[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 171 (Wednesday, December 4, 2013)]
[House]
[Pages H7493-H7498]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAN

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Perry). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 3, 2013, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Roskam) is 
recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous materials on the subject of this Special Order.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, there are hinge points in history. There are 
times at which you can sense that history is moving almost on a hinge 
from one trajectory to another trajectory, and my sense and my 
observation is that the United States is experiencing such a hinge 
right now.
  Okay, what is the hinge? What is the change? What is going on? Here 
is what is happening. The administration has made a decision that is 
moving subtly in some ways, but I think the results are going to be 
very, very consequential and the subtleties will be lost, and we are 
going to be at a very different position. In other words, the hinge 
will move us from our current policy which says that Iran shall not be 
a nuclear power. That is the stated position of the United States. It 
is unambiguous. There is no ambiguity about that, at least not up until 
now.
  But the hinge that is changing is a direction that begins to say, 
well, maybe not. Maybe instead we need a policy of containment, and 
that is very dangerous, Mr. Speaker. That is a direction that we ought 
not go. It is a direction, unfortunately, that the Obama administration 
is leading us in right now, and I'm convinced it is a mistake.
  The House of Representatives has a responsibility as part of a 
coequal branch of government. We have worked, we have passed sanctions 
that are robust and dynamic that are not taken up by the false claim of 
the Iranians, a false promise of future conduct. We need our colleagues 
on the other side of the rotunda to take on a very rigorous sanctions 
bill and to push back very, very aggressively.
  Because here is the thing: the Iranians are allowed to enrich under 
this proposed deal. There is no investigation as it relates to the 
warheads. There is no investigation as it relates to their missile 
capacity. And so what is happening? The Iranians gain an advantage of 
time and money, and we squander both. This is the time when the United 
States needed to be clear and not ambiguous.
  So there are Members who are gathered here today, Mr. Speaker, to 
talk about the seriousness of this issue, to admonish the 
administration and encourage them to change course; and we hope to 
highlight the significant nature of this shift in American foreign 
policy that we are seeing lay out before us as we speak.
  So toward that end, I would be honored at this point to yield to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), my colleague and friend.
  Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  The political pundits are all focused on was this a good deal, was 
this a bad deal. But we're not here in Congress to give a grade to the 
administration. We are here in Congress to decide what legislation 
should be passed. Congress is a policymaking body, although so often 
those in the administration think that we are, at most, advisers or 
critics; but let us take a look at this deal, and we'll see that what 
we get out of this is at least overstated by its proponents.
  Because we are told that this halts their enrichment of uranium. It 
is true that it limits their 20 percent uranium; and Iran will not be 
making progress during the 6-month period of this deal toward its first 
bomb, but they will be making very substantial progress toward their 
eighth, ninth, and 10th bomb. And Iran is not a nuclear power until 
they have some to hide, one or two to test. It is not their objective 
to have but one, because throughout this agreement it is very clear the 
centrifuges keep spinning, the amount of low enriched uranium keeps 
growing; but we're told that Iran will not be increasing its stockpile. 
If you read the agreement, yes, they will, but they have to convert to 
uranium oxide metal, that which they produced during the term of this 
agreement.
  There are some proponents of the agreement that say, Well, that means 
that they are neutralizing all that they produce under the agreement. 
That is hardly true.
  I have been the chair or ranking member of the Terrorism and 
Nonproliferation Subcommittee since it was created in the early part of 
this century, and I have worked with the nonproliferation experts. The 
fact is that this uranium oxide, this huge new additional stockpile to 
be created over the next 6 months can be converted back to gaseous form 
and then enriched further. And converting it back to gaseous form will 
take only a couple of weeks.
  So this agreement provides that Iran makes substantial progress 
toward more low-enriched uranium, building its stockpile toward a real 
collection of nuclear bombs.
  We are also told that we have given up very little in this agreement. 
We have given up far more than you can find in the text because the 
most important thing about our sanctions is momentum. And we passed 
additional sanctions in 2010, 2011, 2012; and, if hadn't been for this 
agreement, the Senate would have passed the bill that we worked on in 
the summer, and we would have passed additional sanctions in 2013.
  The content of those sanctions is important, but even more important 
is the momentum. If you are a multinational corporation, you can find a 
law firm that will find loopholes in our existing sanctions, but you 
will decide not to invest a lot into that business plan because you 
know Congress is going to pass more sanctions.
  Well, now you know we are not passing any sanctions in 2013; and the 
question before us, as legislators, is whether we will be passing 
sanctions in 2014.

  Why is momentum so important not just to those international 
businesses trying to decide whether to invest in exploiting the 
loopholes? Most of economics is psychology. It is currency values. It 
is consumer confidence. It is business confidence. It is investment. 
And we saw the celebrations in Tehran as the business community 
celebrated this agreement because it ends the continuing momentum 
toward additional sanctions.
  But we are not here, again, to grade the administration. That is for 
pollsters and pundits. We are here to decide whether to pass 
legislation.
  It is very clear we are not going to pass legislation that becomes 
effective in 2013. The question before us is whether we will pass 
legislation which, by its terms, becomes effective June 1, 2014. And 
the reason the administration sent some of its top officials to brief 
us in a classified briefing today is because they want to convince us 
not to take any action in the first 5 or 6 months of 2014. Well, what 
does that mean? That means, in effect, we are not going to take action 
in 2014. Why is that?
  Most people think that this deal expires in late May, 6 months after 
it was adopted on November 24, 2013. That is not the case. The start 
date is some day to be determined sometime probably in late January. So 
if we, as a Congress, are convinced not to take any action, not to pass 
any legislation, not to go through the committee process and the markup 
until after this

[[Page H7494]]

agreement has terminated, we are talking about late July. Well, at the 
end of July, we go on break. We come back for, what, 2 or 3 weeks 
between then and the November elections.
  So if the administration can convince us to not do anything until 6 
months after the trigger date, which is a date to be determined 
sometime in January, they can assure the Iranians that no new sanctions 
will be adopted in 2014. And that will be apparent to those doing 
business in Iran and those doing business with Iran.
  The administration complimented us more than once, saying these 
sanctions are what brought Iran to the table, but let us remember that 
the administration opposed the adoption of these sanctions every single 
time. The reason we did not adopt any sanctions against Iran in 2009 
was because of opposition from the administration and the tremendous 
intellectual clout and credibility that the State Department and 
administration bring.
  But it is not just this administration. We didn't pass any sanctions 
during the entire 8 years of the prior administration. Oh, we passed 
some through the House, but they stopped them in the Senate, and with 
considerable effort. Not one bill became law. So we have seen two 
administrations do their best to delay, dilute, prevent, and defeat 
sanctions legislation.
  So now they say, Isn't it great we have this legislation, but don't 
pass any new legislation. Let us remember, we were against the 
legislation they now say is so great.
  The best example of this is the Kirk-Menendez amendment in 2011. That 
was the bill that prevented Iran's central bank from clearing their 
petroleum dollar-denominated transactions through the American banking 
system. Well, what did the administration say in the form of a letter 
from Secretary Geithner? He wrote on December 1, 2011: ``I am writing 
to express the administration's strong opposition to this amendment 
because, in its current form, it threatens to undermine the effective'' 
sanctions. ``In addition, the amendment would potentially yield a net 
economic benefit to the Iranian regime.''

                              {time}  1730

  There is only one reason Iran is at the table today. It is because of 
the sanctions we have adopted the last 3 years. And the most important 
of those was the Menendez-Kirk sanctions that the administration fought 
against.
  What we ought to do is adopt legislation providing additional 
sanctions. And we have already written them. We passed the bill in 
June, with 400 votes on this floor. We should have those sanctions--and 
I would think others--go into effect on June 1, unless Congress, in an 
expedited proceeding, passes a resolution saying, Hold off. We've seen 
enough progress. These sanctions don't need to go into force.
  Instead, and the other choice, we can do nothing on the theory that 
we will do the right thing in the last few days of July, as if Congress 
turns on a dime, as if the State Department has been unsuccessful in 
delaying, defeating, and diluting sanctions in the past. That, I think, 
would be a mistake.
  With that, I would point out that this deal calls for a rollback of 
sanctions that violates American law in a number of respects. It will 
not be the first time that an administration has refused to enforce the 
sanctions bills passed by Congress.
  I will say that from 2010 through 2013 this administration has done a 
much better job of enforcing such legislation than either of the prior 
two administrations. But as a technical matter, the administration has 
agreed to waive that which the law does not allow it to waive, 
particularly section 504. And I will go into the details in some other 
forum.
  Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman for his insight and for his 
leadership on this important issue, and particularly his highlighting 
that the timing, Mr. Speaker, is an illusion, as the gentleman said, to 
think this all turns on a dime on the 1st of June.
  With that, I would like to yield to the gentleman from North Carolina 
(Mr. Hudson).
  Mr. HUDSON. Mr. Speaker, the nuclear deal agreed upon with Iran is 
shameful. There is no better example of this than Iran's announcement 
just days after the agreement was reached to open a new nuclear weapon 
plant that is not even subject to IAEA inspection.
  Any nuclear deal must include swift and decisive action that forces 
Iran to completely abandon its crusade to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability. We must not give a dangerous regime with a penchant for 
terrorism and extremism the capability to build a weapon before the 
world can react.
  A nuclear-equipped Iran is the most dangerous threat to Israel, the 
world, and to the stability of the Middle East. Indeed, with a nuclear 
weapons capability, Iran is a direct threat to the United States.
  Mr. Speaker, negotiations like this require serious discussions about 
our foreign policy in the Middle East, not a reckless decision by 
President Obama that weakens our national security, threatens our 
allies, and lacks the support of this Congress and, frankly, the 
American people.
  Reducing sanctions now merely rewards bad behavior and fundamentally 
halts the progress we have already made. Indeed, instead of reducing 
our influence and taking steps backward, we must pursue every avenue to 
ensure that Iran does not engage in nuclear weapons proliferation and, 
most importantly, does not develop a nuclear weapon.
  The only suitable agreement is one that starts with Iran ending their 
uranium enrichment program; otherwise, we should not loosen sanctions 
on this bad actor.
  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. 
Lamborn).
  Mr. LAMBORN. I thank Representative Peter Roskam, a leader on the 
U.S.-Israel relationship here in Congress. He and I are two of the 
cochairs of the Republican Israel Caucus.
  I share with many colleagues on both sides of the aisle deep concern 
over the interim agreement that this administration has reached with 
Iran over its nuclear program. We have struck a deal that irreversibly 
weakens sanctions against a country that is infamous for deception and 
deceit--a deal that does nothing about the infrastructure of its 
nuclear program.
  In the weeks since the accord was announced, we already see the first 
signs of how these sanctions--which are what brought Iran to the 
negotiating table in the first place--are being eroded by other 
countries eager to resume trade with Iran, as many of us predicted.
  Weakening the sanctions now without demanding that Iran dismantle its 
nuclear program takes away our leverage. They have not stopped a single 
one of its 19,000 centrifuges from enriching uranium. They are not 
dismantling their plutonium plant either, a plant which has absolutely 
no peaceful civilian purpose.
  We are witnessing a recurrence of the kind of effort that failed to 
prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, but in an even more 
volatile and dangerous region of the world. All this is being done with 
a country that our own State Department has long defined as the chief 
state sponsor of international terrorism and which is determined to get 
nuclear weapons.
  By giving up our leverage in return for a flawed interim agreement, 
we are only reducing the chances that a productive accord can ever be 
reached with Iran over its nuclear program where Iran actually 
renounces its right to enrich uranium.
  Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Rodney 
Davis).
  Mr. RODNEY DAVIS of Illinois. Thank you to my good friend and 
colleague from the great State of Illinois (Mr. Roskam) for leading 
this Special Order on a very important subject.
  We have concerns. We should have concerns over a deal with Iran, 
especially as Americans. It wasn't too long ago that President Clinton 
told us that North Korea would abide by a similar deal. They agreed to 
stop their nuclear ambitions in order to get sanctions lifted and get 
billions in aid from the United States. But they went ahead and 
secretly continued their program. I caution this administration and the 
American people to make sure that this doesn't happen again with Iran.
  This interim deal allows Iran to continue enriching uranium to the 5 
percent purity level and to keep building new centrifuges to repair old 
ones. It

[[Page H7495]]

calls for Iran to convert 20 percent of enriched uranium either to fuel 
or to a diluted 5 percent stock. But these processes can easily be 
reversed, especially since this interim deal does not force Iran to 
disassemble the infrastructure that allowed it to produce enriched 
uranium in the first place.

  A nuclear Iran is a grave danger to our friend and greatest ally in 
the Middle East, the State of Israel; the rest of our allies throughout 
the world; and our own American foreign policy interests. As Henry 
Kissinger noted in The Wall Street Journal:

       The heart of the problem is Iran's construction of massive 
     nuclear infrastructure and stockpile of enriched uranium far 
     out of proportion to any plausible civilian energy 
     production.

  I am very concerned that this interim deal does not address the 
issues at hand.
  Furthermore, easing sanctions as part of the interim deal causes us 
to lose leverage at the negotiating table. As many of my colleagues 
have already mentioned, it is these sanctions that brought them to the 
negotiating table. We cannot lose sight of their effectiveness.
  I actually happen to agree with my colleagues here in the House, like 
Mr. Roskam, and my Senator, Mark Kirk, that we should increase 
sanctions. That would give us a stronger negotiating stance and draw 
more concessions from Iran.
  The world needs to be a much safer place for all of us. The only way 
to make it a safer place is to stop Iran's nuclear capabilities. Mr. 
Speaker, this deal does not do that.
  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I will yield to the gentleman from Arizona 
(Mr. Franks). As he is approaching the microphone, let me just make one 
point, and that is something that Mr. Davis just highlighted.
  Sanctions are working. Sanctions have brought the Iranians to the 
table. So think of it this way. You have got a hold of a pit bull. You 
have got it. It is a very dangerous animal and it is ferocious, and if 
you let go of it, it may come and attack you. Why in the world, if you 
have got it under control or under some semblance of control, would you 
say, ``You know what? Let's loosen our grip and try this again''?
  It doesn't make any sense.
  I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. I certainly thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, I would suggest there are two components to every threat 
in terms of national security that this country and other nations face. 
That first component is that of intent, and the second is that of 
capacity.
  If one listens to the rhetoric that the Iranian leaders have spoken 
in recent years, the intent issue should be settled clearly in our 
minds. The question that remains is their capacity.
  I would suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that if, indeed, Iran gains a 
nuclear weapons capability, the world will step into the shadow of 
nuclear terrorism. Terrorists the world over will have indirect access 
to nuclear weapons. My children and those of the Members in this body 
will face a forever future that is uncertain every step they take.
  Mr. Speaker, about 8 years ago, I stood here in this same spot and 
called for Iran to be referred to the Security Council. At that time, 
they had only 160 centrifuges. Of course, the call for them to be 
referred to the Security Council was diminished in that people said 
they needed 3,000 centrifuges for a full-blown nuclear weapons program. 
Today, Mr. Speaker, Iran has 19,000 centrifuges. Those centrifuges will 
continue to spin--most of them--under this agreement that the President 
has announced.
  This agreement the President has announced ignores not only U.S. law, 
but ignores the UN sanctions that are in place. It also ignores the 
fact that Iran has not made any concessions in this area in the last 30 
years. It also ignores the position that this deal puts Israel in--one 
that is untenable and more impossible than any I have seen in my 
lifetime.
  The naivete of this administration in dealing with Iran is something 
that is simply breathtaking.
  Mr. Speaker, I would just suggest to you that if Iran gains nuclear 
weapons, we will need a new calendar. It will change our reality in the 
world that much. And I would say to you that, while there is still 
time, we need to act.
  Mr. Speaker, there is that moment in the life of every problem when 
it is big enough to be seen and still small enough to be addressed, but 
in terms of Iran's nuclear weapons pursuit, that window is closing 
quickly. And whatever this body can do, whatever this President can do 
to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapons capability, must be 
done, because soon they will have the ability to ignore our entreaties 
and only a military intervention will prevent it.
  Mr. Speaker, whatever our cost is for preventing Iran from gaining 
nuclear weapons, it will pale in its significance compared to the cost 
of allowing Iran to become a nuclear-armed nation.
  Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, it is an amazing thing to think about how aggressive 
Iran has been without a nuclear weapon. It is a worldwide sponsor of 
terror, incredibly aggressive, and going after and making threats about 
the Strait of Hormuz and so forth. Can you even imagine what it would 
be like as a nation if it had a nuclear threat behind it? It would 
change the dynamic entirely.
  I think one of the weaknesses of the administration's proposed deal 
is this: it puts the imprimatur of approval on enrichment. Up until 
now, it has been American policy that says, You can't enrich. You have 
no right to a nuclear capability.
  And let's be frank. There is nobody with a straight face that is 
saying that the Iranians have any interest in pursuing nuclear 
technology because of an interest in global warming. This is not an 
energy pursuit at all. It is clearly a pursuit to manipulate the world 
stage toward their ends that are oftentimes driven by terror.
  One of the great advocates of a strong U.S.-Israeli relationship and 
one of the great advocates of a strong U.S. foreign policy is the 
gentlelady from Florida, former chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to whom I now yield.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank Mr. Roskam for his 
leadership in spearheading this discussion on the dangers of last 
month's interim nuclear agreement deal with Iran.
  As we have had more time to dissect this deal, it is becoming clearer 
and clearer that, despite Secretary Kerry's claim that no deal is 
better than a bad deal, we have been had.
  In exchange for the one thing that Iran so desperately needs--
sanctions relief to jump-start its flailing economy--the administration 
received nothing more than window dressing to stop Iran's nuclear 
program.
  This interim deal is the unraveling of the sanctions policy that was 
so painstakingly crafted over the past 10 years. It was aimed at 
bringing Iran's nuclear program to an end. We have already seen other 
nations eager to get back into the Iranian market, and it will now be 
nearly impossible to stop the cash infusion into the Iranian regime.

                              {time}  1745

  How can we stop this?
  This deal is contrary to U.S. sanctions law. It is contrary to U.N. 
Security Council resolutions that explicitly prohibit Iran from being 
able to enrich its own uranium.
  By accepting this deal, the administration has acquiesced to Iran's 
illegitimate claim to a right to enrich uranium, and it has done 
nothing to dismantle the nuclear infrastructure of Iran's. Any 
temporary pause in Iran's progress can now be easily started right up 
again with no real detriment to Tehran's march toward nuclear weapons 
capability.
  The administration has struck a deal with an Iranian regime that is 
one of the world's biggest supporters of terrorism and is a U.S.-
designated state sponsor of terrorism. It has offered sanctions relief 
to the very same man who only 10 years ago, while serving as the chief 
nuclear negotiator of Iran to the West, boasted of using deception to 
buy time for Iran's nuclear program to progress. Yet the administration 
has fallen for what I call the ``Rouhani ruse.''
  We have already seen Iran announce that it will continue construction 
on its plutonium plant at Arak, with some experts believing that Iran 
will exploit a possible loophole in the agreement to allow it to build 
important components

[[Page H7496]]

of this heavy water reactor off site; and we continue to see Iran make 
advances on other nuclear weapons programs not addressed in the interim 
agreement, such as the development of ballistic missile technology 
needed to launch a nuclear payload over long distances.
  Mr. Speaker, not only is this interim deal dangerous for the 
precedent that it sets--that rogue regimes will get rewarded at the 
expense of our friends and allies who do play by the rules--but the 
deal is also dangerous because it weakens our credibility and harms our 
relations with other countries.
  This sends a terrible message to other countries in the region that 
have long feared Iran becoming nuclear but have refrained from seeking 
their own nuclear programs because the United States had promised that 
we would not allow Iran to enrich uranium or to complete its heavy 
water reactor. This deal will create a loss of trust from other 
regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and others, who now see a double 
standard from the United States. Our closest friend and ally--the 
democratic Jewish State of Israel--continues to feel an existential 
threat from Iran.
  President Obama has weakened the trust and the credibility of the 
United States and, in exchange, has strengthened the legitimacy of the 
illegitimate Iranian regime. It is a double whammy--we lose stature 
while elevating a dangerous regime. And all for what--our ability to 
prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and an all-out arms race in the Middle 
East? It is not going to happen. We are going to see a nuclear-armed 
Iran, and we are going to see an all-out arms race in the Middle East. 
We have tarnished our relationships with our trusted allies.
  I remain committed, Mr. Speaker and Mr. Roskam, to ensuring that Iran 
never becomes a nuclear-capable country. I urge my colleagues in the 
Senate to take up the sanctions legislation that we in the House 
overwhelmingly passed earlier this year.
  Mr. Speaker, Iran has no right whatsoever to enrichment. There can be 
no ambiguity here. The United States must not accept any new deal with 
Iran that does not end Iran's enrichment program completely and that 
does not completely dismantle the nuclear infrastructure of this 
dangerous regime.
  I thank Mr. Roskam for his leadership, and we will continue to fight.
  Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentlelady.
  At this time, I would like to yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Weber).
  Mr. WEBER of Texas. I thank the gentleman from Illinois, our 
distinguished deputy whip.
  Mr. Speaker, this House disagrees on almost every issue brought 
before it. However, this is one issue on which this House agrees: we 
all agree that we must never allow a nuclear-armed Iran.
  Repeatedly, this Congress has passed resolutions condemning a nuclear 
Iran as well as having passed multiple pieces of legislation 
strengthening an Iranian sanctions policy in the hopes of halting their 
progress. A number of resolutions calling for sanctions, increased 
scrutiny and the cessation of enrichment have also passed the U.N. 
Security Council. Yet instead of tightening the sanctions policy--a 
policy which has forced Iran to the negotiations table in the first 
place--this administration seems hell-bent on easing those sanctions 
and on allowing the release of billions of dollars in assets and 
finances to Iran. Even more incredulous, we still don't have a 
finalized deal, much less even know the details of what they are 
planning.
  As a result of this administration's easement, Iran is already 
threatening an oil price war within OPEC, and companies around the 
world are jockeying to play in a country that still has no restrictions 
upon enrichment or upon nuclear weaponization. The terms of the so-
called ``deal,'' still under negotiation, allow Iran to continue 
enrichment, directly violating multiple U.N. resolutions, directly 
violating U.S. stated policy, and directly violating international 
stated policy.
  The Institute for Science and International Security recently 
published a report indicating that Iran was a mere few months away from 
reaching that nuclear threshold. However, this administration's 
negotiations do nothing regarding dismantling systems obviously aimed 
at weaponization. They do nothing regarding the removal of uranium 
enriched beyond civilian needs. They do nothing regarding work on 
delivery systems or ballistic missiles, and they do nothing to stop the 
enrichment currently taking place. In essence, Iran has received 
everything it has wanted, and we have gotten nothing. Christmas has 
come early in Iran.
  The Iranian Government, Mr. Speaker, is not to be trusted. It has 
been demonstrated time and time again. If we intend to keep our country 
safe and strong, we cannot grant concessions without first verifying 
behavioral changes from politically unstable countries like Iran. We 
tried that tact, Mr. Speaker, in North Korea. How has that been working 
for us?
  Members of Congress should refuse to stay silent on this issue. It is 
time for the Senate to step up to the plate and pass the Nuclear Iran 
Prevention Act. It is way past time for our administration and our 
negotiators to take a hard-line stand against this evil.
  Here is a plan to do that. Let's demand some action. I will give you 
seven things:
  (1) Demand that Iran stops human rights violations and releases all 
political hostages, including Americans like Pastor Saeed Abedini, 
former U.S. marine Amir Hekmati, and ex-FBI agent Robert Levinson;
  (2) Stop the exportation of terrorism and renounce terrorism;
  (3) Stop all the centrifuges; destroy them; and allow unlimited 
access from the IAEA;
  (4) Publicly apologize to America and Israel for calling them the 
large and small Satan;
  (5) Recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state;
  (6) Withdraw from Syria if they want to prove that Iran is serious.
  (7) Wait a year to show the world they are serious, and perform those 
six functions. We want action, Mr. Speaker, not promises.
  As former Senator Phil Gramm once stated:

       If the lion is going to lie down with the lamb, then we 
     want America to be the lion.

  We want to use our strength, to show our strength, to negotiate from 
a position of strength. To do anything else may make Israel the 
sacrificial lamb. This current administration needs to understand that 
this deal is a bad deal.
  I am Randy Weber, and there you have it.
  Mr. ROSKAM. I thank the gentleman for his insight and for his 
perspective and for his admonition for action.
  Mr. Speaker, at this point, I would like to yield to the gentlelady 
from Indiana (Mrs. Walorski), a member of the Armed Services Committee.
  Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Roskam, for your leadership on the 
issue and for the opportunity to speak about this issue tonight.
  Mr. Speaker, in his State of the Union address on January 24, 2012, 
President Barack Obama said:

       Let there be no doubt: America is determined to prevent 
     Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no 
     options off the table to achieve that goal.

  On March 4, 2012, President Obama again stated his desire to prevent 
a nuclear-armed Iran. He said:

       Iran's leaders should understand that I do not have a 
     policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from 
     obtaining a nuclear weapon.

  On October 22, 2012, President Obama said of Iran:

       The clock is ticking . . . and we are going to make sure 
     that, if they do not meet the demands of the international 
     community, then we are going to take all options necessary to 
     make sure they don't have a nuclear weapon.

  Fourteen months later, the clock is still ticking, and Iran is now 
closer to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
  Now that world leaders have reached an interim agreement on Iran's 
illegal nuclear program, we must be able to verify compliance and 
demand that any final deal completely dismantle Tehran's existing 
nuclear program.
  There are three reasons this is imperative and for the international 
community to demand the suspension of nuclear enrichment:
  First, Tehran must stop all enrichment activities because Iran is in 
noncompliance with the highest form of international law:
  Iran is in direct violation of mandatory U.N. Security Council 
resolutions demanding them to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing. 
By not requiring Iran to abide by multiple U.N. resolutions, we are 
rewarding bad behavior.

[[Page H7497]]

We are signaling to the entire world that we are not serious about 
preventing the spread of nuclear weaponry;
  Second, a nuclear-armed Iran threatens our national security. The 
threat of a nuclear-armed Iran is not something that is just talked 
about in the Halls of this Congress. Every time I am home, I hear the 
fears of Hoosiers who worry about how acts of terrorism might impact 
gas prices, food prices, and the well-being of loved ones. Since 1984, 
our government has designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. The 
State Department has characterized Iran as the ``most active state 
sponsor of terrorism'' in the world. Iran has provided weapons, 
training and funding to terrorist groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah 
and Shiite militias in Iraq, who are responsible for the murders of 
hundreds of U.S. servicemembers and innocent civilians;
  Third, a nuclear-armed Iran threatens to further destabilize an 
already volatile region: If Iran is allowed to further pursue its 
nuclear ambitions, the region--highlighted by perpetual conflict in 
places like Iraq, Syria and Yemen--will become more destabilized. 
Furthermore, a nuclear-armed Iran will jeopardize the safety of our 
allies and partners in the region, like Israel.
  I believe--now more than ever--the United States must renew our 
unbreakable commitment to Israel and her inherent right to self-
defense.
  Iran's continued violation of U.N. and International Atomic Energy 
Agency restrictions have only given the world good reason to question 
Iran's willingness to abide by any future international agreement.
  Mr. Roskam and Mr. Speaker, I call on the President to remember his 
words to the American people about preventing Tehran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon, and I urge the President to use all tools at his 
disposal, including additional sanctions, to persuade Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons.
  Mr. ROSKAM. Thank you, Mrs. Walorski.
  Mr. Speaker, at this point, I would like to yield to the gentlelady 
from Minnesota (Mrs. Bachmann), a member of the House Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mrs. BACHMANN. Mr. Speaker, I want to say thank you to my colleague, 
Peter Roskam. We came in together when we won our election in 2006. It 
has been a privilege to serve with Mr. Roskam, who is not only the head 
and cochair of the Israel Caucus but who is also a strong defender of a 
strong United States national security posture--one that has helped to 
lead the world into safety for decades and one that we continue to 
maintain for the benefit of the American people.

                              {time}  1800

  You see, this is a very interesting time that we are in. We have 
virtually watched the hinge of history turn just in the events of these 
last several weeks.
  Why do I say that? I say that because the Obama administration and 
the negotiators of the Obama administration have entered into a deal 
that could effectively guarantee that Iran will obtain the certainty of 
a nuclear weapon. Now, I know that it is the stated intention of the 
Obama administration that just the opposite of that will happen, but 
there is a big difference between theory and intention and the outcome 
of the result.
  Today, we listened to members from the Obama administration and 
members of the negotiating team from the Obama administration, and they 
seem quite convinced in the theory of stopping Iran from obtaining a 
nuclear weapon. The theory goes something like this. It says we believe 
that Iran has the capacity to continue to enrich uranium and do it for 
a peaceful purpose. They believe that it is possible to verify that 
Iran would do that.
  But what about the reality? What is the reality of what the supreme 
leader of Iran has said their intentions are with this program? Just 
prior to the signing of the agreement, the supreme leader was not 
vague; he was quite clear. He gave a speech on press TV. He wanted the 
world to know what his intentions were. He gave a speech in front of 
tens of thousands of paramilitary troops in the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard. He said that ``it will be Iran's position that we will not 
change our nuclear program one iota.'' So apparently, according to the 
supreme leader, the program that Iran has originally envisioned it will 
go on. ``It will go on at the same pace that it was going on before 
without any change.''
  Once the agreement was struck, there was a real question, and the 
question was this: Will Iran maintain the indigenous inherent ``right'' 
to enrich uranium? You see, that is the whole ball game, Mr. Speaker: 
Will Iran have the right to enrich uranium?
  What do you need to build a nuclear weapon? You need fuel for that 
weapon, whether it is plutonium or whether it is uranium. Iran wants to 
make sure that they achieve the goal, so they are engaging both in 
developing plutonium and uranium. They have a heavy water reactor, the 
Iraq facility, and the Iraq facility is under construction. We have a 
6-month interim agreement where we are supposed to get to a final 
negotiation. The plutonium facility is not built yet, but it is under 
construction.
  One of those items is building a road to the reactor. That road 
continues to be built. There is no effort to stop that from being done. 
There is virtually no way for us to be able to stop mobile components 
from being built elsewhere and eventually brought into the heavy water 
reactor for the plutonium site. That is an issue. That is a big issue, 
and the other one being enrichment.
  We know today that Iran has something like 19,000 centrifuges. A 
minimum 10,000 of those centrifuges are spinning, so much so that the 
estimate is they have somewhere between 9 and 10 tons of enriched 
uranium.
  If we were serious about stopping Iran from creating a nuclear 
weapon, there are several simple things we would do. We would make sure 
that Iran would shut down the heavy water plutonium reactor and we 
would make sure that Iran would dismantle, take a sledgehammer to the 
centrifuges. Gone. That hasn't happened. Not to one. The centrifuges 
remain. So if you have centrifuges enriching, if you have enriched 
uranium, if you are continuing to enrich, I would say you have got a 
program.
  This is very interesting because we just concluded a negotiation. 
From my experience as a former Federal tax litigation attorney--I did a 
lot of negotiating--usually when two sides are negotiating, they do it 
for a reason, and the reason is because they want to be better off, 
both parties, they want to be better off based upon the agreement that 
they negotiated. It seems to me something happened along the way during 
this negotiation. It makes me wonder if the Obama administration 
negotiators forgot which side they were negotiating for.
  Why do I say that? I say that because take a look at what Iran got 
out of the deal. And I want to give full attribution to Illinois 
Senator Mark Kirk, who created this terrific graphic. This is what 
Senator Kirk let's us know about the agreement.
  What we are getting out of the deal are zero centrifuges dismantled. 
These are the machines that create the fuel for a nuclear weapon. Not 
one will be dismantled out of 19,000. Zero uranium of the 9 to 10 tons 
will be shipped out of Iran. So the material remains in Iran. The 
ability to continue to create more material remains in Iran. It looks 
like a pretty good get for Iran.
  Zero nuclear facilities are closed. We know that there is even more 
than we thought originally. There is Natanz, there is Fordo, Parchin, 
and the plutonium reactor at Iraq, let alone other covert programs we 
are not aware of. There is also no delay on the plutonium reactor. In 
fact, the supreme leader in Iran made it abundantly clear. They said, 
we read the agreement to say that we are not going to stop any 
construction on the plutonium Iraq reactor. I would say that is a 
violation of the agreement right there.
  What has been the reaction of the Obama administration? What has been 
the reaction of the negotiators? Do they have egg on their faces? Do 
they look a little foolish from this agreement that they struck? We 
haven't heard anything from the current negotiators.
  There is also no stop in the missile testing. So if Iran has a 
nuclear weapon, if they have the fuel for a nuclear weapon, and if they 
have the capability to deliver that weapon through missile testing, I 
would say they have got something. There is also no stopping terrorism 
from Iran and there is no stopping human rights abuses.

[[Page H7498]]

  Many Americans aren't aware that there are Americans who are being 
held hostage today in Iran. When Ronald Reagan dealt with the Soviet 
Union to try to end the Cold War, Ronald Reagan handed the Soviets a 
list of dissidents that he wanted freed in order for him to begin these 
talks with the Soviet Union. He sent a signal to the Soviet Union. It 
said, in America we believe every American life counts. That sent a 
very strong message.
  In the case of the Obama administration negotiators, they didn't even 
bring it up. They didn't demand that one American be released before we 
talk. Now, this is interesting because the Obama administration put a 
lot of pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel. He said, You, 
Mr. Prime Minister, have to agree to release over 100 murderous thugs, 
including murderers who murdered an American, before the Palestinians 
will come to the table to negotiate with you on the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict. That was our President who put pressure under the prime 
minister--you have got to release thugs in order to negotiate. We would 
put that kind of pressure on Israel and we wouldn't put that kind of 
pressure on Iran?
  You see, that is why, Mr. Speaker, I ask the question: Did the 
negotiators forget which Nation they were negotiating for? Because it 
looks to me like the score is pretty clear: United States zero, Iran 
made out on the deal.
  The sad thing about that final score--and let's hope it is not the 
final score--is that, again, the hinge of history turns. If you have an 
Iran with a nuclear weapon, it won't be just Iran. You will explode 
proliferation. Saudi Arabia will have a nuclear weapon. Egypt will have 
a nuclear weapon. We will have a nuclear weapon most likely in Lebanon. 
And then at that point, what will happen with terrorist organizations 
like Hezbollah, al Qaeda, the al-Nusra Front, and on and on from there? 
The world changes. The hinge of history turns.

  That is why this isn't political. That is why it is bipartisan here 
tonight. It is why Mr. Roskam has taken this very important courageous 
step of holding this time when Members of Congress can weigh in, 
because we aren't about bashing the Obama administration. That is not 
why we are here. We are here because we believe in national security--
America's national security, Israel's national security--and peace 
across the world. That is Pax Americana. America doing everything that 
we can to be forward of keeping the peace in the world.
  This action nearly guarantees war and a threat of a nuclear strike. 
We can prevent that. But the final deal that comes out in these final 
P5+1 negotiations must be very simple: close down the plutonium 
reactor, zero right to enrich for Iran, and zero processing. If you do 
that, then we will have a deal.
  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, we have had a discussion tonight that has 
been incredibly robust. It has been bipartisan. We have had insight 
from members of the Intelligence Committee, the Armed Services 
Committee, Members who have had a long-term interest in Middle Eastern 
affairs and American military affairs, all of whom, Mr. Speaker, have a 
clear view of history. A clear view of history says let's look back at 
past activities as the best indicator of what the future is going to be 
like.
  In summary, Mr. Speaker, what we know is this. That the 
administration has struck a bad deal, maybe for all the right reasons, 
but they have struck a bad deal. It is the responsibility of Congress 
not to put its imprimatur of support on a bad deal, but to act as a 
coequal branch of government and say, We ought not do this. We have got 
to recognize the weakness of it. We have got to recognize the long-term 
consequences of it, and we have got to hold this administration 
accountable.
  I yield back the balance of my time.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on 
the subject of the Special Order today.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Speaker, a few weeks ago, we learned that the Obama 
Administration, along with representatives of the so-called P5+1 
countries, had reached an agreement with Iran on freezing nuclear 
enrichment and relieving a portion of the sanctions that have been 
rightfully levied against Iran.
  I think it is a positive step to have engaged Iran and to have 
reached a multilateral agreement. Certainly, freezing their nuclear 
enrichment, diluting the enrichment levels of Iran's uranium stocks, 
and reestablishing intrusive IAEA inspections are improvements over the 
current situation.
  However, while I appreciate the need for a course of action that 
addresses the threat of a nuclear armed Iran, I maintain strong 
concerns about this agreement.
  Foremost, I have serious doubts about the amount of trust we can 
extend to Iran. Engaging in negotiations that merely freeze their 
nuclear enrichment is a far cry from Iran foreswearing nuclear weapons, 
not to mention their abhorrent support for terrorism in Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon and beyond. We must recall that this is the same fundamentalist 
regime that has supported the murder of Israelis in Argentina, has cast 
doubt on the existence of the Holocaust, and that enabled attacks on 
American military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  Amazingly, despite the supposed goodwill of the agreement, three 
Americans continue to be detained in Iran. I find it extremely 
regrettable that the release of these Americans--Pastor Saeed Abedini, 
former U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati and ex-FBI Agent Robert Levinson--was 
considered marginal to the nuclear issue, and could not be addressed 
simultaneously while negotiations occurred in Geneva. These Americans' 
families are understandably left in pain as they wonder about their 
loved ones' welfare, and what it will ultimately take to get them home. 
This speaks volumes about the intents and reputability of the Iranian 
regime--how can we trust a government to follow through on an agreement 
about nuclear issues when they continue to hold our citizens captive?
  I am also very concerned about the implicit acceptance, if not 
endorsement, of Iran's right to enrich uranium. Numerous United Nations 
Security Council resolutions have stipulated that Iran must stop 
enrichment and set-aside its nuclear program. Yet, somehow, this 
agreement falls short of that previously established UN mandate. While 
it may be acknowledging the nuclear capacity that Iran has achieved, I 
cannot accept that.
  It is unclear to me what peaceful need Iran has for uranium 
enrichment. There are international offers on the table to develop and 
fuel nuclear power plants and to provide medically necessary isotopes 
for Iran, in order to eliminate their purported need for indigenous 
nuclear capability. But Iran would prefer to deny those offers, and use 
the ruse of power and medicine to enable its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.
  This agreement even allows Iran to maintain the facilities, 
centrifuges and basic stockpiles that have enabled their nuclear 
pursuits. Remarkably, the Iranian military facility at Parchin, where 
research on a nuclear weapon has been widely suspected, is not included 
in the inspection program and imposes no restrictions on activities at 
this site.
  Though the opportunity to use these implements may be forestalled for 
now, should a subsequent agreement not materialize, Iran could return 
to its current nuclear capacity in short order, and have billions of 
dollars' worth of sanctions relief in hand, with little long-term 
benefit to show from this short-term accord.
  Yet, an agreement has been reached and we have to accept that as the 
reality at the moment. Nonetheless, I think it is important for the 
U.S. Congress to continue to pursue new sanctions that are contingent 
on Iran's absolute adherence to this agreement, and earnest engagement 
towards a deeper, longer-term agreement that further removes Iran's 
nuclear capacity. We must make clear that there will be swift and 
severe consequences should Iran deviate from the agreement. And, we 
must continue to aggressively counter their terrorism threat, meddling 
in the security affairs of the region, and abuse of human and religious 
rights.
  We must maintain a strong posture towards the Iranian regime, as they 
have done nothing to earn the trust of the United States, or the 
western world in general. Iran remains a threat to regional and global 
security, and we must not neglect or forget that.
  Implementing this agreement and pursuing any longer-term accord must 
be done with open eyes to the real threat that Iran has been and 
continues to be.

                          ____________________