as subsection 
     (d).
       Page 24, before line 20 insert the following:
       (e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the 
     amendments made by this section shall be construed to alter 
     any requirement existing on the date of the enactment of this 
     Act to submit a report under any provision of law.
       Page 43, line 11, strike ``the date of the enactment of 
     this Act'' and insert ``the date of the resignation, 
     reassignment, or removal of the Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency appointed pursuant to section 8G of 
     the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) as in 
     effect before the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     serving on such date''.
       Page 45, line 9, insert before ``the National Security'' 
     the following: ``the Office of the Inspector General of''.


          AMENDMENT NO. 2 OFFERED BY MR. CONNOLLY OF VIRGINIA

       Page 17, line 7, strike ``usage; and'' and insert ``usage, 
     including--''.
       Page 17, after line 7, insert the following:
       ``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of 
     software licenses;
       ``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of 
     comprehensive inventories of software licenses using 
     automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
       ``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment 
     decisions; and
       ``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient 
     software licenses management training; and
       Page 17, line 23, strike ``usage.'' and insert ``usage, 
     including--''.
       Page 17, after line 23, insert the following:
       ``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of 
     software licenses;
       ``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of 
     comprehensive inventories of software licenses using 
     automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
       ``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment 
     decisions; and
       ``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient 
     software licenses management training.


          AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MR. KILMER OF WASHINGTON

       Page 17, line 19, strike ``; and'' and insert a semicolon.
       Page 17, line 23, strike the period and insert ``; and''.
       Page 17, after line 23, insert the following:
       ``(3) based on the assessment required under paragraph (2), 
     make such recommendations with respect to software 
     procurement and usage to the Director of National 
     Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers 
     appropriate.
       Page 18, line 2, strike the quotation mark and the second 
     period.
       Page 18, after line 2, insert the following:
       ``(d) Implementation of Recommendations.--Not later than 
     180 days after the date on which the Director of National 
     Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief 
     Information Officer of the Intelligence Community in 
     accordance with subsection (b)(3), the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, issue 
     guidelines for the intelligence community on software 
     procurement and usage based on such recommendations.''.


           AMENDMENT NO. 4 OFFERED BY MR. ROGERS OF MICHIGAN

       After section 309, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 310. RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN FORMER INTELLIGENCE 
                   OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

       (a) Restriction.--Title III of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 303 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 304. RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN FORMER INTELLIGENCE 
                   OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

       ``(a) Negotiations.--A covered employee shall notify the 
     element of the intelligence community employing such employee 
     not later than 3 business days after the commencement of any 
     negotiation for future employment or compensation between 
     such covered employee and a covered entity.
       ``(b) Separation.--A covered employee may not commence 
     employment with or be contracted by a covered entity--
       ``(1) for a period of one year following the termination of 
     the service or employment of such covered employee by an 
     element of the intelligence community; and
       ``(2) for a period of two years following such termination 
     with respect to any matter that was a part of the official 
     responsibility of such covered employee during the final year 
     of the service or employment of such covered employee by an 
     element of the intelligence community.
       ``(c) Annual Reporting.--
       ``(1) Reporting required.--Each former covered employee who 
     was a covered employee at the time of separation from an 
     element of the intelligence community shall annually report 
     in writing to the element of the intelligence community that 
     most recently previously employed such covered employee any 
     payment received in the preceding year from a foreign 
     government or a covered entity.
       ``(2) Applicability.--The requirement to submit a report 
     under paragraph (1) for each former covered employee shall 
     terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date on which 
     such former covered employee was most recently employed by an 
     element of the intelligence community.
       ``(d) Determination of Foreign Governments Posing a 
     Significant Counterintelligence Threat.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall annually--

[[Page H5048]]

       ``(1) determine which foreign governments pose a 
     significant counterintelligence threat to the United States; 
     and
       ``(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     list of such foreign governments.
       ``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' 
     means--
       ``(A) an employee of an element of the intelligence 
     community with access to sensitive compartmented information 
     occupying a position--
       ``(i) classified at GS-15 of the General Schedule (chapter 
     53 of title 5, United States Code); or
       ``(ii) as a senior civilian officer of the intelligence 
     community (as defined in Intelligence Community Directive No. 
     610 or any successor directive); and
       ``(B) a person who during the preceding 12-month period was 
     an officer or employee of the Congress (as defined in section 
     109(13) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
     App.)) with access to sensitive compartmented information.
       ``(2) Covered entity.--The term `covered entity' means--
       ``(A) any person acting on behalf or under the supervision 
     of a designated foreign government; or
       ``(B) any entity owned or controlled by a designated 
     foreign government.
       ``(3) Designated foreign government.--The term `designated 
     foreign government' means a government that the Director of 
     National Intelligence determines poses a significant 
     counterintelligence threat to the United States under 
     subsection (d).''.
       (b) Effective Date of Negotiation Period Notice.--The 
     requirement under section 304(a) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall 
     take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (c) Applicability of Separation Period.--The requirement 
     under section 304(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     added by subsection (a) of this section, shall not apply to a 
     covered employee that has entered into an employment 
     agreement on or before the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (d) First Reporting Requirement.--The first report required 
     to be submitted by each former covered employee under section 
     304(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
     subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted not later 
     than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (e) First Designation Requirement.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees the initial list of foreign 
     governments under section 304(d) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, not 
     later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (f) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of such Act is amended--
       (1) by striking the second item relating to section 302 
     (Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries) and the items 
     relating to sections 304, 305, and 306; and
       (2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 304. Restrictions on certain former intelligence officers and 
              employees.''.


            AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MS. KELLY OF ILLINOIS

         At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. INCLUSION OF PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTIONS IN 
                   INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.

       Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 3224) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``and Predominantly 
     Black Institutions'' after ``universities''; and
       (2) in subsection (g)--
       (A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
       (B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) Predominantly black institution.--The term 
     `Predominantly Black Institution' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 318 of the Higher education Act of 1965 (20 
     U.S.C. 1059e).''.


           AMENDMENT NO. 8 OFFERED BY MR. CARNEY OF DELAWARE

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION PROCESS.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to Congress a report describing--
       (1) how to improve the declassification process across the 
     intelligence community; and
       (2) what steps the intelligence community can take, or what 
     legislation may be necessary, to enable the National 
     Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions 
     assigned to the Center by Executive Order 13526.


          AMENDMENT NO. 10 OFFERED BY MS. JACKSON LEE OF TEXAS

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY ON THE USE 
                   OF CONTRACTORS IN THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct an 
     assessment of the reliance of intelligence activities on 
     contractors to support Government activities, including an 
     assessment of--
       (1) contractors performing intelligence activities 
     (including intelligence analysis); and
       (2) the skills performed by contractors and the 
     availability of Federal employees to perform those skills.


        AMENDMENT NO. 11 OFFERED BY MR. KEATING OF MASSACHUSETTS

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF MEMORANDA OF 
                   UNDERSTANDING TO FACILITATE INTELLIGENCE-
                   SHARING.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
     Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director 
     of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Program 
     Manager of the Information Sharing Environment, shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee 
     on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the 
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
     the Senate an assessment of the efficacy of the memoranda of 
     understanding signed between Federal, State, local, tribal, 
     and territorial agencies to facilitate intelligence-sharing 
     within and separate from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Such 
     assessment shall include--
       (1) any language within such memoranda of understanding 
     that prohibited or may be construed to prohibit intelligence-
     sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and 
     territorial agencies; and
       (2) any recommendations for memoranda of understanding to 
     better facilitate intelligence-sharing between Federal, 
     State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
Ruppersberger) each will control 10 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge the committee to adopt the amendments en bloc, 
all of which have been examined by both the majority and the minority. 
I believe these amendments to be noncontroversial, and intended to 
enhance the underlying bill.
  The manager's amendment is intended to make minor technical 
modifications to clarify two provisions that were added in markup.
  I have an amendment that would require employees at senior level in 
the intelligence community to endure a ``cooling off'' period before 
being employed by a company that is owned or controlled by a foreign 
government that poses a high counterintelligence threat. It would also 
make them subject to reporting procedures.
  This amendment stems from my concern that some senior level employees 
in the intelligence community retire or otherwise separate from the 
U.S. Government and take employment with foreign companies or foreign-
controlled companies after holding positions where they likely learned 
very sensitive information that would be of value to those particular 
companies or governments.
  It is not intended to be punitive prohibition on post-intelligence 
community employment but rather to establish a procedure to establish 
that sufficient time has lapsed to avoid conflicts of interest or the 
appearance of impropriety.
  Mr. Carney has an amendment that would provide the Congress with a 
useful report on ways to improve the declassification process across 
the intelligence community. The intelligence community has declassified 
a massive amount of documents. Increased transparency through an 
improved declassification process will help rebuild the confidence of 
the American people in their intelligence agencies.
  Mr. Connolly has an amendment that will add several best practices to 
the assessment our bill requires for intelligence community software 
licenses. This amendment is all the more important in light of current 
efforts to improve intelligence community information technology 
systems. Wise management of software licenses can help save the 
taxpayers' dollars while making sure our intelligence officers have the 
tools they need to do their job.
  Ms. Jackson Lee has an amendment that will help us identify ways to 
improve the support contractors offer to the intelligence community. It 
may help us find ways to make the most of scarce resources, all the 
while ensuring that contractors do not perform inherently governmental 
functions.
  Mr. Keating has an amendment concerning intelligence sharing between

[[Page H5049]]

Federal, State, and local entities, which has been a critical tool to 
prevent terrorist attacks on American soil. Joint terrorism task forces 
pool talent, skills, and knowledge from across the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities into a single entity that can respond with the 
flexibility and speed to stop impending threats.
  Even so, we must always look for ways to improve intelligence-sharing 
relationships. This amendment requires a study of the efficacy of the 
memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State, local, 
tribal, and territorial agencies. The study will help identify any 
obstacles to intelligence sharing between agencies and find 
improvements to existing intelligence-sharing relationships.
  Ms. Kelly has an amendment to expand a grant program by the Director 
of National Intelligence to include predominantly black institutions. 
To succeed in their mission, the intelligence agencies need our 
Nation's top talent, and that means they must make full use of our 
Nation's diverse population.
  These grants will help provide study programs in foreign languages 
such as Farsi, Pashto, Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African 
dialects. Foreign language skills are critical for intelligence 
officers, as we all know.
  Mr. Kilmer has an amendment that will require the intelligence 
community Chief Information Officer to make recommendations to the 
Director of National Intelligence based on the software licensing 
assessment required by section 307 of the bill. It will also require 
the DNI to issue guidelines to implement those recommendations. These 
recommendations and guidelines will help the IC implement the results 
of the important assessment that this bill will require regarding 
software licensing.
  I will, therefore, support the amendment.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I ask Members to support the en bloc 
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I support all these amendments.
  I agree with Chairman Rogers that it is very troubling when senior 
U.S. officials who know our most sensitive secrets leave the Federal 
Government and immediately go to work for a company that is owned by a 
foreign country that poses a significant counterintelligence threat to 
us.
  I do have some concerns that this restriction might be seen as 
singling out our intelligence professionals, since it does not apply to 
every senior official in the government with a top secret clearance. I 
would be in favor of a waiver procedure for when the risks are low. For 
example, for someone who wants to teach English at a State-funded 
university in his or her retirement. But on the whole, I agree with Mr. 
Rogers and support this provision.
  I also agree with Mr. Connolly and Mr. Kilmer that we need to find 
efficiencies in the intelligence community's use of software. In fact, 
we just don't need to find them, we need to fix them. Finding and 
fixing inefficiencies translates into saving taxpayer dollars, which is 
something we must always strive to do.
  I agree with Ms. Robin Kelly that we need to increase the diversity 
of our intelligence workforce by adding predominantly black 
institutions to ongoing intelligence community programs currently 
designed for Historically Black Colleges. Diversity is a good thing in 
its own right, and it will create even greater opportunities for 
intelligence collection.
  I agree with Mr. Carney that we must reduce our declassification 
backlog. As The New York Times reported just this week, even material 
that should be automatically declassified isn't. So we need the 
Director of National Intelligence to look across the intelligence 
community and figure out how to improve the declassification process so 
that more national security information can be made available to the 
American people now.
  I also agree with Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee that we need to get a handle 
on how we are employing our contractors. We need to know whether they 
are doing the type of work that should be done by U.S. Government 
employees.
  Let me be clear, however, that contractors perform a very valuable 
service, and our companies are among the very best in the world. But 
there needs to be a clear line between what we expect from our 
employees, who owe 100 percent of their loyalty to the government, and 
what we expect from our contractors, whose patriotism is without 
question, but whose loyalty is also to the company that employs them.
  Finally, I agree with Mr. Keating, Mr. Rooney, and Mr. Hanna that we 
need to take a close look at the memoranda of agreement between the 
Federal Government and the State, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments to make sure they are written clearly enough and well 
enough to ensure the free flow of intelligence, while still making sure 
to protect sources and methods.
  Intelligence is critical, particularly in the midst of a domestic 
crisis. And for it to be useful, it must get to those who need it.
  In addition to the manager's amendment, which makes technical and 
clarifying changes to the bill, I support all these amendments.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chair, let me again thank the ranking 
member and the chairman. Let me also acknowledge the very fine men and 
women that work in our intelligence community in the United States and 
around the world.
  I would like to thank the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence for their efforts to include the Jackson Lee amendment in 
the en bloc amendments and thank them for working with my staff in a 
very cooperative manner.
  The Jackson Lee amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on 
the people the Nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for 
the intelligence community.
  The Jackson Lee amendment requires the Director of the Office of 
National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of 
intelligence activities on contractors to support government 
objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing 
intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
  This complements the underlying bill, because the underlying bill has 
determined to assess the utilization and reduce the number of private 
contractors.
  In a Time article dated Monday, July 19, 2010, a comment says:

       Explosion of contractors in the intelligence community.

  And that has been the case.
  It is important that we recognize that contractors can be useful. But 
like the President stated publicly on August 26, 2013:

       It is important that we have so many extraordinarily 
     capable folks in our military and our government who can do 
     this--and probably do it cheaper.

  Well, I agree with the President and this committee.
  I also take note of an article that cites NSA contractors using 
LinkedIn profiles to cash in on national security.
  I believe that with the work that we are doing here in this 
legislation, along with my amendment, we will get our hands around the 
idea of outsourcing our intelligence work and develop a pathway of 
excellence, as we have in the past.
  We will utilize our veterans, we will utilize military personnel, we 
will utilize young persons who are interested in this as a career, and 
we will have the finest intelligence staffing that we have ever had, as 
we have had in the past.
  I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I again thank the 
chairman and ranking member for including this in the en bloc 
amendments. I think we are on a pathway of greater success in securing 
this Nation.
  Mr. Chair, I support H.R. 4681, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 2014,'' a bill Authorizing appropriations for our 
nation's intelligence agencies for Fiscal Year 2014 through Fiscal Year 
2015. The bill provides funds for the conduct of intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities.
  My thanks to the House Rules Committee for making my amendment in 
order under the rule for H.R. 4681.
  I appreciate the work of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence efforts to include the Jackson Lee Amendment in the En 
Bloc.

[[Page H5050]]

  My amendment is simple and makes an important contribution to the 
bill.
  The Jackson Lee Amendment seeks greater transparency to Congress on 
the people the nation relies upon to perform certain types of work for 
the Intelligence Community.
  The Jackson Lee Amendment requires the Director of the Office of 
National Intelligence to conduct an assessment of the reliance of 
intelligence activities on contractors to support Government 
objectives, including an assessment of contractors performing 
intelligence activities, which would include intelligence analysis.
  The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 2013 
Report on Security Clearance Determinations said that on October 1, 
2013, the total number of persons with a Confidential, Secret or Top 
Secrete security clearance totaled 5,150,379 individual.
  According to the ODNI 3,738,026 were government agency personnel, 
1,056,309 were contractors and 356,044 were categorized as other.
  Between January and October 1, 2013 there were 777,168 security 
clearances approved--152,490 were government agency employees and 
131,209 were contractors with an additional 12,785 designated as other.
  The cost of government security classification in 2oo5 was $7.66 
billion and in 2011 the total was $11.36 billion.
  The amount expended included: 5.65 billion for protection 
maintenance; 1.53 billion for security management oversight and 
planning; 502.51 million for professional education, training and 
awareness; 352.4 million for classification management; 52.76 million 
for declassification.
  The assessment provided for through the Jackson Lee amendment would 
shed light on the work that our federal agency Intelligence 
professionals and the role contractors play in protecting our nation.
  President Obama stated publicly on August 6, 2013 that it is 
important that we have so many 'extraordinarily capable folks in our 
military and our government who can do this, and probably do it 
cheaper.'
  I agree.
  That is why I introduced H.R. 4110, the HERO Transition from 
Battlespace to Workplace Act of 2014.
  This legislation addresses the problem of underemployed veterans in 
obtaining positions that take maximum advantage of their skills and 
experience.
  For some time I have worked to make sure that transparency, 
accountability and oversight were firmly established to guide the work 
of intelligence agencies, including introducing legislation such as 
H.R. 2434.
  I thank my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee for their hard 
work in bringing this bill before the full House for consideration. I 
ask my Colleagues in the House to vote for this en bloc.

                       [From Time, Jul. 19, 2010]

              Time To Tame Washington's Intelligence Beast

                            (By Robert Baer)

       I asked a former colleague who retired from the CIA not 
     long ago what he thought about the Washington Post article 
     Monday, July 19, on the explosion of contractors in the 
     intelligence community. ``It's a horror,'' he said, ``my tax 
     money blowing around Washington like confetti.'' But he 
     reserved his angriest comments for the contractor-driven 
     bureaucracy that allowed a Nigerian would-be suicide bomber--
     as alleged by a resulting federal indictment--to board a 
     Northwest flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December. In 
     spite of the billions and billions of dollars we've showered 
     on contractors, consultants and corporate contracts since 9/
     11, no one managed to disseminate a warning from the 
     Nigerian's father that his son had reportedly become a 
     terrorist.
       The raw numbers in the Post tell the story. Since 9/11, 
     America's intelligence budget has more than doubled, to $75 
     billion. The number of people working at the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency has gone from 7,500 to 16,500. The FBI's 
     Joint Terrorism Task Forces have trebled in number, rising 
     from 35 to io6. Personnel at the National Security Agency has 
     doubled. There are 854,000 people with top-secret security 
     clearances, including contractors--almost 1\1/2\ times the 
     population of Washington. It shouldn't come as a surprise, 
     then, that the Nigerian slipped through the cracks: there are 
     so many more cracks now.
       But we shouldn't reduce the problem to our having become a 
     country saddled with a bureaucratic Frankenstein of 
     timeservers and people cashing in on 9/11. Recently I've been 
     giving talks at government agencies working on 
     counterterrorism. With almost no exceptions, I've found my 
     audiences, including contractors, better informed, more 
     dedicated and better educated than the generation I served 
     with in the CIA. (As I've said elsewhere, if I were applying 
     to the CIA today, I wonder whether I'd make it in.) The 
     problem is that I came away from these talks with the 
     impression that the post-9/11 workforce is bored and even 
     adrift--at least in the sense that there are too many people 
     chasing too little hard intelligence.
       It's a tooth-to-tail problem. CIA Director Leon Panetta has 
     gone on the record as saying there are only a couple hundred 
     al-Qaeda dead-enders in the mountains between Paldstan and 
     Afghanistan, most of whom are dormant, hiding in caves. With 
     a prey so small and elusive and a bureaucracy so Washington-
     bound, it shouldn't come as a surprise that we're tripping 
     over ourselves. Nor should it come as a surprise that more 
     money and more contractors aren't a problem of diminishing 
     returns but rather one of adding to the risk.
       It would be considerably different if we could put this new 
     workforce in the field--for instance, in Afghanistan, a 
     country that demands years and years of on-the-ground 
     experience for a young American intelligence officer to 
     understand it. But our bases there are already overflowing 
     with combat forces, and anyhow, it's too dangerous for 
     Americans to get outside the wire to meet Afghans. Not unlike 
     in Washington, they're stuck behind desks and forced to look 
     at the country from a distance.
       No one intended to create a monster bureaucracy after 9/
     11--Washington has always thrown money and people at a 
     problem rather than good ideas. But now someone has to 
     seriously calculate the damage the outsourcing of 
     intelligence is causing. The story I keep hearing over and 
     over is that the bright young people who came to Washington 
     to fight terrorism--civil servants and contractors alike--
     have become disillusioned, and they will soon turn away from 
     idealism and begin to transform their jobs into comfortable 
     careers. In the case of the contractors, it means more 
     contracts and more contractors. It's all the worse because 
     there are now contractors writing their own contracts.
       For Washington to retake control of intelligence, it needs 
     to remember that intelligence is inherently a governmental 
     function, no different from the courts, the police or 
     legislation. I wish Washington good luck in taking back 
     ground from the contractors, and I hope it can move faster 
     than the next would-be suicide bomber.

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Womack). The question is on the amendments en 
bloc offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The en bloc amendments were agreed to.


            Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Franks of Arizona

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 
printed in House Report 113-465.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. REPORT ON FOREIGN MAN-MADE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE 
                   WEAPONS.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and 
     the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate a report on the threat posed 
     by man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States 
     interests through 2025, including threats from foreign 
     countries and foreign non-State actors.
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Franks) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Rogers. I 
believe he has exhibited the best of the House of Representatives and 
has rendered this country magnificent service, both to our national 
security and to the stability of this Nation. I thank him deeply for 
it, and also for the time to speak on this amendment.

                              {time}  1045

  Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2015 is a 
critical milestone toward protecting Americans at home and those who 
serve our interests and Nation overseas.
  However, it does not currently address one of the critical concerns, 
and that is the threat of a manmade nuclear or electromagnetic pulse, 
or EMP, weapon.
  My amendment would task the Director of National Intelligence to 
report to the Congress on the threat posed by manmade electromagnetic 
pulse weapons to the United States interests through 2025, including 
those threats from foreign countries and foreign nonstate actors.

[[Page H5051]]

  Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that my amendment does not task 
another Federal agency with the responsibility of determining our 
vulnerabilities to EMP and GMD and the potential dangers these threats 
represent to our civilization.
  These studies have already been finalized, and their conclusions 
provide our Nation's leaders and industry officials with the clarity 
they need to move forward toward protecting our grid.
  In fact, Mr. Chairman, there have now been nearly a dozen Federal 
Government reports and studies on the dangers, threats, and 
vulnerabilities the U.S. electric grid faces from EMP and GMD, 
including reports from the EMP Commission, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, the National Academy of Sciences, and the 
U.S. national laboratories. All of them come to similar conclusions. 
The U.S. electric grid is dangerously vulnerable to EMP and GMD.
  Further, many warn that, given the Nation's current lack of 
preparedness, a nuclear or natural EMP event is potentially a 
cataclysmic threat that would be a top national priority for our 
national security and homeland security.
  In 2008, the congressionally authorized EMP Commission stated that 
Russian scientists had proliferated knowledge of a specifically 
designed EMP weapon to North Korea. There may also exist a form of 
mobile EMP devices that can take out our electric substations.
  As The Wall Street Journal reported recently, taking out just a few 
of these substations simultaneously could potentially cause a 
nationwide blackout.
  Our military understands this threat very well, Mr. Chairman, and has 
protected many of our critical defense assets. We, as a Nation, have 
spent billions of dollars, in fact, over the years, hardening our 
nuclear triad, our missile defense capabilities and numerous other 
critical elements of our national security apparatus against the 
effects of electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type of 
electromagnetic pulse that might be generated against us by an enemy.
  However, our civilian grid, which the Defense Department relies upon 
for nearly 99 percent of its electricity needs, is completely 
vulnerable to the same kind of danger.
  This constitutes, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, an invitation on the 
part of certain of our enemies to use the asymmetric capability of an 
EMP weapon against us, and there is now evidence that such strategy is 
being considered by certain of those enemies.
  Mr. Chairman, the time is right for this action, and our efforts 
today may gain us no note in the annals of history, but my hope is that 
they will ultimately lead to a time when this country mitigates this 
threat and disinvites our enemies to try to exploit it against us. I 
pray it happens just that way.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, 
although I do not oppose the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Franks, a leader in the bipartisan House Electromagnetic Pulse 
Caucus, has brought attention to the serious threats posed by 
electromagnetic pulses, whether from a solar storm or a nuclear-armed 
enemy that could harm our critical infrastructure.
  Given what we know about our Nation's critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities, I support this amendment's purpose, to gain even more 
information that can better protect our utilities, financial systems, 
medical facilities, networks, and other infrastructure.
  Therefore, I support this amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do 
the same.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Rhode Island 
(Mr. Langevin), one of the key members of our committee and one of the 
experts in the area of cybersecurity.
  (Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4681, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015.
  I am going to keep my remarks brief, but I first wanted to thank 
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for bringing this bill 
to the floor in a bipartisan way. The bill before us really is 
indicative of how the committee is run in a bipartisan way under 
Chairman Rogers' leadership.
  In particular, I do want to commend Chairman Rogers for his years of 
service on the Intelligence Committee and wish him the best in his 
retirement at the end of this year. He clearly made a difference.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a balanced measure and really critical to 
protecting our Nation's security. I have been pleased to work with the 
chairman and ranking member on several provisions included in the bill.
  This bill makes critical investments in technical and tactical 
intelligence, as well as in our human capabilities.
  In particular, in order to support and develop the long-term health 
of our most important intelligence resource--human talent--this bill 
requires the Director of National Intelligence to create a plan to 
promote cybersecurity and computer literacy among high school and 
university students.
  As cyber threats grow in quantity and sophistication, we must do more 
to train and recruit into the noble calling of government service young 
people with the interest and aptitude for cybersecurity.
  The bill authorizes provisions to reduce the risk of information 
leaks, as well, and unauthorized disclosures of classified information 
by insiders, while maintaining appropriate levels of trust in our 
personnel. We cannot afford a repeat of last year's breach of 
classified information.
  Mr. Chairman, continued focus is needed to ensure that we, of course, 
are supporting the efforts of those patriotic Americans who proudly 
serve our Nation in the intelligence community, while properly 
safeguarding the privacy and civil liberties that our citizens hold 
dear.
  To that end, we must fully absorb the lessons learned over the past 
decade after passage of the landmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act and the changes it brought to the IC.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I certainly look forward to working with my committee 
colleagues to continue this tradition of rigorous, responsible, and 
bipartisan oversight. The work that we do is critical to our national 
security.
  Again, I thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger, as 
well as my colleagues on the committee; and in particular, I want to 
thank the staff for the hard work that they have done in bringing this 
bill to the floor on both sides of the aisle. Their work is critical as 
well.
  I thank my colleagues.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks).
  The amendment was agreed to.


              Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Poe of Texas

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 
printed in House Report 113-465.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following:

     SEC. _. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY TO 
                   DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT AL-QAEDA, ITS 
                   AFFILIATED GROUPS, ASSOCIATED GROUPS, AND 
                   ADHERENTS.

       (a) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a comprehensive report on the United States 
     counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 
     al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents.

[[Page H5052]]

       (2) Coordination.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
     shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of 
     State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, 
     and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other 
     department or agency of the United States Government that has 
     responsibility for activities directed at combating al-Qaeda, 
     its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents.
       (3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
     include the following:
       (A) A definition of--
       (i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known 
     individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;
       (ii) an affiliated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of 
     which known groups constitute an affiliate group of al-Qaeda;
       (iii) an associated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of 
     which known groups constitute an associated group of al-
     Qaeda;
       (iv) an adherent of al-Qaeda, including a list of which 
     known groups constitute an adherent of al-Qaeda; and
       (v) a group aligned with al-Qaeda, including a description 
     of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that 
     qualify it as a group aligned with al-Qaeda.
       (B) An assessment of the relationship between all 
     identified al-Qaeda affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents with al-Qaeda core.
       (C) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of al-
     Qaeda, its affiliated groups, associated groups, and 
     adherents, from January 1, 2010, to the present, including a 
     description of the metrics that are used to assess 
     strengthening or weakening and an assessment of the relative 
     increase or decrease in violent attacks attributed to such 
     entities.
       (D) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a 
     member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in 
     Afghanistan or Pakistan.
       (E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a 
     member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of an al-Qaeda 
     affiliated group, associated group, or adherent.
       (F) A definition of defeat of core al-Qaeda.
       (G) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command, 
     and control between core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, 
     associated groups, and adherents, specifically addressing 
     each such entity.
       (H) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism 
     operations against core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, 
     associated groups, and adherents, and whether such operations 
     have had a sustained impact on the capabilities and 
     effectiveness of core al-Qaeda, its affiliated groups, 
     associated groups, and adherents.
       (4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
     means--
       (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the House of Representatives; and
       (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Poe) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. POE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Chairman Rogers 
for supporting this amendment but, more importantly, for his work on 
the Intelligence Committee for so many years and, prior to that, your 
work with the FBI.
  As a former judge, I got to see a lot of FBI agents come and testify 
in Texas, and they have a wonderful reputation. You also have that 
reputation, and thank you for your service in law enforcement and in 
the House.
  I also want to thank the ranking member for his support, generally, 
for this amendment.
  This amendment requires the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with relevant agencies, to produce a strategy to defeat al 
Qaeda and its affiliates.
  The amendment requires that the President clearly define groups like 
core al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliates and other terms the 
administration uses to define this enemy of America.
  Al Qaeda continues to threaten the security of the United States and 
our allies, both here at home and abroad. Our intelligence services and 
our military have scored some real gains against al Qaeda, but al Qaeda 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan is still able to provide technical, 
tactical, and strategic direction to its affiliates throughout the 
world.
  Al Qaeda has gone from on the verge of strategic defeat to a serious 
and growing threat, depending on who you ask in our intelligence 
services or even the administration. Today, al Qaeda controls more 
territory than it ever has. The fight against al Qaeda is far from 
over, and it will continue to grow.
  As chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade, I have held over a dozen bipartisan 
hearings focusing on this very topic. Once again, I want to thank the 
chairman and ranking member for including this TNT Subcommittee in some 
of the work we have been doing together on the very issue of 
intelligence.
  During these 12 hearings in our subcommittee, we have yet to find a 
witness who can articulate or even agree with the administration's 
counterterrorism strategy or what it is or describe how the 
administration really views al Qaeda and its threat. This seems to be a 
problem. This needs to be clarified, so that all of us know exactly 
what our strategy is nationwide and worldwide.
  So this amendment is necessary, so we can all get on the same page in 
the hymnal with a clear strategy to defeat al Qaeda, so we understand 
what al Qaeda is really doing today in 2014. This is a constantly 
changing movement, and al Qaeda today isn't the same as the al Qaeda in 
2001.
  We need to have a clear understanding of who we are fighting and how 
we are going to defeat the al Qaeda terrorists. Drone strikes and 
target raids are not a strategy; they are tactics. Therefore, I support 
this amendment, and I urge support by the committee and the whole 
House.
  And that's just the way it is.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition, 
although I am not opposed to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
  I support this amendment because the time is right to step back and 
take stock of where we are and how we are doing in our fight against 
terrorism. The threat is not going away, but it is rapidly changing.
  The Director of the FBI, Jim Comey, recently said that the terrorism 
threat is very much alive and growing in new and more dangerous places 
around the world. It even surprised him, when he started, just how 
virulent and dispersed the terrorist threat had become.
  From Pakistan to Yemen, Afghanistan to Syria, north Africa to Iraq, 
the threat from al Qaeda is waning in some areas, but growing in 
others. Unless we approach this dangerous problem holistically and 
precisely, we risk just squeezing the balloon, suppressing terrorism in 
one area, only to see it grow in another.
  So I think it is a good idea to sit down and take a comprehensive 
look at the problem today, to make sure that we are confronting it in 
the precisely right way, to make sure that we are measuring our 
effectiveness correctly, and to make sure that we have the right and 
most current legal authorities.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Gallego

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 
printed in House Report 113-465.
  Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. REPORT ON RETRAINING VETERANS IN CYBERSECURITY.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
     Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
     shall submit to Congress recommendations for retraining 
     veterans and retired members of elements of the intelligence 
     community in cybersecurity.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 604, the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Gallego) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.

[[Page H5053]]

  Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking Chairman 
Rogers and the ranking member for an opportunity to work on this issue 
with them, and I certainly wish Chairman Rogers well in his future 
endeavors.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment helps us find ways to ensure that our 
veterans and other former public servants can continue their service to 
our country on cybersecurity, a critical national security need that 
will only grow in importance over the next several years.
  While Congress is well aware of the challenges that we face in 
cybersecurity, it is important to understand that cyber attacks are not 
only aimed at the government, where they challenge our national 
security and endanger our troops, but these attacks also target our 
Nation's economic advantages, our core advantages, when they steal 
proprietary information and intellectual property from American firms 
that lead the Nation and lead the world in innovation.

                              {time}  1100

  In fact, for the private sector, it is important to know that an IP 
theft in the U.S. costs companies upwards of $250 billion a year, and 
global cyber crime costs $338 billion. And when you factor in downtime, 
either way, that is a lot of money. And we spent up to--no kidding--$1 
trillion fixing these problems.
  These highlight an important point, that if these attacks on American 
companies are so bad, just use your imagination to figure the threat of 
foreign-based cyber attacks on the Department of Defense or other 
critical intelligence agencies. And there is no better group of people 
than our veterans and our retired members of the intelligence community 
who could be ready to assist in cybersecurity.
  This amendment allows us to do everything we can to support our 
veterans who are looking for jobs along with those retired members of 
the intelligence community who have already demonstrated their 
commitment to public service.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to its veterans and to the 
retired members of the intelligence community. We should look for as 
many ways as possible to help them succeed in the job market. And I 
want to thank the gentleman for offering the amendment for promoting 
this. The amendment does, again, highlight the sheer level of threat we 
face from cyber crime, cyber terrorists, cyber espionage. We are being 
overwhelmed.
  When you look at China, Russia, Iran, and now organized crime groups 
who are approaching nation-state capability, it is as bad as I have 
ever seen it. And, again, 85 percent of the networks across America are 
not protected by the government because they are private sector 
networks. The government, itself, is about 15 percent of those 
networks.
  We need to find a pathway, A, to attract the talent that the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gallego) is talking about; and, B, we need to 
allow these private sector folks to protect themselves by gaining 
information, sharing information the government has that could protect 
those networks from cyber catastrophe.
  It is happening each and every day. The next generation of cyber 
warriors are there. And I think this amendment will go a long way to 
recruit the right talent in the right place to help us meet this 
growing threat of the future prosperity, safety, and the security of 
the United States.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment, and I urge 
my colleagues to do the same.
  As I said in the opening hearing on worldwide threats, ``education is 
the keystone of security and prosperity in the 21st century.''
  The cyber threats we face are grave, and we need to train the best, 
the brightest, and the most dedicated--like our veterans and our 
retired intelligence professionals--to be our next generation of cyber 
defenders. We call them cyber warriors.
  Every day, we hear about cyber attacks in the news. Early last year, 
for example, our financial sector suffered a wide-scale network denial 
of service attack that proved difficult and very costly to mitigate. 
The retail giant, Target, is another recent example of our 
vulnerability to cyber attacks. And today, The Washington Post stated 
that Iranian hackers are targeting U.S.A. officials through social 
networks.
  We need to pass cybersecurity legislation like CISPA, and we need to 
do far more to expand our bench of cyber professionals and innovators. 
We need to invest in early education in science, technology, 
engineering, and math. And we equally need to leverage the experience 
and wisdom of our veterans and former intelligence professionals. Our 
adversaries are making heavy investments in cyber education. We must do 
the same. For this reason, I support this amendment.
  I thank my colleague from Texas (Mr. Gallego) for his amendment. He 
represents the area of Texas that is close to the border. He 
understands the threat and why we need intelligence to deal with 
national security.
  Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Chairman, many of our servicemembers have made the 
ultimate sacrifice. There are 4,423 that have died in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom; 66 in Operation New Dawn; and, as of yesterday, 2,320 have 
died in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where I just 
returned from this week. But many of the thousands upon thousands of 
our troops who did make it home to see their mothers, fathers, spouses, 
and kids are alive today because actionable intelligence helped them 
achieve their missions more safety.
  While there has been a lot of criticism about intelligence 
collection--and we have had a very robust debate on these issues--I 
think it is important that we concentrate on the fact that intelligence 
is so critical to the lives of our men and women in uniform. And it 
really does help them come back home today safe with their families 
because of the work of our numerous intelligence agencies who have 
provided the information they need to stay alive.
  Mr. Chairman, I also want to do a shout-out to the Air Force ISR 
Agency in San Antonio, in Bexar County. I know that they do critical 
work to protect and defend our liberty each and every day.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gallego).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Poe 
of Texas) having assumed the chair, Mr. Womack, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4681) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 604, he reported the bill 
back to the House with an amendment adopted in the Committee of the 
Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment 
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
  If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.

[[Page H5054]]

  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                           Motion to Recommit

  Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at 
the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. BISHOP of New York. In its current form, I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Bishop of New York moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 
     4681, to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with 
     instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith 
     with the following amendment:
       At the end of subtitle A of title III, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. __. PROTECTING UNITED STATES MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND 
                   INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS FROM CHINESE AND 
                   OTHER STATE-SPONSORED COMPUTER THEFT.

       The head of each element of the intelligence community 
     shall--
       (1) prioritize efforts to uncover and foil attempts to 
     steal United States military technology, and the intellectual 
     property of United States corporations, by State-sponsored 
     computer hackers from China and other foreign countries;
       (2) consistent with existing law, immediately inform 
     corporations and internet providers of any computer breaches 
     and the steps necessary to combat further intrusion;
       (3) coordinate with other Federal agencies to protect 
     critical United States infrastructure, including the 
     electrical grid, nuclear power plants, oil and gas pipelines, 
     financial services, and air traffic safety, from repeated 
     computer hacking attacks; and
       (4) assist the Department of Justice and other law 
     enforcement agencies, including by supporting the 
     international efforts of United States allies, in efforts to 
     punish and sanction individuals and governments that 
     perpetrate economic espionage and identity theft.

  Mr. BISHOP of New York (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask 
unanimous consent to dispense with the reading.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  The Clerk will read.
  The Clerk continued to read.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, this is the final amendment to 
the bill, which will not kill the bill or send it back to committee. If 
adopted, the bill will immediately proceed to final passage, as 
amended.
  Mr. Speaker, my amendment responds to the increasing threat of 
Chinese and other state-sponsored computer hacking of our national 
infrastructure of computer networks. These cyber attacks have severely 
undermined our national security and continue to threaten our economy.
  Not only are the Chinese hacking into our state secrets, but they are 
stealing our trade secrets, which costs us jobs, and especially jobs of 
the future. China's conduct is reprehensible and unacceptable for a 
major trading partner. In response, my amendment requires the heads of 
the intelligence agencies to prioritize efforts to uncover, stop, and 
prevent future attempts to steal U.S. military technology and 
intellectual property.
  The intelligence agencies are also required to notify businesses and 
Internet providers when network breaches occur, collaborate with 
Federal agencies to protect critical infrastructure, and assist law 
enforcement, as well as our international partners in apprehending, 
halting, and punishing those who infiltrate our systems.
  The need for this amendment is clear. Growing evidence reveals 
extensive activity on the part of the People's Liberation Army to 
conduct cyber, economic, and industrial espionage. Their hacking knows 
no bounds in the pursuit of state and trade secrets alike.
  We have uncovered the traces and telltale signs of hacking into 
Federal systems and U.S. corporations, like Alcoa, U.S. Steel, energy 
companies like SolarPowerAG, and even nuclear power providers like 
Westinghouse Electric Company.
  This month, the Justice Department indicted five members of the 
Chinese military for stealing trade secrets in order to prosper from 
American ingenuity and innovation to undercut our global 
competitiveness.
  These are not isolated incidents. The frequency of these attacks has 
increased over time, costing our economy thousands of jobs and up to 
$100 billion annually. Not only are the Chinese and their partners in 
cyber crime refusing to acknowledge evidence we have uncovered, but 
they refuse to negotiate steps both of our nations could pursue to end 
this threat.
  No one single action will stop the Chinese from trying to infiltrate 
American computer networks, but collaboration between our intelligence 
agencies, law enforcement, and the private sector can strengthen our 
defenses, deter cyber espionage from being launched on foreign shores, 
and protect our jobs.
  My amendment is not the only step we can take, but it is an important 
addition to this bill. The United States deserves better for supporting 
the rights of nations like China to trade in the global marketplace, to 
be treated with respect, and to participate in the community of 
nations. We must send the message to China and our rivals that this 
Congress stands ready to defend our national security and our economy, 
and we must send a message assuring future generations of Americans 
that protecting jobs here at home will always be our priority and that 
our economic might is more important than our military might. Our 
national security and position as a global leader in innovation and 
competitiveness depends on it.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his 
interest. This is exciting news.
  The bill is not crafted correctly, and it opens us up to exposing 
classified information to corporations that may be foreign-owned and 
operated by the very counterintelligence threat we seek to push back 
on. But thank you for this effort.
  We should reject this. We should include resounding support for the 
CISPA bill that carefully drafted language to make sure that there is a 
cyber-sharing relationship, both between the government when it comes 
to malicious code and the private sector who, remember, is all by 
itself out there getting attacked by nation-states and large organized 
criminal groups trying to steal their information.
  If you think about even the last month or so that General Alexander 
was the Director of the National Security Agency, just in that last bit 
of time he was there, the military sites, the government sites were hit 
41 million times by people trying to cause destruction or break in and 
steal something. Again, this is as serious a problem as you can 
imagine, Mr. Speaker, that we are not prepared to handle.
  So that CISPA bill that I think you tried to get here--I mean, part 
of this bill is the redundancy department of redundancy. The second 
part is just not drafted correctly, and we would love to help you get 
to the right place.
  This bill, I think, causes a little more harm than I think you 
realized without carefully considering how you construct a cyber-
sharing malicious code relationship between the government and the 
private sector. It needs to happen. This way, it just exposes, again, 
the information to counterintelligence groups that we don't want to 
have it.
  So I would strongly urge the rejection of the motion to recommit. But 
I want to thank the gentleman. I look forward to working in the next 
few months with the gentleman to make sure that we put in place a 
fighting chance, a fighting chance for the 85 percent of those private 
sector networks that are getting absolutely ravaged every single day by 
cyber attackers, by people who are trying to disrupt activities.

                              {time}  1115

  There are public reports that Iran is probing our financial 
institutions. Think about the idea if they were able or successful to 
go in and take down a financial institution that has trillions

[[Page H5055]]

of dollars every single day in global transactions, destroy data, 
manipulate data, and you don't know who owes whom what. Imagine the 
economic catastrophe that happens.
  Well, guess what? This is not Orwellian. It is not next year, it is 
not 6 months from now, and it is not 10 years from now. It is happening 
today, and every nation on the face of the Earth is trying to get this 
capability--including al Qaeda. They are advertising to try to find the 
right people to develop a capability for a cyberattack to disrupt, to 
destroy, and to cause chaos.
  This is as important an issue as I can think of, Mr. Speaker, that I 
hope we find some resolution on. Again, I have to strongly oppose this 
motion to recommit for the drafting errors I find in the bill. But I 
look forward to working with the gentleman on the CISPA bill that is in 
the Senate and passed by this House in a huge bipartisan way so that we 
can bring relief and security to the future prosperity of the United 
States of America.
  With that, I yield back the balance my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. BISHOP of New York. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and 
nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by 
5-minute votes on passage of the bill, if ordered, and agreeing to the 
Speaker's approval of the Journal, if ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 183, 
nays 220, not voting 28, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 270]

                               YEAS--183

     Barber
     Barrow (GA)
     Bass
     Beatty
     Becerra
     Bera (CA)
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Caardenas
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Cartwright
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clark (MA)
     Clarke (NY)
     Cohen
     Connolly
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     DelBene
     Deutch
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duckworth
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Enyart
     Eshoo
     Esty
     Farr
     Foster
     Frankel (FL)
     Fudge
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garcia
     Grayson
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutieerrez
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Heck (WA)
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinojosa
     Holt
     Honda
     Horsford
     Hoyer
     Huffman
     Israel
     Jackson Lee
     Jeffries
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     Kirkpatrick
     Kuster
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujaan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maffei
     Maloney, Carolyn
     Maloney, Sean
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Meng
     Michaud
     Moore
     Moran
     Murphy (FL)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Negrete McLeod
     Nolan
     O'Rourke
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters (CA)
     Peters (MI)
     Peterson
     Pingree (ME)
     Pocan
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Richmond
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruiz
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Saanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell (AL)
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Sinema
     Sires
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Titus
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Velaazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waxman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)

                               NAYS--220

     Aderholt
     Amash
     Amodei
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barton
     Bentivolio
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Broun (GA)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Burgess
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cantor
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Chabot
     Coble
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Conaway
     Cook
     Cotton
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Daines
     Davis, Rodney
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grimm
     Guthrie
     Hall
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hastings (WA)
     Heck (NV)
     Hensarling
     Herrera Beutler
     Holding
     Hudson
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jolly
     Jones
     Jordan
     Joyce
     Kelly (PA)
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Labrador
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Latham
     Latta
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Marchant
     Marino
     Massie
     McAllister
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McHenry
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Messer
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Mullin
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Perry
     Petri
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rice (SC)
     Rigell
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ryan (WI)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Scalise
     Schock
     Schweikert
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Southerland
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Stockman
     Stutzman
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Wagner
     Walden
     Walorski
     Weber (TX)
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Yoho
     Young (AK)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--28

     Benishek
     Campbell
     Capito
     Chaffetz
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cramer
     Dingell
     Fattah
     Gabbard
     Green, Al
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Lankford
     Lewis
     McCarthy (NY)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Neal
     Palazzo
     Rangel
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Shuster
     Slaughter
     Walberg
     Waters
     Yarmuth

                              {time}  1145

  Messrs. GRIFFITH of Virginia and McHENRY changed their vote from 
``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 345, 
noes 59, not voting 27, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 271]

                               AYES--345

     Aderholt
     Amodei
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barber
     Barletta
     Barr
     Barrow (GA)
     Beatty
     Becerra
     Bera (CA)
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Bridenstine
     Brooks (AL)
     Brooks (IN)
     Brown (FL)
     Brownley (CA)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Bustos
     Butterfield
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cantor
     Capps
     Caardenas
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cartwright
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Castro (TX)
     Chabot
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (NY)
     Coble
     Coffman
     Cole
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (NY)
     Conaway
     Connolly
     Cook
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cotton
     Courtney
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Daines
     Davis (CA)
     Davis, Danny
     Davis, Rodney
     DeGette
     Delaney
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DeSantis
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Duckworth
     Duffy
     Edwards
     Ellmers
     Engel
     Enyart
     Eshoo
     Esty
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foster
     Foxx
     Frankel (FL)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gabbard
     Gallego
     Garamendi
     Garcia
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gingrey (GA)
     Goodlatte
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Grayson
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grimm
     Guthrie
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hastings (WA)
     Heck (NV)
     Heck (WA)
     Hensarling

[[Page H5056]]


     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinojosa
     Holding
     Horsford
     Hoyer
     Hudson
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson Lee
     Jeffries
     Jenkins
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jolly
     Jordan
     Joyce
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly (IL)
     Kelly (PA)
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilmer
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kirkpatrick
     Kline
     Kuster
     LaMalfa
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     Latta
     Levin
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Lowenthal
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan Grisham (NM)
     Lujaan, Ben Ray (NM)
     Lynch
     Maffei
     Maloney, Sean
     Marchant
     Marino
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McAllister
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul
     McCollum
     McHenry
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meadows
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Meng
     Messer
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Moran
     Mullin
     Murphy (FL)
     Murphy (PA)
     Napolitano
     Negrete McLeod
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nolan
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Payne
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters (CA)
     Peters (MI)
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pittenger
     Pitts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rice (SC)
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Roskam
     Ross
     Rothfus
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Ruiz
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Saanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schiff
     Schneider
     Schock
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell (AL)
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Simpson
     Sinema
     Sires
     Smith (MO)
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Stewart
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Titus
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Turner
     Upton
     Valadao
     Van Hollen
     Vargas
     Veasey
     Vela
     Visclosky
     Wagner
     Walden
     Walorski
     Walz
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waxman
     Webster (FL)
     Wenstrup
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Williams
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (IN)

                                NOES--59

     Amash
     Barton
     Bass
     Bentivolio
     Blumenauer
     Broun (GA)
     Burgess
     Capuano
     Clark (MA)
     Cohen
     Conyers
     DeFazio
     DelBene
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellison
     Gibson
     Gohmert
     Gosar
     Grijalva
     Gutieerrez
     Holt
     Honda
     Huelskamp
     Huffman
     Jones
     Kingston
     Labrador
     Lee (CA)
     Lofgren
     Lummis
     Maloney, Carolyn
     Massie
     McClintock
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Moore
     Mulvaney
     Nadler
     O'Rourke
     Perry
     Pocan
     Polis
     Posey
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Schakowsky
     Sensenbrenner
     Speier
     Stockman
     Swalwell (CA)
     Takano
     Tierney
     Velaazquez
     Weber (TX)
     Welch
     Yoho

                             NOT VOTING--27

     Benishek
     Campbell
     Capito
     Chaffetz
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cramer
     Dingell
     Fattah
     Green, Al
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Lankford
     Lewis
     McCarthy (NY)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Neal
     Palazzo
     Rangel
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Shuster
     Slaughter
     Walberg
     Waters
     Yarmuth

                              {time}  1153

  Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York changed her vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated for:
  Mr. WALBERG. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, May 30, 2014, I was unable to 
vote due to my duties and responsibilities in my daughter's wedding 
rehearsal and ceremony on the 30th and 31st. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``yea'' on rollcall No. 271.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, today I missed the following 
votes:
  Democratic Motion to Recommit H.R. 4681. Had I been present, I would 
have voted ``yes'' on this bill.
  H.R. 4681--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 
2015. Had I been present, I would have voted ``yes'' on this bill.

                          ____________________