[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 122 (Tuesday, September 17, 2013)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6482-S6483]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 SYRIA

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I come to the floor this morning to discuss 
another senseless act of violence and our Nation's response.
  In the early morning hours of August 21, the Syrian military began 
firing artillery rockets into the suburbs east of Damascus, hitting 
neighborhoods held by opposition forces that had been fighting to end 
the brutal dictatorship of Bashar al Assad.
  We know from the accounts of independent observers such as Human 
Rights Watch, the work of our intelligence services, and those of our 
allies, that many of these rockets were armed with warheads carrying 
sarin, a deadly nerve gas. We know these rockets were launched from 
areas under the control of Assad's regime, using munitions known to be 
part of Assad's arsenal, and into areas held by opposition forces. We 
know from the report of the U.N. weapons inspectors released yesterday 
that the weapons used, both the rockets and the chemicals themselves, 
were of professional manufacture, including weapons known to be in the 
Syrian Government's arsenal. There is no other source of this deadly 
gas except the Syrian Government. Nothing else makes any sense 
whatsoever.
  President Obama declared that the United States would act in response 
to this threat to global security. He determined it was necessary to 
use American military force to degrade Assad's chemical capability and 
deter future use of such weapons by Assad or others. He did so because 
a failure to act would weaken the international prohibition on chemical 
weapons use. He did so because the failure to act could lead to greater 
proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction, including the 
potential that they could fall into the hands of terrorists and used 
against our people. He did so because if the use of chemical weapons 
becomes routine, our troops could pay a huge price in future conflicts.
  On September 4, a bipartisan majority of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee approved the President's request for an authorization of the 
limited use of military force.
  Faced with this credible threat of the use of force and in response 
to a diplomatic probe by Secretary Kerry, Russia--which had for more 
than 2 years blocked every diplomatic initiative to hold Assad 
accountable for the violent repression of his people--announced that 
Assad's chemical arsenal should be eliminated.
  The agreement that followed requires Syria to give up its chemical 
arsenal on a historically rapid timetable.
  Within a week Syria must fully account for its chemical weapons 
stockpiles and infrastructure. By the end of November, U.N. inspectors 
must be allowed to complete their assessments and key equipment used to 
produce chemical agents must be destroyed. All of Syria's chemical 
stocks, materials and equipment must be destroyed by the end of next 
year.
  Any failure to abide by the terms of the agreement would lead to 
consideration of penalties under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, under 
which the U.N. Security Council may authorize among other steps 
``action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.'' Regardless of U.N. action 
or inaction, the President retains the option of using force if Assad 
fails to fully comply.
  This agreement is a significant step toward a goal we could not have 
achieved with the use of force. The authorization approved by the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee had the stated purpose of degrading 
Assad's chemical capability and deterring the use of chemical weapons 
by Assad or by others. What can now be achieved is more than degrading 
and deterring. We may be able to eliminate one of the world's largest 
stockpiles of chemical weapons.
  We should have no illusions that achieving this outcome will be easy. 
First are the technical and logistical challenges. Many have expressed 
concern about the likelihood that Assad's stockpiles can be secured and 
disposed of as quickly as this agreement provides--by the end of 2014--
especially given the dangerous security environment in Syria. I share 
these concerns. But accepting and addressing these challenges is a 
better course than not acting against the certain danger of leaving 
these weapons in the hands of a brutal dictator allied with Hezbollah, 
a dictator who has demonstrated a willingness to use them against 
civilians.
  Some have expressed doubts that Assad and Russia will follow through 
on the agreement which was reached in Geneva. To address these doubts, 
we must inspect, verify, and continue to hold open the option of a 
strike against Assad's chemical capability if he fails to fully abide 
by the Geneva agreement.
  What I do not understand is why some of the same voices who called 
for the United States to get Russia to end its obstructionism now 
criticize the President for getting the Russians involved. I was 
disappointed to hear my Michigan colleague, Congressman Mike Rogers, 
make the irresponsible claim that this agreement amounts to ``being led 
by the nose'' by Russia. This contradicts his previous statements that 
we need to put pressure on Russia to get involved in a solution to the 
Syrian threat.
  Chairman Rogers has also said: ``What keeps me up at night: We know 
of at least a dozen or so sites that have serious chemical weapons 
caches'' in Syria, and stressed the urgency that ``all the right steps 
are taken so that we don't lose these weapons caches and something more 
horrific happens.''
  Thanks to U.S. pressure and a threat to take military action in 
response to Assad's use of chemicals, the Russians are finally getting 
involved in getting Syria to respond. We have taken a major step toward 
securing these chemical weapons as Chairman Rogers himself so strongly 
urged.
  We need not rely on good intentions from those who have not shown 
good intentions in the past. It was the credible threat of the use of 
military force that brought Russia and Syria to the bargaining table. 
It is a continued credible threat of military force that will keep them 
on track to uphold the provisions of that agreement.
  The President has made it clear, and rightfully so, that ``if 
diplomacy fails, the United States remains prepared to act.''
  Secretary Kerry, standing right beside his Russian counterpart in 
Geneva, emphasized this agreement in no way limits President Obama's 
option to use force if it becomes necessary.
  Many of our colleagues have stressed repeatedly in recent weeks that 
the credible force, the credible threat of military force, is essential 
to reining in Assad. I strongly agree. For the life of me, I cannot 
understand why those who have taken that position would now argue, as 
some of those same colleagues are arguing, that the Geneva agreement is 
somehow of little or no

[[Page S6483]]

use because they say it somehow removes the option to use force. The 
Geneva agreement says nothing of that sort.
  Their argument isn't just inaccurate, it is damaging to our efforts. 
Why would those who believe the threat of force is essential to keeping 
pressure on Syria and Russia want to argue it is no longer available? 
Why would those who have accurately said the United States does not 
need international approval to use its military forces now argue the 
Geneva agreement leaves us in the position of needing to get 
international approval to use force in this case when the Geneva 
agreement does nothing of the sort?
  Some have criticized the Geneva agreement for not doing more to aid 
the Syrian opposition. Russia and Syria tried to get an agreement from 
us to not support the opposition, but they failed to get that agreement 
from us in the Geneva agreement or anywhere else. Indeed, the 
administration is seeking ways to facilitate the additional support for 
the opposition that so many of us believe is essential.
  I believe we should facilitate the provision of additional military 
aid to the opposition, particularly the vetted elements of Syria's 
opposition forces, including antitank weapons. Such aid will help the 
Syrian people defend themselves from the brutal Assad regime, 
furthering our goal of bringing a negotiated end to his rule.
  I find it troubling that so much of the commentary on this topic has 
not dealt with substance and policy. Washington has been and always 
will be a political town, but we now reach the point where politics 
seems to be the only lens through which so many people around here view 
the most important and serious matters of the day, including national 
security.
  Speculation as to motives, or about potential winners or losers, or 
who is up and who is down, misses the point. This is not an ice-skating 
contest with points awarded for style. What is important is our 
national security and whether this agreement advances it. Removing 
weapons of mass destruction from the hands of a brutal dictator--a 
preliminary outcome, yes, but real and tangible--is the direct result 
of American leadership.
  A month, a year, or 5 years ago, an agreement to eliminate Assad's 
chemical weapons would have been seen as a significant gain for our 
security and for the world's security, not just for the President who 
achieved it but far more importantly, again, for the safety of our 
people, of our troops, and the entire world.
  I hope as we continue with the hard work of implementing this 
agreement and as we seek an end to Bashar al Assad's rule, we can keep 
our eyes on those goals and skip the superficial political scorekeeping 
and inaccurate potshots that distract us from achieving those goals.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Schatz). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THUNE. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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