[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 119 (Wednesday, September 11, 2013)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6367-S6369]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SYRIA
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the decision on whether to authorize the
President of the United States to use the military might of our great
Nation against another country is the most significant vote a Senator
can cast. The Constitution vests this responsibility in Congress--a
duty that rests heavily on the shoulders of each and every Member.
We are now engaged in a serious debate about what the appropriate
response should be to the horrific use of
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chemical weapons by the regime of Syrian President Asad who killed his
own people using chemical weapons on August 21. This was not the first
use of chemical weapons by President Asad. He launched several smaller
scale attacks, murdering his citizens, and, notably, many, if not all,
of those attacks occurred after the President drew his redline a year
ago. But it was not until the large-scale August 21 attack of this
year, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 people, that
President Obama decided a military strike against Syria was warranted.
The fact is Asad violated the international convention prohibiting the
use of chemical weapons and crossed President Obama's redline many
times during the past year.
Deciding whether to grant the President this authority is a very
difficult decision. I have participated in numerous discussions with
the President, the Vice President, and experts in and out of
government. I have attended many classified briefings as a member of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and I have carefully
weighed the assessments of the intelligence community and military and
State Department officials. My constituents have also provided me with
valuable insights that have helped to guide my decision. After much
deliberation and thought, I have decided I cannot support the
resolution that was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
last week.
One of the criteria for the use of military force is surely whether
the adversary poses an imminent threat to the American people. More
than once President Obama has stated Syria's chemical weapons and
delivery systems do not pose a direct imminent threat to the United
States. Neither the United States nor any of our allies have been
attacked with chemical weapons. Instead, President Obama justifies the
attack he is proposing as a response to the violation of international
norms, despite the fact that we currently lack international partners
to enforce the Convention on Chemical Weapons through military means.
Although the term ``limited air strikes'' sounds less threatening,
the fact is even limited air strikes constitute an act of war. If bombs
were dropped from the air or cruise missiles were launched into an
American city, we would certainly consider that to be an act of war,
and that is why this decision is fraught with consequences.
American military strikes against the Asad regime, in my judgment,
risk entangling the United States in the middle of a protracted,
dangerous, and ugly civil war. GEN Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, has warned us that the use of U.S. military
force ``cannot resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious,
and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict.''
The introduction of American Armed Forces into this violent conflict
could escalate to the point where we are perceived to be, or actually
are, involved in a Syrian civil war or a proxy war with Hezbollah or
Iran.
In this complex conflict, it is also becoming increasingly difficult
to sort out the good guys from the bad. There is no doubt that Asad is
a brutal, ruthless dictator who murders his own citizens and who is
supported by thousands of Hezbollah terrorist fighters. The opposition,
however, is not pure. It has now been infiltrated by not one but two
affiliates of Al Qaeda as well as by criminal gangs. Caught in the
middle are millions of Syrians who simply want to lead peaceful lives.
The tragic result has been more than 100,000 people killed, 4 million
displaced internally, and 2 million refugees.
We do not know how Asad or his allies would respond to a U.S.
military attack, but an asymmetric attack by Hezbollah aimed at one of
our bases or at other American interests abroad certainly is one
potential response. My concern is that reprisals, followed by
subsequent retaliations, followed by still more reprisals could lead to
an escalation of violence which never was intended by the President but
which may well be the result of the first strike.
I have raised this issue directly with administration officials since
the ``one and done'' strike, as retired GEN Michael Hayden puts it, may
well not work. I have asked the administration what they would do if
Asad waits until the 91st day, when the authorization for the use of
military force expires, and then conducts an attack using chemical
weapons that kills a much smaller number of people. What will we do
then? In each case where I have raised this question, I have been told
that we would likely launch another military strike.
In addition to my concern about being dragged into the Syrian civil
war, I question whether the proposed military response would be more
effective in achieving the goal of eliminating Asad's stockpile of
chemical weapons than a diplomatic approach would be.
Let's be clear. The strikes proposed by the President would not
eliminate Asad's chemical weapons, nor his means of delivering them. In
the President's own words, the purpose of these strikes is ``to degrade
Asad's capabilities to deliver chemical weapons.'' Indeed, you will not
find any military or intelligence official who believes that the strike
contemplated by the administration would eliminate Syria's chemical
weapons stockpile or all of the delivery systems. General Dempsey wrote
to Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin that even if an
explicit military mission to secure Syria's chemical weapons were
undertaken, it would result in the control of ``some, but not all''
chemical weapons in Syria, and that is not what is being discussed
because that would undoubtedly involve boots on the ground.
According to the President, the purpose of his more narrow objective
is to deliver a calculated message to convince Asad not to use his
remaining chemical weapons and delivery systems ever again. But would
such a strike be effective in preventing Asad from using these weapons
again on a small scale after he has absorbed the strike just to deliver
his own message that he retains the capability to do so? Asad would
retain a sufficient quantity of chemical weapons, and he knows that we
did not respond to smaller chemical weapons attacks that he undertook
before the August 21, 2013, event.
So on the one hand, the President is seeking to conduct a precision
military strike that is sufficient to deter Asad from using any
chemical weapons again. On the other hand, he wants to narrow the scope
of a military strike so that Asad does not perceive this act of war as
a threat to his regime. Yet the President has previously stated that
U.S. policy is the removal of Asad.
While administration officials have gone out of their way to state
that the military strikes are only to deter and degrade Asad's chemical
weapons use and are not intended to pick sides in the civil war, the
text of the resolution before us is at odds with the administration's
representations. The text states that it is the policy of the United
States to ``change the momentum on the battlefield in Syria so as to
create favorable conditions for a negotiated settlement that ends the
conflict and leads to a democratic government in Syria.'' Well, no one
could ever consider the Asad dictatorship to be a democratic government
in Syria.
Furthermore, on September 3 Secretary of State John Kerry testified
that ``it is not insignificant that to deprive [Asad] of the capacity
to use chemical weapons or to degrade the capacity to use those
chemical weapons actually deprives him of a lethal weapon in this
ongoing civil war, and that has an impact.''
That is a very mixed message from this administration about the
purpose of these strikes.
All of us want to see a peaceful Syria, no longer led by Asad, nor
controlled by the radical Islamic extremists who are part of his
opposition. But is military action that could well get us involved in
Syria's civil war the right answer?
When I think about the proper response to Asad's abhorrent use of
chemical weapons, I am mindful of the suffering and death that has
occurred as well as the international conventions banning chemical
weapons. Since this is an international norm, however, where are our
international partners--the United Nations, NATO, the Arab League?
I have grave reservations about undertaking an act of war to enforce
an international convention without the international support we have
previously had when undertaking similar action in the past, such as in
Kosovo,
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Afghanistan, and even Iraq. While NATO's Secretary General has
expressed support for consequences, NATO's North Atlantic Council,
which is the body that approves military action for NATO, has not
approved this military action. The Arab League has condemned with words
the use of chemical weapons, but there is yet to be any Arab League
statement that explicitly endorses military action or promises to be
engaged in that action. Even our ally who has been most supportive,
France, has asked for a delay to allow the U.N. inspectors to deliver
their report next week.
Let me add that I believe that report early next week will verify
that it was the Asad regime that used sarin gas. That is my
expectation.
A military strike may well enforce the international norm with
respect to chemical weapons, but at the same time it would weaken the
international norm of limiting military action to instances of self-
defense or those cases where we have the support of the international
community or at least our allies in NATO or the Arab League.
In addressing this difficult and tragic crisis in Syria, the
administration initially presented us with only two choices: Take
military action or make no response at all. I reject and have rejected
from the start the notion that the United States has only two choices--
undertaking an act of war or doing nothing in response to President
Asad's attack on his citizens. There are a variety of nonmilitary
responses to consider that may well be more effective. The most
promising of these options, proposed by the Russians--one of Asad's
strongest allies--would place Syria's chemical weapons stockpile in the
custody of the international community before they would ultimately be
destroyed.
I am not naive about ``trusting'' the Russians. My point is that this
option may well be in Russia's own interests, would be more effective
in securing the stockpile of chemical weapons in Syria, and would
involve the international community. This diplomatic alternative would
put Syria's chemical weapons under verified international control and
would once and for all prevent Asad or anyone else in Syria from using
those weapons. A risk of attacking Asad's facilities is that the
chemical weapons could fall into the hands of terrorist elements in the
country. That risk would be eliminated if the weapons were removed
completely from Syria.
One of the arguments advanced by proponents of the authorization for
the use of military force resolution is that America's credibility is
on the line. This is a legitimate concern. To be sure, it was
unfortunate that the President drew a line in the sand without first
having a well-vetted plan, consulting with Congress, and obtaining the
necessary support for doing so. I would maintain, however, that the
credibility of our great Nation is beyond that of just one statement by
the President, even in his important capacity as Commander in Chief.
The credibility of the United States is backed by a military that is
the most advanced and capable in the world. The strength of our
military sends the clear, unmistakable message that the United States
is capable of exerting overwhelming force whenever we decide it is the
right thing to do and it is necessary to do so. It would be a mistake
for our adversaries to interpret a single vote regarding a military
response to Syria's chemical weapons program as having ramifications
for our willingness to use force when our country or our allies face
direct imminent threats, especially with regard to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.
At the very least we have an obligation to pursue all nonmilitary
options that may well be more effective in preventing the future use of
Asad's chemical weapons than the military option the President has
proposed to undertake.
For these reasons, should the authorization for the use of military
force approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee come to the
Senate floor, I shall cast my vote in opposition.
My hope, however, is that the negotiations underway with the Russians
will pave the way for the removal of chemical stockpiles from Syria and
for their verified ultimate destruction. That is the best outcome for
this crisis. That would lead to a safer world.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, I understand that Members can speak for
up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
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