[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 152 (Tuesday, October 29, 2013)]
[House]
[Pages H6831-H6832]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          BUILDING A NEW MIDDLE EAST--THE WORK OF A GENERATION

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Schiff) for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, for nearly 3 years, the Arab Middle East, an 
enormous arc stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, has been 
in turmoil. Restive millions, frustrated by a lack of economic 
opportunity, repressive politics, and a social structure often at odds 
with modernity, have taken to the streets demanding change. Their 
revolution hangs in the balance with the entrenched interests of the 
former regimes on one side and the stultifying religious rule on the 
other.
  Faced with these daunting realities, the Obama administration may be 
in the midst of a strategic reevaluation of our role in the region--one 
that is far more modest in ambition, more tempered in expectation, and 
certainly more reliant on the use of its diplomatic, not military, 
resources.
  This new approach stands in stark contrast to the effort by the 
George W. Bush administration to deliver a ``freedom agenda''--
sometimes through the barrel of a gun--that would bring democracy to a 
region that has known mostly misrule. That doctrine, or its 
application, proved entirely unworkable, as the societies freed of 
their authoritarian shackles had nothing upon which to build. This is a 
lesson we may be bitterly learning in Libya as well.
  These setbacks and the realization that democracy building is a 
generational undertaking must not lead us to disengage from the region. 
The forces freed by the Arab Spring will not be contained, and I still 
believe they can lead hundreds of millions of people to more 
representative forms of government, more economic opportunity, and, we 
must hope, more tranquility and peace within their borders.
  The United States needs to help build institutions capable of 
supporting a transition in the Arab world in three dimensions: 
political, economic, and civil society. Unmet economic needs are the 
most pressing. At its heart, the Arab Spring is the expression of 
discontent of millions of idle, young Arabs, who have seen the economic 
opportunities that the outside world offers, but whose own economic 
realities are plagued by stagnation, mismanagement, and cronyism.
  The cure is not outright assistance, which will do little to unleash 
or occupy long-term energies of Arab youth. It is investment that will 
allow this generation of Arabs to drag inefficient, antiquated, and 
highly statist economies in the 21st century. Since the ouster of Ben 
Ali and Mubarak, I have pushed for the creation of enterprise funds and 
other nimble vehicles that will allow us to direct resources at 
specific sectors that can help to drive economic growth, as well as 
improve the quality of life for ordinary people.
  In coming years, these economies will need to produce sufficient jobs 
and wealth to both sustain workers and their families and to provide 
the economic conditions for sustainable political stability. But that 
cannot be an excuse to put off political reform now, because capital 
flows will not resume until investors have some confidence that their 
money is safe.
  The experience of both Egypt and Tunisia serve to reinforce the 
inchoate nature of their political transitions. Both countries emerged 
from their respective revolutions with energized Islamist movements 
that were able to triumph over less well-organized secular parties--in 
large measure because the old governments had atomized their opposition 
and left political Islamist governments as the only viable alternative. 
In both countries, this experiment failed as a result of overreaching 
and a misreading of the people's wishes--a development that should ease 
the fears of those who saw a ``green wave'' sweeping across the Middle 
East.
  The dysfunction in both Cairo and Tunis, and the Egyptian military 
deposing of President Mohammed Morsi in a coup, are a reminder that a 
democratic outcome is never assured or to be assumed. The United States 
must stand ready to assist Arab nations with the long-term institution-
building and political spadework that are necessary preconditions for 
democracy.
  In Tunisia, which is small, relatively prosperous, and not nearly as 
divided as some of its larger neighbors, prospects for a peaceful 
transition and

[[Page H6832]]

transfer of power from the current Islamist government to a 
technocratic government that would oversee elections are alive, if not 
entirely well. But while a framework for the installation of a 
caretaker government remains, squabbling between the Islamists and the 
secular opposition has slowed the process and reintroduced uncertainty 
into Tunisia's fragile politics.
  Political institution-building and creating a culture of good 
governance will require targeted assistance, training programs, and a 
lot of patience. Egypt and Tunisia may be a mess now but 10 years from 
now will not be the same as they are today, and we can play a role in 
helping to shape that future.
  Think of some of the other countries that have democratized in recent 
years in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The transitions have 
not been quick or smooth, and many of them are still ongoing. Amid the 
euphoria that accompanied the collapse of the Communist bloc in Eastern 
Europe, we were tempted to believe we were all witnesses to the ``end 
of history,'' as one academic put it.
  The reality has been far messier vestiges of communist oppression 
still remain throughout the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
  These experiences hold an important lesson for the Arab states--that 
persistence pays and that democracy is possible, even where it had not 
existed previously. The United States must support these transitions, 
and we must be willing to use financial inducements and other levers to 
steer their political development in a direction that will best serve 
the Arab peoples and preserve regional and global peace. The partial 
cutoff of military aid to Egypt and the broader conversation it has 
sparked about how best to configure assistance may presage a new 
diplomatic strategy that is less reliant on military relationships 
devoted to the status quo and more supportive of civil society, 
economic and political reform.
  This leads to the third area where the United States can play an 
important role--in trying to support the transition of Arab civil 
society from one that was imposed from above to one driven primarily by 
the needs and interests of its people. Free expression, women's 
empowerment and respect for minority groups are essential to the growth 
of democracy. Focusing assistance to groups in these areas can help to 
broaden the constituency for change and also give the young and 
disaffected an alternative to jihad.
  Today's Arab twentysomethings face even greater challenges than the 
Europeans of 1990s. But President George H.W. Bush and his successor, 
Bill Clinton, both understood that the investment in Eastern Europe was 
one that would pay dividends for decades. They were right and it has. I 
believe that we have a similar opportunity to help the Arab people. It 
will take longer and there will be setbacks. But the alternative is to 
watch a generation succumb to despair--a despair that is likely to have 
negative consequences for us and for our allies. I prefer to bet on 
hope and work for change.

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